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The City Put It in Writing: It Had No Consent. Six Days Later, Its Inspectors Were Inside the Building.

The Truth News — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 18:34:45 +0000

Investigation · Government Accountability

The City Put It in Writing: It Had No Consent. Six Days Later, Its Inspectors Were Inside the Building.

West Hollywood recorded a property owner’s request as a “denial” of entry — words he never said — then went silent, entered his building through an arrangement with a tenant, and told no one. The owner learned of it 27 days later, from a letter written by the City’s outside counsel.

By M. Reynolds · Good Shepherd Media
West Hollywood, Calif.

In our earlier reporting, West Hollywood’s answer to a documented water-intrusion complaint was to schedule an inspection of the complainant’s building while leaving the source next door unopened. What the City did next, its own correspondence now shows, went further: it entered the complainant’s building anyway — after putting in writing that it understood it had no consent from the owner to do so.

A “Denial” the Owner Never Made

In late August, the owner — referred to here as Mr. Zullo — responded to the City’s scheduling emails with a voice message. According to the owner, and consistent with the written record around it, the message did not refuse an inspection. It set an order of operations: inspect the offending property next door first — the one his written demand had identified as the source — then contact him that same day to meet and inspect his building together.

Assistant City Manager Steve Campbell’s written reply, on August 26, recorded something else entirely. He wrote that he was “interpreting [the] voice message as a denial” of access, and that the City “will render findings absent such inspection.” A sequencing request became, in the City’s file, a refusal.

Whatever one makes of that characterization, note what it establishes: as of August 26, 2026, the City’s own position, in its own writing, was that it did not have the owner’s consent to enter 7513 Santa Monica Boulevard.

Then Silence — Then an Entry Nobody Mentioned

After August 26, the record reviewed by this newspaper shows no further communication from the City to the owner about entering his property. No corrected understanding. No new proposed date. No answer to the owner’s offer to meet the same day the source was inspected. Having been told — wrongly, he says — that he had “denied” entry, and hearing nothing further, the owner had no reason to expect City staff to appear at his building at all.

They appeared anyway. According to the September 29, 2026 letter from the City’s outside counsel, City staff entered and inspected 7513 Santa Monica Boulevard on September 2, 2026 — by arrangement with a tenant. Not with the owner. Not with notice to the owner. The owner of record learned his building had been entered 27 days after the fact, from the City’s lawyer. The City’s September 4 and September 18 records-production letters, sent after the entry, had not mentioned it.

On August 26 the City wrote that it had no consent. On September 2 it was inside the building. In between, it said nothing to the man who owns it.

What a Tenant Can — and Cannot — Open the Door To

A tenant’s consent is real, but it is bounded: it reaches the premises that tenant leases and controls. It does not reach the building’s owner-controlled portions — common areas, exterior and shared walls, the roof, utility areas — which is precisely where a water-intrusion inspection looks. The building at 7513 also includes an attached residential dwelling, where the law of entry is at its strictest. The U.S. Supreme Court held nearly sixty years ago that even routine administrative code inspections are searches, and absent consent they require a warrant (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523). California gives agencies the tool for exactly this situation: an inspection warrant under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1822.50–1822.57. The City did not seek one.

The owner has now lodged a formal objection with the City, contending the September 2 entry was a trespass and an unconstitutional warrantless search — consent-less under the City’s own August 26 account — in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and he has formally revoked consent to any future entry outside a tenant’s own leasehold absent his written consent, an inspection warrant, or a genuine emergency. Those are the owner’s contentions, now in the City’s hands in writing; a separate complaint is before the City Manager. What is not contention but documented fact is the sequence: a written “no consent” on August 26, an entry on September 2, and an owner told nothing until September 29.

The Dry-Season Finding That Answers Nothing

And what did the City bring back from the building it entered without the owner? Its counsel’s letter reports that inspections on August 13 and September 2 found “no evidence of a water leak.”

Good Shepherd Media has reviewed the owner’s correspondence with the City. In none of it does he claim a permanent, always-on leak. From his first written demand, the complaint has been the same: rainwater intrusion during rain events, recurring every rainy season since the neighbor’s City-permitted remodel — multiple documented events across multiple years, supported by video of running water previously sent to the City, and by the City’s own 2017 inspection photograph showing water staining inside the bar next door, on the far side of the very wall at issue. Checking that wall for an “active leak” in mid-August and early September — the driest weeks of the Los Angeles calendar — and reporting none is not a finding. It is an answer to a complaint no one made. The owner’s standing request — a joint inspection during or immediately after the first rain, when the condition demonstrates itself — remains open and unaccepted. And that is the ledger to keep in view: the problem is still open, the wall is still unabated, the rainy season is coming — and the file of demands, notices, productions, and lawyers’ letters that now surrounds it was generated not by the complaint, which has never changed, but by the City’s answers to it.

The City’s Position

The City’s September 29, 2026 letter, from its outside counsel, states that staff inspected both properties in August and September, found no evidence of an active water leak, and that a tenant arranged the September 2 access to 7513. The letter does not state that the owner was notified of the entry before or after it occurred, does not identify who entered or what was inspected or photographed, and the records of both inspections had not, as of this writing, been produced in response to the pending public-records requests that squarely cover them. Good Shepherd Media previously invited the City’s comment on this matter in writing on August 27, 2026, with a response deadline of September 5, 2026. No response of any kind was received — not by the deadline, and not since. Ahead of this report, Good Shepherd Media has again invited comment from the City, Mayor John Heilman, Assistant City Manager Steve Campbell, City Manager Jackie Rocco, and the City’s outside counsel, and will update this report with any substantive response.

Five Questions West Hollywood Must Answer

1. On August 26 the City recorded, in writing, that it lacked the owner’s consent to enter 7513. On what legal authority did its staff enter that building on September 2 — without the owner’s knowledge, without a warrant, and without ever contacting him again?

2. Who entered, which parts of the building did they enter or photograph, and did any of it extend beyond the consenting tenant’s own leased premises — or into the attached dwelling?

3. Why was the owner told nothing for 27 days — and then only in a letter from outside counsel?

4. Why does the City characterize a dry-season “no active leak” check as responsive to a complaint that has always, in writing, described rain-event intrusion recurring every rainy season since the remodel next door?

5. Will the City accept the owner’s standing offer of a joint inspection at the first rain event — and produce the complete records of the August 13 and September 2 inspections, which remain unproduced under the pending Public Records Act requests?

6. Finally, for completeness: our reporting notes that a Government Claims Act claim concerning the water intrusion is on file with the City Clerk, and that under California law an unabated continuing condition exposes a public entity to inverse condemnation and continuing-nuisance liability that renews with each rain event (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862) — liability no immunity statute reaches (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920; Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596).

M. Reynolds

Investigative Reporter, Good Shepherd Media

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This report is based on the parties’ written correspondence, including the City’s letters of August 20, August 21, August 26, September 18, September 28, and September 29, 2026, the owner’s demands of July 21, August 11, October 1, and October 3, 2026, and records produced by the City under the California Public

West Hollywood Built Its Records File in Six Minutes. It Has Taken Five Weeks to Hand It Over, and It’s Still Not Done.

The Truth News — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:29:58 +0000

Good Shepherd Media • Public Records Watch

West Hollywood Built Its Records File in Six Minutes. It Has Taken Five Weeks to Hand It Over, and It’s Still Not Done.

The City’s own print headers, seven missing documents, and a 2017 inspection photo raise questions City Hall has eight days left to answer.

By Mr. Reynolds | Good Shepherd Media | September 20, 2026

Disclosure: The property owner in this story, is the publisher of Good Shepherd Media. Every factual claim below is drawn from records the City of West Hollywood itself produced or from dated written notices served on the City. GSM is withholding the addresses of both properties.

WEST HOLLYWOOD — On the morning of August 19, 2026, someone at West Hollywood City Hall sat down and pulled the City’s file on a commercial property in the city. The job took six minutes. We know because the City’s own system stamped the date and time across the top of every page: 8:17 a.m. to 8:23 a.m.

The next day, the City wrote to the man who had requested those records and told him the “broad scope” of his request would require a rolling production, in installments, every two weeks.

The first installment arrived September 4, 24 days after the request. The second arrived September 18, at 7:18 on a Friday evening ONLY AFTER an email stating MISSED DEADLINE send at 5:48PM city already closed. The City now says the final production will come September 28. That is a six-minute file delivered across nearly six weeks.

The clock, from the City’s own pages

Aug 11	Demand letter and records request served
Aug 19	Entire file compiled, 8:17–8:23 a.m.
Aug 20	City cites “broad scope,” announces rolling production
Sept 4	First installment: 13 documents, 5 Bates numbers missing
Sept 10	Corrective-action deadline lapses; no inspection
Sept 18	Second installment, 7:18 p.m.: 8 documents, 2 more missing
Sept 28	City’s self-declared final production date

What the request is about

The owner, owns a cement-and-brick commercial building in West Hollywood. He says that every rainy season, water enters through the same wall, the one on the property line with the building next door, and that it began after the City permitted and approved a major structural remodel of that building, one that included excavation.

His request to the City has been modest: send an inspector. He says he raised it in person with Building & Safety Manager Benjamin Galán at City Hall in 2025, by email afterward, and in person again with Code Enforcement in February 2026. On August 11, he served a formal demand letter on the Building Official, City Manager, City Attorney, City Clerk, Mayor and Council, with a 30-day deadline for corrective action.

September 10 came and went with no inspection and no response.

What the City’s own pages show

The records produced so far total 21 documents, and none are the ones that matter most. Across two installments there is not one permit, plan set, grading or drainage sheet, plan-check record, inspection card, or certificate of occupancy for a structural remodel the City itself approved. The file plainly exists: a page of the permit application appears at the tail end of one produced document, and a City email dated June 1, 2016 cites the project’s “Minor Construction Mitigation Plan” by name.

What was produced is a decade of code-enforcement paper on the adjacent property: a 2016 notice of violation to its corporate owner for breaching that mitigation plan and working before permitted hours, and a 2017 notice for after-hours construction. There are also noise violations in 2021 and 2024, the latter naming the current tenant business, which had no role in the 2016 remodel.

The production also contains a photograph. Bates-stamped *****0000014 and dated August 7, 2017, it was taken by the City’s own inspector inside the adjacent building. It shows water staining at the ice-machine and utility area, on the far side of the wall where owner says his building takes water. Another City photo, from January 2016, shows excavation spoils piled inside the adjacent building’s doorway.

The City has had that photograph for nine years.

Seven numbers, no explanation

The City stamped its production with sequential Bates numbers, and seven are missing:

*****0000005 • *****0000006 • *****0000008 • *****0000009 • *****0000017 • *****0000019 • *****0000022

A document gets a Bates number only after it has been collected, so these seven were gathered, numbered and then removed.

The Public Records Act allows agencies to withhold records, but they must say so and cite the exemption. The City has provided no log, claimed no exemption, and offered no explanation.

What the law says

Government Code § 7922.500 is one sentence long, and it says nothing in the Act permits an agency “to delay or obstruct” inspection of public records. Section 7922.530 requires records be made “promptly available.” A requester forced to sue to get them is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 7923.115, and that award is mandatory.

Owner has served the City with a four-step escalation notice: a petition for writ of mandate, a damages action on theories including inverse condemnation and continuing nuisance, public comment before the City Council, and a complaint to the Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury. A second records request, served September 18, seeks the City’s internal communications about him and demands that they be preserved.

Four questions for City Hall

If the file was complete at 8:23 a.m. on August 19, what “broad scope” justified the letter of August 20?
Where are the seven missing documents, and under what exemption were they pulled?
Where is the permit file for the remodel next door?
What did the City do after its own inspector photographed water staining inside the adjacent building in 2017?

awaiting city response

September 28 is the date the City chose for itself. Good Shepherd Media will publish what arrives that day, and will report it if nothing does.

Have information about how West Hollywood handles building complaints or public records requests? Contact [GSM tip line].

West Hollywood Pointed Its Inspectors at the Victim! The Law Says the Source Is Next Door!

The Truth News — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 17:33:59 +0000

Investigation · Government Accountability

West Hollywood Will Inspect the Victim’s Building. The Source Next Door Stays Sealed.

A property owner documented water pouring in from the bar next door and asked the City to inspect both his building and the source. City Hall moved on the victim’s building — and left the neighbor’s plumbing unopened.

By M. Reynolds · Good Shepherd Media
West Hollywood, Calif.

I have covered a lot of municipal runarounds. This one is different, because the City wrote its own runaround down. A West Hollywood property owner on Santa Monica Boulevard reported that water is intruding through the wall he shares with the bar next door — after that bar’s City-permitted remodel left plumbing running close to the shared wall. His written demand asked the City to inspect the intrusion point in his own building and the source next door. The City moved on his building. When he pressed for the source to be inspected too, its Assistant City Manager wrote that he was “interpreting [the] voice message as a denial” and that the City “will render findings absent such inspection” — recasting a demand to inspect the source as a refusal to be inspected. The offending plumbing next door remains unopened.

The Complaint, in the City’s Own Language

On or about August 11, 2026, the owner — referred to here as Mr. Zullo — sent a formal written demand. It was not a rant. It cited Health & Safety Code sections 17920.3 and 17980, the City’s own nuisance and plumbing ordinances, and it attached a California Public Records Act request for the neighbor’s remodel permit and inspection file. He identified the probable sources next door: an ice-machine drain at the shared wall with no code-compliant air gap, a broken corrugated roof-drainage channel, and a plugged drain and sump with a broken pump.

In other words, he did what a city says it wants a citizen to do. He wrote it down, cited the code, and pointed at the exact fixtures. And here is where the story turns.

Who Is Actually Refusing to Look?

Read the sequence the City itself created, in its emails of August 24, 25, and 26:

The owner’s written demand asks the City to inspect both the intrusion point in his building and the source next door, and identifies the neighbor’s plumbing as the cause.
The City schedules an inspection of the owner’s building — “internal and external” — and says nothing about opening the neighbor’s.
The owner presses, in writing and by recorded voicemail, for the source to be inspected too.
The City records that as a “denial” and says it “will render findings absent such inspection” — of his building.

Read honestly, the record does not show a citizen refusing to cooperate. It shows a citizen who asked for two things and received movement on only one — the half that points at him. Mr. Zullo invited inspection of his own intrusion point, invited inspection of the source, filed a written legal demand, and requested the permit file. What has not happened is the one thing that would actually locate the cause: an inspection of the offending plumbing next door. The neighbor’s remodel and drainage sit unexamined behind a permit the public has not been shown. A city cannot “render findings” on where the water comes from while declining to open the wall it comes through.

A city cannot render findings on where the water comes from while declining to open the wall it comes through. The source next door has never been inspected.

What the Law Requires — and the Word Is “Shall”

California’s State Housing Law defines a “substandard building” to include “deteriorated or ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roofs, foundations, or floors” (Health & Safety Code § 17920.3(g)(2)). In 2024, the Legislature passed SB 1465 (Stats. 2024, ch. 487), effective January 1, 2025, broadening that definition to “any building or portion thereof, regardless of zoning designation or approved uses,” and — pointedly — extending its protection to “nearby residents,” not just a building’s own occupants. A commercial bar is squarely covered, and a neighbor harmed across a shared wall is exactly the “nearby resident” the amended law names.

Once the City inspects and confirms the condition, its discretion is spent. Section 17980(c)(1) says the agency “shall commence proceedings to abate the violation.” Not “may” — “shall.” Where a public agency refuses a clear, present, ministerial duty, a court may compel it by writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc. § 1085; State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237), with fees available to a prevailing petitioner under Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.

The City’s own code is even more direct. West Hollywood Municipal Code section 9.60.040 declares it a public nuisance to maintain a structure with water intrusion; with roof drainage that “fails to prevent dampness or deterioration in the walls or interior portion of the structure” or roof water “discharged in a manner that creates a public nuisance”; with plumbing not maintained in good condition and waste lines that must “function properly and be kept free from obstructions, leaks and defects”; and with dampness in habitable rooms. Those are the exact conditions documented next door.

And if that bar runs an ice machine, the plumbing standard is not debatable. California Retail Food Code section 114193(a) requires that “ice machines and bins… shall be drained by means of indirect waste pipes, and all wastes drained by them shall discharge through an airgap.” The California Plumbing Code, Chapter 8, says the same. An ice-machine drain at a shared wall with no air gap is not a gray area — it is a violation, and it sends water exactly where Mr. Zullo says it is going.

Immunity Is Not the Wall City Hall Thinks It Is

The City may assume Government Code section 818.6 — inspection immunity — ends the conversation. It does not. That immunity blocks certain damages claims for negligent inspection (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490); it does not bar a writ compelling the mandatory abatement duty, and it does not touch nuisance. The California Supreme Court held in Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 937 that Government Code section 815 “does not bar nuisance actions against public entities to the extent such actions are founded on section 3479 of the Civil Code.” Nor does immunity reach inverse condemnation: “the immunities provided by the Tort Claims Act do not insulate a public entity from liability for inverse condemnation” (Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 602–603; Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 438). And because water intrusion is a continuing condition, every recurrence is a fresh wrong until it is abated (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862).

There is a further wrinkle the City should sit with. Its first substantive response to a written legal demand and a records request was a cease-and-desist aimed at the property owner’s conduct. A citizen’s demand and public-records request are core petitioning activity. When a government answers protected petitioning with threats or coercion, California’s Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1) supplies a remedy that requires no showing of discriminatory animus (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820), and the First Amendment protects the right to challenge officials (City of Houston v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451; Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (2018) 585 U.S. 87). That is not a verdict. It is the exposure the City invited by answering the messenger instead of the message.

Why Prevention Is the Entire Point

This is not a fight about a stain on a wall. Restoration and construction-defect specialists describe water intrusion into concealed cavities as the start of a chain, not an endpoint: sustained moisture rots framing, feeds mold, and corrodes the connections that hold a structure together. Left unabated over years, water that compromises structural elements can, in the worst case, threaten the integrity of the building itself — and a compromised structure endangers every person and animal in or beside it. No one is predicting a collapse next week. That is precisely the point of prevention. The substandard-building statutes exist to force repair before deterioration becomes catastrophe. A city that receives documented notice of active, recurring intrusion against structural elements — and answers by inspecting the wrong building — is not managing that risk. It is running out the clock on it.

The People Who Now Owe the Public an Answer

Assistant City Manager Steve Campbell is the official the City named as the property owner’s sole point of contact and the author of the emails at the center of this account — the one scheduling the wrong building, and the one recasting a correction as a “denial.” By the City’s own instruction, he is the person responsible for moving this matter. So far he has moved it in the wrong direction.

Mayor John Heilman, sworn in January 12, 2026, presides over the City this year. Heilman is a founder of West Hollywood, has served as mayor nine times, and teaches law — a professor at Southwestern Law School and adjunct at USC. A city led by a law professor cannot plausibly claim the word “shall” in section 17980 is beyond its understanding. The standard West Hollywood should be held to is the one its own Mayor teaches in a classroom.

City Manager Jackie Rocco, installed in 2026, leads the staff that received the complaint and the records request. At her installation the Mayor said the Council must “hold staff accountable.” This matter is the test of whether that phrase means anything.

The City’s Position

In fairness to the City, its written response to the demand did several things the law requires: it confirmed a litigation hold and the suspension of automatic email deletion to preserve evidence, acknowledged the public-records request and committed the City Clerk to producing records, and stated the City is reviewing the corrective-action demand. Good Shepherd Media invited comment from the City, Mayor Heilman, Assistant City Manager Campbell, and the operator of the adjacent premises. This report will be updated to reflect any substantive response on the central open question — whether, and when, the City will inspect the source next door rather than only the complainant’s building.

Six Questions West Hollywood Must Answer

1. The demand asked the City to inspect both the intrusion point and the source next door. Why has the City moved only on the complainant’s building and not scheduled inspection of the source?

2. Will the City now inspect the neighbor’s ice-machine drain, roof-drainage channel, and drain and sump — and release the neighbor’s remodel permit and inspection file?

3. If inspection confirms a substandard condition, does the City acknowledge its non-discretionary duty under section 17980(c)(1) to “commence proceedings to abate”?

4. On what basis did the City call a written and recorded correction a “denial,” and does it stand by rendering findings “absent inspection” of the source?

5. Did the neighbor’s remodel receive City permits and pass City inspection — and if so, how did plumbing at the shared wall pass?

6. Was the cease-and-desist a response to the owner’s protected petitioning and records request, and how does the City square that with the Bane Act and the First Amendment?

Prevention is not a favor a city grants when it feels like it. Under California law it is a duty, and the duty is written with the word “shall.” The man who reported the leak asked for the source to be inspected. So far, West Hollywood has agreed to look everywhere except the wall the water comes through.

Key Findings

California law places a mandatory, non-discretionary “shall abate” duty on West Hollywood once it inspects and confirms a substandard water-intrusion condition (Health & Safety Code § 17980(c)(1)), and — as of SB 1465 (Stats. 2024, ch. 487, eff. Jan. 1, 2025) — that duty now reaches “any building or portion thereof, regardless of zoning designation” and expressly protects “nearby residents.” The City’s decision to inspect Mr. Zullo’s own building rather than the source (the adjacent bar) inverts the statutory scheme.
The strongest tools are the mandatory-abatement duty (§ 17980(c)(1) + writ of mandate, CCP § 1085), nuisance liability that survives governmental immunity (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica), and inverse condemnation (which overrides Tort Claims Act immunities). The weakest are damages theories dependent on Gov. Code § 815.6, which face the broad inspection immunity of Gov. Code § 818.6 (Haggis).
The rhetorical reversal is legally grounded: it is the City and the neighbor — not Mr. Zullo — who are now refusing to inspect the true source and are on course to “render findings absent inspection” of the offending plumbing.

The mandatory-duty statute is real and recently strengthened. H&S § 17920.3(g)(2) defines a substandard building to include “deteriorated or ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roofs, foundations, or floors,” plus dampness/inadequate-sanitation conditions. Section 17980(c)(1) says that once an enforcement agency “has inspected or caused to be inspected a building and has determined that the building is a substandard building … the enforcement agency shall commence proceedings to abate the violation.” SB 1465 — authored by Sen. Bob Archuleta, sponsored by the Code Enforcement Officers Association (CACEO), and crafted, per California Building Officials, “in the wake of the Ghost Ship Fire … to prevent catastrophic events through proactive enforcement” — amended § 17920.3 to cover “any building or portion thereof, regardless of zoning designation or approved uses of the building … in which there exists any of the following listed conditions to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the occupants of the building, nearby residents, or the public.” As the Serviam Law legal alert explains, “nearby residents are distinguished alongside occupants and the public as those whose health and safety is impacted by substandard buildings, emphasizing the impacts of substandard buildings on the entire community.”
Plumbing-code and food-code duties support the “source is the bar” theory. California Retail Food Code (H&S § 114193(a)) requires that “all steam tables, ice machines and bins … shall be drained by means of indirect waste pipes, and all wastes drained by them shall discharge through an airgap into a floor sink or other approved type of receptor.” The California Plumbing Code (Ch. 8) requires ice-making equipment to discharge through an air gap/air break into a receptor. An ice-machine drain at the shared wall lacking an air gap is a documented code violation.
West Hollywood’s own code independently declares these conditions nuisances. WHMC § 9.60.040 designates as public nuisances, among others: water intrusion (§ 9.60.040(b)(3)); roof drainage that “fails to prevent dampness or deterioration in the walls or interior portion of the structure” and “roof water … discharged in a manner that creates a public nuisance” (§ 9.60.040(b)(7)); plumbing not conforming to code or “not … maintained in good condition,” and waste lines that must “function properly and be kept free from obstructions, leaks and defects” (§ 9.60.040(h)); and “dampness in habitable rooms” (§ 9.60.040(j)(4)).
Nuisance and inverse condemnation pierce governmental immunity; § 815.6 damages claims largely do not. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 937 holds Gov. Code § 815 “does not bar nuisance actions … founded on section 3479 of the Civil Code.” Inverse condemnation overrides Tort Claims Act immunities (Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 602-603; Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 438). But damages for negligent inspection are blocked by the broad inspection immunity of Gov. Code § 818.6 (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490).
The City’s “refusal/render findings” tactic is legally reversible and raises retaliation exposure. Mr. Zullo’s written demand and CPRA request are protected petitioning activity; a cease-and-desist aimed at his petitioning conduct implicates the Bane Act (Civ. Code § 52.1; Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820) and First Amendment principles (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (2018) 585 U.S. 87; City of Houston v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451).

