Civil Negligence vs Criminal Negligence

Negligence is when someone acts in a way that puts the public at risk. It’s something a reasonable person in the same situation would not do. The law recognizes the difference between civil and criminal negligence.

Civil negligence is what lawyers try to prove in lawsuits. To meet this standard, lawyers must prove someone went over the boundaries of a duty of care by a preponderance of the evidence. It does not have to be extreme; a moment’s inattention while driving could be considered civil negligence.

Criminal negligence takes it much further. It’s a drastic difference from how a normal person would act in the situation and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This means there is no other explanation for why the dangerous situation happened in the first place beyond negligence.

Prosecution Function

Fourth Edition (2017) of the CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS for the PROSECUTION FUNCTION

Copyright by the American Bar Association. This work (Criminal Justice Standards) may be used for non-profit educational and training purposes and legal reform (legislative, judicial, and executive) without written permission but with a citation to this source.  Some specific Standards can be purchased in book format.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[Use the navigation bar on the left side to go to a specific Part or Standard.]

PART I: GENERAL STANDARDS

Standard 3-1.1 The Scope and Function of These Standards

(a) As used in these standards, “prosecutor” means any attorney, regardless of agency, title, or full or part-time assignment, who acts as an attorney to investigate or prosecute criminal cases or who provides legal advice regarding a criminal matter to government lawyers, agents, or offices participating in the investigation or prosecution of criminal cases. These Standards are intended to apply in any context in which a lawyer would reasonably understand that a criminal prosecution could result.

(b) These Standards are intended to provide guidance for the professional conduct and performance of prosecutors. They are written and intended to be entirely consistent with the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and are not intended to modify a prosecutor’s obligations under applicable rules, statutes, or the constitution. They are aspirational or describe “best practices,” and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted persons, to create a standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss a charge. For purposes of consistency, these Standards sometimes include language taken from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; but the Standards often address conduct or provide details beyond that governed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. No inconsistency is ever intended; and in any case a lawyer should always read and comply with the rules of professional conduct and other authorities that are binding in the specific jurisdiction or matter, including choice of law principles that may regulate the lawyer’s ethical conduct.

(c) Because the Standards for Criminal Justice are aspirational, the words “should” or “should not” are used in these Standards, rather than mandatory phrases such as “shall” or “shall not,” to describe the conduct of lawyers that is expected or recommended under these Standards. The Standards are not intended to suggest any lesser standard of conduct than may be required by applicable mandatory rules, statutes, or other binding authorities.

(d) These Standards are intended to address the performance of prosecutors in all stages of their professional work. Other ABA Criminal Justice Standards should also be consulted for more detailed consideration of the performance of prosecutors in specific areas.

Standard 3-1.2 Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor

(a) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court. The prosecutor’s office should exercise sound discretion and independent judgment in the performance of the prosecution function.

(b) The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict. The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor should seek to protect the innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.

(c) The prosecutor should know and abide by the standards of professional conduct as expressed in applicable law and ethical codes and opinions in the applicable jurisdiction. The prosecutor should avoid an appearance of impropriety in performing the prosecution function. A prosecutor should seek out, and the prosecutor’s office should provide, supervisory advice and ethical guidance when the proper course of prosecutorial conduct seems unclear. A prosecutor who disagrees with a governing ethical rule should seek its change if appropriate, and directly challenge it if necessary, but should comply with it unless relieved by court order.

(d) The prosecutor should make use of ethical guidance offered by existing organizations, and should seek to establish and make use of an ethics advisory group akin to that described in Defense Function Standard 4-1.11.

(e) The prosecutor should be knowledgeable about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to prosecution or conviction that may be applicable in individual cases or classes of cases. The prosecutor’s office should be available to assist community efforts addressing problems that lead to, or result from, criminal activity or perceived flaws in the criminal justice system.

(f) The prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also a problem-solver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice, and when inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor’s attention, the prosecutor should stimulate and support efforts for remedial action. The prosecutor should provide service to the community, including involvement in public service and Bar activities, public education, community service activities, and Bar leadership positions. A prosecutorial office should support such activities, and the office’s budget should include funding and paid release time for such activities.

Standard 3-1.3 The Client of the Prosecutor

The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.

When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor does not represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter and such law enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor’s clients.

The public’s interests and views should be determined by the chief prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.

Standard 3-1.4 The Prosecutor’s Heightened Duty of Candor

(a) In light of the prosecutor’s public responsibilities, broad authority and discretion, the prosecutor has a heightened duty of candor to the courts and in fulfilling other professional obligations. However, the prosecutor should be circumspect in publicly commenting on specific cases or aspects of the business of the office.

(b) The prosecutor should not make a statement of fact or law, or offer evidence, that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, to a court, lawyer, witness, or third party, except for lawfully authorized investigative purposes. In addition, while seeking to accommodate legitimate confidentiality, safety or security concerns, a prosecutor should correct a prosecutor’s representation of material fact or law that the prosecutor reasonably believes is, or later learns was, false, and should disclose a material fact or facts when necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act or to avoid misleading a judge or factfinder.

(c) The prosecutor should disclose to a court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the prosecutor to be directly adverse to the prosecution’s position and not disclosed by others.

Standard 3-1.5 Preserving the Record 

At every stage of representation, the prosecutor should take steps necessary to make a clear and complete record for potential review. Such steps may include: filing motions including motions for reconsideration, and exhibits; making objections and placing explanations on the record; requesting evidentiary hearings; requesting or objecting to jury instructions; and making offers of proof and proffers of excluded evidence.

Standard 3-1.6 Improper Bias Prohibited 

(a) The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, or socioeconomic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion. A prosecutor should strive to eliminate implicit biases, and act to mitigate any improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it exists within the scope of the prosecutor’s authority.

(b) A prosecutor’s office should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of its work. A prosecutor’s office should regularly assess the potential for biased or unfairly disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, and eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified.    

Standard 3-1.7 Conflicts of Interest

(a) The prosecutor should know and abide by the ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest that apply in the jurisdiction, and be sensitive to facts that may raise conflict issues. When a conflict requiring recusal exists and is non-waivable, or informed consent has not been obtained, the prosecutor should recuse from further participation in the matter. The office should not go forward until a non-conflicted prosecutor, or an adequate waiver, is in place.

(b) The prosecutor should not represent a defendant in criminal proceedings in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.

(c) The prosecutor should not participate in a matter in which the prosecutor previously participated, personally and substantially, as a non-prosecutor, unless the appropriate government office, and when necessary a former client, gives informed consent confirmed in writing.

(d) The prosecutor should not be involved in the prosecution of a former client. A prosecutor who has formerly represented a client should not use information obtained from that representation to the disadvantage of the former client.

(e) The prosecutor should not negotiate for private employment with an accused or the target of an investigation, in a matter in which the prosecutor is participating personally and substantially, or with an attorney or agent for such accused or target

(f) The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political, financial, professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships. A prosecutor should not allow interests in personal advancement or aggrandizement to affect judgments regarding what is in the best interests of justice in any case.

(g) The prosecutor should disclose to appropriate supervisory personnel any facts or interests that could reasonably be viewed as raising a potential conflict of interest. If it is determined that the prosecutor should nevertheless continue to act in the matter, the prosecutor and supervisors should consider whether any disclosure to a court or defense counsel should be made, and make such disclosure if appropriate. Close cases should be resolved in favor of disclosure to the court and the defense.

(h) The prosecutor whose current relationship to another lawyer is parent, child, sibling, spouse or sexual partner should not participate in the prosecution of a person who the prosecutor knows is represented by the other lawyer. A prosecutor who has a significant personal, political, financial, professional, business, property, or other relationship with another lawyer should not participate in the prosecution of a person who is represented by the other lawyer, unless the relationship is disclosed to the prosecutor’s supervisor and supervisory approval is given, or unless there is no other prosecutor who can be authorized to act in the prosecutor’s stead. In the latter rare case, full disclosure should be made to the defense and to the court.

(i) The prosecutor should not recommend the services of particular defense counsel to accused persons or witnesses in cases being handled by the prosecutor’s office. If requested to make such a recommendation, the prosecutor should consider instead referring the person to the public defender, or to a panel of available criminal defense attorneys such as a bar association lawyer-referral service, or to the court. In the rare case where a specific recommendation is made by the prosecutor, the recommendation should be to an independent and competent attorney, and the prosecutor should not make a referral that embodies, creates or is likely to create a conflict of interest. A prosecutor should not comment negatively upon the reputation or abilities of a defense counsel to an accused person or witness who is seeking counsel in a case being handled by the prosecutor’s office.

(j) The prosecutor should promptly report to a supervisor all but the most obviously frivolous misconduct allegations made, publicly or privately, against the prosecutor. If a supervisor or judge initially determines that an allegation is serious enough to warrant official investigation, reasonable measures, including possible recusal, should be instituted to ensure that the prosecution function is fairly and effectively carried out. A mere allegation of misconduct is not a sufficient basis for prosecutorial recusal, and should not deter a prosecutor from attending to the prosecutor’s duties.

