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		<title>Counterman v. Colorado &#8211; Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[Counterman v. Colorado &#8211; Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment justices raising the bar for establishing when a statement is a &#8220;true threat&#8221; not protected by the 1st Amendment. Holding: To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the state must prove that the [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 class="title-text"><em>Counterman v. Colorado &#8211; </em>Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment</h1>
<h2><em><span style="color: #339966;">justices<span style="color: #ff0000;"> raising the bar</span> for establishing when a statement is a &#8220;<span style="color: #ff0000;">true threat</span>&#8221; not protected by the <span style="color: #0000ff;">1st Amendment</span>.</span></em></h2>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong><em>Holding:<span style="color: #ff0000;"> To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the state must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness.</span></em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong><em><span style="color: #000000;">Judgment</span>: <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Vacated and remanded</a>, 7-2, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on June 27, 2023. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-B. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.</span></em></strong></span></p>
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<p><em>Washington — </em>The Supreme Court on Tuesday <span class="link">sided with a Colorado man</span> who was convicted of a crime after sending numerous threatening messages to a woman on Facebook, with the justices raising the bar for establishing when a statement is a &#8220;true threat&#8221; not protected by the First Amendment.</p>
<p>The high court divided 7-2 in the case of <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Counterman v. Colorado</a>, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett in dissent. The court wiped away a Colorado Court of Appeals&#8217; ruling that upheld the conviction of Billy Counterman and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.</p>
<p>Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan said prosecutors must demonstrate that a defendant who made a threat acted recklessly — that is, with the knowledge that others could regard their statement as threatening violence — to establish that the speech is a &#8220;true threat&#8221; and thus no longer covered by the First Amendment.</p>
<p>&#8220;The question presented is whether the First Amendment still requires proof that the defendant had some substantive understanding of the threatening nature of his statements,&#8221; she wrote. &#8220;We hold that it does, but that a mental state of recklessness is sufficient. The state must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.&#8221;</p>
<p>Counterman was prosecuted under a standard requiring the state to show only that a &#8220;reasonable person&#8221; would understand the messages as threats. The majority found that violated the First Amendment.</p>
<p>&#8220;[The state] did not have to show any awareness on his part that the statements could be understood that way. For the reasons stated, that is a violation of the First Amendment,&#8221; Kagan wrote.</p>
<p>In a dissenting opinion written by Barrett, which Thomas joined, the justice said the majority&#8217;s decision &#8220;unjustifiably grants true threat preferential treatment.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;A delusional speaker may lack awareness of the threatening nature of her speech; a devious speaker may strategically disclaim such awareness; and a lucky speaker may leave behind no evidence of mental state for the government to use against her,&#8221; Barrett wrote.</p>
<p>Counterman, she concluded, &#8220;communicated true threats&#8221; and caused the recipient of the messages, a singer-songwriter named Coles Whalen, to fear for her life.</p>
<p>&#8220;Nonetheless, the court concludes that Counterman can prevail on a First Amendment defense,&#8221; Barrett said. &#8220;Nothing in the Constitution compels this result.&#8221;</p>
<p>The case arose from hundreds of Facebook messages Counterman sent to Whalen between 2014 and 2016. Some of the messages were innocuous, while others were more troubling. Whalen tried to block Counterman, but he created multiple accounts to continue sending them.<strong> </strong></p>
<p>In one, Counterman wrote, &#8220;F**k off permanently,&#8221; while in another, he wrote, &#8220;I&#8217;ve tapped phone lines before. What do you fear?&#8221; According to court filings, a third read, &#8220;You&#8217;re not being good for human relations. Die. Don&#8217;t need you.&#8221;</p>
<p>Whalen believed Counterman&#8217;s messages were threatening her life and she was worried she would get hurt. She had issues sleeping, suffered from anxiety, stopped walking alone and even turned down performances out of fear that Counterman was following her.</p>
<p>She eventually turned to the authorities and obtained a protective order, after which Colorado law enforcement arrested Counterman and charged him with stalking under a Colorado law that prohibits &#8220;repeatedly making any form of communication with another person&#8221; in a manner that would &#8220;cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person … to suffer serious emotional distress.&#8221;</p>
<p>Conviction under the law requires proof that the speaker &#8220;knowingly&#8221; made repeated communications, and does not require the person to be aware that the acts would cause &#8220;a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress.&#8221;</p>
<p>Before his trial, Counterman sought to dismiss the charge, arguing that his messages were not &#8220;true threats&#8221; and therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. But the state trial court found that his messages reached the level of a true threat, and the First Amendment did not preclude his prosecution. A jury then found Counterman guilty, and he was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison.</p>
<p>Counterman appealed, arguing the trial court erred when it applied an objective standard for determining whether his messages constituted true threats. He said the court should instead adopt a &#8220;subjective intent&#8221; requirement, which required the state to show he was aware of the threatening nature of his communications.</p>
<p>But the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld his conviction and agreed with the trial court&#8217;s finding that Counterman&#8217;s Facebook messages were &#8220;true threats&#8221; and not protected by the First Amendment. The state supreme court declined to review the case.</p>
<p>The ACLU, which filed a brief in support of Counterman, cheered the decision, saying in a statement that the high court affirmed that &#8220;inadvertently threatening speech cannot be criminalized.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;In a world rife with misunderstandings and miscommunications, people would be chilled from speaking altogether if they could be jailed for failing to predict how their words would be received,&#8221; said Brian Hauss, senior staff attorney with the organization&#8217;s Speech, Privacy, &amp; Technology Project. &#8220;The First Amendment provides essential breathing room for public debate by requiring the government to demonstrate that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly.&#8221;</p>
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<h1 class="is-size-2-tablet is-size-3-mobile has-font-family-compressed mb-sm">ACLU Commends Supreme Court Decision to Protect Free Speech in Case Defining True Threats</h1>
<h2 class="subheading is-special-size-21 has-text-weight-normal mb-sm">In Counterman v. Colorado, the court ruled that the First Amendment requires the government to show recklessness in true threats prosecutions.</h2>
<p>WASHINGTON – The Supreme Court ruled today in <i>Counterman v. Colorado </i>that in true threats cases the First Amendment requires the government to prove that the defendant acted with a culpable mental state, and not merely that his words were objectively threatening.</p>
<p>Colorado law allowed individuals to be convicted if a reasonable person would perceive their words as threatening, regardless of the speaker’s intent. Today’s decision rules that the First Amendment requires the government to show at a minimum that the defendant recklessly disregarded a substantial risk that his words could be perceived as threatening. The court holds that a recklessness standard strikes the right balance between free expression and safety, “offering ‘enough “breathing space” for protected speech,’ without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats.”</p>
<p>“We’re glad the Supreme Court affirmed today that inadvertently threatening speech cannot be criminalized,” said<b> Brian Hauss, senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union’s Speech, Privacy, &amp; Technology Project. </b>“In a world rife with misunderstandings and miscommunications, people would be chilled from speaking altogether if they could be jailed for failing to predict how their words would be received. The First Amendment provides essential breathing room for public debate by requiring the government to demonstrate that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly.”</p>
<p>This case involved a series of disturbing messages that the petitioner, Billy Raymond Counterman, sent to C.W., a professional musician in Colorado, over a two-year period. Counterman was prosecuted and convicted under Colorado’s anti-stalking statute. On appeal, Counterman — who has been diagnosed with a mental illness — argued that his conviction was unconstitutional because the jury was not required to find that he intended to threaten C.W.</p>
<p>The ACLU and its partners filed an amicus brief in the case arguing that a great deal of speech — including political speech, satire, and artistic speech — contains overt or implicit references to violence that could be interpreted as threatening. Without requiring some element of intentional wrongdoing, the ACLU argued, there exists a significant risk that people will be convicted of serious felonies because they failed to adequately anticipate how their words would be perceived.</p>
<p><i>Counterman v. Colorado </i>is a part of the ACLU’s Joan and Irwin Jacobs Supreme Court Docket. The amicus brief was filed with the ACLU of Colorado, the Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the National Coalition Against Censorship.</p>
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<h1 class="title-text">Supreme Court Decides <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em></h1>
