What Is Legal Standing and What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

The Truth News — Sat, 10 Aug 2024 08:56:12 +0000

Standing to Sue – What is it?

standing Definition

Standing, or locus standi, is capacity of a party to bring suit in court.

Standing in State Court

A state’s statutes will determine what constitutes standing in that particular state’s courts. These typically revolve around the requirement that plaintiffs have sustained or will sustain direct injury or harm and that this harm is redressable.

Standing in Federal Court

At the federal level, legal actions cannot be brought simply on the ground that an individual or group is displeased with a government action or law. Federal courts only have constitutional authority to resolve actual disputes (see Case or Controversy).

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (90-1424), 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Supreme Court created a three-part test to determine whether a party has standing to sue:

The plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning that the injury is of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent
There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct brought before the court
It must be likely, rather than speculative, that a favorable decision by the court will redress the injury

STANDING: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Legal standing, or locus standi, refers to the right or capacity to bring an action or to appear in a court. Domestic legislation generally requires a nexus between the offense and the damage suffered by a person to grant him/her legal standing for criminal or civil legal proceedings. Constitutional, administrative, or class action procedures have different requirements for standing. Standing for collective damages follows a different principle than the nexus, focuses on the damage, and is often based on the representation of collective rights.

At its most basic, standing is the right of a party to challenge the conduct of another party in court. Standing is not about the actual issues of the case. Instead, it is about the parties to the lawsuit and where they “stand” in relation towards each other. Courts treat standing as an “antecedent” to a lawsuit. In other words, a party must prove they have standing before the court will consider the merits of the case.

Although the definition of standing varies among different jurisdictions, most courts look at some or all of the following elements before determining whether a party has standing in a case:

A legally cognizable interest. This means that the plaintiff must show an interest that is recognized by the courts or by statute.
An injury-in-fact: The plaintiff must have a real or a threatened injury. This doesn’t have to mean a bodily injury. It can also mean an infringement of a concrete and actual protected interest. (property rights, civil rights, etc.)
Causation: The injury must be caused by the named defendant, not a third-party who acted independently.
Redressability: A plaintiff must show that a favorable court decision will likely redress the injury. Mere speculation is not enough.

Standing In A Personal Injury Case

A personal injury claim is centered around the bodily harm that a person suffers because of another party’s negligence. To determine whether a you have standing to sue, a personal injury lawyer needs to know:

What is your legally cognizable interest? This may be as simple as just asking whether you were in the accident. If a minor child or dependent was in the accident, a parent or legal guardian has a legally cognizable interest in pursuing a claim on their behalf. Similarly, the representative of an estate may have a legally cognizable interest in trying to recover the medical bills for an injured party who has since passed away.
Were you injured? Do you need medical treatment? Will you be able to show the extent of your injuries through medical records and bills?

At risk of stating the obvious, there can be no personal injury claim without an injury. For example, if another driver dings your bumper and scratches some paint you were not otherwise hurt, you have a property damage claim, but not a personal injury claim.

Did you name the proper defendant in the lawsuit? Part of standing is that you must sue the proper party. If you were rear-ended by a driver who was texting on their phone, you want to sue the driver because that is the person whose negligence caused your injury. However, the manufacturer of the driver’s phone would not be a proper defendant.
Will a favorable court decision redress your injury? In a personal injury claim, the court can order the defendant to pay your damages, such as your medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. The court cannot, however, suspend the defendant’s driver’s license or order them to jail as part of a personal injury claim. Those actions can only be brought by the state or local government in venues like traffic or criminal court. source

When the Case Was Initially Filed in An Improper County

The details of California’s choice-of-venue framework are beyond the scope of this article. That said, upon initial receipt of a case, counsel should take a moment to carefully analyze the allegations of the complaint as to venue, to determine whether potential grounds for transfer via this method exist.

Code of Civil Procedure section 396b provides for mandatory transfer of a case that has been filed in the wrong court. Such a motion must be made at the outset of a case, in the time to file a responsive pleading.[i] A motion to transfer on these grounds is made in the transferor court.[ii]

No default may be taken against a party that has filed a motion to transfer while the motion is pending.[iii] On such a motion it is the moving defendant’s burden to present declarations to establish why the filing court was improper.[iv] The motion is granted when the defendant negates the grounds for a venue in the county of filing by the plaintiff.[v]

A situation can arise when a plaintiff selects a venue under Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), which allows an action to be filed in the county in which the defendant resides. Importantly, under this provision, in a multiple defendant case, the action can be filed in a county where any defendant resides.[vi] This creates a potential for a plaintiff to name a “sham” defendant—a defendant against which the plaintiff does not intend to actually prevail, but rather was named solely to permit filing in that defendant’s county of residence.

