VINDICTIVE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

WHAT IS VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION?

Vindictive prosecution is when a prosecutor violates a defendant’s due process rights and if they are using their decision to prosecute the defendant for purposes of retaliation.

The following instances constitute vindictiveness:

• Where the prosecutor charges the defendant with a more serious offense after the defendant appeals the conviction of the lesser offense
• Where the prosecutor charges the defendant with an offense although the defendant has not violated the law.

The following represent instances that DO NOT constitute vindictiveness:

• Adding a charge after the defendant withdraws from a plea bargain agreement
• Indicting the defendant on a more serious charge after the defendant rejected a plea agreement
• Indicting the defendant on a new charge after a mistrial occurred
• Indicting the defendant on a more serious charge after discovering that there was an error in the original information or indictment.

PRESUMPTION OF VINDICTIVENESS

If the presumption of vindictiveness arises, the presumption may be rebutted by showing that a legitimate and objective reason supported the change in the indictment or the basis for the indictment itself. However, if no presumption of vindictiveness arises, the defendant may show that the prosecutor was actually vindictive in her prosecution. The defendant may present direct evidence showing that the prosecutor was vindictive.

WHAT IS SELECTIVE PROSECUTION?

Selective prosecution is when the prosecutor bases her decision of whether to prosecute on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity. If they do this then the prosecutor may be guilty of selective prosecution.

A claim of selective prosecution must be raised in a timely manner before the trial has commenced otherwise the claim may be regarded as untimely and waived. In order for the defendant to prevail on a selective prosecution claim they must overcome the strong presumption that prosecutors have properly performed their duties. A selective prosecution claim is typically analyzed in accordance with the equal protection standards.

The defendant must produce evidence that shows:

• The prosecutor engaged in selective prosecution
• The selective prosecution had a discriminatory effect upon the defendant
• The selective prosecution was pursued with discriminatory intent.

If you need help with this subject contact the legal team of Underwood & Associates with the link below https://www.yourcriminaldefenseattorney.com/blog/2020/october/vindictive-and-selective-prosecution/

Learn more about these sujects

• Malicious Prosecution
• Prosecutional Misconduct
• Vindictive Prosecution
• Retaliatory Prosecution
• Abuse of Process

Selected Issues in Malicious Prosecution Cases

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct

Vindictive Prosecution – Georgetown University

VINDICTIVE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

What is Abuse of Process?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution?

Malicious Prosecution Actions Arising Out Of Family Law Proceedings: Proceed Carefully

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution

SCOTUS Makes It Easier To Sue Police And Prosecutors For Malicious Prosecution

Prosecutional Misconduct – SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors

National District Attorneys Association – National Prosecution Standards – NDDA

What Happens If Charges Are Dropped Before Trial?

Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Possible courses of action Prosecutorial Misconduct

Misconduct by Judges & Prosecutor – Rules of Professional Conduct

PC 1385 – Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise

Thomp$on v. Clark – Maliciou$ Pro$ecution 

Reichle v. Howards (2012) – Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials –1st Amendment

People v. Superior Court (Greer) 5th & 8th Amendment – Bias / Malicious Persecutor

Hartman v. Moore (2006) –Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Epic SCOTUS Decisions

Recoverable Damages Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 LEARN MORE

New Supreme Court Ruling makes it easier to sue police

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of rights under color of law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against rights

Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Rights

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

Recoverable Damages Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

 Police Discretion

The police violated my rights

DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct?

Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Rights

New Supreme Court Ruling makes it easier to sue police

Prosecutorial Misconduct, What is it?

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct

Prosecutorial Misconduct

 Vindictive Prosecution – Georgetown University

 VINDICTIVE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

 Misconduct by Judges & Prosecutor

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT LAW

Equality Act 2010 – Discrimination and mental health

Motion to reconsider – Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1008 Section 1008

Fighting A Judgment Without Filing An Appeal Settlement Or Mediation – Options to Appealing

Right to Truth – Victims’ Bill of Rights – Prop 8 1982

118.1 PC – Police Officers Filing False Reports

America’s criminal legal system is unduly harsh due to abuse by over zealous low functioning prosecutors. These prosecutors have civic duties but have no civic minds. They are supposed to have temprance as leaders, yet they shame their position.

Experts explain how we got here and solutions that will benefit everyone.

America can’t shrink its reliance on mass incarceration until we confront our approach to punishment. These essays by renowned experts in a variety of fields focus on our deep-rooted impulse to punish people in ways that are far beyond what could be considered proportionate. Together, they illustrate how necessary it is to rein in the punitive excess of the criminal legal system, which is inexorably entwined with the legacy of slavery. They also highlight how we have marginalized poor communities and people of color through criminalization and punishment.

Addressing a range of issues — from policing to prosecution to incarceration to life after prison — the writers highlight how our nation has prioritized excess punishment over more supportive and less traumatic ways of dealing with social harm. The essays explore whether, when, and how we could have made different decisions that would have changed the way these systems of punishment and social control evolved.

Looking ahead, they also ask how we can learn from this failed experiment with mass incarceration and prioritize human dignity over human misery.

We hope this series will spur increased discussion on these vital topics. source

A former assistant U.S. attorney explains how prosecutors’ decisions are fueling mass incarceration — and what can be done about it.

This essay is part of the Brennan Center’s series examining the punitive excess that has come to define America’s criminal legal system.

I became a prosecutor because I don’t like bullies. I stopped being a prosecutor because I don’t like bullies.

I grew up on the south side of Chicago in an all-Black neighborhood. My family had direct experience with crime — our house was broken into, and my mother was held up at gun point. As a young Black man, I also had some bad experiences with police officers, like getting stopped for no reason, or being the object of suspicion every time I rode my bike into a white neighborhood.

So, I went into the prosecutor’s office in the District of Columbia as an undercover brother, hoping I could create change from within. I wanted to help keep people safe from criminals, and I wanted to help keep Black people as safe as possible in a racist criminal justice system.

What I instead found was that rather than changing the system, the system was changing me. Like many lawyers, I was competitive and ambitious, and the way for a young lawyer to move up in the prosecutor’s office was to lock up as many people as possible, for as long as possible. It turned out I was good at it, and I started to think of that work as the best way to serve my community.

At some point, though, I began to see things differently. Virtually all the defendants were Black or Latino. In Washington, as in many American cities, if you visit criminal court, you would think that white people don’t commit crime. I came to realize that I did not go to law school to put Black people in prison, especially for the drug crimes that I was prosecuting — crimes that white folks were also committing but didn’t get arrested for. I also didn’t feel that my work sending so many people to prison — especially Black men — was making communities any safer. On the contrary, I learned that too many prosecutors use their power in a way that has contributed to the radical increase in incarceration.

As the most powerful actors in the criminal legal system, local and federal prosecutors have a huge amount of discretion and are subject to little judicial oversight — oversight that might moderate their misuse of prosecutorial power. For example, they decide not only whether to charge someone with a crime, but if so, what crime. Even if a judge does not agree with the prosecutor’s decision to charge someone with a particular crime, the judge is powerless to undo the prosecutor’s action. Because punishment for a crime is largely determined by the sentence that lawmakers have established in the criminal code, the prosecutor often has more power over how much punishment someone convicted of a crime receives than the judge who does the actual sentencing.

Let’s say that a person has been arrested for possessing five pounds of weed (in a jurisdiction where marijuana possession and selling is criminalized). The prosecutor can choose not to charge that person (no sentence, obviously), charge them with simple possession (usually a sentence of limited duration or severity), or charge them with possession with intent to distribute, which can require — by statute — several years in prison. Most prosecutor offices are not transparent about what factors would lead them to which charging decision — and that’s assuming that the office even has uniform standards. Many don’t, and they decide these issues on an ad hoc basis, which risks allowing inappropriate considerations like race to influence who gets charged.

Plea bargaining exacerbates the problem. This is because prosecutors typically offer an accused person a “deal” to avoid going to trial. Some 95 percent of criminal cases are resolved this way. If the defendant agrees to confess their guilt, the prosecutor recommends a sentence to the judge that is less punitive than what the prosecutor would recommend if the defendant goes to trial, and loses. This threat by prosecutors — to throw the book at defendants who are found guilty — radically dilutes the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court authorized this practice in a 1978 case called Bordenkircher v. Hayes. Lewis Hayes had been charged with forgery and faced a 2-to-10-year prison sentence. Prosecutors offered to pursue a five-year sentence if Hayes pleaded guilty and saved them from “the inconvenience and necessity of a trial.” If he refused to plead guilty, prosecutors said they would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act. Because Hayes had previously been convicted of two felonies, a conviction would mandate a sentence of life imprisonment. Hayes exercised his constitutional right to a trial, prosecutors charged him under the Habitual Crime Act, and he was found guilty and sentenced to a life term.

Hayes challenged his conviction on the grounds that his 14th Amendment due process rights were violated when prosecutors threatened to re-indict him on more serious charges if he did not plead guilty to the original, less serious forgery offense. In its 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge. According to the Court, the plea-bargaining system is an “important component of this country’s criminal justice system,” and so long as pleas are made “knowingly and voluntarily,” there is no constitutional violation. The Court did recognize that punishing a person because he “has done what the law plainly allows him to do” is “a due process violation of the most basic sort.” But it rejected the idea that Hayes was being punished, claiming instead that he was just being presented with “difficult choices.”

Since Bordenkircher, plea bargaining has become so institutionalized that, in a case decided in 2012, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”

Prosecutors have also contributed to the racial disparities that are an endemic feature of the U.S. criminal legal system. In 2014, the Vera Institute of Justice published research that examined racial disparities at play in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, and it concluded that “race remained a statistically significant independent factor” at most discretionary points in the legal process. In Vera’s report, based on the analysis of more than 200,000 cases, researchers found that Black and Latino people charged with drug offenses were more likely to receive more punitive plea offers than white defendants, particularly offers that included incarceration. Black and Latino defendants were also more likely than similarly situated whites and Asian Americans to be detained before trial. The study did find that prosecutors treated Black and Latino defendants more favorably in at least one respect: they were more likely than whites to have cases dismissed before they went to trial — probably, the report argued, because “police were more likely to bring them in on bogus or unsubstantiated charges” in the first place.

Many of these policies and practices are being reexamined in jurisdictions across the country, in part thanks to reformers who have won district attorney elections. The “progressive prosecutor” movement owes its start to Angela J. Davis’s 2009 book, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor, which argued that prosecutors should use their discretion to reduce mass incarceration and racial disparities.