<p>On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court decided <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, No. 22-138, holding that a criminal prosecution based on a true threat of violence requires proof that the defendant subjectively understood the threatening character of the statement such that making the statement was at least reckless.</p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, Billy Counterman persistently sent hundreds of unwelcome messages through Facebook to a local musician, creating new accounts to circumvent her attempts to block them. The musician interpreted many of the messages as indicators that Counterman was surveilling her and intended to harm her. Colorado state prosecutors criminally charged Counterman for his behavior, and the Facebook messages themselves were the only evidence presented at trial. Counterman claimed his messages fell within the protections of the First Amendment because they could not be “true threats” if he did not have a subjective understanding that the messages were threatening. The Colorado trial and appellate courts rejected his argument and ruled that “true threats” were subject only to an objective reasonableness standard.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court reversed. While the Court agreed that “true threats of violence” are not protected speech under the First Amendment, the Court held that a court must apply a subjective test to determine if a statement is in fact a true threat of violence. The Court held that this subjective standard is required to avoid a chilling effect on otherwise protected speech. The Court noted that the “ordinary citizen’s predictable tendency” is to steer very wide of speech that may be considered unlawful. The Court held that a subjective standard was necessary to balance the public interest in avoiding unnecessary chilling of lawful speech and the ability of prosecutors to criminally charge defendants for unlawful speech.</p>
<p>The Court then analyzed what level of subjective knowledge is sufficient to accomplish that balance. The Court compared the law governing other non-protected classes of speech, including defamation, and determined that a reckless state of mind is sufficient—i.e., a defendant who consciously disregards a substantial risk that statements would be understood as a true threat may be prosecuted. The Court also concluded that any <em>mens rea</em> requirement higher than recklessness—like purpose or knowledge—would make prosecution too difficult, and “with diminishing returns for protected expression.” To balance the risk of chilling public speech and the need to be able to prosecute true threats of violence, the Court ruled that prosecutors must prove that defendants recklessly made threatening statements.</p>
<p>Justice Kagan authored the opinion of the Court. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurrence in which Justice Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Thomas authored a dissent. Justice Barrett authored a dissent in which Justice Thomas joined.</p>
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<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-17194 " src="https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport-300x63.png" sizes="(max-width: 610px) 100vw, 610px" srcset="https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport-300x63.png 300w, https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport-1024x214.png 1024w, https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport-768x160.png 768w, https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport-1536x321.png 1536w, https://www.naag.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/supremecourtreport.png 1821w" alt="" width="610" height="128" /></p>
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<div class="public-DraftStyleDefault-block public-DraftStyleDefault-ltr" data-offset-key="7t095-0-0">Volume 30, Issue 5</div>
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<p>This <em>Report</em> summarizes an opinion issued on January 23 (Part I); and cases granted review on December 27, 2022, and January 13, 2023 (Part II).</p>
<h3><strong>Opinion: <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 22-138</strong></h3>
<p><em>Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 22-138. The Court will clarify the standard for determining whether a statement is a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment. Most federal courts of appeals apply an objective test that asks whether a reasonable person would interpret the statement as a threat of violence. By contrast, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits employ a subjective test that asks whether the speaker intended the recipient to feel threatened. State courts are similarly divided, with some applying a hybrid test that considers both the speaker’s subjective intent and whether a reasonable person would view the statement as a threat. This is the second time that the Court has agreed to address this split. The issue was presented in <em>Elonis v. United States</em>, 575 U.S. 723 (2015), but the Court ultimately resolved that case on a different basis.</p>
<p>The issue here arises in the context of a criminal prosecution for stalking. Over the course of two years, petitioner Billy Raymond Counterman directly messaged a local musician on Facebook without invitation or response. Some of the messages suggested that he was physically surveilling her, while others told her to “Die” and “Fuck off permanently.” Counterman’s messages caused the victim to fear for her safety, so she told her family and police. Relying on 17 messages, Colorado charged him with stalking. Under Colorado law, prosecutors did not need to prove that Counterman intended his statements to be threatening or that he was aware that they could be interpreted that way. Counterman moved to dismiss the charge on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his messages were not true threats and thus were protected speech. The trial court denied the motion and a jury found Counterman guilty of stalking. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Counterman’s conviction. 497 P.3d 1039. In holding that Counterman’s statements were true threats subject to criminal prosecution, the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the objective test that asks whether a reasonable person would view the statements as threatening. The court of appeals rejected Counterman’s argument that a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a statement to constitute a true threat, noting that the Colorado Supreme Court recently rejected that rule absent further guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court later denied Counterman’s petition for review.</p>
<p>Relying on history, tradition, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Counterman argues in his petition that “heightened scienter is necessary to true threats.” He notes that, generally, consciousness of wrongdoing is required for a criminal conviction. A scienter requirement is especially important for a statute that regulates speech, Counterman contends, because convicting “a person for negligently misjudging how others would construe the speaker’s words would erode the breathing space that safeguards the free exchange of ideas.” Counterman submits that a purely objective test for true threats conflicts with the Court’s true threats jurisprudence, including <em>Virginia v. Black</em>, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). There, the Court stated that true threats “encompass those statements where the speaker <em>means</em> to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” (Emphasis added.) Counterman relies on this language to argue that the Court has already imposed a heightened scienter requirement for true threats. He also points out that in incitement cases, the Court has required proof that the speaker intended to produce imminent disorder. See<em> Hess v. Indiana</em>, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam).</p>
<p>Colorado argues that its objective test for true threats is consistent with the Court’s free speech jurisprudence. It compares its “context-driven objective standard” to the Court’s analysis in <em>Watts v. United States</em>, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). There, in holding that the speaker’s comments at a rally were not true threats subject to criminal prosecution, the Court focused on the plain language of the statements, the context in which they were made, and the listeners’ reaction. Colorado’s test similarly examines “the contested expression’s context, including the listeners’ reaction.” In Colorado’s view, the Court in <em>Black</em> did not subsequently adopt a subjective-intent requirement for true threats. It reads <em>Black </em>as simply identifying one circumstance where a speaker makes a true threat, namely when he communicates with the intent to threaten the recipient. Colorado maintains that <em>Black</em> did not “state that true threats were limited to such statements.” Colorado also contends that an objective test is especially important to protect victims of stalking because stalkers may be delusional, thereby making it difficult for prosecutors to prove a subjective intent to threaten. And because its objective test considers the context in which the statements were made, Colorado submits that speakers will be protected from unfair punishment.</p>
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<section class="abstract ng-scope">
<h2><img decoding="async" class="alignnone size-large wp-image-15537" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/free-speech-cat3-1024x512.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="320" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/free-speech-cat3-1024x512.jpg 1024w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/free-speech-cat3-400x200.jpg 400w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/free-speech-cat3-768x384.jpg 768w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/free-speech-cat3.jpg 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" />Facts of the case</h2>
<div class="ng-binding">
<p>Billy Raymond Counterman repeatedly contacted a person over Facebook in 2014, sending her “creepy” messages from numerous different accounts even after she repeatedly blocked him. Some of the messages implied that Counterman was watching her and saying that he wanted her to die or be killed. She reported Counterman to law enforcement, who arrested him in 2016. He was charged with one count of stalking (credible threat), one count of stalking (serious emotional distress, and one count of harassment; before trial, the prosecution dismissed the count of stalking (credible threat).</p>
<p>Counterman claimed that the remaining charges, as applied to his Facebook messages, would violate his right to free speech under the  First Amendment because they were not “true threats.” The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and a jury found him guilty of stalking (serious emotional distress). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.</p>
</div>
</section>
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<h1 class="article__headline">US Supreme Court makes decision on Counterman v. Colorado</h1>
