Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Protest

Your 1st Amendment Right 

Know Your Rights to Peaceful Assembly & Protests – Download Pamphlet PDF CLICK HERE

The First Amendment prohibits government from abridging “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” This basic freedom ensures that the spirit of the First Amendment survives and thrives even when the majority of citizens would rather suppress expression it finds offensive.

Over the course of our history, freedom of assembly has protected individuals espousing myriad viewpoints. Striking workers, civil rights advocates, anti-war demonstrators and Ku Klux Klan marchers have all taken to the streets and sidewalks in protest or in support of their causes. Sometimes these efforts have galvanized public support or changed public perceptions. Imagine a civil rights movement without the March on Washington or the women’s suffrage movement without ranks of long-skirted, placard-carrying suffragists filling city streets.

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of this freedom in the 1937 case De Jonge v. State of Oregon, writing that “the right to peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.” According to the court the right to assemble is “one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions.”

In De Jonge, the high court struck down an Oregon “criminal syndicalism” law that prohibited advocacy of “any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution.” Dirk De Jonge had been convicted for teaching communist doctrine to a gathering of 300 people. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, ruling that “the holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.”

The First Amendment protects peaceful, not violent, assembly. However, there must a “clear and present danger” or an “imminent incitement of lawlessness” before government officials may restrict free-assembly rights. Otherwise, the First Amendment’s high purpose can too easily be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.

According to the Supreme Court, it is imperative to protect the right to peaceful assembly, even for those with whose speech we disagree, “in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.”

In the early 1960s, young citizens exercised their free-assembly rights in an effort to focus public attention on one of this nation’s most painful problems, segregation. In Columbia, South Carolina, 187 African-American students marched to the South Carolina Statehouse grounds, carrying signs with messages such as “Down with Segregation.”

Although the demonstrators were peaceful and no violence erupted from onlookers, the marchers were all convicted of breaching the peace. However, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions in its 1963 decision Edwards v. South Carolina, finding that the “circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form.” The high court said that the government could not criminalize “the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”

In a more contemporary example of that principle, the Ku Klux Klan in June 1998 marched in the town of Jasper, Texas, where a black man, James Byrd, had been dragged to death behind a pickup truck. Three white men were convicted of the killing.

The KKK’s right to assemble peaceably was secured by the famous 1977 case National Socialist Party v. Skokie, in which the American Civil Liberties Union successfully argued that the First Amendment prohibited officials of Skokie, Ill., from banning a march by the National Socialist Party. Skokie is a Chicago suburb that is home to many Holocaust survivors. One federal judge reasoned that “it is better to allow those who preach racial hatred to expend their venom in rhetoric rather than to be panicked into embarking on the dangerous course of permitting the government to decide what its citizens may say and hear.”

Government officials may not impose restrictions on protests or parades or other lawful assemblies in order to censor a particular viewpoint or because they dislike the content of the message. However, they may impose some limitations on assembly rights by enacting reasonable “time, place and manner” restrictions designed to further legitimate regulatory objectives, such as preventing traffic congestion or prohibiting interference with nearby activities.

Those who protest and march may also have to pay a permit fee as long as the fee is reasonable and officials do not withhold the permit because of their unpopular views. In the 1992 case Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that allowed an administrator to charge a higher permit fee to groups whose march would likely require more police protection. According to the court, free-speech and assembly rights should not become more costly just because marchers may elicit a hostile reaction from onlookers.

The high court also allowed curbs on assembly in its 2003 decision Virginia v. Hicks, saying that the city of Richmond could make the streets and sidewalks of a housing project off-limits to unauthorized people to curb drugs and other crime in the area. Kevin Hicks, a visitor who was arrested, claimed his rights of association and free speech were violated. But a unanimous high court said Hicks, who was purportedly delivering diapers to his child in the housing project, was not engaged in any First Amendment-protected activity.

First Amendment freedoms ring hollow if government officials can repress expression that they fear will create a disturbance or offend. Unless there is real danger of imminent harm, assembly rights must be respected.