Reform-minded prosecutors have different approaches, but they all reject incarceration as a knee-jerk response to social ills. In Chicago, Cook County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx has declined to prosecute low-level offenses such as small-scale retail theft as felonies. In Baltimore, State’s Attorney Marilyn J. Mosby recently announced her office will no longer prosecute sex work, drug possession, and other low-level offenses. Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner requires prosecutors in his office to state on the record the costs and benefits of any prison sentences they recommend to judges. In San Francisco, District Attorney Chesa Boudin has ended the use of “three strikes” laws.

The progressive prosecutor movement is new but promising. Since prosecutors are one of the primary sources of the problem of mass incarceration and excessive punishment, they must be part of the solution. source

Paul Butler is the Albert Brick Professor in Law at Georgetown University and a MSNBC legal analyst. A former federal prosecutor, he is the author of Chokehold: Policing Black Men. 

“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America.” – Former U.S. Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson

Prosecutors hold tremendous power, having wide discretion in whether or not to bring criminal charges against someone and what those charges should be. But they also have constitutional obligations to ensure that those accused of a crime receive all the evidence that might aid the accused person’s defense before trial.

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor intentionally breaks a law or a code of professional ethics while prosecuting a case.

“Prosecutors have demanding jobs and high caseloads, and we recognize that they sometimes make honest mistakes,” says Innocence Project senior litigation counsel Nina Morrison. “Sometimes those mistakes are serious enough that a person convicted of a crime will be entitled to have his or her conviction thrown out, even if the prosecutor didn’t intend to violate the convicted person’s rights.”

In some of those cases, however, the violation is not an accident and rises to the level of intentional misconduct. “In a disturbing number of cases,” Morrison explains, “we have found documents or notes hidden in a prosecutor’s case file containing information that would have directly supported our client’s innocence defense, but which was held back by the prosecutor at trial and kept hidden for decades. And in other cases, credible leads to suppressed evidence can’t be pursued because the original files are destroyed, or witnesses have died or gone missing.”

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor intentionally breaks a law or a code of professional ethics while prosecuting a case. While prosecutors are responsible for following the law themselves and making sure that those in law enforcement who work on an investigation or prosecution do the same, “prosecutorial misconduct” is a term typically reserved for serious and intentional violations.

It is difficult to know the full extent of the problem, in part because prosecutors often are the ones who control access to evidence needed to investigate a claim of misconduct.  But we do know that some prosecutors prize winning a conviction over complying with their constitutional obligations, resulting in error and, in some cases, intentional misconduct. Despite this, there are no reliable systems for holding prosecutors accountable for their misdeeds. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, prosecutors are frequently granted “immunity” from civil lawsuits (meaning they cannot be sued by a wrongly convicted person) even when they intentionally violate the law, making oversight by public agencies and the courts all the more critical.

“We know that official findings of misconduct represent only a fraction of the misconduct that actually occurs.”

In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), Justice Sutherland characterized prosecutorial misconduct as “overstepp[ing] the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.” In the years since Berger, advocates for the wrongly convicted have increasingly focused on prosecutors’ failure to disclose favorable evidence – what are known as “Brady” violations, after the 1963 case of Brady v. Maryland – as one of the most harmful and pervasive forms of prosecutorial misconduct.

In the Dewayne Brown case, for example, a long-buried email chain uncovered more than a decade after Brown’s trial revealed that the trial prosecutor, Dan Rizzo, had deliberately hidden phone records from Brown’s defense attorney that supported Brown’s alibi. Those records might have stayed hidden forever had the police officer who originally obtained them not saved and found a copy in his garage while Brown was wrongfully incarcerated on death row. It was only after the original records were turned over and Brown was released from death row that a special prosecutor assigned to the case concluded that Rizzo not only knew about the phone records before trial, but had knowingly concealed them from Brown’s defense team.

Another example is the case of Stanley Mozee and Dennis Allen, who were both exonerated in Dallas, Texas, in 2019 after spending more than 15 years in prison for a murder they did not commit. Their joint exoneration was based on documents located in the files of the trial prosecutor, Rick Jackson, showing that he’d knowingly put on false testimony from several jailhouse informants and suppressed key evidence from eyewitnesses that would have strongly supported Mozee’s and Allen’s innocence claims.

 

(L-R): Stanley Mozee, Conviction Integrity Unit Chief Cynthia Garza, Dallas County D.A. John Creuzot, Innocence Project Senio… Read more

A survey conducted by the Innocence Project, Innocence Project New Orleans, Resurrection After Exoneration and the Veritas Initiative looked at five diverse states over a five-year period (2004-2008) and identified 660 cases in which courts found prosecutors committed misconduct, such as tampering with key evidence, withholding evidence from the defendant or coercing a witness to give false testimony. In 527 cases, judges upheld the convictions, concluding that the prosecutorial error did not impact the fairness of the defendant’s original trial. In 133 cases, convictions were thrown out. Of the 660 cases examined, only one prosecutor accused of misconduct was disciplined.

The wrongful conviction of an innocent person should be every prosecutor’s greatest concern
(FUCKING LAUGHABLE AT BEST OC DA IS A HARD NOSED ASHOLE MORON VINDICTIVE 2 FACED PAY TO PLAY CRIMINAL HIMSELF, SO YEAH I CALL BULLSHIT CIU).
A prosecutor’s highest priority should be ensuring innocent people are never prosecuted.

The Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) of the OCDA investigates claims of factual innocence presented by defendants who were convicted in the County of Orange, California. 

A defendant or attorney seeking to have a conviction reviewed should complete the Conviction Integrity Intake Form and submit it to the OCDA

cited https://orangecountyda.org/ciu/

Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) of the Orange County District Attorney OCDA

 

OCDA OFFICE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The Orange County District Attorney’s Office – Bureau of Investigation supports the prosecutorial and law enforcement endeavors of the District Attorney. It provides a wide range of policing services tasked with suppressing crime and ensuring all criminal cases filed in Orange County are thoroughly investigated.

The Bureau of Investigation (Bureau) is the Orange County District Attorney’s Office (OCDA) law enforcement division. The Bureau is comprised of more than 130 sworn police Investigators who are seasoned law enforcement professionals recruited from other law enforcement agencies. District Attorney Investigators have extensive investigative experience, highly developed technical skills, exemplary work records, and an outstanding personal history. The Bureau also employs 90 non-sworn support team members.

Investigators assist prosecutors in trial by developing leads and locating additional witnesses, uncooperative or reluctant witnesses, ensuring the safety of victims and witnesses, and engaging in trial strategy with their prosecutor partners.

Their work is extensive, includes writing and serving search and arrest warrants, investigating original cases in complex matters, and going the extra mile to ensure the law is enforced in a just, honest, efficient, and ethical manner.

The Bureau’s “Special Assignments” unit responds to and investigates officer-involved shootings, custodial deaths, police officer criminal misconduct allegations, public corruption, and other sensitive or complex investigations. In addition, OCDA Investigators are assigned and participate on 10 different local, state, and federal task forces. These task forces allow law enforcement to leverage the abilities and expertise of the various participating agencies, which results in coordinated and effective investigations of the highest level crimes.

OCDA Investigator Expertise

• AB 109 Task Force
• Automobile Insurance Fraud
• Branch Court Services
• Child Abduction
• Child Abuse
• Civil Gang Injunctions
• Cyber Crimes
• DEA Task Force
• Cold Case Homicide Task Force
• Consumer Protection
• DNA Collection
• DNA Investigations
• Elder Abuse
• Environmental Protection
• Family Protection
• Felony Panel
• Gangs
• Homicide
• Human Trafficking Task Force
• In-Home Support Services Fraud
• Insurance Fraud
• Juvenile
• Major Fraud
• Medical Insurance Fraud
• Narcotics Enforcement Team 
• Orange County Auto Theft Task Force (OCATT)
• OC Gang Reduction and Intervention Partnership (GRIP)
• Orange County Housing Fraud
• Orange County Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (RCFL)
• Organized Crime
• Professional Standards Division
• Protective Services Unit/Threat Assessment
• Public Assistance/Welfare Fraud
• Real Estate Fraud
• Sexual Assault
• Sober Living Task Force (SLIP)
• Special Assignments/Special Prosecutions
• TARGET
• Taskforce Review of Homicide and Sex Offenses (TracKRS)
• U.S. Marshall Task Force
• Vehicular Homicide
• Workers Compensation

cited https://orangecountyda.org/bureau/https://orangecountyda.org/bureau/

YOU ARE WORTHLESS JEALOUS BUMBLING LYING MORONS INCAPABLE OF SURVIVAL WITHOUT A GOVERMENT JOB, TOO DUMB TO SURVIVE LIKE A CIVILLIAN 

YOU ARE THE REASON PEOPLE SHOULD USE CONTRACEPTIVES, THE ONLY REASON, YOU ARE NOT NEEDED, YOU LIE YOU  ARE DUMB AND CORRUPTED = USELESS!
TO SPARE THE INTELLEGENT FROM DEALING WITH YOUR INSANITY OF YOUR INCOMPETANCE AND BIAS 

YOUR PARENTS WOULD HAVE SAVED THE GOVERMENT FROM A TORT

YOU ARE GUILTY OF CAUSING LYING ABUSING YOUR POWER HARMING DISOBEYING A COURT ORDER AIDING AND ABETTING A FUGITIVE CHILD ENDANGERMENT AND HARM TOP MY CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSPIRACY TO HARM MY CIVIL RIGHTS

AND YOU ARE GUILTY ARE HARMING THE REALTIONSHIP TIME WITH MY SON. YOU HAVE HARMED THE REALTIONSHIP BETWEEN Daddy & Son  –  EACH ONE OF YOU WILL PAY $$ AND YOUR REPUTATION AND ACTIONS WILL BE FOREVER CEMENTED IN WEB HISTORY.

https://goodshepherdmedia.net/daddy-son-suffer/

Maybe CIU should investigate SIU, LHPD, GGPD and the Head DA Todd Spitzer as he is the superior who through pecking order oversees the subordinates under his control.  DA Bradbury (subordinate noun/adjective/verb) subordination and subordinate control of my case has committed Malicious Prosecution, he is guilty too of not watching his subordinate as his elected office has duties he is clearly failing and other duties he clearly violates and does run pay to play games as well.

“Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.”(Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988). This ruling make DA Todd Spitzer Negligent and a conspirator18 U.S. Code § 241 to the violation of my (42-us-code-1983-civil-action ) civil rights and is a violation of code 18 U.S. Code § 242

Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous. Accordingly that which Chief Justice Marshall has called ‘the tenderness of the law Page 11 of 48 for the rights of individuals’ [FN1] entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability.Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the confines of the statute. United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S.  624, 628, 10 S. Ct. 625, 626, 33 L. Ed. 1080; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,485, 37 S. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857. FN1 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37.