<div class="article__summary">The justices considered whether a stalker&#8217;s intent in contacting his victim must be a factor when determining if a statement is a &#8220;true threat.&#8221;</div>
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<p>WASHINGTON, D.C., USA — The Supreme Court ruled Tuesday to make it more difficult to convict a person of making a violent threat, including against the president or other elected officials.</p>
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<p>The Biden administration had warned that the internet and social media have expanded the number and kinds of threats in recent years, including online harassment, intimidation and stalking. And they warned the case could affect the ability to prosecute threats against public officials, which have increased in recent years.</p>
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<p>The high court was ruling in <a href="https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/colorado-news/scotus-hears-challenge-colorado-stalking-law/73-099604a9-6c51-4f47-99a3-aeb794711a96" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a case that involves a man who was sentenced to more than four years in prison in Colorado</a> for sending threatening Facebook messages. The man’s lawyers had argued that he suffers from mental illness and never intended his messages to be threatening.</p>
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<p>The question for the court was whether prosecutors must show that a person being prosecuted for making a threat knew their behavior was threatening or whether prosecutors just have to prove that a reasonable person would see it as threatening.</p>
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<p>Justice Elena Kagan wrote for a majority of the court that prosecutors have to show that “the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.”</p>
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<p>“The State must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence,” she said.</p>
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<p>Seven justices agreed with the outcome. Two conservative justices, Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett, dissented.</p>
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<p>The Biden administration had been among those arguing for the lower “reasonable person” standard.</p>
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<p>“Threats of violence against public officials in particular have proliferated in recent years, including threats against Members of Congress, judges, local officials, and election workers,” the Biden administration had noted, saying the case could affect prosecutions in those cases.</p>
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<div class="photo__caption">Speech of all kinds is generally protected by the free speech clause in the Constitution’s First Amendment, but so-called “true threats” are an exception.</div>
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<p>The specific case before the justices involved Billy Counterman. He contacted a musician through Facebook in 2010 to ask her whether she would perform in a benefit concert he said he was organizing. The woman, Coles Whalen, responded but nothing ever came of it.</p>
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<p>Whalen forgot about the exchange, but four years later, Counterman began sending her Facebook messages again. He ultimately sent hundreds of messages, including ones that were rambling and delusional and others that were quotes and memes. Whalen never responded and blocked Counterman several times, but he would just create a new account and continue sending messages.</p>
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<p>Counterman believed Whalen was responding through other websites and Facebook pages. Whalen became concerned after Counterman’s messages — including “You’re not being good for human relations. Die. Don’t need you.” and “Was that you in the white Jeep?” — suggested he was following her in person. Eventually, the messages were reported to law enforcement and Counterman was arrested. He was convicted and lost an appeal.</p>
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<p>The justices&#8217; ruling is a victory for Counterman and sends his case back to lower courts for another look. In a statement, his attorney John Elwood said that they are “gratified that the Supreme Court agreed with Billy Counterman that the First Amendment requires proof of mental state before it can imprison a person for statements that are perceived as threatening.”</p>
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<p>Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser, whose office prosecuted Counterman, said in a statement that the decision will make it “more difficult to stop stalkers from tormenting their victims.&#8221;</p>
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<p>“In today’s ruling, the Court creates a loophole for delusional and devious stalkers and misapprehends the very nature of threats faced by stalking victims,&#8221; Weiser said. &#8220;In short, this decision will make it more likely that victims of threats— mostly women — will live in fear and will be discouraged from speaking out against their stalkers, believing there is little they can do to hold those stalkers accountable.&#8221;</p>
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<h2><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em>The case is Counterman v. Colorado, 22-138.</em></span></h2>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Opinion of the Court</span> <em>Counterman v. Colorado</em></span></h1>
<p><iframe src="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf" width="1000" height="1000" align="center"><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
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<p><a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-threats-counterman-colorado-first-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 1</a>  <a href="https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-commends-supreme-court-decision-to-protect-free-speech-in-case-defining-true-threats" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 2</a>  <a href="https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2023/6/supreme-court-decides-counterman-v-colorado" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 3</a>  <a href="https://www.naag.org/attorney-general-journal/supreme-court-report-counterman-v-colorado-22-138/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 4</a> <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/22-138" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 5</a> <a href="https://www.9news.com/article/news/politics/national-politics/supreme-court-convict-making-threat/73-32fadd43-5138-4acb-b872-aaee969e200f" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 6</a> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source 7</a></p>
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		<title>Penal Code 422 PC &#8211; Criminal Threats &#8211; California Law</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-422-pc-criminal-threats-california-law/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2022 05:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Laws]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal News The Motivation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[422]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[422 PC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Criminal Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorist Threats]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=9899</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Penal Code 422 PC – Criminal Threats – California Law Penal Code 422 PC prohibits you from making criminal threats. This means threats of death or great bodily injury that are intended to (and that actually do) place victims in reasonable and sustained fear for their safety or the safety of their families. Criminal threats can be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony, and is punishable by up to 3 [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 class="entry-title" style="text-align: center;">Penal Code 422 PC – Criminal Threats – California Law</h1>
<p><iframe title="California Penal Code 422 PC - When does making threats become a crime?" width="640" height="360" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/cYC55Fw80zM?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p class="caption"><strong>Penal Code 422 PC</strong> prohibits you from making <strong>criminal threats</strong>. This means <strong>threats of</strong> <strong>death</strong> or <strong>great bodily injury</strong> that are intended to (and that actually do) place victims in <strong>reasonable and</strong> <strong>sustained fear</strong> for their safety or the safety of their families.</p>
<p class="caption"><strong>Criminal threats</strong> can be charged as</p>
<ul>
<li>a <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/laws/misdemeanor/">misdemeanor</a> or</li>
<li>a <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/laws/felony/">felony</a>, and</li>
<li>is punishable by up to <strong>3 years in jail or prison</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p>The <strong>full text of the statute</strong> reads as follows:</p>
<blockquote><p><em><strong>422.</strong> (a) Any person who willfully <strong>threatens</strong> to commit a crime which will result in <strong>death or great bodily injury</strong> to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a <strong>threat</strong>, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby <strong>causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear</strong> for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.</em></p>
<p><em>(b) For purposes of this section, “<strong>immediate family</strong>” means any spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.</em></p>
<p><em>(c) “<strong>Electronic communication device</strong>” includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or pagers. “Electronic communication” has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.</em></p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Criminal threats</strong> can be charged whether or not you have the ability to carry out the threat even if you do not actually intend to execute the threat. <sup class="fn">1</sup> <sup class="fn">2</sup></p>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen">Examples</h4>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>threatening to shoot another person while you are holding a gun,</li>
<li>a recently fired employee calling the former boss and saying “you and the office staff better watch your backs,”</li>
<li>texting your ex that you’re going to set fire to her apartment.</li>
</ul>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen">Defenses</h4>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Even if a threat was made, it is a <strong>defense</strong> against a criminal threat charge <em>if</em></p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>the threat was <strong>not specific</strong>, but was vague or ambiguous,</li>