David L. Hudson Jr. is a First Amendment fellow for the Freedom Forum and law professor at Belmont University who publishes widely on First Amendment topics. He is the author of several First Amendment books, including “Let The Students Speak!: A History of the Fight for Freedom of Expression in American Schools” (2011), “The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech” (Thomson Reuters, 2012) and a 12-lecture audio course, “Freedom of Speech: Understanding the First Amendment” (Now You Know Media, 2018).

Tony Mauro, fellow for the First Amendment at the Freedom Forum who has covered the U.S. Supreme Court since 1979 including for the National Law Journal and ALM Media Supreme Court Brief, contributed. source

Assembly Requires Us to Come Together

When May Government Restrict Your Right to Assemble and Protest?

Learn when, why, and how the government may set limits on the First Amendment right of assembly.

The right of assembly is closely linked to its more famous companion in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: freedom of speech. Both rights have been at the heart of controversies for much of our country’s history, from picketing strikers in the 1930s to civil rights sit-ins in the 1960s and Black Lives Matter protests in the 2020s, from KKK rallies in the 1920s to white supremacist marches (and riots) in the 21st Century. But the right to gather with others isn’t limited to political protests. It can also include simply hanging out with friends in public.

As with all constitutional rights, the right of assembly may be limited in some situations, including when gatherings threaten public safety and health. This article gives a brief overview of when and how the government may impose restrictions on your right to gather.

Right to Peaceably Assemble & Limits on Protests

No First Amendment rights are absolute, but the right to gather is the only one that includes the most important limit in the actual words of the amendment: “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”

Protests That Turn Violent

The right to peaceably assemble means law enforcement may break up any gathering that has turned violent or raises a “clear and present danger” of violence or disorder (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). The “clear and present danger” standard is a particularly high hurdle for government officials to overcome if they want to prevent planned gatherings ahead of time.

Protests That Pose Public Safety Threats

Violence or the threat of violence isn’t the only limit on the right of assembly. Authorities may also prevent or stop gatherings that pose other immediate threats to public safety.

Police routinely arrest protesters who block traffic on freeways or bridges. That’s generally allowed because maintaining public safety involves keeping streets open and traffic moving. At the same time, courts have repeatedly held that authorities aren’t justified in breaking up public protests just because they slow traffic, inconvenience pedestrians, are annoying, or make other people mad. (See, for example, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).)

However, as part of a wave of anti-protest legislation that picked up steam in 2021, some states have passed laws criminalizing protests that block traffic, even temporarily. For instance, laws in Florida and Oklahoma make it a crime to obstruct the normal use of roadways, including by simply standing in the street. Those same laws also extended protections to drivers who hit protesters. Part of Oklahoma’s law was temporarily prevented from taking effect pending a court decision on whether it’s constitutional. (Fla. Stat. §§ 316.2045, 870.07 (2022); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1321 (2022); Okla. NAACP v. O’Connor, 2021 WL 4992754.)

Protests Resulting in Riots or Property Damage

Protests that lead to property damage—or simply create a threat of property damage—might also be illegal. Under Florida law, for example, you can be arrested for participating in a group of three or more people who intend to engage in disorderly conduct that results in injury, property damage, or the danger of either type of harm—even if you don’t damage any property or do anything violent. And if the protest was large (25 or more people), you could be charged with aggravated riot—a second-degree felony. (Fla. Stat. § 870.01 (2022).)

As is true for limits on free speech, courts have held that government may set rules on where, when, and how public protests and other gatherings can take place, as long as those rules are:

• reasonable
• “content neutral,” meaning they aren’t an attempt to squelch demonstrations or other gatherings based on their political message, and
• “narrowly tailored,” meaning they’re designed to serve legitimate concerns (like health and safety) with as few restrictions as possible on constitutional rights.

These rules are often referred to as “time, place, and manner restrictions.” Below are some examples of how these guidelines limit what the government can do.

Protests in a Public Forum

There’s less leeway to restrict demonstrations and other gatherings in places that are traditionally considered “public forums” for free expression—such as sidewalks, parks, and public squares—than on other types of public property like military installations, prisons, courthouses, and airport terminals.