Standard 3-1.8 Appropriate Workload

(a) The prosecutor should not carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size or complexity, interferes with providing quality representation, endangers the interests of justice in fairness, accuracy, or the timely disposition of charges, or has a significant potential to lead to the breach of professional obligations. A prosecutor whose workload prevents competent representation should not accept additional matters until the workload is reduced, and should work to ensure competent representation in existing matters. A prosecutor within a supervisory structure should notify supervisors when counsel’s workload is approaching or exceeds professionally appropriate levels.

(b) The prosecutor’s office should regularly review the workload of individual prosecutors, as well as the workload of the entire office, and adjust workloads (including intake) when necessary to ensure the effective and ethical conduct of the prosecution function.

(c) The chief prosecutor for a jurisdiction should inform governmental officials of the workload of the prosecutor’s office, and request funding and personnel that are adequate to meet the criminal caseload. The prosecutor should consider seeking such funding from all appropriate sources. If workload exceeds the appropriate professional capacity of a prosecutor or prosecutor’s office, that office or counsel should also alert the court(s) in its jurisdiction and seek judicial relief.

Standard 3-1.9 Diligence, Promptness and Punctuality

(a) The prosecutor should act with diligence and promptness to investigate, litigate, and dispose of criminal charges, consistent with the interests of justice and with due regard for fairness, accuracy, and rights of the defendant, victims, and witnesses. The prosecutor’s office should be organized and supported with adequate staff and facilities to enable it to process and resolve criminal charges with fairness and efficiency.

(b) When providing reasons for seeking delay, the prosecutor should not knowingly misrepresent facts or otherwise mislead. The prosecutor should use procedures that will cause delay only when there is a legitimate basis for such use, and not to secure an unfair tactical advantage.

(c) The prosecutor should not unreasonably oppose requests for continuances from defense counsel.

(d) The prosecutor should know and comply with timing requirements applicable to a criminal investigation and prosecution, so as to not prejudice a criminal matter.

(e) The prosecutor should be punctual in attendance in court, in the submission of motions, briefs, and other papers, and in dealings with opposing counsel, witnesses and others. The prosecutor should emphasize to assistants and prosecution witnesses the importance of punctuality in court attendance.

Standard 3-1.10  Relationship with the Media

(a) For purposes of this Standard, a “public statement” is any extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication or media, including social media. An extrajudicial statement is any oral, written, or visual presentation not made either in a courtroom during criminal proceedings or in court filings or correspondence with the court or counsel regarding criminal proceedings.

(b) The prosecutor’s public statements about the judiciary, jurors, other lawyers, or the criminal justice system should be respectful even if expressing disagreement.

(c) The prosecutor should not make, cause to be made, or authorize or condone the making of, a public statement that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding or heightening public condemnation of the accused, but the prosecutor may make statements that inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s or law enforcement actions and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The prosecutor may make a public statement explaining why criminal charges have been declined or dismissed, but must take care not to imply guilt or otherwise prejudice the interests of victims, witnesses or subjects of an investigation. A prosecutor’s public statements should otherwise be consistent with the ABA Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse.

(d) A prosecutor should not place statements or evidence into the court record to circumvent this Standard.

(e) The prosecutor should exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees, or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement or providing non-public information that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making or providing under this Standard or other applicable rules or law.

(f) The prosecutor may respond to public statements from any source in order to protect the prosecution’s legitimate official interests, unless there is a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding, in which case the prosecutor should approach defense counsel or a court for relief. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

(g) The prosecutor has duties of confidentiality and loyalty, and should not secretly or anonymously provide non-public information to the media, on or off the record, without appropriate authorization.

(h) The prosecutor should not allow prosecutorial judgment to be influenced by a personal interest in potential media contacts or attention.

(i) A prosecutor uninvolved in a matter who is commenting as a media source may offer generalized commentary concerning a specific criminal matter that serves to educate the public about the criminal justice system and does not risk prejudicing a specific criminal proceeding. A prosecutor acting as such a media commentator should make reasonable efforts to be well-informed about the facts of the matter and the governing law. The prosecutor should not offer commentary regarding the specific merits of an ongoing criminal prosecution or investigation, except in a rare case to address a manifest injustice and the prosecutor is reasonably well-informed about the relevant facts and law.

(j) During the pendency of a criminal matter, the prosecutor should not re-enact, or assist law enforcement in re-enacting, law enforcement events for the media. Absent a legitimate law enforcement purpose, the prosecutor should not display the accused for the media, nor should the prosecutor invite media presence during investigative actions without careful consideration of the interests of all involved, including suspects, defendants, and the public. However, a prosecutor may reasonably accommodate media requests for access to public information and events.

Standard 3-1.11 Literary or Media Rights Agreements Prohibited

(a) Before the conclusion of all aspects of a matter in which a prosecutor participates, the prosecutor should not enter into any agreement or informal understanding by which the prosecutor acquires an interest in a literary or media portrayal or account based on or arising out of the prosecutor’s involvement in the matter.

(b) The prosecutor should not allow prosecutorial judgment to be influenced by the possibility of future personal literary or other media rights.

(c) In creating or participating in any literary or other media account of a matter in which the prosecutor was involved, the prosecutor’s duty of confidentiality must be respected even after government service is concluded. When protected confidences are involved, a prosecutor or former prosecutor should not make disclosure without consent from the prosecutor’s office. Such consent should not be unreasonably withheld, and the public’s interest in accurate historical accounts of significant events after a lengthy passage of time should be considered.

Standard 3-1.12   Duty to Report and Respond to Prosecutorial Misconduct

(a) The prosecutor’s office should adopt policies to address allegations of professional misconduct, including violations of law, by prosecutors. At a minimum such policies should require internal reporting of reasonably suspected misconduct to supervisory staff within the office, and authorize supervisory staff to quickly address the allegations. Investigations of allegations of professional misconduct within the prosecutor’s office should be handled in an independent and conflict-free manner.

(b) When a prosecutor reasonably believes that another person associated with the prosecutor’s office intends or is about to engage in misconduct, the prosecutor should attempt to dissuade the person. If such attempt fails or is not possible, and the prosecutor reasonably believes that misconduct is ongoing, will occur, or has occurred, the prosecutor should promptly refer the matter to higher authority in the prosecutor’s office including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, to the chief prosecutor.

(c) If, despite the prosecutor’s efforts in accordance with sections (a) and (b) above, the chief prosecutor permits, fails to address, or insists upon an action or omission that is clearly a violation of law, the prosecutor should take further remedial action, including revealing information necessary to address, remedy, or prevent the violation to appropriate judicial, regulatory, or other government officials not in the prosecutor’s office.

Standard 3-1.13 Training Programs

(a) The prosecutor’s office should develop and maintain programs of training and continuing education for both new and experienced prosecutors and staff. The prosecutor’s office, as well as the organized Bar or courts, should require that current and aspiring prosecutors attend a reasonable number of hours of such training and education.

(b) In addition to knowledge of substantive legal doctrine and courtroom procedures, a prosecutor’s core training curriculum should address the overall mission of the criminal justice system. A core training curriculum should also seek to address: investigation, negotiation, and litigation skills; compliance with applicable discovery procedures; knowledge of the development, use, and testing of forensic evidence; available conviction and sentencing alternatives, reentry, effective conditions of probation, and collateral consequences; civility, and a commitment to professionalism; relevant office, court, and defense policies and procedures and their proper application; exercises in the use of prosecutorial discretion; civility and professionalism; appreciation of diversity and elimination of improper bias; and available technology and the ability to use it. Some training programs might usefully be open to, and taught by, persons outside the prosecutor’s office such as defense counsel, court staff, and members of the judiciary.

(c) A prosecution office’s training program should include periodic review of the office’s policies and procedures, which should be amended when necessary. Specialized prosecutors should receive training in their specialized areas. Individuals who will supervise attorneys or staff should receive training in how effectively to supervise.

(d) The prosecutor’s office should also make available opportunities for training and continuing education programs outside the office, including training for non-attorney staff.

(e) Adequate funding for continuing training and education, within and outside the office, should be requested and provided by funding sources.

PART II: ORGANIZATION OF THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

Standard 3-2.1 Prosecution Authority to be Vested in Full-time, Public-Official Attorneys

(a) The prosecution function should be performed by a lawyer who is

(i) a public official,

(ii) authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction, and

(iii) subject to rules of attorney professional conduct and discipline.

Prosecutors whose professional obligations are devoted full-time and exclusively to the prosecution function are preferable to part-time prosecutors who have other potentially conflicting professional responsibilities.

(b) A prosecutor’s office should have open, effective, and well-publicized methods for communicating with, and receiving communications from, the public in the jurisdiction that it serves.

