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		<title>Statutes (Attempting To Sell The Statute) part 2</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[Statutes (Attempting To Sell The Statute) part 2 GOVERNMENT AGENT ACTING AS THE STATUTE MERCHANT Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="text-align: center;">Statutes (Attempting To Sell The Statute) part 2</h1>
<p align="center"><strong>GOVERNMENT AGENT ACTING AS THE STATUTE MERCHANT</strong></p>
<p><strong>Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.See, e.g.,</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/243/389/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Utah Power &amp; Light Co. V. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917)</strong></a> <strong>409, 391; </strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/311/60/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>United States V. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940) </strong></a><strong>70, 108, and see, generally, In re: </strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/74/666/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall 666 (1868)</strong></a></p>
<p align="center"><strong>NEITHER THE FOR PROFIT GOVERNMENT NOR THE STATUTE MERCHANT/AGENT HAS ACCESS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY</strong></p>
<p><strong>As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act. Suits brought by or against it are not understood to be brought by or against the United States. The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its sovereignty, so far as respects the transaction of the corporation, and exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the charter.);</strong><a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/421/92/49283/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>United States of America v. Georgia-pacific Company, 421 F.2d 92</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>Government may also be bound by the doctrine of equitable estoppel if acting in proprietary [for profit nature ] rather than sovereign capacity); the “Savings to Suitor Clause” is also available for addressing mercantile and admiralty matters aka “civil process” at the common law.</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>THE SECURED NATURAL RIGHT IS ASSURED</strong></p>
<div><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/201/43/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Hale V. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) </strong></a><strong>74, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652</strong>  <strong>The individual may stand upon his constitutionally [secured] rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his own business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and property.</strong></div>
<p><strong>His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. On the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its power.);</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>THE PRIVATE INSOLVENT STATUTE CANNOT UNILATERALLY APPLY TO THE BIOLOGICAL MAN OR WOMAN ABSENT VOLUNTARY ACCEPTANCE</strong></p>
<p><strong>“Courts enforcing your [municipal] statutes do not act judicially but merely ministerally, having thus no judicial immunity and unlike courts of lawdo not obtain jurisdiction by service of process nor even arrest and compelled appearance.”</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/50/336/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336 (1850)</strong></a></p>
<p align="center"><strong>THE CLEARFIELD DOCTRINE IS CONTROLLING AS REGARDS GOVERNMENT AS A PRIVATE PARTY</strong></p>
<p><strong>When Government is reduced to the Standing of a Private Party by their own election to proceed privately in commerce . . . and any presentment or offer of process and thereby commercial transaction becomes a taxable event and the presenter/transferor is required to execute an IRS Form W-9 surrendering his or her Social Security number so that the transaction may be reported to the IRS on Form 1099-OID as a tax liability assignable to the presenter of the instrument.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Whereas, once the bill is assessed on the 1040-V, the agency is forced into a tax loss write-off and all of the agencies forward sales contracts / agreements (which includes all bonds &amp; securities) are accelerated into time to maturity where the agency on down becomes null &amp; void.　 Does this not include the court itself?　 Case in point:　 HUD contracts (forward sales) with the property management company MC&amp;B, which then contracts with the law firm (forward sales), which contracts with the Court (forward sales) and both appear to employ coercive policies to achieve their commercial scheme to intentionally extort the available credit.　 The court and the agencies are themselves a private business and thereby, the forward sales includes said court and becomes just as much a moot point as all other forward sales since this process comes within the Clearfield doctrine to wit:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“As the use of private corporate commercial negotiable paper, debt currency or [Federal Reserve notes] securities [checks] Bonds Vouchers and the like is concerned, said use, removes the sovereignty status of the government and reduces said government to doing business as a private entity, rather than a government in the area of finance and commerce. This circumstance causes the government to move in commerce the same as a corporation or person.　 “Whereas, Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen . . . And thereby; the “entity” known as the [OREGON STATE POLICE/TROOPERS or other TRAFFIC CONTROL OFFICERS in “this state” cannot compel [unilateral] performance upon nor contract its insolvent statute or rules unless it, like any other corporation or person is the holder-in-due course of some (certifiable) contract or [known] commercial agreement between it and the party upon whom the payment and performance are made and thereby, willing to produce said documents and place the same in evidence before trying to enforce its demands called statutes”.　 For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government.”</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/318/363/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Clearfield Trust Co. v United States, 318 U.S. 363, (1943)</strong></a> <a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/22/904/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Bank of United States V. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>NOTE: Any form of license is not a contract, but a mere unilateral waiver of a “natural right” to accept to be regulated in commerce and is usually achieved by fraud in the inducement on the part of the state of the forum aka “this state” through its law merchant commissioners masquerading as a judiciary.</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>LEGISLATURES CANNOT INFRINGE NATURAL RIGHT</strong></p>
<p><strong>Robin v. Hardaway,</strong></p>
<p><strong>1 Jefferson 109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772) aff’d. <em>Gregory v. Baugh,</em> 29 Va. 681, 29 Va. Rep. Ann. 466, 2 Leigh 665 (1831)</strong> (<strong>Now all acts of the legislature apparently contrary to natural right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of things, considered as void.The laws of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been the adjudications of our courts of justice. And cited 8 Co. 118. a. Bonham’s case. Hob. 87; 7. Co. 14. a. Calvin’s case.);</strong></p>
<p><strong>Dr. Bonham’s Case,</strong></p>
<p><strong>8 Coke’s Reports 107, at 118 (1610) ([I]n many cases, the common law will control acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such to be void.); aff’d. <em>Robin v. Hardaway,</em>1 Jefferson 109, 114, 1 Va. Reports Ann. 58, 61 (1772);</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/273/510/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)</strong></a> <strong>524</strong></p>
<p><strong>The thing speaks for itself {<em>Res ipsa loquitur</em>};</strong></p>
<p><strong>1.</strong>Natural Right<strong>. . . (Recognized by “this state” as Paramount to the statute and the natural law is controlling) </strong><strong>BACKGROUND GOING TO THE PRESUMPTIVE AND FRAUDULENT “UNILATERAL” ENFORCEMENT OF THE WHOLLY ELECTIVE CITATION AFTER THE SOVEREIGNS REFUSAL TO CONTRACT WITH THE AGENT/LAW MERCHANT.</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS</strong></p>
<p><strong>ORS 162.355</strong><strong>[1971 c.743 s.210; 1997 c.395 s.1] (<em>Simulating legal process</em></strong>) <strong>(1) A person commits the crime of simulating legal process if the person knowingly issues or delivers to another person any document that in form and substance falsely simulates civil or criminal process. (2) As used in this section: (a) “Civil or criminal process” means a document or order, including, but not limited to, a summons, lien, complaint, warrant, injunction, writ, notice, pleading or subpoena, that is issued by a court or that is filed or recorded for the purpose of: (A) Exercising jurisdiction; (B) Representing a claim against a person or property; (C) Directing a person to appear before a court or tribunal; or (D) Directing a person to perform or refrain from performing a specified act. (b) “Person” has the meaning given that term in ORS 161.015, except that in relation to a defendant, “person” means a human being, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association or a partnership. (3) Simulating legal process</strong> <strong>is a Class C felony.</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>NATURAL RIGHT IS TO PREVAIL OVER THE STATUTE</strong></p>
<p><strong>1. Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations,</strong>one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former [natural right] is to prevail.</p>
<p><strong>2.</strong>Standing. . . (On God’s Land) (Not to be treated as occupying the “airs space above” the land. See: ORS 131.205 to 131.235 below.</p>
<p><strong>3.</strong>Omission. . . (Of the implementing regulation dates of the regulatory statute [displayed within brackets], recognizing the statute as a for profit private copy right law and unenforceable absent knowing acceptance and related quid pro quo consideration.)</p>
<p><strong>4.</strong>Contract. . . (A Secured Right that Cannot be Infringed). “Contract” is acknowledged as applicable under the Uniform Commercial Code and contract goes first and foremost to full disclosure and the right of choice upon full disclosure at Chapter 71- UCC Section 71.1030.</p>
<p><strong>Oregon Statutes – Chapter 71 – General Provisions for Uniform Commercial Code – Section 71.1030 – Supplementary general principles of law applicable.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Unless displaced by </strong>the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent,estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. [1961 c.726 §71.1030]</p>
<p><strong>Fraud will not be entertained under the law merchant and thereby, the agent </strong><strong>cannot contract the statute by use of Fraud in the Inducement:</strong><strong>“… as such fraud is intended to and which does cause one to execute an instrument, or make an agreement… The misrepresentation involved does not mislead one as the paper he signs but rather misleads as to the true facts of a situation, and the false impression it causes is a basis of a decision to sign or render a judgment”. </strong><strong>Source: Steven H. Gifis, ‘Law Dictionary’, 5th Edition, Happauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003, s.v.: ‘Fraud’.</strong></p>
<p><strong>This is the point where “this state[s]” statute merchant “agent” “personally” and in his or her “Individual capacity” pervert the process for and to their own advantage . . . but the law is in place to call said “agent” on their fraud and related extortion, as the natural law will prevail.</strong></p>
<p><strong>1. “This state” recognizes the Natural Right to prevail over the statutes of “this state”, as recognized at ORS Chapter 174: Section 174.030 below.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Oregon Statutes – Chapter 174 – Construction of Statutes; General Definitions – Section 174.030 – Construction favoring natural right to prevail.</strong>Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former [natural right] is to prevail.</p>
<p align="center"><strong>THE CORPORATE STATE EXISTS ONLY IN METAPHYSICAL TERMS</strong></p>
<p><strong>2.”The [de jure] state” acknowledges the Land that you “Stand” on, by addressing that (This [de facto] state, rather than “The state”) exists (APPEARS) in the “airspace” above that land and is not grounded. See: Chapter 131:</strong></p>
<p><strong>ORS 131.205 to 131.235</strong>,<strong>“this” state” means</strong>the [fictitious] land and water and the <strong>air</strong> <strong>space above</strong>the [substantive] Land and Waterwith respect to which “the”State of Oregon[being the land below and on which you are STANDING]has legislative jurisdiction.</p>
<p align="center"><strong>Where and How does the Statute Court Acquire Jurisdiction over the Natural Man or Woman?</strong></p>
<p><strong>“This state” through “its” statute courts i.e. civil/admiralty Prize Courts . . . issues “Charges” . . . the charges cannot reach and therefore empower the court until the charges are grounded to complete the (Circuit of that Court). You are on the Ground or the “Grounded” party and if you don’t voluntarily join (go into controversy and respond to the charges), the court is not grounded and has no “power” to move forward . . . As long as you don’t “appear” or stand outside of the BAR, the court is “dis-empowered” to move or issue motion(s) or process . . . the court must be “plugged” into you to LIGHT ITS FICTIONAL FIRE . . . and this is the behind the scenes slight of hand employed to coerce jurisdiction over the natural Man or party . . . such process is held as “Fraud in the Inducement” whereas;</strong></p>
<p><strong>3. “Omission” as noted within the “Government Printing Office Style Manual” (Rules of Style) provides the recognition and distinction between substantive “natural right” and the right of “standing” of the Sovereign Man or Woman and the private copyright law as simply defined in “this state” and as “elective” and thereby coming within the consideration going to the right of “election” to “Contract” or not to “Contract.” (The Government Shall not Infringe the Right of Contract.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>4. “Contract” is acknowledged as applicable under the Uniform Commercial Code and contract goes first and foremost to full disclosure and the right of choice upon full disclosure at Chapter 71:</strong></p>
<p><strong>Oregon Statutes – Chapter 71 – General Provisions for Uniform Commercial Code – Section 71.1030 – Supplementary general principles of law applicable.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity, </strong><strong>including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent</strong><strong>,</strong> <strong>estoppel,</strong>fraud,<strong>misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. [1961 c.726 §71.1030]</strong></p>
<p><strong>Fraud will not be entertained under the law merchant and thereby, the agent </strong>cannot contract the statute<strong> by use of Fraud in the Inducement: </strong><strong>“… as such fraud is intended to and which does cause one to execute an instrument, or make an agreement… The misrepresentation involved does not mislead one as the paper he signs but rather misleads as to the true facts of a situation, and the false impression it causes is a basis of a decision to sign or render a judgment”.</strong><strong>Source: Steven H. Gifis, ‘Law Dictionary’, 5th Edition, Happauge: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2003, s.v.: ‘Fraud’.</strong></p>
<p><strong>This is the point where “this state[s]” statute merchant “agent” “personally” and in his or her “Individual capacity” pervert the process for and to their own advantage . . . but the law is in place to call said “agent” on their fraud and related extortion, as well as the natural law to wit: </strong><strong>“The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign … It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King [or the people] he shall not be bound.” — The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825):</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>PRIVATE FOR PROFIT STATUTES ARE INSOLVENT ABSENT JOINDER</strong></p>