Size Limits on Protests

A federal court struck down an ordinance that limited the size of most gatherings in front of New York City Hall and the adjacent plaza, except for city-sponsored public events. As the court pointed out, the ordinance wasn’t narrowly tailored to serve the city’s legitimate safety concerns, and it could allow city officials to stop people from gathering based on their point of view. (Housing Works, Inc. v. Safir, 101 F.Supp.2d 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).)

Permits and Fees to Protest

Generally, cities and other governmental bodies (like public universities) are allowed to require groups to get permits for demonstrations, parades, street festivals, and other large gatherings. But courts have struck down these requirements when they impose higher fees or other obstacles linked to the demonstrators’ controversial viewpoints and the expected response. (See, for example, Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).)

Temporary Curfews

As a general rule, courts allow curfews—which usually restrict people’s right to gather at nighttime—when public officials have declared an emergency, the curfews are needed to keep order due to immediate threats to life or property, and the restrictions are temporary.

Buffer Zones

When it comes to laws aimed at keeping anti-abortion demonstrators a certain distance away from clinic entrances and patients, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed some buffer-zone restrictions while striking down others. The different outcomes usually turn on whether a law is designed to serve important public objectives (like protecting privacy and access to medical facilities) without putting too many limits on the rights of protesters (see, for instance, Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) and McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014).) Of course, different outcomes may also depend on the changing makeup of the Court.

Can the Government Restrict Gatherings on Private Property?

Because the First Amendment applies only to government actions or laws that violate rights, private property owners are generally free to keep groups from protesting or gathering on their property. But there are limited exceptions. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, the balance between property owners’ rights and the constitutional rights of people who use that property changes the more owners open up their property for public use for their own advantages, such as on privately owned bridges, railroads, and company towns. (Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).)

Also, some states—like California and New Jersey—provide broader rights than the federal constitution for assembly and speech on certain types of private property, such as shopping centers and private universities.

Seeking Legal Help

If you believe that governmental authorities have violated your right to assemble, a civil rights attorney could help you explore your legal options. But if you’ve been arrested at a protest or other gathering, you should speak with a criminal defense attorney as soon as possible, even if your case involves potential violations of constitutional rights.

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly

FLYERS/LEAFLETS/HANDBILLS/ = MODERN DAY WEBPAGE

The USE of  SOCIAL MEDIA or WEBPAGES (MODERN DAY LEAFLETS) to get  ATTENTION to one’s Cause!
This BEHAVIOR is the modern digital form of leaflets.  Just like standing on a corner with a bunch of leaflets
handing them out or going door to door, not everyone will take one not everyone will see.  How else would
people in 2022 see paper? Most stuck to a screen. This freedom is equal to a leaflet 50 years ago. How else would
someone find like minded individual to support their legal 1st amendment cause and help form peaceful assembly
using News Digital & Old Style Print ?! One needs numbers to make his cause worthy. This is the basic exercise of
speech, news, media and peaceful assembly

Vermont’s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers 1st Amendment Protected Speech?
see also Vermont v. Schenk 2015 

“The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.”

—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)

The freedom of the press, protected by the First Amendment, is critical to a democracy in which the government is accountable to the people. A free media functions as a watchdog that can investigate and report on government wrongdoing. It is also a vibrant marketplace of ideas, a vehicle for ordinary citizens to express themselves and gain exposure to a wide range of information and opinions.

The rise of the national security state and the proliferation of new surveillance technologies have created new challenges to media freedom. The government has launched an unprecedented crackdown on whistleblowers, targeting journalists in order to find their sources. Whistleblowers face prosecution under the World War One-era Espionage Act for leaks to the press in the public interest. And in the face of a growing surveillance apparatus, journalists must go to new lengths to protect sources and, by extension, the public’s right to know.

The ACLU has played a central role in defending the freedom of the press, from our role in the landmark Pentagon Papers case to our defense of whistleblower Edward Snowden and our advocacy for a new media shield law. When press freedom is harmed, it is much harder to hold our government accountable when it missteps or overreaches.