California caselaw is thin on a defendant’s ability to overcome this tactic, but at least one older case exists, Minyard v. Superior Court.[vii] In Minyard, the plaintiff, Holt, filed a complaint in the City & County of San Francisco, alleging she had been injured when the taxicab in which she was riding collided with a pickup truck in the City of Napa, located in Napa County.[viii] She named as defendants Yellow Cab Company, Minyard, Titmus, and Langer.[ix] She alleged Yellow Cab Company, Minyard, and Titmus owned and operated the taxi in which she was riding, and that Langer owned and operated the pickup truck.[x] Langer moved to change venue to Napa County, and the trial court denied his motion.[xi] The court of appeal then granted a writ of mandate and ultimately held the motion should have been granted.[xii]

Minyard based its decision on the uncontested evidence which was presented with the motion. This evidence established the accident occurred in Napa County; Minyard was the owner of the taxi; his employee, Titmus, was driving it at the time of the accident; Langer was the owner and driver of the pickup truck; and Minyard, Titmus, and Langer were residents of Napa County.[xiii] The evidence further established that, while the corporate defendant Yellow Cab Company was a resident of San Francisco, Minyard had been operating his own separate business called “Yellow Cab Co.” in the City of Napa.[xiv] The motion was also supported by an affidavit from an officer of Yellow Cab Company, stating it did not own the taxi involved in the accident.

Thus, as Minyard explained, “[w]ithout the inclusion of Yellow Cab Company, a corporation, as a defendant there could not possibly be any question that Langer had a clear right to the requested change of venue.”[xv] The trial court had, however, concluded because the face of the complaint alleged that Yellow Cab Company was responsible for the accident, it was bound to treat venue in San Francisco as proper.[xvi]

Minyard held this was error. Rather, as Code of Civil Procedure section 395 provides, “if any person is improperly joined as a defendant, …his residence must not be considered in determining the proper place for trial of the action.”[xvii] Minyard explained how this applies in two situations, both when a complaint fails to state a cause of action against a defendant, and “where the nonresident moving party concedes that a cause of action is formally alleged against the resident defendant but claims that the cause of action, in reality, does not exist.”[xviii] As the uncontroverted evidence before the court established that the sole defendant creating venue in San Francisco had been improperly sued, Minyard concluded that the matter should have been transferred.[xix] Minyard itself followed two older cases, Karst v. Seller, and Lachman Co. v. Central Cal. Berry Growers’ Assn.[xx], in reaching its conclusion. Minyard does not appear to have ever been cited a subsequent case, and no known case appears to contradict its conclusion or approach. It thus remains mandatory, binding authority.[xxi] Accordingly, in a “sham” defendant situation, if available at the first outset of a case, defense counsel should consider obtaining appropriate supporting declarations to argue under Minyard the “sham” defendant should not be considered for venue purposes.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (a), also provides for discretionary transfer of a case filed in the wrong county. The important difference of this mechanism—besides its discretionary instead of mandatory nature—is that it may be filed at any reasonable time, unaffected by the strict timing requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 396b.[xxii] Transfer under this statute may therefore be viable when later factual development establishes grounds to attack a “sham” defendant. source

Standing to Sue

Standing is a threshold requirement that a party must meet in order to maintain a lawsuit or to support that party’s participation in the case. “Any litigant must demonstrate that he or she has standing to invoke the power of the court to determine the merits of an issue.” Vaughan v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 740 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[i]n essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must have a “legitimate or sufficient interest at stake in the controversy that will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.” DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, 306 So. 3d 1202, 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Equity Res. v. Cty. of Leon, 643 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).

Test for Standing

When determining whether a plaintiff has standing, courts consider these three elements:

First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which is “concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” and “actual or imminent.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Second, a plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Third, a plaintiff must show “a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” [Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. Stevens, [529 U.S. 765, 771] [(2000)].

State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 n.4 (Fla. 2004) (internal citations edited).

To have standing, a plaintiff must have “a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding, such as an injury that may be redressed by the suit.” See Sun State Utils., Inc. v. Destin Water Users, Inc., 696 So. 2d 944, 945 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). That injury has to be “distinct and palpable, not abstract or hypothetical.” Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 117 (Fla. 2011). See also McCall v. Scott, 199 So. 3d 359, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (explaining that speculative and conclusory allegations of harm cannot confer standing).

Standing is implicated in every lawsuit so cases addressing this issue are varied. See, e.g., Bd. of Adjustment v. Marelli, 728 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“A multitude of cases recognize that neighboring property owners affected by zoning changes have standing to challenge the changes.”); Khazaal v. Browning, 707 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (the grantor of a security interest being foreclosed has a sufficient stake in the litigation); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665, 668–69 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (minor “established a significant interest and demonstrated the necessary injury in fact to establish standing to challenge his [own] adoption.”); Passell v. Watts, 794 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (intended third-party beneficiaries of will had standing to bring legal malpractice action if they could show that the testator’s intent as expressed in the will was frustrated by the negligence of the testator’s attorney).