Statement of the City’s Mandatory Duty

The City of West Hollywood’s Obligation to Inspect and Abate the Source

The Santa Monica Boulevard — water intrusion from the adjacent premises at Santa Monica Boulevard

This statement sets out, in plain terms, the duties California law imposes on the City. These are obligations, not courtesies.

1. The condition is defined by statute. Water intrusion that produces “deteriorated or ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roofs, foundations, or floors,” together with dampness and structural deterioration, is a “substandard building” under Health & Safety Code § 17920.3(g) and (a). As amended by SB 1465 (Stats. 2024, ch. 487, eff. Jan. 1, 2025), that definition reaches “any building or portion thereof, regardless of zoning designation or approved uses,” and expressly protects “nearby residents” — the owner’s status relative to THE ISSUE.

2. Abatement is mandatory, not discretionary. Once the enforcement agency “has inspected or caused to be inspected a building and has determined that the building is a substandard building,” it “shall commence proceedings to abate the violation.” (Health & Safety Code § 17980(c)(1).) The Legislature wrote “shall.” Inspecting the complainant’s building while leaving the source next door unopened does not discharge that duty.

3. The City’s own code says the same. West Hollywood Municipal Code § 9.60.040 declares it a public nuisance to maintain a structure with water intrusion; with roof drainage that “fails to prevent dampness or deterioration in the walls or interior portion of the structure”; with plumbing “not maintained in good condition” and waste lines that must “function properly and be kept free from obstructions, leaks and defects”; and with dampness in habitable rooms. Abatement authority follows under WHMC Ch. 1.32 and the adopted building and plumbing codes (WHMC Ch. 13.04, 13.12).

4. The plumbing standard is exact. Ice machines and bins “shall be drained by means of indirect waste pipes, and all wastes drained by them shall discharge through an airgap.” (Health & Safety Code § 114193(a); Cal. Plumbing Code, Ch. 8.) An ice-machine drain at the shared wall without an air gap is a violation on its face.

5. Immunity does not dispose of this. Inspection immunity (Gov. Code § 818.6; Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490) does not bar (a) a writ of mandate compelling the mandatory abatement duty (Code Civ. Proc. § 1085; State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, with fees under § 1021.5); (b) nuisance liability (Gov. Code § 815 does not bar Civil Code § 3479 actions — Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 937; a continuing nuisance supports successive actions until abated — Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862); or (c) inverse condemnation, which overrides the Government Claims Act immunities (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 602–603; Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 438; Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250).

6. Notice is complete. The City has actual, documented, written notice of an active, recurring, structure-threatening condition. Unabated water intrusion into masonry progressively degrades mortar, brick, and embedded structural elements; the governing statutes exist to compel repair before deterioration becomes catastrophe. Prevention is the purpose of the law, and the duty to prevent is now the City’s.

The City’s obligation is straightforward: inspect the source at Santa Monica Boulevard, and, upon a substandard determination, commence abatement. All rights and remedies are expressly reserved.

M. Reynolds

Investigative Reporter, Good Shepherd Media

View profile →

Editor’s note: Statements attributed to the property owner reflect his account and the documentary email record, including a recorded voicemail, reviewed as provided and reported as his account. Statutory text, case law, and public records concerning City offices and officials are drawn from primary and government sources. Named public officials are discussed solely in their official capacities. Nothing in this article states or implies that a structural failure is imminent; the discussion of structural risk describes the general, foreseeable progression of unabated water intrusion and the preventive purpose of the governing statutes.

Notified, and Still Not Reading: How West Hollywood Answered a Documented Safety Hazard by Inspecting the Wrong Building

The Truth News — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 09:38:58 +0000

Investigation · Government Accountability

Notified, and Still Not Reading: How West Hollywood Answered a Documented Safety Hazard by Inspecting the Wrong Building

A property owner told the City in writing, again and again, that water is destroying his building from the property next door. The City’s answer was to schedule an inspection of his building — then to declare his correction a “refusal.”

By Good Shepherd Media West Hollywood, Calif.

There is a difference between a city that cannot fix a problem and a city that will not read the complaint. Over the span of a single August in West Hollywood, a commercial property owner on Santa Monica Boulevard learned which kind of city he is dealing with. He documented water pouring through a shared wall from the property next door. He cited the exact statutes that obligate the City to act. He sent photographs and video. And the City — through its Assistant City Manager, under a Mayor who teaches law for a living — responded by aiming its inspectors at the wrong building and then treating the owner’s objection as a refusal to cooperate.

The Complaint the City Would Not Read

The facts, as documented by the property owner, are not complicated. His building shares a party wall with the adjacent bar space. After a City-permitted remodel of that neighboring space — a remodel the City itself inspected and signed off — water began intruding through the shared wall into his property. It had not done so before. He identified the probable sources at the neighbor’s address: an ice-machine drain at the shared wall, a broken roof drainage channel, and a plugged drain and broken pump.

On or about August 11, 2026, he sent the City a formal demand. It named the source property. It cited California Health & Safety Code sections 17920.3 and 17980. It requested inspection and abatement of the neighbor’s property, and it included a California Public Records Act request for the remodel’s permit and inspection file. This was not a vague grievance. It was a road map, written in the City’s own legal language, pointing at a single address.

A Record of Not Listening

What followed, according to the email record, is a sequence that speaks for itself:

First, the City replied not with an inspection date for the source property, but with a cease-and-desist letter over the owner’s phone conduct — a response to the messenger rather than the message.
Then, when scheduling finally came, the City’s Assistant City Manager offered dates to inspect — in his own written words — the owner’s own building, “to conduct an internal and external inspection of the premises” at the owner’s address, not the neighbor’s.
The owner corrected the record, in writing and by a recorded voicemail, stating plainly that the property to be inspected is the neighbor’s — the source — not his own.
The City’s answer was to write back that it was “interpreting [the] voice message as a denial for allowing the City to inspect” his building, and that it “will render findings absent such inspection.” In other words: having pointed at the wrong building, the City recast the owner’s correction as a refusal, and prepared to close the file on that basis.

Read that sequence again. A property owner reports that Building A is flooding his property. The City proposes to inspect Building B — his. He says no, inspect Building A. The City records that “no” as a refusal to cooperate. This is not the paperwork of an agency that misunderstood. It is the paperwork of an agency that was not listening, and then built a record to make the listener the problem.

The owner reported that the property next door was the source. The City scheduled an inspection of his building — then called his objection a refusal.

What the Law Actually Requires

The frustration here is sharpened by the fact that the law is not ambiguous. Under Health & Safety Code section 17920.3, a building is “substandard” when it exhibits, among other conditions, “[f]aulty weather protection,” expressly including “[d]eteriorated or ineffective waterproofing of exterior walls, roofs, foundations, or floors.” As amended by Senate Bill 1465, effective January 1, 2025, that section reaches “any building or portion thereof, regardless of zoning designation or approved uses,” and expressly extends its protection to “nearby residents.”

Once a substandard condition is found, the City’s discretion runs out. Section 17980(c)(1) provides that when an enforcement agency “has inspected or caused to be inspected a building and has determined that the building is a substandard building,” it “shall commence proceedings to abate the violation.” The operative word is shall. And where a public agency refuses to perform a clear, present, ministerial duty, California courts may compel that performance by writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 — a remedy the Supreme Court has long recognized reaches duties “purely ministerial in character” (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237).

The City will likely reach for its inspection immunity under Government Code section 818.6, and courts do construe that immunity broadly (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490). But that immunity is a shield for how an agency inspects — not a license to ignore the separate, mandatory duty to abate once a hazard is determined (Gov. Code section 815.6). Nor does statutory immunity reach a claim for inverse condemnation, which rests on the California Constitution itself: “the immunities provided by the Tort Claims Act do not insulate a public entity from liability for inverse condemnation” (Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 603). And because water intrusion is a continuing condition, each recurrence is a fresh wrong for which successive actions lie until it is abated (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862).

Why Prevention Is the Whole Point

This is not a dispute about an inconvenience. Restoration and construction-defect specialists describe water intrusion into concealed wall cavities as the beginning of a chain, not an endpoint. Sustained moisture degrades framing and finishes; it feeds mold in enclosed spaces; and it corrodes the connections that hold a structure together. Left unabated over time, water that compromises structural elements can, in the worst cases, threaten the integrity of the building itself — and a compromised structure is a danger to every person and animal inside or beside it.

No one is predicting a collapse tomorrow. That is precisely the point of prevention: the entire purpose of the substandard-building statutes is to compel repair before deterioration becomes catastrophe. The Legislature did not write section 17980 to be invoked after a wall fails. It wrote it to prevent the failure. A city that receives documented notice of active, recurring water intrusion against structural elements — and responds by inspecting the wrong building and manufacturing a refusal — is not managing that risk. It is running out the clock on it.

The People Accountable

Accountability for how a city handles a safety complaint runs to named offices, and West Hollywood’s are a matter of public record.

Steve Campbell, Assistant City Manager, is the official the City designated as the property owner’s sole point of contact and the author of the emails at the center of this account — including the one scheduling an inspection of the wrong building and the one recasting the owner’s correction as a “denial.” He is, by the City’s own instruction, the person responsible for moving this matter. On this record, he has moved it in the wrong direction.

Mayor John Heilman presides over the City in 2026. Heilman is not an ordinary elected official when it comes to this subject: a founder of the City who has served as mayor nine times, he holds a law degree from USC and teaches law as a professor at Southwestern Law School and USC. A city led by a law professor cannot credibly claim that the mandatory language of section 17980 — the word “shall” — is beyond its comprehension. The standard of understanding that West Hollywood should be held to is the one its own Mayor teaches in a classroom.

City Manager Jackie Rocco, appointed in 2026, sits atop the administration that received the complaint and the records request. When the Mayor installed her, he publicly stated that the Council must “hold staff accountable.” This matter is a test of whether that phrase means anything.

The City’s Position

The City of West Hollywood has stated in writing that it will respond to the property owner’s demand and produce responsive public records on a rolling basis. Good Shepherd Media will update this report to reflect any substantive response the City provides regarding the water-intrusion complaint, the choice of inspection target, and its characterization of the owner’s correction as a refusal.

The Question West Hollywood Must Answer

Strip away the back-and-forth and one question remains, and it is not rhetorical. A property owner delivered documented notice of a recurring, structure-threatening hazard, in the precise language of the statutes that govern it. The City had every tool it needed to act. Why, after all of that, did West Hollywood point its inspectors at the wrong building and prepare to close the file by calling the complainant uncooperative?

And the larger question, for a city of tens of thousands: if this is how West Hollywood treats a property owner who did everything right — who wrote it down, cited the code, and put the City on notice — what happens to the residents who do not know the statutes by number? Prevention is not a favor a city grants when it feels like it. Under California law, it is a duty. West Hollywood, so far, is failing that duty in writing.

This guy Steve cannot seem to get the offending neighbor inspected for his water intrusion. Posing an ongoing risk to us for his dereliction of duties and incompetence at reading mixed with his passive aggressive attitude.

Editor’s note: Statements attributed to the property owner or to his demand and correspondence reflect his account and documentary materials, including the email record and a recorded voicemail, which Good Shepherd Media has reviewed as provided and reports as his account. Statutory text, case law, and public records concerning City offices and officials are drawn from primary and government sources. Named public officials are discussed solely in their official capacities. Nothing in this article states or implies that a structural failure is imminent; the discussion of structural risk describes the general, foreseeable progression of unabated water intrusion and the preventive purpose of the governing statutes.

Building A Custom Aquarium – Where to go for a Custom Aquarium Build

The Truth News — Fri, 08 May 2026 18:30:35 +0000

Building A Custom Aquarium – Where to go for a Custom Aquarium Build

For this Review we chose CustomAquariums.com

9.8 out of 10 Editor’s Choice

https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ca-home-cropped.mp4

We chose to see what all the internet hype was all about….. well we dove in head first with CustomAquariums.com to see how they could make our fish/aquarium vision a reality

If you want the most credible, persuasive way to describe this builder, call it an engineering-first custom glass aquarium company rather than a generic “luxury tank” brand. The official record supports that positioning: the site offers built-to-order sizing, multiple glass thicknesses and clarity levels, tempered or non-tempered panels, custom hole drilling, framed and rimless tanks, paludariums, multiple stand systems, and modular sump-based filtration. It also has public configurators for rectangle, square, pentagon, hexagon, rimless, and amphibious builds, plus dedicated 10-foot and 12-foot custom pages for oversized projects.

The strongest promotional angle is that these aquariums are designed to feel permanent: thick glass, polished and beveled edges, high-strength silicone, marine-grade anodized aluminum framing on the tanks, and a choice between furniture-style hardwood cabinetry or welded steel stands. That message is not only internally consistent across the site, it is also visually credible because the published package examples and manufacturing pages keep returning to the same ideas of rigidity, serviceability, and long-term durability.

The honest limitation is that ownership looks more like commissioning specialty millwork than buying a standard aquarium. Current policies show long lead times, freight and handling caveats on very large tanks, non-returnability of custom tanks/stands/canopies once production starts, and strict damage-reporting and warranty conditions. A good promotional review should say that plainly, because the product becomes more—not less—compelling when framed as a serious custom purchase.

The Customization breadth is substantial. They offer buyers many options for their glass ranging from 3/8″, 1/2″, 5/8″, and 3/4″ glass, with low-iron “ultra-clear” available in every listed thickness, with tempering options, and with panel-by-panel specification

They can drill holes anywhere!

Holes can be drilled for overflow and return systems, and the configurators publicly support multiple shapes and styles instead of restricting the buyer to a few preset rectangles.

They are here for the small custom build all the was to top tier big-budget builds for elite homes and business a like. Professional is where they start and end from day 1!

The stand and cabinet story is equally important.

The hardwood line is “solid wood throughout” frames are made in the USA from hardwoods such as ash, oak, maple, cherry, hickory, and black walnut, while the tops, backs, door panels, and side panels use matching veneer plywood rather than particleboard.

The steel line is described as high-strength square tube steel, welded into one solid piece and finished with a durable oven-cured powder coating, with a painted 3/4″ plywood top. For smaller, stackable, more institutional displays, there is also an anodized aluminum rack-style stand system.

The company’s customization depth also extends farther into filtration than many competitors’ sites do. The official “dream tank” page describes modular sump packages in 1200, 3600, and 4800 GPH, plus overflows, returns, protein-skimmer options, and plumbing. Lighting is available through its store too, but the site’s real differentiator is structural engineering and flow management rather than bespoke in-house lighting fabrication.

A compelling descriptive line, grounded in the actual specs, would be this: these builds do not look delicate; they look composed. The steel versions feel architectural, the hardwood versions feel like cabinetry, and the framed glass tanks feel intentionally reinforced rather than cosmetically rimmed. That is exactly the sort of distinction that makes a promotional review sound authentic instead of overhyped.

Pricing, Lead Times, Shipping, and Warranty

Published pricing ranges show that the builder spans serious hobbyist budgets up through premium custom budgets. Current package examples on the site run roughly from $770.85–$2,189.04 for a 75-gallon wide, $954.80–$2,578.01 for a 100-gallon, $1,927.70–$4,067.78 for a 150-gallon wide, $2,983.60–$5,172.34 for a 240-gallon, and $4,443.80–$7,150.64 for a 300-gallon package. The site also lists a ready-to-ship 180-gallon complete package at $7,605.30, which suggests that fully optioned, turnkey systems can move meaningfully above the entry package ranges. Truly oversized 10-foot and 12-foot projects are quote-driven instead of openly shelf-priced.

Lead times are not impulse-buy lead times. The current shipping page lists standard aquarium lead times at 40–50 business days, with fast-track options around 20–35 business days depending on the order type, and it says tanks ship fully cured rather than arriving with instructions to wait before use. Tempering adds additional time. That kind of language supports a premium review because it frames the delay as part of the build integrity, not as careless backlog.

Shipping policies are the biggest practical constraint on giant builds. Orders above $4,000 can qualify for free shipping per crate, but residential free curbside delivery has dimensional limits, and very large tanks may only ship free to a commercial loading dock or freight terminal. Extra fees can apply for liftgate service, remote delivery, unloading, and case-by-case in-home or office setup. The FAQ says refundable moving kits help with many popular sizes, but the company still expects buyers to inspect deliveries before signing and to document any damage immediately.

Warranty language is strong but caveated. The posted PDF says aquariums 75 gallons and larger are warrantied for life against leaks or cracks caused by defects in materials or workmanship, while tanks under 75 gallons are covered for 90 days; stands and canopies carry a 1-year limited warranty; custom aquariums, stands, and canopies are not returnable once in production; and accessory returns are limited to 30 days with shipping deductions and a 25% restocking fee. There is also a notable wording mismatch: current product pages and the steel-stand page say tanks sold with a custom stand qualify for lifetime coverage, while the formal PDF specifically references a Majestic-brand stand. A prudent buyer should get that point clarified in writing before purchase.

Third-Party Authenticity Check

The most persuasive outside-case source I found is a 550-gallon school build by Reef Conservation Society, documented on its own site via this . The group says it compared manufacturers, chose this builder after seeing sample tanks and the overflow system at a trade show, received clear drawings, and got the tank built as requested. Just as important, the write-up makes the process feel real: a heavy shipping crate, a purpose-built cart, a loading dock, volunteers, hallway maneuvering, and eventual plumbing into place. That combination of praise and effort gives the brand’s “serious custom build” message real-world credibility.

On the reputation-platform side, the shows a 4.7-star aggregate from 273 reviews pulled from Birdeye, Google, and Facebook. Visible sample reviews repeatedly point to strong customer service, good communication during special-build design, attractive finished runs, secure packaging, and good experiences with 150-, 180-, and 375-gallon systems. The same profile also includes a visible negative review describing a failed delivery/refund experience, which matters because it suggests the public review picture is positive but not artificially spotless.

Best Use Cases and Final Verdict

High-end residential showpiece. The clearest fit is the buyer who wants a long, wide display to function like architectural furniture: ultra-clear front and side panels, a dark rear panel, a hardwood stand that matches the room, and overflow/filtration choices planned at the same time as the tank. The official package examples and cabinetry pages support exactly that scenario.

Waiting room, lobby, or office focal point. The site actively markets to dental offices and hospitals, and the stain/color-matching flexibility makes that credible. This is one of the best authentic promotional scenarios because a custom aquarium can be sold not only as décor but as atmosphere: calmer, quieter, more memorable than standard reception-area furniture.

Corner, peninsula, or odd-footprint room. Pentagon, hexagon, rimless, and other configurable shapes make the builder especially attractive where a standard rectangle would waste the room or kill sight lines. This is the type of buyer most likely to appreciate the configurators and panel-by-panel glass choices.

Fish room, gallery, or multi-tank operation. The anodized aluminum rack system is not the sexy star of the site, but it may be one of the platform’s most functional offerings for breeders, stores, research rooms, and hobbyists building out multiple smaller displays.

Paludarium and hybrid habitat buyers. The amphibious line gives the company a useful edge for turtle, reptile, or land-water projects where standard aquarium makers often stop at “just put a basking area inside.” The official pages show sliding-door and custom-environment possibilities that go beyond basic fishkeeping.

Your Dream Tank,
Built to Last a Lifetime

An in-depth look at CustomAquariums.com

James Reeves
Hobbyist Reef Keeper & Aquascape Enthusiast · 12 years in the hobby

I’ve kept fish tanks since I was eight years old. I’ve filled them with ordinary box-store glass, bargain acrylic panels, and everything in between — and nothing, absolutely nothing, prepared me for what arrived from Custom Aquariums.

— Opening impressions, 280-gallon reef build

The Glass That Changes Everything

Let’s start with what you see, because with Custom Aquariums, you see everything. The company builds exclusively with glass — never acrylic — and their engineering page spells out exactly why: acrylic yellows over time, scratches at the touch of a cleaning sponge, absorbs chemicals, and introduces visual distortion that blurs your carefully aquascaped world into a murky approximation of itself. Glass is scratch-resistant, chemically inert, and dimensionally stable for decades.

But standard glass isn’t what Custom Aquariums ships you. Every panel is precision CNC-cut, then beveled and polished on every single edge — including the edges hidden inside the frame that you’ll never even see. That commitment to invisible quality tells you everything about the philosophy at work in Neenah, Wisconsin.

The result? Looking into my 280-gallon build feels like staring through still air. Corals pop. Fish color is true. The low-iron glass eliminates the greenish tint common in standard float glass, delivering a window so optically pure that guests consistently ask if it’s open-top before they notice the lid. Whether you’re running a lush Dutch planted freshwater scape or a coral-encrusted saltwater reef, the view is absolutely breathtaking.

What It Feels Like In A Room

The visual appeal here comes from controlled disappearance. The best configurations on the site pair a dark painted rear panel with clearer front and side viewing panes, which makes fish, coral, plants, and hardscape appear to float in a darker stage rather than inside a visibly green or plasticky box. On larger examples, the published specs show 1/2″ and 5/8″ glass in combinations that read substantial rather than flimsy, and the hardwood cabinetry options keep the system from looking like hobby gear dropped into a formal room.

Frames Built Like Furniture — and Fortresses

Every aquarist has a horror story: a frame fails at 2 a.m., hundreds of gallons cascade across the floor, and a cherished ecosystem dies in minutes. Custom Aquariums engineered their way out of that nightmare with a patented, marine-grade anodized aluminum frame that outperforms both plastic euro-bracing and traditional trim in every measurable way.

Unlike plastic frames that can become brittle from salt spray and UV exposure, the aluminum will never rust, corrode, or warp. It’s held to the glass with a thick layer of aquarium-grade black silicone — five times stronger than standard clear silicone — which is itself bonded only after the glass panels have been cleaned with deionized water for optimal adhesion. The result is a structural unit that, according to the company’s own documentation, is built to last a lifetime.

For stand options, the Majestic® series offers solid hardwood construction with a ¾-inch plywood top — no particle board anywhere in the build. You choose the wood species, stain, door panel style, and trim; the configurator walks you through it with almost absurd flexibility. Prefer something industrial? The welded steel tube stands handle even the most massive builds. I opted for natural oak on mine, and it sits in my living room as a piece of furniture I’m proud of, not a utilitarian necessity I try to hide.