“Freedom of expression is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”

—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut

Freedom of speech, the press, association, assembly, and petition: This set of guarantees, protected by the First Amendment, comprises what we refer to as freedom of expression. It is the foundation of a vibrant democracy, and without it, other fundamental rights, like the right to vote, would wither away.

The fight for freedom of speech has been a bedrock of the ACLU’s mission since the organization was founded in 1920, driven by the need to protect the constitutional rights of conscientious objectors and anti-war protesters. The organization’s work quickly spread to combating censorship, securing the right to assembly, and promoting free speech in schools.

Almost a century later, these battles have taken on new forms, but they persist. The ACLU’s Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project continues to champion freedom of expression in its myriad forms — whether through protest, media, online speech, or the arts — in the face of new threats. For example, new avenues for censorship have arisen alongside the wealth of opportunities for speech afforded by the Internet. The threat of mass government surveillance chills the free expression of ordinary citizens, legislators routinely attempt to place new restrictions on online activity, and journalism is criminalized in the name of national security. The ACLU is always on guard to ensure that the First Amendment’s protections remain robust — in times of war or peace, for bloggers or the institutional press, online or off.

Over the years, the ACLU has represented or defended individuals engaged in some truly offensive speech. We have defended the speech rights of communists, Nazis, Ku Klux Klan members, accused terrorists, pornographers, anti-LGBT activists, and flag burners. That’s because the defense of freedom of speech is most necessary when the message is one most people find repulsive. Constitutional rights must apply to even the most unpopular groups if they’re going to be preserved for everyone.

Some examples of our free speech work from recent years include:

• In 2019, we filed a petition of certiorari on behalf of DeRay Mckesson, a prominent civil rights activist and Black Lives Matter movement organizer, urging the Supreme Court to overturn a lower court ruling that, if left standing, would dismantle civil rights era speech protections safeguarding the First Amendment right to protest.
• In 2019, we successfully challenged a spate of state anti-protest laws aimed at Indigenous and climate activists opposing pipeline construction.
• We’ve called on big social media companies to resist calls for censorship.
• We’re representing five former intelligence agency employees and military personnel in a lawsuit challenging the government’s pre-publication review system, which prohibits millions of former intelligence agency employees and military personnel from writing or speaking about topics related to their government service without first obtaining government approval.
• In 2018, we filed a friend-of-the-court brief arguing that the NRA’s lawsuit alleging that the state of New York violated its First Amendment rights should be allowed to proceed.
• In 2016, the we defended the First Amendment rights of environmental and racial justice activists in Uniontown, Alabama, who were sued for defamation after they organized against the town’s hazardous coal ash landfill.
• In 2014, the ACLU of Michigan filed an amicus brief arguing that the police violated the First Amendment by ejecting an anti-Muslim group called Bible Believers from a street festival based on others’ violent reactions to their speech.

Speech Plus – The Constitutional Law of Leafleting, Picketing, and Demonstrating

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

ANNOTATIONS

Communication of political, economic, social, and other views is not accomplished solely by face-to-face speech, broadcast speech, or writing in newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets. There is also “expressive conduct,” which includes picketing and marching, distribution of leaflets and pamphlets, addresses to publicly assembled audiences, door-to-door solicitation, and sit-ins. There is also a class of conduct, now only vaguely defined, that has been denominated “symbolic conduct,” which includes such actions as flag desecration and draft-card burnings. Because all these ways of expressing oneself involve conduct rather than mere speech, they are all much more subject to regulation and restriction than is simple speech. Some of them may be forbidden altogether. But, to the degree that these actions are intended to communicate a point of view, the First Amendment is relevant and protects some of them to a great extent. Sorting out the conflicting lines of principle and doctrine is the point of this section.