Standing to Assert the Rights of Third Parties

“Ordinarily, of course, a litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” United States Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (quotation omitted). However, there are some notable but narrow exceptions to this rule, where litigants have been allowed to assert the rights of third parties. For example:

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1990) (“Although we have never discussed the concept of ‘next friend’ standing at length, it has long been an accepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances. Most frequently, ‘next friends’ appear in court on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.”);

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (quotation omitted) (“[I]n the First Amendment context, ‘[l]itigants . . . are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.’”);

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (quotation omitted) (standing where there was a close relationship between the rights of the litigant and the rights of third parties “that would be ‘diluted or adversely affected’ should her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force.”);

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (allowing physicians to assert the rights of women patients against interference with their right to an abortion);

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (allowing physicians to assert the rights of women patients against interference with their right to use contraceptives);

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953) (owner of real estate subject to racial covenant granted standing to challenge such covenant in part because she was “the one in whose charge and keeping [reposed] the power to continue to use her property to discriminate or to discontinue such use.”).

Standing to Defend

“While the concept of ‘standing’ generally concerns the right of a party to sue, it also applies to a person’s right to defend.” RHPC, Inc. v. Gardner, 533 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). “Few persons volunteer to defend an action that is not brought against them. Even so, the doctrine applies and a person must have an interest in the subject matter of or relief sought by an action to have the right to defend it. If a person has an interest that may be adversely affected by the outcome of an action in which he was not sued by the plaintiff, he may intervene to protect his interest.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Standing Issues within a Proceeding

Standing issues can also arise during certain proceedings within a pending action. For example, a party, as well as the person subpoenaed, has standing to seek an order quashing a subpoena upon a showing of unreasonableness and oppressiveness. Sunrise Shopping Center, Inc. v. Allied Stores Corp., 270 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). However, only the person served has standing to seek an order quashing service of process. Kaufman v. Metro Limo Fund, Inc., 503 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

How Standing is Determined

Standing is a question of law, which is decided by the presiding judge. See McCall v. Scott, 199 So. 3d 359, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). “Whether a party has standing to bring an action is a preliminary matter to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in that particular case.” In re Huff, 109 B.R. 506, 509 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (citation omitted). “When standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, the Court must accept as true all material allegations and construe them in favor of the party whose standing is challenged.” Id. (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849, 855 (1988)).

However, it is important to remember that the issue of standing may be waived if not raised at the trial level. See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1993) (“The issue of standing should have been raised as an affirmative defense before the trial court, and Krivanek’s failure to do so constitutes a waiver of that defense, precluding her from raising that issue now.”). source

What Is Legal Standing and What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

To pursue a personal injury lawsuit in a Los Angeles court, the injured victim must have legal standing to sue. Let’s look at the legal standing to sue and its three elements with Ehline Law and our personal injury attorneys.

What Is Legal Standing to Sue?

Standing refers to an individual’s capacity to pursue a lawsuit. For example, a person suffering injuries in a car accident caused by the other driver’s negligence has legal standing to bring a civil action against the negligent party. A person with legal standing is a person who has an interest in how the case turns out and how much compensation they receive for the damages incurred.

Standing to sue does not mean that the defendant is guilty. It is a legal concept that allows the person filing a lawsuit to prove their injuries resulted from the defendant’s actions and recover compensation.

The Constitution addresses the standing to sue for cases in Federal courts. However, states have their rulings and laws that affect how state courts determine the standing to sue.

What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

Three elements of standing to sue help determine whether an individual has a legal right to pursue compensation. These include the following.

Injury in Fact

The first of the three elements includes a physical injury, meaning the plaintiff must have suffered injuries in an accident for which they can pursue monetary and non-money damages, including medical bills, lost income, and property damage.

There is no legal standing for hypothetical claims or speculative injuries. It must be an actual injury the defendant caused, and the plaintiff must prove that through evidence. The injury must occur before the plaintiff can file a lawsuit.

Standing to Sue

Causation

When considering causation, the judge or the jury in court does not decide whether or not the defendant is liable for your injuries or damages. They view the evidence provided during pleadings to help determine the reasonable likelihood of a link between the defendant’s behavior and the plaintiff’s injuries.

The court will consider the evidence provided to assess whether you would’ve sustained injuries if the defendant didn’t act in the way they did. If there is no link between the defendant’s conduct and your injuries, you may be unable to prove standing to pursue a claim or lawsuit.

Redressability

Redressability refers to the court’s ability to provide relief to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained by the defendant. When an accident occurs, and the injured victim turns to the court for help, the court cannot undo the accident. Still, they can offer relief by holding the defendant liable for their misconduct and awarding compensation for the damages suffered.

The damages a court can award may include the following:

Victim’s past and present medical bills
Victim’s future medical expenses
In-home medical care or nursing costs
Lost wages
Loss of earning capacity
Pain and suffering
Emotional distress and mental anguish
Costs associated with victim’s disabilities
Reduced quality of life
Loss of enjoyment.