<li>the recipient of the threat could not have reasonably feared for their safety,</li>
<li>the recipient of the threat <strong>was not actually in fear</strong>,</li>
<li>the recipient’s fear was merely fleeting or momentary, OR</li>
<li>you only made a threatening gesture and did not convey your threat verbally, electronically or in writing.</li>
</ol>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Or it may be the case that there was no threat, and the accuser is making a <strong>false allegation</strong>.</p>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen">Penalties</h4>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>Penal Code 422 PC</strong> is a <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/laws/wobbler/">wobbler</a>, which means that prosecutors may file it as either a <strong>misdemeanor</strong> or a <strong>felony</strong>.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If you are convicted of misdemeanor criminal threats, you face up to <strong>one year</strong> in county jail. If you get a felony conviction, you face up to <strong>four years</strong> in the California state prison.<sup class="fn">3</sup> Using a dangerous or <strong>deadly weapon</strong> increases your sentence by one year.<sup class="fn">4</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Because a criminal threats conviction is a “strike” under <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/process/sentencing/three-strikes-law/">California’s three-strikes law</a>, you must serve at least <strong>85%</strong> of your sentence before you are eligible for release.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2 class="nitro-offscreen">1. What is the legal definition of criminal threats?</h2>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>California Penal Code 422 PC</strong> provides the legal definition of a “criminal threat” (formerly referred to as a “terrorist threat”). This section makes it a crime to threaten another person with <strong>immediate harm</strong> when you intend to – and in fact do – cause reasonable and sustained fear in that individual.<sup class="fn">6</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">A prosecutor must prove the <strong>following elements</strong>, beyond a reasonable doubt, to successfully convict you under this statute:</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">you willfully threatened to unlawfully<strong> kill or unlawfully cause great bodily injury</strong> to the alleged “victim,”</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">you made the threat <strong>orally</strong>, in <strong>writing</strong>, or by means of an <strong>electronic communication device</strong>,</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">you intended that your statement be<strong> understood as a threat</strong> and intended that it be communicated to the alleged “victim,”</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">the threat was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it communicated <span class="ff26 ws12">a <strong>serious intention</strong> that the </span>threat would be carried out,</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">the threat actually caused the “victim” to<strong> <span class="ff26 ws14">fear for their own </span>safety</strong> (or for the safety of their immediate family), and</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="t m0 x13 h7 y62e ff26 fs3 fc0 sc0 ls0 ws12">the “victim’s”<span class="ff29 ws15"> </span><span class="ws1c">fear was </span>reasonable under the circumstances.<sup class="fn">7</sup></div>
</li>
</ol>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Note that you can violate California’s criminal threats law <strong>without actually addressing the person</strong> you are threatening.</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong>Example</strong>: The defendant got into a fight with another man over a dirt bike that the other man claimed the defendant was trying to steal. The defendant yelled to a companion, <strong>“Shoot him!”</strong> For this, the defendant was charged with violating Penal Code 422 PC. All that mattered was that the defendant intended his statement to be taken as a threat.<sup class="fn">8</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Let’s take a closer look at some of these terms and phrases to gain a better understanding of their <strong>legal definition</strong>s.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.1"></a>1.1. To kill or seriously injure another person</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">You need <strong>not</strong> threaten to commit a specific crime against the victim. Simply <strong>threatening</strong> to kill or cause great bodily injury is sufficient. <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/12022-7/">Great bodily harm</a> is a <strong>significant or substantial bodily injury</strong>, as opposed to an insignificant or even moderate one.<sup class="fn">9</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Although this law refers to threatening a person, the threat may be directed at an <strong>individual or a group of people</strong> (such as all the employees of a particular company).</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.2"></a>1.2. Verbal, written or electronically communicated statements</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Under <strong>Penal Code 422 PC</strong>, the threat must be</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>verbal,</li>
<li>written or</li>
<li>electronically communicated.</li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Gestures that are <strong>unaccompanied</strong> by a verbal, written or electronically communicated statement will not suffice.</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example</em>:</strong> If you wanted someone to be quiet, and you put your finger to your lips and then slid your finger across your throat, this would <em>not</em> meet the criteria of a criminal threat. However, if you accompanied your gesture with a “sh” or “shush”, that would be considered a verbal statement and would therefore qualify as a criminal threat as long as the other elements of the offense were also satisfied.<sup class="fn">10</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">As for the definition of an “<strong>electronically communicated</strong>” threat, this type of threat is one that is conveyed via a</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>telephone (a land-line or a cell phone),</li>
<li>computer,</li>
<li>video recorder,</li>
<li>fax machine, or</li>
<li>text or pager.<sup class="fn">11</sup></li>
</ul>
<div class="nitro-offscreen">
<p class="caption">Criminal threats can be conveyed via text messages. Indeed, “<strong>text threats</strong>” are often easier for the prosecutor to prove.</p>
</div>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.3"></a>1.3. Fear</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">You do not violate Penal Code 422 PC California’s criminal threats law unless you place the victim in <strong>reasonable fear</strong>. “Fear” as it applies to criminal threats actually encompasses <strong>three different concepts</strong>:</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>that the victim was <em>actually</em> fearful,</li>
<li>that the fear was <em>reasonable</em>, and</li>
<li>that the fear was <em>sustained</em> (as opposed to momentary or fleeting).</li>
</ol>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Let’s take a look at each of these in order.</p>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.3.a"></a>1.3.a. Actual fear</h4>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Before you can be convicted of a criminal threats charge, the prosecution must establish that the recipient of the threat<strong> <em>actually</em> feared for their safety</strong> or for the safety of their family.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the person laughs and replies “Yea, whatever,” that is probably good evidence they do not take the threat <strong>seriously</strong>. Though if they buy a new security system or go into hiding, that is probably good <strong>evidence</strong> that they are really in fear.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">This requirement that the recipient of the threat believes that the <strong>threat is credible</strong> – and is therefore fearful of its execution – may be satisfied whether you</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>deliver the threat in person or</li>
<li>communicate it through a third party.<sup class="fn">12</sup></li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">This is important to understand: You may still be prosecuted for criminal threats even if you are <strong>not</strong> the person who personally conveys the threat.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the victim was <strong>not scared</strong>, there is no criminal threat, and any charges filed under Penal Code 422 PC should be dismissed. However, if the victim was fearful, the analysis turns to the next question – was that fear <strong><em>reasonable</em></strong>?</p>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.3.b"></a>1.3.b. Reasonable fear</h4>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If your threat is <strong>silly or unreasonable</strong>, there can be no reasonable fear. For example, “I’m going to hijack an F-15 and drop a bomb over your house” does not meet the <strong>legal definition</strong> of a criminal threat.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">However, this is not to say that there must be an immediate <strong><em>ability</em> to carry out the threat</strong>, as long as the recipient of the threat reasonably believes that it could be imminent.<sup class="fn">13</sup></p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong>Example</strong>: Tom threatens to shoot Bob and has his hand in his pocket to make it look as if he has a gun, even though he really does not. That would suffice, assuming the additional elements of the crime are also satisfied.</p></blockquote>