We do not overlook those constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, established by Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168,196 [26: 377, 386].
We said in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 [29: 746, 751]—and it cannot be too often repeated—that the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sancity of a man’s home, and the privacies of his life.
As said by Mr. Justice Field in Re Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241,250, “of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value.”

“Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law.”   In re McCowan(1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.

“All are presumed to know the law.” San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107;  San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.

“It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one.”  Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.

In Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002.)  held that a malicious criminal prosecution was a naked constitutional tort, and was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the 4th Amendment. They just said it, basically out of thin air.

Prosecutional Misconduct – SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors

WHAT TO KNOW ABOUT THE TRUTH CLICK HERE TO LEARN MORE

To Learn More…. Read MORE Below and click the links Below 

We also have the Reichle v. Howards (2012) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

OC District Attorney Todd Spitzer is facing a new round of misconduct accusations, with a former homicide prosecutor alleging in a court filing that Spitzer lied to a judge to try to hide racially charged comments Spitzer made that impacted a high-profile murder case.

“I have come into possession of emails which reveal what I believe to be a fraud recently perpetrated upon this Court,” states a court filing late last week by Matt Murphy, who was a former star homicide prosecutor at the DA’s office who has now become one of Spitzer’s fiercest critics.

He accuses Spitzer – Orange County’s top prosecutor – of telling lies that violate his duties as an attorney under state law, including hiding the fact he decided to pursue the death penalty against Jamon Rayon Buggs, a Black man, after Spitzer made racially charged remarks to other prosecutors during an Oct. 1 discussion of the decision.

[Click here to read the court filing.]

Spitzer is denying the allegations, saying he was completely honest with the court.

“The District Attorney’s statement to the court was factually accurate and complete and any allegation to the contrary is simply not true,” Spitzer’s office said in a statement this weekend.

The emails Murphy submitted to court reveal Spitzer decided to pursue the death penalty against Buggs as of Oct. 28 – four weeks after his Oct. 1 racial remarks – but then changed course to life in prison after his prosecutors wrote memos in December saying they would have to disclose Spitzer’s racial remarks to the judge.

Murphy alleges Spitzer then lied multiple times to the judge in an effort to keep secret the memos about his racial comments.

Among them was when Spitzer told the court that he made a decision to only seek life in prison but not death after his Oct. 1 racial statements when debating whether to seek the death penalty against Buggs.

“The only subsequent decision that I made after October 1, 2021 was that I would be seeking LWOP in this matter and not death,” Spitzer wrote in a Jan. 30 memo he submitted to Judge Gregg Prickett on Feb. 4.

Yet the newly revealed emails show Spitzer told prosecutors on Oct. 28 he had “made the decision to seek DP” – using a common shorthand for “death penalty.”

Murphy says this shows Spitzer outright lied to the judge – in violation of state law requirements for attorneys to not mislead courts.

“Clearly, Mr. Sptizer’s memorandum was presented in an attempt to persuade the court to keep his racist remarks hidden from Mr. Buggs’ defense lawyers, as well as from the public at large,” Murphy states in his filing.

“The motive for Mr. Spitzer’s lie is obvious,” he continued:

“To try to convince the court that the racially-charged statements set forth in [then-prosecutor Brahim] Baytieh’s narrative were much ado about nothing, instead of what every experienced capital litigator can see that it represents — a blunder of immense magnitude, and a shameful expression of racial bias in a setting of such solemnity and importance, that Mr. Spitzer reversed his position on seeking the death penalty for the sole purpose of keeping the issue hidden from Mr. Buggs’s defense team and the public.”

Asked for Spitzer’s response to the allegations, his office said, “No official decision [was] made on the death penalty until the court was notified on January 28, 2022 that we would not seek the death penalty.”

“We haven’t been served with a copy of the motion,” added the statement, provided by Spitzer’s spokeswoman Kimberly Edds.

“Questions of the defendant‘s mental competency were brought up by the defense and his behavior in court on October 27, 2021 made it clear that it was an issue that needed to be considered,” the statement added.

As for Spitzer’s Jan. 30 memo to the court, Edds said, “The District Attorney made the right decision to inform the court and disclose this situation out of an abundance of caution.”

Murphy accuses Spitzer of telling an additional lie to the court by claiming no one raised any concerns about his Oct. 1 racial remarks until nearly 90 days later, which Spitzer cited to undermine the credibility of concerns about the remarks.

“The fact that nearly 90 days had passed, not one person of the [DA] Special Circumstances committee asked to reconvene, or asked me for clarification of my statements, or in any way beforehand communicated any potential issues with my statements was literally mind-blowing,” Spitzer wrote in the opening paragraph of his Jan. 30 memo he submitted to Judge Prickett.

Yet the emails show Spitzer actually was told about the racial bias concerns more than 60 days earlier than he claimed to the court, Murphy states in his filing.

One of those documents shows that on Oct. 28, Spitzer received an email noting that a prior death penalty conversation about Buggs had included discussion of the Racial Justice Act – the racial bias law that prosecutors said requires Spitzer’s comments to be turned over to the defense.

“What’s more, [then-prosecutor Brahim] Baytieh’s email goes on to say that he (Baytieh) ‘relied on [the Racial Justice Act] in making my recommendation [not to pursue the death penalty],’ ” Murphy wrote.

Spitzer responded to that email 17 minutes later without contesting it, writing he had decided to pursue the death penalty against Buggs, according to the documents Murphy filed in court.

“Mr. Spitzer’s unabashed attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the court—by claiming that no one who heard the racially biased comments on October 1 protested until December 22 (and thus, Mr. Spitzer argues, the racially biased statements must not have been made at all)—relied on the erroneous belief that nobody else maintained copies of this email exchange,” Murphy wrote.

“Fortunately, he was mistaken.”

Spitzer’s statement did not address this allegation.

Murphy’s contention of a cover-up of Spitzer’s racial remarks are supported by a lead detective in the Buggs murder case and the mother of one of the victims.

“It was disappointing that [a prosecutor] and so many of his colleagues would try and cover this matter up as we all know the ‘cover up is always worse than the crime,’ ” Newport Beach police detective Court Depweg wrote in a Feb. 3 letter to Judge Prickett.

Murphy also contends Spitzer lied to the court about “walling off” from the case everyone from the Oct. 1 meeting – including himself – to address the concerns that he made racial biased comments.

“This was intended to convey the impression that he would no longer take any action that might affect the case,” Murphy wrote in his filing.

But two days later, Spitzer informed Newport Beach’s police chief that people can talk to him about the Buggs case, according to Depweg’s Feb. 3 letter to the judge – something Spitzer later confirmed in a statement to reporters.

That makes Spitzer’s “walling off” statements to the court a “deception,” Murphy alleges.

Spitzer’s statement did not address this allegation.

Murphy contends Spitzer violated state law, which requires all attorneys to use “means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

“I believe that the submission of such a false writing to the court violates an attorney’s statutory and ethical duty ‘never to seek to mislead the judge’ through the use of ‘any false statement of fact or law,’ ” Murphy wrote in his filing.

The county’s top prosecutor has tarnished the integrity of the justice system, he alleges.

“In all of this, we respectfully submit that Mr. Spitzer has disgraced himself, betrayed the victims, the justice system, and the community at large, and further sullied the esteem of the office he was elected to lead,” the filing states.

“In short, Mr. Spitzer has attempted to perpetrate a fraud on this court, and we had a clear ethical duty to provide the attached documents.”

Nick Gerda covers county government for Voice of OC. You can contact him at ngerda@voiceofoc.org.

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sited https://voiceofoc.org/2022/02/emails-fuel-new-claim-da-spitzer-lied-to-court-about-his-death-penalty-decision-in-homicide/

“Little Demon,” a new animated show about a woman who mates with Satan and produces the Antichrist, is raising eyebrows and making cultural waves.

But amid the cacophony of frustrated retorts to the show — which airs on the Disney-owned network FXX and stars Danny DeVito as Satan — faith leaders and media experts are sounding some consequential theological and practical alarms for parents and children alike.

I … can’t believe that this show exists,” Mike Signorelli, senior pastor of V1 Church in New York City, told CBN’s Faithwire. “I think if we could go back 30 years … everybody would universally be shocked and appalled.”

DISTURBING STORYLINES

Signorelli isn’t exaggerating the situation, as the promotional language for “Little Demon” alone showcases the disturbing themes and images embedded in the show — violence, paganism, and satanic storylines cloaked in attempted comedy.

“Thirteen years after being impregnated by Satan, a reluctant mother, Laura, and her Antichrist daughter, Chrissy, attempt to live an ordinary life in Delaware but are constantly thwarted by monstrous forces, including Satan, who yearns for custody of his daughter’s soul,” reads the show’s description.

Signorelli said “Little Demon” is the fulfillment of what happens when morals and ethics slowly erode and decay, sending culture on a slippery slope that tragically yields such a strange moment.

“What happens is, things incrementally change year over year to where you can accept what you would have never accepted in a previous generation,” he said. “As a Christian, I believe that the enemy is after our children. We wrestle not against flesh and blood but principalities powers and rulers in high places.”

Considering the purported paganistic themes in “Little Demon,” one of the quotes about the series that is circulating comes from actress Aubrey Plaza, who plays Laura.

“I love that we are normalizing paganism,” Plaza said while speaking about the show during an event this summer. “Laura is a pagan. She’s a witch. She’s jacked.”

CULTURE’S PRECARIOUS PLACE

Dr. Ted Baehr, a Hollywood mainstay and the founder of Movieguide, an organization that helps families navigate entertainment content, said he’s neither stunned by the airing of “Little Demon” nor is he surprised by the show’s controversial themes, especially considering culture’s precarious standing.

“Seeing this show is … not surprising,” he told CBN’s Faithwire while discussing the disturbing elements and themes. “This is the direction that our culture is going in.”

Despite “Little Demon” airing on FXX, a Disney-owned outlet purportedly targeting 18 to 34-year-olds, the animated series’ edgy language and themes — and the fact it’s a cartoon — could attract much younger viewers curious about the subject matter.

Beyond that, there’s the peculiar inclusion of one of the main characters — the devil’s daughter — who is a young teen, a seemingly strange element for a show purporting to target adults.

“We all know that children want to watch what they’re not supposed to watch,” Signorelli said.

OTHER REACTIONS

Signorelli and Baehr are just two Christians speaking out, though reaction has also moved into the political realm. One Million Moms (OMM), an advocacy group, issued an “urgent warning for parents” over the series, proclaiming, “Disney has taken yet another dangerous step into the darkness.”