During the end of the trial, when the jurors find the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injury, they must decide the value of damages. The damages awarded depend on the injuries sustained and vary from one personal injury case to the other, which is why it is important to discuss your case with an experienced personal injury attorney.

Examples of Personal Injury Cases Pertaining to Standing to Sue

Let’s look at a few examples to illustrate how an individual may have the standing to sue another party.

Example 1: Slip and Fall at a Grocery Store

Jack is walking in the frozen section aisle of a grocery store when he slips, trips, and falls due to a wet floor from a nearby broken freezer, resulting in serious back injuries.

In this case, Jack will likely have standing to sue because:

Jack suffered an injury
The store owner most likely was negligent as they didn’t fix the freezer, mop the floor, or place a warning sign
Compensation would help cover his damages and make him financially whole.

Example 2: Medical Malpractice

John goes to a hospital for surgery and faces discomfort and internal bleeding soon after. After a few tests, the doctors discovered that the surgeon was negligent as he incorrectly placed the medical device inside.

John will likely have the standing to sue the negligent surgeon because he is suffering from internal bleeding; the tests show that the surgeon was negligent; compensation would help cover financial, emotional, and psychological losses from the injuries.

Example 3: Car Accident

Marco’s office colleague died in a car accident after his vehicle got hit by a drunk driver, but Marco will not have legal standing to sue for his colleague’s wrongful death.

Even though Marco shared a close relationship with his office colleague, is in emotional distress, and the driver is responsible for his colleague’s death, Marco doesn’t satisfy the redressability requirement.

The law does not consider Marco a surviving or distant family member, which is why he cannot pursue damages in a wrongful death lawsuit. The court also cannot compensate Marco for his loss since the law does not permit it.

However, his colleague’s family may satisfy the requirements of standing to sue and pursue a wrongful death claim against the drunk driver.

Can a Person Lack the Legal Standing to Sue Even Though They Have a Valid Case?

It is possible for a person to have a valid case but lack the standing to sue. For example, minors may satisfy all the legal requirements of filing a lawsuit but do not have legal standing under the law. Their parents, guardians, or court-appointed representatives may pursue a lawsuit on their behalf.

Besides minors, individuals lacking mental capacity also may not have legal standing. The court may appoint a conservator, or their power of attorney can pursue a civil action on behalf of the incapacitated person. source

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

The concept of “standing” broadly refers to a litigant’s right to have a court rule upon the merits of particular claims for which he seeks judicial relief. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ( “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” ); Black’s Law Dictionary 1536 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “standing” as “a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right” ). ">1 The Supreme Court has held that, as a threshold procedural matter, Federal courts must necessarily resolve standing inquiries before proceeding to the merits of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732 (2008). In fact, a court may raise the issue of standing sua sponte (i.e., of its own accord) in order to ensure that it has jurisdiction, even if no party to the lawsuit contests standing. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam). Although the Supreme Court must examine a litigant’s standing when the lower court has erroneously assumed that standing exists, it will not investigate standing sua sponte in order to rule upon an issue that a lower court denied the litigant standing to bring before the court. Id. ">2 a litigant must have standing in order to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court so that the court may exercise its “remedial powers on his behalf.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99). See also Davis, 554 U.S. at 732; Simon, 426 U.S. at 37 ( “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. The concept of standing is part of this limitation.” ) (citation omitted); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 ( “In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.” ). The Court has occasionally invoked the English common law tradition as supporting its inquiry into a litigant’s standing. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011) ( “In the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial resolution and gave legitimacy to judicial decrees. . . . The Framers paid heed to these lessons.” ). ">3 In general, for a party to establish Article III standing, he must allege (and ultimately prove) that he has a genuine stake in the outcome of the case because he has personally suffered (or will imminently suffer): (1) a concrete and particularized injury; (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party; and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing the elements of standing). For further discussion on the elements of Article III standing, see ArtIII.S2.C1.6.4.1 Overview of Lujan Test. ">4 These requirements seek to ensure that federal courts do not exceed their Article III power to decide actual “cases” or “controversies.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) ( “Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the ‘judicial Power’ of the United States only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process.” ). ">5

The Court has held that the burden of establishing standing falls upon each party who seeks a distinct form of judicial relief, The Supreme Court has indicated that if one party to a lawsuit has standing, other entities can join as parties without having to satisfy independently the demands of Article III, provided those parties do not seek a distinct form of relief from the party with standing. E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) (determining that, because a school superintendent had standing to challenge lower court decisions in which he was named a defendant, the Court did not need to consider whether interveners, who were state legislators, had standing); Davis, 554 U.S. at 724 (requiring a litigant to have standing for each form of relief sought); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Instit. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) ( “[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” ); Director v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 305 (1983) (stating that a justiciable controversy existed because an injured employee who sought coverage under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was a party respondent before the court and had standing, and thus there was no need to determine whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as the official responsible for administration and enforcement of the Act, had standing). ">6 including a party initiating a lawsuit, FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) ( “[P]etitioners in this case must allege . . . facts essential to show jurisdiction. If they fail to make the necessary allegations, they have no standing.” ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ">7 intervening in a lawsuit, A party seeking to intervene in a lawsuit (i.e., seeking to join a lawsuit already in progress) as a matter of right must have Article III standing to seek judicial relief that differs from that sought by the other litigants with standing. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., No. 16-605, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 5, 2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 578 U.S. 539, 543 (2016). ">8 or appealing a lower court decision. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 56 (1986).