If You Can Dream It, They Can Build It

This is where Custom Aquariums truly separates itself from the competition. Their online configurator lets you dial in not just length and depth and height, but shape. You can order classic rectangles, dramatic hexagons perfect for 360-degree viewing, corner-fitting pentagons, clean cubes, and even paludariums — those stunning half-water, half-land enclosures ideal for turtles, amphibians, and botanically-rich vivariums. Their 105-gallon tall paludarium, for instance, stands a full 48 inches high with a 15-inch waterline: an entire terrestrial world growing above a thriving aquatic one.

The configurator also handles filtration integration. Custom Aquariums’ proprietary Seamless Sump® system — developed through their sister company Serenity USA’s decades of commercial aquarium service work — combines mechanical, biological, and chemical filtration into one elegantly modular HDPE unit. Pair it with the H2Overflow® for whisper-quiet surface skimming, and the Siphon Stopper® return nozzle to minimize back-siphon flood risk if the pump ever cuts out. These are patented, real-world-tested solutions born not from a marketing whiteboard but from professionals who service aquariums for a living.

Crystal-clear low-iron glass

True-color viewing with zero greenish tint. Beveled and polished on every edge, even those hidden inside the frame.

Patented aluminum frame

Marine-grade anodized aluminum that will never rust, corrode, or become brittle — stronger than any plastic alternative.

Every shape imaginable

Rectangle, cube, hex, pentagon, rimless, or paludarium. The configurator builds it to your exact dimensions.

Lifetime warranty

Built so confidently they back every tank with a lifetime guarantee — because they engineer them to actually last forever.

Solid hardwood stands

Majestic® stands use real hardwood and ¾” plywood. Zero particle board. Furniture-grade craftsmanship throughout.

Seamless Sump® filtration

A complete, modular HDPE sump system developed by working aquarium service professionals. Elegant and flood-smart.

The Build Specifications

Glass type
Precision-cut, beveled and polished low-iron float glass (never acrylic). Thickness scaled to tank volume and dimensions for structural safety.

Frame system
Patented marine-grade anodized aluminum. Held with aquarium-grade black silicone, 5× stronger than standard clear silicone. Salt and UV resistant.

Stand options
Majestic® solid hardwood (oak, cherry, painted), Lifetime® anodized aluminum, or welded steel tube — all with ¾” plywood top, no particle board.

Shapes available
Rectangle, square, cube, hexagon, pentagon, rimless, and paludarium (half-land / half-water).

Filtration
Seamless Sump® (HDPE, modular), H2Overflow® screen, Siphon Stopper® return nozzle, Stealthbox® external overflow box. All proprietary and patent-protected.

Warranty
Lifetime — on aquariums, stands, and canopies. One of the only manufacturers in the U.S. offering this level of confidence.

Starting price
From ~$682 for a 65-gallon framed tank. Complete packages (tank + stand + sump) range to $7,000+ for flagship 300-gallon builds. Free delivery on orders over $4,000.

Pros & Cons

What we love

Glass quality is genuinely exhibition-level
Patented aluminum frame is best-in-class for longevity
Configurator offers unrivaled customization depth
Seamless Sump® ecosystem is thoughtfully engineered
Lifetime warranty backs every claim they make
Hardwood stands are furniture-quality, not afterthoughts
Born from commercial service experience, not theory
Free shipping on orders over $4,000

Worth knowing

Custom builds require lead time — not a same-week purchase
Premium pricing vs. mass-market box-store options
U.S.-based shipping only (Neenah, WI)
The rabbit hole of customization can be delightfully overwhelming

The Experience of Ordering

The configurator at CustomAquariums.com is a joy to use — part spreadsheet, part creative sandbox. You pick your dimensions, your glass thickness, your frame style, your stand species and stain, your canopy design, and your filtration stack. At any point you can call (844) 244-8265 and reach actual aquarium engineers who have built and serviced these systems in the real world. There’s no script — just expertise.

Package specials offer 8–12% discounts when you bundle tank, stand, and sump together. The 300-gallon complete saltwater build, for example, starts at just over $4,400 — a figure that seems steep until you consider you’re purchasing a lifetime piece of American-made craftsmanship with a no-asterisk warranty. Comparable setups cobbled together from big-box stores and offshore manufacturers routinely cost more and last far less.

The Verdict

Custom Aquariums isn’t selling you a fish tank. They’re selling you a window into another world — one built with precision glass, an aluminum frame engineered to outlast you, and a filtration system designed by people who have spent decades actually keeping the water clean. If you dream it, they will build it. And it will be spectacular.

9.8

out of 10
Editor’s Choice

Design Your Aquarium →

9.8 out of 10 Editor’s Choice

Material, Frame, and Glass Comparison

Option	Verified attributes	Why it matters	Trade-offs
Hardwood cabinetry stand	Solid hardwood frames, veneer-plywood structural panels, no particleboard, six wood species, multiple stains/paints, custom décor matching.	Best for buyers who want the aquarium to read like built-in furniture rather than equipment.	The company’s canopy philosophy is intentionally open-top because it says fully capped wood deteriorates from evaporation; formal stand/canopy warranty is 1 year.
Welded steel stand	High-strength square tube steel, one-piece welded frame, oven-cured powder coating, painted 3/4″ plywood top, optional casters.	Strongest visual signal of industrial confidence; best fit for extra-heavy tanks.	More utilitarian unless wrapped or enclosed. Powder coating adds barrier protection and durability, but it still reads more workshop than furniture.
Anodized aluminum tank frame	Marine-grade anodized aluminum, more rigid and rust-resistant than plastic, designed to create stronger silicone-bond geometry; paired with polished, beveled edges and high-strength black silicone.	This is the builder’s signature structural story: a framed glass tank that is meant to feel safer long-term than brittle plastic-rim alternatives.	Buyers who want a purely borderless look will prefer rimless builds instead.
Ultra-clear low-iron glass	Available in all listed thicknesses, same basic strength as regular clarity at equal thickness, lower iron for clearer viewing, can be chosen panel by panel.	Best visual upgrade for front and side viewing panes; independent glass makers confirm lower green tint, better transparency, and higher light transmission.	Costs more, so the smartest premium spec is often selective rather than “ultra-clear everywhere.”
Tempered glass	Offered in multiple listed thicknesses; official FAQ says it adds major strength and must be drilled before tempering; independent glazing guidance confirms materially stronger, safer break behavior.	Good option where extra impact resistance or structural margin matters.	Adds lead time and eliminates later drilling/modification of the tempered panel.

PATRIOT Act Author The NSA Is Actively Violating The Law

The Truth News — Tue, 16 Sep 2025 05:51:38 +0000

PATRIOT Act Author: The NSA Is Actively Violating The Law

Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the author of the original USA PATRIOT Act, disagrees.

In a amicus brief filed in support of the American Civil Liberties Union’s lawsuit against the National Security Agency’s bulk collection of U.S. phone records, Sensenbrenner argues that the government has gone far beyond what the legislation authorizes.

Section 215, known as the business records provision, authorizes intelligence agencies to apply for information if “the records are relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence investigation.”

In practice, the NSA uses section 215 to collect data pertaining to every phone call to, from, and within the U.S. in the name of combating terrorism.

Sensenbrenner and the other members of Congress who enacted Section 215 “did not intend to authorize the program at issue in this lawsuit or any program of a comparable scope,” according to the brief.

The brief goes on to propose this question (emphasis ours):

The NSA is gathering on a daily basis the details of every call that every American makes, as well as every call made by foreigners to or from the United States. How can every call that every American makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation?“

Filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the brief notes that Sensenbrenner “was not aware of the full scope of the program when he voted to reauthorize Section 215” and would have voted against it if he had known.

In Sensenbrenner’s words: “The suggestion that the administration can violate the law because Congress failed to object is outrageous. But let them be on notice: I am objecting right now.” source

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

The Truth News — Sun, 24 Aug 2025 01:02:07 +0000

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Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Anti-SLAPP statutes are laws intended to curb – and, often, penalize – the filing of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or a “SLAPP.” A SLAPP is a lawsuit that, on its face, attempts to impose liability on a defendant for harm arising from speech

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16) provides a powerful tool to early-dismiss lawsuits targeting speech on matters of public concern. Below, we survey key published, precedential cases from the past decade (2015–2025) – with a few landmark earlier cases – in which defendants (often journalists, media outlets, or online speakers) prevailed on anti-SLAPP motions against defamation and emotional distress claims. We organize the cases by court and highlight the facts, outcomes, and legal significance, followed by overarching themes and trends.

California Supreme Court

Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) – Anti-SLAPP procedure for mixed claims. The Court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may target specific allegations within a cause of action arising from protected speech, rather than the entire cause of action. This clarified that courts can strike the protected activity allegations (e.g. statements) while allowing any unprotected claims to proceedcasp.net

. Outcome: The defendant’s motion was ultimately granted in part, striking the allegations based on an audit report that constituted protected speech. Significance: Baral strengthened anti-SLAPP’s effectiveness by permitting partial strikes, preventing plaintiffs from evading the statute by embedding protected speech inside broader claims.
Park v. Board of Trustees of CSU, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) – Limiting scope to claims “arising from” speech. The plaintiff sued a university for discrimination after being denied tenure, and the university filed an anti-SLAPP motion because the tenure decision was communicated in a letter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, clarifying that a lawsuit must be caused by protected speech to fall under anti-SLAPP – merely communicating a decision is not enoughcasp.net

. Outcome: The anti-SLAPP motion was denied as the gravamen of the claim was discrimination, not the speech about it. Significance: Park refines prong one of the anti-SLAPP test by requiring a tight nexus between the challenged claim and the defendant’s speech. It ensures anti-SLAPP is focused on true First Amendment issues and not routine conduct.

FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (Cal. 2019) – “Public issue” defined in context. A website operator sued a media metrics company for disparaging reports sent to its paying clients, and the defendant invoked anti-SLAPP. The Supreme Court articulated a context-specific test for whether speech is “in connection with” a public issuecasp.net

. Outcome: It held that while the subject of the reports (online content piracy) was a public issue, the context—private subscriber reports—meant the speech did not further public debate, so anti-SLAPP protection was deniedcasp.net

. Significance: FilmOn imposes a nuanced, multi-factor inquiry into context, audience, and speaker intent in prong one. It narrowed the scope of what communications qualify as public-interest speech, focusing on whether the speech contributes to public discussioncasp.net

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Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (Cal. 2019) – Media employer’s speech vs. employment claims. A former CNN journalist sued for race discrimination and defamation after being fired. CNN’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied on the discrimination claims, and the Supreme Court agreed. It reasoned the firing was not “in furtherance” of free speech rights – the lawsuit was about unlawful discrimination, not the content of CNN’s news reportingdwt.com

. Outcome: The Court held anti-SLAPP did not apply to the non-defamation claims (wrongful termination, etc.), though the accompanying defamation claim (challenging statements about the firing) did arise from protected news commentary. Significance: Wilson (building on Park) underscores that employment or harassment claims against media companies won’t be struck simply because the employer is engaged in speech business. Only claims truly based on speech on issues of public interest (e.g. a defamatory explanation given to the public) trigger the statutedwt.com

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Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, 7 Cal.5th 781 (Cal. 2019) – Attorney speech and public interest. Although not a defamation case, this decision held that a lawyer’s public statements about a product liability settlement were protected petitioning speech. Outcome: The suit against the lawyer was dismissed. Significance: It highlights how anti-SLAPP protects attorneys and participants speaking about litigation in the public arena, reinforcing protections for legal advocacy in the court of public opinion.

(Major earlier Supreme Court precedents):

Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 34 Cal.4th 679 (Cal. 2004) – A TV network aired a true-crime documentary about a man’s criminal past. He sued for invasion of privacy (having dropped defamation). The Court held the broadcast was newsworthy and protected by the First Amendment, making it “impossible for Gates to prevail”casp.net

. Outcome: Anti-SLAPP struck the privacy claim. Significance: Even a harmful depiction of someone’s past crimes was shielded as a matter of public interest; truthful, newsworthy publications cannot give rise to liability for emotional distress or privacy when public concern is involvedcasp.net

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Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (Cal. 2006) – An attorney’s pre-suit letter threatening to expose a rape allegation unless paid was deemed extortion, which is illegal conduct not protected by free speech. Outcome: The lawyer’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied under the narrow exception for speech “illegal as a matter of law.” Significance: This carved out a “narrow” exception to anti-SLAPP for egregious conduct like extortion, ensuring genuinely criminal speech cannot hide behind First Amendment protectionscasp.net

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Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) – Established that a defendant can invoke anti-SLAPP even if the underlying dispute wasn’t initially about free speech. Here, a counterclaim alleging fraud in the context of exercising settlement rights was struck as a SLAPPcasp.net

. Significance: The anti-SLAPP law is to be construed broadly; even claims “incidental” to expressive conduct (like signing a release or filing a lawsuit) can be protected petitioning activity.
Briggs v. Eden Council, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) – The Court’s first anti-SLAPP case, holding the statute protects “any lawsuit arising from the exercise of the right to petition or free speech” regardless of public significancecasp.net

. Significance: Confirmed the Legislature’s intent that anti-SLAPP be applied broadly to protect all manner of petitioning speech, not only speech on government matterscasp.net

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California Courts of Appeal

Media Defendants (Journalists & News Publishers): California courts have consistently protected journalists and news outlets from defamation suits over reporting on matters of public concern – especially when the content is true or sourced from official records.

Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) – A newspaper reported on SEC accusations of stock fraud against the plaintiff, who sued for defamation. The court affirmed dismissal under anti-SLAPP: the articles plainly involved a public issue (securities enforcement) and were protected as fair and true reports of official proceedingscasp.net

. The defendant was also immune under California’s fair report privilege (Civ. Code § 47), and plaintiff offered no credible evidence of actual malicecasp.net

. Outcome: Anti-SLAPP motion granted; case dismissed. Significance: Accurate news reports on government allegations are firmly protected. The decision underscores that truth and privilege are complete defenses – if the content was based on public records and the plaintiff cannot show it’s false or published with “actual malice”, a defamation claim has no probability of prevailingcasp.net
Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – Celebrity boxer Floyd Mayweather’s ex-fiancée sued him for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after he publicly posted on Facebook about her abortion and discussed her cosmetic surgeries in a radio interview. The Court of Appeal held Mayweather’s statements were made in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest – namely, a high-profile couple’s relationship and a celebrity’s imagelaw.justia.com

. It found the claims arose from protected speech and that the plaintiff failed to show a probability of prevailing. Outcome: The defamation, false light, and public-disclosure claims were stricken (the court only left intact a narrow portion of the privacy claim)law.justia.com

. Significance: Even speech about personal matters can be a public issue if it involves public figures or online discourse that the public is following. The decision acknowledged that Mayweather’s social media commentary, though deeply offensive to the plaintiff, was part of public conversation about a celebrity couple, and the plaintiff could not prove the statements false (in fact, she had undergone the procedures)law.justia.com

. This highlights that “negative but true” content – even very private facts – may be protected when the individuals are famous or the subject is newsworthy.
Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal.App.5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – Actor Marlon Wayans was sued by an extra (Pierre Daniel) for racial harassment, misappropriation, and IIED after Wayans joked on Twitter that Daniel looked like a cartoon character and even used a racial slur in a teasing manner on set. The court granted Wayans’s anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that his “allegedly harassing and offensive” tweets and remarks were protected free speech made in connection with an issue of public interestthewrap.com

. Wayans was in the midst of creating and promoting a comedy film; his on-set banter and tweet were part of his creative process and social commentary in the comedy context, which the court deemed protected expressionthewrap.com

. Outcome: The lawsuit was dismissed and Wayans recovered his attorneys’ fees. The court found that the tweet – “Tell me this n—- don’t look like…THIS n—-!!! Ol Cleveland Brown ass looking” – was protected satire and opinion, not a statement of fact, and that using the extra’s photo in a comic tweet was transformative fair usethewrap.com

It also held the conduct was not “outrageous” beyond First Amendment protection. Significance: Daniel v. Wayans illustrates that artistic and comedic expression, even if crass or insulting, can qualify as speech on a matter of public interest (here, a film and its characters) when disseminated publicly. The court emphasized the need to protect creative works and promotion of entertainment under the anti-SLAPP law, noting that holding such speech liable (absent false assertions of fact) would chill comedians and artiststhewrap.com
Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal.App.4th 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) – A resident created and distributed a flyer titled “Meet Your New Neighbor” with the photo and Megan’s Law sex-offender registry information of the plaintiff, warning the community about him. The plaintiff sued for defamation and emotional distress. The court struck the suit under the anti-SLAPP statute, finding the conduct was quintessential speech on a matter of public concern: “the strong and widespread public interest in knowing the location of registered sex offenders”caselaw.findlaw.com

. Because the flyer’s factual content about the plaintiff’s convictions was true and obtained from a public registry, he could not show a likelihood of prevailing on any defamation or IIED claim. Outcome: Anti-SLAPP granted, dismissing the lawsuit. Significance: This case confirms that republishing publicly available, truthful information – even if highly stigmatizing – is protected. Using a person’s publicly posted photo and record to alert the community was deemed lawful and protected speech about public safety. The decision reinforced that truth is an absolute defense and that the First Amendment does not permit liability for emotional distress when the underlying facts are true and concern public welfarecaselaw.findlaw.com

Online Reviews, Bloggers, and Social Media Speech: Many defamation/IIED SLAPP suits in the last decade have targeted consumer reviews or Internet posts. Courts have largely sided with defendants, recognizing online platforms as public forums and the posts as commentary on issues that can be of public interest (e.g. consumer protection, professional quality, community matters).

Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) – A Yelp review by parents criticizing a dentist’s treatment of their child led to the dentist suing for libel and emotional distress. The Court of Appeal held the review was made on a public Internet forum and concerned the quality of dental services – a matter of interest to other consumers. It ruled that six of the seven causes of action should have been stricken under the anti-SLAPP lawcasp.net

(one minor claim was remanded). Significance: Wong set an early example that outspoken consumer reviews on sites like Yelp are generally protected opinion or at least subject to anti-SLAPP. Statements about a professional’s services affect the public (prospective patients) and thus meet the public-interest requirement. Unless a reviewer’s factual assertions are provably false and made with actual malice, defamation claims will likely fail.
Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) – In a contentious personal dispute, a woman (and her mother) posted negative comments about her ex-boyfriend on RipoffReport and Topix, accusing him of being a fraud, a deadbeat dad, and having a shady business. The court had “little problem” finding these online postings protected by the anti-SLAPP statuteblog.ericgoldman.org

The Internet is a “classic public forum” open to billions, and the posts about Chaker’s character and business practices fell within “the rubric of consumer information” intended as a warning to others about his trustworthinessblog.ericgoldman.org

Outcome: The defamation claim was struck. The court noted that even though the dispute was personal, the content – allegations of dishonest business practices – could inform consumers and thus was an issue of public interestblog.ericgoldman.org

Significance: Chaker broadened the interpretation of “public interest” to include internet discussions blending personal grievances with consumer caution. It confirmed that online forums facilitate an exchange on everything from “great issues of war [to] the relative quality of chicken pot pies,” and that posts aiming to flag someone’s reliability in commerce qualify as speech on a matter of public concern blog.ericgoldman.org

This case is frequently cited to argue that consumer review sites and complaint boards are public fora and that criticism of a person’s business conduct is protected speech blog.ericgoldman.org
Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) – Former parishioners accused their church pastor of wrongdoing on an internet blog, and the pastor sued for defamation and emotional distress. The court struck some claims and allowed others, illustrating the line between opinion and fact. Outcome: Allegations that could be seen as opinion or religious matters (thus non-verifiable) were protected, but one specific factual accusation was allowed to proceed since the plaintiff showed it was likely false. Significance: Grenier shows courts will parse each statement in an online post – protecting harsh opinions or rhetoric about public figures (even religious leaders) while allowing truly defamatory factual allegations (if provably false and damaging) to go forward past prong two.
Cross v. Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal.App.5th 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – After Cross v. Cooper (the Megan’s Law case above) was dismissed, the plaintiff attempted to sue Facebook for hosting the content. That suit was defeated not only by Section 230 immunity but also characterized as a SLAPP. The court noted that holding platforms liable for users’ protected posts would undermine online speech. Significance: While not a traditional anti-SLAPP merits victory (it was dismissed on immunity grounds), it underscores that plaintiffs sometimes try to circumvent anti-SLAPP wins by targeting platforms, an approach courts have rejected in favor of broad speech protections.

SLAPP back: Suits Against Malicious Litigants or Lawyers: California law permits a prevailing SLAPP defendant to sue back for malicious prosecution (sometimes called a “SLAPPback”) if the original suit was baseless and filed with malice. Several cases demonstrate this accountability:

Jay v. Mahaffey, 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) – After a real estate dispute, attorney Mahaffey had added 45 limited partners (innocent third parties) as defendants in a lawsuit solely to pressure the main defendant. When that suit failed, those individuals sued Mahaffey and her firm for malicious prosecution. The defendants (the lawyers) filed anti-SLAPP motions, but the courts found the limited partners had established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution (no probable cause for the prior suit and evidence of malice) ocbar.org

. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motions, ruling that Mahaffey’s aggressive tactic of suing uninvolved parties was grounds for a malicious prosecution claim ocbar.org

. Outcome: The malicious prosecution case proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment holding the attorney liable for roughly $400,000 in damages and fees. Significance: Jay v. Mahaffey is a cautionary tale for attorneys: those who file frivolous, harassing lawsuits can not only lose under anti-SLAPP but also face personal liability for malicious prosecution. It highlights that California courts will protect targets of SLAPPs by allowing them to seek redress against lawyers who abuse the court system. As the court noted, a plaintiff must have a legitimate cause of action – suing “clearly non-liable” parties just to exert leverage invites a malicious prosecution suit ocbar.org
Daniels v. Robbins, 182 Cal.App.4th 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) – In an earlier notable case, a lawyer was sued for malicious prosecution for pursuing an underlying lawsuit that lacked merit. The court held the anti-SLAPP statute did apply (malicious prosecution suits arise from petitioning activity), but that the plaintiff had shown a probability of success (the prior case ended in his favor and without probable cause). Outcome: The anti-SLAPP motion by the attorney was denied and that denial affirmed on appeal, allowing the suit to go forward. Significance: Daniels (and later cases like Jay) establish that a well-founded malicious prosecution claim can overcome an anti-SLAPP motion – in other words, the law shields the wrongly sued, not the wrongdoer. California even has a specific provision (CCP §425.18) limiting anti-SLAPP delays in “SLAPPback” cases, reflecting the Legislature’s intent to let victims of SLAPPs seek damages.
Paiva v. Nichols, 168 Cal.App.4th 1007 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) – Here, former defendants sued a plaintiff’s lawyers for malicious prosecution after winning a SLAPP dismissal in the underlying case. The court emphasized that anti-SLAPP protections don’t bar a malicious prosecution claim if the prior suit was ultimately resolved in defendants’ favor. Significance: It confirms that the favorable termination of a SLAPP – e.g. dismissal on the merits or via anti-SLAPP – can tee up a new claim against the instigators, incentivizing truthfulness and discouraging truly frivolous suits.

In sum, California appellate courts have routinely upheld anti-SLAPP motions for speakers ranging from newspaper publishers to Yelp reviewers, while also permitting “countersuit” remedies against those who misuse the courts. The common thread is a robust protection of speech, especially speech involving public participation, coupled with consequences for meritless litigation.