“Along with other Disney-associated productions such as ‘Maleficent,’ ‘Star vs. the Forces of Evil,’ and ‘The Owl House,’ this new adult cartoon series, ‘Little Demon,’ is also set in a spiritually demonic realm,” the organization wrote in its warning.

OMM continued, “Disney is introducing viewers, including children who might stumble across this series, to a world of demons, witches, and sorcery. Along with the demonic content of this series, the minds of younger viewers will also be inundated with secular worldviews that reflect the current culture.”

A petition created by the OMM had over 24,000 signatures as of Wednesday morning.

Rep. Mike Johnson (R-La.) is among others who have spoken out against “Little Demon” as well.

The congressman published a Sept. 5 Facebook post calling an ad for the show “disturbing” and describing how he rushed to shield his 11-year-old from the preview when it came on during a recent LSU-Florida State game.

“I could write volumes this morning and unpack pages of Bible verses here, but instead, I’m just going to state the obvious: Please be careful. Our job as parents is to guard the hearts and minds of our kids,” Johnson wrote. “This culture has become alarmingly dark and desensitized, and this is not a game. Disney and FX have decided to embrace and market what is clearly evil. STAY FAR FROM IT.”

He also cited 1 Peter 5:8, which reads, “Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the devil prowls around like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour.”

Johnson wrote a follow-up post Tuesday defending his original comments and emphasizing the importance of speaking the “truth in love,” a calling Christians see rooted in Ephesians 4:15.

The congressman said it’s essential to utter such truths “even — and sometimes most importantly — when it may not be popular.”

Johnson’s words ring true as parents grapple with how to handle shows like “Little Demon.”

PARENTAL DILIGENCE

Parents concerned over shows like “Little Demon” must be diligent, especially as society continues to embrace and infuse occultic and satanic themes into the mainstream.

“The whole culture is in the midst of a satanic revolution — if you want to put it in those terms,” Baehr said, going on to encourage parents to be proactive in monitoring kids’ entertainment consumption.

“We just need to teach them to have the right values to understand they’re not going to get self-esteem by becoming a satanist,” he said.

Baehr also lamented the “big problem” parents face today, as the average child will be inundated with tens of thousands of hours of entertainment by the time they reach the latter teen years.

He encouraged moms and dads to be diligent and to teach discernment early on.

“Parents are overwhelmed, they’re working, they’re tired,” he said, noting moms and dads need to train young people to be wise and perceptive even when parents aren’t around. “You have to teach the teenager or any age child … to be media-wise.”

Pray for our culture amid the onslaught of such dark themes.

https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/entertainment/2022/september/a-satanic-revolution-major-warnings-as-disney-owned-network-releases-disturbing-little-demon-cartoon

Posted by Vanguard Administrator source

Dear Attorney General Bonta,

The ACLU Foundation of Southern California and the undersigned organizations request that you exercise your authority pursuant to CA Civ. Code sec. 52.3 and initiate a pattern or practice investigation into the Orange County District Attorney’s Office (OCDA). Over the last several decades, the OCDA has been embroiled in controversies that have illuminated injustices
within the county’s criminal legal system.¹ 

The OCDA’s latest scandal involves the head of the office, District Attorney Todd Spitzer. Specifically, it has been reported that DA Spitzer made racist statements during a closed-door case strategy discussion with high-ranking prosecutors.² This controversy serves as just the latest confirmation of what has been apparent for years: the policies and practices of the OCDA are stained by systemic racism and bias that produce measurable harms against Black and Brown people in Orange County.

The OCDA has demonstrated a historical commitment to upholding systems of power that oppress people of color throughout Orange County. The recently published report “In(justice) in Orange County: A Case for Change and Accountability” analyzes the disparate impact of OCDA policies and practices on communities of color.³ In Orange County, Black people are overrepresented among individuals charged with a crime. Black residents represent just over 2 percent of the county’s total population yet make up nearly 6 percent of the people charged by the OCDA.⁴ Black residents are more likely to be criminally charged and face jail or prison time for low-level divertible offenses than members of any other racial group. The report indicates that there are persistent racial disparities in access to diversion programs in Orange County.⁵ Whether revealed by the brazen racial disparities in the office’s charging, sentencing, and diversion practices, its criminalization of homelessness,⁶ or by its well-documented failure to seek charges against police officers who kill people of color,⁷ there is ample evidence that systemic racism is deeply ingrained within the policies and practices of the OCDA.

The OCDA’s recent controversy suggests a culture in which prosecutorial decisions, practices, and policies rooted in racism are not only accepted within the office but are modeled explicitly from the top down. DA Spitzer’s alleged disclosure to his colleagues that “he knows many Black people who get themselves out of their bad circumstances and situations by dating white women” is not only an example of an individual prosecution tainted by racial bias, it suggests a broader pattern of racially biased prosecutions by the OCDA against Black people and other individuals of color under DA Spitzer’s leadership.

Additionally, DA Spitzer’s alleged statements implicate AB 2542, also known as the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The CRJA was developed as a legislative mechanism to mitigate exactly the type of racial bias and animus evidenced here—that which “undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal justice under law.”⁸ As the California Legislature stated in section 2(g) of the CRJA, “In California… we can no longer accept racial discrimination and racial disparities as inevitable in our criminal justice system and we must act to make clear that this discrimination and these disparities are illegal and will not be tolerated in California, both prospectively and retroactively.”

Under Article V, Section 13 of the California Constitution and California Civil Code Section 52.3, the Attorney General holds the authority to oversee and authorize civil investigations into a district attorney’s office that has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating state or federal law. Accordingly, we call upon the Office of the Attorney General and the California Department of Justice to further investigate systemic and institutional racism within the policies and practices of the OCDA. In presenting this request, ACLU Foundation of Southern California joins coalition partners and residents of color in Orange County who continue to suffer due to the historical malfeasance of the OCDA, and who demand accountability and transparency.

As the California Court of Appeals opined in 2016, “The magnitude of the systemic problems [in the OCDA] cannot be overlooked.”⁹ Today, we ask that the Attorney General and the California Department of Justice not overlook evidence of glaring systemic racism embedded within the policies and practices of the OCDA. We request that you take this crucial first step in addressing the immense damage inflicted by the OCDA upon Black and Brown residents throughout Orange County.

Sincerely,

• ACLU Foundation of Southern California ACLU Foundation of Northern California Chispa OC
• Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE) HB Huddle Peace and Justice Team
• Housing is a Human Right, Orange County (HHROC) Law Enforcement Accountability Network (LEAN)
• Los Angeles County Public Defenders Union – Local 148 Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC) National Action Network Orange County
• Orange County Emergency Response Coalition Orange County Justice Initiative
• People’s Budget Orange County Stop The Musick Coalition
• The Orange County Rapid Response Network The Peace and Justice Law Center Transforming Justice Orange County
• United Communities for Peace

Manuel v. City, of Joliett

Legality of detention prior to trial

Holding:
(1) Elijah Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth Amendment grounds and
(2) on remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit should determine the accrual date of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim, unless it finds that the city of Joliet has previously waived its timeliness argument.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 6-2, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on March 21, 2017. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Manuel v. City of Joliet is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 5, 2016. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On March 21, 2017, in a 6-2 decision by Justice Elena Kagan, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Seventh Circuit. The court held that a criminal defendant can challenge the legality of detention prior to trial under the Fourth Amendment once legal process in a criminal case begins.

Manuel v. City of Joliet is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 5, 2016. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On March 21, 2017, in a 6-2 decision by Justice Elena Kagan, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Seventh Circuit. The court held that a criminal defendant can challenge the legality of detention prior to trial under the Fourth Amendment once legal process in a criminal case begins.

Background

On March 18, 2011, Elijah Manuel and his brother were stopped by police for failing to signal. Manuel’s brother was the driver of the car. According to Manuel, a police officer detected an odor that smelled of marijuana coming from the inside the car, at which point the officer forcibly removed Manuel from the car and pushed him to the ground, handcuffed him, and assaulted Manuel with punches and kicks. The officer then executed a pat-down search of Manuel and found a bottle of pills. These pills were tested and the testing officers falsified the results to show that the pills Manuel was carrying were ecstasy. Based on the falsified test results, Manuel was arrested. In a grand jury proceeding on March 31, 2011, the officers continued to lie by testifying under oath that the pills discovered were ecstasy. The next day, Manuel submitted a lab report that verified that the pills were not, in fact, ecstasy. Despite this report, Manuel was arraigned on April 8, 2011, and remanded to custody. On May 4, 2011, an assistant state’s attorney sought dismissal of the charges against Manuel. Manuel was released the next day.

On April 10, 2013, Manuel filed a lawsuit with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the city of Joliet, Illinois, and various officers, alleging malicious prosecution for inter alia, the falsified drug results, and other civil rights violations arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Because Manuel’s civil rights claims fell outside the two-year statute of limitations to bring such claims, the district court dismissed them. He was, however, still within the statute of limitations for his malicious prosecution claim. Judge Milton Shadur, however, denied Manuel’s claim, claiming that such prosecutions were barred by the Seventh Circuit’s 2001 opinion in Newsome v. McCabe. Manuel appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that another opinion of that court, Johnson v. Saville, stated that “Newsome left open the possibility of a Fourth Amendment claim against officers who misrepresent evidence to prosecutors.” Manuel also argued that the Seventh Circuit should revisit its decision in Newsome because ten other federal appeals courts permit federal malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment. Manuel’s appeal before Judges Diane Wood, Ilana Rovner, and John Tinder was heard on December 16, 2014. An order of that court was handed down on December 28, 2015.^[1]

In reviewing Manuel’s claims, the judges rejected Manuel’s argument that he both has a right to a malicious prosecution claim cognizable under the Fourth Amendment and that such a suit is permitted in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction as a result of the court’s opinion in Newsome v. McCabe. The court’s order said,^[1]

The three-judge panel’s order also rejected Manuel’s argument that the court overrule Newsome in order to align with other federal circuit courts’ view of the Fourth Amendment’s cognizance of malicious prosecution claims. The Seventh Circuit holds that, “When, after the arrest or seizure, a person is not let go when he should be, the Fourth Amendment gives way to the due process clause as a basis for challenging his detention.” The panel did, however, concede that Manuel’s attorney advanced a “strong argument” on this point, but stated that the “argument is better left for the Supreme Court.”^[1]

By concluding that Manuel can only bring a federal malicious prosecution challenge under the due process clause, and then only if state law has no adequate remedy, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision.^[1]

Petitioner’s challenge

The U.S. Supreme Court considered if federal malicious prosecution claims can be brought under the Fourth Amendment, as Manuel claimed, or if such claims must be considered as violations of due process.