<h4 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.3.c"></a>1.3.c. Sustained fear</h4>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Courts have had a difficult time creating an exact definition for <strong>“sustained” fear</strong>. The best they have come up with is that it refers to</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p>“a state of mind…that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting or transitory.”<sup class="fn">14</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">There is <strong>no set timeframe </strong>to which this refers and it must therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<p class="caption nitro-offscreen">For a criminal threats charge to hold, the victim must be in “sustained fear” which means it lasts for <strong>more than a moment</strong>. Though courts are vague as to exactly <strong>how long</strong> the fear must last.</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><em><strong>Example of sustained fear</strong></em>: The defendant goes to a gas station, displays a knife in his waistband, and tells a man that he would kill the man and his son right then. The court held this was a criminal threat.<sup class="fn">15</sup></p></blockquote>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example where the court found there was no sustained fear</em></strong>: The defendant (a high school student) got in his teacher’s face and stated that he was “going to get him”. The court held that there was nothing to indicate that the fear was more than fleeting or transitory.<sup class="fn">16</sup></p></blockquote>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="1.4"></a>1.4. Conditional and empty threats</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">It bears repeating that the language used in <strong>Penal Code 422 PC</strong> calls for a threat that is</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p>“so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution.”</p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">But despite these exact words, threats that are <strong>conditional or empty</strong> can nevertheless qualify as criminal threats.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>Conditional threats</strong></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Conditional threats are threats that are formulated as a <strong>condition</strong>, such as</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>“I will kill you <em>when</em> I get out of jail” or</li>
<li>“I will kill you <em>if</em> you don’t give me the money by next Tuesday”.</li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The <strong>courts</strong> have held</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p>“<strong>conditional threats</strong> are true threats if their context reasonably conveys to the victim that they are intended”.<sup class="fn">17</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Depending on the circumstances, this type of threat could actually be a form of <strong>extortion</strong> or <strong>blackmail</strong> (discussed in detail under <em>Section 4.2 Extortion</em>), which would subject you to additional penalties under California Penal Code 518 PC).<sup class="fn">18</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">When conditional threats are made with a sense of purpose and likelihood that they <strong>will be executed</strong> if the condition is or is not satisfied, they will be considered criminal threats.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">As the court explains, “‘<strong>Most threats are conditional</strong>; they are designed to accomplish something; the threatener hopes that they <em>will</em> accomplish it, so that he won’t have to carry out the threats.&#8217;”<sup class="fn">19</sup></p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example</em></strong>:  A defendant went to a witness’s home, grabbed her by the throat, put a gun to her head and said “don’t go to court and testify against our home boys or else we’ll hurt you or we’ll take you out. If you go to court and testify, I’ll kill you. There’s nowhere you can go where I won’t be able to find you.” The court held this was a criminal threat.<sup class="fn">20</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>Empty threats</strong></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">“Empty” threats are threats that the maker of the threat <strong>does not intend</strong> to carry out. They are <strong>more of a scare tactic</strong> than a real threat.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Whether or not you “really” intend to execute the threat is <strong>irrelevant</strong> to a criminal threats prosecution. All that is required is that you convey the threat in a <strong>credible manner</strong> so that the recipient of the threat reasonably believes that you intend to see it through.<sup class="fn">21</sup></p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example</em></strong>:  The defendant (a Vietnam vet) brought a grenade to a repair shop and threatened to blow it up. The defendant knew that the grenade was inoperable, but the employees thought it was real. Since the employees reasonably feared the defendant would carry out his threat, he could be convicted.<sup class="fn">22</sup></p></blockquote>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">In general, a judge or jury determines whether or not a statement was a threat by examining all of the <strong>surrounding circumstances</strong> in the case.<sup class="fn">23</sup></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2 class="nitro-offscreen">2. What are common defenses to Penal Code 422?</h2>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the prosecutor cannot prove any of the <strong>elements</strong> above, you cannot be convicted of this offense. As such, there are numerous <strong><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/legal-defenses/">legal defenses</a> </strong>on which your defense team can rely.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The following are <strong>examples</strong> of some of the <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/how-to-beat-a-criminal-threat-charge-top-5-defenses/">most common defenses to a criminal threats charge</a> that your attorney can present on your behalf to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.1"></a>2.1. The threat was not immediate</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The language of Penal Code 422 PC states that the threat must be so “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific” that it conveys an <strong>immediate</strong> <strong>possibility</strong> <strong>of execution</strong>.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">An “<strong>immediate possibility of execution</strong>” doesn’t necessarily mean that it has to be a threat to do something right this second. While it can be that, it can also be a situation where the threatened individual understands that if they do not comply with your demand at some later point, you will be able to execute the threat <em>at that time</em>.<sup class="fn">23</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Though if the alleged threat was so <strong>vague </strong>and there was no sense of when you might execute the threat, that vagueness would serve as a defense.</p>
<div class="nitro-offscreen">
<p class="caption">A good defense lawyer can often successfully <strong>fight a criminal threats charge</strong> in court.</p>
</div>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example</em></strong>: An inmate serving a life prison sentence without the possibility of parole tells one of the deputies that he’s going to kill the deputy and his family. Under this scenario, the inmate would probably not be convicted of making a criminal threat. Without more, there’s no sense of immediacy or any reason for the deputy to assume that the defendant has the ability to carry out his threat.<sup class="fn">24</sup></p></blockquote>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.2"></a>2.2. The threat was vague or ambiguous</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">While a criminal threat must be “specific,” it does not have to communicate a time or <strong>precise manner of execution</strong>.<sup class="fn">25</sup> This means that even if the threat, on its face, appears vague or ambiguous, if the surrounding circumstances clarify its meaning, it will qualify as a <strong>criminal threat</strong>.<sup class="fn">26</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">It, therefore, follows that the absence of circumstances that would be expected to accompany a threat <strong>may serve as a defense</strong> to the claim that the statement was a criminal threat.</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><strong><em>Example</em></strong>: Let’s refer back to an example above where the defendant, a high school student, felt disrespected by his teacher when the teacher opened a door that accidentally hit the student in the head. To retaliate, the student “got in the teacher’s face” and stated that he was “going to get him”.</p>
<p>The court reasoned that the defendant’s statement was nothing more than a vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution. There was simply nothing to indicate that the threat rose to the level of a criminal threat.<sup class="fn">27</sup></p></blockquote>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.3"></a>2.3. The victim was not afraid</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the alleged victim <strong>does not fear your threat</strong> either because they believe that it is a joke or that you are incapable of executing it, then there is no criminal threats violation – period.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The victim must be placed in fear and if, for whatever reason this is not the case, you should be <strong>acquitted</strong> of the charge.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.4"></a>2.4. The threat (or alleged victim’s fear) was unreasonable</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the recipient of the threat does not feel threatened – or if they do, but that fear is <strong>unreasonable </strong>– you should not be convicted of this offense. There are actually two requirements here: the victim’s fear must be</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>reasonable, and</li>
<li>real.</li>
</ol>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If both requirements are not satisfied, there is <strong>no case.</strong><sup class="fn">28</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">This means that it does not matter if the threatened individual actually fears your threat if <strong>it was not reasonable</strong> to do so under the circumstances.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">For example, if someone threatens to run you over with an airplane – and this someone has no pilot’s license and threatens you while you are standing in the street of a residential neighborhood – it would <strong>not be reasonable</strong> for you to fear that the individual making the threat would actually see it through.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.5"></a>2.5. The fear was not sustained</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The last part of the “fear” analysis involves whether the victim’s fear was sustained as opposed to <strong>momentary or fleeting</strong>. If the fear only lasted for a brief moment and did not cause any prolonged concern, you should <strong>not</strong> be convicted of criminal threats.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If the victim’s fear <em>was</em> sustained – but it was an overreaction and therefore not <em>reasonably</em> sustained – that, too, may serve as a <strong>defense</strong>.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.6"></a>2.6. The threat was protected as free speech</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">California’s criminal threats law does not apply to <strong>constitutionally protected speech</strong>.<sup class="fn">29</sup> This law only targets individuals who try to <strong>instill fear</strong> in others, not those who engage in “mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent”.<sup class="fn">30</sup></p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p><em><strong>Example</strong></em>: The defendant, who is an inmate in jail, told a jail psychotherapist that he was thinking about how he was going to kill [his girlfriend] once he was released from jail. The court held that Penal Code 422 PC was not enacted to punish emotional outbursts. The court reasoned that the threats were part of the therapy intended only for the therapist’s ears and, as such, are protected.<sup class="fn">31</sup></p></blockquote>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="2.7"></a>2.7. False accusations</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Because there is no requirement that the victim <strong>suffers any <em>physical</em> injury</strong>, criminal threats is a crime ripe for false accusations. Anyone who is angry, jealous, vengeful, spiteful or trying to escape their own criminal liability could easily <strong>falsely accuse</strong> another person of this serious crime.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">This is especially true when the accusation is of a <strong>verbal threat</strong>, with no written or electronic recording.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">But as <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/ventura/ventura-criminal-defense-lawyer/">Ventura criminal defense lawyer</a> John Murray<sup class="fn">32</sup> explains,</p>