The Supreme Court also addressed standing on appeal in a 2011 case in which government employees that had obtained a favorable judgment on the basis of qualified immunity sought to appeal a lower court’s ruling that their conduct had violated the Constitution. The Court held that these officials had Article III standing because they had a personal stake in seeing the ruling overturned, as its mere existence could lead to the risk of future liability for them. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 703 (2011) ( “If the official regularly engages in that conduct as part of his job . . . he suffers injury caused by the adverse constitutional ruling. So long as it continues in effect, he must either change the way he performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.” ).

Standing on appeal may also be based on an alleged injury arising from the decision below—for example, where the lower court had ordered the appealing party to comply with a government demand that would injure that party, and overturning the lower court’s decision would redress the injury by absolving the appealing party of an obligation to comply with the demand. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 29, 2020) (stating that a petitioner had “appellate standing” where the petitioner suffered a “concrete injury” that was “traceable to the decision below” and could be redressed by the Court). See also West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 20-1530, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 30, 2022).

">9 Each of these parties must make an appropriate showing during each stage of the litigation Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013); Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 ( “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought. . . . While the proof to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255–56 (1994) (observing that, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff may have standing sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if he sets forth “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct” ) (citation omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that the plaintiff’s burden of proof on the standing issue differs depending on whether the case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff is responding to a motion for summary judgment, or the case has gone to trial). ">10 that the elements of injury, causation, and redressability existed at the outset of the lawsuit, and continue to exist, Davis, 554 U.S. at 732–33 ( “[I]t is not enough that the requisite interest exist at the outset. ‘To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time complaint is filed.’” (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)). If an injury no longer exists as the litigation progresses, the court may also lack jurisdiction under the related doctrine of mootness. See ArtIII.S2.C1.8.1 Overview of Mootness Doctrine to ArtIII.S2.C1.8.9 Class Action Litigation and Mootness. ">11 for each claim Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 ( “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought.” ) (internal quotation marks omitted). ">12 and for each form of relief sought. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) ( “Lyons fares no better if it be assumed that his pending damages suit affords him Art. III standing to seek an injunction as a remedy for the claim arising out of the October 1976 events. The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again . . . ” ). ">13 A litigant’s failure to establish standing to sue may result in dismissal of his distinct claims for relief without a decision on the merits of those claims. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (stating that if “the plaintiff’s standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed” ). But see Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 18, 2018) (declining to direct dismissal of a partisan gerrymandering case that involved “an unsettled kind of claim . . . the contours and justiciability of which are unresolved” and, therefore, remanding the case for further proceedings). ">14

Since the 1920s, the Supreme Court has offered various justifications for these somewhat amorphous As discussed below, the Court’s standing jurisprudence has been inconsistent in approach over the years. See ArtIII.S2.C1.6.3 Standing Doctrine from 1940s to 1970s. ">15 constitutional limitations on the categories of litigants who can maintain a claim for judicial relief in an Article III federal court. Although the Supreme Court has often stated that the standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is a proper party to maintain a claim for a particular form of judicial relief in federal court and not on the “issues he wishes to have adjudicated,” the Court has acknowledged the difficulty in separating the plaintiff’s status from the nature of his claims when applying principles of standing. Compare Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) ( “[S]tanding focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated.” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ( “Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” ). ">16 Perhaps the most frequently cited rationale derives from the Constitution’s separation of powers among the branches of government. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. ">17 Issues of standing often arise when a private plaintiff sues the government, seeking to have it act in accordance with the Constitution or other law. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1974) (holding that an association of officers and enlisted members of the military reserves, as well as individual members, lacked standing to sue as taxpayers in a case arguing that the Incompatibility Clause of Article I forbid certain Members of Congress from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve). Issues of standing may also arise in cases in which a litigant sues a private party under a law providing for a private right of action against a private defendant. E.g., Spokeo Inc., v. Robins 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016). ">18 But, as the Court has frequently noted, the Constitution makes the political branches—and not the courts—responsible for “vindicating the public interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 ( “Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” ); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ( “We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.” ); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). When reviewing administrative action or inaction of federal agencies, courts must be wary of intruding upon the President’s duty under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by ordering the Executive to follow the law. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).

The Court has adhered to the standing doctrine even in cases in which no party exists who would have standing to challenge government action or inaction in the courts, noting that the political process is available to those seeking to vindicate generalized grievances. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).