Certiorari granted

On April 27, 2015, petitioner Elijah Manuel initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Manuel’s certiorari request on January 15, 2016. Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on October 5, 2016.

cited https://ballotpedia.org/Manuel_v._City_of_Joliet

137 S.Ct. 911 (2017)

Elijah MANUEL, Petitioner
v.
CITY OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS, et al.

Stanley B. Eisenhammer, Arlington Heights, IL, for Petitioner.

Ilana H. Eisenstein for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner.

Michael A. Scodro, Chicago, IL, for Respondents.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, David T. Goldberg, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, Stanley B. Eisenhammer, Pamela E. Simaga, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, Arlington Heights, IL, for petitioner.

Matthew S. Hellman, Erica L. Ross, Zachary C. Schauf, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, David A. Strauss, Sarah M. Konsky, Chicago, IL, Michael A. Scodro, Clifford W. Berlow, Briana T. Sprick-Schuster, Christopher M. Sheehan, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, Martin J. Shanahan, Jr., Corporation Counsel, Joliet, IL, for respondents.

912*912 Syllabus^[*]

During a traffic stop, police officers in Joliet, Illinois, searched petitioner Elijah 913*913 Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills. Suspecting the pills to be illegal drugs, the officers conducted a field test, which came back negative for any controlled substance. Still, they arrested Manuel and took him to the police station. There, an evidence technician tested the pills and got the same negative result, but claimed in his report that one of the pills tested “positive for the probable presence of ecstasy.” App. 92. An arresting officer also reported that, based on his “training and experience,” he “knew the pills to be ecstasy.” Id., at 91. On the basis of those false statements, another officer filed a sworn complaint charging Manuel with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Relying exclusively on that complaint, a county court judge found probable cause to detain Manuel pending trial.

While Manuel was in jail, the Illinois police laboratory tested the seized pills and reported that they contained no controlled substances. But Manuel remained in custody, spending a total of 48 days in pretrial detention. More than two years after his arrest, but less than two years after his criminal case was dismissed, Manuel filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Joliet and several of its police officers (collectively, the City), alleging that his arrest and detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court dismissed Manuel’s suit, holding, first, that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred his unlawful arrest claim, and, second, that under binding Circuit precedent, pretrial detention following the start of legal process (here, the judge’s probable-cause determination) could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. Manuel appealed the dismissal of his unlawful detention claim; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth Amendment grounds. This conclusion follows from the Court’s settled precedent. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, the Court decided that a pretrial detention challenge was governed by the Fourth Amendment, noting that the Fourth Amendment establishes the minimum constitutional “standards and procedures” not just for arrest but also for “detention,” id., at 111, 95 S.Ct. 854 and “always has been thought to define” the appropriate process “for seizures of person[s] … in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial,” id., at 125, n. 27, 95 S.Ct. 854. And in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114, a majority of the Court again looked to the Fourth Amendment to assess pretrial restraints on liberty. Relying on Gerstein, the plurality reiterated that the Fourth Amendment is the “relevan[t]” constitutional provision to assess the “deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 274, 114 S.Ct. 807; see id., at 290, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[R]ules of recovery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amendment”). That the pretrial restraints in Albright arose pursuant to legal process made no difference, given that they were allegedly unsupported by probable cause.

As reflected in those cases, pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process. The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person absent probable cause. And where legal process has gone forward, but has done nothing to satisfy the probable-cause requirement, 914*914 it cannot extinguish a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim. That was the case here: Because the judge’s determination of probable cause was based solely on fabricated evidence, it did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim. For that reason, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he sought relief not merely for his arrest, but also for his pretrial detention. Pp. 917-919.

2. On remand, the Seventh Circuit should determine the claim’s accrual date, unless it finds that the City has previously waived its timeliness argument. In doing so, the court should look to the common law of torts for guidance, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-258, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, while also closely attending to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. The court may also consider any other still-live issues relating to the elements of and rules applicable to Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim. Pp. 920-922.

590 Fed. Appx. 641, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Elijah Manuel was held in jail for some seven weeks after a judge relied on allegedly fabricated evidence to find probable cause that he had committed a crime. The primary question in this case is whether Manuel may bring a claim based on the Fourth Amendment to contest the legality of his pretrial confinement. Our answer follows from settled precedent. The Fourth Amendment, this Court has recognized, establishes “the standards and procedures” governing pretrial detention. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). And those constitutional protections apply even after the start of “legal process” in a criminal case — here, that is, after the judge’s determination of probable cause. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion); id., at 290, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, we hold today that Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on the ground that it violated the Fourth Amendment (while we 915*915 leave all other issues, including one about that claim’s timeliness, to the court below).

Shortly after midnight on March 18, 2011, Manuel was riding through Joliet, Illinois, in the passenger seat of a Dodge Charger, with his brother at the wheel. A pair of Joliet police officers pulled the car over when the driver failed to signal a turn. See App. 90. According to the complaint in this case, one of the officers dragged Manuel from the car, called him a racial slur, and kicked and punched him as he lay on the ground. See id., at 31-32, 63.^[1] The policeman then searched Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills. See id., at 64. Suspecting that the pills were actually illegal drugs, the officers conducted a field test of the bottle’s contents. The test came back negative for any controlled substance, leaving the officers with no evidence that Manuel had committed a crime. See id., at 69. Still, the officers arrested Manuel and took him to the Joliet police station. See id., at 70.

There, an evidence technician tested the pills once again, and got the same (negative) result. See ibid. But the technician lied in his report, claiming that one of the pills was “found to be … positive for the probable presence of ecstasy.” Id., at 92. Similarly, one of the arresting officers wrote in his report that “[f]rom [his] training and experience, [he] knew the pills to be ecstasy.” Id., at 91. On the basis of those statements, another officer swore out a criminal complaint against Manuel, charging him with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. See id., at 52-53.

Manuel was brought before a county court judge later that day for a determination of whether there was probable cause for the charge, as necessary for further detention. See Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854 (requiring a judicial finding of probable cause following a warrantless arrest to impose any significant pretrial restraint on liberty); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/109-1 (West 2010) (implementing that constitutional rule). The judge relied exclusively on the criminal complaint — which in turn relied exclusively on the police department’s fabrications — to support a finding of probable cause. Based on that determination, he sent Manuel to the county jail to await trial. In the somewhat obscure legal lingo of this case, Manuel’s subsequent detention was thus pursuant to “legal process” — because it followed from, and was authorized by, the judge’s probable-cause determination.^[2]

While Manuel sat in jail, the Illinois police laboratory reexamined the seized pills, and on April 1, it issued a report concluding (just as the prior two tests had) that they contained no controlled substances. See App. 51. But for unknown reasons, the prosecution — and, critically for this case, Manuel’s detention — continued for more than another month. Only on May 4 did an Assistant State’s Attorney seek dismissal of the drug charge. See id., at 48, 101. The County Court immediately granted the request, and Manuel was 916*916 released the next day. In all, he had spent 48 days in pretrial detention.

On April 22, 2013, Manuel brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Joliet and several of its police officers (collectively, the City). Section 1983 creates a “species of tort liability,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,” § 1983. Manuel’s complaint alleged that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights in two ways — first by arresting him at the roadside without any reason, and next by “detaining him in police custody” for almost seven weeks based entirely on made-up evidence. See App. 79-80.^[3]

The District Court dismissed Manuel’s suit. See 2014 WL 551626 (N.D.Ill., Feb. 12, 2014). The court first held that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred Manuel’s claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two years had elapsed between the date of his arrest (March 18, 2011) and the filing of his complaint (April 22, 2013). But the court relied on another basis in rejecting Manuel’s challenge to his subsequent detention (which stretched from March 18 to May 5, 2011). Binding Circuit precedent, the District Court explained, made clear that pretrial detention following the start of legal process could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. See id., at *1 (citing, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750 (C.A.7 2001)). According to that line of decisions, a § 1983 plaintiff challenging such detention must allege a breach of the Due Process Clause — and must show, to recover on that theory, that state law fails to provide an adequate remedy. See 2014 WL 551626, at *1-*2. Because Manuel’s complaint rested solely on the Fourth Amendment — and because, in any event, Illinois’s remedies were robust enough to preclude the due process avenue — the District Court found that Manuel had no way to proceed. See ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Manuel’s claim for unlawful detention (the only part of the District Court’s decision Manuel appealed). See 590 Fed.Appx. 641 (2015). Invoking its prior caselaw, the Court of Appeals reiterated that such claims could not be brought under the Fourth Amendment. Once a person is detained pursuant to legal process, the court stated, “the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture and the detainee’s claim that the detention is improper becomes [one of] due process.” Id., at 643-644 (quoting Llovet v. Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 763 (C.A.7 2014)). And again: “When, after the arrest[,] a person is not let go when he should be, the Fourth Amendment gives way to the due process clause as a basis for challenging his detention.” 590 Fed.Appx., at 643 (quoting Llovet, 761 F.3d, at 764). So the Seventh Circuit held that Manuel’s complaint, in alleging only a Fourth Amendment violation, rested on the wrong part of the Constitution: A person detained following the onset of legal process could at most (although, the court agreed, not in Illinois) challenge his pretrial confinement via the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed.Appx., at 643-644.

917*917 The Seventh Circuit recognized that its position makes it an outlier among the Courts of Appeals, with ten others taking the opposite view. See id., at 643; Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99 (C.A.1 2013) (“[T]here is now broad consensus among the circuits that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon probable cause extends through the pretrial period”).^[4] Still, the court decided, Manuel had failed to offer a sufficient reason for overturning settled Circuit precedent; his argument, albeit “strong,” was “better left for the Supreme Court.” 590 Fed.Appx., at 643.

On cue, we granted certiorari. 577 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 890, 193 L.Ed.2d 783 (2016).

II

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable … seizures.” Manuel’s complaint seeks just that protection. Government officials, it recounts, detained — which is to say, “seiz[ed]” — Manuel for 48 days following his arrest. See App. 79-80; Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (“A person is seized” whenever officials “restrain[ ] his freedom of movement” such that he is “not free to leave”). And that detention was “unreasonable,” the complaint continues, because it was based solely on false evidence, rather than supported by probable cause. See App. 79-80; Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 185 L.Ed.2d 19 (2013) (“[T]he general rule [is] that Fourth Amendment seizures are `reasonable’ only if based on probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime”). By their respective terms, then, Manuel’s claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment fits Manuel’s claim, as hand in glove.