The Public Forum.—In 1895, while on the highest court of Massachusetts, future Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected a contention that public property was by right open to the public as a place where the right of speech could be recognized,¹⁴⁴⁴ and on review the United States Supreme Court endorsed Holmes’ view.¹⁴⁴⁵ Years later, beginning with Hague v. CIO,¹⁴⁴⁶ the Court reconsidered the issue. Justice Roberts wrote in Hague:

 
“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use 
of the streets and public places has from ancient times, been a part 
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”

Although this opinion was not itself joined by a majority of the Justices, the Court subsequently endorsed the view in several opinions.¹⁴⁴⁷

The Roberts view was called into question in the 1960s, however, when the Court seemed to leave the issue open,¹⁴⁴⁸ and when a majority endorsed an opinion by Justice Black asserting his own narrower view of speech rights in public places.¹⁴⁴⁹ Later decisions restated and quoted the Roberts language from Hague, and that is now the position of the Court.¹⁴⁵⁰ Public streets and parks,¹⁴⁵¹ including those adjacent to courthouses¹⁴⁵² and foreign embassies,¹⁴⁵³ as well as public libraries¹⁴⁵⁴ and the grounds of legislative bodies,¹⁴⁵⁵ are open to public demonstrations, although the uses to which public areas are dedicated may shape the range of permissible expression and conduct that may occur there.¹⁴⁵⁶ Moreover, not all public properties are public forums. “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”¹⁴⁵⁷ “The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically compatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”¹⁴⁵⁸ Thus, by the nature of the use to which the property is put or by tradition, some sites are simply not as open for expression as streets and parks are.¹⁴⁵⁹ But if government does open non-traditional forums for expressive activities, it may not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint in according access.¹⁴⁶⁰ The Court, however, remains divided with respect to the reach of the public forum doctrine.¹⁴⁶¹

Speech in public forums is subject to time, place, and manner regulations that take into account such matters as control of traffic in the streets, the scheduling of two meetings or demonstrations at the same time and place, the preventing of blockages of building entrances, and the like.¹⁴⁶² Such regulations are closely scrutinized in order to protect free expression, and, to be valid, must be justified without reference to the content or subject matter of speech,¹⁴⁶³ must serve a significant governmental interest,¹⁴⁶⁴ and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.¹⁴⁶⁵ The Court has written that a time, place, or manner regulation “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied . . . [s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest . . . .”¹⁴⁶⁶ A content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum must also “contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.”¹⁴⁶⁷ Unlike a content-based licensing scheme, however, it need not “adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman.”¹⁴⁶⁸ These requirements include that the “burden of proving that the film [or other speech] is unprotected expression must rest on the censor,” and that the censor must, “within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.”¹⁴⁶⁹

A corollary to the rule forbidding regulation based on content is the principle—a merging of free expression and equal protection standards—that government may not discriminate between different kinds of messages in affording access.¹⁴⁷⁰ In order to ensure against covert forms of discrimination against expression and between different kinds of content, the Court has insisted that licensing systems be constructed as free as possible of the opportunity for arbitrary administration.¹⁴⁷¹ The Court has also applied its general strictures against prior restraints in the contexts of permit systems and judicial restraint of expression.¹⁴⁷²

It appears that government may not deny access to the public forum for demonstrators on the ground that the past meetings of these demonstrators resulted in violence,¹⁴⁷³ and may not vary a demonstration licensing fee based on an estimate of the amount of hostility likely to be engendered,¹⁴⁷⁴ but the Court’s position with regard to the “heckler’s veto,” the governmental termination of a speech or demonstration because of hostile crowd reaction, remains unclear.¹⁴⁷⁵

The Court has defined three categories of public property for public forum analysis. First, there is the traditional public forum— places such as streets and parks that have traditionally been used for public assembly and debate, where the government may not prohibit all communicative activity and must justify content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions as narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate interest.¹⁴⁷⁶ Second, there is the designated public forum, where the government opens property for communicative activity and thereby creates a public forum. Such a forum may be limited—hence the expression “limited public forum”—for “use by certain groups, e. g., Widmar v. Vincent (student groups), or for discussion of certain subjects, e. g.,City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin PERC (school board business),”¹⁴⁷⁷ but, within the framework of such legitimate limitations, “a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”¹⁴⁷⁸ Third, with respect to “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,” the government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on [sic] speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”¹⁴⁷⁹ The distinction between the first and second categories, on the one hand, and third category, on the other, can therefore determine the outcome of a case, because speakers may be excluded from the first and second categories only for a “compelling” governmental interest, whereas exclusion from the third category need only be “reasonable.”