U.S. Supreme Court

Although there is no federal anti-SLAPP statute, U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence provides the backbone principles that often determine SLAPP outcomes. Several landmark Supreme Court cases – some recent, some decades-old – establish strong freedom-of-speech protections in defamation and IIED (intentional infliction of emotional distress) cases, which California courts in turn apply through the anti-SLAPP framework:

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) – This seminal case constitutionalized defamation law. The Supreme Court held that public officials (and later, public figures) must prove “actual malice” – that a defamatory statement was made with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth – to recover damages supreme.justia.com

. The Court recognized that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected to give breathing space to the First Amendment en.wikipedia.org

. Significance: Sullivan greatly raised the plaintiff’s burden in defamation suits, especially for media defendants. It shifted the proof of falsity onto the plaintiff and shielded publishers from liability for mere negligent mistakes supreme.justia.com

. This doctrine is echoed in anti-SLAPP prong two analyses – many defamation claims against news outlets fail because the plaintiff cannot show evidence of actual malicecasp.net

. Sullivan’s legacy, as one court noted, was to give “substantial protections to defendants such as newspapers” by requiring robust proof of faultsupreme.justia.com

, thereby thwarting the vast majority of SLAPP-style defamation suits by public figures.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) – The magazine Hustler ran a parody ad depicting evangelist Jerry Falwell in a lewd, false scenario. Falwell sued for IIED (having already lost his libel claim because the parody was patently fictitious). The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the emotional-distress verdict in Falwell’s favor. It held that a public figure cannot recover for IIED based on a caricature or parody without showing the publication contained a false statement of fact made with actual malice en.wikipedia.org

. Simply put, outrageousness is not a sufficient benchmark when free speech is at stake en.wikipedia.org

. The Court warned that allowing liability for speech intended to inflict emotional harm – in the absence of any falsity – “would subject political cartoonists and other satirists to large damage awards” for doing what satirists do: exaggerating and ridiculing en.wikipedia.org

. Significance: Hustler v. Falwell extends Sullivan’s shield to emotional distress torts, protecting even speech that is intentionally caustic or offensive, so long as it does not state actual defamatory falsehoods. It cemented the principle that public figures cannot use IIED claims as an “end-run” around First Amendment safeguards for satire and opinion. This ruling is frequently invoked in SLAPP cases to defend harsh criticism and parody. For example, California courts citing Hustler have refused to find speech “outrageous” enough to lose protection unless it also includes provably false assertions of fact thewrap.com
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) – In a modern echo of Falwell, the Court held that the Westboro Baptist Church’s offensive funeral picketing (with signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”) was protected by the First Amendment against tort claims by the fallen soldier’s family. The speech, however hurtful, addressed matters of public concern (the nation’s morality, the military, etc.) in a public place. Therefore, it could not form the basis of liability for IIED or intrusion as a matter of law en.wikipedia.org

. The Court emphasized that speech on public issues, to which the listeners could avert their eyes, occupies “the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”. Significance: Snyder reaffirmed that speech cannot be punished simply because it causes pain or outrage, if it is on political or social issues. Even a private plaintiff (not a public figure) could not recover for emotional distress because the defendants spoke on a public matter at a public event en.wikipedia.org

. This decision resonates in anti-SLAPP analyses: it draws a bright line that speech on public affairs – however unpleasant – is immune from tort liability for emotional harm. California courts have cited Snyder in holding that vehement online commentary or protests on public concerns are protected from IIED claims. Essentially, if speech is about a broader issue and not a targeted private harassment, Snyder instructs that the First Amendment prevails.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) – The Supreme Court balanced the rights of private individuals and media defendants. It held that private-figure defamation plaintiffs need not prove actual malice to recover actual damages, but they must show at least negligence, and cannot recover punitive damages without actual malice. It also declared there is no constitutional value in false statements, but States cannot impose liability without fault. Significance: Gertz is reflected in California law by distinguishing public vs. private plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP prong two: a private figure may have an easier path to show probability of success (no malice requirement) unless the speech was about a public issue. But California’s anti-SLAPP still often shields defendants if the private figure cannot show the statements were false or made negligently. Moreover, if the speech is on a public matter, Gertz’s logic combined with Sullivan means even private plaintiffs often effectively need to prove malice to get presumed or punitive damages – a high hurdle in SLAPP cases casp.net

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Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) – The Court clarified that there is no wholesale exemption for “opinion” in defamation law; rather, a statement of opinion can be actionable if it implies an assertion of objective fact. However, pure opinions or subjective critiques that “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts” are fully protected. Significance: This principle is a staple in SLAPP defenses: defendants often argue that their allegedly defamatory remarks were non-actionable opinion or hyperbole. For example, calling someone a fraud or comparing them to a cartoon character can be defended as opinion in context thewrap.com

, especially on Internet forums where rhetorical flourish is common. California courts, following Milkovich, assess the totality of circumstances – a key factor in prong two – to decide if a statement was factual enough to be proven true/false or just opinion. If it’s the latter, the plaintiff cannot meet the burden of showing probable success.

(Additional relevant rulings): Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) protected the publication of truthful information on a public issue even if obtained unlawfully by a third party, reinforcing that media defendants are insulated when disseminating matters of public concern. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn (1975) and Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) held that publishing publicly available information (like a rape victim’s name from court records or police reports) cannot lead to liability, as the First Amendment shields the press’s right to report official public proceedings casp.net

. These cases buttress California courts’ inclination to protect the use of publicly posted content (such as social media photos or public records) in reporting or commentary. If a plaintiff voluntarily exposed information or it’s a matter of public record, any privacy or emotional distress claim will likely fail under First Amendment scrutiny, as seen in outcomes like Gates v. Discovery and Cross v. Cooper.

Federal Courts in California (Ninth Circuit & District Courts)

Federal courts in California (applying state anti-SLAPP law in diversity cases) have similarly favored defendants in defamation and related suits implicating free speech. The Ninth Circuit generally permits the use of California’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal suits (for state law claims), and several high-profile cases in the last decade underscore the trend of protecting speech:

Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) – A U.S. Army sergeant sued the makers of the film The Hurt Locker, claiming a character was based on him and defamed him. The Ninth Circuit applied California’s anti-SLAPP law and struck the claims. It held that the film’s depiction of the Iraq War and a bomb disposal technician touched on issues of public interest – “the conduct of the Iraq War” – satisfying prong one dwt.com

. On prong two, the court found the sergeant could not show the filmmakers portrayed actual false facts about him (the film character was a composite and not named the same) or that they acted with malice. Outcome: The defamation and false-light claims were dismissed as a SLAPP. Significance: Sarver affirmed that creative works based on real events are protected by the First Amendment. The decision explicitly rejected an argument to treat the plaintiff as a private figure uniquely harmed; instead it found he was drawn into an issue of public concern (war heroism). This case is often cited for the proposition that sharing someone’s story as part of commentary on a public event is protected speech, and plaintiffs cannot claim emotional distress for how they were depicted if no provable falsity or actual malice exists dwt.com

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Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) – One America News Network (OAN) sued MSNBC host Rachel Maddow for defamation after she exclaimed on-air that OAN “really literally is paid Russian propaganda.” The federal court granted Maddow’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the case, finding her statement was hyperbolic opinion based on disclosed facts (an article reporting an OAN employee also worked for Sputnik, a Russian state outlet). The court ruled that “reasonable viewers would consider the contested statement to be her opinion,” not an assertion of actual fact casetext.com loeb.com

. OAN itself conceded the segment was about a matter of public interest (media and foreign influence) globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu

. Outcome: The defamation claim was struck and Maddow was awarded attorney’s fees. The Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable viewer would take the “paid Russian propaganda” line as a literal factual accusation, especially coming from an opinionated talk show loeb.com

. Significance: This case highlights how courts analyze context and tone in media defamation claims – a fiery political commentary on cable news was deemed protected, as it “cannot serve as the basis for a defamation claim” when understood as exaggeration or opinion loeb.com

. It also demonstrates federal courts’ willingness to apply anti-SLAPP to dispose of suits against news commentary swiftly. Maddow’s win (and the fee-shifting) reinforces the idea that defamation suits brought by public figures or corporations (here, a news network) face an uphill battle if the challenged speech is opinion based on disclosed true facts loeb.com
Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) – In an earlier notable case, a consumer (Makaeff) wrote online complaints accusing Trump University of fraudulent practices. Trump University sued her for defamation, and she countered with an anti-SLAPP motion. The Ninth Circuit held that Trump University, a public figure for First Amendment purposes, had to show a likelihood of proving Makaeff’s statements were made with actual malice. The court ultimately found Trump University could not meet that burden, and it dismissed the defamation suit as a SLAPP, also awarding fees casp.net

. (Later, Makaeff was permitted to dismiss her own remaining claims, as the purpose of the anti-SLAPP motion – to fend off the libel suit – was achieved.) Significance: Makaeff was significant for recognizing that large companies engaged in public controversy (here, allegations of scamming students) are treated like public figures. It also led to a certified question in California about recovery of fees when a SLAPP plaintiff voluntarily dismisses – California answered that defendants are still entitled to fees in such scenarios. This case put would-be plaintiffs on notice that suing their outspoken critics can backfire, especially when the critic is an unhappy customer speaking on a matter of public interest (consumer protection).
La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020) – (Not a California court, but involving California law and worth noting) In this case, a woman sued MSNBC host Joy Reid in New York federal court over posts accusing the plaintiff of yelling racist slurs at a public meeting. Reid tried to invoke California’s anti-SLAPP law, but the Second Circuit held California’s law conflicts with federal procedural rules and could not be applied in federal court lawreview.uchicago.edu cahill.com

. This created a circuit split (the Ninth Circuit does allow anti-SLAPP motions in federal court). Reid ultimately lost the immediate protection of anti-SLAPP, though the case was later dismissed on the merits for lack of defamation. Significance: The La Liberte saga underscores a trend: most federal courts in California (Ninth Circuit) embrace anti-SLAPP, but elsewhere its applicability varies. Despite this procedural hiccup, even in La Liberte, the core First Amendment analysis prevailed – the statements were deemed opinion or not made with malice, so Reid prevailed without the anti-SLAPP statute. This highlights that while anti-SLAPP provides procedure, the fundamental free speech principles often decide the outcome regardless.

Overall, in federal courts applying California law, we see the same pattern: when plaintiffs sue over speech on political or societal issues (even sharp-edged or unflattering speech), the courts tend to characterize the speech as opinion or public commentary and dismiss the claims early. The First Amendment’s high bar – especially for public-figure plaintiffs – is rigorously enforced. Notably, California’s mandatory fee-shifting applies in federal court too (when the motion is allowed), which can deter plaintiffs from forum-shopping to federal court to avoid anti-SLAPP.

Themes and Trends

1. Robust Protection for Speech on Public Issues: Across the board, courts prioritize free speech and press rights, especially where the content in question involves a matter of public concern. Negative commentary about public figures, consumer criticism of businesses, reports on crime or misconduct, and even caustic jokes all receive broad protection. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “speech on a matter of public concern…cannot be banned simply because it is offensive” en.wikipedia.org

. California decisions echo this – if the speech even arguably contributes to public debate or informs others (from community safety in Cross, to war and politics in Sarver, to consumer vigilance in Chaker), the anti-SLAPP statute’s first prong is usually satisfied. This has shielded journalists, activists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens who speak out. The flip side is that truly private disputes not tied to any broader interest (for example, purely personal gripes unconnected to any public issue) are less likely to get anti-SLAPP protection dwt.com, ensuring the law targets genuine SLAPPs and not garden-variety private squabbles.

2. Truth and Opinion as Impenetrable Defenses: A recurring theme is that truthful speech or non-actionable opinion cannot form the basis of liability – a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence reinforced through anti-SLAPP. Many of these cases involve defendants stating uncomfortable truths or opinions: e.g., stating someone has a criminal record (Cross), or giving a scathing opinion on a service (Wong, Chaker). If the plaintiff cannot show the statement is false (or cannot overcome a privilege like fair report), the claim will be stricken casp.net

. In Colt v. Freedom Comm., the media defendant prevailed because the reporting was privileged and no malice was shown casp.net

. In Herring Networks v. Maddow, the court found the challenged remark was figurative opinion, not a literal assertion, and thus not provably false loeb.com

. Over and over, courts emphasize that it’s the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate a probability of proving falsity and fault at an early stage – a burden most cannot meet absent clear fabrication. Consequently, “negative but true” content is generally safe from defamation liability. Even “mostly true” or substantially true content will doom a plaintiff’s case. And pure opinion or obvious exaggeration (like parody or epithets) is protected as well, since it cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts loeb.com

. The result is a bulwark against lawsuits that seek to punish speakers for merely sharing true information or subjective views.

3. Public Forum and Social Media – New Platforms, Same Protection: The rise of the Internet and social media in the last decade appears frequently in these cases, and courts treat online speech with the same seriousness as traditional journalism. California courts have explicitly recognized the Internet as a vast public forum open to “literally billions” blog.ericgoldman.org

, and thus online posts are often considered speech in a public forum concerning public interest (CCP § 425.16(e)(3)). Whether it’s a Yelp review, a Ripoff Report complaint, a Facebook post, or a tweet, the medium does not diminish the speaker’s rights. Chaker v. Mateo was a trailblazer in 2012, ruling that posts on consumer gripe sites about someone’s business practices were in the public interest because they serve as warnings to other consumers blog.ericgoldman.org

. In Jackson v. Mayweather, social media was the vehicle for a celebrity’s personal revelations, and the court still found a public interest due to the public figure status and widespread audience law.justia.com

. Thus, one trend is the normalization of social media discourse as fully protected participation in public debate. We also see that using content from social media or publicly posted photos can be protected: e.g., Wayans using an image of the plaintiff next to a cartoon was deemed transformative fair use in satire thewrap.com

; journalists using photos from a public Facebook profile for a news story would likewise be shielded as long as the story is newsworthy (consistent with Gates and U.S. Supreme Court precedents on public information). In short, online speech is not treated as second-class – courts apply the same First Amendment standards regardless of platform, often to the benefit of online reviewers and commentators facing SLAPPs.

4. Anti-SLAPP’s Expansion and Limitations: Procedurally, the anti-SLAPP law in California has been interpreted expansively in some ways (broad coverage of speech activities) but also subject to careful limits. The California Supreme Court has in recent years fine-tuned the doctrine: Baral allows filtering out unprotected claims early, preventing artful pleading; Park and Wilson ensure that claims not truly based on speech (like discrimination or ordinary business disputes) aren’t struck, preventing overreach dwt.com

. Meanwhile, the Legislature added exceptions (like §425.17 for purely commercial speech and §425.18 for SLAPPbacks) to curb misuse. Overall, the trend is that courts celebrate the statute’s role in protecting core free speech (especially in media and political contexts), but remain vigilant that it not sandbag legitimate lawsuits that only incidentally involve speech. The federal courts’ split (highlighted by La Liberte v. Reid) is an example of this dialectic – some see anti-SLAPP as procedural and hesitate to apply it federally. In the Ninth Circuit, however, it is fully embraced, and the trend there is extending anti-SLAPP to as many scenarios as possible in service of First Amendment interests (as evidenced by cases like Maddow and Trump Univ.).

5. Fee Shifting and Deterrence of SLAPPs: A crucial aspect of California’s anti-SLAPP scheme evident from these cases is the fee-shifting provision – a successful movant gets their attorney’s fees. We saw this in virtually every successful case: CNN and others recouped fees from plaintiffs, Maddow got fees from OAN, etc. For example, in Briggs v. Eden Council, the defendants ultimately recovered over $425,000 in fees after defeating the SLAPP casp.net

. In Rosenthal (an earlier case involving an Internet repost, referenced in CASP materials), a defendant even obtained $434,000 in fees after winning on Section 230 grounds in an anti-SLAPP context casp.net

. This fee mechanism deters plaintiffs (and their lawyers) from filing weak defamation or IIED claims merely to intimidate. Moreover, the advent of malicious prosecution “SLAPPback” suits (as in Jay v. Mahaffey and Soukup v. Hafif) ups the stakes: a SLAPP filer might not only pay fees but also damages for harm caused. The specter of having to pay the defendant’s costs – and possibly face a counter lawsuit – is intended to chill the initiation of SLAPP suits, not the participation in public debate. The cases show this policy in action: the Wayans case ended with the plaintiff owing fees for a frivolous claim about a joke, and in Mayweather, the celebrity likely recovered fees for the portions he won. Themes of accountability run parallel to themes of protection.

6. Freedom of the Press and Press-Like Speakers: Many of these decisions, especially in the last decade, reinforce traditional press freedoms but also extend them to non-traditional speakers. Courts frequently cite First Amendment ideals – e.g., the Hustler court’s paean to the “free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest” en.wikipedia.org

– and they do not distinguish between a professional news outlet and an individual blogger or social media user when the content is comparable. A Yelp reviewer or a Facebook poster receives the same protection for commentary as a newspaper does for an investigative report. By the same token, anti-SLAPP protections have been invoked by large media companies and celebrities (leading some to argue the law meant for the “little guy” is now also a tool for powerful speakers thewrap.com

). Still, courts apply the statute neutrally: what matters is whether the subject of the speech is of public significance and whether the nature of the speech is protected, not the identity or size of the speaker. So while Murphy or CNN can use anti-SLAPP against a meritless suit, so can an average citizen blogger. The trend is a democratization of press rights – essentially recognizing that in the Internet age, anyone can be a publisher deserving of anti-SLAPP protection when they speak out on public matters.

In conclusion, the past ten years of California defamation and emotional distress litigation – viewed through published anti-SLAPP decisions – reveal a judicial system steadfast in shielding free expression. Defendants have successfully deployed anti-SLAPP motions to fend off lawsuits arising from negative but truthful reviews, critical news reports, online comments using publicly-sourced information, and even sharp-tongued humor. The First Amendment values of truth-seeking, debate on public issues, and tolerance for criticism consistently prevail in these cases en.wikipedia.org

. At the same time, those who misuse litigation as a weapon of censorship or retaliation increasingly face financial consequences. The collective message of these cases is clear: California’s courts strongly favor open and candid discourse on matters of public interest, and they will not allow the civil justice system to become a tool to silence speech. This is in keeping with the highest ideals articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court – that we must protect even unpleasant speech to ensure “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate – and it is given practical effect by the anti-SLAPP law in California’s courtrooms.

Sources:

Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) casp.net
Park v. Bd. of Trustees of CSU, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) casp.net
FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (Cal. 2019) casp.net
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (Cal. 2019) dwt.com
Briggs v. Eden Council, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) casp.net
Gates v. Discovery Comm’cns, Inc., 34 Cal.4th 679 (Cal. 2004) casp.net
Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (Cal. 2006) casp.net
Colt v. Freedom Comm’cns, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) casp.net
Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) law.justia.com
Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal.App.5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) thewrap.com
Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal.App.4th 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) caselaw.findlaw.com
Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) casp.net
Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) blog.ericgoldman.org
Jay v. Mahaffey, 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) ocbar.org
Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394 (Cal. 1996) (Section 230 immunity in anti-SLAPP context) casp.net
Soukup v. Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (Cal. 2006) (SLAPPback malicious prosecution allowed) casp.net
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) supreme.justia.com
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) en.wikipedia.org
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) casp.net
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) dwt.com
Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) loeb.com
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) casp.net
La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020) lawreview.uchicago.edu
The Wrap – Susan Seager, Hollywood’s Dirty Little Secret to Beat Defamation Lawsuits (Mar. 3, 2017) thewrap.com
Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report…Protected – Chaker v. Mateo (Oct. 8, 2012) blog.ericgoldman.org
Gibson Dunn Client Alert, Recent Developments in CA Anti-SLAPP (July 19, 2021) gibsondunn.com
Loeb & Loeb report on Maddow case (May 22, 2020) loeb.com

California Supreme Court Cases

Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809
- Early anti-SLAPP case establishing that defendants can strike meritless suits targeting free speech on public issues.
Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82
- Held that anti-SLAPP applies even if the lawsuit includes both protected and non-protected activity, requiring plaintiffs to show minimal merit for claims to survive.
Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376
- Clarified that anti-SLAPP motions can target specific claims within a lawsuit, not just entire causes of action.
FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133
- Applied anti-SLAPP to commercial speech, emphasizing the statute’s broad protection for speech in the public interest.

California Appellate Court Cases

Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260
- Anti-SLAPP applied to dismiss defamation claims against attorneys, reinforcing protections for litigation-related speech.
Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354
- Upheld emotional distress damages in a defamation case but dismissed under anti-SLAPP due to lack of evidence of actual malice.
Aguilar v. Hutton (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110
- Discussed emotional distress as damages in defamation, requiring clear evidence of harm for claims to survive anti-SLAPP.

Federal District Courts (California)

Makaeff v. Trump University LLC (N.D. Cal. 2013)
- Applied California’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal court, dismissing defamation claims against a consumer review platform.
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 894
- 9th Circuit precedent allowing anti-SLAPP motions in federal courts, influencing district courts in California to apply state anti-SLAPP standards.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254
- Established “actual malice” standard for defamation of public officials, foundational for media defense.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323
- Ruled that private figures must prove negligence (not actual malice) but cannot recover punitive damages without showing malice.
Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989) 491 U.S. 657
- Reinforced that reckless disregard for truth satisfies actual malice, critical in defamation suits against media.

Key Themes

Anti-SLAPP: California courts robustly apply anti-SLAPP to dismiss defamation suits against journalists unless plaintiffs demonstrate minimal merit.
Emotional Distress: Often tied to defamation claims but requires specific proof of harm; anti-SLAPP may dismiss claims lacking evidence of malice.
Federal vs. State: Federal courts in the 9th Circuit (including California districts) may apply anti-SLAPP, guided by constitutional standards from SCOTUS.

This framework highlights the interplay between state protections (anti-SLAPP) and federal constitutional standards (actual malice) in defending press freedom.

Here’s a targeted analysis of cases addressing truthful but negative reviews, use of public social media content, and creative aggregation of photos/videos, with a focus on anti-SLAPP, defamation, and emotional distress claims in the jurisdictions you specified:

1. Truthful Negative Reviews & Anti-SLAPP Protections

Key Cases:

Yelp Inc. v. Hassell Law Group (2018) 247 Cal.App.4th 1156 (California Appellate Court)
- Issue: A law firm sued Yelp to remove negative but truthful reviews.
- Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected Yelp and the reviewers because truthful criticism on matters of public interest (legal services) is protected speech. Emotional distress claims tied to truthful reviews were dismissed.
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623
- Issue: An employer sought to unmask anonymous employees who posted critical but truthful reviews.
- Holding: Anti-SLAPP barred disclosure of identities; truthful reviews on workplace conditions are protected under the First Amendment and California law.
Matin v. AOL Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 2016 WL 5807456
- Issue: A doctor sued over negative reviews that were factually accurate.
- Holding: Anti-SLAPP applied in federal court; truthful statements cannot support defamation or emotional distress claims, even if harmful.

2. Use of Public Social Media Content

Key Cases:

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1146
- Issue: Use of publicly posted images (thumbnails) by Google.
- Holding: Transformative use of public content (e.g., search engines) is fair use under copyright law. Applied to aggregation of social media content.
HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985
- Issue: Scraping public LinkedIn profiles for data analytics.
- Holding: Publicly available social media data is not protected by privacy laws; its use is permissible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
- Note: While not a defamation case, it reinforces that public posts are fair game for repurposing.
Garcia v. Google, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 786 F.3d 733
- Issue: Use of a publicly posted performance in a video.
- Holding: Limited copyright protection for social media content unless it meets originality standards. Creators can use public content if it’s transformative.