<div><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/87/251/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. 251 (1873</strong></a><strong> It is a maxim of the common law, said Savage, C.J., that when an act of Parliament is passed for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong, the King shall be bound by such act though not named, but when a statute is general and any prerogative, right, title, or interest would be divested or taken from the King, in such a case he shall not be bound unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him, for which he cites both English and American authorities, and adds that the people of the state, being sovereign, have succeeded to the rights of the former sovereign, and</strong> <strong>that the people of the state are not bound by the general words in the insolvent law.</strong></div>
<ol>
<li><strong>Sed vide: </strong><strong>The cause of the church is equal to public cause; and paramount is the reason which makes for religion{<em>Causa ecclesiæ publicis æquiparatur; et summa est ratio quæ pro religione facit;</em> Coke, Litt. 341}; The law of God and the law of the land are all one; and both preserve and favor the common and public good of the land {<em>Le ley de dieu et ley de terre sont tout un; et l’un et l’autre preferre et favour le common et publique bien del terre;</em> Keilw. 191}; No man warring for God should be troubled by secular business {<em>Nemo militans Deo implicetur sccularibus negotiis;</em> Coke, Litt. 70}; The thing speaks for itself {<em>Res ipsa loquitur</em>}; A sacrilegious person transcends the cupidity and wickedness of all other robbers {<em>Sacrilegus omnium prædorum cupiditatem et scelerem superat;</em> 4 Coke, 106};</strong> <strong>That is the highest law which favors religion</strong> <strong>{<em>Summa est lex quæ pro religione facit;</em> 10 Mod. 117, 119; 2 Chanc. Cas. 18}; accord,　Fiction yields to truth {<em>Fictio cedit veritati</em>}; We can do nothing against truth {<em>Nihil possumus contra veritatem;</em> St. Albans, Doct. &amp; Stu. Dial. 2, c. 6};</strong> <strong>He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth </strong><strong>{<em>Qui non libere veritatem pronunciat proditor est veritatis</em>};</strong> <strong>Suppression of the truth is (equivalent to) the suggestion of what is false</strong> <strong>{<em>Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi;</em> 23 Barb. N.Y. 521, 525};</strong> <strong>Truth, by whomsoever pronounced, is from God</strong> <strong>{<em>Veritas, a quocunque dicitur, a Deo est</em>};</strong> <strong>A greater or superior force; an irresistible force {</strong><em><strong>Vis</strong> <strong>major</strong></em><strong>};</strong>　<strong>and that class of authority, reason, custom and usage ad infinitum:</strong></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>REMEMBER . . . . ALL AGENTS OF “THIS [corporate] STATE” PROCEED IN THE NATURE OF A “LAW MERCHANT” TO OFFER AND THEREBY “SELL” THE “INSOLVENT” STATUTE . . . THE PRIMARY QUESTION IS: “WHAT IS MY CONSIDERATION SHOULD I ACCEPT YOUR OFFER?” DOESEN’T MY CONSIDERATION HAVE TO BE QUID PRO QUO i.e. VALUE FOR VALUE?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Consider the following:</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>THE USE OF THE HIGHWAYS IS A MATTER OF RIGHT</strong></p>
<p><strong>Oregon Statutes – Chapter 801 – General Provisions and Definitions for</strong> <strong>Oregon Vehicle Code</strong></p>
<p>– Section 801.305 – “Highway.”</p>
<p><strong>(1) “Highway” means every public way, road, street, thoroughfare and place, including bridges, viaducts and other structures within the boundaries of this state, open, used or intended for use of the general public for vehicles or vehicular traffic as a matter of right.</strong></p>
<p><strong>(2) For the purpose of enforcing traffic offenses contained in the Oregon Vehicle Code, except for ORS 810.230, “highway” includes premises open to the public that are owned by a homeowners association and whose boundaries are contained within a service district established on or before July 1, 2002, under ORS 451.410 to 451.610. [1983 c.338 §51; 2007 c.561 §1]</strong></p>
<p><strong>WHEREAS; ORS 801.305 “Highway”. “Highway” means every public way, road, street, thoroughfare and place, including bridges, viaducts and other structures within the boundaries of “this state”, open, used or intended for use of the general public for vehicles and vehicular traffic as a matter of [natural] right.” Reference: HB 3445 (2007) “Officers duty at a traffic stop, is to issue a citation and leave.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Assuming that officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence and that investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle was valid, subsequent seizure of weapons found in vehicle was illegal, where defendant was detained longer than was reasonable and scope of investigation exceeded reason for stop:….” State of Oregon v. Carl Wayne Johnson, CR 89-0008; CA A62045; 106 Or.App. at 371.</strong></p>
<p><strong>The Fourth Amendment “prohibits” unreasonable detention of private citizens without probable cause that the individual detained has or is about to commit a “crime”. You cannot be compelled to produce identification in a “non criminal” setting. </strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/461/352/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>A “traffic stop” is an administrative stop if not based upon a “crime”. If your automobile does not display a “DOT Number” indicating that it is “for hire” you cannot be stopped for any “non-criminal” infraction. See generally: United States v. Herrera, No. 05-3057 (10th Cir. April 19, 2006) D C No 04-CR-20023-02-JWL).</strong></p>
<p><strong>And if you don’t hold or possess the OREGON “DRIVER” LICENSE, you have not elected to become a “Customer” of the OREGON DMV and thereby, there is no existing nexus to presume you have waived your “Right to Travel” and thereby converted said right into a commercial regulatory privilege which by its nature fails on its face as a matter of law.</strong></p>
<p><strong>UNITED STATES V. HERRON, 87 U. S. 251 (1873) a maxim of the common law, said Savage, C.J., that when an act of Parliament is passed for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong, the King shall be bound by such act though not named, but when a statute is general and any prerogative, right, title, or interest would be divested or taken from the King, in such a case he shall not be bound unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him, for which he cites both English and American authorities, and adds that the people of the state, being sovereign, have succeeded to the rights of the former sovereign, and that the people of the state are not bound by the general words in the insolvent law.” i.e. the private for profit copyright statute.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Lastly, the Natural Right to Travel:</strong><strong>　</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>“U.S. Courts affirm that Citizens have the right to</strong><br />
<strong>travel freely on the public right of way”.</strong></p>
<p><strong>For many years Professionals within the criminal justice System have acted upon the belief that traveling by motor vehicle upon the roadway was a privilege that was gained by a citizen only after approval by their respective state government in the form of the issuance of a permit or license to that Particular individual. Legislators, police officers and court officials are becoming aware that there are now court decisions that prove the fallacy of the legal opinion that” driving is a privilege and therefore requires government approval, i.e. a license”. Some of these cases are:</strong></p>
<p><strong>Case # 1 – “Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience. – Chicago Motor Coach v Chicago 169 NE 22</strong><br />
<strong>(“Regulated” here means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, signs, etc. NOT a privilege that requires permission i.e.- licensing, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, etc.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>Case # 2 – “The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”- Thompson v Smith 154 SE 579.</strong></p>
<p><strong>It could not be stated more conclusively that Citizens of the states have a right to travel, without approval or restriction, (license,) and that this right is protected under the U.S. Constitution. Here are other court</strong><br />
<strong>decisions that expound the same facts:</strong></p>
<p><strong>Case # 3 – “The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the 5th Amendment.” </strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/357/116/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, (1958)</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>Case # 4 – “Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal Liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the </strong><strong>territory of any State is a right secured by the l4th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.” – Schactman v Dulles, </strong><a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/225/938/417737/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>225 F.2d 938 (1955)</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT</strong></p>
<p><strong>As hard as it is for those of us in Law enforcement to believe, there is no room for speculation in these court decisions. The American citizen does indeed have the inalienable right to use the roadways unrestricted in any manner as long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of </strong><strong>another.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Government, in requiring the people to file for “drivers Licenses, vehicle registrations, mandatory insurance, and demanding they stop for vehicle inspections, DUI/DWI roadblocks etc. without question, are “restricting”, and therefore violating, the Peoples common law right to travel.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Is this a new legal interpretation on this subject of the right to travel? Apparently not. The American Citizens and Lawmen Association in conjunction with The U.S. Federal Law Research Center are presently involved in studies in several areas involving questions on constitutional law. One of the many areas under review is the area of “Citizens right to travel.” In an interview a spokesmen stated: “Upon researching this subject over many months, substantial case law has presented itself that completely substantiates the position that the “right to travel unrestricted upon the nations highways” is and has always been a fundamental right of every Citizen.”</strong></p>
<p><strong>This means that the “beliefs and opinions” our state legislators, the courts, and those of as involved in the law enforcement profession have acted upon for years have been in error. Researchers armed with actual facts state that U.S. case law is overwhelming in determining that – to restrict, in any fashion, the movement of the individual American in the free exercise of their right to travel upon the roadways, (excluding “commerce” which the state Legislatures are correct in regulating), is a serious breach of those freedoms secured by the U.S. Constitution, and most state Constitutions, i.e – it is Unlawful.</strong></p>
<p><strong>THE REVELATION THAT THE AMERICAN CITIZEN HAS ALWAYS HAD THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO TRAVEL RAISES PROFOUND QUESTIONS TO THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED IN MAKING AND ENFORCING UNDER FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, “INSOLVENT” STATE LAWS FOR PROFIT.</strong></p>
<p><strong>The first of such questions may very well be – If the States have been enforcing laws that are unconstitutional on their face, it would seem that there must be some way that a state can legally put restrictions, such as – licensing requirements, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, vehicle inspections, D.W.I. roadblocks, to name just a few, on a Citizens constitutionally protected right. Is that not so?</strong></p>
<p><strong>For the answer to this question let us look, once again, to the U.S. courts for a determination on this very issue.</strong></p>
<p><strong>The case of </strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/110/516/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)</strong></a> <strong>states very plainly: “The State cannot diminish rights of the people.”</strong></p>
<p><strong>“the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.”-</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/263/22/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22,24 (1923)</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>Would we not say that these judicial decisions are straight to the point – that there is no lawful method for government to put restrictions or Limitations on rights belonging to the people?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Other cases are even more straight forward:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” –</strong><a href="http://supreme.justia.com/us/384/436/case.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966 )</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>“The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.· –</strong><a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/230/486/232145/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d 486, 489</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>“There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional rights.”-</strong><a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/481/945/292727/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 945</strong></a> <strong>( There is no question that a citation/ticket issued by a police officer, for no drivers license, no current vehicle registration, no vehicle insurance etc. which carries a fine or jail time, is a penalty or sanction, and is indeed “converting a Right into a crime”.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>We could go on, quoting court decision after court decision, however, In addition, the Constitution itself answers our question- “Can a government legally put restrictions on the rights of the American people at anytime, for any reason”? (Such as in this particular case – when the government believes it to be for the safety and welfare of the people).</strong></p>
<p><strong>The answer is found in ARTICLE SIX of the U.S. Constitution:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding”. (This tells us that the U.S. Constitution is to be upheld over any state, county, or city Laws that are in opposition to it.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>In the same Article it goes on to say just who it is within our governments that is bound by this Supreme Law:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;”. – ART. 6 U.S. CONST.</strong></p>
<p><strong>We know that Police officers, are a part of the Executive branch. We are “Executive Officers”.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Article 6 above, is called the SUPREMACY CLAUSE, and it clearly states that, under every circumstance, the above listed officials in these United States must hold this documents tenets supreme over any other laws, regulations, or orders. Every U.S. Police officer knows that they have sworn a oath to the people of our nation that we will not only protect their lives and property, but, that we will uphold, and protect their freedoms and rights under the Supreme laws of this nation, – the U. S. Constitution.</strong></p>
<p><strong>In this regard then, we must agree that those within government that restrict a Citizens rights, (such as restricting the people’s right to travel,) are acting in violation of his or her oath of office and are actually committing a crime against such Citizens. Here’s an interesting question. Is ignorance of these laws an excuse for such acts by officials? If we are to follow the “letter of the law (as we are sworn to do), this places officials that involve themselves in such unlawful acts in an unfavorable legal situation. For it is a felony and federal crime to violate, or deprive citizens of their constitutionally protected rights.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Our system of law dictates the fact that there are only two ways to legally remove a right belonging to the people. These are – #1 – by lawfully amending the constitution, or #2 – by a person knowingly waiving a particular right.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Some of the confusion in our present system has arisen because many millions of people have waived their right to travel “unrestricted” upon the roadways of the states and opted into the jurisdiction of the state for various reasons. Those who have knowingly given up these rights are now legally regulated by state law, the proper courts, and “sworn, constitutionally empowered officers-of-the-law,” and must acquire proper permits, registrations, insurance, etc.</strong></p>