https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/17-speech-plus.html

Court has changed position on regulating commercial expression

In 1976 the Court reversed its position and identified constitutional values for purely commercial expression. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976), the Court concluded that “the free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to effective decision making in “a free enterprise system” and “to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.” Although the Virginia Pharmacy decision did not explicitly overturn Valentine, it unambiguously repudiated that precedent’s conclusion regarding constitutional protection for commercial speech. Finally, in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) the Court articulated a four-part test to be used when regulating commercial speech.

https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/212/valentine-v-chrestensen

What does a free press do?

Press freedom in action takes many forms. Around the world, many people believe a free press ensures a thriving democracy.

People have a need to know. Journalists have a right to tell. News is history in the making and journalists provide the first draft of history. The information gathered by journalists allows people to make decisions and participate in democracy, such as by voting or petitioning the government.

For decades, many Americans have believed that diversity affects the quality of journalism. More diversity in the news and among the people who produce journalism can have a significant impact – whether that diversity reflects race, gender, sexual orientation and identity, life experience or ideology.

An outlet that publishes false information about a person, for example, can be sued for libel.

Newsgathering

REPORTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN PUBLIC PLACES

Journalists gather news by observing, talking to people, taking photos and recording videos. Journalists aren’t guaranteed access that others aren’t, but they can be in public anywhere any of us can, with the same rights and restrictions.

The courts have generally stood behind journalists who act reasonably in trying to get information — but courts have not protected those who blatantly disregard police orders. Courts have recognized under the First Amendment that journalists can be left alone by the police, so long as they do not unreasonably interfere with or obstruct police activity or risk their own personal safety.

The Supreme Court has said that recording video in public places can be protected speech if the recorder – professional journalist or otherwise – has a message and an audience to receive it.

What courts don’t all agree on is what limits and restrictions are OK, for example, whether there is sometimes or always a right to record police activity, or whether laws or policies can limit the circumstances in which recording can take place.

https://www.freedomforum.org/freedom-of-press/the-medias-role-as-watchdogs/#Press5

“The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.”

—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)

The freedom of the press, protected by the First Amendment, is critical to a democracy in which the government is accountable to the people. A free media functions as a watchdog that can investigate and report on government wrongdoing. It is also a vibrant marketplace of ideas, a vehicle for ordinary citizens to express themselves and gain exposure to a wide range of information and opinions.

The rise of the national security state and the proliferation of new surveillance technologies have created new challenges to media freedom. The government has launched an unprecedented crackdown on whistleblowers, targeting journalists in order to find their sources. Whistleblowers face prosecution under the World War One-era Espionage Act for leaks to the press in the public interest. And in the face of a growing surveillance apparatus, journalists must go to new lengths to protect sources and, by extension, the public’s right to know.

The ACLU has played a central role in defending the freedom of the press, from our role in the landmark Pentagon Papers case to our defense of whistleblower Edward Snowden and our advocacy for a new media shield law. When press freedom is harmed, it is much harder to hold our government accountable when it missteps or overreaches.

https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/freedom-press

Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.​

KRANTZ v. CITY OF FORT SMITH United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. No. 97-3359. Decided: November 30, 1998

1. are not facially invalid on First Amendment overbreadth grounds,

2. are not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs, and

3. were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose.   In addition, defendant the City of Dyer challenges plaintiffs' standing.   
   For the reasons stated below, we hold that plaintiffs have standing to sue the City of Dyer. We further hold that the 
   ordinances are unconstitutional because they are facially overbroad restrictions on free speech.   Accordingly, we do not 
   reach the remaining issues raised on appeal.   The judgments of the district court are reversed, and the case is remanded 
   to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
   

