Anti-SLAPP Law Cases - Case Law Summaries & Citings -

[audio t="00:00:10" autoplay="true" loop="true" mp3="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Fort-Minor-Remember-the-Name.mp3"][/audio] 2023–2025 Anti-SLAPP Update — Added October 2026 The alphabetical California Court of Appeal and Ninth Circuit lists below this section run through 2022. These are the published decisions since then that matter most to speakers, publishers, and citizens who report wrongdoing to government. A. Federal court — what changed in 2025 Gopher Media LLC v. Melone (9th Cir. en banc, Oct. 9, 2025) No. 24-2626. The full Ninth Circuit overruled Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018 and held that in federal court, a district judge's denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion is not immediately appealable. The court assumed the statute still applies in federal court, and the mandatory attorney-fee award to a prevailing defendant (CCP § 425.16(c)(1)) is unchanged. This rule applies only in federal court. In California state court, CCP § 425.16(i) still gives an immediate appeal of any order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion, and Varian Medical Systems v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 still stays the trial court while that appeal is pending. Note for the Ninth Circuit list below: Batzel v. Smith is overruled on appealability; DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures (2013) reaffirmed Batzel and is no longer good law on that point. B. California Supreme Court — suing back after an abusive lawsuit Escamilla v. Vannucci (Cal. Mar. 20, 2025) S282866. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and held that a malicious-prosecution claim brought by a non-client against the opposing party's attorney is governed by the general two-year limitations period (CCP § 335.1), not the one-year attorney-liability period of CCP § 340.6. Victims of a baseless lawsuit have two years, not one, to sue the lawyer who brought it. C. California Courts of Appeal — published, 2023–2024 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955 — Reversed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. The public-interest exception, CCP § 425.17(b), is construed narrowly; a plaintiff cannot escape the anti-SLAPP statute by labeling a suit a public-interest action when it seeks relief for itself. Simantob v. Akhtarzad (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1122 — A malicious-prosecution claim survived an anti-SLAPP motion; the court rejected the "interim adverse judgment rule" as a shield for the party who brought the earlier meritless case. Confirms that winning the underlying case and then suing the person who filed it remains a real remedy. Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005 — Malicious-prosecution claim against an attorney who filed a baseless action had the "minimal merit" needed to defeat the attorney's anti-SLAPP motion. Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953 — Social-media posts criticizing a land-use consultant over a development project were protected activity on an issue of public interest; the court analyzed each challenged post separately under Baral. Divine Food & Catering, LLC v. Western Diocese of the Armenian Church (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1048 — Statements made in connection with a pending dispute were protected; step two is a "summary-judgment-like procedure" in which the court does not weigh evidence. Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099 — An anti-SLAPP motion, like a conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a count as pleaded (Baral, p. 393). Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1117 — A "cause of action" under § 425.16(b)(1) means "allegations of protected activity asserted as grounds for relief"; the primary-right theory does not control anti-SLAPP analysis. Norman v. Ross (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1193 — Whatever a plaintiff calls the "target" of a cause of action, if protected speech or petitioning supplies an element of the claim, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show minimal merit. Bui v. Ngo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1061 — Two-step framework restated; the movant shows the act falls within one of the four categories in § 425.16(e), then the plaintiff must substantiate the claim with admissible evidence. Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361 — Movant's first-step duty: identify each allegation of protected activity and the claims it supports (Baral, p. 396). Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648 — Anti-SLAPP applies in family-law proceedings; Baral's step-two burden restated. San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State Univ. Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76 — The statute does not immunize anyone; it screens out meritless claims early so the speaker is not forced through costly litigation. D. Does a state anti-SLAPP law apply in federal court? The circuit split Yes: Ninth Circuit — U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1999) 190 F.3d 963; Gunn v. Drage (2023) 65 F.4th 1109; First Circuit — Godin v. Schencks (2010) 629 F.3d 79. No: Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group (D.C. Cir. 2015) 783 F.3d 1328; Los Lobos Renewable Power v. AmeriCulture (10th Cir. 2018) 885 F.3d 659; Carbone v. Cable News Network (11th Cir. 2018) 910 F.3d 1345; Klocke v. Watson (5th Cir. 2019) 936 F.3d 240; La Liberte v. Reid (2d Cir. 2020) 966 F.3d 79. No immediate appeal of a denial: Ernst v. Carrigan (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 116; Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic LLC (10th Cir. 2024) 98 F.4th 1320; Gopher Media v. Melone (9th Cir. en banc 2025). E. New York — press coverage of court cases and arrests is protected Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd. (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. Aug. 22, 2024) 232 A.D.3d 10. A CEO sued The Daily Mail over an article about his divorce, custody fight and five arrests. Held: a news site is a public forum; reporting on domestic-violence allegations, court proceedings and criminal charges is a matter of public interest (any subject "other than a purely private matter"); the fair-report privilege (Civil Rights Law § 74) protected the article; the plaintiff could not show a "substantial basis" for his claims; and the defendants were entitled to mandatory attorney fees under New York's 2020-amended anti-SLAPP law (Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a; CPLR 3211(g)). See also Gottwald v. Sebert (N.Y. 2023) 40 N.Y.3d 240 (fees available where a SLAPP was continued after Nov. 10, 2020). F. Nationwide status (2025) Institute for Free Speech, Anti-SLAPP Statutes: 2025 Report Card (Aug. 25, 2025; updated Sept. 15, 2025): 40 states and the District of Columbia now have an anti-SLAPP law. California's statute is cited as a model for breadth of coverage, mandatory fee-shifting, and its command that courts construe it "broadly." Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Understanding Anti-SLAPP Laws and state-by-state Anti-SLAPP Legal Guide. Anti-SLAPP Law Cases - Case Law Summaries & Citings Anti-SLAPP laws, which stand for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, are designed to protect individuals from lawsuits intended to silence or intimidate them for exercising their rights to free speech and petition. What are SLAPPs? Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs): These are lawsuits filed with the primary goal of silencing or intimidating someone who is exercising their right to free speech or petition, rather than with the intention of winning the case. Motivations: SLAPPs are often brought by wealthy individuals or corporations against their critics, aiming to bankrupt them through the cost and time of litigation. Chilling Effect: The threat of a SLAPP lawsuit can have a chilling effect on free speech, as people may be afraid to speak out or participate in public matters for fear of being sued. What are Anti-SLAPP Laws? Purpose: Anti-SLAPP laws aim to prevent SLAPPs by providing a mechanism for defendants to quickly dismiss lawsuits that are essentially designed to intimidate or silence them. How they work: Motion to Strike: Under most anti-SLAPP statutes, a defendant can file a motion to strike the lawsuit, arguing that it is a SLAPP suit. Burden of Proof: The burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff (the person who filed the lawsuit) to demonstrate that they have a high probability of prevailing in the case. Dismissal and Fees: If the plaintiff cannot meet this burden, the lawsuit is dismissed, and the defendant may be entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs. California's Anti-SLAPP Law California's anti-SLAPP law is codified in California Civil Procedure Code § 425.16. Key Benefits of Anti-SLAPP Laws: Protecting Free Speech: Anti-SLAPP laws help protect the right to free speech and public participation. Preventing Abuse of the Legal System: They discourage the use of lawsuits as a tool for intimidation and silencing. Reducing Litigation Costs: By allowing for early dismissal of SLAPP suits, they reduce the costs and time associated with lengthy and expensive litigation. Encouraging Public Participation:By protecting individuals from SLAPPs, these laws encourage people to participate in public matters without fear of retaliation. U.S. Supreme Court Influence on Anti-SLAPP Issues These cases support the principle that those who misuse courts to punish speech can be sanctioned or stopped – anti-SLAPP statutes put that principle into routine practice at the state level. The United States Supreme Court has not directly reviewed a state anti-SLAPP statute, and there is currently no federal anti-SLAPP law. However, several landmark Supreme Court decisions form the constitutional backdrop that anti-SLAPP laws enforce. These cases often involve defamation and First Amendment rights, and they guide lower courts in balancing reputation versus free speech. Here are a few key rulings: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) – The cornerstone of modern defamation law. The Supreme Court unanimously held that public officials (later extended to public figures) suing for defamation must prove the statement was made with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth casp.net . This ruling was explicitly driven by a desire to prevent an environment where critics of official conduct could be silenced by lawsuits. The case itself was essentially a SLAPP-type scenario: Southern officials were suing civil rights activists/newspapers to deter criticism of segregation practices. Sullivan elevated First Amendment protections, stating that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”, even if it includes vehement, caustic, and sometimes erroneous attacks. This principle is at the heart of anti-SLAPP: most SLAPP targets are speaking about public issues or figures, and Sullivan ensures such speech has breathing space. Many anti-SLAPP victories (especially where plaintiffs are public figures, like Nygård or Trump University) are a direct application of Sullivan’s malice rule. In effect, Sullivan set a high bar that often causes SLAPP suits to fail – anti-SLAPP statutes complement it by allowing early determination of whether that bar is met. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) – A unanimous Supreme Court protected an outrageous parody published in Hustler. The magazine ran a fake ad poking lurid fun at Reverend Jerry Falwell, a public figure, implying he had a drunken incestuous rendezvous (all clearly a grotesque joke). Falwell sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress since he couldn’t meet defamation standards (the ad was so over-the-top no one believed it literally). The Supreme Court ruled public figures cannot do an end-run around First Amendment protections by suing for emotional distress when the speech is about them and isn’t false factual defamation quinnemanuel.com This case is often cited i anti-SLAPP contexts to emphasize that satire, parody, or harsh humor – even if deeply offensive – is protected speech so long as it doesn’t assert specific false facts. Falwell had no remedy because the parody was not reasonably seen as true. This reinforces what California courts have held: vigorous caricature or opinion (like comparing someone to a cartoon or using hyperbole) is shielded. In anti-SLAPP motions, defendants often invoke Hustler v. Falwell to argue that claims like IIED or other torts cannot proceed when based on the same protected speech underlying an unsuccessful defamation claim. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) – Here, the Supreme Court clarified that simply labeling a statement as “opinion” does not make it immune, if the statement implies an assertion of objective fact. In Milkovich, a journalist wrote that a high school coach “lied” under oath. The Court found that could be provable as true or false (either he perjured or not) and therefore was potentially defamatory despite being in a column. While Milkovich is sometimes cited by plaintiffs to attack an “opinion” defense, it actually aligns with how California courts parse speech: they look at the totality of circumstances to see if a reasonable reader would take a statement as factual quinnemanuel.com .Anti-SLAPP case law in CA (like Summit Bank, Chaker, Bently Reserve) has refined this by examining context to distinguish fact from opinion Milkovich ensures that defendants can’t escape liability if they couch a false fact as “in my opinion, X is a thief” – that still implies a factual basis that can be proven false. Thus, while anti-SLAPP protects opinions, Milkovich serves as a reminder: if a statement implies a clear defamatory fact (e.g., criminal behavior) and that implication is provably false, it’s not protected. California courts hew to this by allowing cases like Bently (where “sociopathic landlord caused deaths” was specific enough to imply factual assertions) to survive anti-SLAPP caselaw.findlaw.com Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) – Snyder concerned a tort suit against the Westboro Baptist Church for picketing a military funeral with vile anti-gay signs. The deceased soldier’s father sued for IIED. In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters’ speech, although hurtful, was on matters of public concern (morality, military policy, etc.) and took place in public, so it was protected by the First Amendment casp.net . The Court emphasized that speech on public issues “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” This case resonates with anti-SLAPP because many SLAPPs involve emotionally charged speech on public issues (for example, online posts accusing someone of wrongdoing in a public controversy). Snyder tells courts to protect even extreme expressions of opinion on public matters. California’s anti-SLAPP law explicitly protects conduct “in connection with an issue of public interest,” and Snyder reaffirms that if the subject is of public concern, the speaker gets broad latitude. It’s a powerful precedent for SLAPP defendants: even intentionally inflicting emotional distress through speech is not actionable if the speech is about a public issue and not a disguised factual allegation. In essence, Snyder extends the logic of Sullivan/Falwell – robust protection for speech on public affairs – even to private figure plaintiffs (Snyder himself was not a public figure, but the topic was public). Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) – A less famous case, but one directly addressing retaliatory lawsuits: The Supreme Court recognized that baseless lawsuits filed to retaliate against someone’s exercise of rights (there, employees’ union activities) can be enjoined in the labor law context casp.net . While not a defamation case, this decision acknowledged the concept of a “retaliatory lawsuit” as an unfair labor practice if without merit. It foreshadowed anti-SLAPP laws by noting that the right to petition (file lawsuits) does not protect suits that are a mere sham to cover retaliation. Similarly, Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures (1993) established a test for sham litigation (lawsuits that are objectively baseless and intended to harm a rival) casp.net These cases support the principle that those who misuse courts to punish speech can be sanctioned or stopped – anti-SLAPP statutes put that principle into routine practice at the state level In conclusion, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on a state anti-SLAPP statute, its First Amendment jurisprudence strongly undergirds the anti-SLAPP framework. Truth, opinion, and public concern are recurring touchstones in both arenas. Anti-SLAPP laws essentially provide a procedural fast-track to apply these constitutional protections. The cases above (from Sullivan to Snyder) ensure that freedom of speech – especially on public matters – remains protected against the chilling effect of costly litigation, and anti-SLAPP statutes are a state-level commitment to the same end. Important Recent Anti-SLAPP Case Summaries Below are recent published opinions involving California’s anti-SLAPP statute in defamation and social-media/content contexts. Each summary lists the case name, court, decision date, and key points about how anti-SLAPP was applied to public commentary, defamation claims, or reposted/repurposed content on social platforms. California Courts of Appeal Jackson v. Mayweather, Jr. – California Court of Appeal (Mar. 27, 2017, published). Floyd Mayweather’s ex-partner sued him for defamation, false light, and public disclosure of private facts after he posted on Facebook/Instagram that their breakup was due to her secretly getting an abortion, and discussed her cosmetic surgeries on a radio show. The Court of Appeal held Mayweather’s posts were about a celebrity dispute of public interest (celebrity gossip about abortion and plastic surgery) and thus met anti-SLAPP prong one law.justia.com On prong two, the court found Jackson could not likely prove the statements false or unlawfully invasive: the core facts (her abortion and surgeries) were essentially true or newsworthy, and any false details (e.g. who ended the relationship) were not defamatory lexology.com The court therefore struck the defamation and related tort claims under the anti-SLAPP statute, although it allowed a narrow part of the privacy claim (posting her sonogram) to proceed lexology.com Cross v. Facebook, Inc. – California Court of Appeal (Aug. 9, 2017, published). A musician and his companies sued Facebook after users created pages impersonating and defaming him. Facebook’s refusal to remove the pages led to claims including defamation, negligence, and breach of contract. The Court of Appeal held Facebook’s alleged conduct—hosting and not removing user content—fell within an anti-SLAPP “act in furtherance of free speech” on a public issue (the posts concerned dangers of fatigued tour-bus drivers, a matter of public interest) The court then ruled the plaintiffs had no probability of prevailing because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes platforms from liability for third-party content blog.ericgoldman.org Thus, all of the claims were struck under anti-SLAPP, underscoring that a social media platform cannot be sued for failing to remove user posts in these circumstances. Woodhill Ventures LLC v. Yang – California Court of Appeal (July 14, 2021, published). An “internet celebrity” took to Twitter and a podcast to lambast a bakery that made his child’s birthday cake with candy decorations resembling pills. The bakery sued for defamation, and the defendant invoked anti-SLAPP, claiming his online rant was about a public safety issue (“candy confusion” for kids). The Court of Appeal denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the posts were not made in connection with a genuine public issue cccba.org . Using the FilmOn context analysis, the court decided the purpose and context of the tweets/podcast were merely to shame or punish the bakery, not to inform the public of a safety concern cccba.org . Because the speech was essentially a personal gripe (aimed at “whipping up” viewers for revenge) rather than commentary on a matter of public interest, the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect it cccba.org U.S. Federal Courts in California Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow – U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Cir. (Aug. 17, 2021). One America News Network (plaintiff) sued MSNBC host Rachel Maddow for defamation after Maddow’s show repeated a report that an OAN contributor “is also being paid by the Russian government to produce propaganda.” Maddow moved to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the anti-SLAPP dismissal of the suit . Applying California defamation law, the court held Maddow’s statement was figurative and hyperbolic speech, not a literal assertion of fact . In context – an opinionated TV segment preceded by true facts about the reporter’s ties to Sputnik – the “Russian propaganda” comment was obvious exaggeration that no reasonable viewer would take as provably false fact cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov . Because the challenged remark was protected by the First Amendment as opinion/rhetorical hyperbole, it could not be defamatory, and the anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted. CoreCivic, Inc. v. Candide Group, LLC – U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Cir. (Aug. 30, 2022). CoreCivic, a private prison company, sued activist Morgan Simon and her firm (Candide Group) for defamation over online articles (Forbes.com) linking CoreCivic to the family-separation policy and claiming it lobbied for harsher immigration laws. Candide filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The Ninth Circuit first reaffirmed that California’s anti-SLAPP special motion does apply in federal court (consistent with 9th Circuit precedent) . It then examined the statements under Rule 12(b)(6) standards (no discovery yet) . The court concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead falsity or defamation regarding the family-separation statements law.justia.com . Those statements – saying CoreCivic profited from detaining immigrants and was “at the heart” of the family separation controversy – were either substantially true or not explicitly about illegal conduct, and thus not actionable as pled. The Ninth Circuit accordingly upheld the anti-SLAPP dismissal of CoreCivic’s defamation claims related to family separations law.justia.com . (Note: A portion of the case addressing an implied-defamation theory about CoreCivic’s lobbying was vacated and remanded, as one judge believed a jury could find an implied false message that CoreCivic held children in its facilities caselaw.findlaw.com U.S. Supreme Court New York Times Co. v. Sullivan – U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 9, 1964). A landmark defamation case arising from a newspaper ad about civil rights protests. The Supreme Court held that public officials who sue for defamation over statements about their official conduct must prove the statements were made with “actual malice” – i.e. with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth casp.net . This high bar protects vigorous public debate by preventing libel suits from silencing commentary on public officials’ performance casp.net . Sullivan’s actual malice standard underpins many anti-SLAPP outcomes in cases of public interest speech. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell – U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 24, 1988). The publisher of Hustler ran a raunchy parody ad that depicted minister Jerry Falwell in an incestuous rendezvous. Falwell sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress (and libel), but the Supreme Court ruled for Hustler. Even outrageous or offensive parody is protected by the First Amendment when it targets a public figure, so long as it does not state actual facts in falsehood supreme.justia.com . The Court emphasized that speech does not lose protection just because it is meant to ridicule; public figures cannot recover for emotional distress from satire absent a false statement of fact made with actual malice supreme.justia.com . This case illustrates robust protection for creative content (like satire) about public figures, foreshadowing anti-SLAPP principles shielding harsh criticism and caricature. Snyder v. Phelps – U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 2, 2011). The family of a fallen soldier sued picketers from the Westboro Baptist Church for emotional distress and other torts after the church members protested near the soldier’s funeral with highly offensive signs. The Supreme Court held that the church’s protest was fully protected speech because it addressed matters of public concern (military and morality) in a public place en.wikipedia.org . Speech on a public issue, in a public forum, cannot be the basis for tort liability for emotional distress, even if it is hurtful or outrageous en.wikipedia.org . In effect, the First Amendment trumped the tort claims. Snyder shows the high level of protection given to public commentary on social or political issues – the type of protection anti-SLAPP laws aim to reinforce by quickly dismissing lawsuits targeting such speech. Anti-SLAPP Law Cases - Involving Newspapers and Social Medial Case Law Summaries & Citings Here are many examples where newspapers, magazines, or media outlets published true but offensive or disturbing commentary or opinions, and courts upheld their legality under First Amendment protections or anti-SLAPP laws, as long as they were factually accurate or clearly opinions, not lies. Here are some notable ones: 1. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) – U.S. Supreme Court What happened: Hustler published a satirical ad mocking Reverend Jerry Falwell, suggesting (in parody form) he had an incestuous encounter with his mother Truth vs. Offensiveness: It was clearly labeled as satire and not meant to be true. It was offensive, vulgar, and cruel—but not actionable. Ruling: Supreme Court said public figures can’t sue for emotional distress caused by parody or opinion unless it's a false statement of fact made with actual malice. Why it matters: Even horrendous satire or commentary about public figures is protected speech, if there’s no provable lie. 2. Snyder v. Phelps (2011) – U.S. Supreme Court What happened: Westboro Baptist Church picketed a Marine’s funeral with signs saying “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “Fags Doom Nations.” Truth vs. Offensiveness: Their protest was hate-filled but based on their genuine religious and political beliefs. Ruling: Supreme Court ruled 8–1 that their offensive public speech on matters of public concern (military policy, religion,) was fully protected. Why it matters: True or sincerely held beliefs—even if horrific—can’t be punished if they don’t lie and relate to public issues. 3. Herring Networks v. Maddow (2021) – 9th Circuit What happened: Rachel Maddow said on-air that a journalist working for OAN “is being paid by the Russian government to produce propaganda.” Truth vs. Offensiveness: Based on a factual Daily Beast article, her commentary was harsh opinion built on disclosed facts. Ruling: Court said her remarks were protected hyperbole, not actionable lies. Why it matters: Strong opinions that interpret or exaggerate public facts are often safe under anti-SLAPP and First Amendment law. 4. Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) – California Court of Appeal What happened: Users posted impersonating and defaming a musician, alleging misconduct. Facebook refused to take the pages down. Truth vs. Offensiveness: The posts were part of a broader discussion on tour-bus driver fatigue—a public safety issue. Ruling: Facebook’s platform choices were protected under anti-SLAPP, and under Section 230. Why it matters: Offensive posts on matters of public concern—even if painful to a person’s reputation—can be protected. Local Columnist / Op-Eds Examples (not specific court cases, but legal context holds): Editorials or columns that criticize politicians, condemn social groups, or make bold cultural statements often fall into this category. If the writer states true facts or expresses opinions, even if it's mean, offensive, or unpopular, it’s protected. Think of NYT op-eds on war, crime, or race that spark backlash but stay within the bounds of truth and protected speech. Anti-SLAPP Defamation Cases in California and Federal Courts Below is a compilation of published opinions involving anti-SLAPP motions in defamation lawsuits across the California Supreme Court, California Courts of Appeal, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court (First Amendment cases). These cases feature defamation claims arising from newspaper articles, online journalism, social media posts, and other commentary/opinion content — often harsh but either true or non-actionable opinion. Each entry summarizes the parties, court, outcome, and notable reasoning or precedent. Overview of Key Cases Case (Year) Court Key Issue Outcome/Precedent Briggs v. Eden Council (1999) CA Supreme Court Landlords sued nonprofit for “harassing” statements to gov’t Anti-SLAPP granted – Statute must be construed broadly; covers any petitioning speech, regardless of public significance casp.net Established broad application of anti-SLAPP. Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) CA Supreme Court Defamation over republished email on Internet Anti-SLAPP granted – Internet re-publisher immune under CDA §230; confirmed anti-SLAPP protects online speech casp.net Gates v. Discovery Comm. (2004) CA Supreme Court Ex-convict sued TV network for crime docudrama Anti-SLAPP granted – Crime report was newsworthy/public issue and First Amendment-protected, so plaintiff’s privacy claim could not succeed casp.net\ FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify (2019) CA Supreme Court Business sued over online report labeling it as risky content Anti-SLAPP granted – Clarified “issue of public interest” test: context of speech (audience, speaker, purpose) matters cccba.org only at private clients not of public interest. Established contextual analysis for prong one. Seelig v. Infinity (2002) CA Court of Appeal Reality TV participant sued radio hosts for insults Anti-SLAPP granted – Radio commentary calling plaintiff names (e.g. “gold-digger”) was opinion/hyperbole, not provably false fact casp.net Suit dismissed as speech on public forum about a public controversy (reality TV). Chaker v. Mateo (2012) CA Court of Appeal Man sued ex’s mother for online posts calling him a “deadbeat dad” and fraud Anti-SLAPP granted – Posts on consumer forum about plaintiff’s character and business practices were on a public forum and of public interest (warning to others); statements were general insults or true (he was a convicted criminal) caselaw.findlaw.com Non-specific vitriol and true facts are not defamatory. Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) CA Court of Appeal Bank sued ex-employee over anonymous internet rants Anti-SLAPP granted – Posts on a “Rants and Raves” forum about the bank were in a public forum on matters of public interest (banking practices) cccba.org Context (online rant with hyperbolic tone) meant statements were likely opinion, not factual assertions. Nygård Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) CA Court of Appeal Fashion mogul sued ex-employee and magazine for tell-all article Anti-SLAPPgranted – Plaintiff Peter Nygård was a public figure, and article about his business and lifestyle was an issue of public interest. Plaintiff could not show falsity or actual malice; differing personal experiences and opinions on his management style aren’t provably false caselaw.findlaw.com Herring Networks (OAN) v. Maddow (2020) U.S. District (S.D. Cal), aff’d 9th Cir. OAN network sued MSNBC host Rachel Maddow for on-air comment it “really literally is paid Russian propaganda” Anti-SLAPP granted – Court found Maddow’s statement was rhetorical opinion based on disclosed facts (an article reporting an OAN reporter’s ties to Russia). Thus, it “cannot serve as basis for defamation” loeb.com Dismissal affirmed; OAN ordered to pay Maddow’s legal fees. La Liberte v. Reid (2020) U.S. 2nd Circuit (federal) Private individual sued Joy Reid (MSNBC) for posts falsely accusing her of yelling racist slurs (viral photo context) Defamation claim dismissed, but anti-SLAPP inapplicable in federal court – The court deemed plaintiff a limited-purpose public figure and found no actual malice (one post was opinion, the other lacked malice). It declined to apply California’s anti-SLAPP law in federal diversity court caselaw.findlaw.com illustrating a circuit split (contrast with 9th Cir.). New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) U.S. Supreme Court Public official sued newspaper over civil rights ad (false statements) Established “actual malice” rule – Public officials (and later, public figures) must prove defendant’s knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard casp.net . Landmark protection for harsh criticism of public figures, forming the constitutional backdrop for anti-SLAPP protections. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) U.S. Supreme Court Jerry Falwell sued Hustler for outrageous parody ad (claimed emotional distress) Speech protected – Even extreme or “outrageous” parody about a public figure is protected by the First Amendment; public figures cannot use tort claims to bypass defamation standards. This case, while not an anti-SLAPP motion, underscores strong protection for satirical opinion. Snyder v. Phelps (2011) U.S. Supreme Court IIED suit against protesters who picketed a military funeral with offensive signs Speech protected – In a 1st Amendment ruling, the Court held that even hurtful speech on public issues (here, signs on public matters) is protected from tort liability. Highlights the principle that speech on public issues cannot be punished simply for being outrageous – a rationale in spirit with anti-SLAPP aims casp.net (Above, “CA Court of Appeal” cases are California intermediate appellate courts; U.S. District refers to federal trial courts applying California law; U.S. Supreme Court entries provide relevant First Amendment context, as there is no federal anti-SLAPP statute.) California Supreme Court – Notable Anti-SLAPP Rulings Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) – California Supreme Court – In the first California Supreme Court case interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, landlords Dan and Judy Briggs sued a tenant-rights nonprofit (ECHO) for defamation and other torts, claiming the organization’s staff made false, harsh statements about them (calling Mr. Briggs “racist,” “redneck,” etc.) to government agencies casp.net . The trial court struck the suit under CCP §425.16, but the Court of Appeal reversed, opining the speech wasn’t of “public significance.” The Supreme Court unanimously reinstated the anti-SLAPP dismissal, holding the statute “shall be construed broadly” and applies to “any lawsuit arising from the exercise of petition or free-speech rights”, regardless of the issue’s prominence casp.net . In other words, a defendant need not show the speech was of great public importance – reporting a grievance to government or the press is protected even if it’s a local or private issue. Briggs set a precedent that anti-SLAPP protections are to be interpreted expansively, thereby protecting a wide range of outspoken commentary from retaliatory suits. The Briggses were ordered to pay over $425,000 in attorney fees for filing a SLAPP casp.net Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) – California Supreme Court – This landmark case combined anti-SLAPP law with internet speech immunity. Ilena Rosenthal, an online activist, forwarded an email on an Internet newsgroup that contained allegedly defamatory accusations against two doctors. The doctors sued Rosenthal for defamation. Rosenthal responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing her act of republishing someone else’s words online was protected. The trial court agreed and struck the suit; the Court of Appeal reversed in part. The Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit entirely, holding that Rosenthal was immune under Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act for reposting third-party content casp.net . Thus, her anti-SLAPP motion was granted in full. This case is notable for protecting those who repost or share articles/posts online – even if the content is harsh or potentially false – so long as they did not originally create the defamation. The decision underscored that online forum hosts and users cannot be treated as publishers of others’ statements, and it affirmed that such suits should be stricken early under anti-SLAPP law. (Notably, the court awarded Rosenthal over $430,000 in attorney fees on remand casp.net Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. (2004) – California Supreme Court – This case involved the republishing of truthful information in a creative format. Wayne Gates, who had been convicted years prior as an accessory to murder, sued Discovery Communications after the network aired a docudrama about the crime. Gates claimed the TV program defamed him and invaded his privacy by casting him in a negative light. Discovery’s anti-SLAPP motion (following a partially denied demurrer) was originally denied by the trial court, which oddly questioned whether the show was “newsworthy.” The Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court reversed that denial, ordering the claims stricken. The Supreme Court held that Discovery’s program was speech on a matter of public interest (crime and punishment) fully protected by the First Amendment Because Gates’ criminal role was a matter of public record and the program’s content was essentially true, he “would [be] impossible to prevail” on a privacy claim casp.net This ruling is an important precedent confirming that media outlets can dramatize or republish public court records or true events without fear of defamation/privacy suits – and that anti-SLAPP is an appropriate vehicle to swiftly dismiss such suits. It emphasizes that truthful, public-interest content – even if unflattering – cannot give rise to liability. FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) – California Supreme Court – While not a defamation case per se, FilmOn significantly clarified the anti-SLAPP “public issue” requirement in a way that affects all media-related SLAPP cases. FilmOn, an online video platform, sued an internet analytics company (DoubleVerify) for issuing reports to subscribers (advertisers) labeling FilmOn’s content as potentially pirated or adult. DoubleVerify’s anti-SLAPP motion argued its reports were free-speech commentary on matters of public concern (online content quality). The trial court denied the motion, and the case reached the Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court devised a new contextual test: even if speech involves a topic of public interest, courts must consider the “context” and “purpose” of the speech – i.e. who the speaker is, the audience, and whether the speech was intended to participate in or promote discussion of a public issue Here, DoubleVerify’s confidential client reports, though about piracy (a public topic), were not aimed at informing the public or engaging in debate; they were a private business communication. The Supreme Court held such speech wasn’t in connection with a public issue in the anti-SLAPP sense, so the motion was properly denied cccba.org FilmOn is important for journalists and online speakers because it prevents stretching of anti-SLAPP’s scope to purely private communications, while still protecting genuine public discourse. The decision guides lower courts to distinguish true public commentary (e.g., a news article or tweet to the world) from speech that, despite touching on a public subject, isn’t contributing to any public conversation. (Other California Supreme Court decisions have further shaped anti-SLAPP law Navellier v. Sletten (2002) permitting use of anti-SLAPP even when defendants are accused of litigation-related speech; Flatley v. Mauro (2006) carving out extortionate speech as unprotected; Park v. CSU (2017) refining what it means for a claim to “arise from” protected speech; Wilson v. CNN (2019) addressing anti-SLAPP in employment cases. However, the above cases are most relevant to defamation in media, online, and creative content contexts. California Courts of Appeal – Defamation & Opinion in Media/Social Media California’s appellate courts have produced dozens of published anti-SLAPP opinions, many involving journalists, publishers, or internet speakers sued for commentary. Below are key examples that illustrate how courts handle harsh criticism that is true or constitutionally protected opinion: Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) – A classic early case where a participant on the reality TV show “Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire?” sued radio talk show hosts who ridiculed her on-air. The hosts had invited the plaintiff, Katya Seelig, for an interview which she declined; in response, they lampooned her on their popular morning show, calling her derogatory names (like “chicken butt” and “gold-digger”) and joking she was after money caselaw.findlaw.com . Seelig alleged defamation and emotional distress. The defendants filed both a demurrer and an anti-SLAPP motion. Result: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and struck the suit . It held the radio commentary was covered by anti-SLAPP (speech on a public forum about a matter of public interest – reality TV and a quasi-celebrity participant). Crucially, the court found that none of the insults or remarks were actionable statements of fact – they were “rhetorical hyperbole” or opinions not provably true or false casp.net . This case set a precedent that unflattering opinions or name-calling, especially in entertainment media discussion, cannot support a defamation claim. Even if the speech was harsh or unfair, as long as it did not assert provably false facts, it was protected. Seelig thus exemplifies anti-SLAPP’s role in guarding vigorous criticism and satire, especially toward those in the public eye (even a reality show contestant). Wong v. Jing (2010) – This case involved a Yelp review and is often cited in “online review” defamation contexts. A father was unhappy with his child’s dentist, Dr. Jing, and his wife posted a negative review on Yelp. The review included claims that the dentist’s treatment and the office’s use of a certain chemical caused their son to get sick, and it warned other parents. Dr. Jing sued for defamation, asserting the post falsely implied she poisoned a child. The Court of Appeal, however, found the Yelp post squarely within anti-SLAPP protection: it was a statement made on a public Internet forum about the quality of medical/dental services – an issue of concern to many consumers . On the merits, the court concluded that most of the statements were either true, or opinion based on the speaker’s own experience (and thus not provably false) caselaw.findlaw.com . For instance, saying a child “got sick after a visit” was considered a protected statement of personal experience or opinion, not a verifiable claim that could be proven false. The defamation claims were struck. Wong v. Jing underscores that online reviews, even if strongly negative, enjoy broad protection – especially when they involve matters of public interest like health and consumer information. As long as the reviewer doesn’t knowingly make false assertions of fact, their critical opinions cannot be litigated. This case has served as an important pro-defendant precedent for Yelp and other social media criticism suits content.next.westlaw.com Chaker v. Mateo (2012) – This is a notable “CyberSLAPP” case protecting sharp online accusations in a personal dispute. In Chaker, a man (Chaker) who ran a self-improvement business found himself the target of scathing posts on RipoffReport.com and Topix.com, authored by his ex-girlfriend’s mother (Mateo). Mateo’s posts accused Chaker of being a “deadbeat dad,” “criminal,” “womanizer” and suggested people should be cautious dealing with him lawpipe.com caselaw.findlaw.com . Chaker sued for defamation. The Court of Appeal ruled the posts were protected speech in connection with an issue of public interest – even though the dispute was personal – because the content warned others about Chaker’s character and business practices, essentially a consumer forum report about an individual’s trustworthiness lawpipe.com . On the second prong, the court found Chaker couldn’t show a probability of prevailing: the statements were largely non-actionable opinion or true. Notably, the court observed that calling someone a “deadbeat dad” or saying he “uses people” is general, hyperbolic critique – not a specific factual claim that can be proven false . The only arguably factual assertion was that Chaker “is a criminal,” but that statement was true (he had a prior criminal conviction) . Thus, Mateo’s anti-SLAPP motion was granted, wiping out the lawsuit caselaw.findlaw.com . Chaker v. Mateo is frequently cited to show that vitriolic online rants are often considered protected opinion, especially on informal internet forums, and even accusations that might sound like facts are not defamatory if the plaintiff actually has such a negative attribute (here, a criminal record) or if the context makes it clear they are conveying personal judgment. This case broadened the “public interest” concept to include warnings about an individual’s behavior posted on public websites, reflecting the courts’ recognition that online communities discussing individuals can be participating in a form of public discourse. Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) – In this case, anonymous internet speech and context were key. Summit Bank sued an unknown poster (later identified as Rogers, a disgruntled former employee) who had made derogatory comments about the bank and its CEO on an Internet message board (Craigslist’s “Rants and Raves”) . The posts were laced with crude language and accusations about the bank’s stability and management. The Court of Appeal held the statements met the anti-SLAPP public interest threshold: they were made on a public website and concerned a business and its leadership – matters that could affect investors, customers, or employees cccba.org . More importantly, when analyzing defamation merit, the court heavily emphasized the online context: the posts were on a forum literally labeled “Rants and Raves,” written in a “diatribe” style with “lack of formality, poor grammar and spelling,” and clearly more of an angry vent than an assertion of fact . The court noted that in such a setting, readers are less likely to view the statements as factual – it’s understood as blowing off steam. Indeed, following precedents like Krinsky (2008) and Chaker, the Summit Bank court found the comments to be non-actionable opinions and hyperbole given the context . It reversed the trial court and ordered the suit stricken under anti-SLAPP. This case is a touchstone for the proposition that anonymous internet speech is not automatically immune, but when it appears in forums known for opinionated, unverified chatter, it will often be deemed protected opinion rather than defamation caselaw.findlaw.com . The ruling protected the poster’s First Amendment right to criticize his former employer vehemently online, and Summit Bank had to pay the poster’s legal fees. Summit Bank thus illustrates how courts filter defamation claims through the lens of the medium and style of speech, often finding that what might look defamatory on paper is innocuous ranting in its actual internet context. Cross v. Cooper (2011) – This case highlights protection for republishing public information. A real estate seller (Cooper) discovered that a neighbor was a registered sex offender (information publicly available via Megan’s Law). Cooper’s realtor mentioned this fact in a flyer or to potential buyers, and the offended neighbor (Cross) sued for defamation and interference, claiming the implication he was dangerous was false. The Court of Appeal found the anti-SLAPP statute applied because crime and community safety are issues of public interest, and the communication was made in a public forum context (disclosures in a home sale) . On the merits, the court held that merely truthfully identifying someone as a registered sex offender cannot be defamatory – it was a true statement from an official public registry, and warning neighbors or buyers was protected activity in furtherance of public safety (also likely protected by California’s privileges). The anti-SLAPP motion was granted, and the case was dismissed casetext.com . Cross v. Cooper is often cited alongside cases like GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton to emphasize that sharing true, publicly available information – even if stigmatizing – is protected speech on a matter of public concern. It also shows how anti-SLAPP dovetails with other speech protections (here, truth and statutory privilege) to defeat lawsuits aimed at silencing people who share critical facts on social media or other platforms. Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) – A celebrity/business figure SLAPP case, showing that being famous doesn’t shield one from criticism. Famed fashion executive Peter Nygård sued a former employee (Timo) and a Finnish magazine after Timo gave an interview describing Nygård’s “abusive” behavior and extravagant lifestyle. Nygård alleged defamation and breach of a confidentiality agreement. The Court of Appeal held that the entire suit was a SLAPP: (1) The article’s content – the inner workings of an international fashion company and its colorful owner – involved public figures and was of public interest (Nygård employed thousands and cultivated a public image of wealth and success) caselaw.findlaw.com . (2) Nygård could not show a likelihood of prevailing. The court reasoned that the disparaging statements were largely subjective opinions or personal impressions of Nygård’s conduct (e.g. describing the boss as tyrannical) – different employees had different experiences, but that “does not render Timo’s statements false or defamatory.” . Any factual assertions were not provably false or were not materially damaging. Moreover, Nygård, as a public figure, had to show actual malice, which he couldn’t: there was no evidence the magazine or Timo knew any statement was false or seriously doubted it . The appellate court affirmed the strike of all claims . Nygård is a noteworthy precedent confirming robust anti-SLAPP protection for tell-all stories and exposés about famous individuals or companies, especially when the plaintiff tries to plead around defamation by adding contract or interference claims (the court also noted a California Labor Code policy that employees can discuss workplace conditions ). The case is frequently cited for the principle that an issue can be in the “public interest” if the public is merely interested in it – here, the public’s curiosity about a flamboyant fashion mogul’s behavior sufficed caselaw.findlaw.com . It also reassures media that interviews and critical profiles of high-profile figures are protected, absent clear evidence of falsity and malice. Daniel v. Wayans (2017) – This case merges social media, comedy, and creative process. Actor/comedian Marlon Wayans was sued by an actor (Pierre Daniel) who had been hired as an extra on a Wayans movie. Wayans had tweeted a side-by-side photo comparing Daniel (who is African-American with a unique afro hairstyle) to a cartoon character (“Cleveland Brown” from Family Guy), captioning it with a joking slur as if in character. Daniel sued for racial harassment and misappropriation, claiming the tweet and on-set teasing were injurious. Wayans invoked anti-SLAPP, arguing his tweet and jokes were part of his creative process in making a comedy film and commentary on a public platform (Twitter) . The Court of Appeal agreed with Wayans. It held that his actions were “in furtherance of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest” – namely, the creation of a comedic work and the ensuing social media discussion . Wayans’s million-follower Twitter feed was deemed a public forum, and an actor in his film was of public interest due to Wayans’s public persona . On the merits, the court found the plaintiff’s claims could not succeed: the tweet was protected speech (opinion/joke) and not severe enough to be harassment as a matter of law. The anti-SLAPP motion was granted, tossing the case . The significance of Daniel v. Wayans is its recognition that social media posts by artists can be protected as part of creative expression on matters of public interest (in this case, comedic commentary and the public’s interest in a celebrity’s social media) aalrr.com . It also illustrates that even where a plaintiff feels personally attacked (here by a racial epithet, albeit used in a comedic context), the courts will carefully weigh First Amendment interests. The decision was a win for artistic freedom and social media speech, affirming that a joke made to over a million followers about a matter of public entertainment is shielded from tort liability, even if it’s edgy or offensive. (Notably, the California Supreme Court had granted review, signaling interest in the case, but the review was later dismissed – leaving the pro-speech appellate ruling in place casetext.com Bently Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios (2013) – One of the few cases where an anti-SLAPP motion by a defendant failed in a defamation context, it highlights the flip side: when harsh accusations are treated as factual assertions, a plaintiff can proceed. In Bently, a wealthy property owner (Bently) and his company were accused in anonymous online reviews of effectively terrorizing and evicting tenants, even implying their actions caused deaths of some elderly tenants . The poster (Papaliolios) claimed “the building is owned by a sociopathic narcissist” and gave detailed accounts of evictions and tenant departures, suggesting nefarious conduct . Bently sued for libel, and Papaliolios filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the Yelp posts were opinions on a public forum about a matter of public interest (landlord-tenant issues in San Francisco). The Court of Appeal acknowledged the public forum/public interest prong was met (tenant treatment in a large city is of public concern) but held that Bently demonstrated a probability of prevailing on libel caselaw.findlaw.com . Unlike in Chaker or Summit Bank, these posts included specific factual allegations (evictions without cause, harassment leading to deaths) that were “reasonably susceptible of [being proven] true or false.” . The court found that a reasonable reader could take the statements literally (despite some colorful language) and that Bently produced evidence to show many claims were false . Because false statements of fact (especially accusing someone of causing death or serious wrongdoing) are not protected, Papaliolios’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied and the lawsuit could proceed . Bently Reserve is an important counterpoint case, underscoring that anti-SLAPP laws do not license defamation: if a speaker’s words assert specific, verifiably false facts that injure reputation, the speaker can still be held to account. The case reinforces the “sine qua non of defamation is falsehood” – thus, while courts broadly protect opinion and true or hyperbolic speech, they will allow defamation claims past the SLAPP filter when concrete lies (e.g., “these owners illegally evicted tenants and caused deaths”) are alleged with sufficient supporting detail caselaw.findlaw.com . For media defendants, Bently Reserve is a reminder to stick to opinion or ensure factual claims are true; for plaintiffs, it demonstrates that anti-SLAPP is not an absolute shield if you can make a strong showing of falsity and resulting damage. In summary, California’s appellate courts have vigorously enforced anti-SLAPP protections for speech related to newspapers, magazines, blogs, and social media. From these cases, a few themes emerge: Opinions, epithets, and hyperbole – especially on internet forums or talk shows – are generally not actionable. Cases like Seelig, Chaker, Summit Bank, and Wong all emphasize that free speech allows rude or sharp-tongued criticism. If the tone or context signals that a statement is one’s personal view or exaggeration, courts will classify it as non-defamatory opinion caselaw.findlaw.com . The threshold for a plaintiff to show such speech is defamatory is very high, especially when made in informal online settings or entertainment contexts. Truth or substantially true statements (even if unflattering) are protected. Defendants who accurately report on public records or truthfully warn others (as in Cross v. Cooper or Gates v. Discovery) will prevail. The anti-SLAPP law pairs with California’s truth defense and privileges (Civil Code §47) to dispose of suits over true content quickly casp.net . Public interest and public figure status are construed broadly. Content about services, businesses, or anyone who has sought public attention (even in a limited sphere) often qualifies as an “issue of public interest.” For instance, a Yelp review of a dentist, a forum post about a bank, or gossip about a fashion tycoon were all treated as matters the public has a legitimate interest in caselaw.findlaw.com lawpipe.com . Likewise, plaintiffs like Nygård or Chaker were deemed public or limited-purpose public figures, raising their bar to prove defamation (actual malice) caselaw.findlaw.com lawpipe.com . This reflects California’s tendency to err on the side of free discussion, even about individuals who aren’t traditional politicians or celebrities. Creative and satirical works get special solicitude. Courts recognize the importance of creative freedom – e.g., Daniel v. Wayans protected a comedian’s improvisational joke on social media as part of making a film aalrr.com . Fictional portrayals or parodies are also usually covered by anti-SLAPP if sued. Even when individuals feel personally attacked (as in Wayans or Seelig), California courts tend to protect the creator or commentator to avoid a chilling effect on artistic expression. Clear falsity and provable harm are required to overcome anti-SLAPP. When plaintiffs have survived an anti-SLAPP motion (as in Bently Reserve), it is because they could show specific factual claims that are false and defamatory (e.g., accusing someone of serious misconduct that can be disproven) caselaw.findlaw.com . This aligns with fundamental defamation law (false statement of fact causing damage), but anti-SLAPP raises the bar by forcing plaintiffs to present evidence early. Weak defamation claims – where a plaintiff is essentially upset about someone’s harsh opinion – will be thrown out at the outset. Federal Court Applications (U.S. District Courts) – California Anti-SLAPP in Action Although anti-SLAPP laws are state statutes, they frequently come up in federal courts (usually when a defamation case with state-law claims is filed in or removed to federal court). California’s law has been applied in federal courts within the Ninth Circuit for years gtlaw.com , though other circuits disagree on applicability. Below are examples of how federal courts (especially in California) have handled anti-SLAPP motions in defamation and SLAPP suits, touching on online speech and journalism: Thomas v. Los Angeles Times (C.D. Cal. 2002) – Dr. Melvin Thomas, who had been the subject of a laudatory biography about his WWII experiences, sued the L.A. Times for an article casting doubt on his claims (implying some of his war stories were exaggerated or false). He alleged defamation by implication. The federal court granted the newspaper’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding the reporting to be protected speech on a public issue (history and war heroism) and concluding that Thomas was unlikely to prevail on the merits . The court dissected the article and found it did not actually assert false facts about Thomas – it simply presented conflicting evidence about his war record . Without a provably false defamatory assertion, Thomas’s claim failed. This case, like many in federal court, shows anti-SLAPP’s utility in disposing of suits against mainstream media: even implication or nuanced reporting can be shielded if the gist isn’t provably false or if the plaintiff is a public figure who can’t show malice casp.net Nicosia v. De Rooy (N.D. Cal. 1999) – One of the early internet defamation cases: an author’s agent, Nicosia, sued an online journalist (De Rooy) who had published web articles accusing Nicosia of fraud and unethical behavior in handling the estate of Beat writer Jack Kerouac’s daughter. The federal court granted De Rooy’s anti-SLAPP motion . It reasoned that Nicosia was at least a limited public figure in the controversy over the literary estate, and he hadn’t shown a likelihood of proving the statements were false or made with malice . Some statements were deemed opinion (“suspected fraud”) and others, while factual-sounding, lacked evidence of falsity. The court’s dismissal (and award of fees) demonstrated early on that online investigative reporting and watchdog commentary would get anti-SLAPP protection just like traditional journalism. It also underscored the burden on public figures to come forward with proof of falsity and malice to avoid dismissal casp.net Makaeff v. Trump University (S.D. Cal./9th Cir. 2013) – This high-profile case arose from a lawsuit where a consumer, Tarla Makaeff, wrote online and to authorities complaining that “Trump University” (a real estate seminar business) was a scam. Trump University counter-sued her for defamation. Makaeff invoked California’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Trump University was a limited-purpose public figure in the debate over its business practices, requiring it to show Makaeff acted with actual malice caselaw.findlaw.com . Trump University could not meet that bar – Makaeff’s complaints had a factual basis (other students had similar experiences), and there was no evidence she knew anything she said was false. The Ninth Circuit thus ordered the defamation counterclaim stricken under anti-SLAPP (and later, Makaeff was awarded her attorney fees). This case was significant not only for its result – protecting a consumer’s right to blow the whistle on a company’s shady practices – but also for the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation that California anti-SLAPP applies in federal court (a stance that has since been consistent in the Ninth Circuit gtlaw.com ). It also generated an influential concurring opinion about public figure status in the internet age. Makaeff exemplifies how anti-SLAPP can empower individuals (even against well-known figures like Donald Trump’s business) to speak out about potential fraud without fear of a protracted lawsuit. Herring Networks, Inc. (OAN) v. Maddow (S.D. Cal. 2020) – We touched on this in the table: One America News Network (OAN), a conservative news channel, sued MSNBC anchor Rachel Maddow for defamation after she satirically said on-air that OAN “really literally is paid Russian propaganda.” Maddow’s team removed the case to federal court and filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Judge Cynthia Bashant granted the motion and dismissed the case, ruling that Maddow’s statement was protected opinion based on disclosed facts. Maddow had been commenting on a Daily Beast article that revealed one OAN employee also wrote for a Kremlin-owned outlet – she clearly presented that source and then hyperbolically riffed on it on her show . The court found no reasonable viewer would interpret Maddow’s quip as an assertion that the network was officially paid by Russia; rather, it was a colorful exaggeration for effect loeb.com . Because the challenged remark was not provably false (it was an opinion drawn from true facts), OAN’s defamation claim had no minimal merit and was struck. The court also noted the context – a political commentary on a public issue – firmly put the speech under anti-SLAPP protection. OAN was ordered to pay about $250,000 in attorney’s fees to Maddow lawandcrime.com . On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in 2021 affirmed the dismissal (agreeing the statement was opinion and/or hyperbole) lawprofessors.typepad.com . Herring Networks v. Maddow illustrates federal courts’ alignment with California courts in protecting political commentary and media criticism as opinion. It also shows anti-SLAPP’s might in federal court: not only was the case tossed early, but the plaintiff faced a hefty fee bill for bringing a SLAPP. This outcome likely deters other deep-pocketed entities from suing over similar political commentary. La Liberte v. Reid (E.D.N.Y./2nd Cir. 2020) – This case is a cautionary tale about the limits of state anti-SLAPP in federal courts outside the Ninth Circuit. The facts read like a social media age drama: Roslyn La Liberte was photographed angrily confronting a teen at a California city council meeting about immigration. The photo went viral with claims she shouted racist slurs (comparisons were made to civil rights era hatred). MSNBC commentator Joy Reid reposted the photo and echoed the accusations in two posts to her large Twitter/Instagram audience caselaw.findlaw.com . In reality, the teen later stated La Liberte had not yelled slurs. La Liberte sued Joy Reid for defamation in New York federal court (diversity jurisdiction). Reid invoked California’s anti-SLAPP law (since the posts concerned a California event involving a California plaintiff). The district court decided to apply anti-SLAPP and struck the claim, finding La Liberte was a limited public figure in the sanctuary-law debate and hadn’t pled actual malice, and that one of Reid’s posts was non-actionable opinion (comparing La Liberte’s image to an infamous segregationist photo) caselaw.findlaw.com . The court even granted Reid anti-SLAPP fees. However, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the anti-SLAPP ruling: it held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute (particularly its requirement to show probability of success to avoid dismissal) conflicts with Federal Rules (12 and 56) and cannot apply in federal court in that circuit lawreview.uchicago.edu . They therefore vacated the “strike” and fee award law.justia.com . Importantly, the Second Circuit still dismissed the lawsuit on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds – essentially agreeing La Liberte’s complaint failed to state actual malice or actionable defamation case-law.vlex.com . So Joy Reid still won, but without anti-SLAPP. La Liberte demonstrates a split: in some federal courts (Second, D.C. Circuits, etc.), defendants cannot formally use anti-SLAPP motions, though they can often achieve the same result through a regular motion to dismiss. The case also underscores First Amendment standards: the court found La Liberte, by injecting herself in a heated public controversy (speaking at a council meeting on immigration laws), became a limited-purpose public figure, and Reid’s commentary – though harsh and arguably incorrect – was not published with malice and was partly protected opinion caselaw.findlaw.com . Thus, even without anti-SLAPP, the traditional free-speech protections led to dismissal. This outcome aligns with the spirit of anti-SLAPP: public figures facing media criticism must meet a high bar to recover. It’s worth noting that, had this case been in California (or the Ninth Circuit), anti-SLAPP would have applied and Joy Reid would likely have been entitled to fees; in New York, she won but without a fee-shift. As a result, media defendants in states without anti-SLAPP or in circuits rejecting state anti-SLAPP in federal court lose a powerful tool for early dismissal and fees – which is why a federal anti-SLAPP law has been proposed rcfp.org . (Other notable federal cases: Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group (D.C. Cir. 2015), where the D.C. Circuit similarly held D.C.’s anti-SLAPP law inapplicable in federal court, even as it affirmed dismissal of a defamation claim by a public figure; CoreCivic v. Candide Group (9th Cir. 2022), reaffirming anti-SLAPP’s applicability in Ninth Circuit and striking a private prison company’s defamation suit over social media criticism gtlaw.com ; and Tobinick v. Novella (11th Cir. 2015), a case of a doctor suing a skeptic blogger where the court applied California anti-SLAPP to some claims but not others due to choice-of-law analysis. Each reflects the intersection of anti-SLAPP with federal practice and the strong constitutional baselines that often independently dispose of SLAPP-type suits.) here is a great resource: SLAPP Cases Decided by the California Supreme Court California State Courts Opinions in the U.S. District Courts concerning the California Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16): California Supreme Court (alphabetical by case name) Baral v. Schnitt California Supreme Court, 2016 1 Cal.5th 376, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 376 P.3d 604 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contained causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and a claim for declaratory relief. Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion sought to strike all references to an audit by an accounting firm. The trial court denied the motion without deciding whether the complaint contained allegations of protected activity, ruling that the anti-SLAPP motion applied only to entire causes of action as pleaded in the complaint, or to the complaint as a whole, not to isolated allegations within causes of action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as used in § 425.16(b)(1), “cause of action” referred to allegations of protected activity asserted as grounds for relief, and thus the anti-SLAPP statute could reach distinct claims within pleaded counts, requiring a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity, even if mixed with assertions of unprotected activity. The Court disapproved of the opinion in Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90. Barrett v. Rosenthal California Supreme Court, 2006 40 Cal.4th 33, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 55, 146 P.3d 510 Three plaintiffs, vocal critics of alternative medicine, sued our client, breast-implant awareness activist Ilena Rosenthal, for defamation and related claims, based on critical comments she made about two of them on the Internet. The trial court granted her anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed this ruling as to two plaintiffs, but reversed as to the third. The California Supreme Court held that the third plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as well, ruling that Rosenthal was protected from civil liability for republication of the words of another on the Internet by section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act. On remand, the trial court awarded more than $434,000 for attorneys fees. Barry v. The State Bar of California California Supreme Court, Jan. 5, 2017 2 Cal.5th 318, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 386 P.3d 788 Plaintiff attorney filed an action seeking to vacate a stipulation she had entered into to having committed professional misconduct and a 60-day suspension from the practice of law. The trial court granted the State Bar’s anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that the claims arose from protected activity and that plaintiff could not establish a probability of prevailing, because (inter alia) a superior court lacked subject mater jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. The trial court also awarded $2,575 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff appealed the fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed the fee award, finding that the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded it from ruling on the State Bar’s anti-SLAPP motion and awarding fees. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and upheld the fee award, holding that the superior court properly found that plaintiff had failed to show a probability of prevailing on her claim because the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that said ruling was not on the merits of plaintiff’s claim. Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System California Supreme Court, 2021 11 Cal.5th 995, 281 Cal.Rptr. 3d 678, 491 P.3d 1058 Briggs v. ECHO California Supreme Court, 1999 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564 The Briggses, landlords, sued our client, a nonprofit organization that provides counseling, mediation, and referral services related to landlord-tenant disputes, alleging that the organization harassed and defamed them. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed in a 2-1 decision, finding no “issue of public significance” in the defendant’s conduct. In its first case involving the California anti-SLAPP law, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly and covers any lawsuit arising from the exercise of the right to petition the government, regardless of the issue involved. In total, the trial court awarded more than $425,000 for attorneys fees and costs. City of Cotati v. Cashman California Supreme Court, 2002 29 Cal.4th 69, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 Note: This case was reviewed together with Navellier v. Sletten and Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. A city’s action for declaratory relief respecting the constitutionality of its ordinance, filed in state court in response to a similar action filed by citizens in federal court, does not constitute a SLAPP and is not subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. City of Montebello v. Vasquez California Supreme Court, 2016 1 Cal.5th 409, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 376 P.3d 624 A city sued three of its former council members and a former city administrator, claiming they violated Gov. Code, § 1090, by voting on a waste hauling contract in which they held a financial interest. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that defendants’ votes on the contract were not protected activity under § 425.16. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the council member defendants’ votes cast in favor of the contract at issue constituted protected activity under § 425.16. Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club California Supreme Court, 2008 45 Cal.4th 309, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 196 P.3d 1094 Club Members for an Honest Election (Club) sued the Sierra Club, claiming its elections were unfairly influenced when the board of directors promoted the views that advanced the majority of the Board and members’ position, in conflict with Club’s minority interests. The Court of Appeal applied the public interest litigation exception under C.C.P. 425.17(b) and allowed plaintiff’s claim to proceed, based on the reasoning that the main purpose of the lawsuit was to protect the public interest. The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the Court of Appeal applied the exception too broadly. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s application of the “principle thrust or gravamen” test and stated that 425.17(b) must be narrowly interpreted. For a claim to fall within the public interest exception, the plaintiff must seek to advance the public interest, and only the public interest. In this case, plaintiff requested remedies that would benefit Club by advancing its interests within the Sierra Club. By seeking a personal gain, the plaintiff was prohibited from invoking the exception. The Court ruled in favor of the Sierra Club and granted its anti-SLAPP motion. Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. California Supreme Court, 2002 29 Cal.4th 53, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685 Note: This case was reviewed together with Navellier v. Sletten and City of Cotati v. Cashman The party moving to strike a complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute is not required to demonstrate that the action was brought with the intent to chill the exercise of constitutional speech or petition rights. Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals California Supreme Court, 2014 58 Cal.4th 655, 168 Cal.Rptr.165, 318 P.3d 833 FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. California Supreme Court, 2019 7 Cal.5th 133, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d 591, 439 P.3d 1156 Flatley v. Mauro California Supreme Court, 2006 39 Cal.4th 299, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606, 139 P.3d 2 Flatley, a well-known entertainer, sued attorney Mauro, who threatened to take legal action against him for Flatley’s alleged rape of Mauro’s client. Mauro sent Flatley a “prelitigation settlement” offer demanding payment of $100,000,000 to settle the claim. If Flatley refused to pay, Mauro threatened to not only file a lawsuit, but to widely publicize the rape allegation, including following Flatley around to every place he toured, and to “ruin” Flatley. In addition, Mauro threatened to publicly disclose other alleged criminal violations of immigration and tax law that were entirely unrelated to the rape allegation. The Court of Appeal found that Mauro’s actions constituted extortion as a matter of law, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. The California Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal, holding that a defendant cannot assert the anti-SLAPP statute to protect illegal activity if “either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law.” The Court noted that this was a “narrow” exception, based on the extreme circumstance in this case. Thus, the Court held that Mauro’s anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied. Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. California Supreme Court, 2004 34 Cal.4th 679, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 101 P.3d 552 Gates had been convicted of accessory after the fact to a murder and served three years in prison. Several years later Discovery produced a program about the crime, portraying Gates’s involvement. After the program was broadcast, Gates sued Discovery for defamation and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted Discovery’s demurrer to the defamation cause of action but denied its demurrer to the complaint for invasion of privacy. Discovery then filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the latter complaint; the court denied the motion, finding that Discovery had failed to demonstrate that its account of the crime was newsworthy, thus making it likely that Gates would prevail on his complaint for invasion of privacy. The appellate court’s reversal was upheld, since Discovery’s report is protected by the First Amendment and current case law would make it impossible for Gates to prevail on his claim. Geiser v. Kuhns California Supreme Court, 2022 13 Cal.5th 1238, 297 Cal. Rptr. 3d 592, 515 P.3d 623 In re Episcopal Church Cases California Supreme Court, 2009 45 Cal.4th 467, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 275, 198 P.3d 66 The Los Angeles Diocese sued St. James Parish to recover property when the Parish broke with the Episcopal Church, largely over a doctrinal disagreement after the Episcopal Church ordained an openly gay bishop. The Parish filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its disagreement with the Church arose from protected speech. The trial court granted the motion, which was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and held that, because the central issue in the case was a property dispute, the anti-SLAPP motion was not appropriate. The Court recognized that protected speech was tangentially at issue, but held that the action must “arise from” protected activity for the defendant to succeed in an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court recognized that protected activity might “lurk in the background,” but found that this would not transform a property dispute into a SLAPP. Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche California Supreme Court, 2003 31 Cal.4th 728, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 636, 74 P.3d 737 The court affirms the Court of Appeal’s decision that a malicious prosecution action is not exempt from scrutiny under the state’s anti-SLAPP law. Ketchum v. Moses California Supreme Court, 2001 24 Cal.4th 1122, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735 Ketchum sued his tenant Moses for allegedly filing false reports with government agencies about the condition of Ketchum’s property. Moses prevailed on a special motion to strike Ketchum’s complaint. Moses had a contingency fee contract with his attorney; if the anti-SLAPP motion failed, the attorney would receive no fee. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, and included a fee enhancement to reflect the risk of nonpayment in a contingency contract. It later supplemented this award with additional fees and costs after Ketchum attempted to challenge the fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirms the judgement of the Court of Appeal but criticizes the rationale of the Court of Appeal. A successful movant of an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled not only to attorney fees incurred in the pursuit of the anti-SLAPP motion, but also to fees incurred in litigating the award of attorney fees. While attorney fees incurred in pursuit of an anti-SLAPP motion may be enhanced to reflect contingent risk, fees incurred after a successful motion may not be so enhanced because an award of fees is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute and therefore there is no risk of nonpayment. Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District California Supreme Court, 2006 39 Cal.4th 192, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 41, 138 P.3d 193 Physician George Kibler sued defendant hospital and its employees for defamation and other torts after defendants addressed complaints in a peer review meeting that Kibler was verbally abusive and physically threatening at work, resulting in his temporary suspension. Both the trial and appellate courts granted the hospital’s special motion to strike Kibler’s complaint. The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to establish whether a hospital peer review proceeding was “any other official proceeding authorized by law” under 425.16(e)(2). The court concluded that peer review actions, mandated by the Business and Professions Code, function as a quasi-judicial proceeding and are within the ambit of anti-SLAPP protection. The court affirmed the granting of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter California Supreme Court, 2019 7 Cal.5th 781, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 444 P.3d 97 Navellier v. Sletten California Supreme Court, 2002 29 Cal.4th 82, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 Note: This case was reviewed together with Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. and City of Cotati v. Cashman Plaintiffs sued Sletten for a variety of causes, including breach of contract for filing counterclaims in an earlier lawsuit in federal court. Sletten moved to strike this cause of action as a SLAPP, claiming that his counterclaims were protected under the First Amendment’s right of petition. The Court of Appeal (in an unpublished decision) concluded that Sletten’s counterclaims were not a “valid exercise” of that right, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, since he had earlier waived his right to sue Navellier in a “release of claims” as a condition of return to employment. The Supreme Court reverses, holding that Sletten had met his threshold burden of demonstrating that Navellier’s action for breach of contract “is one arising from the type of speech and petitioning activity that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (See follow-on decision in Navellier v. Sletten, First District Court of Appeal.) Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism California Supreme Court, 3/22/18 A defendant must file a special motion to strike a cause of action within 60 days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action, pursuant to CCP § 425.16(f), subject to the trial court’s discretion under that subdivision to permit late filing (rejecting contrary ruling in Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298). Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman California Supreme Court, 2011 51 Cal.4th 811, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115 Plaintiff sued its former attorney and his law firm for breach of fiduciary duty and related claims. The attorney had represented the client in obtaining approval for a redevelopment project. After the representation ended, the attorney campaigned against the city council’s approval of the redevelopment project by soliciting signatures on a referendum petition. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the claims arose from protected petitioning activity and plaintiff has not shown a probability of prevailing on its claims. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal. Citing the Court’s “inherent, primary authority over the practice of law,” the Court proceeded directly to the second “prong” (whether plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on its claims) without addressing the first “prong” (whether the anti-SLAPP law applies). It found that plaintiff had met its burden on the second “prong,” holding that from the undisputed facts, it was reasonable to infer that the attorney relied on confidential information in opposing the project, the requirement that a lawyer not misuse a client’s confidential information applied to discussion of public issues, and such misuse of information was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Olson v. Doe (January 13, 2022, S258498) Parrish v. Latham & Watkins California Supreme Court, 2017 3 Cal.5th 767, 400 P.3d 1 The denial of summary judgment barred a subsequent malicious prosecution action under the interim adverse judgment rule, notwithstanding a finding of bad faith. Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University California Supreme Court, 2017 2 Cal.5th 1057, 98 Cal. Rptr. 859, 393 P.3d 905 Professor Sungho Park sued the California State University, challenging its decision to deny him tenure, asserting that it was discriminatory. The University filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied by the trial court, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the university could invoke the anti-SLAPP law because the professor’s lawsuit was based on communications the university made in the course of arriving at its decision to deny tenure, which were made in connection with an official proceeding. In a unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal. The Court held that “a claim is not subject to a motion to strike simply because it contests an action or decision that was arrived at following speech or petitioning activity, or that was thereafter communicated by means of speech or petitioning activity. Rather, a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” The Court disapproved of three Court of Appeal opinions, Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District, DeCambre v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego, and Tuszynska v. Cunningham. Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson California Supreme Court, 2019 6 Cal.5th 610, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 433 P.3d 899 Rusheen v. Cohen California Supreme Court, 2006 37 Cal.4th 1048, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713 Rusheen sued Cohen for abuse of process, for allegedly filing false declarations on the issue of service, and conspiring to execute the resulting default judgment against Rusheen. Cohen filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that Cohen’s conduct was privileged under Civil Code section 47(b) as communications in the course of a judicial proceeding. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that executing on the improper default judgment was unprivileged, noncommunicative conduct. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted. It concluded that where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying). S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti California Supreme Court, 2006 39 Cal.4th 374, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 138 P.3d 713 When plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their entire action without prejudice before defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, defendants could not recover attorney fees and costs pursuant to 425.16, subsection (c). Serova vs. Sony Music Entertainment et al. California Supreme Court, 2022 13 Cal.5th 859 Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore California Supreme Court, 2010 49 Cal.4th 12, 109 Cal.Rptr. 3d 329, 230 P.3d 1117 In 2004, defendant attorney Pierce Gore placed several newspaper ads advising deck owners of potential legal claims against plaintiff Simpson Strong-Tie. The company sued Gore, listing a litany of claims like trade libel and unfair business practices, for implying that the company’s galvanized screws were defective, and sought to enjoin the ad. When Gore filed a special motion to strike, Simpson Strong-Tie invoked C.C.P. §425.17(c), the commercial speech exception. The trial court rejected Simpson Strong-Tie’s argument and granted the special motion to strike, which was upheld on appeal. In affirming the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court looked at the parameters of the commercial speech exception under 425.17(c). The Court held that the burden of showing the applicability of 425.17(c) falls on the plaintiff. The Court then clarified that the purpose of the exception was to stop businesses from using advertising to “trash talk” competitors. Gore sold legal services, not screws—he was not a business competitor with defendant, thus his ad was not the type of speech targeted by subsection (c). Under the two-step analysis, the Court found that Gore’s speech was protected. Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif California Supreme Court, 2006 39 Cal.4th 260, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 638. 139 P.3d 30 Plaintiff Peggy Soukup filed a SLAPPback action for abuse of process and malicious prosecution against her former employers after prevailing on her anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiffs’-turned-defendants’ attorney Herbert Hafif then filed a special motion to strike her complaint. The California Supreme Court considered the legislative purpose of C.C.P. §425.18(h), which precludes a SLAPPback defendant from filing a special motion to strike if the underlying action was illegal as a matter of law; the statute also “stack[s] the procedural deck in favor” of SLAPPback plaintiffs. Finding that the SLAPP Hafif filed against Soukup did not violate various statutes and was not a “sham” lawsuit, the court ruled that Hafif did not break the law in asserting claims against Soukup, despite the fact that his claim was dismissed as a SLAPP. Ultimately, the court found that Soukup showed a probability of prevailing on the malicious prosecution claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a separate motion, Hafif’s anti-SLAPP appellate counsel Ronald Stock sought to strike Soukup’s claim, arguing that his limited involvement in appealing the anti-SLAPP motion was insufficient to sustain a malicious prosecution claim. The Court rejected this argument based on the evidence. Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co. California Supreme Court, 2019 6 Cal.5th 931, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 434 P.3d 1152 Taus v. Loftus California Supreme Court, 2007 40 Cal.4th 683, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775. 151 P.3d 1185 Nicole Taus sued defendant authors for defamation and other torts after a journal published articles relating to a psychologist’s study about her as a child. The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on several grounds, but affirmed its finding that Taus could proceed with her claim of improper intrusion into private matters. While recognizing that it is common practice for reporters to conceal motives in newsgathering, the Court drew a distinction, finding that this protection was not so broad as to allow a person to falsely pose as the colleague of a mental health professional to elicit highly personal information about a subject from the subject’s relative or close friend. While a single claim survived on appeal, the Court awarded costs and fees to defendants because the majority of plaintiff’s claims should have been dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court also expressed reservations about the appellate court’s unequivocal conclusion that Taus was not a limited public figure based on her consent to be the subject of a prominent medical study, and revealing her face and voice in publicly viewed materials. Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino California Supreme Court, 2005 35 Cal.4th 180, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 106 P.3d 958 “The perfecting of an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike automatically stays all further trial court proceedings on the merits upon the causes of action affected by the motion.” Vargas v. City of Salinas California Supreme Court, 2009 46 Cal.4th 1, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 205 P.3d 207 The City of Salinas distributed a newsletter explaining Measure O, a contentious ballot measure that would phase out the city’s utility tax. Supporters of the ballot measure sued the city for expending public funds on the newsletter, claiming it was an impermissible election communication as defined by the Government Code. The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s granting of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, but based its conclusion on a different standard than the Court of Appeal. The Court clarified that government entities and public officials are entitled to anti-SLAPP protection. The Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case that defendants’ conduct was unlawful and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. California Supreme Court, 2019 7 Cal.5th 871, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 444 P.3d 706 Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester California Supreme Court, 2002 28 Cal.4th 811, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733 Note: Opinion overruled in part by Assembly Bill 1158 (2005), amending Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(b)(3). The issue presented is whether, in an action for malicious prosecution, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in the underlying action establishes that there was probable cause to support the action, thus precluding a suit for malicious prosecution. The court says it does when the denial is predicated on a finding that the action had potential merit. Zamos v. Stroud California Supreme Court, 2004 32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802 The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution. California Courts of Appeal (Cases listed A – Z) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z # Superior Court, Appellate Division – Published Opinions Federal Courts Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Selected cases (alphabetical by case name) SLAPP Cases Decided by the California Courts of Appeal The following is a list of published SLAPP opinions decided by the California Courts of Appeal and a brief summary of some of them. Clicking on the name of the case will lead to the text of the opinion. For most opinions issued on or after April 3, 2013, clicking on the case name will lead to the text of the opinion on Google Scholar. # 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003, 2d District – 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789) Plaintiff sued Steinberg for business damages, alleging that Steinberg had colluded with plaintiff’s former employee to promote legislative action adverse to plaintiff’s business by facilitating meetings between the former employee and representatives of professional associations. The trial court granted Steinberg’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that the cause of action was conduct “in furtherance of free speech or petition in connection with a public issue” and plaintiff had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its complaint, including counts of inducing breach contract and inducing breach of fiduciary duties. The appellate court affirms. 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016, 4th District – 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 212Cal.Rptr.3d 304) (modified 12-29-16) 1100 Park Lane Associates v. Feldman (2008, 1st District – 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) 1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn., Inc. v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2018, 2d District – 28 Cal.App.5th 1146, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 740) A Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019, 2d District – 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Abuemeira v. Stephens (2016, 2d District – 246 Cal.App.4th 1291, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 437) Albanese v. Menounos (2013, 2d District – 218 Cal.App.4th 923, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 546) Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management (2022, B313842) A.F. Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006, 4th District – 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Aguilar v. Goldstein (2012, 2d District – 207 Cal.App.4th 1152, 144 Cal.Rptr3d 238) All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic and Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010, 1st District – 183 Cal.App.4th 1186, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 861) Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011, 4th District – 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 781) Alston v. Dawe (2020, 4th District – 52 Cal.App.5th 706, 267 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) American Humane Association v. Los Angeles Times Communications (2001, 2d District – 92 Cal.App.4th 1095, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 488) Plaintiff sought declaratory relief to prevent the LA Times from using a confidential internal report about conflicts of interest in the plaintiff organization. The trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. In the published portion of its opinion, the appellate court addresses the question of the timing of a request for attorney fees and costs (2011, 4th District – 200 Cal. App. 4th 656) Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005, 1st District – 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 863) Ampex sued an anonymous Internet poster for defamation and the poster responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. Once the poster was identified as Cargle, Ampex dismissed the suit and refiled the action in New York. The appellate court in an earlier opinion ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion even after dismissal. In this opinion the court holds that Cargle was the prevailing party in the trial court and was therefore entitled to attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute. Anderson v. Geist (2015, 4th District – 236 Cal.App.4th 79, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 286) Animal Legal Defense Fund v. LT Napa Partners LLC (2015, 1st District – 234 Cal.App.4th 1270, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 759) Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004, 4th District – 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 100) This case arose from highly publicized and controversial litigation concerning the validity of “second-parent” adoptions. The parties were domestic partners. Sharon bore two children by artificial insemination during the relationship. Annette successfully petitioned the court to adopt the first child as a second parent. After the couple separated Annette filed a legal action to adopt the second child. Following that action, Annette sued Sharon for defamation arising from statements made by Sharon in a letter to an advocacy organization. The trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The trial court ruled that the action arose from constitutionally protected speech but concluded that Annette had established a probability of prevailing on her claim. The appellate court disagrees on the grounds that Annette is a public figure by virtue of the public controversy surrounding the adoption proceedings and cannot prove the actual malice required of public figures alleging defamation. Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009, 2d District – 164 Cal.App.4th 1108, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 849) Antounian v. Louis Vuitton Malletier (2010, 2d District – 189 Cal.App.4th 438, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 3) Applied Business Software, Inc. v. Pacific Mortgage Exchange, Inc. (2008, 2d District – 138 Cal.App.4th 1307, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 371) Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018, 1st District – 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 165) Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021, 4th District – 61 Cal.App.5th 136, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 519) Aron v. WIB Holdings (2/28/2018, 2d District – 21 Cal.App.5th 1069, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017, 1st District – 8 Cal.App.5th 768, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 358) Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital (2016, 4th District – 5 Cal.App.5th 810, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 388) ARP Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. (2006, 2d District – 42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 62) Association for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. L.A. Times Communs. LLC (2015, 2d District – 239 Cal.App.4th 808, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 564) Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Assn. (2022, 1st District – 76 Cal.App.5th 1043, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 150) Averill v. Superior Court (1996, 4th District – 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 782) Averill publicly criticized a plan by a charitable organization to convert a house in her neighborhood into a shelter for battered women. After she attempted to pursuade her employer not to contribute to the charity, the charity sued her for slander solely for her comments to her employer. The lower court’s denial of Averill’s special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that comments made in private, if made in connection with a public issue, are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. B Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010, 4th District – 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 153) Bailey v. Brewer (2011, 2d District – 197 Cal.App.4th 781, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380) Balla v. Hall (2021, 4th District – 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 695) Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009, 4th District – 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 782) Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006, 2d District – 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 688) Plaintiff filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Michael Larivee and the Quisenberry Law Firm. The trial court allowed Larivee to join in the Quisenberry Law Firm’s special motion to strike and granted the motion even though the hearing was held more than 30 days after service. Affirming the lower court’s ruling, the appellate court found the hearing to be timely and held that joinder to a special motion to strike is effective as long as the joining defendant demonstrates that the action arises out of protected First Amendment activity. Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015, 1st District – 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 511) Baughn v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2016, 3d District – 246 Cal.App.4th 328, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 764) Beach v. Harco National Insurance Co. (2003, 3d District – 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 454) Plaintiff sued his insurer, alleging bad faith in handling his claim because of delay. The company filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing that, because the claim was eventually submitted to arbitration, the company’s processing of the claim was an exercise of its right of petition under the First Amendment and therefore protected by both the anti-SLAPP statute and the “litigation privilege” (Civil Code § 47(b)). The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. According to the court, the cause of action lies in nonaction and delays, not in any specific statement or writing by the company, and none of this conduct involved the company’s right of petition. Moreover, “the fact that a dispute exists that might ultimately lead to arbitration does not make every step in that dispute part of a right to petition.” Behunin v. Superior Court (2017, 2d District – 9 Cal.App.5th 833, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 475) Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996, 2d District – 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357) Beilenson defeated Sybert in an election for U.S. Congress. After the election Sybert sued Beilenson, a campaign worker, a consulting firm, and a campaign committee, alleging that Beilenson distributed libelous campaign literature. The lower court’s denial of Beilenson’s special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court holds that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements by candidates for public office and their supporters. Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018, 2d District – 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 71) Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLCJune 29, 2021 (2021, Second District – 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 662) Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP (2004, 2d District – 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 621) Benasra sued lawyers who represented his business rival while still representing him, alleging breach of duty of loyalty. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court reverses, holding that the court’s earlier decision in Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp — that a claim for legal malpratice is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint — applies to a complaint alleging breach of attorney duty of loyalty. Ben-Shahar v. Pickart (2014, 2d District – 231 Cal.App.4th 1043, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 464) Benitez v. North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 106 Cal.App.4th 978, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 364) While Benitez was being treated for infertility at NCWCMG’s facility, she told her doctor she was a lesbian. Subsequently she encountered difficulties in receiving infertility treatment at NCWCMG. Benitez sued on a variety claims. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, on which the trial court did not rule. On appeal, Benitez argued that the motion is without merit and should be denied. The appellate court refuses to consider the issue on the grounds that there is no appealable order from the trial court. Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios (2013, 1st District – 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 423) Benton v. Benton (2019, 4th District – 39 Cal.App.5th 212, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 118) Bergman v. Drum (2005, 2d District – 129 Cal.App.4th 11, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 112) Bergman sued attorney Drum for malicious prosecution of a case against her, and in response Drum filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The motion was denied and then affirmed in an earlier appeal, in which the appellate court concluded that Bergman had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on her claim. Thereafter the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. In this appeal the court holds that the doctrine of the law of the case precluded summary judgment for the defendant because summary judgement was inconsistent with the appellate court’s previous ruling concerning the anti-SLAPP motion. Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015, 2d District – 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 187 CAl.Rptr.3d 36) Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004, 4th District – 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 197) Plaintiffs sued Planned Parenthood under California’s Unfair Competition Law (Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.), alleging that its websites contained “unlawful, unfair, confusing, and misleading statements” concerning abortion, and seeking injunctive relief. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was granted by the trial court after plaintiffs were unable to show a reasonable probability of prevailing on their claims for injunctive relief. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the state’s anti-SLAPP statute is unconstitutional on its face. The appellate court rejects all of plaintiffs’ arguments and affirms the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. Bernstein v. LaBeouf (2019, 2d District – 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 173) Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015, 1st District – 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 499) Birkner v. Lam (2007, 1st District – 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 190) Blackburn v. Brady (2004, 4th District – 116 Cal.App.4th 460, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 696) Blackburn obtained an undivided one-half interest in property co-owned by Brady and his partner Lanser at public auction in partial satisfaction of a money judgment against Lanser. In this action for partition Blackburn also alleges fraud, that Brady and Lanser conspired to drive up the value of the land at auction. Brady filed a special motion to strike the complaint for fraud, arguing that his written bid and any oral statements made at the auction were made in connection with an official proceeding, i.e., Brady’s lawsuit against Lanser, and thus was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. The court agrees with existing case law that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect every act having any connection, however remote, with an official proceeding. In order for statements or writings to be protected by the statute they must be made in connection with “an issue under consideration or review” in the proceeding. Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004, 2d District – 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 385) DIRECTV sent letters to thousands of people who purchased devices that can pirate DIRECTV’s television signals, demanding that the recipients cease using the devices. Several recipients of these demand letters filed a complaint against DIRECTV, alleging that the mailing of the demand letters was an unfair business practice (Business & Professions Code, § 17200). DIRECTV filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirms, holding that the provision of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute that excludes public interest lawsuits does not apply to the plaintiff-purchasers’ action, and DIRECTV is entitled to have the complaint stricken. Bleavins v. Demarest (2011, 2d District – 196 Cal. App. 4th 1533, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 580) Blue v. Office of Inspector General (2018, 3d District – 23 Cal.App.5th 138, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 590) Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2017, 4th District – 13 Cal.App.5th 851, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 598) Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021, 4th District – 11 Cal.5th 995, 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678) Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2022, 4th District – 83 Cal. App. 5th 288, 298 Cal. Rptr. 3d 730) Booker v. Rountree (2007, 4th District – 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 733) Bowen v. Lin (2022, 2d District – 80 Cal. App. 5th 155) Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996, 2d District – 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207) A deputy sheriff shot and killed a citizen during execution of a search warrant. Following an investigation by the district attorney, the deputy was exonerated. However, the DA’s public report of the investigation questioned the veracity of the affidavit supporting the search warrant. The deputy sued the district attorney for slander. The trial court’s denial of the district attorney’s special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. Held: the state’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to public employees who issue reports and comment on issues of public interest relating to their official duties. Moreover, public entities are “persons” for the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute and thus entitled to recover attorney fees when they prevail on a special motion to strike a complaint. Branner v. Regents University of California (2009, 1st District – 175 Cal.App.4th 1043, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 690) Braun v. The Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997, 1st District – 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58) Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc. (2004, 4th District – 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 702) Brenton sued for product liability and other causes of tort action, alleging that she suffered a psychotic breakdown after using a Metabolife product. She also alleged that Metabolife’s false advertising and misbranding of the product violated the state’s unfair business practices statute (Business & Professions Code § 17200). Metabolife moved to strike the entire complaint as a SLAPP, arguing that Brenton’s complaint targeted protected commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. According to the court, the specific issue in this case is a recurring one: whether a claim against a manufacturer for physical injury, allegedly caused by use of its product, is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute merely because the manufacturer also engaged in commercial speech to market the product. The court rejects Metabolife’s argument that its labeling and advertising of the product are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because they constitute, in the statute’s terms, written statements made in a place open to the public in connection with an issue of public interest. In addition, the court holds that the newly enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 (effective Jan. 1, 2004) expressly removes Brenton’s complaint for unfair business practices from the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection. (Section 425.17 provides that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to “any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, … arising from any statement or conduct by that person,” as long as certain conditions are met.) The court rejects Metabolife’s argument that section 425.17 is unconstitutional because it cannot withstand the strict scrutiny standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n (1980). (See also Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc., 3d District Court of Appeal (2004).) Briganti v. Chow (2019, 2d District – 42 Cal.App.5th 504, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 909) Brighton Collectibles, LLC v. Hockey (2021, 2nd District – 65 Cal.App.5th 99, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 518) Brill Media Co., LLC v. TCW Group, Inc. (2005, 2d District – 132 Cal.App.4th 324, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 371) 74 affiliated media companies sued defendant bond holders and their related entities for breach of contract and interference with economic relations, alleging defendants caused the default of and liquidation of plaintiffs’ entities by breaching confidentiality agreements and interfering with pending contracts. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. The appellate court reversed, concluding plaintiffs’ claims arose out of commercial speech and conduct and therefore fell under the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. Judge Bosk dissented. Britts v. Superior Court (2006, 6th District -145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 185) Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016, 2d District – 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 483) Brown v. Grimes (2011, 2d District – 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 893) Burrill v. Nair (2013, 3d District – 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 332) C C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019, 2d District – 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 806) Cabral v. Martins (2009, 1st District – 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 99 Cal. Rptr.3d 394) California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand (2008, 2d District – 160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 268) Callanan v. GRIZZLY DESIGNS, LLC (June 29, 2022, C094008) Carpenter & Zuckerman, LLP v. Cohen (2011, 2d District – 195 Cal.App.4th 373, Cal.Rptr.3d) Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007, 2d District – 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 839) Carver v. Bonds (2005, 1st District – 169 Cal.App.4th 328, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 480) Plaintiff podiatrist sued baseball player, reporters, and newspaper for defamation arising from statements in a newspaper article. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions were granted; plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that stating facts and opinions about plaintiff was plainly “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of … [defendants’] constitutional right[s] of free speech” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4); and since the statements served as a warning against plaintiff’s method of self-promotion, and were provided along with other information to assist patients in choosing doctors, the statements involved a matter of public concern. Furthermore, because plaintiff could not prove falsity, and because some of the newspaper’s statements were privileged, he did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims. Castillo v. Pacheco (2007, 2d District – 150 Cal.App.4th 242, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 305) Castleman v. Sagaser (2013, 5th District – 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 492) Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm, Inc. (2022, 1st District – 73 Cal.App.5th 764, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 773) Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018, 1st District – 19 Cal.App.5th 203, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 848) Century21 v. Haberman (2009, 4th District – 173 Cal.App.4th 1, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 249) Chabak v. Monroy (2007, 5th District – 140 Cal.App.4th 821, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 777) Chaker v. Mateo (2012, 4th District – 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 496) Chambers v. Miller (2006, 4th District – 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 825) Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. v. Peng Xufeng (2020, 4th District – 57 Cal.App.5th 1, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 853) Charney v. Standard General, L.P. (2017, 2d District – 10 Cal.App.5th 149, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 889) Chavez v. Mendoza (2001, 4th District – 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 600) Mendoza sued an insurance company and its agents, Richard and Ina Chavez, asserting numerous contract and tort claims. All claims but one were dismissed. Subsequently the Chavezes sued Mendoza for malicious prosecution. Mendoza moved to strike the complaint as a SLAPP. The trial court ruled that a malicious prosecution complaint was not subject to the state’s anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court reversed the ruling, holding that a malicious prosecution complaint is subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. However, the court also concluded that the Chavezes had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their complaint and therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of Mendoza’s special motion to strike the complaint. Cheveldave v. Tri Palms Unified Owners Assn. (2018, 4th District – 27 Cal.App.5th 1202, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 792) Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011, 2d District – 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910) Cho v. Chang (2013, 2d District – 219 Cal.App.4th 521, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 846) Chodos v. Cole (2012, 2d District – 210 Cal.App.4th 692, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 451) Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (“Alnor I”) (2007, 4th District – 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866) Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (“Alnor II”) (2008, 4th District – 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866) Church of Scientology of California v. Wollersheim (1996, 2d District – 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620) The Church of Scientology filed a lawsuit seeking to vacate a multimillion dollar judgment against it, in favor of our client, Lawrence Wollersheim. This was part of extensive and drawn-out litigation (lasting 15 years) between Scientology and Wollersheim. The trial court granted Wollersheim’s anti-SLAPP motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to causes of action arising from any act in furtherance of the right of petition, such as Wollersheim’s original successful lawsuit, regardless of the subject matter. More than $428,000 in fees were awarded. Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020, 4th District – 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 380) Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez (2021, 2d District – 63 Cal.App.5th 117, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 501) City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011, 2d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 142) City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013, 4th District – 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 698) City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011, 2d District – 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 433) City of Long Beach v. California Citizens for Neighborhood Empowerment (2003, 2d District – 111 Cal.App.4th 302, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 473) City filed a civil complaint against CCNE, alleging violations of the municipal code concerning campaign contributions. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, holding that the “prosecutorial exemption” in the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to the complaint and the city had not demonstrated that it was likely to prevail on the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the prosecutorial exemption — “enforcement actions brought in the name of the people of the State of California” — applies to civil actions by cities enforcing municipal law. According to the court, the legislative history of the statute indicates a broader intent behind the exemption than is evident from the specific wording. (See also People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc., 1st District Court of Appeal, and People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar, 4th District Court of Appeal.) City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League (2006, 2d District – 135 Cal.App.4th 606, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 632) The City of Los Angeles, on behalf of two of its employees, filed petitions seeking workplace violence protective orders under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 against animal rights activists. Defendants filed anti-SLAPP motions which the trial court denied, holding that the petitions were exempt as public entity enforcement actions under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(d).The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply because the City filed the petitions as “employer” and not in its capacity as “public prosecutor” the petitions arose from protected free speech activity; and the City failed to demonstrate a probability it would prevail on its claims because (1) the protective orders under section 527.8 can only be brought against natural persons (not ADL), and (2) the City presented no evidence that individual defendant Ferdin conveyed a credible threat of violence in the workplace. City of Riverside v. Stansbury (2007, 4th District – 155 Cal.App.4th 1582, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 862) City of San Diego v. Dunkl (2001, 4th District – 86 Cal.App.4th 384, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 269) The City and the partnership that owns the San Diego Padres baseball team filed preemptive suits against proponents of a ballot initiative that would have made certain negative findings concerning an earlier city ordinance that authorized funds for construction of a downtown ballpark. Plaintiffs argued that the initiative was invalid and should not be placed on the ballot even if adequate signatures were obtained because the initiative sought to enact measures that were beyond the power of hte voters to adopt. Defendants filed a special motion to strike. The trial court granted summary judgment and ruled that in consequence the SLAPP motion was moot. The appellate court affirms. “Where . . . declaratory relief actions present purely legal questions about the validity of the subject matter of the lawsuits, . . . the SLAPP issue of whether the plaintiffs are more probably than not going to prevail in their actions may appropriately be determined by the use of related summary judgment proceedings.” City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005, 2d District – 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72) Several lawsuits were brought concerning enforcement of initiatives approved by voters in Santa Monica and Pasadena. The initiatives sought to prevent city officials from receiving certain advantages from persons or entities who benefited from decisions made by those officials. Pasadena officials refused to certify the initiative on the grounds that they believed it was unconstitutional. A Pasadena resident filed a petition for a writ of mandate to require the city to certify the initiative; the initiative’s sponsor was granted leave to intervene. The city filed a cross-complaint against the sponsor seeking a judicial declaration that the city had no duty to certify the initiative under the law. The sponsor filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the cause of action in the cross-complaint arose from protected First Amendment activity and the city was not able to demonstrate the required probability of succeeding on the cross-complaint. CKE Restaurants, Inc. v. Moore (2008, 2d District – 159 Cal.App.4th 262, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 921) Clarity Co. Consulting v. Gabriel (2022, 2d District – 77 Cal.App.5th 454, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 532) Clark v. Mazgani (2009, 2d District – 170 Cal.App.4th 1280, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 24) Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2006, 1st District – 137 Cal.App.4th 1166, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 818) Note! Opinion superseded by California Supreme Court’s granting of petition for review on June 21, 2006 (S143087).Plaintiffs filed suit against Sierra Club, alleging improper distribution of information during an election to the Club’s board of directors. The trial court granted Sierra Club’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It reversed as to three causes of action which it found were exempt under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17(b) as a public interest action. It also found that one cause of action was not exempt under section 425.17(b) because the claim “seeks relief pertaining specifically to [two named directors] … [and] the gravamen of a cause of action seeking relief of such a personal kind does not satisfy the public interest criterion of the exemption of § 425.17.” The court found that the claim arose from acts protected by the First Amendment in connection with a public issue, and that the uncontested summary judgment in favor of defendant conclusively established that plaintiff had no probability of prevailing. Cohen v. Brown (2009, 2d District – 173 Cal.App.4th 302, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 24) Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012, 2d District – 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 646) Collier v. Harris (2015, 4th District – 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 31) Collondrez v. City of Rio Vista (2021, 1st District – 61 Cal.App.5th 1039, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 895) Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245) The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against Colt for “an illegal scheme to manipulate the price of four stocks.” Colt responded to the SEC action by stipulating to a consent decree. After Freedom Communications published stories about the SEC allegations, Colt sued for defamation and other damages. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, and the appellate court affirms. The court concluded that, because defendant is immune from liability for the articles under Civil Code section 47 and plaintiff had not offered credible evidence of actual malice, plaintiff had not established a probability of prevailing on the complaint as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. Coltrain v. Shewalter (2003, 4th District – 66 Cal.App.4th 94, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 600) Our clients, the neighbors of an apartment complex, filed nuisance actions in small claims court against the owners of the complex, after unsuccessful attempts to abate alleged criminal activity and harassment by residents of the complex. In retaliation, the owners of the complex sued our clients for trade libel, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After our clients filed an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiffs dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeal found that our clients were targets of a SLAPP and were entitled to recover our attorneys fees, even though the plaintiffs dismissed the complaint. Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017, 2d District – 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 767) Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 110 Cal.App.4th 26, 1 Cal.Rpr.3d 390) Commonwealth Energy gave Investor Data a list of Commonwealth’s shareholders. After Investor Data used the list to market its services to the shareholders, Commonwealth sued for a variety of business-related causes of action. Investor Data filed an anti-SLAPP motion, denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirms. The court points out that, because the speech alleged to be the cause of action (Investor Data’s pitch to Commonwealth’s investors) did not occur within an official proceeding, the decision whether Investor Data’s statements are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute depends entirely on whether the statements were made in connection with a public issue (following the standard announced by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity). The court holds that a sales pitch for a commercial service does not qualify as a public issue for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See the earlier case, Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 1st District Court of Appeal.) ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001, 4th District – 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625) After a failed attempt at merger between ComputerXpress and a business owned by defendants, defendants posted statements about ComputerXpress on the internet and filed a complaint against ComputerXpress with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). ComputerXpress sued, alleging in nine causes of action that defendants had conspired to damage its reputation and cause it economic harm. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to strike the entire complaint on the grounds that none of the causes of action fell under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court noted that the nine causes of action were based on three distinct sets of facts: (1) statements made in private business transactions, (2) the internet postings, and (3) the SEC complaint. The court concluded that statements made in the internet postings and SEC complaint fell under the anti-SLAPP statute, whereas the statements made in private business transactions did not. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the causes of action subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. In addition, the court ruled that defendants should be considered the prevailing party on the SLAPP motion, notwithstanding their partial success, and thus are entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred by the motion. Comstock v. Aber (2013, 1st District – 212 Cal.App.4th 931) Lisa Aber filed a claim of sexual harassment and battery against her employer and two of its employees. One of those employees filed a cross-complaint against Aber, alleging claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Aber’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the cross-complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed. In its decision, the Court of Appeal held that Aber’s statements to the police, a nurse, and the employer’s HR manager were all protected under the anti-SLAPP law, as statements made in, or in connection with matters under review by, an official proceeding or body, and that the cross-complainant had not shown that his claims had any merit. Cross-complainant appealed the trial court’s award of $62,299.60 for Aber’s attorneys’ fees and costs, but that appeal was later dismissed. Conroy v. Spitzer (1999, 4th District – 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443) A candidate for public office sued his rival, alleging defamation in the rival’s campaign statements. The appellate court upholds the trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint. Plaintiff was a public figure and thus required to prove malice to prevail on a claim of defamation; he failed to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction a probability of prevailing on his claim, as required to defeat the special motion. Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 107 Cal.App.4th 595, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 191) Consumer and consumer advocate sued a manufacturer of herbal supplements, alleging false advertising and other causes of action for the company’s claim that its herbal supplement enlarged women’s breasts. The appellate court affirms the trial court’s denial of the company’s special motion to strike the complaint. Defendant had not shown that its commercial speech was protected by the state’s anti-SLAPP statute and in any event plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims. Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007, 4th District – 152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 434) Contreras v. Dowling (2016, 1st District – 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 707) Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2013, 4th District – 215 Cal.App.4th 1237, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 70) Coretronic Corporation et al. v. Cozen O’Connor et al. (2011, 2d District – 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 254 County of Riverside v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016, 4th District – 246 Cal.App.4th 20, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 573) Cross v. Cooper (2011, 6th District – 197 Cal. App. 4th 357; 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903) Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017, 1st District – 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 250) Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Association (2017, 3d District – 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Cruz v. City of Culver City (2016, 2d District – 2 Cal.App.5th 239, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 736) Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019, 4th District – 35 Cal.App.5th 1109, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 200)Curtin Maritime Corp. v. Pacific Dredge & Construction, LLC (2022, 4th District – 76 Cal.App.5th 651, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 639) D D’Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014, 6th District – 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 171) D.C. v. R.R. (2010, 2d District – 182 Cal.App.4th 1190, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 399) Dae v. Traver (2021, 2nd District, Division 2 – 69 Cal.App.5th 447, 284 Cal.Rptr.3d 495) Daimler Chrysler Motors Co. v. Lew Williams, Inc. (2006, 3d District – 142 Cal.App.4th 344, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 233) Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000, 4th District – 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205) The appellate court upholds the trials court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint. Held: The anti-SLAPP statutes applies to allegedly defamatory statements made at meetings of a homeowners association and in the association’s newsletter because both forums were open to the public and the defendants’ statements “concerned the manner in which a large residential community would be governed.” Daniel v. Wayans (2017, 2d District – 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 213Cal.Rptr.3d 865) Daniels v. Robbins (2010, 4th District – 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 223) Dean v. Friends of Pine Meadow (2018, 1st District – ___ Cal.App.5th ___, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 865) DeCambre v. Rady Children’s Hospital-San Diego (2015, 4th District – 235 Cal.App.4th 1, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 888) (modification, 4-2-15) Decker v. The U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 105 Cal.App.4th 1382, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 892) Note: Opinion overruled by Assembly Bill 1158 (2005), amending Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. UDR is a consumer reporting agency that gathers and sells information about unlawful detainer cases. Several tenants, after unsuccessfully attempting to have UDR amend information about them in UDR’s records, sued UDR, alleging negligence, defamation, and other acts. The trial court denied UDR’s anti-SLAPP motions to strike the complaints, finding that the motions were frivolous. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that UDR’s motions did not meet the requirement in the anti-SLAPP statute for notice of a hearing no later than 30 days after service of the motion. (See also Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2002).) de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC (2018, 2d District – 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 625) Delois v. Barrett Block Partners (2009, 1st District – 177 Cal.App.4th 940, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 609) Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc (2014, 2d District – 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 131) Dept. of Fair Employment & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC (2007, 2d District – 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 349) Dible v. Haight Ashbury Free Clinics (2009,1st District – 170 Cal.App.4th 843, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 464) Dickens v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. (2004, 2d District – 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 877) Dickens was charged in criminal court with defrauding Provident by submitting false claims that he was disabled. Dickens was acquitted by a jury. He then sued Provident, alleging malicious prosecution and other causes of action. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirms, holding that a malicious prosecution claim based on termination of a criminal prosecution in plaintiff’s favor is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court concludes that Dickens failed to establish a prima facie case of liability for malicious prosecution because he offered no evidence that defendant was instrumental in the criminal prosecution against Dickens. Dickinson v. Cosby I (2017, 2d District – 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 430) Dickinson v. Cosby II (2019, 2d District – 37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 250 Cal.Rptr.3d 350) Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011, 2d District- 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 736) Direct Shopping Network, LLC v. James (2012, 2d District – 206 Cal.App.4th 1551, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Dixon v. Superior Court (1994, 4th District – 30 Cal.App.4th 733, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 687) Surveyor brought an action against a university professor, alleging interference with economic relationships, libel, slander, and trade libel arising from statements critical of the surveyor’s report regarding a proposed development at the university. The statements were made during the public review period following issuance of a negative declaration under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The lower court’s denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. Doe v. Luster (2006, 2d District – 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 403) Doe v. McLaughlin (September 21, 2022, No. A161534) Doe v. State of California (2017, 4th District – 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 391) John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016, 2d District – 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60) Donovan v. Dan Murphy Foundation (2012, 2d District – 204 Cal.App.4th 1500, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 71) Dorit v. Noe (2020, 1st District – 49 Cal.App.5th 458, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 98) Dougherty v. Haag (2008, 4th District – 165 Cal.App.4th 315, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996, 2d District – 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830) A recording company sued a law firm for defamation for alleging the company had failed to pay royalties to charities designated by celebrities who had made a recording. The lower court’s granting of the defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. The law firm’s letter to celebrities who had participated in the recording is protected from defamation liability under Civil Code section 47 as a communication preliminary to an official proceeding. Defendants’ appellate attorney fees are recoverable as part of attorney fees authorized by the anti-SLAPP statute. Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001, 4th District – 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 174) Landlord sued attorney who represented tenants in unlawful detainer action for defamation, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress. The appellate court affirms the trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaints. The anti-SLAPP statute applies because the cause of action is statements made in connection with a pending unlawful detainer action, statements that arguably involved public issues of nuisance and safety (defendant stated that someone had twice entered a locked garage and turned off the dial of the tenants’ water heater). Plaintiff’s complaint was pleaded without the requisite specificity and defendant’s statements were privileged under Civil Code section 47(b). The court of appeal also stated that the provision in the anti-SLAPP law for attorney fees must be construed broadly, that a pro per defendant could collect fees under anti-SLAPP law for assistance from retained anti-SLAPP counsel, and that defendant could proceed to collect fee award even though plaintiff had appealed it, unless plaintiff posted a bond. Drell v. Cohen (2014, 2d District – 232 Cal.App.4th 24, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 191) Drum v. Bleau, Fox & Associates (2003, 2d District – 107 Cal.App.4th 1009, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602) Bleau Fox, a law firm, won a legal malpractice action against Drum and his law firm in a jury trial. Although the judge stayed the judgment pending notice of appeal, Bleau Fox immediately filed a levy against Drum’s bank account. Drum then filed a complaint against Bleau Fox for abuse of process. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that Drum had established a prima facie case and the action is not barred by the litigation privilege (Civil Code section 47(b)). Drummond v. Desmarais (2009, 6th District – 176 Cal.App.4th 439, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 394) Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 45 (2003, 1st District – 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 501) After he was terminated as assistant business manager for a union, the union’s trustee posted a statement on the Internet that Du Charme had been fired for “financial mismanagement”. Du Charme sued the trustee and the union on a variety of complaints. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied on the grounds that the statement posted on the Internet was not made in connection with any official proceeding and did not concern a public issue, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms, emphasizing that a statement must concern an issue of widespread public interest to qualify for protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. “[M]ere publication … should not turn otherwise private information … into a matter of public interest.” Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. v. Buschel (2016, 4th District – 6 Cal.App.5th 1098, 212 Cal Rptr 3d 75) Dunning v. Clews (2021, 4th District – 64 Cal.App.5th 156, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 607) Dunning v. Johnson (April 23, 2021, D076570) DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000, 4th District – 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 755) A class action was filed against DuPont, claiming damages on behalf of purchasers of a drug manufactured by DuPont and alleging that DuPont made false statements before regulatory bodies, the medical profession, and the public regarding the drug. DuPont filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The motion was denied by the trial court. The appellate court determined that the remarks complained of were “acts in furtherance of the person’s [DuPont’s] right of petition or free speech” protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff could demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims, as required by the statute. (See also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 9th Circuit Court of Appeal.) Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013, 4th District – 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 406) Dyer v. Childress (2007, 2d District – 147 Cal.App.4th 1273, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 544) Dziubla v. Piazza (2020, 4th District – 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 297) E Edward v. Ellis (December 14, 2021, G059523) Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC (2014, 3d District – 230 Cal.App.4th 244, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 490) Endres v. Moran (2006, 2d District – 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 786) Plaintiffs sued, claiming defendants had committed various torts as part of a wrongful attempt to control a church. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted for only one of the eleven causes of action (for conspiracy). The trial court denied defendants’ motion for attorneys fees and defendants appealed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the results of the anti-SLAPP motion were so minimal and insignificant that the case remained essentially the same, and the defendants were not prevailing parties, justifying the lower court’s ruling that defendants should not recover fees. Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications Engineers (1996, 1st District – 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 491) Note: Opinon disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity.Ericsson sued a consultant who recommended another company’s proposal to supply and install a communications system for Ventura County, alleging that the consultant intentionally misrepresented the merits of Ericsson’s proposal. The trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. The appellate court concludes that the consultant’s report was prepared in fulfillment of a contract, not for the purpose of speaking out on a public issue (expenditure of public funds). Evans v. Unkow (1995, 1st District – 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 624) A former public official sued individuals who had filed a notice of petition to recall him from office, alleging that statements made in the notice were defamatory. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action, and held that evidence opposing a special motion to strike a complaint must be admissible and declarations may generally not be based on information or belief. F Fair Political Practices Commission v. American Civil Rights Coalition, Inc. (2004, 3d District – 121 Cal.App.4th 1171, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 157) Note: Opinion overruled by Assembly Bill 1158 (2005), amending Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion because it was not heard within 30 days after service of the motion and defendants did not establish that the court’s docket conditions required a later hearing, as required by the state’s anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms. Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022, 4th District – 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 521) Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004, 2d District – 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 493) A seller of women’s apparel filed an action for defamation against the Coalition, a nonprofit organization, alleging that defendants falsely claimed it was responsible for “hundreds of thousands of dollars” in unpaid wages due its workers. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that Fashion 21 had established a probability of prevailing on its complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of proving the falsity of defendants’ statements about unpaid wages. See companion case Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court. FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc. (2017, 2d District – 13 Cal.App.5th 707, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 539) Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates (2021, 2nd District – 68 Cal.App.5th 136, 283Cal.Rptr.3d 22) Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015, 4th District – 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001, 2d District – 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906) After learning that Paladino planned to sue Fox for wrongful termination, Fox sued Paladino, its former in-house counsel, alleging disclosure of confidential and privileged information. The trial court denied Paladino’s special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Fox could not show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits inasmuch as an in-house counsel could disclose ostensible employer-client confidences to his own attorneys in the preparation of a suit for wrongful termination by the employer. Freeman v. Schack (2007, 4th District – 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 867) Freemont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011, 2d District – 198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478) FRYM v. 601 MAIN STREET LLC (2022, 1st District – 82 Cal. App. 5th 613) G Gallagher v. Connell (2004, 2d District – 123 Cal.App.4th 1260, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 673) Evidence that is normally inadmissible may, if no objections are raised, be considered by the court in determining whether a plaintiff challenged by an anti-SLAPP motion has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the complaint. Gallanis-Politis v. Medina (2007, 2d District – 152 Cal.App.4th 600, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 701) Gallano v. Burlington Coat Factory of California, LLC (2021, 1st District – 67 Cal.App.5th 953, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 748) Gallant v. City of Carson (2005, 2d District – 128 Cal.App.4th 705, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 318) Gallant alleged she was terminated as general manager of the city after she reported misdeeds of a city attorney and that, prior to her termination, employees of the city had made public defamatory remarks about her competency as general manager. She sued the city for defamation and wrongful termination. City filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint for defamation, which the trial court granted. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that Gallant had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on her claim. Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. (2002, 2d District – 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 560) Gallimore sought damages from State Farm for alleged misconduct in handling his claims. The company filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing that Gallimore’s allegations were based on reports that the company had filed with the state’s Department of Insurance. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the lower court, and State Farm, had confused allegations of wrongdoing with the evidence required to prove them. Garcia v. Rosenberg (2019, 5th District – 42 Cal.App.5th 1050, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 377) The Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court (2004, 2d District – 117 Cal.App.4th 1156, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 506) In this companion case to Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, the appellate court considered whether the trial court had “good cause” to lift the stay on discovery required when an anti-SLAPP motion is filed. Before hearing defendants’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ libel claim, the trial court permitted plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the issue of actual malice. The appellate court concludes that the trial court absued its discretion in allowing discovery on actual malice before first determining whether plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of establishing the other elements of libel. Garretson v. Post (2007, 4th District – 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 230) Gaynor v. Bulen (2018, 4th District – 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 243) GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional Corp. (2009, 2d District – 171 Cal.App.4th 901, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 218) Gerbosi et al. v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein (2011, 2d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 73) GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs (2013, 2d District – 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 831) Ghafur v. Bernstein (2005, 1st District – 131 Cal.App.4th 1230, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 626) Defendants wrote a letter to the state superintendent of education concerning Ghafur and the charter schools he managed. The letter urged an investigation of religious instruction in the schools and a link to an Islamic terrorist organization. Ghafur sued defendants for defamation. The trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that Ghafur was unlikely to prevail on his complaint. Ghafur, as a public official, was required to proffer clear and convincing evidence that defendants acted with malice and he had not. Gilbert v. Sykes (2007, 3d District – 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 752) Golden Eagle Land Investment, L.P. v. Rancho Santa Fe Association (2018, 4th District – 19 Cal.App.5th 399, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 903) Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC et al. v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022, 1st District – 81 Cal.App.5th 82, 296 Cal.Rptr.3d 768) Golden State Seafood, Inc. v. Schloss (2020, 2d District – 53 Cal.App.5th 21, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 608) Goldstein v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004, 2d District – 122 Cal.App.4th 229, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 292) In a class action Ralphs Grocery filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied by the trial court on the grounds that the various causes of action did not arise from conduct protected by the First Amendment, and in any case class actions are exempt from the special motion to strike under the state’s anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant filed a writ petition, which was summarily denied. It then filed a notice of appeal. The court dismisses the appeal. Held: When a special motion to strike is denied on the grounds the cause of action is exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute procedures, the right of immediate appeal under the statute is inapplicable. Gotterba v. Travolta (2014, 2d District – 228 Cal.App.4th 35, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 131) The Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002, 1st District – 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 534) The Taxpayers Alliance paid for a television ad critical of Davis. After the ad was broadcast, the Davis Committee sued for injunctive relief, seeking to compel the Alliance to comply with disclosure and reporting requirements of the Political Reform Act of 1974. The Alliance filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, which was denied by the trial court. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the financing of the TV ad was activity protected by the First Amendment and the Davis Committee was not likely to succeed in its bid to compel the Alliance to comply with the Political Reform Act. The court distinguishes this case from Paul for Council v. Hanyecz. Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010, 2d District – 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 692) Greco v. Greco (2016, 3d District – 2 Cal.App.5th 810, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 501) Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey (2005, 2d District – 133 Cal.App.4th 1572, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 684) Greka Integrated, Inc. sued a former employee for breach of contract and conversion. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court held that where a party expressly consents to an untimely hearing date, he has thereafter waived his right to object thereto. The court found that defendant’s statements were covered by the anti-SLAPP law because they were made to his counsel, to authorities, in deposition, and in trial testimony. The court also found that Greka presented no evidence that defendant disclosed proprietary or confidential information or that defendant’s possession of the information was wrongful. Grenier v. Taylor (2015, 5th District – 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 867) Grewal v. Jammu (2011, 1st District – 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 835) Gruber v. Gruber (2020, 2d District – 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 819) Guarino v. County of Siskiyou (3/1/2018, 3d District – 21 Cal.App.5th 1170, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 95) Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009, 2d District – 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 214) H Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010, 1st District – 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 129) Hailstone v. Martinez (2009, 5th District – 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 798) Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007, 2d District – 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 347) Haneline Pacific Properties, LLC v. May (2008, 4th District – 167 Cal.App.4th 311, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 919) Hansen v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008, 5th District – 171 Cal.4th 1537, 90 Cal. Rptr.3d 381) Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014, 1st District – 227 Cal.App.4th 159, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 397) Hart v. Darwish (2017, 2d District – 12 Cal.App.5th 218, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 757) Hawran v. Hixson (2012, 4th District – 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 88) Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016, 2d District – 7 Cal.App.5th 416, 212Cal.Rptr.3d 589) Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006, 4th District – 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 547) Plaintiff homeowner sued defendant homeowners association for allegedly defamatory statements defendant’s attorneys made in a letter which it sent out to residents of Tuscany Hills regarding a legal dispute over access through plaintiff’s property. The trial court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed, finding that the letter was protected by the litigation privilege and thus plaintiff could not prevail. Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012, District – 203 Cal.App.4th 450) Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2015, 6th District – 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 807) Hicks v. Richard (2019, 4th District – 39 Cal.App.5th 1167, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 578) HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004, 2d District – 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 786) The parties had had a business relationship for a brief period. After the relationship was ended, Lawyers Title sued HMS to recover fees allegedly owed it. Judgment was entered by stipulation. HMS then filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Lawyers Title. Defendant’s special (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike the complaint was denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirms the order, concluding that HMS had met its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on it malicious prosecution lawsuit by making a prima facie showing that Lawyers Title acted with the intent to deliberately misuse the legal system for personal gain or satisfaction at HMS’s expense. Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica (2006, 2d District – 144 Cal.App.4th 1247, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 181) Hui v. Sturbaum (2014, 1st District – 222 Cal.App.4th 1109, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 569) Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2013, 2d District – 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 123) Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005, 4th District – 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521) Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. (HLS) and its employee Claire Macdonald sued defendant animal rights activists for trespass, harassment, and related causes of action arising from protests which occurred outside plaintiff Macdonald’s home. Defendants appealed an order denying their anti-SLAPP motion.The appellate court affirmed the denial as to some but not all causes of actions. The court held that the anti-SLAPP statute applied because the gravamen of the action against defendants was based on their exercise of First Amendment rights, and that mere allegations that defendants acted illegally did not render the anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable. As to the probability of plaintiffs’ prevailing on the merits, the court held that collateral estoppel based on the granting of a preliminary injunction was inapplicable to an anti-SLAPP motion because the issues were not identical. It granted the motion to strike the causes of action for trespass and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage because plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence. It also granted the motion to strike plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because plaintiff failed to show duty. The court affirmed the denial as to the causes of action for harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and Macdonald’s individual unfair competition claim because plaintiffs showed a probability of prevailing. Hupp v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2013, 4th District – 221 Cal.App.4th 398, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 919) Hutton v. Hafif (2007, 2d District – 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 109) Hylton v. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009, 4th District – 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805) I-J In re Marriage of Benner (2019, 4th District – 36 Cal.App.5th 177, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 906) Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016, 1st District – 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 853) Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005, 2d District – 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933) Inland Oversight Comm. v. County of San Bernardino (2015, 4th District – 239 Cal.App.4th 671, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 384) Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons (2006, 4th District – 140 Cal.App.4th 515, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 517) Plaintiff holding company sued defendant for defamation and other causes of action arising out of an email message in which defendant questioned plaintiff’s financial condition with regard to its purchase and operation of four hospitals. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reversed, finding the email message concerned an issue of public interest, and plaintiff failed to show a probability of prevailing on its claims because it failed to show falsity or any waiver of defendant’s First Amendment rights. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 39 v. Macys Inc. (2022, 1st District – 83 Cal. App. 5th 985)Issa v. Applegate (2019, 4th District – 31 Cal.App.5th 689, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 809) Jackson v. Mayweather (2017, 2d District – 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 234) Jackson v. Yarbray (2009, 2d District – 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 303) JAMS, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016, 4th District – 1 Cal.App.5th 984, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 307) Jay v. Mahaffey (2013, 4th District – 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 700) Jeffra v. California State Lottery (2019, 2d District – 39 Cal.App.5th 471, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 873) Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (2019, 2d District – 36 Cal.App.5th 766, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 122) Jeppson v. Ley (2020, 2d District – 44 Cal.App.5th 845, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 921) Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003, 2d District – 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 715) Attorneys sued for litigation-related malpractice filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the malpractice action was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms. Held: the suit does not arise out of the attorneys’ First Amendment right to petition but rather from negligent failure to protect a client’s legal rights.) Jewett v. Capital One Bank (2003, 2d District – 113 Cal.App.4th 805, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 675) Jewett filed a class action complaint against the bank, alleging that the bank’s mailed offers of lines of credit constituted deceptive and unfair business practice. The bank moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that its mass solicitations were protected speech involving a public issue or an issue of public interest. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses, holding that credit card solicitations do not qualify for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute. “[T]o extend the protection of section 425.16 [of the Civil Code] to credit card solicitations would subvert the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 425.16….” JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013, 3d District – 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 450) J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016, 2d District – 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 782) Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010, 2d District – 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 539) Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co (2012, 4th District – 204 Cal.App.4th 1097, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 396) Johnston v. Corrigan (2005, 2d District – 127 Cal.App.4th 553, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 657) The trial court denied a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Subsequently it granted a motion for reconsideration and then awarded attorney fees. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order. The appellate court concludes that it did. JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012, 4th District – 205 Cal.App.4th 1512) K Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002, 2d District – 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187) Kajima sued the City for payment for work and the City cross-complained of breach of contract. Kajima moved to strike the cross-complaint as a SLAPP; the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirms the denial. The court concludes that the allegations in the City’s cross-complaint arose from Kajima’s bidding and contracting practices, not from “acts in furtherance of its right of petition or free speech.” The court states: “We publish this opinion … to emphasize that a cross-complaint or independent lawsuit filed in response to, or in retaliation for, threatened or actual litigation is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute simply because it may be viewed as an oppressive litigation tactic. No lawsuit is properly subject to a special motion to strike under section 425.16 unless its allegations arise from acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” Karnazes v. Ares (2016, 2d District – 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 155) (modified 2-26-16) Kashian v. Harriman (2002, 5th District -98 Cal.App.4th 892, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576) Kashian was chairman of the board of trustees of a nonprofit community hospital, which planned to build a for-profit hospital in partnership with several physicians. Harriman, a public-interest lawyer, wrote a letter to the state attorney general asking for an investigation of the hospital’s tax-exempt status, alleging that Kashian had a pecuniary interest in certain of the hospital’s transactions. Kashian sued Harriman for defamation and unfair business practices; the latter complaint was based on the allegation that Harriman was engaged in the practice of litigation designed to “extort settlements” that benefitted Harriman. The trial court granted Harriman’s special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms. Its lengthy opinion is devoted in large part to a discussion of whether the immunity from liability under Civil Code section 47 (the “litigation privilege”) applies to allegations of violations of the state’s “unfair business practice” statute (Business & Professions Code section 17200). Keading v. Keading (2021,1st District – 60 Cal. App. 5th 1115, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 338) Kemps v. Beshwate (2009, 5th District – 180 Cal.App.4th 1012, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 480) Kenne v. Stennis (2014, 2d District – 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 198) Kettler v. Gould (2018, 2d District – 22 Cal.App.5th 593, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 580) Key v. Tyler (2019, 2d District – 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d 224) Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021, 2d District – 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 567) Kim v. R Consulting & Sales, Inc. (2021, ourth District – 67 Cal.App.5th 263, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 918) Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020, 4th District – 45 Cal.App.5th 442, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 725) Km v. Access Insurance Company (2017, 4th District – 17 Cal.App.5th 595, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 711) Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky LLP (2013, 4th District – 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 599) Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006, 4th District – 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 712) Kreeger v. Wanland (2006, 3d District – 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 779) Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc. (2007, 2d District – 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 48) Kunysz v. Sandler (2007, 4th District – 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 779) Kurwa v. Harrington, Foxx, Dubrow & Canter, LLP (2007, 2d District – 146 Cal.App.4th 841, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 256) Kurz v. Syrus Systems, LLC (2013, 6th District – 221 Cal.App.4th 748, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 554) Kyle v. Carmon (1999, 3d District – 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 303) Plaintiff school superintendent dismissed his complaint with prejudice against our client, Shelly Carmon, after we filed an anti-SLAPP motion but before the court had ruled on the motion. The trial court issued an order granting the motion to strike and awarding attorneys fees and costs. The Court of appeal held that the trial court’s adjudication of the merits of the motion supported affirmance of the award of attorney’s fees and costs. L L.A. Taxi Coop. v. Indep. Taxi Owners Ass’n of L.A. (2015, 2d District – 239 Cal.App.4th 918, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 579) L.G. v. M.B. (2018, 2d District – 25 Cal.App.5th 211, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 494) La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012, 5th District – 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 716) Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. The Chronicle Publishing Co. (“Morehouse I”) (1995, 1st District – 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 46) A university offering a Ph.D. in “sensuality” sued a newspaper for libel for a series of articles on the university in relation to hearings by the county board of supervisors on whether the university was violating local health, land use, and other government regulations, and a suit by the county to enjoin alleged violations. The lower court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. The Chronicle Publishing Co. (“Morehouse II”) (1995, 1st District – 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 542) A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike a complaint is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs only for work related to the motion, not for work unrelated to the motion. [Note: This opinion was issued before the 1997 amendment of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, requiring that the anti-SLAPP statute be construed broadly, and before the Supreme Court decision in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, which held that courts, “wherever possible, should interpret the First Amendment in a manner favorable to the exercise of freedom of speech, not to its curtailment.”] Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019, 6th District – 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 238) Lam v. Ngo (2001, 4th District – 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 582) Vietnamese-Americans demonstrated against the display of North Vietnam’s flag in a store window. One group focused attention on a city councilman, Lam, who was perceived to be indifferent. Lam owned a restaurant, where demonstrators gathered. After the restaurant’s landlord, Ngo, allowed the demonstrators to gather in the parking lot, restaurant and patron property was intentionally damaged. Lam sued Ngo and 1,500 “Doe” demonstrators for damages and obtained a TRO, later a preliminary injunction, against the demonstrators. Ngo filed a motion to strike the complaint against him pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that Ngo had already lost in the contest over the preliminary injunction and had not presented anything “new.” The appellate court reverses. Held: the granting of the preliminary injunction did not have the effect of res judicata with respect to the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. Moreover, Lam could not be held personally liable for acts committed by others absent evidence that he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious acts, incited lawless action, or gave specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats, and no such evidence was presented to counter the anti-SLAPP motion. Nevertheless, violent acts associated with the protest are not protected by the First Amendment and do support tort liability, and thus the case is remanded to allow the plaintiff to substitute named individuals who can be shown to have engaged in tortious acts. Lanz v. Goldstone (2015, 1st District – 243 Cal.App.4th 441, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 227) Law Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang (2009, 2d District – 178 Cal.App,4th 869, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 771) Lee v. Fick (2005, 2d District -135 Cal.App.4th 89, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 375) Plaintiff high school athletic coach filed a lawsuit for libel, slander, and other causes of action for statements defendant parents made in a letter to the school board, oral statements defendants made to other parents, and oral statements made to the school board while requesting that it reconsider its decision to retain the coach. The trial court granted defendants anti-SLAPP motion for the libel cause of action, finding that the letter was written to prompt official action and was privileged under Civil Code section 47(b). However it denied the motion to strike the remaining causes of action. The appellate court affirmed the granting of the motion to strike the libel claim, but reversed the trial court’s denial as to the other claims, holding that defendants’ oral comments to school officials, interested parties (other parents), and the school board were all privileged. Lee v. Kim (2019, 2d District – 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 546) Lee v. Silveira (2016, 4th District – 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 705) Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. Diaz (2005, 2d District – 131 Cal.App.4th 1517, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 139) Leegin brought an action for fraud against Diaz, an employee, alleging that Diaz had knowingly filed a fraudulent worker’s compensation claim. The trial court granted Diaz’s special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that Leegin is not likely to prevail on its claim. Lefebvre v. Lefebvre (2011, 2d District – 199 Cal.App.4th 696, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 171) Lennar Homes of California, Inc. v. Stephens (2015, 4th District – 232 Cal.App.4th 673, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 638) Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004, 2d District – 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 507) After the Levys constructed a backyard playhouse, a neighbor complained to her city councillor, who inquired of planning department officials whether the construction conformed to regulations. Eventually a city employee notified the Levys that the playhouse was an unapproved structure and had to be removed or modified. The Levys sued the city and the councillor for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting councillors from giving orders to any subordinate of the city manager. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied on the grounds that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court reverses, holding that the city councillor’s communication to the planning department was advocacy protected by the First Amendment, not an order, and therefore covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. Li v. Jin (2022, 6th District – 83 Cal.App.5th 481, 298 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717) Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003, 2d District – 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 536) KCOP secretly recorded private consultations between Lieberman, a physician, and reporters posing as patients. The recordings were broadcast by KCOP to support allegations that Lieberman was improperly prescribing controlled drugs. Lieberman sued KCOP for violation of Penal Code section 632, which prohibits electronic eavesdropping on a confidential communication without consent of all parties and provides for monetary damages. The trial court denied KCOP’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, finding that Lieberman had presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of section 632. The trial court affirms. The court concludes that the secret recording was an act in furtherance of free speech inasmuch as the recording was incorporated into a news report, and therefore plaintiff’s cause of action is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. Nevertheless, plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on his complaint since (1) a section 632 violation occurs the moment a confidential communication is secretly recorded, regardless of whether it is subsequently disclosed, and (2) there is no affirmative defense in the fact that the secret recording was part of legitimate newsgathering. Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008, 1st District – 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707) Lin v. City of Pleasanton (2009, 1st District – 175 Cal.App.4th 1143, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 730) Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Services, Inc. (1996, 1st District – 50 Cal.App.4th 1633, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 613) Note: This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity. Securities broker-dealers sought to enjoin the “unauthorized practice of law” by companies that represent individual investors in arbitration proceedings with brokers. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that disputes over individual investment losses are not matters of public concern and therefore the brokers’ complaint was not subject to the anti-SLAPP statue. Litinsky v. Kaplan (2019, 2d District – 40 Cal.App.5th 970, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 62) Liu v. Moore (1999, 2d District – 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 807) A SLAPP plaintiff cannot avoid liability for defendant’s attorney’s fees by dismissing its complaint prior to the hearing on defendant’s motion to strike the complaint. The court must still decide the merits of the motion to strike in order to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to fees. Lockton v. O’Rourke (2010, 2d District – 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 392) Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton (2009, 2d District – 173 Cal.App.4th 675, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 220) Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht (2015, 1st District – 235 Cal.App.4th 496, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 385) Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Margaret Williams, LLC (2019, 2d District – 43 Cal.App.5th 87, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 354) Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee (2013, 1st District – 213 Cal.App.4th 635, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 641) Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995, 4th District -37 Cal.App.4th 8, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 350) City, hoping to develop a shopping mall, sued a competing developer for interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, and unfair competition, alleging that the developer encouraged citizens to speak out at public meetings and file law suits against the city’s proposed mall. The trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike the complaint is reversed. Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2015, 2d District – 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 784) M M.F. Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc. (2012, 6th District – 207 Cal.App.4th 180, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 160) M.G., a minor, v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001, 4th District – 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 504) An article in Sports Illustrated about adult coaches who sexually molest youths included a photograph of a Little League team, five players of which were molested by the manager. M.G. (and others) appeared in the photo and sued for invasion of privacy. The trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike is affirmed. The appellate court agreed that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the publication of the story. Time Warner argued that the photo was not private and its publication met the test of newsworthiness. Plaintiffs argued the photo was private and not newsworthy. The court concluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated the likelihood of prevailing on the merits of their claim, thus fulfilling their burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. Macias v. Hartwell (1997, 2d District – 55 Cal.App.4th 669, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222) An unsuccessful candidate for a labor union office sued the successful candidate, alleging that defendant’s campaign flyers were defamatory. The trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. The “anti-SLAPP law applies to defamation actions arising out of statements made in a union election.” Major v. Silna (2005, 2d District – 135 Cal.App.4th 1485, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 875) In connection with an election, defendant Silna mailed a letter to a number of Malibu residents supporting certain candidates. Plaintiff Major filed a complaint for injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Malibu Municipal Code. Silna filed an anti-SLAPP motion which the trial court denied, finding that Major’s action fell within the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17(b) exemption to the anti-SLAPP law. The appellate court reversed, concluding that section 425.17 did not apply because subdivision (d)(2) excepts from this exemption “[a]ny action against a person … based upon the … dissemination … or similar promotion of any … political … work.” The court further held that Major could not show a probability of prevailing on the merits because he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. Maleti v. Wickers (2022, 6th District – 82 Cal.App. 5th 181) Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010, 4th District – 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 487) Malin v. Singer (2013, 2d District – 217 Cal.App.4th 1283, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 292) Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009, 2d District – 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 457) Manlin v. Milner (2022, 2d District – 82 Cal. App. 5th 613) Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (“Mann I”) (2004, 4th District – 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 215) The court holds that where a defendant has shown that a substantial part of a cause of action constitutes speech or petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff need only show a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim. Once the plaintiff makes this showing, the court need not determine whether the plaintiff can substantiate all theories for that cause of action. Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (“Mann II”) (2006, 4th District – 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 607) Plaintiff challenged an attorney fees award, arguing that defendants were not prevailing parties within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (c) because they were unsuccessful in striking three of the four challenged causes of action. The appellate court held that “a party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion,” and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendants were prevailing parties on the anti-SLAPP motion. However, it found that the lower court erred in failing to reduce the fees to reflect that defendants were only partially successful on the motion and ordered the fees reduced by 50%. Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008, 3d District – 158 Cal.App.4th 1075, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 614) Marijanovic v. Gray, York & Duffy (2006, 2d District – 137 Cal.App.4th 1262, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 867) Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against defendant and its counsel. Each defendant filed anti-SLAPP motions, which were denied on the basis that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish probable cause. Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007, 2d District – 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 488) Marshall v. Webster (2020, 3d District – 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 268 Cal.Rptr.3d 530) Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494) Martinez sued Metabolife for personal injury, alleging that the injury was caused by ingestion one of Metabolife’s products. Metabolife filed a special motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the complaint targeted commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. This case was decided shortly before Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 became effective (Jan. 1, 2004). Section 425.17 states that the anti-SLAPP motion cannot be applied to any complaint against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services where the cause of action arises from advertising or other commercial speech. (See also Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2004); Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc., 3d District Court of Appeal (2004).) Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011, 4th District – 198 Cal. App.4th 611, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 410) Matson v. Dvorak (1995, 3d District – 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 880) An unsuccessful candidate for a local legislative office sued a rival candidate and several contributors to an organization that published a flyer accusing him of having “hundreds of dollars of unpaid fines and citations” issued by the police, alleging libel and invasion of privacy. The trial court’s granting of defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2002, 2d District – 99 Cal.App.4th 1179, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 794) Defendant law firm prosecuted a case for copyright infringement against Mattel, maker of the Barbie doll. A federal district court found for Mattel, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that the case for copyright infringement was without factual foundation. Mattel then sued the law firm in state court for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court of appeal rules that an action for malicious prosecution qualifies for treatment under the anti-SLAPP statute and affirms the trial court’s judgment that the plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its action. Maughan v. Google Technology Inc. (2006, 2d District – 143 Cal.App.2d Dist 1284, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 861) McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007, 4th District – 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 467) McNair v. Superior Court (2016, 2d District – 6 Cal.App.5th 1227, 211 Cal Rptr 3d 919) Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016, 4th District – 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45) (modified 3-20-2020 – 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 237) Medley Capital Corporation v. Security National Guaranty, Inc. (2017, 1st District – 17 Cal.App.5th 33, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 Melbostad v. Fisher (2008, 1st District – 165 Cal.App.4th 987, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 354) Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc. (2010, 2d District – 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 294) Mendoza v. Hamzeh (2013, 2d District – 215 Cal.App.4th 799, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 832) Mendoza v. Wichmann (2011, 3d District – 194 Cal.App.4th 1430, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 823) Metcalf v. U-Haul International, Inc. (2004, 4th District – 118 Cal.App.4th 1261, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 686) Metcalf sued U-Haul for unfair competition, alleging that it consistently overstated the size of its rental trailers in advertisements. U-Haul filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the complaint arose from its constitutionally protected right to commercial speech. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirms. At issue on appeal is Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, which prevents defendants sued for false advertising from using the anti-SLAPP motion and which became effective after the complaint in this case was filed. The court rejects appellant’s contentions that section 425.17 is unconstitutionally discriminatory and that in any event it cannot apply to a case in progress. Midland Pacific Building Corp. v. King (2007, 2d District – 153 Cal.App.4th 499, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 129) Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008, 2d District – 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 510) Miller v. Filter (2007, 3d District – 150 Cal.App.4th 652, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 671) Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2019, 1st District – 41 Cal.App.5th 247, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 124) Mireskandari v. Gallagher (2021, 4th District – 59 Cal.App.5th 346, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 371) Mission Beverage Company v. Pabst Brewing Company, LLC (2017, 2d District – 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 547) Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998, 2d District – 65 Cal.App.4th 713, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 1) Note: This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity. Mission Oaks applied to the county for a tract map for property development and agreed to pay for an environmental impact report (EIR). The draft EIR found that Mission Oaks’ project would have numerous adverse and unmitigable consequences. Mission Oaks sued the county for breach of contract, alleging that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the county and the consultant that prepared the EIR. The trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is upheld. “Here Mission Oaks is simply a disgruntled developer who does not like the findings prepared by the independent environmental consultants for the County and the public. Mission Oaks seeks to stifle the EIR prepared for the County and the public. [The] SLAPP [statute] is designed to preclude such attempts to silence those who speak out on matters of public interest before legislative bodies.” The court distinguished this case from Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications Engineers. Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Verjil (2013, 4th District – 218 Cal.App.4th 892, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 524) Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC (2021, 2nd District – 70 Cal.App.5th 207, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 211) MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich (3/12/2018, 4th District – 21 Cal.App.5th 167, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 198) Mobile Medical Services, etc. v. Rajaram (2015, 4th District – 241 Cal.App.4th 164, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 568) Mongols Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. City of Lancaster (2012, 2d District – 208 Cal.App.4th 124, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 122) Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 483 (1999, 6th District – 69 Cal.App.4th 1057, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 10) Hotel sued union alleging defamatory statements by a union official in a news report of a labor dispute at the hotel. The trial court granted the union’s special motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court affirms, holding that plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case of slander in its pleadings. Moore v. Kaufman (2010, 2d District – 189 Cal.App.4th 604, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 196) Moraga-Orinda Fire Protection District v. Weir (2004, 1st District – 115 Cal.App.4th 477, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 13) After a homeowners association submitted a rebuttal argument against a tax increase for a voter information pamphlet, the fire district sought a court order modifying or eliminating certain statements in the association’s argument. The association filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the fire district’s petition and then denied the association’s request for attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute on the grounds that, since the mandamus proceeding had been resolved on the merits, the anti-SLAPP motion was moot. On appeal the fire district contends that challenges to statements in voter pamphlets are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute and that the statute must be “harmonized” with provisions in the Elections Code authorizing legal challenges to false or inaccurate voter pamphlets. The appellate court rules that the anti-SLAPP statute is not inconsistent with the Elections Code, that it does apply in this case, and the association is entitled to fees and costs. Morin v. Rosenthal (2004, 2d District – 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 149) Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp. (2014, 1st District – 224 Cal.App.4th 125, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 461) The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that it was untimely. Defendants had argued that they could not have filed the motion any sooner because they had a motion pending to transfer the case to another district of the superior court. The appellate court affirms. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (2021, 4th District – 67 Cal.App.5th 1149, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d 164) Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2007, 2d District – 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 885) Moss Bros. Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz (2018, 4th District – 27 Cal.App.5th 424, 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 292) Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (2021, 4th District – 62 Cal.App.5th 905, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 204) Mundy v. Lenc (2012, 2d District – 203 Cal.App.4th 1401, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 464) Murphy v. Twitter Inc. (2021, 1st District – 60 Cal.App.5th 12, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 360) Murray v. Tran (2020, 4th District – 55 Cal.App.5th 10, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 231) Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021, 2nd District – 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 625) N-O Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. (2003, 4th District – 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 420) This class action against Twin Laboratories, which manufactures and markets nutritional and dietary supplements, alleged violation of various statutes because of false advertising of product ingredients. Twin Labs moved to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that its advertising was commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. The trial court agreed that defendant’s labeling and advertising were protected commercial speech but also concluded that plaintiffs had established a probability of prevailing on their claims, therefore defeating the motion. The appellate court affirms the denial but on the grounds that a list of product ingredients is not commercial speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Nam v. Regents of University of California (2016, 3d District – 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 687) Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005, 4th District – 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 385) Plaintiff sued IHOP for fraud alleging that IHOP never intended to keep its promise made in a stipulated judgment to consider offers to purchase her franchise “without undue delay.”; IHOP appealed the trial court’s denial of its anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed, finding that 1) the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 exemption did not apply because any promises or statements made by defendant were to induce settlement of a lawsuit and were not made during a commercial transaction; 2) the complaint arose from defendant’s statements in, or in connection with a judicial proceeding; and 3) plaintiff did not prove a probability of prevailing on her claim because the statements IHOP made during a stipulated judgment were protected by the litigation privilege and she failed to show causation. Navellier v. Sletten (2003, 1st District – 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201) Plaintiffs brought actions for fraud and breach of contract. Defendant moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, the motion was denied, and the appellate court affirmed on the grounds that the causes of action — negotiation and execution of a release agreement and pursuit of counterclaims in litigation — were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (unpublished opinion). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the causes of action were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and remanded the case to the court of appeal with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion. (See Navellier v. Sletten, California Supreme Court.) Specifically, the court was directed to consider whether plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on its complaint. In this opinion the court holds that the plaintiffs have not established a probability of prevailing on their claims and thus reverses the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Nelson v. Tucker Ellis, LLP (2020, 1st District – 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 250) Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2012, 4th District – 204 Cal.App.4th 65, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 446) Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021, 4th District – 71 Cal.App.5th 769, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 631) Neville v. Chudacoff (2008, 2d District – 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 383) Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2016, 4th District – 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 216) (ordered published 12/26/16) (re-appealed, 2018, 4th District – 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 540) Nguyen-Lam v. Cuoung Cao (2009, 4th District – 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 205) Northern California Carpenters Regional Council v. Warmington Hercules Associates (2004, 1st District – 124 Cal.App.4th 296, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 918) A carpenters’ union and individuals sued building contractors for failure to pay them prevailing wages under city’s Redevelopment Agency’s policy, alleging unfair business practices. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the lawsuit was retaliation for their petition to a state agency for a determination that they were not required to pay prevailing wages. The motion was denied by the court on the grounds that the cause of action did not arise from filing a petition with the state but from failure to pay prevailing wages. On appeal plaintiffs argued that the court was required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 to affirm the trial court’s denial. Section 425.17 was intended to curb abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute by providing that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to “any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public.” The appellate court affirms the trial court’s ruling, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint meets the conditions of section 425.17. (See also Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc..) Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2006, 1st District – 143 Cal.App.1st 1284, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 861) Nunez v. Pennisi (2015, 6th District – 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 912) Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula(2008, 2d District – 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 210) O&C Creditors Group, LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019, 1st District – 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 596) Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland (2020, 1st District – 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 170) Ojjeh v. Brown (2019, 1st District – 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 146) Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2017, 2d District – 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 475) Olaes v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. (2006, 3d District – 135 Cal.App.4th 1501, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 467) Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against his former employer, alleging he had been defamed during its investigation of sexual harassment complaints against him. The trial court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply because a sexual harassment investigation within a private company does not constitute an official proceeding, and an investigation by a private employer concerning a small group of people does not involve an issue of public interest. Old Republic Construction Program Group v. The Boccardo Law Firm, Inc. (2014, 6th District – 230 Cal.App.4th 859, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 129) Olivares v. Pineda (2019, 1st District – 40 Cal.App.5th 343, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 213) Olive Properties, L.P. v. Coolwaters Enterprises, Inc. (2015, 2d District – 241 Cal.App.4th 1169, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 524) Olsen v. Harbison (2005, 3d District – 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 684) Co-counsel sued each other in a dispute over fee sharing. Nine months after a second amended complaint was filed, defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court found the anti-SLAPP motion was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after service of the complaint. Harbison appealed. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as frivolous and sanctioned Harbison. Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017, 2d District – 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 246) Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Nativo Lopez (2010, 4th District – 190 Cal.App.4th 1248, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 127) Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007, 1st District – 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 29) Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Props, LLC (2012, 4th District – 212 Cal.App.4th 97, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 117) (Opinion filed on 11/19/12; modified on 11/2712; and certified for publication on 12/18/12) P Padres L.P. v. Henderson (2004, 4th District – 114 Cal.App.4th 495, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 584) The owners of the Padres baseball club filed claims for malicious prosecution against attorney Henderson arising from a series of lawsuits Henderson had filed challenging actions taken by the City of San Diego, in collaboration with the Padres, to develop a new baseball park. Henderson filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike all claims. The trial court dismissed claims based on one of Henderson’s lawsuits (plaintiffs had conceded the claim was time-barred) and denied the special motion to strike the claims based on other lawsuits filed by Henderson. The appellate court reverses in part. The court holds that no absolute privilege applies to Henderson’s filing of the lawsuits against the Padres (and thus distinguishes City of Long Beach v. Bozek, California Supreme Court, 1982). The court concludes, however, that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated the requisite lack of probable cause in support of two of their three claims for malicious prosecution. Paiva v. Nichols (2008, 6th District – 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) Panakosta v. Hammer Lane Management, LLC (2011, 3d District – 199 Cal.App.4th 612, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 835) Paredes v. CREDIT CONSULTING SERVICES, INC. (2022, 6th District – 82 Cal. App. 5th 410) Park 100 Investment Group II, LLC v. Gregory R. Ryan (2009, 2d District – 180 Cal.App.4th 795, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 218) Pasternack v. McCullough (2015, 4th District – 235 Cal.App.4th 1347, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 81) (re-appealed, 4th District – — Cal.Rptr.3d —) Patel v. Chavez (2020, 2d District – 48 Cal.App.5th 484, 261 Cal.Rptr.3d 829) Paterno v. Superior Court (2008, 4th District – 163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 244) Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001, 2d District – 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 864) Paul was a candidate for city council. He sued defendants, alleging that they interfered with his candidacy by contributing to an opponent in a manner that violated the state’s Political Reform Act. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the allegation. They effectively conceded the illegal nature of their method of campaign contributions, but argued that their campaign money laundering was nevertheless “in furtherance” of their First Amendment rights, and thus was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses, holding that such illegal activity is not a valid exercise of constitutional rights as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See also The Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayers Alliance. Paul v. Friedman (2002, 2d District 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82) Former clients sued Paul, a securities broker, alleging fraud, negligence, and violation of securities laws. Paul was completely vindicated in an arbitration proceeding; in addition, the court awarded sanctions against the plaintiffs for filing a “frivolous claim for which there was no factual foundation.” Paul then sued his former clients and their lawyer, Friedman, for malicious prosecution and a variety of other causes arising from Friedman’s investigation of Paul during the aribtration proceeding and disclosure of personal information. Friedman filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, on the grounds that the investigation and disclosure of information were related to “an issue under consideration or review” in the arbitration proceeding. The trial court granted Friedman’s motion to strike all tort and contract claims but refused to strike Paul’s claim that Friedman has breached a confidentiality agreement reached at the commencement of arbitration for the earlier lawsuit. In a complex decision the appellate court rules that Paul’s tort and contract claims cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute since Friedman had not met his burden of proof, i.e., he had not made the required prima facie showing that Paul’s claims arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006, 6th District – 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 148) Lynch brought an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Paulus’s action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional interference with contract. The court granted the motion and awarded Lynch attorney fees and costs. Paulus appealed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Paulus failed to make a prima facie showing of lack of probable cause for his malicious prosecution claim. The court further found that Paulus had made no independent factual or legal arguments regarding the merits of his other claims in the trial court, nor had he specifically addressed the matter in his opening brief, and thus deemed Paulus to have abandoned any challenge to the order striking those two claims. Pech v. Doniger (2022, 2nd District – 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 47) People v. Health Laboratories of North America, Inc. (2001, 1st District – 87 Cal.App.4th 442, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 618) The district attorneys of two counties sued the manufacturer of a weight-loss product, alleging that advertising claims violated various state statutes. Defendant filed a special motion to strike, arguing that the action was prosecuted to chill its exercise of free speech. Defendant acknowledged that the anti-SLAPP statute expressly does not apply to an enforcement action brought by a district attorney (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (d)), but challenged the constitutionality of this exclusion. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms, holding that the exclusion does not violate the “equal protection” clause of either the U.S. or California constitutions. People v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (2014, 1st District – 228 Cal.App.4th 1382, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 496) People ex rel. 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc. (2000, 2d District – 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 71) An insurance company sued a company that assisted individuals in preparing estimates of damages from an earthquake. Plaintiff alleged that defendants arranged with homeowners to artificially increase the estimates on the condition they receive up to 50 percent of the insurance payments. Defendants filed a special motion to strike, arguing that the estimates were prepared in anticipation of litigation and therefore were exercises in the right of petition. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirms. “At the time defendants created and submitted their reports and claims, there was no ‘issue under consideration’ pending before any official proceedings.” People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rubin (2021, 4th District – 66 Cal.App.5th 493, 280 Cal.Rptr.3d 858) People ex rel. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Anapol (2012, 2d District – 211 Cal.App.4th 809) People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004, 4th District – 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 844) The state attorney general filed a complaint against Brar to obtain an order to stop Brar from filing lawsuits under the state’s unfair competition law. Brar moved to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal dismisses the motion as friviolous inasmuch as the anti-SLAPP statute, by its own provisions, does not apply to actions brought by public prosecutors. People ex rel. v. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp. (2012, 4th District – 210 Cal.App.4th 487, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 361) Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005, 1st District – 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31) This case arose from the collapse of a fraudulent investment scheme. Plaintiffs — investors who lost millions and a bankruptcy trustee representing entities that were used to perpetrate the scheme — sued defendant law firm for conduct which allegedly helped advance the fraudulent scheme. The trial court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reversed in part, finding the motion should have been granted in part because plaintiffs’ claims were partially based on positions the firm took in court, or in anticipation of litigation with the SEC, and some plaintiffs did not establish a probability of prevailing. Specifically, the court concluded the bankruptcy trustee’s claims on behalf of one entity were barred by the doctrine of unclean hands and the investors’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Personal Court Reporters, Inc. v. Rand (2012, 2d District – 205 Cal.App.4th 182, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 301) Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002, 2d District – 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 647) A landlord notified tenants to vacate their parking spaces for construction. The tenants association encouraged tenants to send the landlord a letter protesting that they could be forced to vacate their parking spaces only after a “legal process.” In the aftermath, two of the landlord’s locks were broken. The landlord sued the tenants association and certain tenants for damages on a variety of claims. Defendants filed a demurrer and notified the plaintiff of their intention to file a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. On the eve of the deadline to file the anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff dismissed all but two individual defendants, and shortly thereafter filed an amended complaint. The trial court dismissed the case under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) and thus did not conduct a hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute; the motion was denied on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. Held on appeal: “the trial court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant whose SLAPP motion was not heard solely because the matter was dismissed before defendants obtained a ruling on the SLAPP motion.” Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Superior Court (2003, 2d District – 107 Cal.App.4th 761, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 400) Philipson & Simon v. Gulsvig (2007, 4th District – 154 Cal.App.4th 347, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 504) Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (2004, 1st District – 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926) Plaintiff brought an action for unfair business practice under Business & Professions Code § 17500, alleging that Tyson made false and deceptive representations about its chicken products sold in California. Tyson filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the cause of action arose from Tyson’s exercise of its right of free speech “in connection with a public issue”. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of success on its claims. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, enacted while the appeal was pending, applies to the case. Section 425.17 provides that the anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint cannot be applied to “any cause of action brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, … arising from any statement or conduct by that person,” as long as certain conditions are met. Moreover, section 425.17 contains a retroactivity clause that operated as a repeal of the trial court’s order. (See also Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc.) Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Foti (2003, 1st District – 107 Cal.App.4th 345, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 46) Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief, asking the court to apply to defendants an earlier injunction limiting demonstrations outside its clinic. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that defendants had waived protection of the anti-SLAPP statute by stipulating that the present action could be filed. The appellate court affirms the denial. Held: the question whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies in this case became moot once the trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment because in denying summary judgment the trial court impliedly found that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claim. Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008, 4th District – 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 95) Plumley v. Mockett (2008, 2d District – 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 822) Pott v. Lazarin (2020, 6th District – 47 Cal.App.5th 141, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 631) Prediwave Corporation v. SImpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009, 6th District – 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 245) Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (“Premier Medical I”) (2006, 2d District – 136 Cal.App.4th, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 43) Defendants petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) to determine whether plaintiff was improperly representing treating physicians in WCAB proceedings. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendants were engaged in anticompetitive activity. Arguing that the complaint was based entirely on the defendants’ constitutional right to petition the WCAB, defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the constitutional right to petition includes the basic act of seeking administrative action. Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (“Premier Medical II”) (2008, 2d District – 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 695) Price v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2011, 3d District- 195 Cal.App.4th 962; 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 220) Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2014, 1st District – 226 Cal.App.4th 643, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 238) Q-R Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009, 4th District- 175 Cal. App. 4th 1363; 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196) Ralphs Grocery Company v. United Foods and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2011, 5th District – 192 Cal.App.4th 200, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 878) Ralphs Grocery Company v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017, 4th District – 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 305) certified for publication Ramona Unified School District v. Tsiknas (2005, 4th Distict – 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381) Ramona Unified School District (District) sued Neighborhood Alliance for Safe Ramona Schools (Alliance) for abuse of process and barratry stemming from Alliance’s writ petition challenging a District construction project. The trial court granted Alliance’s anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirmed. It held that the gravamen of the abuse of process claim was actually for malicious prosecution, and was barred under City of Long Beach v. Bozek, California Supreme Court, 1982, which held a government entity may not institute a malicious prosecution proceeding against a former plaintiff. To succeed on the barratry claim, plaintiffs had to show the defendants “excited” at least three groundless lawsuits, however defendants’ amendments to their writ petition did not constitute separate proceedings. Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2016, 2d District – 247 Cal.App.4th 1080, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 46) Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021, 2nd District – 63 Cal.App.5th 869, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 227) Reed v. Gallagher (2016, 3d District – 248 Cal.App.4th 841, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 178) Renewable Resources Coalition , Inc. v. Pebble Mines Corp. (2013, 2d District – 218 Cal.App.4th 384, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 901) Reyes v. Kruger (2020, 6th District – 55 Cal.App.5th 58, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 549) Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2004, 2d Distict – 116 Cal.App.4th 135, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333) Several individuals sued Sony Pictures under the state’s unfair competition statute, alleging that Sony falsely portrayed a person as a film critic and attributed to him laudatory reviews of its films. The studio filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint; the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that advertisements for films, as commercial speech, are not protected under the First Amendment. The appellate court (in a split decision) affirms. Richmond Compassionate Care Collective v. 7 Stars Holistic Foundation, Inc. (2019, 1st District – 32 Cal.App.5th 458, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 816) Rivera v. First Databank, Inc. (2010, 4th District – 187 Cal.App.4th 709, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 1) Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003, 1st District – 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 81) Rivero sued numerous individuals and entities, alleging defamation and other claims arising from statements made by the union as part of its contract negotiation campaign. Rivero, a supervising janitor at a university, had been accused of theft, extortion, and favoritism by employees he supervised. Although the charges were not substantiated by an investigation, Rivero’s position was terminated and he was assigned work as a pot scrubber. During contract negotiations with the university the union distributed flyers that claimed union janitors had stood up to their “abusive supervisor” and caused his firing. The union filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the statements made by the union during contract negotiations do not fall under activity protected by the state’s anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court affirms. Most of the court’s opinion focuses on the phrase “in connection with a public issue” in the anti-SLAPP statute. RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020, 4th District – 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 425) Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Association (2003, 2d District – 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 546) Roberts was a candidate in an election for municipal court judge in Los Angeles. The bar association evaluates all candidates in contested elections for judgeships through its judicial evaluation committee. A candidate may request disqualification of any member of the committee who the candidate believes has a potential conflict of interest. Roberts objected to seven members of the committee. The day after the committee publicly issued an evaluation of Roberts as “not qualified,” Roberts sued the association for breach of contract and fraud based on the allegation that one of the committee members who should have been disqualified at her request was actually present during committee deliberations. The association filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint; the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the suit, which sought damages in connection with the evaluation process, was not a SLAPP. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the evaluation process is “inextricably intertwined with and part and parcel of the evaluations,” which are constitutionally protected speech. Thus, the anti-SLAPP statute applies as much to the evaluation process as to the evaluations themselves. Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995, 2d District – 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 464) A city councilman, alleging libel, sued proponents of a campaign to recall him. At issue was a mailer stating that the plaintiff had been fined by the city for operating an illegal business out of his home. The trial court’s granting of a special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. Robinzine v. Vicory (2006, 1st District – 148 Cal.App.4th 1416, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 65) Robles v. Chalilpoyil (2010, 6th District – 181 Cal.App.4th 566, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 628) Roche v. Hyde (2020, 1st District – 51 Cal.App.5th 757, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 301) Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (2014, 2d District – 225 Cal.App.4th 660, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 431) Rohde v. Wolf (2007, 2d District – 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 348) Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001, 3d District – 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 674) Rosenaur launched a ballot initiative to permit commercial development of land he owned. The measure lost after a bitterly fought campaign. Rosenaur sued defendants, opponents of the measure, alleging defamation. The trial court granted a special motion to strike the allegation. The appellate court affirms, holding that the statements alleged to be defamatory could not reasonably be interpreted as factual and therefore plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case for defamation. Rosenaur also appealed the award of attorney fees to defendants, arguing that defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees because defense counsel agreed to a partial pro bono fee. Held: neither the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute nor the policies underlying it justifies denying a prevailing defendant attorney fees when representation is pro bono. Ross v. Kish (2006, 2d District – 145 Cal.App.4th 188, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 484) Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019, 2d District – 35 Cal.App.5th 1062, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 840) Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Association (2005, 4th District – 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 133) Ruiz alleged that two letters written by HVCA’s attorney defamed him. The trial court denied HVCA’s anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that the letters were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that the two letters were communications regarding an issue of public interest. The court further found that Ruiz had not shown a probability of prevailing: he failed to show the second letter was defamatory, or that either letter had been published. However, the court remanded with directions for the trial court to reconsider Ruiz’s request for discovery only on the issue of publication of the first letter and decide the anti-SLAPP motion accordingly. Russell v. Foglio (2008, 2d District – 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 87) S S.A. v. Maiden (2014, 4th District – 229 Cal.App.4th 27, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 567) Salma v. Capon (2008, 1st District – 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 873) Sanchez v. Bezos (June 30, 2022, B309364, B312143) San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015, 4th District – 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 559) San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association (2004, 1st District – 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 724) A complaint seeking judicial review of an action or decision by a public entity is not subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The action is not itself an exercise of the public entity’s right of free speech or petition. Sandlin v. McLaughlin (2020, 4th District – 50 Cal.App.5th 805, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 874) Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies v. Santa Barbara County Association of Governments (2008, 2d District – 167 Cal.App.4th 1229, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 714) Santa Clara Waste Water Company v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division (2017, 2d District – 17 Cal.App.5th 1082, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 885) Santa Monica Rent Control Board v. Pearl Street, LLC (2003, 2d District – 109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 903) The Board filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that state and local rent control law were violated by defendants. At issue is whether, in light of facts presented to the Board, defendants are entitled to charge market rate for rental of certain units. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the basis of the suit — defendants’ filing of notices of their intention to re-rent units at market rates — is not an act by defendants in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech and therefore is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Save Westwood Village v. Luskin (2014, 2d District – 233 Cal.App.4th 135, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 328) Scalzo v. American Express Co. (2010, 2d District – 185 Cal.App.4th 91, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 638) Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008, 1st Distrct – 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 880) Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2002, 2d District – 97 Cal.App.4th 227, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 313) UDR is a consumer reporting agency that gathers and sells information about unlawful detainer cases. Schoendorf, a tenant, after unsuccessfully attempting to have UDR amend information about her in UDR’s records, sued UDR for acts of negligence. The trial court granted the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, on the grounds that UDR had a constitutionally protected right to disseminate information found in court records. The appellate court reverses on the grounds that the information gathered by UDR does not come exclusively from court records. In addition, the court holds, UDR has a duty under both state and federal credit reporting statutes, which require “maximum accuracy” in credit reports, and this duty is not abrogated or reduced by any First Amendment rights. (See also Decker v. The U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003) Schroeder v. City Council of the City of Irvine (2002, 4th District – 97 Cal.App.4th 174, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 330) Schroeder sued the Irvine City Council over the council’s approval of funds for a voter registration drive (Vote 2000), alleging that the program was a ruse to campaign for a county measure concerning development of an abandoned military airbase. The trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, ruling that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of proving that the expenditures for Vote 2000 were unlawful political expenditures. Schroeder appealed, arguing that if his demonstration of the likelihood of prevailing on his claims was deficient it was because he was denied permission to conduct “specified discovery” that would have produced evidence the expenditures were unlawful. In addition, he argued that the anti-SLAPP statute’s provision for attorney fees for the prevailing party should be construed as permissive or declared unconstitutional. The appellate court concludes that Schroeder had not shown good cause to conduct specified discovery; materials sought by Schroeder were either readily available without the device of discovery or were irrelevant to his claims as a matter of law. The court also upholds the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP statute’s provision for mandatory attorney fees. Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & Community Services Dist. (2014, 1st District – 225 Cal.App.4th 1345, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 899) Scott v. Metabolife International, Inc. (2004, 3d District – 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 242) Scott sued Metabolife for damages for false and deceitful advertising, alleging that she was injured by a Metabolife product. Metabolife filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the causes of action arose from its advertising, labeling, marketing, and promoting of its product, activities protected by the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to strike the complaint for false advertising on the grounds that “applying [the anti-SLAPP statute] to advertising would be stretching the definition of that statute to its outermost boundaries.” The appellate court affirms on the grounds that Metabolife’s advertising of its products for profit does not concern an issue of public interest as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Between the trial court’s ruling and the time this matter was heard in oral argument before the appellate court, California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17 became law. Under section 425.17, commercial advertising is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.) (See also Martinez v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2003); Brenton v. Metabolife International, Inc., 4th District Court of Appeal (2004).) Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002, 1st District – 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 108) Seelig participated in a TV show, “Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire.” Before the broadcast Seelig was invited to appear on a radio talk show. She declined. The radio program hosts discussed on the air her refusal to be interviewed. Seelig sued the radio program hosts and the broadcast station owners for damages, alleging defamation and other causes. The defendants filed both a demurrer and a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court reverses, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the radio broadcast and plaintiff could not prevail on the merits of her claims, since none of the alleged defamatory statements were actionable statements of fact. Seltzer v. Barnes (2010, 1st District – 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 290) Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2020, 2d District – 44 Cal.App.5th 103, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 398) Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017, 2d District – 17 Cal.App.5th 823, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 772) Sheley v. Harrop (2017, 3d District – 9 Cal.App.5th 1197, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 606) Shekhter v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2001, 2d District – 89 Cal.App.4th 141, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 843) Financial sued a number of persons, including Shekhter, alleging insurance fraud. The suit was settled, with the condition that all information relating to the suit be kept confidential. Later, in the present case, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against Shekhter alleging insurance fraud. Shekhter filed a cross-complaint against Allstate but also Financial Indemnity, its lawyers, and others. Shekhter alleged inter alia that the conduct of Financial’s lawyers in the earlier suit against him included unfair business practices and violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Motions by different defendants to strike specific causes of action in the cross-complaint were denied by the trial court. The appellate court reversed. Held: a special motion to strike can apply toa single cause of action when other claims remain to be resolved. Additionally, actions by an attorney on behalf of a SLAPP target fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. In this case because the actions alleged to be unfair business practices and violations of the Unruh Act arose in connection with the prosecution of a lawsuit, they were actions in furtherance of the right of petition and thus covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. Sheppard v. Lightpost Museum Fund (2006, 6th District – 146 Cal.App.4th 315, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 821) Siam v. Kizilbash (2005, 6th District – 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 368) Kizilbash accused Siam of abusing his two sons, reporting him to public officials. He also filed a civil harassment petition against Siam. In turn, Siam sued Kizilbash for defamation and malicious prosecution among other causes of action. The trial court denied Kizilbash’s motion to dismiss the entire complaint as a SLAPP. The appellate court upholds the order except for the claim of malicious prosecution, holding that such a claim may not be based on a civil harassment petition. In addition, the court holds that the “litigation privilege” (Civil Code section 47) is overriden by liability for false reporting under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code section 11164 et seq.). Silk v. Feldman (2012, 2d District – 208 Cal.App.4th 547) Simmons v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2001, 3d District – 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397) Simmons filed a cross-complaint for defamation after Allstate sued him for unfair business practices (alleging that Simmons had overtreated patients covered by Allstate). The trial court granted a special motion to strike the cross-complaint. On appeal, Simmons claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him leave to amend the cross-complaint after the court had granted the motion. Held: allowing a SLAPP plaintiff to amend the complaint would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose of providing for quick dismissal of meritless lawsuits. Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020, 2d District – 50 Cal.App.5th 1037, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 903) Singh v. Lipworth (2014, 3d District – 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 131) Sipple v. Foundation for National Progress (1999, 2d District – 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 83 Cal.Rptr. 677) The magazine “Mother Jones” published an article about a custody battle, ostensibly to show how rich and powerful men may use the legal system to their advantage over women who may have been abused by them. The subject of the article sued the magazine for defamation. The appellate court upholds the trial court’s dismissal of the suit following a special motion to strike the complaint. The court concluded that the subject of the article was not the private affair of an individual but a public proceeding involving public issues. “[T]he issues of spousal abuse generated in the custody proceedings are of public interest when the person accused of the abuse is a nationally known figure identified with morality campaigns for national leaders ….” The defendant argued that there was a probability he would prevail on his defamation claim because not all of the magazine article was privileged under Civil Code section 47, which confers an absolute privilege on any fair and true report of a judicial proceeding. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the defendant has made his case if he can establish by the evidence that the gist of the alleged defamatory statements is justified. Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (2020, 1st District – 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 594) Slaney v. Ranger Insurance Co. (2004, 2d District – 115 Cal.App.4th 306, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 915) Slaney prepared an estimate for repair of an aircraft in support of a claim by third parties presented to Ranger Insurance. The company denied the claim on grounds that the claim was fraudulently excessive and sued the insureds and Slaney for bad faith. Slaney’s motion for summary judgment was granted and he was dismissed from the suit. The insureds subsequently received a judgment against the company as well as punitive damages for malicious denial of their claim. Slaney then brought this action for malicious prosecution. The trial court denied the company’s anti-SLAPP motion after concluding that Slaney presented sufficient evidence to establish a probability of prevailing on his complaint. The appellate court affirms. According to the court, the underlying judgment against the company, which included a finding of malice and an award of punitive damages, demonstrated a potential for recovery in the present case. Slauson Partnership v. Ochoa (2003, 2d District – 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 668) The owner of a mini-mall filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Ochoa, alleging he had organized ongoing demonstrations against one of the mall’s tenants, a club that produced nude shows. Ochoa filed an anti-SLAPP motion, but a month later the parties stipulated to an injunction that regulated the manner of the demonstrations. Ochoa’s motion was tabled to allow time for the injunction to be tested and reviewed by the court. After a month and a half, the trial court, based on testimony about the conduct of the demonstrations, denied the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had succeeded in demonstrating a probability of succeeding on its claim. In a lengthy opinion, the appellate court affirms, ruling that the trial court did not err in considering the same evidence for both the motion to strike and the injunction. Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010, 5th District – 190 Cal.App.4th 40, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 805) Sonoma Media Investments, LLC v. Superior Court (2019, 1st District – 34 Cal.App.5th 24, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 5) South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011, 3d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 634) Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2014, 2d District – 232 Cal.App.4th 477, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 436) Spencer v. Mowat (2020, 2d District – 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 372) Sprengel v. Zbylut (2015, 2d District – 241 Cal.App.4th 140, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 407) (modified 10-29-15) Squires v. City of Eureka (2014, 1st District – 231 Cal.App.4th 577, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 10) Stafford v. Attending Staff Assn. of LAC + USC Medical Center (2019, 2d District – 41 Cal.App.5th 629, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 369) StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc. (2006, 4th District – 136 Cal.App.4th 1392, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 682) StaffPro filed a malicious prosecution suit against Elite which responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted Elite’s motion, ruling that StaffPro failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability that it would prevail because it had not shown favorable termination or probable cause. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a severability analysis is improper in determining whether a malicious prosecution plaintiff has demonstrated favorable termination of an underlying lawsuit. Thus, since the first cause of action in the underlying suit had not terminated in favor of StaffPro, it could not demonstrate favorable termination, and therefore could not prevail in its malicious prosecution suit. Starview Property, LLC v. Lee (2019, 2d District – 41 Cal.App.5th 203, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 58) State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Majorino (2002, 2d District – 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 719) Majorino and O’Brien sued several people after they were allegedly assaulted during a party at a private home. The home’s owners were among the named defendants; the owners tendered their defense to State Farm under their homeowner policy. State Farm then filed an action for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial determination of its duty to indemnify the homeowners. In turn, Majorino and O’Brien filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that State Farm’s action was designed to chill their right to petition for legal redress. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that Majorino and O’Brien had failed to demonstrate that State Farm’s action for declaratory relief qualified as a SLAPP under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. “[T]he act which underlies and forms the basis for State Farm’s declaratory relief action is not the personal injury lawsuit filed by appellants, but the [homeowners’] tender of the defense of that lawsuit under a policy that contains an arguably applicable exclusionary clause.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee (2011, 3d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 183) Steadman v. Osborne (2009, 4th District – 178 Cal.App.4th 950, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 724) Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012, 2d District – 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 519) Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014, 6th District – 226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 173) Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010, 1st District – 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 98) Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016, 2d District – 3 Cal.App.5th 118, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 411) Sugarman v. Benett (2021, 2d District – 73 Cal.App.5th 165, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 174) Sugarman v. Brown (2021, 2d District – 73 Cal.App.5th 152, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 165) Summerfiled v. Randolph (2011, 2d District – 201 Cal.App.4th 127) Sunset Millennium Associates, LLC v. Le Songe, LLC (2006, 2d District – 138 Cal.App.4th 256, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 273) Sunset Millennium Associates v. LHO Grafton Hotel (2006, 2d District – 146 Cal.App.4th 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 828) Supershuttle International, Inc. v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (2019, 2d District – 40 Cal.App.5th 1058, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 666) Swanson v. County of Riverside (2019, 4th District – 36 Cal.App.5th 361, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 476) Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007, 4th District – 157 Cal.App.4th 1385, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 561) Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004, 2d District – 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 882) In response to Pueblo’s lawsuit against it, Sylmar filed a cross-complaint alleging fraud among other actions. Pueblo filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint for fraud. Before the hearing on the motion, Sylmar filed an amended cross-complaint. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal Sylmar argued that its amended cross-complaint made the anti-SLAPP motion moot. The appellate court holds that a plaintiff may not avoid a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion by filing an amended pleading, and thus, if the motion is granted, may not avoid the mandatory award of costs and attorney fees to the SLAPP target. Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019, 2d District – 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 445) T Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008, 2d District – 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 847) Takhar v. People ex rel. Feather River Air Quality Management Dist. (2018, 3d District – 27 Cal.App.5th 15, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 759) Talega Maintenance Corp. v. Standard Pacific Corp. (2014, 4th District – 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 453) Tendler v. www.jewishsurvivors.blogspot.com (2008, 6th District – 164 Cal.App.4th 802, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 407) Appellant Tendler obtained a pre-lawsuit discovery order in an Ohio state court directed to Google, from whom he sought to learn the identities of the anonymous individuals who had posted statements about him on the Internet that he believed were defamatory. Tendler then filed a request for subpoenas in Santa Clara County Superior Court premised on the Ohio discovery order. The anonymous individuals filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The court held that a request for a subpoena is not a “cause of action,” and therefore cannot be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. In his concurrence, Justice McAdams urged the Legislature to consider whether the anti-SLAPP law should be expanded to include such third-party subpoena requests. As of Jan. 1, 2009, amendments to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.1 and 1987.2 provide that in a successful motion to quash such a subpoena, the court shall award the amount of the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in making the motion. Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011, 2d District – 193 Cal.App.4th 133, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 264) Teamsters Local 2010 v. Regents of University of California (2019, 1st District – 40 Cal.App.5th 659, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 394) Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005, 3d District – 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 145) Plaintiffs, employees of Davis Community Church, sued the church and others for defamation and emotional distress, alleging that church officials falsely accused them of having an inappropriate sexual relationship with a minor in the course of their church work. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirms the order, concluding that private communications concerning issues of public interest are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (see Averill v. Superior Court) and plaintiffs had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims. Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP (2012, 1st District – 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 17) Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Joslin (2020, 4th District – 49 Cal.App.5th 366, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 814) Traditional Cat Association, Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004, 4th District – 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 353) This case arose because of a split in the ranks of organized cat breeders. The founder of The Traditional Cat Association sued defendants for allegedly defamatory statements published on their website. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, concluding that plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their complaint. The court’s decision was based on its ruling that defendants’ statute of limitations defense in their anti-SLAPP motion was not a proper issue for determination under the terms of the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court finds this conclusion erroneous. Moreover, it rejects plaintiffs’ argument that a cause of action for defamation arising from statements posted on a website arises continuously while the website is operating, holding that the single publication rule in the law of defamation applies to statements published on websites. Because defendants posted the alleged defamatory statements more than a year before plaintiffs filed their complaint, the action for defamation is barred by the statute of limitations. This is the first California court to adopt the single-publication rule for web publishing. Thomas v. Quintero (2005, 1st District – 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 619) Quintero was part of organized public protests against Thomas, his landlord. After Quintero and others appeared at Thomas’s church, Thomas took action against Quintero by filing a petition seeking injunctive relief against civil harassment (Civil Code section 527.6). Quintero responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reverses. Held: A Section 527.6 petition to enjoin civil harassment is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike. However, an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), issued pending a hearing on the petition for injunctive relief, is not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. The request for a TRO does not qualify as a “cause of action” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009, 6th District – 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 661) Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014, 4th District – 222 Cal.App.4th 1447, 166 CAl.Rptr.3d 729) Towner v. County of Ventura (2021, 2d District – 63 Cal.App.5th 761, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 891) Trapp v. Naiman (2013, 4th District – 218 Cal.App.4th 113, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 462) Trilogy at Glen Ivy Maintenance Assn. v. Shea Homes, Inc. (2015, 4th District – 235 Cal.App.4th 361, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 8) Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (2020, 4th District – 50 Cal.App.5th 920, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 892) Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021, 2d District – 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 831) Truck Insurance Exchange v. Federal Insurance Company (2021, 2d District – 63 Cal.App.5th 211, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 579) Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port District (2003, 4th District – 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57) Plaintiff sued the Port for a variety of business-related causes of action, alleging that the Port had interfered with an exclusive negotiating agreement between plaintiff and others concerning development of bayfront property. The Port filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the lawsuit arose from the Port’s review of plans for the development. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal plaintiff argued that no issue concerning the development project was before the Port in any official process when the Port commented on the project. Even if that were true, the appellate court says, the project was nevertheless a matter of public interest and therefore the Port’s comments were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Because the court also finds that plaintiff did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims, it affirms the grant of the motion. Tucker Ellis LLP v. Superior Court (2017, 1st District – 12 Cal.App.5th 1233, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 382) Tukes v. Richard (2022, 2d District – 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 296 Cal.Rptr.3d 707) Turnbull v. Lucerne Valley Unified School District (2018, 4th District – 24 Cal.App.5th 522, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 488) Turner v. Vista Pointe Ridge HOA (2009, 4th District – 180 Cal.App.4th 676, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 750) Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Herrera (2006, 1st District – 136 Cal.App.4th 164, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 21) Plaintiff Tutor-Saliba Corporation sued the City Attorney of San Francisco for allegedly defamatory statements he made in a speech before the San Francisco Chinese-American Democratic Club regarding a lawsuit he had filed against plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the alleged defamatory statements were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47(a) (“official duty privilege”), as well as under Government Code sections 821.6 and 820.2 (“prosecutorial immunity” and “discretionary immunity,” respectively). The appellate court affirmed. Tuszynzka v. Cunningham (2011, 4th District – 199 Cal.App.4th 257, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 63) U-V Ulkarim v. Westfield LLC (2014, 2d District – 227 Cal.App.4th 1266, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 17) USA Waste of California, Inc. v. City of Irwindale (2010, 2d District – 184 Cal.App.4th 53, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 466) United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2005, 6th District – 171 Cal.App.4th 1617, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 619) U.S. Western Falun Dafa Association v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce (2008, 1st District – 163 Cal.App.4th 590, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 710) Urick v. Urick (2017, 2d District – 15 Cal.App.5th 1182 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 125) ValueRock TN Properties, LLC v. PK II Larwin Square SC LP (2019, 4th District – 36 Cal.App.5th 1037, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 179) Vargas v. City of Salinas (Salinas II) (2011, 6th District – 200 Cal.App.4th 1331, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 244) Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021, 2d District – 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 246) Vergos v. McNeal (2007, 3d District – 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647) Vivian v. Labrucherie (2013, 1st District – 214 Cal.App.4th 267, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707) Visher v. City of Malibu (2005, 2d District – 126 Cal.App.4th 363, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 816) City refused to process plaintiffs’ application for a “coastal development permit” because the city’s right to do so was the subject of a lawsuit by the city against the California Coastal Commission. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate to require the city to process their application. The city moved to dismiss the petition as a SLAPP. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and refused to dismiss the petition. The appellate court affirms on the grounds that plaintiffs’ petition arose from the city’s refusal to process an application, not from the city’s lawsuit against the Coastal Commission. Although the city could not claim the protection of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute, it was not left defenseless in preserving its case against the Coastal Commission. Vogel v. Felice (2005, 6th District – 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 350) Two candidates for public office sought damages for libel and other torts based on statements posted on a public website. Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied on the grounds that the allegedly libelous statements could be shown to have exceeded privileges afforded under state law and the U.S. Constitution. The appellate court reverses. According to the court, plaintiffs’ claims fell squarely within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, requiring plaintiffs to show they could prevail on the merits, and plaintiffs failed to carry this burden. W Walker v. Kiousis (2001, 4th District – 93 Cal.App.4th 1432, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 69) Walker, a California Highway Patrolman, arrested Kiousis for suspected drunk driving. After pleading guilty, Kiousis filed a citizen complaint against Walker with the CHP, alleging conduct inappropriate for an officer. The CHP determined the complaint was without merit, and Walker then sued Kiousis for defamation. Civil Code section 47 generally creates an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of an official proceeding. However, section 47.5 creates an exception, allowing a peace officer to bring a defamation action against an individual who knowingly and maliciously files a false complaint about the office. Kiousis moved to dismiss Walker’s suit, arguing that Civil Code section 47.5 was unconstitutional and therefore his complaint to the CHP was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion to strike, but on the grounds that Walker had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his lawsuit, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, because he had not shown he sustained any actual damage. The appellate court affirmed the granting of the motion to strike, but on the grounds that section 47.5 is unconstitutional because it impermissably regulates speech based on the content of the speech. Wallace v. McCubbin (2003, 2d District – 111 Cal.App.4th 744, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 909) Wang v. Hartunian (2003, 2d District – 111 Cal.App.4th 744, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 909) In a dispute over use of a vacant lot owned by Wang, Hartunian obtained a permanent restraining order against Wang. Hartunian summoned the police on several occasions to deal with alleged violations of the order, and on one occasion effected a citizen’s arrest of Wang. Wang sued Hartunian alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process among other causes of action. Hartunian’s special motion to strike the complaint as a SLAPP was granted by the trial court, which concluded that Wang was not likely to prevail on his claims. The appellate court reverses, holding that a citizen’s arrest is not a protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007, 4th District -153 Cal.App.4th 790, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 575) Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006, 3d District – 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 633) Plaintiffs sued defendants for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and the court of appeal affirmed. On remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees for the work on appeal as well as for defendants’ challenge to plaintiffs’ undertaking to stay enforcement of the judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the award of attorney fees for the undertaking. The appellate court affirmed, finding that not permitting attorney fees for such efforts would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent to encourage continued participation in free speech and petition activities. Weeden v. Hoffman (2021, 4th District – 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 262) Weinberg v. Feisel (2003, 3d District – 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 385) Weinberg sued Feisel for defamation, alleging that Feisel told others that Weinberg had stolen a valuable collector’s item. Feisel moved to strike the complaint as a SLAPP, contending that his statements accused plaintiff of criminal activity and that criminal activity is always a matter of public interest. The trial court denied the motion, noting that Feisel never reported his suspicions to law enforcement officials and offered no evidence that he intended to file civil charges against plaintiff. The appellate court affirms. The court concludes that nothing in the record supports even an arguable suggestion that Feisel’s statements constituted speech protected by the First Amendment and therefore plaintiff’s causes of action were not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute. “Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his dispute with plaintiff was anything other than a private dispute….” West v. Arent Fox LLP (2015, 2d District – 237 Cal.App.4th 1065, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 729) (modified 6/26/15) White v. Lieberman (2002, 2d District – 103 Cal.App.4th 210, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 608) Attorney Lieberman represented homeowners in an action against White for slander of title, and the trial court found White liable. An appellate court reversed on the grounds the action was not supported by substantial evidence. Subsequently White sued Lieberman for malicious prosecution of the slander action. The trial court sustained Lieberman’s demurrer, but refused to consider Lieberman’s anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that it was moot in view of the successful demurrer. The appellate court concludes that the trial court erred in determining that Lieberman’s motion was moot. Because a malicious prosecution action is within the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute, and there is no possibility White can prevail, the only matter left for the trial court’s consideration is the amount of attorney fees. (See Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, where the same issue is decided similarly.) Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017, 4th District – 17 Cal.App.5th 352, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 321) Widders v. Furchtenicht (2008, 2d District – 167 Cal.App.4th 769, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 428) Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004, 1st District -121 Cal.App.4th 883, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 497) Brokerage firm sued Wolk, alleging Wolk had made defamatory statements about its business integrity on her website, where Wolk publishes information for the general public about a special type of life insurance policy brokered by plaintiffs. Wolk moved to strike the claim for defamation as a SLAPP; the trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reverses the ruling. The court agrees that the anti-SLAPP statute applies in this case but concludes that plaintiffs showed the requisite probability of prevailing on their claim for defamation. Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994, 2d District – 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446) Several court reporters brought suit against an alliance of court reporters, claiming unfair business practice and interference with plaintiffs’ existing contracts and prospective economic advantages. Defendants cross-complained for damages arising from a flyer circulated by the plaintiffs to raise money for litigation costs. The trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike the cross-complaint is reversed. Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002, 4th District – 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 275) Plaintiffs appealed an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion but dismissed the appeal before it was decided. Defendant moved for an award of attorney fees in connection with the appeal but the court denied recovery of fees. Defendant appealed the denial. The court of appeal reverses, holding that defendants in a SLAPP are entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in connection with defending the anti-SLAPP motion on appeal even when plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Once the trial court has granted an anti-SLAPP motion, the judicial decision that the action was a SLAPP remains intact unless reversed by the court of appeal and thus the defendant remains the “prevailing party” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2016, 2d District – 6 Cal.App.5th 822, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 724) (Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded) Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018, 1st District – 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 25)Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022, No. C094051) Witte v. Kaufman (2006, 3d District – 141 Cal.App.4th 1201, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 790) Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020, 1st District – 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 677) Wong v. Jing (2010, 6th District – 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747) The trial court denied an anti-SLAPP motion to strike a dentist’s claims of libel per se and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, filed against two parents and Yelp!, arising from a negative review on Yelp! regarding the dentist’s treatment of the parents’ child. The Court of Appeal held that six of the seven claims should have been dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP law. Wong v. Wong (2019, 1st District – 43 Cal.App.5th 358, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 624) Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang (2021, 2nd District – 68 Cal.App.5th 624, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d 507) Workman v. Colichman (2019, 2d District – 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 636) World Financial Group, Inc. v. HBW Ins. & Financial Services, Inc. (2009, 2d District – 172 Cal.App.4th 1561, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 227) X-Y-Z Xu v. Huang (2021, 2nd District – 73 Cal.App.5th 802, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 558) Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc. (2020, 4th District – 48 Cal.App.5th 939, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 429) Yeager v. Holt (2018, 3d District – 23 Cal.App.5th 450, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 693) Yee v. Cheung (2013, 4th District – 220 Cal.App.4th 184, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 851) York v. Strong (2015, 4th District – 234 Cal.App.4th 1471, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 845) Young v. Midland (2022, Nos. A161843, A162784) Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012, 4th District – 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 119) Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002, 1st District – 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 516) Yu filed a class action on behalf of California residents against two banks for abuse of process and unfair business practice after the banks filed debt-collection actions in Virginia, their home state. The trial court sustained the banks’ demurrer to a third amended complaint but denied the banks’ concurrent anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds the latter was moot in light of the successful demurrer. The banks appealed. Both parties appealed. On appeal Yu argued that, because the anti-SLAPP motion was filed a year after the original complaint, it was untimely under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court holds that an amended complaint is a “complaint” under the anti-SLAPP statute (which requires that a special motion to strike be filed “within 60 days of the service of the complaint”), and, since the motion in this case was filed within 60 days of service of the third amended complaint, it was timely. In addition, the anti-SLAPP motion is no longer moot, the court concludes, in light of the court’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer. Nevertheless, the court affirms the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion but on the grounds that Yu’s claims “have sufficient potential merit to withstand Banks’ anti-SLAPP motion.” The case is interesting because the filing of a collection action in a distant state in effect deprives customers of the opportunity to defend themselves. Nevertheless, the court filing is a protected First Amendment activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, so only a determination that there is a likelihood the plaintiffs might prevail preserves the complaint for abuse of process. Zhang v. Chu (2020, 2d District – 46 Cal.App.5th 46, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 536) Zhang v. Jenevein (2019, 2d District – 31 Cal.App.5th 585, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 800) Zhao v. Wong (1996, 1st District – 48 Cal.App.4th 1114, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 909) Note: This opinion was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity. Zhao sued Wong for slander, alleging that Wong had falsely accused her of murdering his brother in a newspaper article about a coroner’s investigation into the brother’s mysterious death and a contest in probate court over the brother’s will. The trial court granted a special motion to strike the complaint, saying that “if you make a comment about a judicial proceeding, that’s an act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition [or] free speech.” The appellate court reverses, concluding that the brother’s death, although newsworthy, did not rise to the level of a public issue protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Zucchet v. Galardi (2014, 4th District – 229 Cal.App.4th 1466, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 363)**************************************** Superior Court, Appellate Division – Published Opinions: O’Neil-Rosales v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. (2017, App.Div.Super.Ct – LA – 11 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 723) source Federal SLAPP Cases Decided by U.S. District Courts in California Opinions in the U.S. District Courts concerning the California Anti-SLAPP Statute (CCP § 425.16): [note: the list below also includes some non-California cases involving CCP § 425.16] Alfasigma USA, Inc. v. First Databank, Inc. United States District Court, N.D. California. August 02, 2019 398 F.Supp.3d 578 Alfasigma USA, Inc. v. First Databank, Inc. 525 F.Supp.3d 1088 – ND Cal 2021 Ayyadurai v. Floor64, Inc. 270 F.Supp.3d 343 – D Mass. 2017 Arenas v. Shed Media US Inc. 881 F.Supp.2d 1181 – CD Cal. 2011 Blatt v. Pambakian 432 F.Supp.3d 1141 – CD Cal. 2020 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 722 F.Supp.2d 1148 – CD Cal. 2010 Browne v. McCain 611 F.Supp.2d 1062 – CD Cal. 2009 Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 448 F.Supp.2d 1172 – CD Cal. 2006 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 229 F.Supp.2d 962 – CD Cal. 2007 Choose Energy, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute 87 F.Supp.3d 1218 – ND Cal. 2015 Clifford v. Trump 339 F.Supp.3d 915 – CD Cal. 2018 Cline v. Reetz-Laiolo 329 F.Supp.3d 1000 – ND Cal. 2018 Competitive Technologies. v. Fujitsu Ltd. 286 F.Supp.2d 1118 – ND Cal. 2003 This is a very complex case of patent infringement and numerous related causes of action, further complicated by issues of choice of law since the case was transferred from a district court in Illinois. Competitive Technologies filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike certain counterclaims asserted by Fujitsu. The court concludes that California law does not apply to Fujitsu’s counterclaims. Condit v. National Enquirer, Inc. 248 F.Supp.2d 945 – ED Cal. 2002 The wife of U.S. Congressman Gary Condit sued the National Enquirer for libel based on statements published in two issues of the weekly publication. Defendant’s motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute is denied on the grounds that the allegedly defamatory statements did not concern a public issue and the plaintiff had demonstrated in her complaint that she could succeed on the merits. Cox v. Mariposa County 445 F.Supp.3d 804 – ED Cal. 2020 Davis v. Hollins Law 942 F.Supp.2d 1004 – ED Cal. 2013 Dean v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 562 F.Supp.3d 928 – CD Cal. 2022 Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Development, LLC v. Pandora Marketing, LLC 500 F.Supp.3d 1104 2020 WL – CD Cal. 2020 Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Development, LLC v. Pandora Marketing, LLC 541 F.Supp.3d 1020 – CD Cal. 2021 Dickman v. Kimball, Tirey & St. John, LLP 982 F.Supp.2d 1157 – SD Cal. 2013 Drawsand v. F.F. Properties, L.L.P. 866 F.Supp.2d 1110 – ND Cal. 2011 E.D.C. Technologies, Inc. v. Seidel 225 F.Supp.3d 1058 – ND Cal. 12-6-2016 eCash Technologies v. Guagliardo 127 F.Supp.2d 1069 – CD Cal 2000 After defendant registered the domain name “ecash.com”, plaintiff filed federal claims of cyberpiracy, trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and trademark dilution. Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking cancellation of plaintiff’s registration of the “eCash” mark and alleging unfair or unlawful business practices by plaintiff under state law. The court granted plaintiff’s special motion to strike defendant’s state law counterclaims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute inasmuch as the counterclaims were based on a letter from plaintiff’s counsel that was a communication related to pending litigation and therefore privileged under Civil Code section 47(b). Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty Ltd. 290 F.Supp.3d 923 – ND Cal. 2017 Elem Indian Colony of Pomo Indians of the Sulphur Bank Rancheria v. Ceiba Legal, LLP 230 F.Supp.3d 1146 – ND Cal. 2-2-2017 Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir 544 F.Supp.2d 1044 – ED Cal. 2006 Flores v. Emerich & Fike 416 F.Supp.2d 885 – ED Cal. 2006 Plaintiff fruit growers filed a complaint alleging various forms of alter ego liability, fraudulent transfers, and the existence of a racketeering enterprise against the corporate defendants and the law firm and individual attorneys who represented them (Fike defendants). The Fike defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike several of the claims. The district court found that the section Civil Code 425.17 exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because it was strictly a private dispute, and the alleged actions of the Fike defendants did not involve marketing their services nor were representations made to potential consumers or to gain a competitive advantage. The court granted the motion to strike each cause of action because plaintiffs did not show a probability of prevailing on any of their claim. Four Navy Seals & Jane Doe v. Associated Press 413 F.Supp.2d 1136 – SD Cal. 2005 Freeman v. ABC Legal Services, Inc. 827 F.Supp.2d 1065 – ND Cal. 2011 Friedman v. DirecTV 262 F.Supp.3d 1000 – CD Cal. 2015 Gallagher v. Philipps 563 F.Supp.3d 1048 – SD Cal. 2021 Gamble v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 348 F.Supp.3d 1003 – ND Cal. 2018 Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1 132 F.Supp.2d 1261 – CD Cal. 2001 Several individuals, using pseudonyms, posted remarks about a publicly traded telecommunications company in an Internet chat room. The company brought suit in state court, alleging trade libel, libel per se, interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The court granted the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, after finding that the company had not satisfied its burden of showing a probability of success on its claims for trade libel and defamation. The court concluded that, given the context of publication and the “colorful and figurative language” of the postings, defendants’ statements about the company could not reasonably be understood to be factual. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc. 63 F.Supp.2d 1127 – ND Cal 1999 Globetrotter made statements to the market concerning the products of Elan and Rainbow and subsequently sued the two companies. The defendant companies brought a number of state-law counterclaims for damages due to Globetrotter’s statements. Globetrotter filed a special motion to strike the counterclaims under the anti-SLAPP statute. The motion was denied on the grounds that statements by one company regarding the conduct of a competitor do not come within the statute’s protection of Petition Clause conduct. Gottesman v. Santana 263 F.Supp.3d 1034 – SD Cal. 2017 Hanover Insurance Company v. Fremont Bank 68 F.Supp.3d 1085 – ND Cal. 2014 Harkonen v. Fleming 880 F.Supp.2d 1071 – ND Cal. 2012 Hart v. Larson 232 F.Supp.3d 1128 – SD Cal. 2017 Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 – SD Cal. 2020 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 Hutton v. Law Offices of Collins & Lamore 668 F.Supp.2d 1251 – SD Cal. 2009 In re Bohrer United States Bankruptcy Court, 628 B.R. 676 – SD Cal. 2021 In re Landes United States Bankruptcy Court, 627 B.R. 144 _ ED Cal. 2021 In re Outlaw Laboratories, LP Litigation 352 F.Supp.3d 992 – SD Cal. 2018 Intel Corporation v. Seven Networks, LLC 562 F.Supp.3d 454 2021 – ND Cal. 2021 Johnson v. Altamirano 418 F.Supp.3d 530 – SD Cal. 2019 Kearney v. Foley & Lardner 553 F.Supp.2d 1178 – SD Cal. 2008 Lauter v. Anoufrieva 642 F.Supp.2d 1060 – CD Cal. 2009 Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC 26 F.Supp.3d 1002 – SD Cal. 2014 Maloney v. T3Media, Inc. 94 F.Supp.3d 1128 – CD Cal. 2015 Mandel v. Hafermann 503 F.Supp.3d 946 – ND Cal 2020 Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. San Diego County (“Manufactured II”) 606 F.Supp.2d 1266 – SD Cal. 2009 MCSI, Inc. v. Woods 290 F.Supp.2d 1030 – ND Cal. 2003 Plaintiff sued defendants for multiple causes, including defamation, based on “negative statements” about the company on an Internet forum for discussion of large, publicly traded corporations. Defendant Woods, who had posted the remarks, filed a special motion to strike the complaint against him under the the anti-SLAPP statute. The court denies the motion on the grounds that the remarks did not concern a public issue and therefore are not protected by the statute. Mello v. Great Seneca Financial Corp. 526 F.Supp.2d 1024 – CD Cal. 2008 Metabolife International, Inc. v. Susan Wornick (“Wornick I”) 72 F.Supp.2d 1160 – SD Cal. 1999 Metabolife claimed that defendants, in statements on a television broadcast, committed defamation, slander, trade libel, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. The trial court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute. It concludes that defendants’ statements are protected by the First Amendment, either because they are true or represent opinion, and thus are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. Because the court refuses to admit evidence proferred by Metabolife as expert evidence, Metabolife cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in this case.) Metabolife International, Inc. v. Susan Wornick (“Wornick II”) 213 F.Supp.2d 1220 – SD Cal. 2002 Order granting attorney fees to defendant who prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion. National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical Progress 533 F.Supp.3d 802 – ND Cal. 2021 New.net, Inc. v. Lavasoft 356 F.Supp.2d 1090 – CD Cal. 2004 Parties are Internet software publishers. New.net writes software that is downloaded from the Internet to an individual’s computer without the knowledge or request of the computer owner. Lavasoft provides software that detects such programs and allows the computer owner to remove them. Plaintiff lost its bid for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Lavasoft from including New.net software in its list of removable programs. The court’s denial was based in part on the grounds that Lavasoft, through its software, was engaged in expression protected under the First Amendment. Defendant then filed an anti-SLAPP motion against all state-law claims, which the court granted. Nicosia v. DeRooy 72 F.Supp.2d 1093 – ND Cal. 1999 Nicosia sued DeRooy for defamation in connection with statements published about Nicosia on DeRooy’s website. Nocosia was agent for the writer Jack Kerouac’s daughter Jan. The court granted a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, reasoning that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure subject to the actual malice standard, had failed to plead actual malice with sufficient specificity, and therefore had failed to establish a probability that he would prevail in the case as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. O’Handley v. Padilla — F.Supp.3d —- N.D. California 2022 Penrose Hill, Limited v. Mabray 479 F.Supp.3d 840 – ND Cal. 2020 Physician’s Surrogacy, Inc. v. German 311 F.Supp.3d 1190 – SD Cal. 2018 Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Associates 946 F. Supp. 2d 957 – ND Cal. 2013 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress 214 F.Supp.3d 808 – ND Cal. 2016 Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress 402 F.Supp.3d 615 – ND Cal. 2019 PLS.com, LLC v. National Association of Realtors 516 F.Supp.3d 1047 – CD Cal. 2021 Plumleigh v. City of Santa Ana 754 F.Supp.2d 1201 – CD Cal. 2010 Powertech Technology, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc. 872 F.Supp.2d 924 – ND Cal. 2012 Price v. Stossel 590 F.Supp.2d 1262 – CD Cal. 2008 Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos 359 F.Supp.3d 801- ND Cal. 2019 Ray Charles Foundation v. Robinson 919 F.Supp.2d 1054 – CD Cal. 2013 (Reversed by Ninth Circuit on non-anti-SLAPP issues; see 765 F.3d 1109, 1114) Resolute Forest Products, Inc. v. Greenpeace International — F.Supp.3d —- – ND Cal. 10-16-2017 Robinson v. Alameda County 875 F.Supp.2d 1029 – ND Cal. 2012 Rogers v. Home Shopping Network 57 F.Supp.2d 973 – CD Cal. 1999 Rogers sued the National Enquirer, alleging libelous statements about her in a published article. The newspaper filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute’s provision for staying discovery was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Procedure 56, and therefore postponed ruling on the motion until after the plaintiff had an opportunity to discover the identity of the purported confidential source of the published statements. “[I]f a defendant desires to make a special motion to strike based on the plaintiff’s lack of evidence, the defendant may not do so until discovery has been developed sufficiently to permit summary judgment under Rule 56. Once the nonmoving party has been given the opportunity to conduct discovery, the special motion can be heard….” Rouse v. Law Offices of Rory Clark 465 F.Supp.2d 1031 – SD Cal. 2009 Select Portfolio Servicing v. Valentino 875 F.Supp.2d 975 – ND Cal. 2012 Shack v. NBC Universal Media, LLC 467 F.Supp.3d 885 – CD Cal. 2020 Sharper Image Corporation v. Target Corp. 425 F.Supp.2d 1056 – ND Cal. 2006 Defendants brought counterclaims for tortious interference with economic advantage and unfair competition. Plaintiff filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants’ counterclaims were based on emails sent by plaintiff to retailers and media representatives who advertised the product in question, advising them of the lawsuit and asking them not to carry or advertise the product. The district court concluded that because the intended audience of the emails was actual or potential buyers or customers, or persons likely to repeat the statement to or otherwise influence an actual or potential buyer or customer, the counterclaims were exempt from the anti-SLAPP law, pursuant to Civil Code Section 425.17(c). Shropshire v. Fred Rappoport Co. 294 F.Supp.2d 1085 – ND Cal. 2003 Plaintiffs sued for copyright infringement and other causes of action, including interference with prospective economic advantage, after it terminated defendants’ rights to use a song in a video production. Defendants filed a special (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike the complaints for interference with prospective economic advantage on the grounds that the complaints were based on statements made by defendant in anticipation of litigation with plaintiffs and therefore protected by California’s “litigation privilege” statute. The court concludes that, before it can decide on the motion, it must resolve the factual question whether defendant’s allegedly tortious statements were made “with a good faith belief in a legally viable claim and in serious contemplation of litigation” and therefore plaintiff must be permitted to conduct discovery on this point. Accordingly, the court does not apply the California anti-SLAPP statute’s stay on discovery. Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. 144 F.Supp.3d 1088 – ND Cal. 2015 Smith v. Levine Leichtman Capital Partners, Inc. 723 F.Supp.2d 1205 – ND Cal. 2010 Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese Factory, LLC 634 F.Supp.2d 1009 – ND Cal. 2007 Stossel V. Meta No. 21-cv-07385-VKD – ND California 2022 Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles 530 F.Supp.2d 1084 – CD Cal. 2008 Synopsys, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. 313 F.Supp.3d 1056 – ND Cal. 2018 Thomas v. Los Angeles Times Communications 189 F.Supp.2d 1005 – CD Cal. 2002 Thomas was the subject of a biography on his experiences during World War II. Thomas claimed to be a member of the French resistance and, as an agent of the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps, to have uncovered evidence concerning Nazi concentration camp practices. After publication of the biography, an article critical of Thomas’s claims appeared in the Los Angeles Times. Thomas sued for damages, alleging defamation by implication. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The district court grants the motion on the grounds that it is unlikely Thomas would prevail on the merits of his claim. The court analyzes in detail the Los Angeles Times article to reach the conclusion that it does not provide sufficient evidence of defamation by implication. Tisdale v. City of Los Angeles 617 F.Supp.2d 1003 – CD Cal. 2009 Tobinick v. Novella 108 F.Supp.3d 1299 – SD Fla 2015 Troy Group, Inc. v. Tilson 364 F.Supp.2d 1149 – CD Cal. 2002 The Troy Group sued Tilson for defamation based on a statement Tilson made to his attorney in a lawsuit against Troy. Tilson filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The parties disputed whether Tilson’s statement was “in connection with an issue of public interest” as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court grants Tilson’s motion on the grounds that the public issue requirement was satisfied and Troy had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of its claim. Tuck Beckstoffer Wines LLC v. Ultimate Distributors 682 F.Supp.2d 1003 – ND Cal. 2010 TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc. 626 F.Supp.2d 1120 – C.D. Cal. 2009 UCP International Company Limited v. Balsam Brands Inc. 420 F.Supp.3d 966 – ND Cal. 2019 United States ex rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 445 F.Supp.3d 786 – ED Cal. 2020 United Tactical Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc. 143 F.Supp.3d 982 – ND Cal. 2015 Weiland Sliding Doors & Windows, Inc. v. Panda Windows & Doors, LLC 814 F.Supp.2d 1033 – SD Cal. 2011 Welker v. Law Office of Daniel J. Horwitz 626 F.Supp.2d 1068 – S.D. Cal. 2009 source source U.S. District Courts in California Selected cases (alphabetical by case name) Federal SLAPP Cases Decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Batzel v. Smith 9th Circuit, 2003 333 F.3d 1018 Overruled by Gopher Media LLC v. Melone (9th Cir. en banc, Oct. 9, 2025) No. 24-2626, on appealability: in federal court, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is no longer immediately appealable. Smith, a contractor hired by Batzel at her home, saw numerous “older European” paintings on Batzel’s walls and thought he overheard her say she was the granddaughter of one of Hitler’s deputies. He sent an e-mail to an agency involved in tracking down artwork stolen by the Nazis, and the agency posted the e-mail on its website. Batzel sued Smith and the director of the agency, Ton Cremers, for defamation. Cremers filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff was not likely to prevail on her complaint, as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, because he was exempt from liability for reposting Smith’s e-mail on the Internet under 47 U.S.C. 230 — a part of the 1996 Communications Decency Act that sets limitations on liability under state law for postings on the Internet. The motion was denied by the district court on the grounds that section 230 did not apply to Cremers’ in this case. The 9th Circuit panel holds, as a threshold matter, that denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an immediately appealable “final decision” in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1291. “Because California law recognizes the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute as a substantive immunity from suit, this court … will do so as well.” (Cf. United States, ex rel. Newsham et al. v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. below.) The court disagrees with the district court’s interpretation of section 230, vacates the district court’s denial of the special motion to strike, and remands for further hearings on questions of fact in light of its interpretation of section 230. Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer 9th Circuit, 2005 403 F.3d 672 After Kremer became dissatisfied with hair restoration provided by Bosley, he started a website to criticize the service. Because the website address was “BosleyMedical.com,” Bosley sued Kremer for trademark infringement and cybersquatting under the federal Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Kremer filed an anti-SLAPP motion against Bosley’s state-law trademark claims. The district court granted the motion but the appellate court reverses. “An infringement lawsuit by a trademark owner over a defendant’s unauthorized use of the mark as his domain name does not necessarily impair the defendant’s free speech rights.” The court concludes that while a summary judgment motion might have been appropriate, an anti-SLAPP motion was not. Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2017 878 F.3d 759 CoreCivic v. Candide Group 9th Circuit, 2022 46 F.4th 1136 Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2015 775 F.3d 1172 DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp. 9th Circuit, 2013 706 F.3d 1009 Reaffirmed Batzel; no longer good law on appealability after Gopher Media (2025). Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2013 730 F.3d 946 EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2021 1 F.4th 1164 Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2008 515 F.3d 1019 Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir 9th Circuit, 2011 631 F.3d 1299 Falck Northern California Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Solutions, LLC 9th Circuit, 2022 25 F.4th 763 Graham-Sult v. Clainos 9th Circuit, 2013 738 F.3d 1131 Graham-Sult v. Clainos 9th Circuit, 2014 756 F.3d 724 Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. CNN, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2014 742 F.3d 414 Greensprings Baptist Christian Fellowship Trust v. Cilley 9th Circuit, 2010 629 F.3d 1064 Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow 9th Circuit, 2021 8 F.4th 1148 Hilton v. Hallmark Cards 9th Circuit, 2010 599 F.3d. 894 Hyan v. Hummer 9th Circuit, 2016 825 F.3d 1043 Jordan-Benel v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2017 859 F.3d 1184 Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP 9th Circuit, 2009 590 F.3d 638 Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.) 9th Circuit, 2013 724 F.3d 1268 Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC 9th Circuit, 2013 715 F.3d 254 736 F.3d 1180 Maloney v. T3Media, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2017 853 F.3d 1004 Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego 9th Circuit, 2011 655 F.3d 1171 Manufactured Home Communities., Inc. v. County of San Diego 9th Circuit, 2008 544 F.3d 959 Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. 9th Circuit, 2016 830 F.3d 881 Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick 9th Circuit, 2001 264 F.3d 832 In this lengthy and complex opinion (including a partial dissent) the court reverses in part and affirms in part the judgment of the district court (see district court decision). The district court had ruled that certain expert testimony on behalf of Metabolife could not be admitted; as a result, Metabolife was unable to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its claims for defamation and trade libel, and therefore the court granted the anti-SLAPP motions of all defendants. The appellate court reverses the district court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony because it found the reasons cited by the district court constitute abuse of discretion. In the court’s view, admitting the expert evidence would not enhance the ability of Metabolife to prevail on its claims against one defendant, a professor of medicine, and therefore the court affirms the decision to grant that defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. However, as to the other defendants — a TV reporter and her broadcaster — the court reverses the decision to grant their anti-SLAPP motions on the grounds that their edited broadcast of the professor’s statements about Metabolife failed to qualify as “protected speech” under the First Amendment because they deleted crucial qualifiers from the original statement. In its opinion the court rules that the discovery-limiting provision of the anti-SLAPP statute (Section 425.16, subd. g) conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), and therefore cannot be applied in federal court. The dissent points out that, despite the general prohibition, the state statute nevertheless allows a judge to permit discovery “for good cause” and therefore does not conflict with the federal rule. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar 9th Circuit, 2010 611 F.3d 590 PLANET AID, INC. v. REVEAL, CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (August 11, 2022, No. 21-15690) Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress 9th Circuit, 2018 890 F.3d 828 Price v. Stossel 9th Circuit, 2010 620 F.3d 992 Roberts v. McAfee, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2010 660 F.3d 1156 Safari Club International v. Rudolph 9th Circuit, 2017 862 F.3d 1113 Sarver v. Chartier 9th Circuit, 2016 813 F.3d 891 Thomas v. Fry’s Electronics, Inc. 9th Circuit, 2005 400 F.3d 1206 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema (2002) does not undermine the court’s earlier decision in United States, ex rel. Newsham et al. v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (see below) that the California anti-SLAPP motion to strike and entitlement to fees and costs are available in federal court. Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America v. Hirsh 9th Circuit, 2016 831 F.3d 1179 United States, ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. 9th Circuit, 1999 190 F.3d 963 In a case of first impression the court holds that subdivisions (b) and (c) of the California anti-SLAPP statute do not conflict directly with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus are applicable in federal diversity actions. Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications Co. 9th Circuit, 2004 377 F.3d 1081 Verizon, as “incumbent local exchange carrier,” had several interconnection agreements with Covad, a competitive carrier. Verizon sued Covad for fraud, alleging that Covad had issued false “trouble tickets” as part of a scheme to reduce its own service costs. Covad asserted counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant Covad on Verizon’s claims and summary judgment for Verizon on Covad’s counterclaims. Defendants filed special motions to strike Verizon’s original complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, but the court granted Verizon leave to amend its complaint and deferred ruling on the motions to strike pending receipt of the amended complaint. The court then denied the motions to strike based on an analysis of the amended complaint. Both parties appealed the summary judgments; Covad appealed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court affirms the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that “granting a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiff’s initial complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)’s policy favoring liberal amendment.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 9th Circuit, 2003 317 F.3d 1097 Plaintiffs filed a class action against a drug manufacturer, the American Psychiatric Assn. (APA), and Children and Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD), alleging that they promoted sales of Ritalin (used to treat hyperactivity) in violation of California’s unfair business practice laws. Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Procedure as well as an anti-SLAPP motion. The district court declined to rule on the anti-SLAPP motions before it had ruled on the motions to dismiss, deeming such motions premature. The district court first granted all of the motions to dismiss and then granted all of the anti-SLAPP motions. The appellate court agrees with the district court’s approach to ruling on the motions. It affirms the ruling on the anti-SLAPP motions of APA and CHADD on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from speech protected by the First Amendment and plaintiffs had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their claims as required by the anti-SLAPP statute. With respect to the drug manufacturer, however, because the court reverses the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, it also reverses the grant of that defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. (See also DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, 4th District.) Zamani v. Carnes 9th Circuit, 2007 491 F.3d 990 Bankruptcy Courts Restaino v. Bah U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit, 2005 321 B.R. 41 Held: California’s anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in bankruptcy cases involving both federal questions and pendant state-law claims. The court agrees with the court in Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group, Globetrotter v. Rainbow Technologies, Inc. (U.S. Dist. Ct. for No. Cal.; see above) that the anti-SLAPP statute is applicable to state-law claims but not to federal questions. source SOME GOOD 1ST AMENDMEND ANTI SLAPP LAW FOR YOU SISSY'S: Anti-SLAPP Law Cases - Case Law Summaries & Citings https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-cases-case-law-summaries-citings/ Anti-SLAPP Law in California https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-in-california/ Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article https://goodshepherdmedia.net/court-tosses-disbarred-lawyers-suit-over-newspaper-article/ Anti Slapp Law Resources: https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-in-california/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-and-free-speech-in-defamation-emotional-distress-cases/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/attorney-liability-for-meritless-litigation-leading-to-harm/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/court-tosses-disbarred-lawyers-suit-over-newspaper-article/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-supreme-court-confirms-that-the-anti-slapp-statute-applies-to-claims-of-discrimination-and-retaliation/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-cases-case-law-summaries-citings/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/free-speech-the-first-amendment-and-social-media/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-anti-slapp-laws-protect-your-right-to-free-speech/ https://goodshepherdmedia.net/code-of-civil-procedure-section-425-16-californias-anti-slapp-law/ [embed]https://youtu.be/V6bj2DS7Rq4?si=LFhK9yKEBI-71Vgh[/embed] [embed]https://youtu.be/ZKVk2aguQTA?si=VytCJsh31bDfxT9p[/embed] https://www.opencase.com/chat/64e53fe2080d488a91723ceea7154b6b