(c) If a particular matter requires the appointment of a special prosecutor from outside the office, adequate funding for this purpose should be made available. Such special prosecutors should know and are governed by applicable conflict of interest standards for prosecutors. A private attorney who is paid by, or who has an attorney-client relationship with, an individual or entity that is a victim of the charged crime, or who has a personal or financial interest in the prosecution of particular charges, or who has demonstrated any impermissible bias relevant to the particular matter, should not be permitted to serve as prosecutor in that matter.

(d) Unless impractical or unlawful, the prosecutor’s office should implement a system for allowing qualified law students, cross-designated prosecutors from other offices, and private attorneys temporarily assigned to the prosecutor’s office, to learn about and assist with the prosecution function.

Standard 3-2.2 Assuring Excellence and Diversity in the Hiring, Retention, and Compensation of Prosecutors

(a) Strong professional qualifications and performance should be the basis for selection and retention for prosecutor positions. Effective measures to retain excellent prosecutors should be encouraged, while recognizing the benefits of some turnover. Supervisory prosecutors should select and promote personnel based on merit and expertise, without regard to partisan, personal or political factors or influence.

(b) In selecting personnel, the prosecutor’s office should also consider the diverse interests and makeup of the community it serves, and seek to recruit, hire, promote and retain a diverse group of prosecutors and staff that reflect that community.

(c) The function of public prosecution requires highly developed professional skills and a variety of backgrounds, talents and experience. The prosecutor’s office should promote continuing professional development and continuity of service, while providing prosecutors the opportunity to gain experience in all aspects of the prosecution function.

(d) Compensation and benefits for prosecutors and their staffs should be commensurate with the high responsibilities of the office, sufficient to compete with the private sector, and regularly adjusted to attract and retain well-qualified personnel. Compensation for prosecutors should be adequate and also comparable to that of public defense counsel in the jurisdiction.

Standard 3-2.3 Investigative Resources and Experts

    The prosecutor should be provided with funds for qualified experts as needed for particular matters. When warranted by the responsibilities of the office, funds should be available to the prosecutor’s office to employ professional investigators and other necessary support personnel, as well as to secure access to forensic and other experts.

Standard 3-2.4 Office Policies and Procedures

(a) Each prosecutor’s office should seek to develop general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and standard operating procedures for the office. The objectives of such policies and procedures should be to achieve fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the criminal law within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.

(b) In the interest of continuity and clarity, the prosecution office’s policies and procedures should be memorialized and accessible to relevant staff. The office policies and procedures should be regularly reviewed and revised. The office policies and procedures should be augmented by instruction and training, and are not a substitute for regular training programs.

(c) Prosecution office policies and procedures whose disclosure would not adversely affect the prosecution function should be made available to the public.

(d) The prosecutor’s office should have a system in place to regularly review compliance with office policies.

Standard 3-2.5 Removal or Suspension and Substitution of Chief Prosecutor

(a) Fair and objective procedures should be established by appropriate legislation that empowers the governor or other public official or body to suspend or remove, and supersede, a chief prosecutor for a jurisdiction and designate a replacement, upon making a public finding after reasonable notice and hearing that the prosecutor is incapable of fulfilling the duties of office due to physical or mental incapacity or for gross deviation from professional norms.

(b) The governor or other public official or body should be similarly empowered by law to substitute, in a particular matter or category of cases, special counsel in the place of the chief prosecutor, by consent or upon making a finding after fair process that substitution is required due to a serious conflict of interest or a gross deviation from professional norms.

(c) Removal, suspension or substitution of a prosecutor should not be permitted for improper or irrelevant partisan or personal reasons.

PART III: PROSECUTORIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Standard 3-3.1 Structure of, and Relationships Among, Prosecution Offices

(a) When possible, the geographic jurisdiction of a prosecution office should be determined on the basis of population, caseload, and other relevant factors sufficient to warrant at least one full-time prosecutor and necessary support staff.

(b) In all States, there should be coordination of the prosecution policies of local prosecution offices to improve the administration and consistency of justice throughout the State. To the extent needed, a central pool of supporting resources, forensic laboratories, and personnel such as investigators, additional prosecutors, accountants and other experts, should be maintained by the state government and should be available to assist local prosecutors. A coordinated forum for prosecutors to discuss issues of professional responsibility should also be available. In some jurisdictions, it may be appropriate to create a unified statewide system of prosecution, in which the state attorney general is the chief prosecutor and district or county or other local prosecutors are the attorney general’s deputies.

(c) Regardless of the statewide structure of prosecution offices, a state-wide association of prosecutors should be established. When questions or issues arise that could create important state-wide precedents, local prosecutors should advise and consult with the attorney general, the state-wide association, and the prosecutors in other local prosecution offices.

(d) Federal, state, and local prosecution offices should develop practices and procedures that encourage useful coordination with prosecutors within the jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. Prosecutors should work to identify potential issues of conflict, coordinate with other prosecution offices in advance, and resolve inter-office disputes amicably and in the public interest.

Standard 3-3.2 Relationships With Law Enforcement

(a) The prosecutor should maintain respectful yet independent judgment when interacting with law enforcement personnel.

(b) The prosecutor may provide independent legal advice to law enforcement about actions in specific criminal matters and about law enforcement practices in general.

(c) The prosecutor should become familiar with and respect the experience and specialized expertise of law enforcement personnel. The prosecutor should promote compliance by law enforcement personnel with applicable legal rules, including rules against improper bias. The prosecutor’s office should keep law enforcement personnel informed of relevant legal and legal ethics issues and developments as they relate to prosecution matters, and advise law enforcement personnel of relevant prosecution policies and procedures. Prosecutors may exercise supervision over law enforcement personnel involved in particular prosecutions when in the best interests of justice and the public.

(d) Representatives of the prosecutor’s office should meet and confer regularly with law enforcement agencies regarding prosecution as well as law enforcement policies. The prosecutor’s office should assist in developing and administering training programs for law enforcement personnel regarding matters and cases being investigated, matters submitted for charging, and the law related to law enforcement activities.

Standard 3-3.3 Relationship With Courts, Defense Counsel and Others

(a) In all contacts with judges, the prosecutor should maintain a professional and independent relationship. A prosecutor should not engage in unauthorized ex parte discussions with, or submission of material to, a judge relating to a particular matter which is, or is likely to be, before the judge. With regard to generalized matters requiring judicial discussion (for example, case-management or administrative matters), the prosecutor should invite a representative defense counsel to join in the discussion to the extent practicable.

(b) When ex parte communications or submissions are authorized, the prosecutor should inform the court of material facts known to the prosecutor, including facts that are adverse, sufficient to enable the court to make a fair and informed decision. Except when non-disclosure is authorized, counsel should notify opposing counsel that an ex parte contact has occurred, without disclosing its content unless permitted.

(c) In written filings, the prosecutor should respectfully evaluate and respond as appropriate to opposing counsel’s arguments and representations, and avoid unnecessary personalized disparagement.

(d) The prosecutor should develop and maintain courteous and civil working relationships with judges and defense counsel, and should cooperate with them in developing solutions to address ethical, scheduling, or other issues that may arise in particular cases or generally in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors should cooperate with courts and organized bar associations in developing codes of professionalism and civility, and should abide by such codes that apply in their jurisdiction.

Standard 3-3.4 Relationship With Victims and Witnesses

(a) “Witness” in this Standard means any person who has or might have information about a matter, including victims.

(b) The prosecutor should know and follow the law and rules of the jurisdiction regarding victims and witnesses. In communicating with witnesses, the prosecutor should know and abide by law and ethics rules regarding the use of deceit and engaging in communications with represented, unrepresented, and organizational persons.

(c) The prosecutor or the prosecutor’s agents should seek to interview all witnesses, and should not act to intimidate or unduly influence any witness.

(d) The prosecutor should not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden, and not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate legal rights. The prosecutor and prosecution agents should not misrepresent their status, identity or interests when communicating with a witness.

(e) The prosecutor should be permitted to compensate a witness for reasonable expenses such as costs of attending court, depositions pursuant to statute or court rule, and pretrial interviews, including transportation and loss of income. No other benefits should be provided to witnesses unless authorized by law, regulation, or well-accepted practice. All benefits provided to witnesses should be documented and disclosed to the defense. A prosecutor should not pay or provide a benefit to a witness in order to, or in an amount that is likely to, affect the substance or truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.

(f) A prosecutor should avoid the prospect of having to testify personally about the content of a witness interview. The prosecutor’s interview of most routine or government witnesses (for example, custodians of records or law enforcement agents) should not require a third-party observer. But when the need for corroboration of an interview is reasonably anticipated, the prosecutor should be accompanied by another trusted and credible person during the interview. The prosecutor should avoid being alone with any witness who the prosecutor reasonably believes has potential or actual criminal liability, or foreseeably hostile witnesses.