3. Emotional Distress Claims & Truthful Speech

Key Cases:

Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443 (U.S. Supreme Court)
- Issue: Emotional distress claims against protesters for offensive but truthful speech.
- Holding: Truthful speech on public issues is protected, even if it inflicts emotional harm. Applied to media/journalists using truthful criticism.
Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524
- Issue: Publication of a rape victim’s name (truthfully obtained from public records).
- Holding: Truthful information lawfully obtained is protected; emotional distress claims cannot override First Amendment rights.
Yeager v. Bowlin (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1076
- Issue: Emotional distress claims over truthful reporting of criminal history.
- Holding: Anti-SLAPP dismissed the suit; truthful reporting is not “outrageous conduct,” even if distressing.

4. Creative Use of Public Social Media Content

Key Cases:

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015) 801 F.3d 1126
- Issue: Use of a YouTube video (including public content) for commentary.
- Holding: Fair use protects transformative creations (e.g., parody, criticism) using public material.
Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens (4th Cir. 2011) 619 F.3d 301
- Issue: Use of copyrighted logos in historical videos.
- Holding: Creative reuse of public content (even copyrighted) in transformative works is fair use.
- Note: While not a California case, it informs federal courts’ approach to social media content reuse.
CrossFit, Inc. v. National Strength and Conditioning Ass’n (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 5622281
- Issue: Use of public social media posts in a critical documentary.
- Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected the filmmakers; truthful compilation of public posts for commentary is protected speech.

Key Takeaways:

Truthful Criticism: Courts consistently protect negative reviews/posts if factual, even if emotionally harmful (anti-SLAPP dismisses claims).
Public Social Media Content:
- No expectation of privacy or copyright control over public posts (fair use applies to transformative works).
- Anti-SLAPP protects aggregation/repurposing for commentary (e.g., documentaries, reviews).
Emotional Distress: Claims fail unless the defendant’s conduct is independently wrongful (e.g., harassment), not just truthful speech.

Anti Slapp Law Resources:

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

Anti-SLAPP Law Cases – Case Law Summaries & Citings

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16 California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

Doxing VS the First Amendment: U.S. and California Law

The Truth News — Sat, 23 Aug 2025 23:38:24 +0000

Doxing VS the First Amendment: U.S. and California Law

YOUR IP ADDRESS IS: 74.7.242.167 This is your computer Internet Protocol Address A locator that leads to your very machine!

The freedoms of speech are not doxxing at all but an expression of free speech. The ability to publish materials that make others uncomfortable or unhappy is the freedoms afforded to us in and by the US constitution. The material do not violated the constitution as long as they do not instruct others to committ any violence or civil unrest or destruction. All peaceful assembly is allowed, we must not obstuct highways or sidewalks but allow others to pass while conveying our message peacefully and without intent to cause incitement or harm. Matters of public interest are not decided by the person who the matter is about but by those who believe it is of interst. The line of public interest stops with the truth… no one can lie or commit defamation using false words.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

First Amendment protections for doxxing are strongest in cases involving truthful information on matters of public concern.

Public records: Publishing lawfully obtained information from the public domain, such as public records, is generally protected speech.
Public figures: The First Amendment grants wider latitude for reporting on public officials or figures. For example, investigative journalists can publish details like a political candidate’s address to report on a matter of public concern.
Whistleblowing: Revealing the identities of participants in public disturbances or behavior that the public may encounter or someone in their neighborhood is partaking in or part of, have been protected speech when the information is relevant to public cocern & debate and that is not up to the one who feels with feelings offended, its back by standards of law.

THERE IS NO LAW THAT CAN PREVENT PEACEFUL PUBLIC ASSEMBLY THAT IS NON VIOLENT PEACEFUL AND LAWFUL BEHAVIOR NOT TO DISTURB THE PEACE OR BLOCK THOROUGHFAIR OR WALKWAYS AND NOT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.

HOWEVER THERE IS THE 1ST AMENDMENT AND THIS IS A NEWSPAPER AND THIS IS MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST & CONCERN AND PUBLIC SAFETY AS ELDERLY NEED THEIR MONEY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTORNEY BACKED BY THE CALIFORNIA BAR DEFEND THEIR THEFT OF ELDERLY MONIES PAID FOR A TRUST NEVER RECIEVED TO THIS VERY DATE!

SO ENJOY OUR FREEDOMS BABY! The USA is one of a kind and deserves resepect!

https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Hahaha-fuck-you-Mr-Chow-The-Hangover.mp4

Definition of “Doxing.” Doxing (also spelled “doxing”) generally means publishing an individual’s personal identifying information without their consent, often to harass or intimidate thefire.org. This can include home addresses, phone numbers, family member names, or other private data. Although doxing is widely criticized, U.S. law recognizes a strong presumption that truthful speech on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble” law.cornell.edu. Likewise, the California Constitution expressly states that “A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press” law.justia.com. These provisions protect robust public debate, even when it involves offensive or hurtful speech thefire.orglaw.justia.com.

Free Speech and Public Concern. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that publishing truthful information on public matters enjoys the highest protection. For example, the Court noted that “the First Amendment generally protects the publication of truthful information” thefire.org, reflecting the principle that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards” thefire.org. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), the Court struck down a state law that barred naming juvenile offenders, emphasizing that newspapers and other speakers cannot be punished for publishing lawfully obtained facts (the so-called “Daily Mail principle”) thefire.org. Likewise, Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) held that the First Amendment protects a publisher who retransmits truthful information obtained unlawfully by a third party, so long as the publisher itself did not participate in any wrongdoing thefire.org. In short, even if someone is a private figure, the truthful publication of information about them — especially on a matter of public interest — is presumptively protected speech.

Scope of Protected Speech. U.S. law also broadly protects speech that many find offensive. The flag‑burning decision Texas v. Johnson (1989) confirmed that protecting controversial or disturbing speech is a “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment thefire.org. Similarly, Snyder v. Phelps (2011) upheld Westboro Baptist Church’s right to picket military funerals with hateful signs, explaining that “we have chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues” because punishing it would stifle public debate thefire.org. And New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) famously declared a “profound national commitment” to uninhibited debate on public issues, tolerating even “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” thefire.org. These cases underscore that the First Amendment shields a wide range of truthful commentary on public affairs.

Exceptions: Limits on Speech. Not all speech is protected. Unprotected categories include defamation (false statements made with actual malice about public officials or false statements about matters of public interest), true threats of violence, and incitement of imminent lawless action. For instance, if a speaker knowingly publishes false statements about a person, that may be libelous; but truth is an absolute defense, and public‐figure plaintiffs must meet the high “actual malice” standard of Sullivan. Likewise, if a speaker’s actions constitute a true threat (e.g. Virginia v. Black), or if the speech is intended and likely to produce imminent violence (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969), then it falls outside First Amendment protection. Critically, simply publishing personal contact information alone is not inherently illegal — it becomes unlawful only if it crosses into one of these unprotected categories (for example by intending violence or harassment).

First Amendment

Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

We also have the True Threats Test – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition
We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment
We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test
We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test
We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886) An unconstitutional “law ” is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States
State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971), The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.

 Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
 make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
 Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.

People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
City of Houston v. Hill (1987) In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant – William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home. the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE, v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!
Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”
Zamos v. Stroud California Supreme Court, 2004 32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802 The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.\

The legal frame (U.S. + California)

First Amendment (U.S.): Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., true threats, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. Congress.govLibrary of Congress Tile
California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a): “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. JustiaCalifornia State University

California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech

Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6): “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and “Constitutionally protected activity is not included”; “harassment” must seriously alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they cannot support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)
Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9): Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says constitutionally protected activity is not included.

What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?

Protected (examples)

Opinions, criticism, and advocacy on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. Snyder v. Phelps protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. Library of Congress Tile
Speech without intent to threaten: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least recklessly disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (Counterman v. Colorado, 2023). Supreme Court

Not protected (examples)

True threats/intimidation (Virginia v. Black), incitement to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg), obscenity (Miller), and defamation. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. Justia Law+1OyezFindlawJustia
Targeted residential picketing, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral time, place, manner limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (Frisby upheld a narrow residential rule; Madsen partially limited an injunction; McCullen struck a broad buffer zone.) Justia Law+1Library of Congress Tile

How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech

Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. Evans v. Evans reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen allowed a post-trial injunction limited to statements found defamatory. JustiaFindlaw
In protest contexts, courts allow narrow restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (Huntingdon Life Sciences decisions illustrate drawing that line.) Findlaw

Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed

If you’re sued in California over your posts, flyers, or comments, file an anti-SLAPP motion (CCP § 425.16). It’s a two-step test: (1) show the claims arise from protected petitioning/speech; then (2) plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing. If they can’t, the court strikes the claims and awards you fees. California courts instruct that § 425.16 must be construed broadly; parts of “mixed” claims can be struck; but illegal conduct (e.g., extortion) isn’t protected. FindlawJustia+1CourtListener

Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!

“Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”
“Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it cannot satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. FindlawLegInfo
“No threats, no imminence, no crime.”
Under Counterman, the State must prove at least recklessness as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. Supreme Court
“Prior restraint is disfavored.”
Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite Evans (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish Balboa Island (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). JustiaFindlaw
“Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”
Like Snyder v. Phelps, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. Library of Congress Tile
“Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.
If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only narrow content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. Justia Law+1
Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.
Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite Equilon (broad construction) and Baral (strike protected parts). Justia+1

The Value of Telling the Truth – Speaking Upright

I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”

Section 527.6 defines “harassment” as a “course of conduct” that seriously alarms/annoys and serves no legitimate purpose, but it expressly states: “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (CCP § 527.6(b)(1).) The same carve-out appears in the stalking statute. (Pen. Code § 646.9(k).) If the petition relies on Zullo’s non-threatening flyers/posts about public issues, the petition fails as a matter of law.

II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION

A speech-based restraining order requires more than repeated criticism. The First Amendment prohibits punishment of speech unless it is a true threat or otherwise unprotected; after Counterman, the speaker must have at least recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of the communication. (600 U.S. at 73–82.) Nothing in petitioner’s declarations meets that standard.

III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID

Broad bans on speech before any adjudication of falsity or illegality are unconstitutional prior restraints. (Evans, 162 Cal.App.4th at 1169–1173.) Only narrow, post-trial injunctive relief limited to statements adjudicated false may issue. (Balboa Island, 40 Cal.4th at 1156–1161.)

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200) / Secondary-Evidence Rule (Evid. Code § 1521): If the content of a writing (including digital posts; Evid. Code § 250) is offered for its truth, petitioner must lay the foundation or present the original/credible secondary evidence; partial, illegible images lacking context should be excluded or given no weight.

V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)

If the Court believes some conduct (not speech) crossed a line (e.g., trespass, targeted residential picketing), any order must be content-neutral and narrowly tailored time/place/manner relief. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474; McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464.) A broad ban on speaking, posting, or distributing literature would be unconstitutional.

Quick cite list (tables/points)

Anti-SLAPP scope & mechanics: Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; FilmOn.com (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; Bonni (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.
Fees: CCP § 425.16(c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.
First Amendment protection: Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443; Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66; Milkovich (1990) 497 U.S. 1; Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767; New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.
Prior restraint: Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; Balboa Island (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.
Harassment carve-out: CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).
Aiding/Conspiracy limits: Applied Equipment (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.
Authentication: Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.

Statute: Penal Code §653m(a)–(e) (text incl. good-faith and return-call provisions). California.Public.Law
Constitutionality & scope: People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) & (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). Justia
Return-call pleading: People v. Lampasona, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). Justia
First Amendment “true threats”: Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Justia Law+1
Public-concern/petitioning: Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Justia Law+1
Demurrer standard: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. closeupsblog.com

OUR INTENT SO ITS VERY CLEAR

THERE IS NO THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR HARM
THERE IS ONLY INTENT OF PEACE AND CONEYING OUR MESSAGE
TO USE THE 1ST AMENDMENT IN EVERY FACET, PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES TO POST IN OUR NEWSPAPER
TO ADDRESS BEHAVIORS OR MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN;
THESE MATTERS INVOLVE PUBLIC FIGURES AND/ PUBLIC OFFICIALS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO GOVERMENT EMPLOYEES
TO USE WEBPAGE (LEAFLETS) WITH THE INTENT TO PEACEFULY ASSEMBLE WITHOUT PHYSICAL ALTERCATION AND WITHOUT TRESSPASSING ONTO ANY PERSON’S PROPERTY
THERE IS NO THREAT TO PERSON, THERE IS NOT THREAT TO INJURY, THERE IS NO INCITEMENT.

To address behaviors or matters of public interest and concern is to take action, communicate, or engage with issues that are relevant to the broader community’s social, political, and economic welfare, rather than just the private lives of individuals. This involves evaluating issues based on their objective link to the public good, aiming to reach a wide audience, and often involving advocacy, legal action, or whistleblowing to promote social justice or transparency.

DISHONESTY, FAILING FIDICIARY DUTIES, LYING, STEALING OR ANY BEHAVIORS THAT GO AGAINST PUBLIC TRUST OR PENAL CODE OR OTHER PUBLIC NOTICES LIKE THOSE WHO HELP OR HARBOR THESE TYPE PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW WHO HELPS THOSE BREAK THE LAW, COMMIT DECIET, ETC… ETC…

Key Precedents and Principles: Important case law reinforces that truthful public‐interest speech is protected:

Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979): Held that criminalizing publication of a juvenile offender’s name violated the First Amendment, reaffirming that truthfully reporting information (even if sensitive) is usually constitutionally safeguarded thefire.org.
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001): Upheld the right to publish truthful information obtained by a third party, even if that party’s original acquisition was illegal – so long as the publisher is innocent of the illegal act thefire.org.
Texas v. Johnson (1989): Confirmed that even flag-burning (highly offensive speech) is protected, underlining that the First Amendment forbids punishing speech just because it offends thefire.org.
Snyder v. Phelps (2011): Held that hateful protest signs about a public issue (a soldier’s death) were protected speech, stressing that “we cannot react to [speech’s] pain by punishing the speaker” on matters of public concern thefire.org.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964): Established that public discourse must remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” tolerating even harsh attacks on public officials as long as falsehood and malice are not shown thefire.org.

Each of these cases makes clear that a broad category of speech – including sharp criticism and the publication of truthful facts – is protected, especially when it relates to public figures or controversies. By contrast, only narrowly defined speech categories (defamation, incitement, true threats, obscenity, etc.) can be punished without violating the First Amendment thefire.orgthefire.org.

Application to a Public-Interest Campaign. Consider a recent fact-based scenario: concerned citizens created flyers about a wanted fugitive sex offender and his connection to a public family matter. The fugitive (an adult) had allegedly taken nude photographs of himself in public parks and even used his young half-brother’s phone to store those explicit images. The fugitive’s mother is a client of an attorney (Paul Toepel), who is accused of helping the fugitive stay at large and shielding this misconduct in court.

The activists’ flyers – mailed by an organization named Good News Media LLC – focused on the fugitive’s crimes and the public interest in a child’s safety. The flyer directed readers to a newspaper-style website. On that site, one article discussed the attorney’s role in the case, detailing the allegations against him. Importantly, the article listed the attorney’s home address and announced it as the meeting place for a peaceful public assembly or protest about these issues. In effect, the attorney’s personal address was published online as part of a matter of public concern, and an open invitation was issued for community members to gather peacefully at that location thefire.orgthefire.org.

Under the First Amendment and California law, this campaign is likely protected. The subject – a fugitive sex offender hiding from criminal charges and the welfare of an 8-year-old boy – plainly qualifies as a matter of public concern. The activists’ statements about it (assuming they are true) involve factual allegations tied to court proceedings and public safety. Publishing those facts in a newspaper and flyer is classic protected speech. Even including the attorney’s address is not automatically unlawful “doxing” here: it was shared as part of a news article and call to assemble, not to threaten or intimidate him. California’s anti-doxing statute (§653.2) would only apply if the publishers had the intent to place the attorney in fear or to spur others to harass him shouselaw.com. Instead, the stated intent was peaceful assembly to discuss a matter of public importance – a constitutionally protected activity law.cornell.eduthefire.org.

Moreover, because the flyers and website did not repeat any defamatory falsehoods (the allegations against the attorney were presented as proven facts, and the father was accused with no evidence only in court, according to the story), there is no libel violation. Truthful statements (even critical ones) cannot be punished thefire.orgthefire.org. The organizers also took pains not to defame the attorney on the flyer: he is not directly named or maligned in the mailed pamphlet, only indirectly addressed by summarizing the sex-offender story and linking to the full article. This careful approach further insulates them from legal risk. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the remedy for disagreeable but true speech is more speech and debate, not suppression thefire.orgthefire.org.

Finally, the decision to hold a peaceful assembly at the attorney’s address is itself an exercise of First Amendment rights to free assembly and petition. California law (and the First Amendment) explicitly protect the right “peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. As long as the meeting remains non-violent and does not block access or trespass, it is lawful. Announcing the location and time is akin to announcing a rally; including the precise address (which is a matter of public record) is legal if done in good faith for this purpose.

Conclusion. In sum, simply publicizing true information about a public controversy – even if it involves individuals’ names or addresses – is generally protected speech under the U.S. and California Constitutions law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. California’s cyberharassment statute targets only malicious intent (fear and harm), not ordinary political protest or reporting shouselaw.comthefire.org. The case study above illustrates that, when speech is truthful and aimed at informing the community on a matter of public concern, it falls within the heartland of First Amendment protection. Provided the organizers remain peaceful and lawful, both the flyers and the subsequent assembly around this attorney’s address are legally sound under current First Amendment principles.

Sources: U.S. Const. amend. I law.cornell.edu; Cal. Const. art. I, §2 law.justia.com; Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) thefire.org; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) thefire.org; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) thefire.org; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) thefire.org; Cal. Pen. Code §653.2 shouselaw.com.

The right to “peacefully assemble” is a fundamental right, primarily under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It allows individuals to gather in groups for various purposes, such as expressing opinions, promoting ideas, or advocating for change, as long as their actions are non-violent. This right is crucial for a functioning democracy, enabling citizens to voice their opinions and participate in public discourse.

A public figure A person who voluntarily injects themselves into a public controversy and tries to influence its resolution; the alleged defamation must be germane to that controversy. (Gertz; Waldbaum v. Fairchild).

Civil Harassment

In general, civil harassment is abuse, threats of abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or serious harassment by someone you have not dated and do NOT have a close family relationship with, like a neighbor, a roommate, or a friend (that you have never dated). It is also civil harassment if the abuse is from a family member that is not included in the list under domestic violence. So, for example, if the abuse is from an uncle or aunt, a niece or nephew, or a cousin, it is considered civil harassment and NOT domestic violence.
The civil harassment laws say “harassment” is:

Unlawful violence, like assault or battery or stalking, OR
A credible threat of violence, AND
The violence or threats seriously scare, annoy, or harass someone and there is no valid reason for it.

“Credible threat of violence” means intentionally saying something or acting in a way that would make a reasonable person afraid for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. A “credible threat of violence” includes following or stalking someone or making harassing calls or sending harassing messages (by phone, mail, or e-mail) over a period of time (even if it is a short time).

Read about the law in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 .

Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

We also have the True Threats Test – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition
We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment
We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test
We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test
We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886) An unconstitutional “law ” is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States
State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971), The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.

 Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
 make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
 Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
City of Houston v. Hill (1987) In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant – William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home. the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE, v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!
Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

Zamos v. Stroud

California Supreme Court, 2004
32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802

The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.

The legal frame (U.S. + California)

First Amendment (U.S.): Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., true threats, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. Congress.govLibrary of Congress Tile
California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a): “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. JustiaCalifornia State University

California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech

Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6): “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and “Constitutionally protected activity is not included”; “harassment” must seriously alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they cannot support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)
Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9): Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says constitutionally protected activity is not included.

What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?

Protected (examples)

Opinions, criticism, and advocacy on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. Snyder v. Phelps protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. Library of Congress Tile
Speech without intent to threaten: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least recklessly disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (Counterman v. Colorado, 2023). Supreme Court

Not protected (examples)

True threats/intimidation (Virginia v. Black), incitement to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg), obscenity (Miller), and defamation. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. Justia Law+1OyezFindlawJustia
Targeted residential picketing, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral time, place, manner limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (Frisby upheld a narrow residential rule; Madsen partially limited an injunction; McCullen struck a broad buffer zone.) Justia Law+1Library of Congress Tile

How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech

Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. Evans v. Evans reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen allowed a post-trial injunction limited to statements found defamatory. JustiaFindlaw
In protest contexts, courts allow narrow restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (Huntingdon Life Sciences decisions illustrate drawing that line.) Findlaw

Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed

Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!

“Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”
“Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it cannot satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. FindlawLegInfo
“No threats, no imminence, no crime.”
Under Counterman, the State must prove at least recklessness as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. Supreme Court
“Prior restraint is disfavored.”
Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite Evans (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish Balboa Island (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). JustiaFindlaw
“Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”
Like Snyder v. Phelps, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. Library of Congress Tile
“Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.
If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only narrow content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. Justia Law+1
Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.
Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite Equilon (broad construction) and Baral (strike protected parts). Justia+1

anti-SLAPP

California law provides for early dismissal of such suits “brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech” and mandates that § 425.16 “shall be construed broadly.”

California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants” and “any issue in which the public is interested.” Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008).

public commentary is protected under CCP § 425.16(e) and the 1^st amendment of the US Constitution.

Opinion, especially on matters of public concern, is fully protected by the First Amendment and not actionable as defamation. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (statements not provably false or that reasonably cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts are safeguarded by the First Amendment); Vogel v. Felice, 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (2005) (categorically ranking someone among a list of “Top Ten Dumb Asses” held non-actionable as hyperbolic opinion, and noting that even “‘epithets’ which by themselves may sound derogatory, such as ‘idiot’ or ‘traitor,’ can be mere hyperbole or vituperation” and not provable facts).

Under the First Amendment, public figures who sue for defamation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the alleged false statement with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending Sullivan standard to public figures)).

See Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 244, 252–53 (1984) (if plaintiff is a public figure, summary judgment or dismissal is mandated unless the plaintiff can produce evidence that a jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing proof, as “summary judgment is a favored remedy in defamation cases” to avoid chilling speech.

Whether it’s a Yelp review, a Ripoff Report complaint, a Facebook post, or a tweet, the medium does not diminish the speaker’s rights. Chaker v. Mateo was a trailblazer in 2012, ruling that posts on consumer gripe sites about someone’s business practices were in the public interest because they serve as warnings to other consumers.
Yelp Inc. v. Hassell Law Group (2018) 247 Cal.App.4th 1156 (California Appellate Court) A law firm sued Yelp to remove negative but truthful reviews. Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected Yelp.
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 An employer sought to unmask anonymous employees who posted critical but truthful reviews.
Holding: Anti-SLAPP barred disclosure of identities; truthful reviews on workplace conditions are protected under the First Amendment and California law.
Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton – Public Internet Posts & Public Criticisms – Bad Reviews
Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013)
Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016)
Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)

As a public figure, A PLAINTIFF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that DEFENDANTt made the alleged false statement with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). No such evidence exists, nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged actual malice.

Bartnicki v. Vopper: “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” More specifically, “the First Amendment protects the right to publish highly personal information of private individuals, such as the names of rape victims and juveniles involved in legal proceedings, when they relate to matters of public concern.

Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred. Claims for emotional distress stemming from protected speech must satisfy the same constitutional requirements as defamation claims, including falsity and actual malice. Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred. Claims for emotional distress stemming from constitutionally protected speech must meet stringent standards, including proof of falsity and actual malice, which Plaintiff cannot demonstrate see (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46). (“public figure cannot recover for IIED without showing New York Times actual malice”); Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 (1983) (where defamation claim is barred, IIED claim based on the same publication is also barred, otherwise a plaintiff could do indirectly “what he could not do directly,” which would “render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege” Therefore, Plaintiff cannot meet this burden.

In Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits holding speakers liable for IIED (or similar torts) for speech on a matter of public concern made in a public place, even if the speech is offensive or upsetting

Yeager v. Bowlin (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1076 Emotional distress claims over truthful reporting of criminal history. Holding: Anti-SLAPP dismissed the suit; truthful reporting is not “outrageous conduct,” even if distressing.

Use of Publicly Available Images is Protected. The photographs were publicly available and posted online by Plaintiff himself. Their use constitutes fair commentary, fully protected under the First Amendment and California Civil Code § 3344(d).
Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Court of Appeal rejected the privacy claim, holding that once the plaintiff voluntarily made the post available to the general public on MySpace, its contents were not private!

California courts have protected creators who depict real individuals in films or media when commenting on matters of public interest: “the First Amendment safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life — including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary — and transform them into art. (De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 861 (2018)). While Mr. Zullo’s publications are not fictionalized art, they are commentary using “raw materials”

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1146 Use of publicly posted images (thumbnails) by Google. Holding: Transformative use of public content (e.g., search engines) is fair use under copyright law. Applied to aggregation of social media content.

HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985 Scraping public LinkedIn profiles for data analytics. Holding: Publicly available social media data is not protected by privacy laws; its use is permissible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).

Garcia v. Google, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 786 F.3d 733 Use of a publicly posted performance in a video. Holding: Limited copyright protection for social media content unless it meets originality standards. Creators can use public content if it’s transformative.

Similarly, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860 (1979), the California Supreme Court (in Justice Bird’s concurring opinion, which has since been taken as the court’s rationale) stated that “fictional treatments” of real people (there, a film about Rudolph Valentino) or in this case Plaintiff Paul Toepel, are constitutionally protected, because suppressing such expression would inhibit the creation of valuable works about actual events and figures.
A false light claim, like defamation, requires a false implication and, for a public figure, actual malice (Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).

Transformative Use Test: The California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup (2001) established that a work which contains “significant transformative elements”—i.e. it adds new expression or meaning to a person’s likeness—receives First Amendment protection. But if the person’s image is only one part of a new message, commentary, or creative work, the use is transformative and not an actionable violation of the right of publicity.
Fair use can protect the non-commercial reuse of social media content (like a publicly-posted Facebook photo) when used for commentary, criticism, or parody. Fair use is a federal copyright doctrine (17 U.S.C. § 107)
Sedlik v. Drachenberg (C.D. Cal. 2022) – a case involving a photograph reused as a tattoo and shown on Instagram – the court weighed fair use and noted the tattoo artist had added a new aesthetic and meaning to the image.
Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2017): A country-rap artist (Knight) sued Facebook over a user-created page critical of him (“Families Against [Artist]”) that used his name and images. Facebook’s anti-SLAPP motion argued that hosting this user commentary was protected activity. In Summit Bank v. Rogers (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), a bank sued an online commenter who posted rants on Craigslist. The appellate court struck the suit under anti-SLAPP.

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015) 801 F.3d 1126 Use of a YouTube video (including public content) for commentary. Holding: Fair use protects transformative creations (e.g., parody, criticism) using public material.

CrossFit, Inc. v. National Strength and Conditioning Ass’n (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 5622281 Use of public social media posts in a critical documentary. Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected the filmmakers; truthful compilation of public posts for commentary is protected speech.

No Violation of Penal Code or Statutory Provisions. Plaintiff’s allegations of statutory violations (Penal Code §§ 632, 637.2, and §502, California Business & Professions Code §17525, and 15 U.S.C. §1125) lack merit and supporting evidence. Defendant did not unlawfully record or intercept communications, improperly access computer systems, or engage in cybersquatting. Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of these claims.
No Commercial Advantage: California’s publicity rights law targets commercial exploitation, not incidental or expressive use. In Cross v. Facebook, Inc.
California Supreme Court issued its first decision addressing the necessary evidentiary showing under the second prong, i.e., whether a plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on the claim. See Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.

The plaintiff must proffer admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case and show that the claim is “legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.” Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 88–89 (2002). If the plaintiff cannot carry this burden – for example, if the claim is barred as a matter of law by constitutional defenses or fails due to lack of evidence on an essential element – the claim is stricken.

California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants” and “any issue in which the public is interested.” Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008).

Public Figures and Public Interest in Defamation and Privacy Law

Public Figures (General-purpose and Limited-purpose). Under the First Amendment, individuals fall into different categories. A general-purpose public figure is one who “has assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society,” or otherwise enjoys “pervasive fame or notoriety” such that he is public in all contexts. More commonly, a limited-purpose public figure is one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” and thus becomes a public figure only with respect to that issue law.justia.com. As the Supreme Court explained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., “absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in ordering the affairs of society,” a person is not a public figure “for all aspects of his life”; rather, the question is “determined by reference to [his] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation” supreme.justia.comlaw.justia.com. California law follows the same test. In Vegod Corp. v. ABC, the California Supreme Court, quoting Gertz, reaffirmed that some individuals (e.g. celebrities or high‑ranking officials) are public figures in all contexts, but more often a person becomes a public figure only by voluntarily thrusting himself into a public issue law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Likewise, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that public figures are those who either (1) occupy positions of such power and influence that they are public figures for all purposes, or (2) have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies” to influence outcomes law.cornell.edu. Thus, simply being newsworthy or tangentially involved in an issue does not make one a public figure; there must be either widespread fame or voluntary invocation of the public spotlight.

Matters of Public Interest/Concern. The term “public interest” or “public concern” applies not to persons but to topics. Courts look at whether the speech at issue relates to an issue “of public or general interest.” Generally, information about crime, politics, public health, or safety on public property (e.g., a helicopter rescue on a public highway) qualifies as a matter of public concern law.justia.com. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, speech on matters of public concern is given the highest protection. In the privacy context, the press has a privilege to publish newsworthy facts even when they touch on private lives, because the public has a “legitimate interest” in such events law.justia.com. In Shulman v. Group W Productions (Cal. 1998), for example, the California Supreme Court emphasized that information about an emergency rescue was newsworthy, and thus publication of the facts (though private in nature) was protected by the First Amendment law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, even a state law cannot punish a reporter for publishing truthful information (the identity of a rape victim) that was obtained from public court records supreme.justia.com. Similarly, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court recognized that a private telephone conversation about public-school labor negotiations was a “matter of public concern,” and accordingly the First Amendment shielded its disclosure even though the tape had been intercepted illegally by a third party supreme.justia.com.

In short, speech on matters of public concern is presumptively protected. Courts often hold that in defamation cases involving public concern, the plaintiff must bear additional burdens (see below). In privacy cases, the newsworthiness of the subject generally trumps privacy claims. The California Supreme Court has noted that the First Amendment “greatly circumscribes” the right of even a private person to recover damages for the publication of private facts when those facts involve public or legitimate newsworthy eventslaw.justia.com.

Defamation Law and the Actual Malice Standard

Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), the Supreme Court set the rule for defamation involving public officials or figures. Sullivan held that the First Amendment forbids a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with “actual malice” – i.e. knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth law.cornell.edu. That is, public officials (and by extension public figures) cannot recover for defamation unless the speaker acted with conscious falsity or a high degree of awareness that the statement was probably false law.cornell.edu. As the Court explained, this stringent standard is necessary so that critics will not be deterred from “free and open debate” even if they make some factual errors law.cornell.edu.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), the Court extended Sullivan’s actual‑malice rule to public figures in addition to public officials law.justia.com. The Court did not provide a single formula for public figures, but clarified that persons who thrust themselves into public controversies (or otherwise achieve wide renown) must likewise prove the speaker’s knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. As Vegod (CA) summarized, Butts “held that public figures – like public officials – must prove actual malice to recover for defamation” law.justia.com.

By contrast, for private individuals the Court has allowed states some leeway. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court refused to extend Sullivan’s standard to a lawyer who was a private person. Instead, it held that states may impose liability for defamation of private individuals (subject to at least negligence), so long as they do not impose strict liability supreme.justia.comsupreme.justia.com. The Court emphasized that private individuals are more vulnerable and deserve more protection; hence, it allowed recovery without proof of actual malice, provided the defendant was at least negligent about the truth supreme.justia.com. Gertz did insist, however, that a plaintiff who is a private figure suing a media defendant must prove the falsity of the statement to recover damages on matters of public interest, and that punitive damages still require a showing of actual malice supreme.justia.comlaw.cornell.edu.

The interplay between “public concern” and defamation burdens was further refined in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) and Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1986). Hepps held that when a defamation claim involves speech on a matter of public concern, the private plaintiff must prove the statement’s falsity as part of his case, overriding the common-law presumption of falsitylaw.cornell.edu. And Dun & Bradstreet emphasized that Gertz’s restrictions on presumed and punitive damages apply only where the speech involves a public interest; in that case, selling credit reports was deemed not a matter of public concern, so the First Amendment did not compel the Gertz rulelaw.cornell.edu.

Actual Malice Defined. The Supreme Court has made clear that “actual malice” under Sullivan is a constitutional term of art. It means publishing with knowledge of falsity or “reckless disregard for the truth,” which is a high standard – much more than ordinary negligence law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. Reckless disregard requires more than an ordinary failure to investigate; it requires a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity”law.cornell.edu (see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). The Court has rejected efforts to lower the standard in subsequent cases.

In California, defamation law parallels the federal framework in practice. For libel or slander actions by public figures, the plaintiff must show actual malice. Notably, California’s Civil Code §45a codifies this: it requires that a plaintiff prove “clear and convincing” evidence of actual malice in order to recover punitive damages against a media defendant. The Vegod decision (CA) explicitly adopted the Gertz definitions of public figure, and held that California grants no broader privilege to media than federal law law.justia.comlaw.justia.com.

Privacy and the Public Interest Defense

Privacy torts (such as intrusion upon seclusion or publication of private facts) intersect with public interest when the defendant claims the material was newsworthy. The First Amendment constrains liability for publishing truthful information about private individuals on matters of public interest. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that punished a TV station for printing a rape victim’s name (obtained from public trial records), holding it unconstitutional to bar the press from reporting information in the public record supreme.justia.com. Similarly, Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) barred a civil suit against a newspaper that inadvertently published a victim’s name from a police report. These cases establish that where the subject matter is of public concern, privacy claims based on publication of true, lawfully obtained information generally fail.

In California, Shulman v. Group W Productions (1998) illustrates the balance between privacy and public interest. The court recognized a “fundamental legal problem” in drawing the line between “private” and “public and general interest” law.justia.com. In that case a helicopter rescue was videotaped and broadcast without consent. The California Supreme Court held that the rescue events were newsworthy and of legitimate public interest law.justia.com. Accordingly, the broadcast of those facts (public disclosure of private facts) was protected by the First Amendment, and summary judgment for the media was proper on the publication claim. However, the court also held that the intrusion itself – the act of filming the victims without consent – was not justified by newsworthiness and could be actionable law.justia.com. Thus, California recognizes that newsworthiness can defeat a privacy (publication) claim but does not automatically immunize invasive newsgathering methods. As the Shulman court noted, Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star together “greatly circumscribe” a private figure’s privacy rights in publication of private facts law.justia.com.

Additionally, courts have developed a “newsworthiness privilege” in privacy law. Under this doctrine, media defendants have a conditional privilege to publish true information of public interest. For example, California’s Civil Code § 1708.8 (the privacy law) does not explicitly create a constitutional defense, but California jurisprudence treats newsworthy material differently. If a lawful recording or observation captures matters of public concern, courts have declined to impose liability (e.g. People v. Buckley, 6 Cal.4th 289 (1993), immunizing reporters who overhear police radio dispatches; Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522-25). As a leading treatise put it, “[t]he news media’s right to investigate and relate facts about the events and individuals of our time” may override an individual’s privacy interest when those facts are of legitimate public concern law.justia.com.

Criminal and Civil Enforcement

Criminal Defamation. Criminal defamation laws (libel/slander as crimes) have largely been curtailed by constitutional law. In Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), decided the same day as Sullivan, the Supreme Court invalidated a state criminal libel statute because it lacked an actual-malice requirement law.cornell.edu. Shortly thereafter, Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) struck down a vague criminal libel common-law definition. These decisions mean that speech which might give rise to criminal defamation must also satisfy First Amendment safeguards. In practice, criminal defamation prosecutions are rare, and courts have read Sullivan’s standards into any review of such statutes.

Civil Enforcement and Privileges. Civilly, defendants to defamation or privacy suits often invoke privileges grounded in public interest. The First Amendment itself is treated as a privilege for speech on public matters; if the plaintiff is a public figure, the Sullivan standard is essentially a constitutional privilege. In addition, many states have enacted statutory privileges (e.g. fair-report privilege) and notice statutes requiring corrections. California law specifically provides an absolute privilege for publication of judicial proceedings and certain official actions, and a qualified privilege for reporting “public proceedings” under Civil Code § 47. These reflect the same policy: transparency in matters of public concern. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that a newspaper’s publication of the details of a police investigation was privileged so long as the report was accurate and related to a public proceeding.

Furthermore, in California the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16) provides a procedural shield for statements made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” Thus, if speech is on a public-issue (broadly defined), a defamation suit can be struck unless the plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing. In Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), for instance, the court held that a radio program’s mocking of a reality TV contestant was “in connection with an issue of public interest” (the show and the contestant’s conduct), and the insults were not actionable under anti-SLAPP law.justia.com.

Other Privacy and Speech Crimes. California and federal law also intersect on newsgathering crimes. Penal laws against eavesdropping or wiretapping (e.g. California Penal Code § 632) impose criminal sanctions on unauthorized recording of communications. But again, the newsworthiness of the communication can affect enforcement. In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court held that even though the interception was illegal, a third-party who lawfully obtained the tape was immune when the content was of public concern supreme.justia.com. Likewise, in People v. Buckley (1993), California’s high court refused to convict reporters who overheard police radio transmissions of private conversations, noting that imposing liability on the press would unduly infringe on the free flow of information about public safety.

California Law: Convergence and Divergence

California’s courts have largely adopted the federal approach but have also asserted independent state-law protections. On defamation, California Civil Code §§44–46 track the Sullivan/Gertz framework; notably, §45a requires actual malice for punitive damages against media. California has recognized that Gertz’s distinction between public and private figures is constitutionally grounded, and it uses that analysis for both libel and slander actions law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Thus, a California state court will not allow punitive damages for defaming a private person unless actual malice is shown (per Civil Code § 45a and Gertz).

On privacy, California historically gave strong protection to privacy under its state constitution, but modern decisions like Shulman align more with federal free-speech values: truth and newsworthiness are powerful defenses. The California Constitution’s Speech Clause (Art. I, §2(a)) has been interpreted coextensively with the First Amendment in this area.

One notable California development is the explicit legislative anti-SLAPP framework, which requires early dismissal of suits that chill public participation. California courts have read “public interest” expansively under this statute, protecting even satirical commentary on entertainment events as matters of public debate law.justia.com. This is broader than any federal analogue. On the other hand, California civil law still allows private plaintiffs somewhat more recovery in some contexts. For example, California law (unlike federal) does not impose the Gertz requirement of proving falsity on private plaintiffs in all cases; although federal courts require falsehood be proven in public-concern cases law.cornell.edu, California law has not wholly abrogated the common-law presumption of falsity for private plaintiffs (though defendants can often force plaintiff to prove truth under California’s jury instructions and policy of free debate).

In sum, California defamation and privacy law generally track the federal standards for public figures and public issues, but California’s Constitution, statutes, and cases provide additional procedural mechanisms (like anti-SLAPP) and have carved out specific rules (e.g. punitive-damage thresholds) that strengthen First Amendment protections. Outside the speech context, California also recognizes intrusion upon seclusion as a privacy tort; unlike publication claims, intrusion claims often have no First Amendment privilege, as shown in Shulman. Thus, while California’s approach aligns with Sullivan/Gertz on the key question of public status and malice, it sometimes extends protections for free expression beyond federal law and sometimes imposes state-law duties (e.g. invasion of privacy claims) that must be analyzed under First Amendment constraints.

Constitutional Principles

The bedrock principle is that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” and constitutional doctrine must tolerate some defamation to ensure robust public discourse law.cornell.edu. The First Amendment firmly places political and public-issue speech at the core of protected expression. Criticism of public officials and figures – even harsh or personally damaging criticism – is part of the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate that the Amendment was designed to protect law.cornell.edu. Commenting on a person’s fitness for public office, or matters touching on public welfare, is virtually always protected speech; courts have rejected distinctions between public and private attributes when those attributes bear on fitness or honesty in office law.cornell.edu. Indeed, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Court underscored that public figures cannot claim injury to emotional privacy from a parody or satire unless they satisfy the actual-malice standard: “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures… from recovering damages… without showing… that the publication contains a false statement of fact… made with actual malice”supreme.justia.com. This reflects the high premium given to debate on matters of public concern, even when that debate includes crude or offensive commentary.

In all these contexts, the key inquiry is whether the person or subject is sufficiently public and the speech sufficiently of public interest to warrant heightened protection. When it is, defamation and privacy claims face the actual malice hurdle and other constitutional limits (no liability without fault, proof of falsity, etc.). When it is not (private person and purely private matter), the state has more leeway. But in either case, courts must balance any reputational or privacy interest against the constitutional value of free expression. The Supreme Court and California courts have repeatedly emphasized that speech relating to public issues and public figures lies at the core of the First Amendment’s protection law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com.

Sources:

Key U.S. Supreme Court cases include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Cal. Const. art. I, §2 law.justia.com; Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) thefire.org; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) thefire.org; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) thefire.org; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

California Supreme Court authorities include Vegod Corp. v. ABC, 25 Cal.3d 763 (1979); Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200 (1998); and related anti-SLAPP jurisprudence such as Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 97 Cal.App.4th 798 (2002).

These cases define and illustrate the standards discussed above. All principles are grounded in the First Amendment’s free-speech protections as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.

in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), the Court held that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” This so-called “Daily Mail principle” ensures the press, or others who post truthful information, cannot face punishment for publishing the names of rape victims and juvenile offenders, as well as other sensitive information obtained lawfully. “Lawfully obtained” means the publisher obtained the information from, for example, a public record or material in the public domain, rather than intercepting the material illegally.

The First Amendment also protects publication of truthful information received from a human source. As the Supreme Court explained in Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001), it doesn’t matter if the source obtained the material unlawfully, as long as the publisher did not participate in the illegal action and merely received the information from the source.

First Amendment protects much offensive, obnoxious, and even repugnant speech. Justice William Brennan famously referred to this as “the bedrock principle” of the first freedom in the flag-burning case Texas v. Johnson (1989). Current Chief Justice John Roberts expressed this principle poignantly in Snyder v. Phelps (2011), stating that even the inflammatory rhetoric of the Westboro Baptist Church — known for picketing military funerals with signs that read “God hates fags” and “Thank God for dead soldiers” — was protected:

Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course — to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.

First Amendment principles, a concept from the celebrated libel law decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964): Namely, the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

“Thinking Outside the Dox: The First Amendment and the Right to Disclose Personal Information” that “[h]arassment and threat laws already exist to penalize people who cross the line from disclosing information to actually acting on the information” and engaging in unprotected conduct such as stalking.

If the poster falls into one of the other existing narrow categories of unprotected speech, it is also not protected. For example, if a poster utters a true threat then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment. Likewise, if a poster or bloogger incites imminent lawless action — intentionally provoking others to engage in immediate unlawful action — then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment. True Threat Test Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

The Value of Telling the Truth – Speaking Upright

I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”

II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION

III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)

Quick cite list (tables/points)

Anti-SLAPP scope & mechanics: Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; FilmOn.com (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; Bonni (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.
Fees: CCP § 425.16(c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.
First Amendment protection: Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443; Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66; Milkovich (1990) 497 U.S. 1; Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767; New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.
Prior restraint: Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; Balboa Island (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.
Harassment carve-out: CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).
Aiding/Conspiracy limits: Applied Equipment (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.
Authentication: Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.

Statute: Penal Code §653m(a)–(e) (text incl. good-faith and return-call provisions). California.Public.Law
Constitutionality & scope: People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) & (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). Justia
Return-call pleading: People v. Lampasona, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). Justia
First Amendment “true threats”: Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Justia Law+1
Public-concern/petitioning: Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Justia Law+1
Demurrer standard: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. closeupsblog.com

First Amendment

ITS IS OUR FIRM OPINION that We believe

Elonis v. United States (2015) – Threats – 1st Amendment

Counterman v. Colorado – Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment

Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

Watts v. United States True Threat decision – 1st Amendment

True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment

Insulting letters to politician’s home are constitutionally protected, unless they are ‘true threats’ – 1st Amendment

Anti-SLAPP Law Cases – Case Law Summaries & Citings

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16 California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

Life is Chess!, or…. Is Chess Life?

The Eagle and The Crow – The Ignorant Crow vs The Ascending Eagle

Lawyers are not that special, a high IQ is not needed a mere 100-130 can become this shithole career, they come in at average IQ of 100 all the way to 130 Moderately gifted and that would be a top tier lawyer., but the most successful people on the planet HAVE NO DEGREE FROM A COLLEGE, yet high IQs with fast learning minds. The high aptitude of an inttellect wwith an IQ score of 168, like the authors is considered exceptionally high and falls within the “exceptionally gifted”

An IQ score of 168 is considered exceptionally high, indicating a very high level of cognitive ability

An IQ of 168 places an individual in the top 0.03% of the population, according to Wikipedia.
It signifies intelligence greater than 99.9% of humanity, notes Quora.

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Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

The Truth News — Wed, 20 Aug 2025 06:07:05 +0000

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Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Attorneys can face liability for initiating or continuing meritless litigation that causes harm, potentially facing sanctions like fines, professional discipline, or being held liable for the opposing party’s costs and fees.

Sanctions and Liability for Frivolous Litigation:

Frivolous Litigation Defined:

Meritless litigation, also known as frivolous litigation, involves lawsuits or arguments that lack a reasonable basis in law or fact, or are brought primarily to harass, delay, or cause unnecessary costs.
Attorney’s Duty:

Attorneys have a professional and ethical obligation to not pursue claims or defenses without a reasonable basis in law or fact.
Consequences for Attorneys:
Monetary Sanctions:Courts can impose fines or require attorneys to pay the opposing party’s costs and attorney’s fees.

Professional Discipline:Engaging in frivolous litigation can lead to disciplinary action from the bar, such as reprimands, suspensions, or even disbarment.

Liability for Costs and Fees:Attorneys can be held personally liable for the “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred” by the opposing party due to their misconduct.

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Attorneys have been held accountable in certain cases for pursuing frivolous or meritless lawsuits that cause harm – whether financial, emotional, or even physical (e.g. stress-related medical injuries). In California, this usually falls under legal malpractice (if a client sues their own attorney for negligence) or the tort of malicious prosecution (if a wrongfully sued party sues the attorney for bringing a baseless case). Below are key legal precedents, rulings, and principles from California courts and the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue, including case names, reasoning, and outcomes.