<blockquote class="nitro-offscreen"><p>“Our attorneys are all former police investigators and prosecutors. This experience allows us to explore and examine cases in a way where we can detect the lies and reveal the truth. If you were falsely accused of making criminal threats, we will fight the charge to clear your name.”</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2 class="nitro-offscreen">3. What are the penalties for a 422 PC conviction?</h2>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Penal Code 422 PC is what’s known as a “<strong>wobbler</strong> ” which means that prosecutors may charge the offense as either a <strong>misdemeanor</strong> or a <strong>felony</strong>, depending on</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>the circumstances of the offense, and</li>
<li>your criminal history.</li>
</ol>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If convicted of the <strong>misdemeanor</strong>, you face up to one year in county jail and a maximum $1,000 fine. If convicted of the <strong>felony</strong>, you face</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>up to three years in the <a href="https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California state prison</a> and</li>
<li>a maximum $10,000 fine.<sup class="fn">33</sup></li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If you personally use a deadly or dangerous <strong>weapon</strong> to communicate your threat, you face an <em>additional and consecutive</em> one-year in the state prison.<sup class="fn">34</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Lastly, if you make <strong>threats</strong></p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>on more than one occasion,</li>
<li>against multiple people, or</li>
<li>pursuant to different objectives,</li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">you could face these <strong>penalties <em>for each threat</em> </strong>that you communicate.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Note that the <a href="https://da.lacounty.gov/" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office</a> will generally not <strong>prosecute</strong> criminal threats cases unless:</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>The offense was related to domestic violence or a hate crime;</li>
<li>You made repeat threat offenses in the last 24 months;</li>
<li>There is a documented history of threats from you toward the victim;</li>
<li>You had a dangerous or deadly weapon during the offense; or</li>
<li>There was no indication of substance abuse disorder or mental illness.<sup class="fn">35</sup></li>
</ol>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="3.1"></a>3.1. California three strikes law</h3>
<div class="nitro-offscreen">
<p class="caption">A <em>felony</em> criminal threats conviction is a <strong>strike under California’s Three Strikes law</strong>.</p>
</div>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">When charged as a felony, a conviction for criminal threats qualifies as a <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/1192-7/">serious felony</a> which means that it is a “<strong>strike</strong>” for purposes of California’s three-strikes law.<sup class="fn">36</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If you are subsequently charged with <em>any</em> felony, and you have a prior “<strong>strike</strong>” on your record, you will be referred to as a “second striker,” and your sentence will be twice the term otherwise required by law.<sup class="fn">37</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If charged with a third felony, and you have <strong>two prior strikes</strong>, you</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>will be referred to as a “third striker” and</li>
<li>will serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years to life in the state prison.<sup class="fn">38</sup></li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Because Penal Code 422 PC is a strike, you must serve at least <strong>85%</strong> of your sentence before you will be eligible for release on <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/parole/">parole</a>.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="3.2"></a>3.2. Additional penalties</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Penal Code 422 PC is considered a <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/laws/crimes-involving-moral-turpitude/">crime of moral turpitude</a>.<sup class="fn">39</sup> “<strong>Crimes of moral turpitude</strong>” are crimes that are viewed as more offensive and reprehensible than others. Based on this classification, a conviction for California’s <strong>criminal threats</strong> law potentially subjects you to</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>professional discipline (since <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/professional-licenses/">criminal convictions can affect professional licenses</a>),<sup class="fn">40</sup> and</li>
<li><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/immigration/deportation-defense/deportable-crimes/">deportation or removal if you are a legal immigrant or alien</a>.<sup class="fn">41</sup></li>
</ul>
<h2 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4"></a>4. Are there related offenses?</h2>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">There are a number of offenses that could be charged<strong> in connection</strong> with criminal threats. If you threaten to kill or seriously injure another person during the commission or attempted commission of another crime, prosecutors will likely <strong>charge</strong> you with both crimes.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">The following are some <strong>examples</strong> of these types of offenses.</p>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.1"></a>4.1. Penal Code 136.1 PC California’s law against dissuading a witness</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/136-1/">Penal Code 136.1 PC California’s law against dissuading a witness</a> prohibits <strong>preventing</strong> or attempting to prevent any witness or victim of a crime from</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>reporting the crime or</li>
<li>testifying about the crime.<sup class="fn">42</sup></li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If you attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying and do so by threatening imminent harm in violation of California’s criminal threats law, prosecutors will likely <strong>charge</strong> you with both offenses.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Like Penal Code 422 PC, dissuading a witness is a <strong>wobbler</strong>, punishable by</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>up to 1 year in a county jail, or</li>
<li>up to 4 years in the state prison.</li>
</ul>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.2"></a>4.2. Extortion</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Simply put, you violate <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/518/">Penal Code 518 PC California’s extortion law</a> when you use <strong>force or threats</strong> to gain</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>money,</li>
<li>property or</li>
<li>other services.</li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">You also commit <strong>extortion</strong> when you threaten a public officer in order to compel them to perform an official act.<sup class="fn">43</sup></p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Suppose, for example, you <strong>threaten</strong> a politician. You tell him that if he does not vote for the specific legislation, you will make sure his family <strong>suffers</strong> the consequences. Prosecutors could charge you with both <strong>extortion</strong> and criminal threats.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Extortion is a <strong>felony</strong>, punishable by</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>2, 3 or 4 years in the state prison and</li>
<li>a maximum $10,000 fine.<sup class="fn">44</sup></li>
</ul>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.3"></a>4.3. Domestic violence</h3>
<div class="nitro-offscreen">
<p class="caption">Criminal threats cases often occur in dating and <strong>domestic</strong> contexts</p>
</div>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/laws/domestic-violence/">California’s domestic violence laws</a> apply to crimes that are committed against your <strong>current or former</strong></p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>spouse,</li>
<li>romantic partner,</li>
<li>cohabitant,</li>
<li>child, or</li>
<li>parent.</li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>Allegations</strong> of domestic violence are often based on highly charged emotional situations. It is not at all uncommon for people in these situations to threaten violence even when there is <strong>no actual intent</strong> to inflict harm. Though if the recipient of the threat <strong>fears</strong> for their safety, prosecutors will likely charge you with</p>
<ol class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>criminal threats as a crime of domestic violence (which may subject you to additional penalties), or</li>
<li>criminal threats in addition to another domestic violence offense if there are also allegations of actual force or violence.</li>