(g) The prosecutor should advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against self-incrimination and the right to independent counsel when the law so requires. Even if the law does not require it, a prosecutor should consider so advising a witness if the prosecutor reasonably believes the witness may provide self-incriminating information and the witness appears not to know his or her rights. However, a prosecutor should not so advise, or discuss or exaggerate the potential criminal liability of, a witness with a purpose, or in a manner likely, to intimidate the witness, to influence the truthfulness or completeness of the witness’s testimony, or to change the witness’s decision about whether to provide information.

(h) The prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between witnesses and the defense counsel, other than the government’s employees or agents if consistent with applicable ethical rules. The prosecutor should not advise any person, or cause any person to be advised, to decline to provide defense counsel with information which such person has a right to give. The prosecutor may, however, fairly and accurately advise witnesses as to the likely consequences of their providing information, but only if done in a manner that does not discourage communication.

(i) Consistent with any specific laws or rules governing victims, the prosecutor should provide victims of serious crimes, or their representatives, an opportunity to consult with and to provide information to the prosecutor, prior to making significant decisions such as whether or not to prosecute, to pursue a disposition by plea, or to dismiss charges. The prosecutor should seek to ensure that victims of serious crimes, or their representatives, are given timely notice of:

(i) judicial proceedings relating to the victims’ case;

(ii) proposed dispositions of the case;

(iii) sentencing proceedings; and

(iv) any decision or action in the case that could result in the defendant’s provisional or final release from custody, or change of sentence.

(j) The prosecutor should ensure that victims and witnesses who may need protections against intimidation or retaliation are advised of and afforded protections where feasible.

(k) Subject to ethical rules and the confidentiality that criminal matters sometimes require, and unless prohibited by law or court order, the prosecutor should provide information about the status of matters in which they are involved to victims and witnesses who request it.

(l) The prosecutor should give witnesses reasonable notice of when their testimony at a proceeding is expected, and should not require witnesses to attend judicial proceedings unless their testimony is reasonably expected at that time, or their presence is required by law. When witnesses’ attendance is required, the prosecutor should seek to reduce to a minimum the time witnesses must spend waiting at the proceedings. The prosecutor should ensure that witnesses are given notice as soon as practicable of scheduling changes which will affect their required attendance at judicial proceedings.

(m) The prosecutor should not engage in any inappropriate personal relationship with any victim or other witness.

Standard 3-3.5 Relationship with Expert Witnesses

(a) An expert may be engaged for consultation only, or to prepare an evidentiary report or testimony. The prosecutor should know relevant rules governing expert witnesses, including possibly different disclosure rules governing experts who are engaged for consultation only.

(b) A prosecutor should evaluate all expert advice, opinions, or testimony independently, and not simply accept the opinion of a government or other expert based on employer, affiliation or prominence alone.

(c) Before engaging an expert, the prosecutor should investigate the expert’s credentials, relevant professional experience, and reputation in the field. The prosecutor should also examine a testifying expert’s background and credentials for potential impeachment issues. Before offering an expert as a witness, the prosecutor should investigate the scientific acceptance of the particular theory, method, or conclusions about which the expert would testify.

(d) A prosecutor who engages an expert to provide a testimonial opinion should respect the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the substance of the expert’s opinion on the relevant subject.

(e) Before offering an expert as a witness, the prosecutor should seek to learn enough about the substantive area of the expert’s expertise, including ethical rules that may be applicable in the expert’s field, to enable effective preparation of the expert, as well as effective cross-examination of any defense expert on the same topic. The prosecutor should explain to the expert that the expert’s role in the proceeding will be as an impartial witness called to aid the fact-finders, explain the manner in which the examination of the expert is likely to be conducted, and suggest likely impeachment questions the expert may be asked.

(f) The prosecutor should not pay or withhold any fee or provide or withhold a benefit for the purpose of influencing the substance of an expert’s testimony. The prosecutor should not fix the amount of the fee contingent upon the expert’s testimony or the result in the case. Nor should the prosecutor promise or imply the prospect of future work for the expert based on the expert’s testimony.

(g) The prosecutor should provide the expert with all information reasonably necessary to support a full and fair opinion. The prosecutor should be aware, and explain to the expert, that all communications with, and documents shared with, a testifying expert may be subject to disclosure to opposing counsel. The prosecutor should be aware of expert discovery rules and act to protect confidentiality and the public interest, for example by not sharing with the expert confidences and work product that the prosecutor does not want disclosed.

(h) The prosecutor should timely disclose to the defense all evidence or information learned from an expert that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense, even if the prosecutor does not intend to call the expert as a witness.

Standard 3-3.6 When Physical Evidence With Incriminating Implications is Disclosed by the Defense 

When physical evidence is delivered to the prosecutor consistent with Defense Function Standard 4-4.7, the prosecutor should not offer the fact of delivery as evidence before a fact-finder for purposes of establishing the culpability of defense counsel’s client. The prosecutor may, however, offer evidence of the fact of such delivery in response to a foundational objection to the evidence based on chain-of-custody concerns, or in a subsequent proceeding for the purpose of proving a crime or fraud regarding the evidence.

PART IV: INVESTIGATION; DECISIONS TO CHARGE, NOT CHARGE, OR DISMISS; AND GRAND JURY

Standard 3-4.1 Investigative Function of the Prosecutor

(a) When performing an investigative function, prosecutors should be familiar with and follow the ABA Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations.

(b) A prosecutor should not use illegal or unethical means to obtain evidence or information, or employ, instruct, or encourage others to do so. Prosecutors should research and know the law in this regard before acting, understanding that in some circumstances a prosecutor’s ethical obligations may be different from those of other lawyers.

Standard 3-4.2 Decisions to Charge Are the Prosecutor’s

(a) While the decision to arrest is often the responsibility of law enforcement personnel, the decision to institute formal criminal proceedings is the responsibility of the prosecutor. Where the law permits a law enforcement officer or other person to initiate proceedings by complaining directly to a judicial officer or the grand jury, the complainant should be required to present the complaint for prior review by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding the complaint should be communicated to the judicial officer or grand jury.

(b) The prosecutor’s office should establish standards and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether formal criminal proceedings should be instituted. 

(c) In determining whether formal criminal charges should be filed, prosecutors should consider whether further investigation should be undertaken. After charges are filed the prosecutor should oversee law enforcement investigative activity related to the case.

(d) If the defendant is not in custody when charged, the prosecutor should consider whether a voluntary appearance rather than a custodial arrest would suffice to protect the public and ensure the defendant’s presence at court proceedings.

Standard 3-4.3 Minimum Requirements for Filing and Maintaining Criminal Charges 

(a) A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.

(b) After criminal charges are filed, a prosecutor should maintain them only if the prosecutor continues to reasonably believe that probable cause exists and that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

(c) If a prosecutor has significant doubt about the guilt of the accused or the quality, truthfulness, or sufficiency of the evidence in any criminal case assigned to the prosecutor, the prosecutor should disclose those doubts to supervisory staff. The prosecutor’s office should then determine whether it is appropriate to proceed with the case.

(d) A prosecutor’s office should not file or maintain charges if it believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.

Standard 3-4.4  Discretion in Filing, Declining, Maintaining, and Dismissing Criminal Charges           

(a) In order to fully implement the prosecutor’s functions and duties, including the obligation to enforce the law while exercising sound discretion, the prosecutor is not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support. Among the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge, even though it meets the requirements of Standard 3-4.3, are:

(i) the strength of the case;

(ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;

(iii) the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense;

(iv) the impact of prosecution or non-prosecution on the public welfare;

(v) the background and characteristics of the offender, including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation;

(vi) whether the authorized or likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the offender;

(vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant;

(viii) any improper conduct by law enforcement;

(ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons;

(x) potential collateral impact on third parties (children involved, etc..) , including witnesses or victims;

(xi) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others;

(xii) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases;

(xiii) changes in law or policy;

(xiv) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;

(xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and

(xvi) whether the public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.

(b) In exercising discretion to file and maintain charges, the prosecutor should not consider:

(i) partisan or other improper political or personal considerations;

(ii) hostility or personal animus towards a potential subject, or any other improper motive of the prosecutor; or

(iii) the impermissible criteria described in Standard 1.6 above.

(c) A prosecutor may file and maintain charges even if juries in the jurisdiction have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.

(d) The prosecutor should not file or maintain charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial and are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or deter similar conduct.

(e) A prosecutor may condition a dismissal of charges, nolle prosequi, or similar action on the accused’s relinquishment of a right to seek civil redress only if the accused has given informed consent, and such consent is disclosed to the court. A prosecutor should not use a civil waiver to avoid a bona fide claim of improper law enforcement actions, and a decision not to file criminal charges should be made on its merits and not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver.

(f) The prosecutor should consider the possibility of a noncriminal disposition, formal or informal, or a deferred prosecution or other diversionary disposition, when deciding whether to initiate or prosecute criminal charges. The prosecutor should be familiar with the services and resources of other agencies, public or private, that might assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion or deferral from the criminal process.