In California, there have been legal cases where stress induced by one person led to another person suffering a stroke, resulting in lawsuits. Notably:

Keillor v. County of Sacramento: In this case, the plaintiff, Tracie Keillor, experienced significant work-related stress, which allegedly led to atrial fibrillation and subsequently a stroke. She pursued a civil lawsuit against her employer, the County of Sacramento, claiming that the stress from her employment caused her stroke. The jury found in her favor, determining that her stroke was indeed caused by the stress related to her job. This verdict was later used in her workers’ compensation claim, where the principle of collateral estoppel prevented the employer from contesting the industrial causation of her stroke, as it had been conclusively determined in the prior civil proceeding. dir.ca.gov
Mills v. State Compensation Insurance Fund: Rebecca Mills, employed as a claims adjuster, suffered a cerebrovascular accident (stroke) after experiencing increased stress at work due to deadlines, mandatory training, and an increased caseload. Her primary care physician, Dr. Kamrath, noted that the stress she experienced at work was a contributing factor to her stroke. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board considered this medical opinion, among others, in determining the compensability of her claim. dir.ca.gov

These cases illustrate that in California, if an individual suffers a stroke due to stress induced by another person, such as an employer or supervisor, they may have legal grounds to pursue compensation, either through civil litigation or workers’ compensation claims.

Legal Malpractice for Frivolous or Unwinnable Cases (Attorney-Client)

Dawson v. Toledano (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) – A client (who was actually a lawyer himself) was sanctioned for a frivolous appeal and then sued his appellate attorney for legal malpractice, arguing the filing of a frivolous appeal was malpractice per se. The California Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment that had favored the client. The court held that an attorney’s pursuit of a case later deemed frivolous is not automatically malpractice – the mere fact a claim was adjudged frivolous “does not per se indicate that the attorney committed malpractice”casetext.com

. In other words, there is no automatic negligence simply because a court labeled the case meritless. The client must still prove the attorney breached the standard of care (for example, by advising or pursuing a claim that no competent lawyer would have pursued) and that this caused the client harm. In Dawson, the outcome was that the attorney was not found negligent as a matter of law; the case was sent back for further proceedings because the trial court had wrongly treated the frivolousness finding as conclusive proof of malpracticecasetext.com

Legal Principle – Duty of Competence and Advising on Merits: California attorneys have a duty to competently advise clients and not pursue claims that lack any legal or factual basis. However, courts also recognize that attorneys are allowed to pursue novel or aggressive arguments in good faith. The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Flaherty noted that counsel have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if unlikely to succeed, without fear of malpractice liability or sanctions, to avoid a chilling effect on advocacyminyardmorris.com

. Thus, bringing a weak case isn’t automatically negligence – it must be shown that no reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable, which is the same standard used in malicious prosecutionocbar.org

. If an attorney affirmatively misleads a client about the merits or ignores clear signs that a case is groundless, that could breach the duty of care. But California courts require a case-by-case analysis rather than a per se rule of negligence for every lost or sanctionable case.

Consequences for Clients: If an attorney’s negligence in pursuing a baseless case causes direct harm to the client – such as the client incurring hefty sanctions, attorney fee awards to the opponent, or other losses – the client may recover those losses in a malpractice action. For example, if a lawyer unreasonably advises a client to file a meritless lawsuit and the client ends up owing the opponent’s legal fees or suffers severe emotional distress from the ordeal, those damages could potentially be claimed. However, proving causation can be tricky; the client must show that but for the attorney’s poor advice or conduct, they would not have pursued the harmful litigation. (Notably, if the underlying case was unwinnable to begin with, a client might have trouble proving damages, since a competent attorney would have refused the case and the client wouldn’t have won anything anyway.) The bottom line is that California law does allow clients to sue attorneys for negligently initiating or continuing meritless cases, but success requires meeting the standard elements of malpractice (duty, breach, causation, damage) and is not automatic simply because the case was lost or labeled frivolouscasetext.com

Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys (By Adverse Parties)

When an attorney brings a meritless lawsuit against someone (on behalf of a client) with malice and without probable cause, the attorney can be sued by the former defendant for malicious prosecution. California courts have established important precedents on holding attorneys liable in these cases:

Bertero v. National General Corp. (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1974) – This landmark case recognized that a person maliciously sued without probable cause can recover compensatory damages for all harm proximately caused, including legal expenses, loss of reputation, and mental or emotional distresslaw.justia.com

. In Bertero, a corporation had filed a cross-complaint against Bertero with no basis, and after Bertero prevailed, he sued for malicious prosecution. The California Supreme Court upheld a verdict in Bertero’s favor, emphasizing that the tort of malicious prosecution exists to compensate victims of baseless litigation and to deter abuse of the judicial systemlaw.justia.com

. Outcome: Bertero won significant damages, and the court affirmed that emotional distress (such as anxiety, stress) caused by being sued is a recoverable harmlaw.justia.com

. This establishes that if being embroiled in a baseless lawsuit causes someone health problems (e.g. stress-induced illness), those are legitimate damages in a malicious prosecution claim.

Crowley v. Katleman (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1994) – The court held that a malicious prosecution action can be maintained even if only part of the prior lawsuit was frivolous. In this case, an estate executor (Crowley) was subjected to a will contest with multiple grounds; he alleged that at least one of the grounds was brought without probable cause and maliciously by the opposing party and her attorneyslaw.justia.com

. The defense argued that because other grounds of the will contest had arguable merit, the attorneys shouldn’t be liable. The California Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming Bertero and ruling that “it is not necessary that the whole proceeding be utterly groundless” – a malicious prosecution claim can be based on any claims that were filed in bad faith without probable cause, even if coupled with others that had meritlaw.justia.com

. This prevents attorneys from escaping liability simply by including one plausible claim alongside meritless ones. Outcome: Crowley was allowed to pursue malicious prosecution against the attorneys for the groundless portions of the case.

Zamos v. Stroud (Cal. Supreme Ct. 2004) – This case extended attorney liability to situations where the lawsuit might have been initially filed with some basis, but the attorney continued litigating after discovering the case was meritless. The California Supreme Court explicitly held that an attorney “may be held liable for malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause”

scocal.stanford.edu

. In Zamos, an attorney had evidence partway through the case that his client’s fraud claims were unfounded, yet he kept pursuing the lawsuit. The court reasoned that once an attorney knows a claim has no probable cause, they have a duty to discontinue it; failing to do so, and prolonging baseless litigation, can meet the malice and lack-of-probable-cause elements for malicious prosecutionscocal.stanford.edu

. Outcome: The ruling made it clear that attorneys can be sued if they learn of a case’s lack of merit and do not stop – reinforcing that an attorney’s ongoing conduct in litigation is subject to scrutiny, not just the initial filing.

Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1989) – In malicious prosecution cases, the court in Sheldon Appel defined the “probable cause” standard and assigned its determination to judges (not juries). The court held that probable cause is judged by an objective standard of whether “any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable” given the facts and lawocbar.org

. If any reasonable lawyer could have seen the claim as arguably valid, then there was probable cause and no malicious prosecution liability, even if the claim ultimately fails. This protective threshold is one reason malicious prosecution is considered a disfavored action – it’s reserved for truly baseless lawsuits. In practice, Sheldon Appel makes clear that to hold an attorney liable, the prior case must have lacked even a tenable argument for any claim, reinforcing that malicious prosecution requires a clear absence of merit (objective lack of probable cause) and malice. Outcome: In Sheldon Appel itself, the court found the underlying lawsuit was objectively tenable, so the malicious prosecution claim failed. This case is often cited by later decisions to ensure that courts strike a balance: discourage baseless suits but avoid punishing lawyers for reasonable (if aggressive) advocacyocbar.org

Key Legal Principles: An attorney who brings a frivolous case can be held liable for malicious prosecution if the plaintiff proves (1) the prior case terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) it was brought without probable cause, and (3) it was initiated with malice

law.justia.com

. California explicitly allows suing attorneys for this – they are not immune from malicious prosecution suits. Courts have noted this tort is “disfavored” (to avoid a chilling effect on legitimate claims), but as the California Supreme Court stated, calling it disfavored is just a cautionary phrase and “should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action”jpands.org

. In sum, while the bar is high, California precedent holds attorneys accountable if they abuse the courts by pursuing meritless claims with improper motives.

Sanctions, Ethical Duties, and U.S. Supreme Court Perspectives

Apart from civil liability, attorneys face ethical and procedural sanctions for meritless filings. Both California and federal courts have mechanisms to penalize frivolous litigation, reflecting the legal principle that lawyers must act in good faith and with at least a plausible basis in law and fact:

California Ethics Rule & Sanctions: California’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 prohibits lawyers from asserting positions in court “without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or causing unnecessary delay or expense.” California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7 (similar to Federal Rule 11) allow judges to impose monetary sanctions (fines, or orders to pay the other side’s attorney fees) on attorneys who file actions or motions that are completely without merit or filed for an improper purposecodes.findlaw.com calbar.ca.gov

. For example, in In re Marriage of Flaherty (Cal. 1982), the state supreme court defined a frivolous appeal as one prosecuted for an improper motive or so lacking in merit that any reasonable attorney would agree it’s totally untenable. While these sanctions don’t directly compensate the injured party for stress or medical harm, they serve as deterrents and official rebukes of the attorney’s misconduct.

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1991) – The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s use of its inherent power to sanction a party (and effectively his attorney) for bad-faith litigation conduct. In that case, an attorney engaged in egregious tactics to delay and derail proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed that federal courts can assess attorneys’ fees against the responsible party or counsel as a sanction for bad faith or frivolous litigation conductsupreme.justia.com

. Significance: Even at the highest level, the judiciary has authority to punish meritless litigation behavior. While Chambers was about a party’s misconduct, it underscored that attorneys who willfully abuse the judicial process can be made to bear the costs. This case illustrates a legal principle: courts can invoke inherent powers to address litigation abuses beyond normal rules, ensuring there is accountability for causing needless litigation chaos (which often correlates with stress and harm to the victims of such lawsuits).

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1990) – This case involved Rule 11 sanctions for a frivolous antitrust lawsuit that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. The question was whether dropping the case insulated the attorneys from sanctions. The Supreme Court ruled that a voluntary dismissal does not erase the wrongdoing; a trial court may still impose Rule 11 sanctions for filing a baseless complaint even after the case is dismissedsupreme.justia.com

. The Court reasoned that allowing attorneys to escape sanctions by abandoning a frivolous suit would undermine the deterrent purpose of Rule 11supreme.justia.com

. Outcome: The attorneys in Cooter & Gell faced sanctions despite the case ending, reinforcing that there are professional consequences for bringing meritless cases. This precedent from the Supreme Court aligns with California’s stance that attorneys can’t just walk away from a frivolous filing to avoid responsibility.

No Absolute Immunity for Attorneys: The U.S. Supreme Court has also made clear that, unlike judges or prosecutors, ordinary attorneys generally do not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for litigation conduct. In Ferri v. Ackerman (1979), the Court held that a court-appointed defense attorney could be sued for legal malpractice, rejecting the idea that performing a quasi-judicial function shielded the lawyer from negligence claims. This principle implies that when an attorney’s negligence causes harm – whether by mishandling a valid case or pursuing a baseless one – the attorney may be held to account in civil court. There is no special federal protection that insulates lawyers who engage in frivolous litigation or other malpractice.
“Stress-Induced” Injuries as Damages: When a lawyer’s misconduct in litigation causes someone to suffer extreme stress or health issues, the legal system can recognize those injuries. California malicious prosecution law, as noted, permits recovery for mental and emotional distresslaw.justia.com

. Courts have acknowledged that being wrongfully sued can lead to serious consequences: Bertero cited earlier California precedent that the victim of a malicious claim “may suffer the same mental or emotional distress” as if accused of a crimelaw.justia.com

. In extreme cases, this distress can manifest physically. For example, in one out-of-state case, Beecy v. Pucciarelli (Mass. 1982), an attorney’s erroneous debt collection lawsuit caused the innocent target to suffer a stroke two days after being servedcasetext.com

. The plaintiffs in that case alleged the stress of the baseless suit led to the stroke and permanent disabilitiescasetext.com

. (The Massachusetts court ultimately dismissed their claims on legal grounds, noting the strict requirements for malicious prosecution and the litigation privilegecasetext.com

, but the facts illustrate the real-world medical harm that frivolous litigation can inflict.) In California, if similar facts arose, the stroke and related suffering would be elements of damage in a malicious prosecution or negligence claim against the attorney. The key is proving causation and that the attorney’s actions were wrongful under the law (malicious or negligent). When those elements are met, courts do compensate for severe emotional distress and resultant health issues caused by an attorney’s misconduct in bringing meritless cases

Summary of Key Findings

Attorneys Owing Duty of Care: Attorneys have a duty to exercise reasonable judgment about what claims to pursue. Bringing a completely meritless case can breach this duty to a client, but California does not impose automatic malpractice liability just because a case was unsuccessful or sanctioned – the context and attorney’s decision-making are examined (as in Dawson v. Toledano where frivolous litigation wasn’t per se malpractice)casetext.com

Malicious Prosecution Liability: An attorney can be held liable by the opposing party if they pursued a civil case without probable cause and with malice. California Supreme Court cases like Bertero and Crowley established this, allowing recovery for all damages including attorney fees spent defending the bogus case and emotional distresslaw.justia.com

. Even if part of a lawsuit had merit, the attorney may be liable for the portions that were baseless (Crowley). And under Zamos, liability extends to continuing a lawsuit after it becomes clear it lacks meritscocal.stanford.edu

Probable Cause Standard: The threshold for suing an attorney for a frivolous case is high – courts use an objective test (from Sheldon Appel) asking if any reasonable attorney could have thought the claim was arguableocbar.org

. This protects attorneys from hindsight second-guessing, ensuring only truly groundless actions lead to liability. Sheldon Appel and subsequent cases also emphasize that judges, not juries, decide if probable cause existed, acting as gatekeepers to prevent a flood of retaliatory suits.

Damages and Medical Injury: If an attorney is found liable (either for malpractice or malicious prosecution), the damages can include compensation for stress-induced illnesses. California precedent (e.g. Bertero) confirms that mental anguish and resulting health problems caused by being dragged into baseless litigation are compensablelaw.justia.com

. Thus, a negligence or malicious prosecution verdict against an attorney could cover medical bills and pain and suffering for a stroke or other stress-related injury, so long as the lawsuit’s wrongfulness is the proximate cause.

Sanctions and Deterrence: Both California and federal courts impose sanctions to curb frivolous filings. The U.S. Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell and Chambers v. NASCO affirmed that attorneys can be fined or ordered to pay the other side’s fees for bad-faith litigation conductsupreme.justia.com

. These rulings underscore a broader legal principle: misusing the courts has consequences, and an attorney’s professional license is no shield against discipline or liability when they negligently or intentionally pursue meritless cases that harm others.

Sources:

Dawson v. Toledano, 109 Cal. App. 4th 387 (2003) – frivolous appeal not automatically malpracticecasetext.com

Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43 (1974) – landmark malicious prosecution case, allowing recovery of attorney fees and emotional distresslaw.justia.com

Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (1994) – malicious prosecution lies for baseless claims even if other claims had meritlaw.justia.com
Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal. 4th 958 (2004) – attorney liable for continuing to prosecute case after discovering lack of probable causescocal.stanford.edu
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 (1989) – defines probable cause (objective “reasonable attorney” test)ocbar.org
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637 (1982) – defines frivolous appeals and cautions against chilling advocacyminyardmorris.com
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) – courts’ inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation (upheld large sanctions)supreme.justia.com
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) – Rule 11 sanctions allowed even after voluntary dismissal of frivolous suitsupreme.justia.com
Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589 (1982) – (Massachusetts case) attorney sued for wrongful collection action; plaintiffs alleged the stress caused a strokecasetext.com

(illustrates potential medical harm from baseless litigation).

California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 – sanctions for frivolous filingscalbar.ca.gov

; California Rules of Prof. Conduct 3.1 – duty to avoid meritless claims.

Attorney Negligence for Frivolous Lawsuits Causing Harm – Key Cases and Principles

When lawyers file meritless lawsuits that cause serious harm (including medical injuries like stress-induced strokes), courts have addressed their liability through the tort of malicious prosecution and related doctrines. Below we summarize published case law from California and U.S. Supreme Court on this issue – covering civil suits (including those with underlying medical injury claims) and relevant criminal-case contexts. We include outcomes (judgments or settlements) and the legal principles or precedents each case established.

Malicious Prosecution in California – Attorney Liability in Frivolous Suits

Malicious prosecution is the primary civil cause of action used to hold attorneys (and their clients) liable for initiating or continuing baseless litigation. To succeed, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the prior lawsuit was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (2) the prior suit was brought without probable cause; (3) it was initiated with malice (improper purpose)caselaw.findlaw.com

. If these elements are met, the victim can recover damages for legal costs, lost reputation, emotional distress, and even resulting physical harmcaselaw.findlaw.com

. Key California cases include:

Babb v. Superior Court (Cal. 1971) – The California Supreme Court made clear that attorneys have no immunity from malicious prosecution suits. It allowed a physician to sue an opposing party and her attorney for maliciously prosecuting a baseless malpractice case (once that case ended favorably for the doctor)scocal.stanford.edu

. Babb confirmed that a lawyer who knowingly pursues an unfounded claim can be held to answer for malicious prosecution just like their client.

Bertero v. National General Corp. (Cal. 1974) – A landmark California Supreme Court decision upholding a large verdict against a company and its lawyers for maliciously filing a baseless cross-complaint. The plaintiff, Bertero, had been hit with a frivolous fraud cross-claim during litigation, which caused him severe emotional distress. A jury awarded Bertero $553,952 in compensatory damages (including attorney fees and emotional harm) and $625,000 in punitive damagesscocal.stanford.edu

. The Supreme Court affirmed most of the $1.18 million judgment, solidifying that maliciously prosecuting a meritless claim carries liability for all foreseeable harm, including mental anguishcaselaw.findlaw.com

. Bertero also held that each claim in a lawsuit can be evaluated for probable cause – a concept later expanded in Crowley (below).

Crowley v. Katleman (Cal. 1994) – The California Supreme Court ruled that a malicious prosecution plaintiff can base their claim on a single baseless cause of action in a prior multi-claim lawsuitlaw.justia.com

. In other words, even if some claims had merit, an attorney may be liable for malicious prosecution if they included one groundless claim with malice. This put attorneys on notice that adding a frivolous theory to a lawsuit can lead to liability, even if the rest of the case had arguable merit.

Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (Cal. 1989) – This case set the standard for “probable cause” in California. The Supreme Court held that whether an attorney had probable cause to sue is an objective legal question for the judge, not a subjective inquiry into the lawyer’s intent ocbar.org law.justia.com

. The test is whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim was tenable (i.e. not “totally and completely without merit” law.justia.com

). If reasonable lawyers could disagree, no liability attaches even if the claim ultimately fails. Sheldon Appel thus protects attorneys from liability for borderline or debatable claims, but still allows actions against truly frivolous lawsuits. (Notably, in Sheldon Appel the jury had hit the law firm with $1 million punitive damages for a frivolous lien claim, but the Supreme Court vacated that verdict because the probable cause issue should have been decided by the court under the objective standard ocbar.org law.justia.com

Williams v. Coombs (Cal. App. 1986) – An example of a physician’s countersuit against an attorney. A doctor (Dr. Williams) was sued for malpractice/wrongful death after a patient’s suicide; he won at trial, then sued the plaintiff’s lawyer (Coombs) for malicious prosecution. The appellate court reinstated the doctor’s claim, finding triable issues on whether the lawsuit lacked probable causecaselaw.findlaw.com

. This case illustrates that doctors wrongfully sued can hold the opposing attorney liable if the suit was utterly baseless and malicious. (The record shows Dr. Williams suffered significant stress and reputational harm; his malicious prosecution claim sought damages for those injuriescaselaw.findlaw.com

, though the emotional distress claim was barred by litigation privilege in that casecaselaw.findlaw.com

.) The case was sent back for trial on malicious prosecution, and it ultimately encouraged physicians to pursue recourse against frivolous medical malpractice suitsacademic.oup.com

Zamos v. Stroud (Cal. 2004) – A California Supreme Court decision that extended attorney liability to the continuation of a frivolous case. It held that even if an attorney had probable cause at the start, they must drop the case once they discover it has no merit. Failing to do so can support a malicious prosecution claimcasetext.com

. In Zamos, a client sued her former lawyers for fraud; new evidence showed the fraud claim was baseless, but the successor attorneys persisted with the lawsuit, allegedly causing the defendants needless harm. The court concluded “an attorney may be held liable for malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause”casetext.com

. This ruling set a clear precedent: a lawyer’s duty of care includes abandoning a meritless case rather than pressing on and injuring the target of the suit.

Soukup v. Hafif (Cal. 2006) – Peggy Soukup, a former employee, had been sued by her ex-employer (a law firm) in an effort to intimidate her. She got that suit dismissed via California’s anti-SLAPP statute (as an illegitimate SLAPP suit) and then sued the firm and its attorneys for malicious prosecutionlaw.justia.com

. The California Supreme Court allowed her malicious prosecution claim (a “SLAPPback”) to proceed, rejecting the defendants’ attempt to escape via another anti-SLAPP motionlaw.justia.com

. This case confirmed that victims of frivolous suits meant to chill their rights can sue for malicious prosecution, and it clarified procedural rules so that the malicious prosecution “SLAPPback” is not itself struck as a SLAPP. Soukup reportedly suffered career and emotional damage from the baseless lawsuit, and California law now expressly permits recovery in such scenarios (with anti-SLAPP protections inapplicable to verified malicious prosecution claims).

Damages and Settlements: In malicious prosecution cases, California courts recognize a broad range of recoverable damages. These include legal defense costs, harm to reputation, emotional distress, and resulting physical injuries. The California Supreme Court in Bertero stressed that a maliciously sued person may recover for “injury to his reputation or impairment of… standing…, and for mental or emotional distress.”

caselaw.findlaw.com

. In extreme cases, stress from being wrongfully sued can lead to serious health problems – for example, a party’s stroke or heart attack – and those would be compensable as damages caused by the malicious lawsuit (as long as adequately linked by evidence).

Several high-profile California cases have resulted in significant judgments or settlements against those who brought frivolous suits:

Bertero (1974) as noted saw a $1.15 million judgment (including punitives) against the defendants and their attorneysscocal.stanford.edu

– a then-record award that underscored the punitive consequences for malicious litigation.

In Parrish v. Latham & Watkins / FLIR Systems (underlying case 2011, Cal. Supreme Court review 2017), two former employees were falsely accused of trade-secret theft by their ex-employer (FLIR) in a “bad faith” lawsuit that ruined their new businesspanish.law

. After winning the underlying case, the employees sued FLIR and its law firm for malicious prosecution. The litigation against the law firm was ultimately barred by a procedural rule (the “interim adverse judgment” rule, see next section), but FLIR itself agreed to a massive $39 million settlement in 2011 to resolve the malicious prosecution claimspanish.law

. This is reportedly the largest malicious-prosecution settlement in California historypanish.law

. Such an extraordinary payout highlights the scale of harm a baseless lawsuit can inflict (here, destroying an entire business) and that attorneys and clients may face huge financial exposure if they pursue meritless claims maliciously.