</ol>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.4"></a>4.4. Penal Code 646.9 PC California’s stalking law</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/646-9/">Penal Code 646.9 PC California’s stalking law</a> prohibits harassing or threatening another person to the point where that individual <strong>fears</strong> for their safety or the safety of their family.<sup class="fn">45</sup> This law is very <strong>similar</strong> to Penal Code 422 PC.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">If you “<strong>stalk</strong>” another person and communicate a verbal, written or electronically transmitted threat that causes the recipient reason to believe that you intend to carry out that threat, you face prosecution for criminal threats and stalking.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">Stalking is also a <strong>wobbler</strong>, punishable by</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>up to 1 year in a county jail or</li>
<li>up to 5 years in the state prison.<sup class="fn">46</sup></li>
</ul>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.5"></a>4.5. Penal Code 186.22 PC California’s gang enhancement</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/186-22/">Penal Code 186.22 PC</a> is known as California’s criminal <strong>street gang</strong> enhancement. If you <strong>threaten</strong> another individual <em>for the benefit of a gang</em>, you subject yourself to</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>5, 10, 15 or 25-years-to-life in prison in addition and consecutive to</li>
<li>the sentence that you would otherwise receive for your Penal Code 422 PC conviction.<sup class="fn">47</sup></li>
</ul>
<h3 class="nitro-offscreen"><a name="4.6"></a>4.6. Aggravated trespass</h3>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/601/">Penal Code 601 PC aggravated trespass</a> is frequently charged along with <strong>criminal threats</strong>.</p>
<p class="nitro-offscreen"><strong>Aggravated trespass</strong> is charged when you</p>
<ul class="nitro-offscreen">
<li>make a credible threat to the safety of another person or their immediate family, and</li>
<li>enter that person’s residence or workplace within thirty (30) days of making the threat,</li>
<li>without a lawful purpose and with intent to carry out the threat.<sup class="fn">48</sup></li>
</ul>
<p class="nitro-offscreen">PC 601 aggravated trespass is a <strong>wobbler</strong>, with a maximum felony sentence of three (3) years.<sup class="fn">49</sup></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div class="footnotes nitro-offscreen">
<h4>Legal References:</h4>
<ol>
<li id="fn:1"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=422" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California Penal Code 422 PC</a> California criminal threats.</li>
<li id="fn:2">See same, <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=422" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 422 PC</a> California’s criminal threats law.</li>
<li id="fn:3">See same. See also <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=17.7.&amp;nodeTreePath=3&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 18</a> PC — Punishment for felony not otherwise prescribed; alternate sentence to county jail. See also Penal Code 672 PC — Offenses for which no fine prescribed; fine authorized in addition to imprisonment. (“Upon a conviction for any crime punishable by imprisonment in any jail or prison, in relation to which no fine is herein prescribed, the court may impose a fine on the offender not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) in cases of misdemeanors or ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cases of felonies, in addition to the imprisonment prescribed.”)</li>
<li id="fn:4"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/12022/">Penal Code 1</a><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/12022/">2022 PC</a> — Terms of imprisonment for committing or attempting felony or violation while armed with firearm or using deadly or dangerous weapon; application to principals in commission of offense or attempted offense; judicial discretion.</li>
<li id="fn:5">Our California criminal defense attorneys have local Los Angeles law offices in Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale, Lancaster, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Pomona, Torrance, Van Nuys, West Covina, and Whittier. We have additional law offices conveniently located throughout the state in Orange County, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, San Jose, Oakland, the San Francisco Bay area, and several nearby cities.</li>
<li id="fn:6">See <a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/">California Penal Code</a> 422 PC California criminal threats law, endnote 1, above.</li>
<li><a href="https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/1300/1300/" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">CALCRIM No. 1300</a> – Criminal Threat, Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2020 edition). See also: <a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-george-t" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">In re George T. </a><span class="ff27 ws9"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-george-t" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">(2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14921884265106777752&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) <span class="SS_LeftAlign"><span class="SS_RptrLine">12 Cal. 5th 719</span></span></a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/ayala-v-superior-court-the-people" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Ayala v. Superior Court (Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, 2021) <span class="SS_LeftAlign"><span class="SS_RptrLine">67 Cal. App. 5th 296</span></span></a>.</span></li>
<li id="fn:8"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11928906640513235040&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Lipsett (Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, 2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1060</a></li>
<li id="fn:9"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-maciel-8" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679</a>, 685 (“The phrase “crime which will result in great bodily injury” means the crime, if committed, would result in great bodily injury. (CALJIC No. 9.94.) “[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened [in connection with a Penal Code 422 PC California criminal threats violation].””). CALCRIM No. 1300.</li>
<li id="fn:10"><a href="https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/the-people-v-franz-892968432" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:11">See <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=422" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 422 PC</a> California’s criminal threats law, endnote 1, above.</li>
<li id="fn:12"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-ryan-d" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861</a>. (“[California Penal Code] Section 422 does not require that a threat be personally communicated to the victim by the person who makes the threat</li>
<li><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lopez-942" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Lopez (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679</a>. (“The terrorist threat statute [currently the criminal threats statute] requires a threat to be “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (Penal Code § 422.) The statute does not require an immediate ability to carry out the threat.”)</li>
<li id="fn:14"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=People+v.+Fierro+(2010)+180+Cal.App.4th+1342&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholart" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer external">People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342</a>, 1349. (“” Sustained fear” refers to a state of mind. As one court put it, “[d]efining the word ‘sustained’ [in section 433] by its opposites, we find that it means a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting or transitory.” (<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17362285430171578653&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149</a>, 1151, 1153, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 7 ( <em>Allen</em> ).)”)</li>
<li id="fn:15">Facts taken from Fierro, above.</li>
<li id="fn:16">Facts taken from <a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-ricky-t" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:17"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12123525252984339169&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Brooks (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 142</a>, 149.</li>
<li id="fn:18"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=518.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California Penal Code 518</a> — Definition. (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”)</li>
<li id="fn:19">See Brooks at 147, endnote 17, above.</li>
<li id="fn:20">See same at 149.</li>
<li id="fn:21"><a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2305962/people-v-wilson/" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806</a>. (“…section 422 [California’s criminal threats law] does not require an intent to actually carry out the threatened crime. ( <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4466481422426043105&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212</a>, 1220, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 303.) Instead, the defendant must intend for the victim to receive and understand the threat, and the threat must be such that it would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.”). See also <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-gonzalez-2017" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Gonzalez </a><span class="ff27 ws25">(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1147.</span></li>
<li id="fn:22">Facts based on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16127606753131212567&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:23">See, for example, <a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914bbfaadd7b04934799d07" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Mendoza </a><span class="ff27 ws25"><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914bbfaadd7b04934799d07" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340</a>; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-butler-72" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer"><span class="ff29 ws24">People v. </span></a></span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-butler-72" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">Butler </a><span class="ff27 ws9"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-butler-72" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 752-753</a>; </span><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-solis-2035" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer"><span class="ff29">People </span>v. Solis </a><span class="ff27 ws3f"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-solis-2035" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002</a>; and, </span><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/591484aaadd7b049344ba7ae" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Garrett </a><span class="ff27 ws9"><a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/591484aaadd7b049344ba7ae" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 962</a>.</span></li>