">19 As a result, unelected judges lack the authority to render advisory opinions as to whether Congress or the Executive has followed the law; they may only decide a specific case brought before the court by a party that has suffered a particularized injury as a result of the government’s actions. See supra note 19. See also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 693–94 (2013) (characterizing the standing requirement as “an essential limit on [the Court’s] power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” ). For more on Article III’s bar on advisory opinions and its relationship to standing doctrine, see ArtIII.S2.C1.4.1 Overview of Advisory Opinions. ">20 Such deference to the political branches, particularly in cases raising questions about the separation of powers, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) ( “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation of powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” ); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ( “The judicial power of the United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditional authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” ); id. at 474 ( “Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.” ). Thus, the Court applies the standing requirements most stringently when litigants challenge the constitutionality of an action or omission by one or both of the political branches of government. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) ( “[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” ); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100, 101 (1968) ( “The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.” ). The Court later stated that “Flast failed to recognize that [standing] doctrine has a separation of powers component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the other branches . . . ” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996). In the Court’s early years, Chief Justice John Marshall noted that if federal courts could hear “every question under the Constitution,” rather than traditional “cases” or “controversies,” then federal courts would have jurisdiction over many issues that should be the subject of legislative discussion and decision. 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (Charles Cullen ed., 1984) ( “If the judicial power extended to every question under the Constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” ). The French sociologist and political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville once noted the benefits of the U.S. federal judiciary’s requirement that a litigant have a direct stake in the outcome of legal proceedings to maintain a lawsuit, stating that: “It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as the basis of a prosecution.” 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 102 (Philips Bradley, ed., 1945). ">21 reflects the Court’s understanding of the “limited . . . role of the courts in a democratic society,” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011) ( “Continued adherence to the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III maintains the public’s confidence in an unelected but restrained Federal Judiciary.” ). ">22 as well as its determination that federal courts should hear only those types of cases that the English judicial system would historically have considered suitable for judicial resolution. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 337 ( “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” ); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) ( “In limiting the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ Article III of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law.” ) ">23 And separation of powers concerns have also motivated the Court’s conclusion that Article III limits Congress’s ability to confer standing on plaintiffs to sue the government by enacting statutes containing “citizen-suit” provisions. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. ">24 Such case law has reasoned that permitting plaintiffs who do not have a personal and direct stake in the outcome of a case to sue under one of these provisions would effectively allow the Legislative Branch to intrude upon the Executive Branch’s duty to enforce the law. Id. ( “To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” ) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). ">25

Although standing doctrine is grounded primarily in constitutional separation of powers concerns, the Supreme Court has also cited other rationales for its existence that may not be constitutional in nature. Requiring the litigant to have a personal stake in the outcome of his lawsuit ensures that a court will decide complex legal and factual issues in the context of a specific factual situation involving adverse parties who can more clearly illuminate for judges the issues in dispute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction must have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” ). ">26 Even in cases in which adversity between the parties exists, standing doctrine seeks to ensure that federal courts will not exercise the judicial power, which can significantly affect the lives, liberty, and property of others, to resolve generalized grievances brought primarily for the benefit of “concerned bystanders” who seek to vindicate abstract ideological interests (for example, a general interest in the protection of the environment is insufficient to confer standing). United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (stating that the injury-in-fact requirement of standing “prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders” ). See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) ( “While generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice.” ); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986); Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472–73 ( “[The standing requirement] tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. . . . The [Article III] aspect of standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order.” ). ">27 More practical reasons for the standing requirements include a need to reserve the limited resources of the federal courts for concrete disputes; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) ( “Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” ). ">28 the sweeping precedential effects of the Court’s holdings on the merits in constitutional litigation, which can be difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to alter without amending the Constitution; Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011) ( “Making the Article III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’s power to change.” ). ">29 and a need for the court to fashion relief no more broadly than the litigant’s situation requires. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974). ">30

The Supreme Court has also previously recognized certain prudential limitations on the exercise of federal courts’ jurisdiction, which, although lacking constitutional status, may nonetheless result in a court’s refusal to hear a case: (1) when the litigant seeks to assert the rights of third parties not before the court; (2) when the litigant seeks redress for a generalized grievance widely shared by a large number of citizens; and (3) when the litigant challenges government action or inaction and its asserted interests do not fall within the zone of interests arguably protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision underlying its claims. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 760 (2013) ( “Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (listing the three types of prudential restraints); Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979). ">31 In recent years, however, the Court has questioned the basis of the doctrine of prudential standing. Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014). ">32 The Court has suggested that the bar on generalized grievances is a constitutional (and not prudential) requirement. Id. ">33 Moreover, the Court likewise has determined that a court applying the “zone of interests” test should examine whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of a statutory provision creating a cause of action. Id. ">34 Furthermore, Congress, through express legislation, may abrogate these prudential standing requirements, to the extent that they remain viable and are not mandated by the Constitution. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ( “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.” ). ">35