Standard 3-4.5 Relationship with a Grand Jury

(a) In presenting a matter to a criminal grand jury, and in light of its ex parte character, the prosecutor should respect the independence of the grand jury and should not preempt a function of the grand jury, mislead the grand jury, or abuse the processes of the grand jury.

(b) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as a legal advisor to the grand jury, the prosecutor should appropriately explain the law and may, if permitted by law, express an opinion on the legal significance of the evidence, but should give due deference to the grand jury as an independent legal body.

(c) The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments to a grand jury in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner that would be impermissible in a trial.

(d) The entirety of the proceedings occurring before a grand jury, including the prosecutor’s communications with and presentations and instructions to the grand jury, should be recorded in some manner, and that record should be preserved. The prosecutor should avoid off-the-record communications with the grand jury and with individual grand jurors.

Standard 3-4.6 Quality and Scope of Evidence Before a Grand Jury

(a) A prosecutor should not seek an indictment unless the prosecutor reasonably believes the charges are supported by probable cause and that there will be admissible evidence sufficient to support the charges beyond reasonable doubt at trial. A prosecutor should advise a grand jury of the prosecutor’s opinion that it should not indict if the prosecutor believes the evidence presented does not warrant an indictment.

(b) In addition to determining what criminal charges to file, a grand jury may properly be used to investigate potential criminal conduct, and also to determine the sense of the community regarding potential charges.

(c) A prosecutor should present to a grand jury only evidence which the prosecutor believes is appropriate and authorized by law for presentation to a grand jury. The prosecutor should be familiar with the law of the jurisdiction regarding grand juries, and may present witnesses to summarize relevant evidence to the extent the law permits.

(d) When a new grand jury is empanelled, a prosecutor should ensure that the grand jurors are appropriately instructed, consistent with the law of the jurisdiction, on the grand jury’s right and ability to seek evidence, ask questions, and hear directly from any available witnesses, including eyewitnesses.

(e) A prosecutor with personal knowledge of evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation should present or otherwise disclose that evidence to the grand jury. The prosecutor should relay to the grand jury any request by the subject or target of an investigation to testify before the grand jury, or present other non-frivolous evidence claimed to be exculpatory.

(f) If the prosecutor concludes that a witness is a target of a criminal investigation, the prosecutor should not seek to compel the witness’s testimony before the grand jury absent immunity. The prosecutor should honor, however, a reasonable request from a target or subject who wishes to testify before the grand jury.

(g) Unless there is a reasonable possibility that it will facilitate flight of the target, endanger other persons, interfere with an ongoing investigation, or obstruct justice, the prosecutor should give notice to a target of a grand jury investigation, and offer the target an opportunity to testify before the grand jury. Prior to taking a target’s testimony, the prosecutor should advise the target of the privilege against self-incrimination and obtain a voluntary waiver of that right.

(h) The prosecutor should not seek to compel the appearance of a witness whose activities are the subject of the grand jury’s inquiry, if the witness states in advance that if called the witness will claim the constitutional privilege not to testify, and provides a reasonable basis for such claim. If warranted, the prosecutor may judicially challenge such a claim of privilege or seek a grant of immunity according to the law.

(i) The prosecutor should not issue a grand jury subpoena to a criminal defense attorney or defense team member, or other witness whose testimony reasonably might be protected by a recognized privilege, without considering the applicable law and rules of professional responsibility in the jurisdiction.

(j) Except where permitted by law, a prosecutor should not use the grand jury in order to obtain evidence to assist the prosecution’s preparation for trial of a defendant who has already been charged. A prosecutor may, however, use the grand jury to investigate additional or new charges against a defendant who has already been charged.

(k) Except where permitted by law, a prosecutor should not use a criminal grand jury solely or primarily for the purpose of aiding or assisting in an administrative or civil inquiry.

PART V: PRETRIAL ACTIVITIES and NEGOTIATED DISPOSITIONS

Standard 3-5.1 Role in First Appearance and Preliminary Hearing

(a) A prosecutor should be present at any first appearance of the accused before a judicial officer, and at any preliminary hearing.

(b) At or before the first appearance, the prosecutor should consider:

(i) whether the accused has counsel, and if not, whether and when counsel will be made available or waived;

(ii) whether the accused appears to be mentally competent, and if not, whether to seek an evaluation;

(iii) whether the accused should be released or detained pending further proceedings and, if released, whether supervisory conditions should be imposed; and

(iv) what further proceedings should be scheduled to move the matter toward timely resolution.

(c) The prosecutor handling the first appearance should ensure that the charges are consistent with the conduct described in the available law enforcement reports and any other information the prosecutor possesses.

(d) If the accused does not yet have counsel and has not waived counsel, the prosecutor should ask the court not to engage in substantive proceedings, other than a decision to release the accused. The prosecutor should not obtain a waiver of other important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing, from an unrepresented accused unless that person has been judicially authorized to proceed pro se.

(e) The prosecutor should not approach or communicate with an accused unless a voluntary waiver of counsel has been entered or the accused’s counsel consents. If the accused does not have counsel, the prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel, and is given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.

(f) If the prosecutor believes pretrial release is appropriate, or it is ordered, the prosecutor should cooperate in arrangements for release under the prevailing pretrial release system.

(g) If the prosecutor has reasonable concerns about the accused’s mental competence, the prosecutor should bring those concerns to the attention of defense counsel and, if necessary, the judicial officer.

(h) The prosecutor should not seek to delay a prompt judicial determination of probable cause for criminal charges without good cause, particularly if the accused is in custody.

Standard 3-5.2  The Decision to Recommend Release or Seek Detention 

(a) The prosecutor should favor pretrial release of a criminally accused, unless detention is necessary to protect individuals or the community or to ensure the return of the defendant for future proceedings.

(b) The prosecutor’s decision to recommend pretrial release or seek detention should be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant and the offense, rather than made categorically. The prosecutor should consider information relevant to these decisions from all sources, including the defendant.

(c) The prosecutor should cooperate with pretrial services or other personnel who review or assemble information to be provided to the court regarding pretrial release determinations.

(d) The prosecutor should be open to reconsideration of pretrial detention or release decisions based on changed circumstances, including an unexpectedly lengthy period of detention.

Standard 3-5.3 Preparation for Court Proceedings, and Recording and Transmitting Information 

(a) The prosecutor should prepare in advance for court proceedings unless that is impossible. Adequate preparation depends on the nature of the proceeding and the time available, and will often include: reviewing available documents; considering what issues are likely to arise and the prosecution’s position regarding those issues; how best to present the issues and what solutions might be offered; relevant legal research and factual investigation; and contacting other persons who might be of assistance in addressing the anticipated issues. If the prosecutor has not had adequate time to prepare and is unsure of the relevant facts or law, the prosecutor should communicate to the court the limits of the prosecutor’s knowledge or preparation.

(b) The prosecutor should make effort to appear at all hearings in cases assigned to the prosecutor. A prosecutor who substitutes at a court proceeding for another prosecutor assigned to the case should make reasonable efforts to be adequately informed about the case and issues likely to come up at the proceeding, and to adequately prepare.

(c) The prosecutor handling any court appearance should document what happens at the proceeding, to aid the prosecutor’s later memory and so that necessary information will be available to other prosecutors who may handle the case in the future.

(d) The prosecutor should take steps to ensure that any court order issued to the prosecution is transmitted to the appropriate persons necessary to effectuate the order.

(e) The prosecutor’s office should be provided sufficient resources and be organized to permit adequate preparation for court proceedings.

Standard 3-5.4 Identification and Disclosure of Information and Evidence

 (a) After charges are filed if not before, the prosecutor should diligently seek to identify all information in the possession of the prosecution or its agents that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense charged, impeach the government’s witnesses or evidence, or reduce the likely punishment of the accused if convicted.

(b) The prosecutor should diligently advise other governmental agencies involved in the case of their continuing duty to identify, preserve, and disclose to the prosecutor information described in (a) above.

(c) Before trial of a criminal case, a prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the defense of information described in (a) above that is known to the prosecutor, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes it is likely to change the result of the proceeding, unless relieved of this responsibility by a court’s protective order. (Regarding discovery prior to a guilty plea, see Standard 3-5.6(f) below.) A prosecutor should not intentionally attempt to obscure information disclosed pursuant to this standard by including it without identification within a larger volume of materials.

(d) The obligations to identify and disclose such information continue throughout the prosecution of a criminal case.

(e) A prosecutor should timely respond to legally proper discovery requests, and make a diligent effort to comply with legally proper disclosure obligations, unless otherwise authorized by a court. When the defense makes requests for specific information, the prosecutor should provide specific responses rather than merely a general acknowledgement of discovery obligations. Requests and responses should be tailored to the case and “boilerplate” requests and responses should be disfavored.

(f) The prosecutor should make prompt efforts to identify and disclose to the defense any physical evidence that has been gathered in the investigation, and provide the defense a reasonable opportunity to examine it.

(g) A prosecutor should not avoid pursuit of information or evidence because the prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.