<p><strong>There are basically two groups of people in this category:</strong></p>
<p><strong>#1 – Any citizen that involves themselves in “commerce,” (business for private gain), upon the highways of the state.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Here is what the courts have said about this:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“…For while a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion…” – State v Johnson, 243 P. 1073, 1078.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Other U.S. court cases that confirm and point out the difference between the “right” of the citizen to travel and a government “privilege” are – Barney v Board of Railroad Commissioners; State v City of Spokane, 186 P. 864.; Ex Parte Dickey (Dickey v Davis), 85 S.E. 781.; Teche Lines v Danforth, 12</strong><br />
<strong>So.2d 784.</strong></p>
<p><strong>There are numerous other court decisions that spell out the JURISDICTION issue in these two distinctly different activities. However, because of space restrictions we will leave it up to officers to research it further for themselves. (See last page for additional references).</strong></p>
<p><strong>#2 – The second group of citizens that are legally under the jurisdiction of the state is the individual citizen who has voluntarily and knowingly waived their right to travel “unregulated and unrestricted” by requesting placement under such jurisdiction through the acquisition of a state – drivers license, vehicle registration, mandatory insurance, etc. (In other words “by contract only”.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>We should remember what makes this “legal,” and not a violation of the individual’s common law right to travel “unrestricted” is that they knowingly volunteer, freely, by contract, to waive their right. If they were </strong><strong>forced, coerced or unknowingly placed under the States powers, the courts have said it is a clear violation of their rights.</strong></p>
<p><strong>This in itself raises a very interesting question. What percentage of the people in each state have filed, and received, licenses, registrations, insurance etc. after erroneously being advised by their government that it </strong><strong>was mandatory?</strong></p>
<p><strong>Many of our courts, attorneys and police officials are just becoming informed about this important issue and the difference between “Privileges vs. Rights”. We can assume that the majority of those Americans carrying state licenses, vehicle registrations etc., have no knowledge of the rights they waived in obeying laws such as these that the U.S. Constitution clearly states are unlawful, i.e. “laws [that are insolvent], are of no effect”. In other words – “LAWS THAT ARE NOT LAWS AT ALL.”</strong></p>
<p><strong>OUR SWORN DUTY</strong></p>
<p><strong>An area of serious consideration for every police officer, is to understand that the most important law in our land he has taken an oath to protect, defend, AND ENFORCE, is not state laws, nor city or county ordinances, but, that law that supercede all other laws in our nation, – the U.S. Constitution. If laws in a particular police officer’s state, or local community are in conflict with the SUPREME LAW of our nation, there Is no question that the officer’s duty is to “uphold the U.S. Constitution.”</strong></p>
<p><strong>What does this mean to the “patrol officer” who will be the only sworn “Executive Officer” on the scene, when knowledgeable Citizens raise serious objections over possession of insurance, drivers licenses and other restrictions? It definitely means these officers will be faced with a hard decision. (Most certainly if that decision affects state, city or county revenues, such as the issuing of citations do.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>Example: If a state legislator, judge or a superior tells a police officer to proceed and enforce a contradictory, (illegal), state law rather than the Supreme Law of this country, what is that “sworn officer” to do? Although we may not want to hear it, there is but one right answer, – “the officer is duty bound to uphold his oath of office” and obey the highest laws of the nation. THIS IS OUR SWORN DUTY AND IT’S THE LAW!</strong></p>
<p><strong>Such a strong honest stand taken by a police officer, upholding his or her oath of office, takes moral strength of character. It will, without question, “SEPARATE THE MEN FROM THE BOYS.” Such honest and straight forward decisions on behalf of a government official have often caused pressure to be applied to force such officers to set aside, or compromise their morals or convictions.</strong></p>
<p><strong>As a solace for those brave souls in uniform that will stand up for law and justice, even when it’s unpopular, or uncomfortable to do so…let me say this. In any legal stand-off over a sworn official “violating” or “upholding” their oath of office, those that would side with the “violation” should inevitable lose.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Our Founding Fathers assured us, on many occasions, the following: Defending our freedoms in the face of people that would for “expedients sake,” or behind the guise, “for the safety and welfare of the masses,” ignore people’s rights, would forever demand sacrifice and vigilance from those that desired to remain free. That sounds a little like – “Freedom is not free!”</strong></p>
<p><strong>Every police officer should keep the following U.S. court ruling in mind that was covered earlier, before issuing citations in regard to presumptive “mandatory licensing, registration and insurance” – verses – “the right of the people to travel unencumbered”:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“THE CLAlM AND EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY [SECURED] RlGHT CANNOT BE CONVERTED INTO A CRIME.” –</strong><a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/230/486/232145/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d 486, 489</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>And as we have seen, “traveling freely,” going about ones daily activities, is the exercise of a most basic right.</strong></p>
<p><strong>UNITED STATES V. HERRON, 87 U. S. 251 (1873) It is a maxim of the common law, said Savage, C.J., that when an act of Parliament is passed for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong, the King shall be bound by such act though not named, but when a statute is general and any prerogative, right, title, or interest would be divested or taken from the King, in such a case he shall not be bound unless the statute is made by express words to extend to him, for which he cites both English and American authorities, and adds that the people of the state, being sovereign, have succeeded to the rights of the former sovereign, and that the people of the state are not bound by the general words in the insolvent law.</strong><br />
<strong><br />
Aid&amp;Abet Newsletter Mon, 03 Feb 2003 14:09:19 -0600</strong><br />
<strong>P.O.BOX 8787, PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85066</strong></p>
<p><strong>CLARIFICATON:</strong></p>
<p><strong>The courts state that a Citizen has an unalienable right to travel freely. This includes the right to travel freely for one’s own private need and enjoyment in an automobile on the public right of way. However, the term “motor vehicle” has a special meaning in the law, as does the term “driving”. “Motor vehicles” are self-propelled devices used for “transport of persons and/or property on the highway”. “Transport” means to move something in commerce. “Driving” is the act of controlling a “motor vehicle”. All of these terms relate to specifically defined commercial use of the public right of way, and commercial use of publicly maintained property is not a right, but a privilege that can be taxed through licensure and registration.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Note also:</strong></p>
<p><strong>The registration of the vehicle at the time of purchase is accomplished by way of “fraud in the inducement,” “Actual Fraud” and Theft by Deception, whereby the “certificate of origin” of the vehicle in question is caused to be surrendered to the DMV, presuming to transfer legal title to said DMV, when in fact, the DMV has given no value for said vehicle. In essence, evidence of registration is an admission of the above criminal acts to defraud and claim control of property that the DMV has no commercially vested interest in except by way of constructive fraud.</strong></p>
<p><strong>“Every commercial law and every regulation is a price-fix of sorts and generates – for some service or some product – a queue, a shortage or a forcible redistribution of resources and must by its nature indemnify the actor/customer.” (But requires knowing “Joinder” by you! Never go into controversy . . . that is by deception, considered a traverse and joinder! (a presumptive knowing grant of jurisdiction.)</strong></p>
<p><strong>The bottom line is biblical re the corporation and other fictional entities:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean [thing]; and I will receive you . . “</strong></p>
<p><strong>2 Corinthians 6:17</strong></p>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> THE FOLLOWING PAGE BELOW ALSO HAVE A PLETHORA OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">ON THIS GOD GIVEN RIGHTS, SEARCH AND PROPERTY RIGHTS BELOW</span></h1>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile</a></strong></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/scotus-around-robin-v-hardaway/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790</strong></span></a></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>cited <a href="https://keystoliberty2.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/statutes-attempting-to-sell-the-statute-part-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://keystoliberty2.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/statutes-attempting-to-sell-the-statute-part-2/</a></p>
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		<title>NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 May 2022 07:04:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[amendment 14]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amendment 4]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amendment 5]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[free to travel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IV Amendment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NO Law]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[this article below&#8217;s title may be quite misleading (we kept the original author&#8217;s as this was his reason for his research) so keep reading, it will give you a vast outlook on your rights with judges, DA&#8217;s, police and other government servants NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile 24 pages [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><b>this article below&#8217;s title may be quite misleading (we kept the original author&#8217;s as this was his reason for his research)<br />
</b></span></em><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><em><b>so keep reading, it will give you a vast outlook on your rights with judges, DA&#8217;s, police and other government servants</b></em></span></h3>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em><strong>NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile 24 pages of rulings supporting your rights</strong></em></span></h1>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em><strong>Government / Public Servants / Officers / Judges Not Immune from suit!</strong></em></span></h2>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>As will be made painfully evident herewithin, a Private automobile is <strong>not required </strong>by <strong>any law</strong>, <strong>code or statute to be recorded</strong>. Any recording (<strong>pledge</strong>) of Private automobile to any agency is strictly <strong>voluntary</strong>. Any recordation / contract you or a Dealership has done was a fraudulently conveyed act as the recording agency/automobile Dealer told you that you must record your Private Property. The voluntary pledge that was done without just compensation is usually done through fraud, deceit, coercion and withholding of facts, which can only be construed as fraud and unjust enrichment by agency as well as a willful malicious act to unjustly enrich the recording agency and its public servants.</p>
<p>If men<strong>, through fear, fraud or mistake</strong>, should in terms renounce or <strong>give up any natural right</strong>, the eternal law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such renunciation. <strong>The right to freedom being the gift of Almighty God</strong>, it is <strong>not in the power of man to alienate this gift and voluntarily become a slave</strong>. <strong><u>Samuel Adams</u></strong>, our great president.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, -‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: first, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit: second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”  <em><u>Budd v. People of State of New York</u>, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).</em></span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">There should be <strong>no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty</strong>, <strong>or arbitrary spoilation of property</strong>. <em>(<u>Pol</u><u>ice</u> <u>pow</u><u>er</u>, <u>Due</u> <u>Process</u>) <strong><u>Barber v. Connolly,</u> </strong>113 U.S. 27, 31; <strong><u>Yick Yo v. Hopkins</u></strong>, 118 U.S. 356.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">But whenever the <strong>operation and effect of any general regulation is to extinguish or destroy </strong>that which <strong>by law of the land is the property </strong>of any person, so far as it has that effect, it is unconstitutional and void.  Thus, a <strong> <u>law</u> is considered as being a deprivation of property </strong>within the meaning of this constitutional guaranty <strong>if it deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys its value, restricts or interrupts its common, necessary, or profitable use, </strong>hampers the owner in the application of it to the purposes of trade, <strong>or imposes conditions upon the right to hold or use it and thereby seriously impairs its value.  </strong><em>(<u>Sta</u><u>tute</u>) <strong>167 Am. Jur. </strong>2d, Constitutional Law, Section 369.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>Justice  Bandeis  </strong>eloquently  <strong>affirmed  his  condemnation  of  abuses practiced by Government officials</strong>, who were defendants, acting as Government officials. In the case of <em><strong> <u>Olmstead vs. U.S.</u> </strong>277 US 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575; 72 L ED 944 (1928) </em><strong>he declared</strong>:</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;Decency,  security,  and  liberty  alike  <strong>demand  that Government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of  conduct  that  are  commands  to  the  Citizen.  </strong>In  a Government of laws, existence of the Government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. <strong>Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breads contempt for law; </strong>it invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the law, the end justifies the means would bring a terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face.&#8221;</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>The Duty of the Licensor / DMV Commissioner</u></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">The information created and surrounding the <strong>stricti juris </strong>doctrine regarding a particular license which may, or may not, be represented by and revealed within the contents and control of a <u>license agreement</u></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8212; “<strong>but must be revealed upon demand, and failure to do so is</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>concealment</u></strong><strong>,  a  withholding  of  <u>material  facts</u>  (the  enducing, contractual  consideration) known by those who have a duty and are bound to reveal</strong>.”  <em><strong><u>Dolcater  v.  Manufacturers &amp; Traders Trust Co</u></strong>., D.C.N.Y., 2F.Supp. 637, 641.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>Is an automobile always a vehicle (or motor vehicle)?