The following essays trace the development of Article III standing doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence from its origins in the 1920s to the development of the modern doctrine and its key elements of injury, causation, and redressability. They then examine select topics that implicate the doctrine, including cases in which a plaintiff seeks to maintain standing to challenge government action or inaction by relying solely upon his status as a taxpayer, as well as the various forms of representational standing that a litigant who has not himself sustained injury may rely upon when asserting the rights of people not before the court. Finally, they conclude with an overview of standing for Members of Congress, congressional control of standing, and what remains of the concept of prudential standing. Federal rules for standing do not apply in state courts, which may have their own rules not addressed in this essay. Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ( “We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or . . . a federal statute.” ). However, when a state court enters a judgment in a case in which the plaintiffs would not have had standing had they brought the case in federal court, a party may have standing to appeal that judgment in federal court if the judgment rests upon an allegedly incorrect interpretation of federal law and causes the appellant direct injury. Id. at 623–24 ( “When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.” ) (citations omitted). ">36

1

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ( “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” ); Black’s Law Dictionary 1536 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “standing” as “a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right” ).

2

Federal courts must necessarily resolve standing inquiries before proceeding to the merits of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732 (2008). In fact, a court may raise the issue of standing sua sponte (i.e., of its own accord) in order to ensure that it has jurisdiction, even if no party to the lawsuit contests standing. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001) (per curiam). Although the Supreme Court must examine a litigant’s standing when the lower court has erroneously assumed that standing exists, it will not investigate standing sua sponte in order to rule upon an issue that a lower court denied the litigant standing to bring before the court. Id.

3

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99). See also Davis, 554 U.S. at 732; Simon, 426 U.S. at 37 ( “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. The concept of standing is part of this limitation.” ) (citation omitted); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 ( “In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.” ). The Court has occasionally invoked the English common law tradition as supporting its inquiry into a litigant’s standing. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011) ( “In the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial resolution and gave legitimacy to judicial decrees. . . . The Framers paid heed to these lessons.” ).

4

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing the elements of standing). For further discussion on the elements of Article III standing, see ArtIII.S2.C1.6.4.1 Overview of Lujan Test.

5

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) ( “Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the ‘judicial Power’ of the United States only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process.” ).

6

The Supreme Court has indicated that if one party to a lawsuit has standing, other entities can join as parties without having to satisfy independently the demands of Article III, provided those parties do not seek a distinct form of relief from the party with standing. E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009) (determining that, because a school superintendent had standing to challenge lower court decisions in which he was named a defendant, the Court did not need to consider whether interveners, who were state legislators, had standing); Davis, 554 U.S. at 724 (requiring a litigant to have standing for each form of relief sought); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Instit. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) ( “[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” ); Director v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 305 (1983) (stating that a justiciable controversy existed because an injured employee who sought coverage under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was a party respondent before the court and had standing, and thus there was no need to determine whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, as the official responsible for administration and enforcement of the Act, had standing).

7

FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) ( “[P]etitioners in this case must allege . . . facts essential to show jurisdiction. If they fail to make the necessary allegations, they have no standing.” ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

8

A party seeking to intervene in a lawsuit (i.e., seeking to join a lawsuit already in progress) as a matter of right must have Article III standing to seek judicial relief that differs from that sought by the other litigants with standing. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., No. 16-605, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 5, 2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 578 U.S. 539, 543 (2016).

9

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 56 (1986).The Supreme Court also addressed standing on appeal in a 2011 case in which government employees that had obtained a favorable judgment on the basis of qualified immunity sought to appeal a lower court’s ruling that their conduct had violated the Constitution. The Court held that these officials had Article III standing because they had a personal stake in seeing the ruling overturned, as its mere existence could lead to the risk of future liability for them. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 703 (2011) ( “If the official regularly engages in that conduct as part of his job . . . he suffers injury caused by the adverse constitutional ruling. So long as it continues in effect, he must either change the way he performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.” ).

10

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013); Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 ( “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought. . . . While the proof to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255–56 (1994) (observing that, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff may have standing sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if he sets forth “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct” ) (citation omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that the plaintiff’s burden of proof on the standing issue differs depending on whether the case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff is responding to a motion for summary judgment, or the case has gone to trial).

11

Davis, 554 U.S. at 732–33 ( “[I]t is not enough that the requisite interest exist at the outset. ‘To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time complaint is filed.’” (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)). If an injury no longer exists as the litigation progresses, the court may also lack jurisdiction under the related doctrine of mootness. See ArtIII.S2.C1.8.1 Overview of Mootness Doctrine to ArtIII.S2.C1.8.9 Class Action Litigation and Mootness.

12

Davis, 554 U.S. at 734 ( “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought.” ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

13

See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) ( “Lyons fares no better if it be assumed that his pending damages suit affords him Art. III standing to seek an injunction as a remedy for the claim arising out of the October 1976 events. The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again . . . ” ).