(h) A prosecutor should determine whether additional statutes, rules or caselaw may govern or restrict the disclosure of information, and comply with these authorities absent court order.

Standard 3-5.5   Preservation of Information and Evidence

(a) The prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to preserve, and direct the prosecutor’s agents to preserve, relevant materials during and after a criminal case, including

(i) evidence relevant to investigations as well as prosecutions, whether or not admitted at trial;

(ii) information identified pursuant to Standard 3-5.4(a); and

(iii) other materials necessary to support significant decisions made and conclusions reached by the prosecution in the course of an investigation and prosecution.

(b) The prosecutor’s office should develop policies regarding the method and duration of preservation of such materials. Such policies should be consistent with applicable rules and laws (such as public records laws) in the jurisdiction. These policies, and individual preservation decisions, should consider the character and seriousness of each case, the character of the particular evidence or information, the likelihood of further challenges to judgments following conviction, and the resources available for preservation. Physical evidence should be preserved so as to reasonably preserve its forensic characteristics and utility.

(c) Materials should be preserved at least until a criminal case is finally resolved or is final on appeal and the time for further appeal has expired. In felony cases, materials should be preserved until post-conviction litigation is concluded or time-limits have expired. In death penalty cases, information should be preserved until the penalty is carried out or is precluded.

(d) The prosecutor should comply with additional statutes, rules or caselaw that may govern the preservation of evidence.

Standard 3-5.6 Conduct of Negotiated Disposition Discussions

(a) The prosecutor should be open, at every stage of a criminal matter, to discussions with defense counsel concerning disposition of charges by guilty plea or other negotiated disposition.

(b) A prosecutor should not engage in disposition discussions directly with a represented defendant, except with defense counsel’s approval. Where a defendant has properly waived counsel, the prosecutor may engage in disposition discussions with the defendant, and should make and preserve a record of such discussions.

(c) The prosecutor should not enter into a disposition agreement before having information sufficient to assess the defendant’s actual culpability. The prosecutor should consider collateral consequences of a conviction before entering into a disposition agreement. The prosecutor should consider factors listed in Standard 3-4.4(a), and not be influenced in disposition discussions by inappropriate factors such as those listed in Standards 3-1.6 and 3-4.4(b).

(d) The prosecutor should not set unreasonably short deadlines, or demand conditions for a disposition, that are so coercive that the voluntariness of a plea or the effectiveness of defense counsel is put into question. A prosecutor may, however, set a reasonable deadline before trial or hearing for acceptance of a disposition offer.

(e) A prosecutor should not knowingly make false statements of fact or law in the course of disposition discussions.

(f) Before entering into a disposition agreement, the prosecutor should disclose to the defense a factual basis sufficient to support the charges in the proposed agreement, and information currently known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is likely to reduce punishment.

(g) A prosecutor should not agree to a guilty plea if the prosecutor reasonably believes that sufficient admissible evidence to support conviction beyond reasonable doubt would be lacking if the matter went to trial.

Standard 3-5.7 Establishing and Fulfilling Conditions of Negotiated Dispositions

(a) A prosecutor should not demand terms in a negotiated disposition agreement that are unlawful or in violation of public policy.

(b) The prosecutor may properly promise the defense that the prosecutor will or will not take a particular position concerning sentence and conditions. The prosecutor should not, however, imply a greater power to influence the disposition of a case than is actually possessed.

(c) The prosecutor should memorialize all promises and conditions that are part of the agreement, and ensure that any written disposition agreement accurately and completely reflects the precise terms of the agreement including the prosecutor’s promises and the defendant’s obligations. At any court hearing to finalize a negotiated disposition, the prosecutor should ensure that all relevant details of the agreement have been placed on the record. The presumption is that the hearing and record will be public, but in some cases the hearing or record (or a portion) may be sealed for good cause.

(d) Once a disposition agreement is final and accepted by the court, the prosecutor should comply with, and make good faith efforts to have carried out, the government’s obligations. The prosecutor should construe agreement conditions, and evaluate the defendant’s performance including any cooperation, in a good-faith and reasonable manner.

(e) If the prosecutor believes that a defendant has breached an agreement that has been accepted by the court, the prosecutor should notify the defense regarding the prosecutor’s belief and any intended adverse action. If the defense presents a good-faith disagreement and the parties cannot quickly resolve it, the prosecutor should not act before judicial resolution.

(f) If the prosecutor reasonably believes that a court is acting inconsistently with any term of a negotiated disposition, the prosecutor should raise the matter with the court.

Standard 3-5.8 Waiver of Rights as Condition of Disposition Agreements 

(a) A prosecutor should not condition a disposition agreement on a waiver of the right to appeal the terms of a sentence which exceeds an agreed-upon or reasonably anticipated sentence. Any waiver of appeal of sentence should be comparably binding on the defendant and the prosecution.

(b) A prosecutor should not suggest or require, as a condition of a disposition agreement, any waiver of post-conviction claims addressing ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or destruction of evidence, unless such claims are based on past instances of such conduct that are specifically identified in the agreement or in the transcript of proceedings that address the agreement. If a proposed disposition agreement contains such a waiver regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecutor should ensure that the defendant has been provided the opportunity to consult with independent counsel regarding the waiver before agreeing to the disposition.

(c) A prosecutor may propose or require other sorts of waivers on an individualized basis if the defendant’s agreement is knowing and voluntary. No waivers of any kind should be accepted without an exception for manifest injustice based on newly-discovered evidence, or actual innocence.

(d) Although certain claims may have been waived, a prosecutor should not condition a disposition agreement on a complete waiver of the right to file a habeas corpus or other comparable post-conviction petition.

(e) A prosecutor should not request or rely on waivers to hide an injustice or material flaw in the case which is undisclosed to the defense.

Standard 3-5.9 Record of Reasons for Dismissal of Charges

When criminal charges are dismissed on the prosecution’s motion, including by plea of nolle prosequi or its equivalent, the prosecutor should make and retain an appropriate record of the reasons for the dismissal, and indicate on the record whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.

PART VI: COURT HEARINGS AND TRIAL

Standard 3-6.1    Scheduling Court Hearings

Final control over the scheduling of court appearances, hearings and trials in criminal matters should rest with the court rather than the parties. When the prosecutor is aware of facts that would affect scheduling, the prosecutor should advise the court and, if the facts are case-specific, defense counsel.

Standard 3-6.2    Civility With Courts, Opposing Counsel, and Others

(a) As an officer of the court, the prosecutor should support the authority of the court and the dignity of the courtroom by adherence to codes of professionalism and civility, and by manifesting a professional and courteous attitude toward the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors, court staff and others. In court as elsewhere, the prosecutor should not display or act out of any improper or unlawful bias.

(b) When court is in session, unless otherwise permitted by the court, the prosecutor should address the court and not address other counsel or the defendant directly on any matter related to the case.

(c) The prosecutor should comply promptly and civilly with a court’s orders or seek appropriate relief from such order. If the prosecutor considers an order to be significantly erroneous or prejudicial, the prosecutor should ensure that the record adequately reflects the events. The prosecutor has a right to make respectful objections and reasonable requests for reconsideration, and to seek other relief as the law permits. If a judge prohibits making an adequate objection, proffer, or record, the prosecutor may take other lawful steps to protect the public interest.

Standard 3-6.3 Selection of Jurors

(a) The prosecutor’s office should be aware of legal standards that govern the selection of jurors, and train prosecutors to comply. The prosecutor should prepare to effectively discharge the prosecution function in the selection of the jury, including exercising challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. The prosecutor’s office should also be aware of the process used to select and summon the jury pool and bring legal deficiencies to the attention of the court.

(b) The prosecutor should not strike jurors based on any criteria rendered impermissible by the constitution, statutes, applicable rules of the jurisdiction, or these standards, including race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity. The prosecutor should consider contesting a defense counsel’s peremptory challenges that appear to be based upon such criteria.

(c) In cases in which the prosecutor conducts a pretrial investigation of the background of potential jurors, the investigative methods used should not harass, intimidate, or unduly embarrass or invade the privacy of potential jurors. Absent special circumstances, such investigation should be restricted to review of records and sources of information already in existence and to which access is lawfully allowed. If the prosecutor uses record searches that are unavailable to the defense, such as criminal record databases, the prosecutor should share the results with defense counsel or seek a judicial protective order.

(d) The opportunity to question jurors personally should be used solely to obtain information relevant to the well-informed exercise of challenges. The prosecutor should not seek to commit jurors on factual issues likely to arise in the case, and should not intentionally present arguments, facts or evidence which the prosecutor reasonably should know will not be admissible at trial. Voir dire should not be used to argue the prosecutor’s case to the jury, or to unduly ingratiate counsel with the jurors.

(e) During voir dire, the prosecutor should seek to minimize any undue embarrassment or invasion of privacy of potential jurors, for example by seeking to inquire into sensitive matters outside the presence of other potential jurors, while still enabling fair and efficient juror selection.