</strong></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>ARGUMENT:</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><u>Federal;</u></strong></span></h3>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;‘‘<strong>Motor vehicle</strong>’’ means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and <strong>used for commercial purposes </strong>on the highways in transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property and cargo; &#8230; <strong>&#8220;Used for commercial purposes&#8221; means </strong>the carriage of persons or property for <strong>any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration</strong>, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other <strong>undertaking intended for profit</strong>[.]&#8221; <em><strong><u>18 U.S.C. 31</u>.</strong></em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;A <strong>carriage is </strong>peculiarly a family or <strong>household </strong>article.  It contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of the householder or of the family.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Arthur v Morgan</u></strong>, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 S.D. NY 1884).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;<em>The <strong>Supreme Court</strong>, in <strong><u>Arthur v. Morgan</u></strong>, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed.  825</em>, held that <strong>carriages were properly classified as household effects</strong>, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Hillhouse v United States,</u> </strong>152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;A soldier&#8217;s <strong>personal automobile </strong>is part of his &#8220;<strong>household goods</strong>[.]&#8221;   <em><strong><u>U.S.</u> <u>v Bomar</u></strong>, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235&#8243; </em> 19A Words and Phrases &#8211; Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;[I]t is a jury question whether &#8230; an automobile &#8230; is a motor vehicle[.]&#8221; <strong><u>United States v Johnson,</u></strong><strong> </strong><em>718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>State:</strong></span></h3>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Use determines classification</u></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;In determining whether or not a motor boat was included in the expression household effects, <em>Matter of Winburn&#8217;s Will, supra [139 Misc. 5, 247 N.Y.S. 592]</em>, stated the test to be &#8220;whether the articles are or are not used in or by the household, or for the benefit or comfort of the family&#8221;.&#8221;  <em> <strong><u>In re</u> <u>Bloomingdale&#8217;s Estate</u></strong>, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (1955)</em>.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;<strong>The use to which an item is put, rather than its physical characteristics</strong>, determine whether it should be classified as &#8220;consumer goods&#8221; under <em>UCC 9-109(1) or   &#8220;equipment&#8221; under UCC 9-109(2).&#8221;   <strong> <u>Grimes v Massey Ferguson, </u></strong><strong><u>Inc</u></strong>., 23 UCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Under UCC 9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use.  The two are mutually exclusive and the <strong>principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative</strong>.&#8221;   <strong><u>James Talcott, Inc. v Gee</u></strong>, <em>5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The <strong>classification of goods </strong>in UCC 9-109 <strong>are mutually exclusive</strong>.&#8221;  <strong> <u>McFadden</u> <u>v Mercantile-Safe Deposit &amp; Trust Co.</u></strong>, <em>8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The classification of &#8220;goods&#8221; under [UCC] 9-109 <strong>is a question of fact</strong>.&#8221; <strong><u>Morgan County Feeders, Inc. v McCormick,</u></strong> <em>18 UCC Rep Serv 2d 632; 836 P.2d 1051 (Colo. App., 1992).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The definition of &#8220;<strong>goods</strong>&#8221; <strong>includes an automobile</strong>.&#8221;   <strong><u>Henson v Government</u></strong> <strong><u>Employees Finance &amp; Industrial Loan Corp.</u></strong>,<em> 15 UCC Rep Serv 1137; 257 Ark 273,516 S.W.2d 1 (1974).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Household goods</u></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The term &#8220;<strong>household goods</strong>&#8221; &#8230; <strong>includes everything </strong>about the house that is usually held and enjoyed therewith and that tends to the comfort and accommodation of the household.  <em><strong><u>Lawwill v. Lawwill</u></strong>, 515 P.2d 900, 903, 21 Ariz.App. 75</em>&#8221; 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part Cites Mitchell&#8217;s Will below.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Bequest &#8230; of such &#8220;household goods and effects&#8221; &#8230; included not only household furniture, but everything else in the house that is usually held and used by the occupants of a house to lead to the comfort and accommodation of the household. <em>State ex rel. <strong><u>Mueller v</u> <u>Probate Court of Ramsey County,</u> </strong>32 N.W.2d 863, 867, 226 Minn. 346.&#8221; 19A Words and Phrases &#8211; Permanent Edition (West) 514.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;<strong>All household goods owned by the user </strong>thereof and <strong>used solely for noncommercial purposes shall be exempt from taxation</strong>, and such person entitled to such exemption <strong>shall not be required to take any affirmative </strong><strong>action </strong><strong>to receive the benefit from such exemption</strong>.&#8221;  <em><strong><u>Ariz. Const. Art. 9, 2</u></strong>.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Automobiles classified as vehicles</u></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;&#8220;[H]ousehold goods&#8221;&#8230;did not [include] an automobile&#8230;used by the testator, who was a practicing physician, in going from his residence to his office and vice versa, and in making visits to his patients.&#8221;  <em><strong><u>Mathis v</u> <u>Causey</u></strong>, et al., 159 S.E. 240 (Ga. 1931).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Debtors could not avoid lien on motor vehicle, as <strong>motor vehicles are not </strong><strong>&#8220;household goods&#8221; </strong>within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance provision.  <em><strong><u>In re Martinez, Bkrtcy.N.M.</u></strong>, 22 B.R. 7, 8.&#8221;  19A Words and Phrases &#8211; Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Automobiles NOT classified as vehicles</u></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Automobile purchased for the <strong>purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of </strong><strong>employment was &#8220;consumer goods&#8221; </strong>as defined in UCC 9-109.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Mallicoat v</u> <u>Volunteer Finance &amp; Loan Corp.</u></strong>, 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App., 1966).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The provisions of UCC 2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use).&#8221; <em><strong><u>Maryland</u> <u>Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle</u> <u>Admin.,</u> </strong>25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;An automobile was part of testatrix&#8217; &#8220;household goods&#8221; within codicil. <em> <strong><u>In</u> <u>re </u></strong><strong><u>Mitchell&#8217;s Will,</u></strong> 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674, 675 [1942].&#8221;  19A</em> Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) 512.  Cites Arthur v Morgan, supra.  &#8220;[T]he expression &#8220;<strong>personal effects&#8221; clearly includes an automobile</strong>[.]&#8221;  <strong><u>In</u> <u>re<em> Burnside&#8217;s Will</em></u></strong><em>, 59 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (1945).</em>  Cites Hillhouse, Arthur, and Mitchell&#8217;s Will, supra.  &#8220;[A] yacht and six automobiles were &#8220;personal belongings&#8221; and &#8220;household effects[.]&#8221;&#8221;  <em>  <strong><u>In re Bloomingdale&#8217;s Estate</u></strong>, 142 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (1955).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>CONCLUSION</u></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>Is an automobile always a vehicle (or motor vehicle)?  </strong><strong>No</strong>.  This is a question of fact that <strong>turns on the use to which the automobile in question is put </strong>(i.e., either personal or commercial).  While the presumption of an automobile being a vehicle (or motor vehicle) is created by the owner of said automobile registering same with the state as a vehicle, <strong>this </strong><strong>presumption may be overcome by an </strong><strong>affirmative defense to the allegation of the automobile being a vehicle, </strong><strong>baring any evidence to the contrary indicating commercial use.</strong></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><u>Use defines Classification</u></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><u>Private Automobile is NOT required to be registered by Law</u> The <strong>California Motor Vehicle Code, section 260</strong>: Private cars/vans etc. not in commerce / for profit, are immune to registration fees:</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>(a) </strong>A “<strong>commercial vehicle</strong>” is a vehicle of a type <strong>REQUIRED </strong>to be <strong>REGISTERED </strong>under this code”.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>(b) </strong>“Passenger vehicles which are <strong>not used </strong>for the transportation of persons <strong>for hire, </strong>compensation or profit, and housecars, <strong>are not commercial vehicles</strong><strong>”</strong><strong>.</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>(c) </strong>“a vanpool vehicle <strong>is not a commercial vehicle.</strong>”</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">and; “A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a <strong>“consumer goods</strong>”, &#8230;it is <strong>NOT </strong>a type of vehicle <strong>required to be registered </strong>and “<strong>use tax</strong>” paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax.”  <em><strong><u>Bank of Boston vs Jones</u>, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14</strong>.</em>  And;  “It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is based upon a reasonable classification, and does not involve any unconstitutional discrimination, although <strong>it does not apply to private vehicles, </strong>or those used by the owner in his own business, and not for hire.”  <em><strong><u>Desser v. Wichita</u>, (1915) 96 </strong><strong>Kan. 820; <u>Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs.</u>, 75 A.L.R. 22.</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">“Thus self-driven vehicles are <strong>classified according to the use </strong>to which they are put <strong>rather than according to the means by which they are propelled</strong>.”  <strong><em><u>Ex Parte Hoffert</u>, 148 NW 20.</em>  </strong>And; “In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials <strong>“</strong><strong>ma</strong><strong>y</strong>” exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they <strong>“</strong><strong>must</strong>” <strong>exempt them</strong>.”  <em><strong> </strong><strong><u>State v. Johnson</u></strong><strong>, 243 P. 1073; 60 </strong><strong>C.J.S. section 94 page 581.</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">See <strong>New Jersey Motor Vehicle Code Chapter 3, Section 39:3-1.  Certain vehicles excepted from chapter </strong>which reads: “<strong>Automobile, </strong>fire engines <strong>and such self propelling vehicles as are used neither for the conveyance of persons for hire</strong>, pleasure or business, nor for the transportation of freights, such as steam road rollers and traction engines <strong>are excepted from the provisions of this chapter.</strong>”</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">See <strong>Annual Report of the Attorney General of the State of New York issued on July 21, 1909, ALBANY NEW YORK, pages 322-323 </strong>which reads: “<strong>There is NO requirement that the owner of a motor vehicle shall procure a license to run the same, nor is there any requirement that any other person shall do so, unless he proposes to become a chauffeur or a person conducting an automobile as an employee for hire or wages. </strong>Yours very truly, EDWARD R. O’MALLEY Attorney General.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">See <em><strong>Laws of New York 1901, Chapter 53, page 1316, Section 169a</strong>.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">See also <em><strong>Laws of Wyoming 2002, Motor Vehicle Code, page 142, Section 31-5- </strong></em><em><strong>See RCW 5.24.010!</strong></em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">“<strong>Privately owned </strong>Buses not engaged in for hire Transportation are <strong>outside the jurisdiction </strong>of <em>Division of Motor Vehicles enforcement of N.C. G.S. Article 17, Chapter 20***” 58 N.C.A.G. 1</em> (<strong>It follows that those Citizens not engaged in extraordinary use of the highway for profit or gain are likewise outside the jurisdiction of the Division of Motor Vehicles</strong>.)</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">“Since a <strong>sale of personal property is not required to be evidenced by any written instrument in order to be valid</strong>, it has been held in North Carolina that there may be a <strong>transfer of title to an automobile without complying with the registration statute which requires a transfer and delivery of a certificate of title.</strong>”  <em><strong>N.C. Law Review Vol. 32 page 545, <u>Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis</u> <u>Motor Co.</u>, 190 N.C. 157.</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">“The following <strong>shall be exempt from the requirements of registration and the certificate of title</strong>:</span><br />
<span style="color: #008000;"><strong>        1.) </strong>Any such vehicle driven or <strong>moved upon the highway </strong>in conformance with the provisions of this Article relating to manufacturers, dealers, <strong>or nonresidents</strong>.”</span><br />
<span style="color: #008000;"><strong>        2.) </strong>Any such vehicle which is driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to another. ****20-51(1)(2) (comment: not driven or moved</span><br />
<span style="color: #008000;">upon the highway for transporting persons or property for profit.) <strong>(Case note to North Carolina G.S. 12-3 </strong><strong>“</strong><strong>Statutory Construction</strong><strong>”</strong><strong>)</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">The California Constitution in Article I, Section 8 (and similar statements made in all other state constitutions), mandates that no one &#8220;<strong>be compelled to be a witness against himself</strong>,&#8221; is in agreement with the Supreme Court ruling in <em><strong><u>Haynes v. U.S.</u></strong>, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722,</em> wherein the ruling was that <strong>to force anyone to register anything is communicative</strong>, and such communicative evidence is <strong>precluded by the 5th Amendment</strong><strong>.</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;<strong>No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways</strong>, byways, nor waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. <strong>Travel </strong>is <strong>not a privilege requiring, licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances</strong>.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Chicago Coach Co. </u><u>v. City of Chicago,</u> </strong>337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>The fundamental Right to travel is NOT a Privilege, it’s a gift</u></strong><strong> <u>granted by your Maker, and restated by our founding fathers as</u> <u>Unalienable and cannot be taken by any Man / Government made Law</u> <u>or color of law known as a private Code (secret) or a Statute,</u></strong></span></p>
<h3><strong><u>To Wit:</u></strong></h3>
<p><span style="color: #ff6600;">&#8220;As general rule men have natural right to do anything which their inclinations may suggest, if it be not evil in itself, and <strong>in no way </strong><strong>impairs the rights of others.</strong>&#8221;  <em><strong><u>In Re Newman</u> </strong>(1858), 9 C. 502.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;<strong><u>Traveling</u> </strong>is passing from place to place&#8211;act of <strong>performing journey</strong>; and <strong>traveler is person who travels</strong>.&#8221;  <strong><u>In <em>Re Archy </em></u></strong><em>(1858), 9 C. 47.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Right of transit through each state, with every species of property known to constitution of United States, and recognized by that paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each citizen, and does not depend upon uncertain and changeable ground of mere comity.&#8221; <strong> <u>In Re</u> <u>Archy</u> </strong>(1858), 9 C. 47.</span></p>