14

E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (stating that if “the plaintiff’s standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed” ). But see Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 18, 2018) (declining to direct dismissal of a partisan gerrymandering case that involved “an unsettled kind of claim . . . the contours and justiciability of which are unresolved” and, therefore, remanding the case for further proceedings).

15

As discussed below, the Court’s standing jurisprudence has been inconsistent in approach over the years. See ArtIII.S2.C1.6.3 Standing Doctrine from 1940s to 1970s.

16

Although the Supreme Court has often stated that the standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is a proper party to maintain a claim for a particular form of judicial relief in federal court and not on the “issues he wishes to have adjudicated,” the Court has acknowledged the difficulty in separating the plaintiff’s status from the nature of his claims when applying principles of standing. Compare Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) ( “[S]tanding focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated.” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ( “Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” ).

17

E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.

18

See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1974) (holding that an association of officers and enlisted members of the military reserves, as well as individual members, lacked standing to sue as taxpayers in a case arguing that the Incompatibility Clause of Article I forbid certain Members of Congress from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve). Issues of standing may also arise in cases in which a litigant sues a private party under a law providing for a private right of action against a private defendant. E.g., Spokeo Inc., v. Robins 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).

19

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 ( “Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” ); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ( “We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.” ); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). When reviewing administrative action or inaction of federal agencies, courts must be wary of intruding upon the President’s duty under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by ordering the Executive to follow the law. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).The Court has adhered to the standing doctrine even in cases in which no party exists who would have standing to challenge government action or inaction in the courts, noting that the political process is available to those seeking to vindicate generalized grievances. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).

20

See supra note 19. See also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 693–94 (2013) (characterizing the standing requirement as “an essential limit on [the Court’s] power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” ). For more on Article III’s bar on advisory opinions and its relationship to standing doctrine, see ArtIII.S2.C1.4.1 Overview of Advisory Opinions.

21

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) ( “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation of powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” ); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ( “The judicial power of the United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditional authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” ); id. at 474 ( “Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.” ). Thus, the Court applies the standing requirements most stringently when litigants challenge the constitutionality of an action or omission by one or both of the political branches of government. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) ( “[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” ); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100, 101 (1968) ( “The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.” ). The Court later stated that “Flast failed to recognize that [standing] doctrine has a separation of powers component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the other branches . . . ” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996). In the Court’s early years, Chief Justice John Marshall noted that if federal courts could hear “every question under the Constitution,” rather than traditional “cases” or “controversies,” then federal courts would have jurisdiction over many issues that should be the subject of legislative discussion and decision. 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (Charles Cullen ed., 1984) ( “If the judicial power extended to every question under the Constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” ). The French sociologist and political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville once noted the benefits of the U.S. federal judiciary’s requirement that a litigant have a direct stake in the outcome of legal proceedings to maintain a lawsuit, stating that: “It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as the basis of a prosecution.” 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 102 (Philips Bradley, ed., 1945).

22

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011) ( “Continued adherence to the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III maintains the public’s confidence in an unelected but restrained Federal Judiciary.” ).

23

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 337 ( “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” ); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) ( “In limiting the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ Article III of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law.” )

24

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.

25

Id. ( “To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” ) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).

26

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction must have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” ).

27

United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (stating that the injury-in-fact requirement of standing “prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders” ). See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) ( “While generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice.” ); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986); Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472–73 ( “[The standing requirement] tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. . . . The [Article III] aspect of standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order.” ).

28

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) ( “Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.” ).

29

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011) ( “Making the Article III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’s power to change.” ).

30

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).

31

United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 760 (2013) ( “Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (listing the three types of prudential restraints); Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979).

32

Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014).

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ( “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.” ).

36

Federal rules for standing do not apply in state courts, which may have their own rules not addressed in this essay. Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ( “We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or . . . a federal statute.” ). However, when a state court enters a judgment in a case in which the plaintiffs would not have had standing had they brought the case in federal court, a party may have standing to appeal that judgment in federal court if the judgment rests upon an allegedly incorrect interpretation of federal law and causes the appellant direct injury. Id. at 623–24 ( “When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.” ) (citations omitted). source

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What Is Legal Standing and What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

Standing to Sue – What is it?

standing Definition

Standing in State Court

Standing in Federal Court

Further Reading

STANDING: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Standing In A Personal Injury Case

When the Case Was Initially Filed in An Improper County

Standing to Sue

Test for Standing

Standing to Assert the Rights of Third Parties

Standing to Defend

Standing Issues within a Proceeding

How Standing is Determined

What Is Legal Standing and What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

What Is Legal Standing to Sue?

What Are the Elements of Standing to Sue?

Injury in Fact

Standing to Sue

Causation

Redressability

Examples of Personal Injury Cases Pertaining to Standing to Sue

Example 1: Slip and Fall at a Grocery Store

Example 2: Medical Malpractice

Example 3: Car Accident

Can a Person Lack the Legal Standing to Sue Even Though They Have a Valid Case?