This Court decided some four decades ago that a claim challenging pretrial detention fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In Gerstein, two persons arrested without a warrant brought a § 1983 suit complaining that they had been held in custody for “a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.” 420 U.S., at 106, 95 S.Ct. 854. The Court looked to the Fourth Amendment to analyze — and uphold — their claim that such a pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a judge (or grand jury) first makes a reliable finding of probable cause. See id., at 114, 117, n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854. The Fourth Amendment, we began, establishes the minimum constitutional “standards and procedures” not just for arrest but also for ensuing “detention.” Id., at 111, 95 S.Ct. 854. In choosing that Amendment “as the rationale for decision,” the Court responded to a concurring Justice’s view that the Due Process Clause offered the better framework: The Fourth Amendment, the majority countered, was “tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and it[ ] always has been thought to define” the appropriate process “for seizures of person[s]… in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial.” Id., at 125, n. 27, 95 S.Ct. 854. That Amendment, standing alone, guaranteed “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant 918*918 pretrial restraint.” Id., at 125, 95 S.Ct. 854. Accordingly, those detained prior to trial without such a finding could appeal to “the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unfounded invasions of liberty.” Id., at 112, 95 S.Ct. 854; see id., at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854.^[5]

And so too, a later decision indicates, those objecting to a pretrial deprivation of liberty may invoke the Fourth Amendment when (as here) that deprivation occurs after legal process commences. The § 1983 plaintiff in Albright complained of various pretrial restraints imposed after a court found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, and then bind him over for trial, based on a policeman’s unfounded charges. See 510 U.S., at 268-269, 114 S.Ct. 807 (plurality opinion). For uncertain reasons, Albright ignored the Fourth Amendment in drafting his complaint; instead, he alleged that the defendant officer had infringed his substantive due process rights. This Court rejected that claim, with five Justices in two opinions remitting Albright to the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807 (plurality opinion) (“We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment … under which [his] claim must be judged”); id., at 290, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]njuries like those [he] alleges are cognizable in § 1983 claims founded upon … the Fourth Amendment”). “The Framers,” the plurality wrote, “considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.” Id., at 274, 114 S.Ct. 807. That the deprivations at issue were pursuant to legal process made no difference, given that they were (allegedly) unsupported by probable cause; indeed, neither of the two opinions so much as mentioned that procedural circumstance. Relying on Gerstein, the plurality stated that the Fourth Amendment remained the “relevan[t]” constitutional provision to assess the “deprivations of liberty” — most notably, pretrial detention — “that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” 510 U.S., at 274, 114 S.Ct. 807; see id., at 290, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[R]ules of recovery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amendment”).

As reflected in Albright‘s tracking of Gerstein‘s analysis, pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. See supra, at 917. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong — when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Then, too, a person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification. Legal process 919*919 has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim — or somehow, as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed.Appx., at 643-644. If the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.^[6]

For that reason, and contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s view, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he sought relief not merely for his (pre-legal-process) arrest, but also for his (post-legal-process) pretrial detention.^[7] Consider again the facts alleged in this case. Police officers initially arrested Manuel without probable cause, based solely on his possession of pills that had field tested negative for an illegal substance. So (putting timeliness issues aside) Manuel could bring a claim for wrongful arrest under the Fourth Amendment. And the same is true (again, disregarding timeliness) as to a claim for wrongful detention — because Manuel’s subsequent weeks in custody were also unsupported by probable cause, and so also constitutionally unreasonable. No evidence of Manuel’s criminality had come to light in between the roadside arrest and the County Court proceeding initiating legal process; to the contrary, yet another test of Manuel’s pills had come back negative in that period. All that the judge had before him were police fabrications about the pills’ content. The judge’s order holding Manuel for trial therefore lacked any proper basis. And that means Manuel’s ensuing pretrial detention, no less than his original arrest, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Or put just a bit differently: Legal process did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim because the process he received failed to establish what that Amendment makes essential for pretrial 920*920 detention — probable cause to believe he committed a crime.^[8]

III

Our holding — that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process — does not exhaust the disputed legal issues in this case. It addresses only the threshold inquiry in a § 1983 suit, which requires courts to “identify the specific constitutional right” at issue. Albright, 510 U.S., at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807. After pinpointing that right, courts still must determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-258, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Here, the parties particularly disagree over the accrual date of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim — that is, the date on which the applicable two-year statute of limitations began to run. The timeliness of Manuel’s suit hinges on the choice between their proposed dates. But with the following brief comments, we remand that issue to the court below.

In defining the contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts. See ibid. (explaining that tort principles “provide the appropriate starting point” in specifying the conditions for recovery under § 1983); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-390, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (same for accrual dates in particular). Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. See id., at 388-390, 127 S.Ct. 1091; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 921*921 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). But not always. Common-law principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims, serving “more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 258, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006); see Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) (noting that “§ 1983 is [not] simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims”). In applying, selecting among, or adjusting common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue.

With these precepts as backdrop, Manuel and the City offer competing views about what accrual rule should govern a § 1983 suit challenging post-legal-process pretrial detention. According to Manuel, that Fourth Amendment claim accrues only upon the dismissal of criminal charges — here, on May 4, 2011, less than two years before he brought his suit. See Reply Brief 2; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25, n. 16 (taking the same position). Relying on this Court’s caselaw, Manuel analogizes his claim to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. See Reply Brief 9; Wallace, 549 U.S., at 389-390, 127 S.Ct. 1091. An element of that tort is the “termination of the … proceeding in favor of the accused”; and accordingly, the statute of limitations does not start to run until that termination takes place. Heck, 512 U.S., at 484, 489, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Manuel argues that following the same rule in suits like his will avoid “conflicting resolutions” in § 1983 litigation and criminal proceedings by “preclud[ing] the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.” Id., at 484, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364; see Reply Brief 10-11; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25, n. 16. In support of Manuel’s position, all but two of the ten Courts of Appeals that have recognized a Fourth Amendment claim like his have incorporated a “favorable termination” element and so pegged the statute of limitations to the dismissal of the criminal case. See n. 4, supra.^[9] That means in the great majority of Circuits, Manuel’s claim would be timely.

The City, however, contends that any such Fourth Amendment claim accrues (and the limitations period starts to run) on the date of the initiation of legal process — here, on March 18, 2011, more than two years before Manuel filed suit. See Brief for Respondents 33. According to the City, the most analogous tort to Manuel’s constitutional claim is not malicious prosecution but false arrest, which accrues when legal process commences. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 47; Wallace, 549 U.S., at 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (noting accrual rule for false arrest suits). And even if malicious prosecution were the better comparison, the City continues, a court should decline to adopt that tort’s favorable-termination element and associated accrual rule in adjudicating a § 1983 claim involving pretrial detention. That element, the City argues, “make[s] little sense” in this context because “the Fourth Amendment is concerned not with the outcome of a prosecution, but with the legality of searches and seizures.” Brief for Respondents 16. And finally, the City contends that Manuel forfeited an alternative theory for treating his date of release as the date of accrual: to wit, that his pretrial detention “constitute[d] a continuing Fourth Amendment violation,” each day of which triggered the statute of limitations anew. Id., at 29, and 922*922 n. 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36; see also Albright, 510 U.S., at 280, 114 S.Ct. 807 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (propounding a similar view). So Manuel, the City concludes, lost the opportunity to recover for his pretrial detention by waiting too long to file suit.

We leave consideration of this dispute to the Court of Appeals. “[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). Because the Seventh Circuit wrongly held that Manuel lacked any Fourth Amendment claim once legal process began, the court never addressed the elements of, or rules applicable to, such a claim. And in particular, the court never confronted the accrual issue that the parties contest here.^[10] On remand, the Court of Appeals should decide that question, unless it finds that the City has previously waived its timeliness argument. See Reply to Brief in Opposition 1-2 (addressing the possibility of waiver); Tr. of Oral Arg. 40-44 (same). And so too, the court may consider any other still-live issues relating to the contours of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting.

I join Justice ALITO’s opinion in full but write separately regarding the accrual date for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim. Justice ALITO suggests that a claim for unreasonable seizure based on a warrantless arrest might not accrue until the “first appearance” under Illinois law (or the “initial appearance” under federal law) — which ordinarily represents the first judicial determination of probable cause for that kind of arrest — rather than at the time of the arrest. See post, at 923, 927 (dissenting opinion); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (taking a similar approach). Which of those events is the correct one for purposes of accrual makes no difference in this case, because both the arrest and the first appearance occurred more than two years before petitioner filed suit. See ante, at 916; see also Wallace, supra, at 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (petitioner’s claim was untimely regardless of whether it accrued on day of arrest or first appearance).

I would leave for another case (one where the question is dispositive) whether 923*923 an unreasonable-seizure claim would accrue on the date of the first appearance if that appearance occurred on some day after the arrest. I think the answer to that question might turn on the meaning of “seizure,” rather than on the presence or absence of any form of legal process. See post, at 926-927 (describing the ordinary meaning of “seizure”).

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting.

I agree with the Court’s holding up to a point: The protection provided by the Fourth Amendment continues to apply after “the start of legal process,” ante, at 913, if legal process is understood to mean the issuance of an arrest warrant or what is called a “first appearance” under Illinois law and an “initial appearance” under federal law. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §§ 5/109-1(a), (e) (West Supp. 2015); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5. But if the Court means more — specifically, that new Fourth Amendment claims continue to accrue as long as pretrial detention lasts — the Court stretches the concept of a seizure much too far.

What is perhaps most remarkable about the Court’s approach is that it entirely ignores the question that we agreed to decide, i.e., whether a claim of malicious prosecution may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. I would decide that question and hold that the Fourth Amendment cannot house any such claim. If a malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Constitution, it must find some other home, presumably the Due Process Clause.

I

The question that was set out in Manuel’s petition for a writ of certiorari and that we agreed to decide is as follows:

“[W]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim based upon the Fourth Amendment. This question was raised, but left unanswered, by this Court in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 [114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114] (1994). Since then, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held that a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim is cognizable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983″). Only the Seventh Circuit holds that a Fourth Amendment Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not cognizable.” Pet. for Cert. i (emphasis added).

The question’s reference to “a malicious prosecution claim” was surely no accident. First, the conflict on the malicious prosecution question was the centerpiece of Manuel’s argument in favor of certiorari.^[1] 924*924 Second, unless Manuel is given the benefit of the unique accrual rule for malicious prosecution claims, his claim is untimely, and he is not entitled to relief.