<p><em><strong><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Traffic infractions are not a crime.&#8221; <u>People v. Battle</u>, 50 Cal. App. 3, step 1, Super, 123 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639.</span></strong></em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&#8220;First, it is <strong>well established law </strong>that the <strong>highways </strong>of the state <strong>are </strong><strong>public property</strong>, and <strong>their primary and preferred use is for private purposes</strong>, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.&#8221;  <em><strong><u>Stephenson vs. Rinford</u></strong>, 287 US 251; </em><em><strong><u>Pachard vs Banton</u></strong>, 264 US 140,</em> and cases cited;<em> <strong><u>Frost and F. Trucking </u></strong><strong><u>Co. vs. Railroad Commission</u></strong>, 271 US 592; <strong><u>Railroad commission vs.</u> <u>Inter-City Forwarding Co.,</u> </strong>57 SW.2d 290; <strong><u>Parlett Cooperative vs.</u> <u>Tidewater Lines, </u> </strong>164 A. 313.</em></p>
<p>Freedom to <u>travel</u> is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen&#8217;s &#8220;<u>liberty</u>&#8220;.  We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtailment. (Road)  <strong><u>Kent v. Dulles</u></strong>, 357 U.S. 116, 127.</p>
<p>The right to travel is a part of the &#8220;<u>liberty</u>&#8221; of which the citizen cannot be deprived without <u>due</u> <u>p</u><u>r</u><u>o</u><u>ce</u><u>s</u><u>s</u> of law under the <u>Fifth</u> Amendment. So much is conceded by the solicitor general.  In Anglo Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as Magna Carta.  <em><strong><u>Kent v. Dulles</u></strong>, 357 U.S. 116, 125.</em></p>
<p>“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but a common and fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.”</p>
<h2><strong><u>Chicago</u></strong></h2>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><em><strong><u>Motor Coach v. Chicago</u></strong>, 337 Ill. 200, 169 NE 22, 66 ALR 834. <strong><u>Ligare </u></strong><strong><u>Chicago</u></strong>, 139 Ill. 46, 28 NE 934. <strong><u>Boone v. Clark</u></strong>, 214 SW 607; 25 AM JUR (1st) Highways, Sec. 163.</em> &#8220;The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by a carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a City may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.&#8221;<em> <strong><u>Thompson v. Smith</u></strong><strong> </strong>154 SE 579.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with public interest and convenience.  <em><strong><u>Chicago Coach Co.</u> <u>v. City of Chicago</u></strong>, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22, 206.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;&#8230; It is now universally recognized that the state does possess such power [to impose such burdens and limitations upon private carriers when using the public highways for the transaction of their business] with respect to common carriers using the public highways for the transaction of their business in the transportation of persons or property for hire.  That rule is stated as follows by the <strong>supreme court </strong><strong>o</strong><strong>f the United States</strong>: &#8216;A citizen may have, under the fourteenth amendment, the right to travel and transport his property upon them (the public highways) by <strong>auto vehicle</strong>, but <strong>he has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them <em>as a common carrier for hire</em></strong>.    Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due process clause or the equal protection clause.&#8217; <em> (<strong><u>Buck </u><u>v. Kuykendall</u></strong>, 267 U. S. 307 [38 A. L. R. 286, 69 L. Ed. 623, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324].)</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business <strong>differs radically an obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business </strong>and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach or omnibus.  The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a right common to all; while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary.  As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the latter its power is broader; the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature.  This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities.”</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>In   <em><u>Thompson v. Smith</u></em></strong><em>, Chief of Police. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604.</em> Sept. 12, 1930 <strong>it states</strong>:</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Constitutional law</u></strong><strong>:  </strong>Citizen&#8217;s right to travel upon public highways and transport his property thereon in ordinary course of life and business is common right.  The right of a citizen so to do is that which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire property, and to pursue happiness and safety.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Automobiles, Highways</u></strong><strong>:     </strong>Citizen&#8217;s right to travel upon public highways includes right to use usual conveyances of time, including horse-drawn carriage, or automobile, for ordinary purposes of life and business.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Injunction</u></strong><strong>:   </strong>Injunction lies against enforcement of <strong>void statute or ordinance</strong>, where <strong>legal remedy is not as complete or adequate as injunction</strong>, or where <strong>threatened or attempted enforcement will do irreparable injury to person in interfering with exercise of common fundamental personal right</strong>.  By &#8220;irreparable injury&#8221; is meant an injury of such a nature that fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law and that to refuse the injunction would be a denial of justice.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>Constitutional Law </strong>§ 101 – <strong>right to travel </strong>– <strong>5. </strong>The nature of the Federal Union and constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of the United States uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. <strong>6. </strong>Although not explicitly mentioned in the Federal Constitution, the right freely to travel from one state to another is a basic right</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>License Not Legally Required to Travel &#8211; 72 hr. Right of Rescission &#8211; No License Excuse, provided you have a passport handy &#8211; <a style="color: #008000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/license-not-legally-required-to-travel-72-hr-right-of-rescission/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">read here</a></strong></span></p>
<h2><strong>Under the US Constitution.</strong></h2>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Constitutional Law </strong>§ 101 <strong>– law chilling assertion of rights </strong>– <strong>7.  </strong>If a law has no other purpose than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it is patently unconstitutional.  <em><strong><u>Shapiro v Thompson</u></strong>, 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600, 89 S Ct 1322.</em></span></p>
<p>So with all of that in mind, cite/deliver the cases above and</p>
<p><strong>you have given the agency</strong>, etc. <strong>knowledge!</strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">Under <em><strong><u>USC Title 42 §1986</u></strong></em>. Action for neglect to prevent …,  it states: <strong>Every person </strong>who, having <strong>knowledge </strong>that any wrongs conspired or to be done… and having power to prevent or aid in preventing … Neglects or refuses so to do … <strong>shall </strong>be <strong>liable </strong>to the <strong>party injured</strong>…  and; The means of <strong>&#8220;knowledge&#8221;</strong>, especially where it consists of public record is deemed in law to be &#8220;<strong>knowledge of the facts</strong>&#8220;.  As the means of &#8220;knowledge&#8221; if it appears that the individual had notice or information of circumstances which would put him on inquiry, which, if followed, would lead to &#8220;knowledge&#8221;, or that the facts were presumptively within his knowledge, he will have deemed to have had actual knowledge of the facts and may be subsequently liable for any damage or injury.  You, therefore, have been given &#8220;knowledge of the facts&#8221; as it pertains to this conspiracy to commit a fraud against me.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">I state now that I will <strong>NOT waive any fundamental Rights </strong>as:</span><br />
<span style="color: #ff0000;">“waivers of <strong>fundamental Rights </strong>must be knowing, intentional, and voluntary acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. <em><strong><u>U.S. v.</u> <u>Brady</u></strong>, 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970);  <strong><u>U.S.v. O’Dell</u></strong>, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947)”.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">And that the <strong>agency committed fraud, deceit, coercion, willful intent to injure another, malicious acts, RICO activity and conspired by</strong>; Unconscionable “contract” &#8211; <strong><em>“One which no sensible man <u>not</u> under delusion, or duress, or in distress would make, <u>and such as no honest and fair man would accept</u></em></strong>.”; <em><strong><u>Franklin Fire Ins. Co.  v.  Noll</u></strong>, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949, 950.</em>  and;  &#8220;Party cannot be bound by contract that he has not made or authorized.&#8221; <em> <strong><u>Alexander v.</u> <u>Bosworth</u> </strong>(1915), 26 C.A. 589, 599, 147 P.607.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>And therefore</strong>; “<strong>Failure to reveal the <u>material facts</u> </strong>of a <u>license</u> or <strong>any <u>agreement</u> </strong>is <strong>immediate grounds for </strong><strong>estoppel.” <em> <u>Lo Bue v. Porazzo</u></em></strong><em>, 48 Cal.App.2d 82, 119, p.2d 346, 348.</em></p>
<p>The fraudulently <strong>“presumed” quasi-contractus </strong>that binds the Declarant with the CITY/STATE agency, is void for fraud ab initio, since the de facto CITY/STATE <strong>cannot produce the material fact </strong>(consideration inducement) or the jurisdictional clause (who is subject to said statute).  (SEE: <em><strong> <u>Master / Servant [Employee]</u> <u>Relationship</u> </strong>&#8212; <strong><u>C.J.S</u>.)  </strong>&#8212; <strong>“<u>Personal, Private, Liberty</u>”-</strong></em></p>
<p>Since the “consideration” is the “life blood” of any agreement or quasi-agreement, (contractus) “&#8230;<strong><u>the absence of such from the</u> <u>record is a major manifestation of want of jurisdiction</u></strong>, <strong>since without evidence of consideration there can be no presumption of even a quasi-contractus.   Such is the importance of a “consideration.”  <em><u>Reading </u><u>R.R. Co.  v.  Johnson</u></em></strong><em>, 7 W &amp; S (Pa.) 317</em></p>
<p>So <strong>without a Contract </strong>(no recording of the M.C.O.) or consideration there is no DMV / government etc. jurisdiction as the property does not “<strong>reside</strong>” in the colorable fictitious territory as evidenced in Supreme Court cite below:</p>
<p>In <em><strong><u>Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox </u></strong>, 298 U.S. 193 (1936)</em> <strong>it states</strong>:  Property taxes can be on tangibles or intangibles.   <strong>In order to have a <em> <u>situs</u> </em>for taxation </strong>(a basis for imposing the tax), tangible property (physical property) <strong>must reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authority</strong>, and intangibles…</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">Under <em><strong><u>USC Title 42 §1982</u></strong></em>. Property rights of citizens …, further evidences the above position that the City or State cannot take land because they DO NOT have Jurisdiction.                         It states that federal or state governments / agencies <strong>MUST have a monetary or proprietary interest </strong>in your real private property in order to have jurisdiction over it (if your land has no government grant/funding or is not a subsidized government project, then agencies have neither).                         DEMAND any public servant/said agencies to provide the legal document that allows any federal or state agency to supersede and/or bypass <em><strong><u>Title 42 USC §1982 </u></strong><strong><u>and/or </u></strong><strong><u>§1441.   Title </u></strong><strong><u>42 §1983</u></strong><u>.</u></em> Civil action for deprivation of rights …, further  protects Declarant’s private property.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">The <strong>State cannot diminish <u>rights</u> of the people</strong>.  <em><strong><u>Hurtado v. California</u></strong>, 110 U.S. 516.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>&#8220;To say that one may not defend his own property is usurpation of power by legislature.&#8221;  <em><u>O&#8217;Connell v. Judnich</u> </em></strong><em>(1925), 71 C.A.386, 235 664.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;A state MAY NOT impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted (sic) by the Federal Constitution.&#8221; <em><strong><u>MURDOCK v PENNSYLVANIA</u></strong>, 319 US 105.</em></span></p>
<p>&#8220;&#8230; THE POWER TO TAX INVOLVES THE POWER TO DESTROY&#8221;.  <em><strong><u>McCULLOUGH v </u></strong><strong><u>MARYLAND</u></strong>, 4 Wheat 316.</em></p>
<p>&#8220;All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, <strong>but those over which it does not extend are exempt from taxation</strong>. This proposition may almost be pronounced as self-evident.  The sovereignty of the state extends to everything <strong>which exists by its authority or its permission</strong>.” <strong><u>McCullough v</u> <u>Maryland</u></strong>, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat] 316 (1819).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">To be that <u>statutes</u> which would deprive a citizen of the <u>ri</u><u>ghts</u> of person or property without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of <strong> <em><u>common</u> <u>law</u></em>, would not be the law of the land. </strong><em>(<u>J</u><u>ury</u>) <strong><u>Hoke v. Henderson</u></strong>, 15, N.C. 15 25 AM Dec 677.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">U.S. <strong>adopted <em><u>Common laws</u> </em></strong>of England with the Constitution. <em><strong><u>Caldwell vs. Hill</u></strong>, 178 SE 383 (1934).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;The phrase <strong>&#8216;<u>common</u> <u>law</u>&#8216; </strong>found in this clause, is <strong>used in contradistinction </strong>to <u>equity</u>, and <u>admiralty</u>, and maritime <u>jurisprudence</u>.&#8221;  <em><strong><u>Parsons v. Bedford</u></strong>, et al, 3 Pet 433, 478-9.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;If the <strong> <u>common</u> <u>law</u> </strong>can try the cause, <strong>and give full redress</strong>, that alone <strong>takes away </strong>the <u>admiralty</u> <u>jurisdiction</u>.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Ramsey v. Allegrie</u></strong>, supra, p. 411.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em><u>Inferior Courts</u></em> &#8211; The term may denote any court subordinate to the chief tribunal in the particular judicial system; <strong> <u>but it is commonly</u> <u>used as the designation of a court</u> </strong>of <em> <u>special</u></em>, <em> <u>limited</u></em>, or <em> <u>statutory</u> <u>jurisdiction</u></em>, <em>whose <strong> <u>record must show</u> </strong></em>the <em> <u>existence</u> </em>and <em> <u>attaching of</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> </em>in <u>any given case</u>, in order to give <em> <u>presumptive validity</u> </em>to its <em> <u>judgment</u></em>.  <em><strong><u>In re Heard’s Guardianship</u>, </strong>174 Miss. 37, 163, So. 685.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">The high Courts have further decreed, that Want of Jurisdiction makes <strong><em>“&#8230;all acts of judges, magistrates, U.S. Marshals, sheriffs, local police, all void and not just voidable</em></strong>.”  <em> <strong><u>Nestor  v.  Hershey</u></strong>,  425 F2d 504.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Void Judgment</u></strong> &#8211;  <strong><em>“One which has no legal force or effect, invality of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place directly or collaterally.   <u>Reynolds   v.</u><u>Volunteer State Life Ins. Co</u>., </em></strong><em>Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Voidable Judgment</u></strong> &#8211; “<strong><em>One apparently valid, but in truth wanting in some <u>material</u> respect.”  <u>City of Lufkin v. McVicker</u>, </em></strong><em>Tex.Civ.App., 510 S.W. 2d 141, 144.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><u>Property MUST be devoted / pledged to the public with your</u></strong><strong> <u>consent and being fully compensated for such</u></strong></span></h2>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;&#8230; In one of the so-called elevator cases, that of <em><strong><u>Munn </u><u>v. Illinois</u></strong>, </em><em>94 U. S. 113, [24 L. Ed. 77]</em>, it is said: &#8216;When, therefore, one <em>devotes his property </em>to a use in which the public have an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.&#8217;  <strong>But so long as he uses his property for private use, and in the absence of devoting it to public use, the public has no interest therein which entitles it to a voice in its control.  </strong>Other case to the same effect are <em><strong><u>Budd </u><u>v. New York</u></strong>, 143 U. S. 517, [36 L. Ed. 247, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468]; <strong> <u>Weems Steamboat Co. </u><u>v.</u></strong> <strong><u>Peo</u></strong><strong><u>p</u></strong><strong><u>le</u></strong><strong><u>&#8216;</u></strong><strong><u>s Co.</u></strong><strong><u>,</u></strong> 214 U. S. 345, [16 Ann. Cas. 1222, 53 L. Ed. 1024, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 661]; <strong> <u>Monongahela Nav. Co. </u><u>v. United States,</u> </strong>148 U. S. 336, [37 L. Ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622];</em> and <em><strong><u>Del Mar Water Co. </u><u>v.</u> <u>Eshleman</u><u>,</u> </strong>167 Cal. 666, [140 Pac. 591, 948]</em>.  Indeed, our attention is directed to no authority in this state or elsewhere holding otherwise.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Associated etc. Co. v. Railroad Commission </u> </strong>(1917) 176 Cal. 518, 526.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">&#8220;&#8230; That subjecting petitioners&#8217; property to the use of the public as common carriers constitutes a taking of the same, admits of no controversy.  <strong>&#8216;Whenever a law deprives the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his property, or imposes restraints upon such use and enjoyment that materially affect its value, without legal process or compensation, it deprives him of his property within the meaning of the constitution. &#8230; </strong>It is not necessary, in order to render the statute obnoxious to the restraints of the constitution, that it must in terms or effect authorize the actual physical taking of the property or the thing itself, so long as it affects its free use and enjoyment, or the power of disposition at the will of the owner.&#8217;  <em>(<strong><u>Forster </u><u>v.</u> <u>Scott</u></strong>,136 N. Y. 577, [18 L. R. A. 543, 32 N. E. 976];</em> <em><strong><u>Monongahela Nav.</u><u>Co. </u><u>v. United States,</u> </strong>148 U. S. 312, 336, [37 L. Ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622]</em>. &#8230; Mr. Lewis in his work on Eminent Domain, third edition, section 11, says: <strong>&#8216;A law which authorizes the taking of private property without compensation, &#8230; cannot be considered as due process of law in a free government.&#8217;  </strong><em>(<strong><u>C</u></strong><strong><u>hicago etc, R. R. Co. </u><u>v. Chicago</u></strong>, 166 </em><em>U. S. 226, [41 L. Ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581].&#8221; <strong><u>Associated Co.</u> <u>v. Railroad Commission</u> </strong>(1917) 176 Cal. 518, 528-530.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">It is <strong>beyond the power of a State by <u>legislation</u> fiat </strong>to convert property used exclusively in the business of a private carrier, into a public utility, or to make the owner a public carrier, for <strong>that would be taking private <u>property</u> for public use without just compensation which </strong><strong>n</strong><strong>o State can </strong>do consistently with the <u>due</u> <u>process</u> of law clause of the 14th Amendment.  (See <u>police</u> <u>power</u>) <em><strong><u>Producers Transportation Co. v. RR</u> <u>Commission</u></strong>, 251 U.S. 228, 230; <strong><u>Wolff Co. v. Duke</u></strong>, 266 U.S. 570, 578.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong><u>The binding shackles of Government is the Constitution, to wit:</u></strong></h2>
<p>If the <strong>state were to be given the power </strong>to <strong>destroy rights through </strong><strong>taxation</strong>, then the <strong>framers of our constitutions wrote said documents in vain</strong>. A <strong>republic </strong>is not an easy form of government to live under, and when the responsibility of citizenship is evaded, democracy decays and authoritarianism takes over.  <strong><u>Earl Warren</u></strong>, &#8220;A Republic, If You Can Keep It&#8221;, p 13.</p>
<p>It is a <strong>fundamental principle </strong>in our institutions, indispensable <strong>to the preservation of public <u>liberty</u>, </strong>that one of the <strong>separate departments of government shall not usurp powers committed by the <u>Constitution</u> to another department.  <em><u>Mugler v. Kansas</u></em></strong><em>, 123 U.S. 623, 662.</em></p>
<p><em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">An unconstitutional law is not a law, it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. <u>Norton vs. Shelby County</u>, 118 US 425.</span></strong></em></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">“Primacy of position in our state constitution is accorded the Declaration of Rights; thus emphasizing the importance of those basic and <strong>inalienable rights of personal liberty and private property </strong>which are thereby reserved and guaranteed to the people and <strong>protected from arbitrary invasion </strong>or impairment <strong>from any governmental quarter</strong>. The Declaration of Rights <strong>constitutes a limitation upon the powers of every department of the state government</strong>. <strong><em><u>State ex rel. Davis v.</u> <u>Stuart.</u> </em></strong>64 A.L.R. 1307, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>&#8220;The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state, or federal, or even from the Constitution. </strong>They exist inherently in every man, <strong>by endowment of the Creator, </strong>and are <strong>merely reaffirmed in the Constitution</strong>, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people&#8217;s rights are not derived from the government, but <strong>the government&#8217;s authority comes from the people. </strong>The Constitution but states again these <em>rights already existing, </em>and when legislative encroachment by the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and permanent rights, it is the <strong>duty of the courts </strong>to so declare, and <strong>to afford the necessary relief</strong>. <em><strong><u>City of Dallas, et al. v. Mitchell</u></strong>, 245 S. W. 944, 945-46 (1922).</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">The <span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>US Constitution</em></a></strong></span> is designated as a supreme enactment, a fundamental act of legislation by the people of the state.   <strong>The <a style="color: #ff00ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">constitution</span></a> is legislation direct from the people acting in their sovereign capacity, while a statute is legislation from their representatives, subject to limitations prescribed by the superior authority. <em><u>Ellingham v. Dye</u></em></strong><em>, 178 Ind.  336; NE 1; 231 U.S. 250; 58 L. Ed. 206; 34 S. Ct. 92; <strong> <u>Sage v. New </u></strong><strong><u>Y</u></strong><strong><u>o</u></strong><strong><u>r</u></strong><strong><u>k</u></strong><strong><u>,</u></strong> 154 NY 61; 47 NE 1096.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>&#8220;Owner has constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his property.&#8221; <em><u>Simpson v. Los Angeles</u> </em></strong><em>(1935), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another&#8221;. <em><strong><u>SIMMONS v US</u></strong>, supra.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>&#8220;When rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.&#8221;<em> <u>Miranda vs.</u> <u>Arizona,</u> 384 US 436 p. 491</em>.</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>&#8220;The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.&#8221;<em> <u>Miller v. U.S.</u> 230 F 2d 486, 489.</em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">History is clear that the first ten amendments to the <u>Constitution</u> were adopted to secure certain <u>common</u> <u>law</u> <u>rights</u> of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.&#8221;                                <em><strong><u>Bell v. Hood</u></strong>, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. &#8212; So. Dist. CA.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of cardinal <u>constitutional</u> guarantee. <em> <strong><u>Riley v. Certer</u></strong>, 165 Okal. 262; 25 P.2d 666; 79 ALR 1018.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>When any <u>court</u> violates the clean and unambiguous language of the <em><u>Constitution</u></em>, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it. <em>(See 16 Ma. Jur. 2d 177, 178) <u>State v. Sutton</u>, 63 Minn. 147, 65 NW 262, 30 L.R.A. 630 Am. 459.</em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;The &#8216;liberty&#8217; guaranteed by the constitution must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiar and known to the framers of the constitution. This liberty denotes the right of the individual to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to locomote, and generally enjoy those rights long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Myer v. Nebraska</u></strong>, 262 U .S. 390, 399; <strong><u>United</u> <u>States v. Kim Ark</u></strong>, 169 U.S. 649, 654.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Norton vs. Shelby County</u></strong>, 118 US 425 p. 442. </em> &#8220;The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>&#8220;No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.&#8221;  <u>16 Am Jur 2nd</u>, Sec 177 late 2d, Sec 256.</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>All <u>laws</u> which are repugnant to the <u>Constitution</u> are null and void. Chief Justice Marshall, <em><u>Marbury vs Madison</u>, 5, U.S. (Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803).</em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">It cannot be assumed that the framers of the <u>constitution</u> and the <u>people</u> who adopted it, did not intend that which is the plain import of the language used.   When the language of the constitution is positive and free of all ambiguity, all courts are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid the hardships of particular cases.  We must accept the constitution as it reads when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign power. <em> <strong><u>Cook vs Iverson</u></strong>, 122, N.M. 251.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;<strong>Right of protecting property</strong>, declared inalienable by constitution, is <strong>not mere right to protect it by individual force, but right to protect it by law of land</strong>, and force of body politic.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Billings v.</u> <u>Hall</u> </strong>(1857), 7 C. 1.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;Constitution of this state declares, <strong>among inalienable rights </strong>of each citizen, that of <strong>acquiring, possessing and protecting property</strong>.  This is one of primary objects of government, is guaranteed by constitution, and cannot be impaired by legislation.&#8221;  <em><strong><u>Billings v. </u></strong><strong><u>Hall</u></strong><strong> </strong>(1857), 7 C. 1.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong><u>State Constitution &#8211;</u></strong> “The state constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives.  Not one of them has a right to ignore or disregard these mandates&#8230;”  <em><strong><u>John</u> <u>F. Jelko Co. vs. Emery</u></strong><u>,</u> 193 Wisc. 311;  214 N.W. 369, 53 A.L.R., 463;  <strong> <u>Lemon vs. Langlin</u></strong>, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464.</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong><em><u>The People are the Sovereign!</u></em></strong></h2>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong><u>P</u></strong><strong><u>e</u></strong><strong><u>o</u></strong><strong><u>p</u></strong><strong><u>l</u></strong><strong><u>e</u></strong> <strong>a</strong><strong>r</strong><strong>e supreme, not the state.  <em><u>Waring vs. the Mayor of Savannah</u></em></strong><em>, 60 Georgia at 93.</em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">The <strong>people of the State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them</strong>.  The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. (<strong>Added <em>Stats. 1953, c. 1588, p.3270, </em></strong><em><strong>sec. 1.)</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">The <strong>people are the recognized source of all authority</strong>, state or municipal, and to this authority it must come at last, whether immediately or by circuitous route. <em><strong><u>Barnes v. District of Columbia</u></strong>, 91 U.S. 540, 545 [23: 440, 441]. p 234.</em></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">“the government is but an agency to the state,” &#8212; the state being the sovereign people.      <em><u>State v. Chase</u></em>, 175 Minn, 259, 220 N.W. 951, 953.</span></strong></p>
<p><u>S</u><u>o</u><u>v</u><u>e</u><u>r</u><u>e</u><u>i</u><u>gn</u><u>t</u><u>y</u> itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.  And the law is the definition and limitation of power.</p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;&#8230;The Congress cannot revoke the Sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.&#8221; <em> <strong><u>Perry v. United States</u></strong>, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).</em></span> &#8220;The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity is one of the Common-Law immunities and defenses that are available to the Sovereign&#8230;&#8221; Citizen of Minnesota. <em><strong><u>Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,</u> </strong>(1988) 491 U.S. 58, 105 L.Ed. 2d. 45, 109 S.Ct. 2304</em>. <span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;The people of the state, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the king by his own prerogative.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Lansing v. Smith,</u> </strong>(1829) 4 Wendell 9, (NY).</em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong><u>Private Corporate State / Municipality Policy Enforcement Officer<br />
</u></strong><strong><u>  a.k.a Police Officer Duties and limitations of power</u></strong></span></h1>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>&#8220;Nothing is gained in the argument by calling it ‘police power.’” <em><u>Henderson </u></em><u>v. <em>City of New York</em></u><em>, </em>92 U.S. 259, 2771 (1875); <em><u>Nebbia </u></em><u>v. <em>New</em></u><em> <u>York</u></em><em>, </em>291 U.S. 501 (1934).</strong></span></p>