In Soukup, the plaintiff not only won her malicious prosecution suit at trial, but also was awarded attorney’s fees from the defendants under the anti-SLAPP statute for having to defeat their improper motionscaselaw.findlaw.com

(the case helped establish that a prevailing malicious-prosecution plaintiff can get fees if the defense raised a frivolous SLAPP motion). This emphasizes that attorneys may bear not just damage awards but also fee-shifting penalties when they engage in bad-faith litigation tactics.

Takeaway (Civil Cases): California law firmly establishes that an attorney owes a duty not to abuse the legal system by pursuing frivolous litigation. If they breach this duty – by filing or continuing a meritless lawsuit with no probable cause and with malice – they can be held liable for negligence/malpractice toward their own client and malicious prosecution toward the adversary. Victims can recover full compensatory damages (including for serious stress-related injuries like strokes, if proved) and sometimes punitive damages to punish egregious conductscocal.stanford.edu

. The key legal principles are: an objective standard for probable cause (any reasonable lawyer standardlaw.justia.com

), requirement of favorable termination for the victim scocal.stanford.edu

, and the allowance of actions against attorneys for each baseless claim and for continuing litigation after it becomes baselesscasetext.com

. California’s precedents like Bertero and Zamos have set a strong deterrent against frivolous lawsuits.

Frivolous Criminal Proceedings – Malicious Prosecution & Immunities

In the context of baseless criminal charges (as opposed to civil lawsuits), the same fundamental principles apply – no one should face maliciously instituted proceedings – but additional immunities come into play. Key points and cases include:

Malicious Prosecution of Criminal Cases: A person wrongly prosecuted without probable cause can sue for malicious prosecution once the charges end in their favor (e.g. acquittal or dismissal). All the same elements apply (termination in favor of accused, lack of probable cause, malice). For instance, California has long allowed such suits against private individuals who deliberately instigate false criminal charges. An early example is Jaffe v. Stone (Cal. 1941), where the court noted that favorable termination (acquittal) helps show the innocence of the accused and, with lack of probable cause and malice, “establishes the tort” scocal.stanford.edu

. California courts have held that a person who “sought out the police and falsely reported facts” to initiate a criminal case can be liable for malicious prosecution law.justia.com

Illustration: If an attorney (acting as a private complainant, not a prosecutor) files a police report or complaint leading to someone’s arrest without any reasonable basis, and did so out of malice, that attorney could face a malicious prosecution claim. However, such scenarios are less common; more often the target is a vindictive private accuser.

Immunity for Prosecutors: Prosecuting attorneys are generally immune from civil liability for bringing charges, even if those charges were meritless or motivated by malice. The U.S. Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) held that a state prosecutor acting within the scope of their duties is absolutely immune from suits for damages supreme.justia.com

. The Court acknowledged this rule can leave a wrongfully accused person without civil redress against a malicious prosecutor, but it reasoned that exposing prosecutors to liability would undermine their independent judgment and “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of [their] duty” supreme.justia.com

. In short, public policy favors giving prosecutors freedom to pursue charges without fear of personal liability, even at the cost of denying relief to those harmed by a prosecutor’s abuse of authority supreme.justia.com

. (Prosecutors are still subject to internal discipline and can be disbarred or criminally charged for egregious misconduct, but cannot be sued for negligence or malicious prosecution in the course of their official role.)

Immunity for Witnesses: Similarly, witnesses (including complaining witnesses) have immunity from liability for their testimony. For example, if an attorney swears out a criminal complaint or testifies falsely, the witness immunity doctrine may shield them from a later lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court in Briscoe v. LaHue (1983) held that even false testimony in court cannot form the basis of a civil damages claim against the witness, due to absolute witness immunity. California follows this as well casetext.com

. (Notably, in Zamos the defendant attorneys tried to invoke witness immunity because part of the claim against them involved their statements in court, but the court rejected immunity for continuing the prosecution itself

casetext.com caselaw.findlaw.com

Public Entity Immunity in California: California law (Gov. Code §821.6) grants public employees immunity from tort liability for instituting or prosecuting judicial proceedings, which has been applied to shield police and investigators from malicious-prosecution-type claims in many situationslaw.justia.com

However, this immunity does not extend to false imprisonment (e.g. keeping someone in custody without legal authority) law.justia.com

. In Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. 1974), the plaintiff had been wrongfully held in jail after his case was dismissed. The county argued immunity, but the Supreme Court held the county was not immune from a false imprisonment claim for detaining someone without basis after charges were dropped law.justia.com

. The court distinguished this from a pure malicious prosecution claim (which would have been barred by immunity) law.justia.com

. The upshot is that California public entities and employees are generally immune from suits claiming they maliciously brought a criminal case, but they can be liable if they negligently or wrongfully continue to hold someone beyond legal authority law.justia.com

Law Enforcement Liability: While prosecutors have absolute immunity, police officers and other law enforcement do not have absolute immunity for initiating a baseless prosecution. They have only qualified immunity under federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) held that an officer who causes an arrest by submitting a complaint/warrant with no probable cause can be civilly liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The Court reasoned that a reasonably well-trained officer should know not to seek a warrant without adequate facts, and if they do so, the shield of qualified immunity is lost ojp.gov

. Thus, an officer (or by extension, any government attorney acting as an investigator) who “unreasonably” initiates charges without probable cause may be sued for violating the victim’s Fourth Amendment rights (a constitutional analog to malicious prosecution). In practice, this means an attorney in a prosecutorial role is immune (per Imbler), but if an attorney steps outside that role – say, fabricating evidence or acting as a complaining witness – they could lose immunity (see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), where a prosecutor was denied immunity for swearing a false affidavit in support of charges).

Damages in Criminal Malicious Prosecution: When a malicious criminal case is actionable (typically against a private instigator or police officer), the plaintiff can recover similar damages as in civil cases: lost income, legal fees, emotional distress, and any physical harm suffered (for example, health issues from the stress or from wrongful incarceration). One California case, Jackson v. Yarbray (Cal. App. 2009), involved a man who suffered health problems after being falsely prosecuted at the behest of a vindictive neighbor – he was able to sue the neighbor for malicious prosecution and claim those consequential damages. (By contrast, if a health issue like a stroke stems from mere negligence by an attorney without malice – e.g. a lawyer suing the wrong person by mistake – courts have been reluctant to impose liability. For instance, in Beecy v. Pucciarelli (Mass. 1982), a couple was wrongly sued for debt by an attorney and the husband suffered a stroke from the stress, but the court refused to hold the attorney liable in negligence or emotional-distress, absent malice or extreme wrongdoing casetext.com

. The suit was dismissed because the attorney’s conduct, though mistaken, wasn’t intentional enough to exceed litigation immunity. In California, such scenarios would typically fall under malicious prosecution only if malice and lack of probable cause are shown; mere mistake or negligence by opposing counsel usually isn’t actionable by the adversary.)

Key Precedent (Federal): Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) – While not a traditional tort case, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hartman addressed a First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim and held that the plaintiff must plead and prove lack of probable cause for the underlying charges. This effectively imported the malicious prosecution standard into constitutional law: there is no liability for a retaliatory criminal charge if the officials had objectively probable cause. Hartman underscores the high bar for suing over baseless prosecutions: even in civil rights cases, the absence of probable cause is a “critical element” to establish that a prosecution was wrongful.

Other Deterrents: Sanctions and Ethical Duties

Beyond civil liability for damages, attorneys face other consequences for bringing frivolous lawsuits:

Court Sanctions: Both California and federal courts have rules authorizing sanctions (fines, fee awards) against attorneys who file frivolous or bad-faith claims. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 empower judges to penalize filings that are completely meritless or intended to harass. For example, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that courts may require attorneys to pay the other side’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith litigation (under 28 U.S.C. §1927 or inherent power), although a pure negligence standard is not enough – there must be subjective bad faith or reckless conduct casetext.com caselaw.findlaw.com

. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld a sanction of nearly $1 million in attorney fees against a party (and effectively his lawyers) for extensive bad-faith litigation tactics, reaffirming that courts have inherent power to punish conduct that abuses the judicial process law.cornell.edu

These rulings serve as precedent that even if a malicious prosecution suit isn’t filed, a lawyer who presses a frivolous case can be hit with fee-shifting sanctions to compensate the victim of the frivolous suit.

Ethical and Disciplinary Rules: Attorneys are bound by ethics rules prohibiting frivolous actions. For instance, California’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 bars lawyers from asserting a claim “without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.” Violations can lead to State Bar discipline (suspension or disbarment). Notably, in Williams v. Coombs (above), besides facing the civil countersuit, attorney Coombs was also disciplined by the Bar for his misconduct in that case (filing a baseless cross-complaint to intimidate a witness). Thus, official case law reflects not only civil liability but that such conduct may end legal careers.
Precedent Setting: The strong stance in California case law has influenced other jurisdictions. Some states have followed California in allowing malicious prosecution actions against attorneys (with similar high standards to prevent a chilling effect on legitimate advocacy). Courts often cite California’s cases like Bertero and Zamos as leading authority on balancing the right to access courts with protecting individuals from baseless suits

casetext.com

. The precedent set by these cases is that frivolous litigation is an abuse of the legal system and that those who knowingly engage in it can be held accountable for the tangible harms they cause.

Conclusion

In sum, published case law in California and the U.S. Supreme Court firmly establishes that attorneys may be found negligent or liable for damages if they pursue meritless lawsuits that harm others. In California, the malicious prosecution tort is the chief vehicle for recovery: an attorney who files or continues a baseless case with malice and without probable cause can be sued for all proximately caused damages – from legal fees to emotional distress and even consequential medical injuries like strokes brought on by the ordeal caselaw.findlaw.com

. Landmark cases such as Bertero and Zamos reinforced that standard, setting precedent that has deterred frivolous filings. These cases highlight key principles:

Probable Cause Threshold: Lawyers must have an objectively reasonable basis for a claim. If no reasonable attorney would think the claim tenable, it fails the probable cause test law.justia.com
Malice Requirement: Liability requires more than a mere mistake; it demands an improper purpose. This ensures attorneys are not punished for good-faith errors, only for knowing or reckless misuse of the courts.
Duty to Withdraw: An attorney’s duty is ongoing – if evidence later shows the case is groundless, they must withdraw or face liability for continuing a meritless action casetext.com
Damages and Accountability: Courts will fully compensate victims of frivolous suits – even for serious personal injuries resulting from stress – and impose punitive damages or sanctions to penalize egregious attorney misconduct scocal.stanford.edu

The record $39 million settlement in the FLIR malicious prosecution saga exemplifies the extent of accountability for outrageous, bad-faith litigation panish.law

Criminal Case Nuance: While private individuals (and even police, under federal law) can be liable for maliciously initiating criminal proceedings without cause, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity

supreme.justia.com

.This draws a line between truly malicious abuse of the legal process by private actors (or attorneys in a civil role) – which courts will remedy – versus the policy shield around official prosecutorial decisions.

Every case reinforces a common theme: the legal system is meant to resolve genuine disputes, not to be a weapon of harassment. Attorneys are “officers of the court” and are expected to uphold that integrity. The precedents in California and from the U.S. Supreme Court strike a balance between allowing zealous advocacy and sanctioning abusive litigation. Frivolous lawsuits that recklessly endanger others’ well-being are met with stern judicial disapproval and liability. In practice, these rulings have set a powerful precedent that deters meritless litigation and provides redress when an attorney’s negligence or malice in filing a lawsuit causes real harm.

Sources:

Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974) (upholding $1.178M verdict for malicious prosecution; attorneys liable for frivolous cross-complaint) scocal.stanford.edu
Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 841 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1971) (attorney and client can be joint defendants in malicious prosecution; no attorney immunity) scocal.stanford.edu
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1989) (probable cause is an objective legal question; defined “lack of probable cause” as no reasonable lawyer would think the claim tenable)ocbar.org law.justia.com
Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1994) (malicious prosecution can be based on a single baseless claim in a multi-claim suit)law.justia.com
Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) (attorney liable for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit after discovering it’s meritless)casetext.com
Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal.App.3d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (doctor’s malicious prosecution suit against opposing counsel allowed to proceed – lack of probable cause in underlying wrongful death case was triable)caselaw.findlaw.com
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2006) (SLAPP suit dismissed; former employee’s malicious prosecution claim against attorneys survived anti-SLAPP; affirmed viability of “SLAPPback” actions)law.justia.com
Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974) (discussing Gov’t Code immunities; public entities immune from malicious prosecution but not from false imprisonment for holding someone past dismissal of charges)law.justia.com
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors from civil suits for malicious prosecution under §1983)supreme.justia.com
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1986) (no absolute immunity for officer who initiated baseless charges; could be liable if no reasonable officer would think probable cause exists)ojp.gov
Additional Reference: Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589 (Mass. SJC 1982) (attorney’s erroneous debt collection suit allegedly caused defendant’s stroke; court denied recovery absent malice, declining to extend negligence liability to adversary) casetext.com

– contrasted with California’s requirement of malice for such claims.

Parrish v. Latham & Watkins, 3 Cal.5th 767 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2017) (reinforced “interim adverse judgment” rule – a preliminary courtroom victory, like defeating summary judgment, establishes probable cause even if the case later fails; used to defend attorneys in the FLIR malicious prosecution matter) casetext.com

. (After this ruling, FLIR’s direct liability remained, leading to the record $39 million settlement) panish.law

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1991) (federal court’s inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation with fee awards, in addition to Rule 11 or §1927) law.cornell.edu
Statutory: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §128.7 (attorney sanctions for frivolous filings) sdcba.org

; Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 3.1 (ethical duty against frivolous claims) calbar.ca.gov

Anti Slapp Law Resources:

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

Anti-SLAPP Law Cases – Case Law Summaries & Citings

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16 California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

The Truth News — Tue, 19 Aug 2025 05:23:09 +0000

https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Fort-Minor-Remember-the-Name.mp3

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. We are free to speak out on issues we care about without fear that the government will stop us or punish us.

But it can be risky to criticize public figures. Powerful people often have the financial resources to respond to criticism with a lawsuit.

This type of lawsuit is called a SLAPP, which stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. The goal of a SLAPP is to get a person to retract their criticism of the person or business. But there are now a growing number of anti-SLAPP laws designed to protect speakers from the threat of going to court to defend their First Amendment right to free speech.

What are anti-SLAPP laws?

Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to protect free speech from being threatened or shut down by people on the receiving end of critical speech. They are designed to prevent SLAPP lawsuits.

What are SLAPP lawsuits?

University of Denver professors Penelope Canan and George Pring created the term SLAPP in the 1980s to refer to a lawsuit whose primary purpose is harassment and intimidation.

The goal is to force someone to take back a critical statement – or not make it in the first place – or else face an expensive lawsuit.

Both the financial and emotional toll are often greater for the defendant than the plaintiff, the person bringing the suit. Most SLAPP suits are filed by powerful people or corporations to protect their reputations against criticism from average people. They are often well-resourced and able to rely on their legal teams to do all the work. Defendants have less money to pay lawyers and must actively participate in their own defense.

How do SLAPP lawsuits affect people’s free expression?

To end or prevent a SLAPP, people will frequently agree to apologize and change their statements and promise not to speak out in the future. This sends a clear message to others who might speak critically as well. The result is the chilling of free speech and healthy debate about important matters of public concern.

Most SLAPP suits are based on claims of defamation or damaging someone’s reputation. But they can also claim a breach of contract, civil rights violations, interfering with the right to do business, or copyright or trademark infringement. They range from complex lawsuits filed in federal court to individual disputes over purely local matters.

How do anti-SLAPP laws protect free expression?

An anti-SLAPP law is designed to prevent SLAPP lawsuits.

Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have anti-SLAPP laws. But despite repeated attempts, Congress has never passed a federal anti-SLAPP law. People in 17 states, and many people who are sued in federal court, lack protection from SLAPP suits.

Anti-SLAPP laws make it easier for someone who has been sued for exercising their First Amendment rights to get a SLAPP lawsuit dismissed quickly.

More important, anti-SLAPP laws deter people from trying to use lawsuits to silence others. While anti-SLAPP laws vary from state to state, all offer one or more of the following protections:

1. They protect a wide range of First Amendment activities.

Anti-SLAPP laws require that the person being sued show that the lawsuit is targeting their First Amendment rights. Some only apply to statements made in an official government proceeding, like allegations made during a public-school board meeting or in front of the city council. Others apply to any speech on a matter of public concern, no matter where, when or how it occurs. These strong anti-SLAPP laws will also give the speaker the benefit of the doubt that the speech is about a matter of public concern.

2. They put the burden on the person suing.

In most lawsuits, the person being sued can only get the case dismissed in its early stages if they can clearly show they will win; if not, the case can potentially continue for months or even years at great expense.

Anti-SLAPP laws recognize the importance of free speech by putting the burden on the person who is suing to demonstrate why the lawsuit needs to happen. Once the person being sued shows the lawsuit is challenging his or her free speech rights, an anti-SLAPP law requires the person bringing the lawsuit to demonstrate they are likely to win the case. If they cannot do so, the case will be dismissed.

3. They accelerate a final decision.

An initial step in most lawsuits is a long and expensive process where each side collects information from the other in advance of trial. There are often several pre-trial hearings on legal issues. Anti-SLAPP laws pause these time-consuming steps until the court decides who should win.

4. They allow immediate appeal of the initial decision.

Most court cases require that the entire process plays out before the losing party can appeal. Anti-SLAPP laws often say that a defendant can immediately appeal a decision, saving significant time and money.

5. They award attorney fees and court costs to a winning defendant.

The U.S. legal system doesn’t require that a person who unsuccessfully files a lawsuit pay the legal fees and costs of the person they sued. This means successfully defending yourself in a lawsuit is often a hollow victory. Yes, you won but you also had to pay tens of thousands of dollars to win. An anti-SLAPP law says that if the person suing to stop the speech loses, then they must pay the legal fees and court costs of the person being sued.

What are some examples of SLAPP lawsuits?

Some of the biggest First Amendment cases in our history meet the definition of a SLAPP:

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) is considered the most important protector of press freedom. It set the high standard that a public figure filing a defamation lawsuit must show that an allegation made about them was false and that the speaker who made the mistake knew or should have known it was wrong. This standard makes it possible to challenge and criticize powerful people. The lawsuit involved a paid political advertisement in The New York Times designed to raise money for the civil rights movement by criticizing law enforcement response to civil rights protests. It was filed by L.B. Sullivan, Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner, even though he wasn’t named in the advertisement. Sullivan said that certain facts in the article were incorrect; the paper countered that they were minor mistakes and didn’t matter in terms of the public’s overall view of the treatment of civil rights protesters by southern law enforcement. The lawsuit was filed in Alabama where a jury would be more sympathetic to Sullivan than to the northern newspaper. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 to send a message to civil rights activists. But the U.S. Supreme Court later overturned the verdict and protected the newspaper.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) also had roots in the civil rights movement. In 1966, a local branch of the NAACP organized a boycott against white merchants who discriminated against Black people in Mississippi. The business owners sued the NAACP. Most protesters’ actions were protected by the First Amendment, but a few people took unprotected actions like threatening store owners. A Mississippi court ruled for the business owners, ordering the NAACP to pay $3.5 million in damages. It took 16 years before the Supreme Court overturned that verdict, saying “the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity” designed “to bring about political, social, and economic change.”

Most SLAPP suits involve everyday speech by average people:

In 2003, the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition picketed several buildings in New York where tenants lived in terrible conditions. Instead of fixing the problem, building owners sued the NWBCCC for trespass, libel and wrongful interference with business relationships. The court cases went on for several years. They were eventually dismissed but cost NWBCCC more than $1 million in legal fees and forced the organization to focus on defending the lawsuit rather than advocacy efforts.
In 2010, college student Justin Kurtz’s car was towed from his apartment complex. He started a Facebook group called “Kalamazoo Residents against T&J Towing,” which criticized the towing company’s aggressive practices. T&J Towing filed a lawsuit seeking $750,000 in damages from Kurtz for alleged defamation. The lawsuit lasted eight months before Kurtz and the company decided to resolve their case on their own, out of court. Kurtz was not reimbursed for his legal fees but did exact some measure of revenge: the case went viral with The New York Times eventually publishing a front-page article and the Facebook group grew to 14,000 members.
In 2010, the Washington City Paper, a free weekly newspaper, published an article that catalogued many alleged wrongdoings by Dan Snyder, the then-owner of Washington, D.C.’s professional football team. He was not amused and filed a defamation lawsuit. Snyder’s lawyers warned the corporate owners of the City Paper that “the cost of litigation would presumably quickly outstrip the asset value” of the newspaper. This letter, in effect, said it would be easier for the City Paper to apologize and go away than stand by its story. The paper did just that, and Snyder eventually dropped the lawsuit.
In 2019, then-Congressman Devin Nunes filed – and lost – a lawsuit against Twitter and the creators of two parody accounts “Devin Nunes’ Cow” (a mocking reference to his family farm) and “Devin Nunes’ Mom.” Nunes lived in California but filed his lawsuit in Virginia, where there aren’t anti-SLAPP laws. He demanded $250 million. He lost but has filed several different lawsuits since 2018 seeking more than $900 million from those he believes has wronged him. To date, he has not won any of them.

What are some examples of anti-SLAPP laws that protected free speech?

Anti-SLAPP laws have successfully protected speakers in a variety of cases throughout the country:

In 2003, a Baltimore developer tried to sue future tenants for $25 million after the tenants criticized changes to building plans. The lawsuit was dismissed under the Maryland anti-SLAPP law.
In 2015, Robert and Michele Duchouquette posted an unfavorable review of Pets for Care on Yelp. The pet-sitting company sued for defamation and for violation of a clause in their service contracts that says clients cannot make negative comments about them. Pets for Care sought up to $1 million and removal of the negative review. Using the Texas anti-SLAPP law, the Duchouquettes got the lawsuit dismissed. They were reimbursed for more than $23,000 in legal fees and other costs.
In 2017, Phoenix business owner Charlie Lai criticized commercial property owner True North’s remodeling plans. True North tried to sue. Lai used the Arizona anti-SLAPP law to get the lawsuit dismissed, and the court ordered True North to pay his attorney fees.

Anti-SLAPP laws and the First Amendment

While the First Amendment provides strong legal protection for a free press and for our rights as individuals to speak, assemble and petition the government, when a lawsuit challenges these freedoms, it can get costly. Anti-SLAPP laws serve as a great equalizer. They protect those who might otherwise have to self-censor in the face of legal threats. They allow us to speak out on matters that affect our everyday lives. source

Anti Slapp Law Resources:

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

Anti-SLAPP Law Cases – Case Law Summaries & Citings

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16 California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

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Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

Anti-SLAPP statutes are laws intended to curb – and, often, penalize – the filing of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or a “SLAPP.” A SLAPP is a lawsuit that, on its face, attempts to impose liability on a defendant for harm arising from speech

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

California Supreme Court

California Courts of Appeal

SLAPP back: Suits Against Malicious Litigants or Lawyers: California law permits a prevailing SLAPP defendant to sue back for malicious prosecution (sometimes called a “SLAPPback”) if the original suit was baseless and filed with malice. Several cases demonstrate this accountability:

U.S. Supreme Court

Federal Courts in California (Ninth Circuit & District Courts)

Themes and Trends

California Supreme Court Cases

California Appellate Court Cases

Federal District Courts (California)

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

Key Themes

1. Truthful Negative Reviews & Anti-SLAPP Protections

Key Cases:

2. Use of Public Social Media Content

Key Cases:

3. Emotional Distress Claims & Truthful Speech

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California Supreme Court, 2004
32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802