A

I would first consider what I take to be the core of the question presented — whether a “malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment.” See ibid. Manuel asked us to decide that question because it may be critical to his ultimate success in this lawsuit. Why is that so?

The statute of limitations for Manuel’s claim is Illinois’s general statute of limitations for personal-injury torts, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), which requires suit to be brought within two years of the accrual of the claim, see Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 735, § 5/13-202 (West 2010). Here is the chronology of relevant events in this case:

• March 18, 2011: Manuel is arrested and brought before a county court judge, who makes the required probable-cause finding because Manuel was arrested without a warrant.

• March 31, 2011: Manuel is indicted by a grand jury.

• April 8, 2011: Manuel is arraigned.

• May 4, 2011: An assistant state’s attorney moves to dismiss the charges, and the motion is granted.

• May 5, 2011: Manuel is released from jail.

• April 22, 2013: Manuel files his complaint.

Since the statute of limitations requires the commencement of suit within two years of accrual, Manuel’s claim is untimely unless it accrued on or after April 22, 2011. And the only events in the above chronology that occurred within that time frame are the dismissal of the charge against him and his release from custody. A claim of malicious prosecution “does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); see 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1976). None of the other common-law torts to which Manuel’s claim might be compared — such as false arrest or false imprisonment — has such an accrual date. See Wallace, supra, at 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091 925*925 (holding that a claim for false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment accrues when “the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process”). Therefore, if Manuel’s case is to go forward, it is essential that his claim be treated like a malicious prosecution claim.

B

Although the Court refuses to decide whether Manuel’s claim should be so treated, the answer to that question — the one that the Court actually agreed to review — is straightforward: A malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the Fourth Amendment.

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit,” the Court has explained, is “to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). In this case, Manuel charges that he was seized without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In order to flesh out the elements of this constitutional tort, we must look for “tort analogies.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Manuel says that the appropriate analog is the tort of malicious prosecution, so we should look to the elements of that tort.

To make out a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff generally must show three things: (1) “that the criminal proceeding was initiated or continued by the defendant without `probable cause,'” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, P. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 876 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser and Keeton) (emphasis added), (2) “that the defendant instituted the proceeding `maliciously,'” id., at 882, and (3) that “the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused,” 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653(b); see also Heck, supra, at 489, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

There is a severe mismatch between these elements and the Fourth Amendment. First, the defendants typically named in Fourth Amendment seizure cases — namely, law enforcement officers — lack the authority to initiate or dismiss a prosecution. See Prosser and Keeton 876. That authority lies in the hands of prosecutors. A law enforcement officer, including the officer responsible for the defendant’s arrest, may testify before a grand jury, at a preliminary examination, see Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §§ 5/109-3(b), 5/109-3.1(b) (West 2010), or hearing, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.1, and at trial. But when that occurs, the officer is simply a witness and is not responsible for “the decision to press criminal charges.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 371, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012).

Second, while subjective bad faith, i.e., malice, is the core element of a malicious prosecution claim, it is firmly established that the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness is fundamentally objective. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). These two standards — one subjective and the other objective — cannot co-exist. In some instances, importing a malice requirement into the Fourth Amendment would leave culpable conduct unpunished. An officer could act unreasonably, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment, without even a hint of bad faith. In other cases, the malice requirement would cast too wide a net. An officer could harbor intense personal ill will toward an arrestee but still act in an objectively reasonable manner in carrying out an arrest.

Finally, malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination element makes no sense when the claim is that a seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, after all, prohibits all unreasonable seizures — regardless of whether a 926*926 prosecution is ever brought or how a prosecution ends. A “Fourth Amendment wrong” “is fully accomplished,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), when an impermissible seizure occurs. The Amendment is violated and the injury is inflicted no matter what happens in any later proceedings.

Our cases concerning Fourth Amendment claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prove the point. For example, we have recognized that there is no favorabletermination element for a Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim. See Wallace, 549 U.S., at 389-392, 127 S.Ct. 1091.^[2] An arrestee can file such a claim while his prosecution is pending — and, in at least some situations — will need to do so to ensure that the claim is not time barred. See id., at 392-395, 127 S.Ct. 1091. By the same token, an individual may seek damages for pretrial Fourth Amendment violations even after a valid conviction. For example, in Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 308, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), the respondent pleaded guilty to a drug crime without raising any Fourth Amendment issues. He then brought a § 1983 suit, challenging the constitutionality of the search that led to the discovery of the drugs on which his criminal charge was based. The Court held that respondent’s suit could proceed — despite his valid conviction. Id., at 323, 103 S.Ct. 2368; see also Heck, 512 U.S., at 487, n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (“[A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction”).

The favorable-termination element is similarly irrelevant to claims like Manuel’s. Manuel alleges that he was arrested and held based entirely on falsified evidence. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the prosecution was eventually able to gather and introduce legitimate evidence and to obtain a conviction at trial. The unlawful arrest and detention would still provide grounds for recovery. Accordingly, there is no good reason why the accrual of a claim like Manuel’s should have to await a favorable termination of the prosecution.

For all these reasons, malicious prosecution is a strikingly inapt “tort analog[y],” Wilson, 471 U.S., at 277, 105 S.Ct. 1938 for Fourth Amendment violations. So the answer to the question presented in Manuel’s certiorari petition is that the Fourth Amendment does not give rise to a malicious prosecution claim, and this means that Manuel’s suit is untimely. I would affirm the Seventh Circuit on that basis.

II

Instead of deciding the question on which we granted review, the Court ventures in a different direction. The Court purports to refrain from deciding any issue of timeliness, see ante, at 919, but the Court’s opinion is certain to be read by some to mean that every moment of pretrial confinement without probable cause constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And if that is so, it would seem to follow that new Fourth Amendment claims continue to accrue as long as the pretrial detention lasts.

A

That proposition — that every moment in pretrial detention constitutes a “seizure” — 927*927 is hard to square with the ordinary meaning of the term. The term “seizure” applies most directly to the act of taking a person into custody or otherwise depriving the person of liberty. It is not generally used to refer to a prolonged detention. Dictionary definitions from around the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment define the term “seizure” as a single event — and not a continuing condition. See, e.g., 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 67 (1828) (Webster) (defining “seizure” as “the act of laying hold on suddenly”); 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1785) (defining “seizure” as “the act of taking forcible possession”); 1 T. Dyche & W. Pardon, A New General English Dictionary (14th ed. 1771) (defining “seize” as “to lay or take hold of violently or at unawares, wrongfully, or by force”). As the Court has explained before, “[f]rom the time of the founding to the present, the word `seizure’ has meant a `taking possession.'” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (quoting 2 Webster 67). And we have cautioned against “stretch[ing] the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest.” 499 U.S., at 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547. The Members of Congress who proposed the Fourth Amendment and the State legislatures that ratified the Amendment would have expected to see a more expansive term, such as “detention” or “confinement,” if a Fourth Amendment seizure could be a long event that continued throughout the entirety of the pretrial period.

In my view, a period of detention spanning weeks or months cannot be viewed as one long, continuing seizure, and a pretrial detainee is not “seized” over and over again as long as he remains in custody.^[3] Of course, the damages resulting from an unlawful seizure may continue to mount during the period of confinement caused by the seizure, but no new Fourth Amendment seizure claims accrue after that date.^[4] Thus, any possible Fourth Amendment claim that Manuel could bring is time barred.

B

The Court is mistaken in saying that its decision “follows from settled precedent.” Ante, at 914. The Court reads Albright v. 928*928 Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), to mean that the Fourth Amendment can be violated “when legal process itself goes wrong,” ante, at 918, but the accuracy of that interpretation depends on the meaning of “legal process.” The Court’s reading is correct if by “legal process” the Court means a determination of probable cause at a first or initial appearance. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/109-1 (West Supp.2015); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(b). When an arrest warrant is obtained, the probable-cause determination is made at that time, and there is thus no need for a repeat determination at the first or initial appearance. But when an arrest is made without a warrant, the arrestee, generally within 48 hours, must be brought before a judicial officer, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), who then completes the arrest process by making the same determination that would have been made as part of the warrant application process. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §§ 5/109-1(a), (b); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4(a), 5(b). Thus, this appearance is an integral part of the process of taking the arrestee into custody and easily falls within the meaning of the term “seizure.” But other forms of “legal process,” for example, a grand jury indictment or a determination of probable cause at a preliminary examination or hearing, do not fit within the concept of a “seizure,” and the cases cited by the Court do not suggest otherwise.

Take Albright first. A detective named Oliver procured a warrant for the arrest of Albright for distributing a “look-alike” substance. See Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 344 (C.A.7 1992). The warrant was based on information given to Oliver by the purchaser of the substance. Ibid. After learning of the warrant, Albright turned himself in, was booked, and was released on bond. Ibid. Oliver testified at what Illinois calls a preliminary examination and apparently related the information provided by the alleged purchaser. Ibid. The judge found probable cause, but the charges were later dismissed. Ibid. According to the Seventh Circuit, probable cause was sorely lacking, id., at 345, and Albright sued Oliver under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Oliver had violated his substantive due process right not to be prosecuted without probable cause. All that this Court held was that Albright’s claim had to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process.

The Court now reads Albright to mean that a Fourth Amendment seizure continues “after the start of `legal process,” but three forms of what might be termed “legal process” were issued in Albright: the arrest warrant, the order releasing him on bond after his first appearance, and the order holding him over for trial after the preliminary examination. I agree that Albright’s seizure did not end with the issuance of the warrant (that would be ridiculous since he had not even been arrested at that point) or the first appearance, see ante, at 918-919, and n. 6, but it is impossible to read anything more into the holding in Albright. The terse plurality opinion joined by four Justices said no more; the opinion of Justice Scalia, who joined the plurality opinion, referred only to Albright’s “arrest,” 510 U.S., at 275, 114 S.Ct. 807 (concurring opinion); and Justices KENNEDY and THOMAS, who concurred in the judgment, did so only because Albright’s “allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 281, 114 S.Ct. 807 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in the judgment). To read anything more into Albright is to adopt the position taken by just one Member of the plurality, see 929*929 id., at 279, 114 S.Ct. 807 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (seizure continues throughout the period of pretrial detention), and the two Justices in dissent, see id., at 307, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).

The other precedent on which the Court relies, Gerstein, goes no further than Albright. All that the Court held in Gerstein was that if there is no probable-cause finding by a neutral magistrate before an arrest, there must be one after the arrest. 420 U.S., at 111-116, 95 S.Ct. 854. The Court reasoned that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id., at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854. The Court said nothing about whether a claim for a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment could accrue after an initial appearance.