<h3><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government.&#8221; </span></strong><span style="color: #339966;"><em><strong><u>Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart</u>, 284 F.Supp. 94.</strong></em></span></h3>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>F</strong><strong>a</strong><strong>i</strong><strong>l</strong><strong>u</strong><strong>r</strong><strong>e to obey the command of a police <u>officer</u> </strong>constitutes a traditional form of breach of the peace.  Obviously, however, <strong>one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that </strong><strong>c</strong><strong>o</strong><strong>m</strong><strong>m</strong><strong>a</strong><strong>n</strong><strong>d is itself violative of the <u>constitution</u>. <em> <u>Wright v. Georgia</u></em></strong><em>, 373 U.S. 284, 291-2.</em></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">That an <u>officer</u> or employee of a state or one of its subdivisions is deemed to be acting under &#8220;color of law&#8221; as to those deprivations of right committed in the fulfillment of the tasks and obligations assigned to him.<em> <u>Monroe v. Page</u>, 1961, 365 U.S. 167.  </em>       (<u>Civil</u> <u>law</u>)</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>Actions by state <u>officers</u> and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority, can be actions under &#8220;color of law.&#8221;    <em><u>Stringer v.</u> <u>Dilger</u>, 1963, Ca. 10 Colo., 313 F.2d 536. </em> (<u>C</u><u>ivil</u> <u>law</u>)</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>&#8220;The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution.&#8221; <em><u>Bacahanan vs. Wanley</u>, 245 US 60;  <u>Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission</u>, 294 US 613.</em></strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong> <em> Section 242</em> of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.</strong> <strong>For the purpose of <em>Section 242,</em> acts under<em> &#8220;color of law&#8221;</em></strong> <strong>include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official&#8217;s lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties.</strong> <strong>Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include <span style="color: #ff0000;"><em>police officers</em>,</span></strong> prisons guards <strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">and other law enforcement officials,</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities,</span></em></strong> and others who are acting as public officials. <strong>It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim.</strong></span></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><strong>* NO ID . ID requirments &#8211; no crime no need, innocent free man</strong></h3>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.&#8221;<em> <u>Donnolly vs.</u> <u>Union Sewer Pipe Co</u>., 184 US 540; <u>Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co.</u>, 24 A. 848; <u>O&#8217;Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co.,</u> 108 A. 887.</em></span></strong></p>
<p>When <strong>officers detained </strong>appellant for the <strong>purpose of requiring him to identify himself</strong>, they performed a <strong><u>seizure</u> of his person </strong>subject to the requirements of the <strong><u>Fourth Amendment</u></strong>&#8230; The Fourth Amendment, of course, applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest&#8230; <strong>Whenever a </strong><strong>p</strong><strong>o</strong><strong>l</strong><strong>i</strong><strong>c</strong><strong>e officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has &#8216;seized&#8217; that person</strong>, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be &#8216;reasonable&#8217;.  <strong>*  </strong>&#8220;But even <strong>assuming </strong>that <strong>purpose </strong>(prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in <strong>criminal activity</strong>, the guarantees of the <strong><u>Fourth Amendment</u> </strong>do not allow it.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;<strong>T</strong><strong>h</strong><strong>e application of&#8230;(a code)&#8230;to detain appellant and require him to identify himself </strong>violated the <strong><u>Fourth Amendment</u> </strong>because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged, or had engaged, in <strong>criminal conduct</strong>.   Accordingly, appellant <strong>may not be</strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>NO ID &#8211; P</strong><strong>u</strong><strong>n</strong><strong>i</strong><strong>s</strong><strong>h</strong><strong>e</strong><strong>d for refusing to identify himself</strong>, and the conviction is reversed.&#8221; </span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>(<u>Probable</u> <u>cause</u>)</strong></span>  <span style="color: #008000;"><em><strong><u>Brown v. Texas</u></strong>, 443 U.S. 47, (1979)</em></span></p>
<h3><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>* </strong>&#8220;<strong>Traffic infractions are not a crime</strong>.&#8221; <strong><u>People v. Battle</u></strong></span></h3>
<p>&#8220;To this end, the <strong><u>Fourth Amendment</u> </strong>requires that a <strong>seizure must be based on specific objective facts indicating that society&#8217;s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, </strong>or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1><strong><u>Government / Public Servants / Officers / Judges Not Immune from suit!</u></strong></h1>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;The officers of the law, in the execution of process, <span style="color: #ff0000;">are required to know the requirements of the law</span>, and<span style="color: #ff0000;"> if they mistake them, whether through ignorance or design</span>, and <span style="color: #ff0000;">anyone</span> is <span style="color: #ff0000;">harmed</span> by <span style="color: #ff0000;">their</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">error</span>, they <span style="color: #ff0000;">must respond</span> in <span style="color: #ff0000;">damages.</span>&#8221; <em><u>Roger v. Marshall</u> (United States use of Rogers v. Conklin), 1 Wall. (US) 644, 17 Led 714.</em></span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;It is a general rule that an officer, executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise, who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction, and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.&#8221;  <u>Cooper</u> <u>v. O`Conner</u>, 69 App DC 100, 99 F (2d)</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>&#8220;Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights.      <em>&#8220;<u>AFLCIO v.</u> <u>Woodard</u>, 406 F 2d 137 t.</em></strong></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people.&#8221;   (<u>Civil</u> <u>Rights</u>) <em><u>Rabon vs Rowen Memorial</u> <u>Hospital, Inc.</u> 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.</em></span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><em><strong><u>Government Immunity</u></strong> &#8211; “In <strong> <u>Land  v.  Dollar</u></strong>, 338 US 731 (1947)</em>, the court noted, <strong>“that when the government entered into a commercial field of activity, it left immunity behind.”  <em><u>Brady  v.  Roosevelt</u></em></strong><em>, 317 US 575 (1943); <strong> <u>FHA  v.  Burr</u></strong>, 309 US 242 (1940); <strong> <u>Kiefer  v.  RFC</u></strong>, 306 US 381 (1939).</em></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The high Courts, through their citations of authority, have frequently declared,  that  “&#8230;where  any  state  proceeds  against  a  <u>private</u> <u>individual</u> in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by <u>direct</u> or <u>collateral</u> means regarding the matters involved.”  <em><u>Luckenback v. The Thekla</u>, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; <u>Lyders v. Lund</u>, 32 F2d 308;</em></span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">“When  <u>enforcing mere statutes</u>, judges of <u>all</u> courts <u>do not act</u> <u>judicially</u> (and thus are <u>not protected</u> by “<u>qualified</u>” or “<u>limited</u> <u>immunity</u>,” &#8211; SEE:<em> <u>Owen v. City</u>, 445 U.S. 662;  <u>Bothke  v.  Terry</u>, 713 </em></span></strong><em><span style="color: #ff00ff;">F2d 1404) </span></em></p>
<p>&#8211; &#8211; <strong>“but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved  agency  &#8212;  but  <u>only  in  a  “ministerial</u>”  and  <u>not  a</u> <u>“discretionary capacity</u></strong>&#8230;”  <em><strong><u>Thompson  v.  Smith</u></strong>, 154 S.E. 579, 583<strong>; <u>Keller v. P.E.</u></strong>, 261 US 428<strong>; <u>F.R.C. v. G.E.</u></strong>, 281, U.S. 464.</em></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/thompson-v-clark-364-f-supp-3d-178/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Thompson v. Clark 2022</a> Holding: Larry Thompson&#8217;s showing that his criminal prosecution ended without a conviction satisfies the requirement to demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution in a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution; an affirmative indication of innocence is not needed.</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>Immunity for <u>judges</u> does not extend to acts which are clearly outside of their jurisdiction.  <u>Bauers v. Heisel,</u> </strong><em>C.A. N.J. 1966, 361 F.2d 581, Cert. Den. 87 S.Ct. 1367, 386 U.S. 1021, 18 L.Ed. 2d 457 (see also <u>Muller v. Wachtel</u>, D.C.N.Y. 1972, 345 F.Supp. 160;  <u>Rhodes v. Houston</u>, D.C. Nebr. 1962, 202 F.Supp. 624 affirmed 309 F.2d 959, Cert. den 83 St. 724, 372 U.S. 909, 9 L.Ed. 719, Cert. Den 83 S.Ct. 1282, 383 U.S. 971, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 311, Motion denied 285 F.Supp. 546).</em></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held liable for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney&#8217;s fees.&#8221; <u>Lezama v. Justice Court</u>, A025829.</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;The<strong> immunity of judges for acts within their judicial role</strong> is beyond cavil.&#8221; <em><strong><u>Pierson v. Ray</u></strong>, 386 U.S. 547 (1957).</em> Keyword within their role, outside of that role they are not.</span></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity bar to such relief, and in situations where in their judgment an injunction against a judicial officer is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner&#8217;s constitutional rights, courts will grant that relief. </span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;There is no common law judicial immunity.&#8221; <em><u>Pulliam v. Allen</u>, 104S.Ct. 1970; cited in <u>Lezama v. Justice Court</u>, A025829.</em></span></strong></p>
<p>&#8220;<u>J</u><u>u</u><u>d</u><u>g</u><u>e</u><u>s</u>, members of city council, and police <u>officers</u> as well as other public officials, may utilize good faith defense of action for damages under 42-1983, <strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">but no public official has absolute immunity from suit under the 1871 civil rights statute.&#8221; <em>(<u>Samuel vs University of</u> <u>Pittsburg</u>, 375 F.Supp. 1119, &#8216;see also, <u>White vs Fleming</u> 374 Supp. 267.)</em></span></strong></p>
<p><strong>42 U.S. Code § 1983 &#8211; Civil action for deprivation of rights &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/42-us-code-1983-civil-action-for-deprivation-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">read here</a></span></strong></p>
<p><strong>9.3 </strong><strong>Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant in Individual Capacity </strong><strong>—</strong>Elements and Burden of Proof &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/9-3-section-1983-claim-against-defendant-in-individual-capacity-elements-and-burden-of-proof/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><strong>click here</strong></em></a> </span>to learn requirements</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><strong>California Civil Code Section 52.1 &#8211; </strong><strong>Interference by threat, intimidation or coercion with exercise or enjoyment of individual rights <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-civil-code-section-52-1/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">read here</a></span></strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong><u>TAKE DUE NOTICE ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, SERVANTS, JUDGES,</u></strong><strong> <u>LAYERS, CLERKS, EMPLOYEES:</u></strong></h2>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law.&#8221;   <u>In re McCowan</u> <em>(1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.</em></span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;All are presumed to know the law.&#8221; <em> <u>San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel</u> (1882), 62 C. 641; <u>Dore v. Southern Pacific Co.</u> (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; <u>People v. Flanagan</u> (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; <u>Lincoln v. Superior Court</u> (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107;  <u>San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard</u> (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 36</em>8.</span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one.&#8221;  <em><u>Daniels v. Dean</u> (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.</em></span></strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong><u>Jurisdiction challenged to all, at any and all times</u></strong></h2>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;Judge acted in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of (personal) jurisdiction would be liable.&#8221;<em> <u>Dykes v. Hosemann</u>, 743 F.2d 1488 (1984).</em>  </span></strong><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8220;In such case the judge has lost his judicial function, has become a mere private person, and is liable as a trespasser for damages resulting from his unauthorized acts.&#8221;</span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8220;Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the <em>Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; </em><br />
<em>also <u>Bradley v. Fisher</u>, 13 Wall 335,351.&#8221; <u>Manning v. </u><u>Ketcham</u>, 58 F.2d 948.</em></span></strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>&#8220;A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority and for the exercise of </strong></span><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, </strong></span><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>no excuse is permissible.&#8221; <em><u>Bradley v.Fisher,</u>13 Wall 335, 351, 352.</em></strong></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong><u>AT LAST</u></strong></h2>
<p><span style="color: #008000;">“But, in fact and in law, such <strong>statutes </strong>are intended <strong>to be applied </strong>to those who are <strong>here as &#8220;residents&#8221; in this State </strong>under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution and the so- called Fourteenth Amendment.”  <em><strong><u>United States v United Mine Workers of</u><u>America</u>, </strong>(1947) 67 S.Ct. 677, 686, 330 U.S. 258.</em></span></p>
<p><strong>Notice to all whom these presents may come:</strong></p>
<p><strong>“If I am here at all I am so as a man; I am NOT here as a <u>resident</u> </strong>of any State (Nation), <strong>nor am I of or “<u>in this state</u>”, </strong>nor am I a [statutory] &#8220;citizen of the United States&#8221; (in Congress assembled) as <strong>ALL </strong>are fictions/creations of government and therefore and as such no statutes apply to Me as evidenced in above cases. I am a Creature of Nature (the Creator) and therefore I am a transient foreigner by Nature while traveling through Life I am here as a <strong>in intinere</strong>, as a neutral, for a short time, on my way to the greater beyond, a steward of my father’s land and wishes. My documents of <strong>“</strong><strong>in intinere</strong><strong>” </strong>standing are recorded for all to see.” See: <strong> <em><u>Dred Scott v. Sanford</u></em></strong><em>, 60 US (19 How.) 393, 595 (1857) Justice Curtis, S.Ct.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1><strong><u>Notice of Full Faith and Credit</u></strong></h1>
<p>We understand America has gone into LEFT FIELD&#8230;. DON&#8217;T WORRY the RIGHT WAY&#8230;. WILL ALWAY BE RIGHT NEVER WRONG, AND WE KEEP A COPY OF THE CONSTITUION IN CASE SOMEONE NEEDS TO SEE THE RIGHT WAY OUR FOREFATHERS SET FORTH TO ENSURE YOU WOULD HAVE RIGHTS, ITS OUR DUTY AS CITIZENS TO STUDY OUR LAWS AND REBUKE THE ONES THAT GO AGAINST GOD OR THE CONSTITUTION  <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">click here</a> to read the whole <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US Constitution</a> with the <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bill of Rights</a>  all the <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">amendments</a> to the <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US constitution</a> are listed <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-us-constitution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a></p>