(f) If the court does not permit voir dire by counsel, the prosecutor should provide the court with suggested questions in advance, and request specific follow-up questions during the selection process when necessary to ensure fair juror selection.

(g) If the prosecutor has reliable information that conflicts with a potential juror’s responses, or that reasonably would support a “for cause” challenge by any party, the prosecutor should inform the court and, unless the court orders otherwise, defense counsel.

Standard 3-6.4 Relationship With Jurors

(a) The prosecutor should not communicate with persons the prosecutor knows to be summoned for jury duty or impaneled as jurors, before or during trial, other than in the lawful conduct of courtroom proceedings. The prosecutor should avoid even the appearance of improper communications with jurors, and minimize any out-of-court proximity to or contact with jurors. Where out-of-court contact cannot be avoided, the prosecutor should not communicate about or refer to the specific case.

(b) The prosecutor should treat jurors with courtesy and respect, while avoiding a show of undue solicitude for their comfort or convenience.

(c) After discharge of a juror, a prosecutor should avoid contacts that may harass or embarrass the juror, that criticize the jury’s actions or verdict, or that express views that could otherwise adversely influence the juror’s future jury service. The prosecutor should know and comply with applicable rules and law governing the subject.

(d) After a jury is discharged, the prosecutor may, if no statute, rule, or order prohibits such action, communicate with jurors to investigate whether a verdict may be subject to legal challenge, or to evaluate the prosecution’s performance for improvement in the future. The prosecutor should consider requesting the court to instruct the jury that, if it is not prohibited by law, it is not improper for jurors to discuss the case with the lawyers, although they are not required to do so. Any post-discharge communication with a juror should not disparage the criminal justice system and the jury trial process, and should not express criticism of the jury’s actions or verdict.

(e) A prosecutor who learns reasonably reliable information that there was a problem with jury deliberations or conduct that could support an attack on a judgment of conviction and that is recognized as potentially valid in the jurisdiction, should promptly report that information to the appropriate judicial officer and, unless the court orders otherwise, defense counsel.

Standard 3-6.5 Opening Statement at Trial

(a) The prosecutor should give an opening statement before the presentation of evidence begins.

(b) The prosecutor’s opening statement at trial should be confined to a fair statement of the case from the prosecutor’s perspective, and discussion of evidence that the prosecutor reasonably believes will be available, offered and admitted to support the prosecution case. The prosecutor’s opening should avoid speculating about what defenses might be raised by the defense unless the prosecutor knows they will be raised.

(c) The prosecutor’s opening statement should be made without expressions of personal opinion, vouching for witnesses, inappropriate appeals to emotion or personal attacks on opposing counsel. The prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any comment on a defendant’s right to remain silent.

(d) When the prosecutor has reason to believe that a portion of the opening statement may be objectionable, the prosecutor should raise that point with defense counsel and, if necessary, the court, in advance. Similarly, visual aids or exhibits that the prosecutor intends to use during opening statement should be shown to defense counsel in advance.

Standard 3-6.6 Presentation of Evidence

(a) The prosecutor should not offer evidence that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses. When a prosecutor has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of particular evidence, the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to determine that the evidence is reliable, or not present it.

(b) If the prosecutor reasonably believes there has been misconduct by opposing counsel, a witness, the court or other persons that affects the fair presentation of the evidence, the prosecutor should challenge the perceived misconduct by appealing or objecting to the court or through other appropriate avenues, and not by engaging in retaliatory conduct that the prosecutor knows to be improper.

(c) During the trial, if the prosecutor discovers that false evidence or testimony has been introduced by the prosecution, the prosecutor should take reasonable remedial steps. If the witness is still on the stand, the prosecutor should attempt to correct the error through further examination. If the falsity remains uncorrected or is not discovered until the witness is off the stand, the prosecutor should notify the court and opposing counsel for determination of an appropriate remedy.

(d) The prosecutor should not bring to the attention of the trier of fact matters that the prosecutor knows to be inadmissible, whether by offering or displaying inadmissible evidence, asking legally objectionable questions, or making impermissible comments or arguments. If the prosecutor is uncertain about the admissibility of evidence, the prosecutor should seek and obtain resolution from the court before the hearing or trial if possible, and reasonably in advance of the time for proffering the evidence before a jury.

(e) The prosecutor should exercise strategic judgment regarding whether to object or take exception to evidentiary rulings that are materially adverse to the prosecution, and not make every possible objection. The prosecutor should not make objections without a reasonable basis, or for improper reasons such as to harass or to break the flow of opposing counsel’s presentation. The prosecutor should make an adequate record for appeal, and consider the possibility of an interlocutory appeal regarding significant adverse rulings if available.

(f) The prosecutor should not display tangible evidence (and should object to such display by the defense) until it is admitted into evidence, except insofar as its display is necessarily incidental to its tender, although the prosecutor may seek permission to display admissible evidence during opening statement. The prosecutor should avoid displaying even admitted evidence in a manner that is unduly prejudicial.

Standard 3-6.7 Examination of Witnesses in Court

(a) The prosecutor should conduct the examination of witnesses fairly and with due regard for dignity and legitimate privacy concerns, and without seeking to intimidate or humiliate a witness unnecessarily.

(b) The prosecutor should not use cross-examination to discredit or undermine a witness’s testimony, if the prosecutor knows the testimony to be truthful and accurate.

(c) The prosecutor should not call a witness to testify in the presence of the jury, or require the defense to do so, when the prosecutor knows the witness will claim a valid privilege not to testify. If the prosecutor is unsure whether a particular witness will claim a privilege to not testify, the prosecutor should alert the court and defense counsel in advance and outside the presence of the jury.

(d) The prosecutor should not ask a question that implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith belief is lacking.

Standard 3-6.8 Closing Arguments to the Trier of Fact

(a) In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), the prosecutor should present arguments and a fair summary of the evidence that proves the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record, unless the prosecutor knows an inference to be false. The prosecutor should, to the extent time permits, review the evidence in the record before presenting closing argument. The prosecutor should not knowingly misstate the evidence in the record, or argue inferences that the prosecutor knows have no good-faith support in the record. The prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any reference to a defendant’s decision not to testify.

(b) The prosecutor should not argue in terms of counsel’s personal opinion, and should not imply special or secret knowledge of the truth or of witness credibility.

(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to improper prejudices of the trier of fact. The prosecutor should make only those arguments that are consistent with the trier’s duty to decide the case on the evidence, and should not seek to divert the trier from that duty.

(d) If the prosecutor presents rebuttal argument, the prosecutor may respond fairly to arguments made in the defense closing argument, but should not present or raise new issues. If the prosecutor believes the defense closing argument is or was improper, the prosecutor should timely object and request relief from the court, rather than respond with arguments that the prosecutor knows are improper.

Standard 3-6.9 Facts Outside the Record

When before a jury, the prosecutor should not knowingly refer to, or argue on the basis of, facts outside the record, unless such facts are matters of common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience, or are matters of which a court clearly may take judicial notice, or are facts the prosecutor reasonably believes will be entered into the record at that proceeding. In a nonjury context the prosecutor may refer to extra-record facts relevant to issues about which the court specifically inquires, but should note that they are outside the record.

Standard 3-6.10 Comments by Prosecutor After Verdict or Ruling

(a) The prosecutor should respectfully accept acquittals. Regarding other adverse rulings (including the rare acquittal by a judge that is appealable), while the prosecutor may publicly express respectful disagreement and an intention to pursue lawful options for review, the prosecutor should refrain from public criticism of any participant.  Public comments after a verdict or ruling should be respectful of the legal system and process.

(b) The prosecutor may publicly praise a jury verdict or court ruling, compliment government agents or others who aided in the matter, and note the social value of the ruling or event. The prosecutor should not publicly gloat or seek personal aggrandizement regarding a verdict or ruling.

PART VII: POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND SENTENCING

Standard 3-7.1 Post-trial Motions 

The prosecutor should conduct a fair evaluation of post-trial motions, determine their merit, and respond accordingly and respectfully. The prosecutor should not oppose motions at any stage without a reasonable basis for doing so.

Standard 3-7.2 Sentencing

(a) The severity of sentences imposed should not be used as a measure of a prosecutor’s effectiveness.

(b) The prosecutor should be familiar with relevant sentencing laws, rules, consequences and options, including alternative non-imprisonment sentences. Before or soon after charges are filed, and throughout the pendency of the case, the prosecutor should evaluate potential consequences of the prosecution and available sentencing options, such as forfeiture, restitution, and immigration effects, and be prepared to actively advise the court in sentencing.

(c) The prosecutor should seek to assure that a fair and informed sentencing judgment is made, and to avoid unfair sentences and disparities.

(d) In the interests of uniformity, the prosecutor’s office should develop consistent policies for evaluating and making sentencing recommendations, and not leave complete discretion for sentencing policy to individual prosecutors.

(e) The prosecutor should know the relevant laws and rules regarding victims’ rights, and facilitate victim participation in the sentencing process as the law requires or permits.