In the present case, notwithstanding defendants’ evidence that government officials received complaints about handbills left on cars and that the ordinances were enacted for the purpose of preventing litter, defendants have not established a factual basis for concluding that a cause-and-effect relationship actually exists between the placement of handbills on parked cars and litter that impacts the health, safety, or aesthetic well-being of the defendant cities.   This flaw in defendants’ position provides an alternative basis for reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants.   Id. at 469 (“The City has not provided factual support for the assumptions that underlie its exclusion of churches, and the alleged secondary effects of churches on commercial activity remain a disputed factual issue.”);   cf.  Excalibur Group, 116 F.3d at 1221 (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant where the record “indicate [d] that the city had substantial evidence on which to base its conclusions about the secondary effects of adults-only businesses.”).   Even if we were to assume that a logical connection exists between plaintiffs’ handbilling activities and the actual or potential presence of litter on defendants’ streets, that correlation does not necessarily mean the ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of preventing litter.   Although a governmental restriction does not have to be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of regulation, it may not, under well-established constitutional standards, curtail substantially more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose, which is precisely what the ordinances do.

Conclusion

We hold that the challenged portions of the ordinances are not narrowly tailored to serve the governmental purpose asserted by defendants.   Having therefore determined as a matter of law that the ordinances are facially invalid on overbreadth grounds, we need not address plaintiffs’ remaining arguments on appeal concerning their claims of selective enforcement and discriminatory enactment.   The judgments of the district court are reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-8th-circuit/1381522.html

Hale v. Henkel was decided by the united States Supreme Court in 1906. The opinion of the court states:
“The “individual” may stand upon “his Constitutional Rights” as a CITIZEN. He is entitled to carry on his “private” business in his own way. “His power to contract is unlimited.” He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and property. “His rights” are such as “existed” by the Law of the Land (Common Law) “long antecedent” to the organization of the State”, and can only be taken from him by “due process of law”, and “in accordance with the Constitution.” “He owes nothing” to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.”
HALE V. HENKEL 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906) Hale v. Henkel is binding on all the courts of the United States of America until another Supreme Court case says it isn’t. No other Supreme Court case has ever overturned Hale v. Henkel

None of the various issues of Hale v. Henkel has ever been overruled Since 1906, Hale v. Henkel has been cited by the Federal and State Appellate Court systems over 1,600 times! In nearly every instance when a case is cited, it has an impact on precedent authority of the cited case.  Compared with other previously decided Supreme Court cases, no other case has surpassed Hale v. Henkel in the number of times it has been cited by the courts. Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906 Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633

Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) ”

an in-depth article can be found below regarding

more Scotus for you 1st Amendment – First Amendment + Rulings in Favor 

FLYERS/LEAFLETS/HANDBILLS/ = MODERN DAY WEBPAGE

TODAY WE USE SOCIAL MEDIA OR WEBPAGES TO CATCH EYEBALLS ATTENTION TO OUR CAUSE, THE BEHAVIOR IS THE MODERN DIGITAL FORM OF LEAFLETS 

U.S. Supreme Court

• Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
• Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137,(1803) “The Constitution of these United States is the supreme law of the land. Any law that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void of law.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) “… the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”
  Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional. “In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank”. “All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID”. Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional.
  
• State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
• Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
• Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
• SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
• Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
  When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
• United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
• Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
• Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),  The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The     Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.
   Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.  Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.

• People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
  
• A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
• Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
  speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
• Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
  The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
• Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
  A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
• Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
  The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
• Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974)  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
• City of Houston v. Hill (1987)  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
  
  
• STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
• STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant –  William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
• State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
• Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
• People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS  determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!
• Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”
  But the D.C. Circuit (1989) expressly held that the First Amendment prevented the statute from applying to “public or political discourse,”
   such as condemnation of political officials (even left expressly for that official).

• Vermont’s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers 1st Amendment Protected Speech? see also Vermont v. Schenk 2015 

How did the US Supreme Court test speech ? For Obscenities the Supreme Court has went for Hicklin rule but that have been dropped in place of 
the Miller Test in California v. Miller come up with a way to test speech outside of obscene? How does the Supreme Court determine if words are 
a is a TRUE THREAT or just free speech. Watts v. United States - True Threat Test