<p><span style="color: #ff00ff;">The <u>laws</u> of nature are the <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong>laws of God</strong></em></span>, whose authority can be <span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>superseded by no power on earth</strong></span>.  A <strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him</span> </strong>from whose punishments they cannot protect us.  <strong>All human constitutions </strong>which <strong>contradict his cannot protect us</strong>.  All human constitutions which contradict his (God&#8217;s) laws, <strong>we are in conscience bound to disobey</strong>.  <em>1772, <a style="color: #ff00ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/robin-v-hardaway/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><u>Robin v. Hardaway</u></strong></a>, 1 Jefferson 109. </em></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790. </strong></span><em><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Biblical Law at &#8220;Common Law&#8221; supersedes all laws, and &#8220;Christianity is custom, custom is Law.&#8221;</span></strong></em></p>
<p><b style="color: #ff0000;">(I, Me, Myself am a “state”, with standing, standing in “original jurisdiction” know as the common law, Gods Law, a neutral traveling in </b><span style="color: #ff0000;"><b>itinerary</b></span><b style="color: #ff0000;">, demanding all of my rights under God’s Natural Law, recorded in part in the Bible<span style="color: #ff0000;">, </span><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">which law is recognized in</span><em> US Public Law 97-280</em> as “the word of God and all men are admonished to learn and apply it” so I demand anyone and everyone to notice God’s Laws, which are My Makers Laws and therefore My Laws!)</span></b></p>
<ul>
<li><strong><em>– Article 1 of the Bill of Rights – guarantees freedom of religion-</em><br />
</strong>Constitution for the United States of America <em>ARTICLE IV, sect. 1</em>, Full faith and credit among states. (Self-executing constitutional provisions) Section 1.  Full faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state.</li>
</ul>
<p>And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.</p>
<p><strong>Note: </strong>Emphasis added to cites, mine!</p>
<p>cited <a href="https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Freedom/Rights/Travel/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Freedom/Rights/Travel/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile1.pdf</a> or <strong>download it <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a></em></span></strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> THE FOLLOWING PAGE BELOW ALSO HAVE A PLETHORA OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">ON THIS GOD GIVEN RIGHTS, SEARCH AND PROPERTY RIGHTS BELOW</span></h1>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/statutes-attempting-to-sell-the-statute-part-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Statutes (Attempting To Sell The Statute) part 2</a></strong></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/scotus-around-robin-v-hardaway/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790</strong></span></a></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>cited <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile1.pdf</a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>Traveling but lost your Valid License?</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/traveling-but-lost-your-valid-license/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Corruption Over the Years]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Laws]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[no license]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[No License to Drive]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=3037</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[License Not Legally Required to be on your person to Travel  but you are required in all 50 states to have a valid one. So you may say this sounds backwards&#8230;. You need to have a valid license in the US to drive in the US. That said you may have lost you Driver&#8217;s License [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>License Not Legally Required to be on your person to Travel </strong></h1>
<p>but you are required in all 50 states to have a valid one. So you may say this sounds backwards&#8230;.</p>
<p>You need to have a valid license in the US to drive in the US. That said you may have lost you Driver&#8217;s License but still it is Valid. You may not want to operate like a shady shit criminal and not have any ID, so you grab your trusty Passport.  Your passport legally identifies you with all the same attributes as a Driver&#8217;s License, including a photo, used to identify whom you are.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Now the clincher is, YOU MUST KNOW YOUR DRIVER&#8217;S LICENSE NUMBER. This way the officer uses your Passport to identify who you are as a person. Than he looks up your state Driver&#8217;s License, He compares whom you say you, comparing attributes and photo. His online version of your ID also has a photo to help him.  He should say you are free to go.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>If you DO NOT HAVE A VALID LICENSE then this is a lot more difficult, because cops don&#8217;t read well and don&#8217;t know much in life. Many lower court judge&#8217;s are beyond lazy, but if you want an awesome ruling for those Judge&#8217;s out there still upholding law and basing their decisions off of caselaw that has covered this area then one may want to peruse:<br />
<a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/campbell-v-walker-right-to-use-of-highway/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">CAMPBELL V WALKER, 78, Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del) 41</span></strong></a> &#8211; &#8220;The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,  *** a traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle&#8221;</p>
<p>you still need to be a legal citizen, and if you get a ticket anyway you can address the judge with the facts.  You are a good citizen whom lost or misplaced his Driver&#8217;s License, or turned it in and don&#8217;t use it anymore because its not in a commercial capacity.  You have a valid license which you gave the officer.  You also provided the officer with extra verification of which was your passport, just to be a good citizen <span style="color: #008000;">(as he can see your photo with a Driver&#8217;s License Lookup) </span></p>
<p>Ticket should be dismissed in the interest of Justice</p>
<p class="site-title"><a href="https://okassembly.org/" rel="home">The Oklahoma Assembly</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="site-description"> De Jure Republic on the Land &amp; Soil</p>
<header class="entry-header">
<h1 class="entry-title">72 Hour Right of Rescission</h1>
</header>
<div class="entry-content">
<p>After you have recorded your Certificate of Assumed Name and Deed of Reconveyance (and the other 928’s) and mailed your letters to the US Secretary of State and the Oklahoma Secretary of State, you are now on the public record as a living American State National; heir to the American estate. After at least 21 days on the public record without being rebutted, the matter is considered “settled”. You are no longer a federally enfranchised “U.S. Citizen”, or “Citizen of the United States”, and you are no longer a fictional, legally dead entity or person.</p>
<p>And therefore: statutes, ordinances and House bills, written by the State of Oklahoma or your local county government (all incorporated entities which have Dunn &amp; Bradstreet numbers), do not apply to you, the Oklahoma State National.</p>
<p>However, the State Highway Patrol or the incorporated Sherriff’s department or the City of ____ Police Department (also all incorporated entities with their own D&amp;B numbers) will attempt to address you by the LEGAL VESSEL which was (fraudulently) created in your name. These corporations do this because it is not lawful for a corporation to “achieve parity” with a living man or woman. Only corporations can engage in commerce with other corporations or legal persons, and so these federally enfranchised “law enforcement” corporations are addressing your VESSEL.</p>
<p>So what’s a State National to do when a “policy officer” pulls them over and <strong>presumes</strong> they are “driving” their “motor vehicle” in commerce, and writes their VESSEL a citation for a statute that does not apply to a living man or woman?</p>
<p>Before any of this happens, understand the difference between:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Driving</strong> a <strong>motor vehicle</strong> in <strong>commerce</strong>, as a <strong>commercial driver</strong>,</li>
<li><strong>Traveling</strong> in <strong>private</strong> in your <strong>automobile</strong>.</li>
</ol>
<p>If you are driving while on the clock, or driving a company vehicle, or driving a commercial vehicle, and especially if you hand him your Drivers License, then this is considered to be “in commerce”. If you are traveling to the store, to a friend’s house, on vacation, on the weekend, on break, off the clock, traveling in your own private automobile, not for hire – you get the idea – then <strong>you are traveling in your private capacity</strong>.</p>
<p><span style="color: #ff0000;">The key concept here is the</span> <a href="https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/tacit" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">“tacit agreement”</a>. If you do not object to any presumption and hand the officer your driver’s license, the officer is free to <strong>presume</strong> your <strong>tacit agreement</strong> that you are operating or <strong>driving</strong> a <strong>motor vehicle</strong> in <strong>commerce</strong>. <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">If instead you state clearly and politely that you are traveling in private in your automobile, and you hand him your <span style="color: #0000ff;">passport</span>, then you have overtly communicated to him that you are operating in your private capacity, and no tacit agreement can be presumed otherwise.</span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Unless you are driving a commercial vehicle, or on the clock, or making your living as a commercial driver, then always give him your passport.</span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #008000;">First, stand firmly on your rights, but be polite and cordial.</span></strong> Police officers are doing their jobs, and their incorporated employers may not have educated them properly about the status of the State National. Even if they were open to being educated on the subject, just remember how long it took your friends and family to understand the State National status. A 5 minute traffic stop may not be enough time to educate someone.</p>
<p>The officer may still not understand what you are talking about, and may write you a ticket anyway. He may also attempt to coerce you into signing the ticket, telling you that you can sign the ticket or else go to jail (this is threat, duress and coercion). Here is what you can do:</p>
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote"><p>First, you can sign the signature box with your name, and include TDC at the end, which means it was “signed under <strong>Threat</strong>, <strong>Duress</strong> or <strong>Coercion</strong>“. This is another way of rebutting the presumption that this contract was entered into with your “free and genuine consent”.</p>
<p>If there’s room, you could also add this after your name “all rights reserved, without prejudice”.</p></blockquote>
<p>However you sign it: <strong>after receiving the citation, you have 72 business hours to rescind it. </strong>This can be clearly done by stating you do not accept their offer to contract. With a <strong>red marker/sharpie</strong>, write legibly diagonally across the ticket with the following:</p>
<div class="wp-block-media-text alignwide has-media-on-the-right is-stacked-on-mobile">

<div class="wp-block-media-text__content">
<p>” <strong>72 hr. Right of Rescission – Your offer to contract is NOT accepted while traveling in private. I provided a passport not a license. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/242" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">USC Title 18, Section 242</a> x_______________________________ </strong>“</p>
<p>Sign on the bottom line, and either mail this into the police department issuing you the citation, or if possible, drop it off in person.</p>
<p>You could also create a custom rubber red-ink stamp to say the same thing with a sharper image and more “official punch”, and autograph it with wet-ink in blue, but the message is the same.</p>
<p>You may get notices in the mail from the police department either rejecting your right to rescission, or a demand that you appear in court, or pay the fine. Do the same thing with these notices, write the same statement above in a red marker/sharpie, refusing their contract.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>And while you’re at it, send your response to the police department with a cover letter by Registered Mail, with Green Return Receipt. And when you receive the Return Receipt, attach it (super glue on top edge) to a Certified Proof of Service, and record it with your County Clerk Land Records office along with a copy of your Cover Letter and photo copy of the canceled contract.</p>
</div>
<p>This Oklahoma site points out FEDERAL LAW that allows this to take place <a href="https://okassembly.org/?page_id=308" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://okassembly.org/?page_id=308</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1>“Driving for Opportunity Act of 2021”.</h1>
<div class="main-wrapper">
<h2 class="primary">H.R.2453 — 117th Congress (2021-2022)<small class="right"><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2453/all-info">All Information</a> (Except Text)<br />
</small></h2>
<p>This bill authorizes the Department of Justice to make grants to states that do not suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew a driver&#8217;s license of an individual based on such individual&#8217;s failure to pay a civil or criminal fine or fee.</p>
<p>Grants shall be awarded to (1) cover the costs incurred by a state to reinstate driver&#8217;s licenses previously suspended <mark class="searchterm-highlight" data-markjs="true">for</mark> unpaid fines and fees; (2) maximize the number of individuals with suspended driver&#8217;s licenses eligible to have <mark class="searchterm-highlight" data-markjs="true">driving</mark> privileges reinstated or regained; (3) provide assistance to individuals living in areas where public transportation options are limited; and (4) ease the burden on states where the state or local law that permitted the suspension or revocation of, or refusal to renew, driver&#8217;s licenses or the registration of a motor vehicle based on the failure to pay civil or criminal fines or fees was in effect during the three year period ending on the date on which a state applies <mark class="searchterm-highlight" data-markjs="true">for</mark> or receives a grant under this bill.</p>
<p>The Government Accountability Office must study the implementation of the grant program authorized by this bill, including the known effects of repealing state laws that have permitted the suspension, revocation, or refusal of a driver&#8217;s license or motor vehicle registration based on the failure to pay civil or criminal fines or fees.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> THE FOLLOWING PAGE BELOW ALSO HAVE A PLETHORA OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">ON THIS GOD GIVEN RIGHTS, SEARCH AND PROPERTY RIGHTS BELOW</span></h1>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/statutes-attempting-to-sell-the-statute-part-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Statutes (Attempting To Sell The Statute) part 2</a></strong></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/no-law-requires-you-to-record-pledge-your-private-automobile/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile</a></strong></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/scotus-around-robin-v-hardaway/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong>Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790</strong></span></a></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<h2 class="primary"></h2>
</div>
<div>cited <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/998/text" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/998/text</a></div>
<div>cited <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2453?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22driving+for+opportunity+act%22%7D#:~:text=Introduced%20in%20House%20(04%2F12%2F2021)&amp;text=This%20bill%20authorizes%20the%20Department,or%20criminal%20fine%20or%20fee." target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/bill%20authorizes%20the%20Department,or%20criminal%20fine%20or%20fee.</a></div>
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