The Court thus is forced to rely on dicta — taken out of context — from Gerstein. For example, the Court cites Gerstein‘s statement that “[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system,” and that it “always has been thought to define the `process that is due’ for seizures of person[s]… in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial.” Id., at 125, n. 27, 95 S.Ct. 854. This statement hardly shows that a Fourth Amendment seizure continues throughout a period of pretrial detention, and the Court does not mention the very next sentence in Gerstein — which suggests that the Fourth Amendment might govern “only the first stage” of a prosecution, eventually giving way to other protections that are also part of our “elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). In the end, Gerstein stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires a post-arrest probable cause finding by a neutral magistrate; it says nothing about whether the Fourth Amendment extends beyond that or any other “legal process.”

* * *

A well-known medical maxim — “first, do no harm” — is a good rule of thumb for courts as well. The Court’s decision today violates that rule by avoiding the question presented in order to reach an unnecessary and tricky issue. The resulting opinion will, I fear, inject much confusion into Fourth Amendment law. And it has the potential to do much harm — by dramatically expanding Fourth Amendment liability under § 1983 in a way that does violence to the text of the Fourth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.

[*] The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

[1] Because we here review an order dismissing Manuel’s suit, we accept as true all the factual allegations in his complaint. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).

[2] Although not addressed in Manuel’s complaint, the police department’s alleged fabrications did not stop at this initial hearing on probable cause. About two weeks later, on March 30, a grand jury indicted Manuel based on similar false evidence: testimony from one of the arresting officers that “[t]he pills field tested positive” for ecstasy. App. 96 (grand jury minutes).

[3] Manuel’s allegation of unlawful detention concerns only the period after the onset of legal process — here meaning, again, after the County Court found probable cause that he had committed a crime. See supra, at 915-916. The police also held Manuel in custody for several hours between his warrantless arrest and his first appearance in court. But throughout this litigation, Manuel has treated that short period as part and parcel of the initial unlawful arrest. See, e.g., Reply Brief 1.

[4] See also Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 114-118 (C.A.2 1995); McKenna v. Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (C.A.3 2009); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260-262 (C.A.4 2000); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953-954, 959-960 (C.A.5 2003) (en banc); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-309 (C.A.6 2010); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126-1127 (C.A.9 2002); Wilkins v. De-Reyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797-799 (C.A.10 2008); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584-586 (C.A.11 1996); Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 510-511 (C.A.D.C.2007).

[5] The Court repeated the same idea in a follow-on decision to Gerstein. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), we considered how quickly a jurisdiction must provide the probable-cause determination that Gerstein demanded “as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention.” In holding that the decision should occur within 48 hours of an arrest, the majority understood its “task [as] articulat[ing] more clearly the boundaries of what is permissible under the Fourth Amendment.” 500 U.S., at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661. In arguing for still greater speed, the principal dissent invoked the original meaning of “the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of `unreasonable seizures,’ insofar as it applies to seizure of the person.” Id., at 60, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The difference between the two opinions was significant, but the commonality still more so: All Justices agreed that the Fourth Amendment provides the appropriate lens through which to view a claim involving pretrial detention.

[6] The opposite view would suggest an untenable result: that a person arrested pursuant to a warrant could not bring a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the reasonableness of even his arrest, let alone any subsequent detention. An arrest warrant, after all, is a way of initiating legal process, in which a magistrate finds probable cause that a person committed a crime. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (explaining that the seizure of a person was “without legal process” because police officers “did not have a warrant for his arrest”); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 119, pp. 871, 886 (5th ed. 1984) (similar). If legal process is the cut-off point for the Fourth Amendment, then someone arrested (as well as later held) under a warrant procured through false testimony would have to look to the Due Process Clause for relief. But that runs counter to our caselaw. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-569, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because a magistrate’s warrant was not backed by probable cause). And if the Seventh Circuit would reply that arrest warrants are somehow different — that there is legal process and then again there is legal process — the next (and in our view unanswerable) question would be why.

[7] Even the City no longer appears to contest that conclusion. On multiple occasions during oral argument in this Court, the City agreed that “a Fourth Amendment right … survive[d] the initiation of process” at the hearing in which the county judge found probable cause and ordered detention. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; see id., at 33 (concurring with the statement that “once [an] individual is brought … before a magistrate, and the magistrate using the same bad evidence says, stay here in jail … until we get to trial, that that period is a violation of the Fourth Amendment”); id., at 51 (stating that a detainee has “a Fourth Amendment claim” if “misstatements at [such a probable-cause hearing] led to ongoing pretrial seizure”).

[8] The dissent goes some way toward claiming that a different kind of pretrial legal process — a grand jury indictment or preliminary examination — does expunge such a Fourth Amendment claim. See post, at 927, n. 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (raising but “not decid[ing] that question”); post, at 927-928 (suggesting an answer nonetheless). The effect of that view would be to cut off Manuel’s claim on the date of his grand jury indictment (March 30) — even though that indictment (like the County Court’s probable-cause proceeding) was entirely based on false testimony and even though Manuel remained in detention for 36 days longer. See n. 2, supra. Or said otherwise — even though the legal process he received failed to establish the probable cause necessary for his continued confinement. We can see no principled reason to draw that line. Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable cause makes a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment: Whatever its precise form, if the proceeding is tainted — as here, by fabricated evidence — and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights, for all the reasons we have stated. By contrast (and contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 927, n. 3), once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (invalidating a conviction under the Due Process Clause when “the record evidence could [not] reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960) (striking a conviction under the same provision when “the record [wa]s entirely lacking in evidence” of guilt — such that it could not even establish probable cause). Gerstein and Albright, as already suggested, both reflected and recognized that constitutional division of labor. See supra, at 917-918. In their words, the Framers “drafted the Fourth Amendment” to address “the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty,” Albright, 510 U.S., at 274, 114 S.Ct. 807 (emphasis added), and the Amendment thus provides “standards and procedures” for “the detention of suspects pending trial,” Gerstein, 420 U.S., at 125, n. 27, 95 S.Ct. 854 (emphasis added).

[9] The two exceptions — the Ninth and D.C. Circuits — have not yet weighed in on whether a Fourth Amendment claim like Manuel’s includes a “favorable termination” element.

[10] The dissent would have us address these questions anyway, on the ground that “the conflict on the malicious prosecution question was the centerpiece of Manuel’s argument in favor of certiorari.” Post, at 923. But the decision below did not implicate a “conflict on the malicious prosecution question” — because the Seventh Circuit, in holding that detainees like Manuel could not bring a Fourth Amendment claim at all, never considered whether (and, if so, how) that claim should resemble the malicious prosecution tort. Nor did Manuel’s petition for certiorari suggest otherwise. The principal part of his question presented — mirroring the one and only Circuit split involving the decision below — reads as follows: “[W]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process.” Pet. for Cert. i. That is exactly the issue we have resolved. The rest of Manuel’s question did indeed express a view as to what would follow from an affirmative answer (“so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim”). Ibid. (And as the dissent notes, the Seventh Circuit recounted that he made the same argument in that court. See post, at 923-924, n. 1.) But as to that secondary issue, we think (for all the reasons just stated) that Manuel jumped the gun. See supra, at 920-922. And contra the dissent, his doing so provides no warrant for our doing so too.

[1] The Court defends this evasion on the ground that it is resolving “the one and only Circuit split involving the decision below.” Ante, at 922, n. 10. That is flatly wrong. As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, its decision in this case and an earlier case on which the decision here relied, Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (2001), conflict with decisions of other circuits holding that a malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. The decision below states: “Manuel argues that we should reconsider our holding in Newsome and recognize a federal claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the available state remedy. By his count, 10 other Circuits have recognized federal malicious-prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment.” 590 Fed.Appx. 641, 643 (C.A.7 2015). The court refused to overrule Newsome and said that “Manuel’s argument is better left for the Supreme Court.” Ibid.

Manuel’s petition for a writ of certiorari repeatedly made the same point. See Pet. for Cert. 2 (“The Seventh Circuit stands alone among circuits in not allowing a federal malicious prosecution claim grounded on the Fourth Amendment”); id., at 10 (“Ten Federal Circuits Correctly Hold That Malicious Prosecution is Actionable as a Fourth Amendment, Section 1983 Claim”); ibid. (“[E]ight circuits have held that malicious prosecution is cognizable through a Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim”). All of the decisions that are cited as being in conflict with the decision below involved malicious prosecution claims and are described as such. See id., at 10-11.

It is certainly true that the question whether a malicious prosecution claim may be brought under the Fourth Amendment subsumes the question whether a Fourth Amendment seizure continues past a first or initial appearance, but answering the latter question does not by any means resolve the Circuit split that Manuel cited and that we took this case to resolve. Suppose that the Seventh Circuit were to hold on remand that a Fourth Amendment seizure may continue up to the date when trial begins but no further. Such a holding would be consistent with the Court’s holding in this case, but there would still be a conflict between Seventh Circuit case law and the decisions of other Circuits (on which Manuel relied, see ibid.), holding that a standard malicious prosecution claim (which requires a termination favorable to the defendant) may be brought under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 99 (C.A.1 2013); Manganiello v. New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-161 (C.A.2 2010); McKenna v. Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (C.A.3 2009); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (C.A.4 2012); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (C.A.6 2010); Grider v. Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (C.A.11 2010).

[2] In Wallace, the Court noted that “[f]alse arrest and false imprisonment overlap” and decided to “refer to the two torts together as false imprisonment.” 549 U.S., at 388-389, 127 S.Ct. 1091.

[3] By the Court’s logic, there is no apparent reason why even a judgment of conviction should cut off the accrual of new Fourth Amendment claims based on the use of fabricated evidence. The Court writes that “[n]othing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable cause makes a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Ante, at 920, n. 8. “[I]f the proceeding is tainted — as here, by fabricated evidence — and the result is that probable cause is lacking,” the Court continues, “then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights, for all the reasons we have stated.” Ibid. Although the Court inserts the word “pretrial” in this sentence, its logic provides no reason for that limitation. If a Fourth Amendment seizure continues as long as a person is detained, there is no reason why incarceration after conviction cannot be regarded as a continuing seizure. The Court asserts that the Fourth Amendment “drops out of the picture” after trial, ibid., but it does not explain why this is so. There are facilities that house both pretrial detainees and prisoners serving sentences. If a detainee is transferred following conviction from the section for detainees to the section for prisoners, does the transfer render this person “unseized”?

[4] There is authority for the proposition that a grand jury indictment or a determination of probable cause after an adversary proceeding may be an intervening cause that cuts off liability for an unlawful arrest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007); Prosser and Keeton 885. I would not decide that question here.