<li id="fn:23">See Melhado, endnote 23, above, at 1538. (“We consider one additional point not expressly addressed by the cases we have mentioned. [Penal Code] Section 422 [California’s criminal threats law] makes illegal a threat which conveys a gravity of purpose and the “<em>immediate</em> prospect of execution.” How are we to understand the requirement that the prospect of execution be immediate, when, as we have seen, threats often have by their very nature some aspect of conditionality: A threat is made to convince the victim to do something “or else.” In light of the analysis and reasoning articulated in <em>Brooks</em> and the other cases, which place important emphasis on the effect the threatening words have on the victim, we understand the word “immediate” to mean that degree of seriousness and imminence which is understood by the victim to be attached to the <em>future prospect</em> of the threat being carried out, should the conditions not be met.”)</li>
<li id="fn:24">Facts taken from <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mosley-81" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Mosley (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 313</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:25">See Wilson, endnote 21, above, at 806.</li>
<li id="fn:26">See same at 807-808. (“A communication that is ambiguous on its face may nonetheless be found to be a criminal threat if the surrounding circumstances clarify the communication’s meaning. [Citation.]” ( <a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-george-t" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">George T.</a><em>, supra</em>, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635.) In determining whether conditional, vague, or ambiguous language constitutes a violation of section 422, the trier of fact may consider “the defendant’s mannerisms, affect, and actions involved in making the threat as well as subsequent actions taken by the defendant.”). See also <a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-bolin-31391" target="_blank" rel="noopener external noreferrer">People v. Bolin <span class="ff27 ws21">(1998) 18 Cal.4th </span>297, 339-340</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:27"><a href="https://casetext.com/case/in-re-ricky-t" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:28"><a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20090529594" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer external">Mosley v. Walker (2009) 623 F.Supp.2d 1078</a>, 1088. (“Moreover, the prosecution must show that the victim feared the defendant, and this “element has both an objective and subjective component; [the victim’s] fear must have been reasonable, and it must have been real.””)</li>
<li id="fn:29">See In re Ryan D., endnote 12, above, at 861. (“First, [Penal Code] section 422 [California’s criminal threats law] cannot be applied to constitutionally protected speech. (See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7301307581218989644&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961</a>, 968-969.) In fact, a prior legislative effort to punish criminal threats (former §§ 422, 422.5; Stats. 1977, ch. 1146, § 1, pp. 3684-3685) was declared unconstitutional. (<a id="insertion_173125" class="insertion link" href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-mirmirani-23296" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" data-insertion-id="173125">People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375</a>.) Recognizing that the Constitution does not necessarily preclude the Legislature from punishing threats, our Supreme Court held that “statutes which attempt to do so must be narrowly directed only to threats which truly pose a danger to society.” ( <em>Id</em>. at p. 388, fn. 10.) The court added that “a threat can be penalized only if ‘on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made [it] is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.’ ” ( <em>Ibid</em>., quoting from <a href="https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c624add7b049347d905d" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">United States v. Kelner (2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020</a>, 1027.)”)</li>
<li id="fn:30"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12168183653802879764&amp;q=People+v.+Wilson+(2010)+186+Cal.App.4th+789&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6,29&amp;as_vis=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer external">People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789</a>, 805. <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2269613/people-v-felix/" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People<span class="alt"> v. </span>Felix (Cal. Ct. App., 2001) 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 311</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:32">Ventura criminal defense lawyer John Murray represents clients at the Ventura Hall of Justice, the Van Nuys courthouse, the Pasadena courthouse, the Burbank courthouse, the Glendale courthouse, the Lancaster courthouse, the San Fernando courthouse, and the Criminal Courts Building.</li>
<li id="fn:33">See <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=422" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 422 PC</a> California’s criminal threats law, endnote 1, above.</li>
<li id="fn:34"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/12022/">California Penal Code Section 12022</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:35">See Felix, endnote 31, above at 915-916. (“The trial court imposed an eight-month consecutive sentence for each of these two terrorist threat convictions [currently known as criminal threats convictions]. (“[S]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishments for an indivisible course of conduct.” (<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=961714848401360979&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52</a>.) But multiple crimes are not one transaction where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm. (<a id="insertion_171460" class="insertion link" href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-massie-24585" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" data-insertion-id="171460">People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899</a>, 908; <a href="https://casetext.com/case/people-v-kwok-4" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236</a>, 1253-1256.) “Separate sentencing is permitted for offenses that are divisible in time” ( People v. Kwok<em>, supra</em>, at p. 1254.) The trial court could reasonably infer that each threat was a separate crime. They were not connected because Felix made them at different times at different places. Although Felix made two threats on May 27, the first was directed at two victims, the second was exclusively against Luckhart. Felix contends these crimes were part of a pattern of anger against Luckhart. But Felix had time to reflect before making the second threat. The trial court could reasonably infer that because of his anger he intended the second threat to cause new emotional harm to Luckhart.”); <a href="https://www.georgegascon.org//wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SPECIAL-DIRECTIVE-20-07-.docx.pdf" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">LADA Special Directive 20-07</a>.</li>
<li id="fn:36"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=1192.7.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California Penal Code 1192.7 PC</a> — Legislative intent regarding prosecution of violent sex crimes; plea bargaining; limitation; definitions; amendment of section. (“(c) As used in this section, “serious felony” means any of the following:… (38) criminal threats, in violation of Section 422.”)</li>
<li id="fn:37"><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/667/">California Penal Code 667 PC</a> — Habitual criminals; enhancement of sentence; amendment of section — California Three Strikes law.</li>
<li id="fn:38">See same.</li>
<li id="fn:39"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7917614223717720036&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=6&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">People v. Thornton (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 419</a>, 424. (“a person violating [Penal Code] section 422 [California’s criminal threats law] must intend that the victim receive and understand the threat, and the threat must be such that would cause a reasonable person to fear for the safety of himself or his family. While the statute does not require that the violator intend to cause death or serious bodily injury to the victim, not all serious injuries are suffered to the body. The knowing infliction of mental terror is equally deserving of moral condemnation. In summary, we have no doubt that the making of the threats described in section 422 violates generally accepted standards of moral behavior, whether or not the person intended to actually carry out those threats. Accordingly, section 422 is a crime of moral turpitude.”)</li>
<li id="fn:40">To learn more about how criminal convictions can affect professional licenses, please visit our pages on professional license issues (which are organized by individual professions).</li>
<li id="fn:41"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1227" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">8 U.S. Code Section 1227</a> — Deportable aliens.</li>
<li id="fn:42"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=136.1.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 136.1 PC</a> — California’s dissuading a witness law.</li>
<li id="fn:43"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=518.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California Penal Code 518</a> — Definition.</li>
<li id="fn:44"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=520.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">California Penal Code 520</a> — Punishment.</li>
<li id="fn:45"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=646.9.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 646.9 PC</a> California’s stalking law.</li>
<li id="fn:46">See same.</li>
<li id="fn:47"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=186.22.&amp;nodeTreePath=4.6.12&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 186.22 PC</a> California’s criminal street gang enhancement.</li>
<li id="fn:48"><a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=601.&amp;lawCode=PEN" target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer">Penal Code 601 PC</a> – Aggravated trespass.</li>
<li id="fn:49">Same.</li>
</ol>
<p><a href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/422/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
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