Standard 3-7.3 Information Relevant to Sentencing

(a) The prosecutor should assist the court in obtaining complete and accurate information for use in sentencing, and should cooperate fully with the court’s and staff’s presentence investigations. The prosecutor should provide any information that the prosecution believes is relevant to the sentencing to the court and to defense counsel. A record of such information provided to the court and counsel should be made, so that it may be reviewed later if necessary. If material incompleteness or inaccuracy in a presentence report comes to the prosecutor’s attention, the prosecutor should take steps to present the complete and correct information to the court and defense counsel.

(b) The prosecutor should disclose to the defense and to the court, at or before the sentencing proceeding, all information that tends to mitigate the sentence and is known to the prosecutor, unless the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a court order.

(c) Prior to sentencing, the prosecutor should disclose to the defense any evidence or information it provides, whether by document or orally, to the court or presentence investigator in aid of sentencing, unless contrary to law or rule in the jurisdiction or a protective order has been sought.

Rule 3.8 $pecial Re$pon$ibilitie$ of a Pro$ecutor

Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

• (a) not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows* is not supported by probable cause;
• (b) make reasonable* efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable* opportunity to obtain counsel;
• (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal* has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;
• (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known* to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows* or reasonably should know* tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;* and
• (e) exercise reasonable* care to prevent persons* under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons* assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 3.6.
• (f) When a prosecutor knows* of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable* likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
  • (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
  • (2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
    • (i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court
      authorizes delay, and
    • (ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable* efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
• (g) When a prosecutor knows* of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction. The repealed prior version of this rule that was effective from November 1, 2018 to May 31, 2020, and the Executive Summary concerning those amendments can be found here.

Comment
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.* This rule is intended to achieve those results. All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3.1 and 3.4.

[2] Paragraph (c) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly* waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (c) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable* waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused’s voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.

[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (d) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194] and its progeny. For example, these obligations include, at a minimum, the
duty to disclose impeachment evidence or information that a prosecutor knows* or reasonably should know* casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (d) does not
require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (d) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.

[4] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal* if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial* harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[5] Paragraph (e) supplements rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial* likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (e) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).

[6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rules 5.1 and 5.3.) Ordinarily, the reasonable* care standard of paragraph (e) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate
cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[7] When a prosecutor knows* of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable* likelihood that a person* outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person* did not commit, paragraph (f) requires prompt disclosure to  the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (f) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable* efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 4.2.) Statutes may require a prosecutor to preserve certain types of evidence in criminal matters. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1417.1-1417.9.) In addition, prosecutors must obey file preservation orders concerning rights of discovery guaranteed by the Constitution and statutory provisions. (See People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581]; Shorts v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 709 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 392].)

[8] Under paragraph (g), once the prosecutor knows* of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the
circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.

[9] A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (f) and (g), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this rule. source

PART VIII: APPEALS AND OTHER CONVICTION CHALLENGES  

Standard 3-8.1 Duty To Defend Conviction Not Absolute 

The prosecutor has a duty to defend convictions obtained after fair process. This duty is not absolute, however, and the prosecutor should temper the duty to defend with independent professional judgment and discretion. The prosecutor should not defend a conviction if the prosecutor believes the defendant is innocent or was wrongfully convicted, or that a miscarriage of justice associated with the conviction has occurred.

Standard 3-8.2 Appeals — General Principles  

(a) All prosecutors should be sufficiently knowledgeable about appellate practice to be able to make a record sufficient to preserve issues and arguments for appeal, and should make such a record at the trial court level.

(b) When the prosecutor receives an adverse ruling, the prosecutor should consider whether it may be appealed. If the ruling may be appealed, the prosecutor should consider whether an appeal should be filed, and refer it to an appellate prosecutor if appropriate for decision.

(c) When considering whether an adverse ruling should be appealed, the prosecutor should evaluate not only the legal merits, but also whether it is in the interests of justice to pursue such an appeal, taking into account the benefits to the prosecution, the judicial system, and the public, as well as the costs of the appellate process and of delay to the prosecution, defendant, victims and witnesses.

(d) A prosecutor handling a criminal appeal should know the specific rules, practices and procedures that govern appeals in the jurisdiction.

(e) The prosecutor’s office should designate one or more prosecutors in the office to develop expertise regarding appellate law and procedure, and should develop contacts with other offices’ prosecutors who have such expertise. The prosecutor’s office should develop consistent policies and positions regarding issues that are common or recurring in the appellate process or court. The prosecutor’s office should regularly notify its prosecutors and law enforcement agents about new developments in the law or judicial decisions, and should provide regular training to such personnel on such topics.

(f) A prosecutor handling a criminal appeal who was not counsel in the trial court should consult with the trial prosecutor, but should exercise independent judgment in reviewing the record and the defense arguments. The appellate prosecutor should not make or oppose arguments in an appeal without a reasonable legal basis.

Standard 3-8.3 Responses to New or Newly-Discovered Evidence or Law

If a prosecutor learns of credible and material information creating a reasonable likelihood that a defendant was wrongfully convicted or sentenced or is actually innocent, the prosecutor should comply with ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h). The prosecutor’s office should develop policies and procedures to address such information, and take actions that are consistent with applicable law, rules, and the duty to pursue justice.

Standard 3-8.4 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Defense Counsel  

(a) In any post-conviction challenge to the effectiveness of defense counsel, the prosecutor should be cognizant of the defendant’s potential attorney-client privilege with former defense counsel as well as former defense counsel’s other ethical or legal obligations, and not seek to abrogate such privileges or obligations without an unambiguous legal basis, or court order.

(b) If a prosecutor observes, at any stage of a criminal proceeding, defense counsel conduct or omission that might reasonably constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to preserve the defendant’s right to effective assistance as well as the public’s interest in obtaining a valid conviction, while not intruding on a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. During an ongoing defense representation, the prosecutor should not express concerns regarding possible ineffective assistance on the public record without an unambiguous legal basis or court order, and should not communicate any such concerns directly to the defendant.

Standard 3-8.5 Collateral Attacks on Conviction 

If required to respond to a collateral attack on a conviction, the prosecutor should consider all lawful responses, including applicable procedural or other defenses. The prosecutor need not, however, invoke every possible defense to a collateral attack, and should consider potential negotiated dispositions or other remedies, if the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s office reasonably conclude that the interests of justice are thereby served.

sourced https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/

Rule 3-110 Failing to Act Competently

(A) A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.

(B) For purposes of this rule, “competence” in any legal service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.

(C) If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required.

Discussion:

The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. (See, e.g., Waysman v. State Bar (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; Trousil v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; Palomo v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; Crane v. State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; Vaughn v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; Moore v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)

In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances. (Amended by order of Supreme Court, operative September 14, 1992.) source

Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

(Rule approved by the Supreme Court, effective Nov. 2, 2017)

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

• (A) Not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
• (B) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
• (C) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;
• (D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
• (E) Exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 5-120.
• (F) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
  • (1) Promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
  • (2) If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
    • (a) Promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
    • (b) Undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
• (G) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

Discussion:

• [1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons. Rule 5-110 is intended to achieve those results. All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3-200 and 5-220.
• [2] Paragraph (C) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (C) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused’s voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.
• [3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S. Ct. 1194] and its progeny. For example, these obligations include, at a minimum, the duty to disclose impeachment evidence or information that a prosecutor knows or reasonably should know casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (D) does not require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (D) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.
• [4] The exception in paragraph (D) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
• [5] Paragraph (E) supplements rule 5-120, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (E) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 5-120(B) or 5-120(C).
• [6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rule 3-110, Discussion.) Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard of paragraph (E) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.
• [7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (F) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (F) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 2-100.)
• [8] Under paragraph (G), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.
• [9] A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (F) and (G), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of rule 5-110. (Amended by order of Supreme Court, operative Nov. 2, 2017.)

https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Previous-Rules/Rule-5-110

Five Ethics Rules Every Prosecutor Should Know

1. In addition to a prosecutor’s constitutional and statutory duties to disclose evidence, a prosecutor must, after making a reasonably diligent inquiry, timely disclose to the defense all evidence all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense. See North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(d), Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.

How does this rule differ from a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), to learn of and disclose to the defendant materially favorable evidence? The ethical requirement is broader. That is because, unlike a prosecutor’s due process obligation, the ethics rule does not include a materiality requirement. North Carolina State Bar v. Brewer, 05 DHC 37 Reprimand at 26 n.9 (April 4, 2008) (citing Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 714 (1987) (noting that to fulfill ethical obligations under modern ethics codes “the prosecutor must disclose all exculpatory evidence . . . whether or not the evidence presented or omitted is important enough, in the context of all of the evidence presented at trial, to warrant a reversal of the conviction”; concluding that “[a]n ethical violation can, and often will, be present even when due process is not violated.”).

Rule 3.8(d) also requires a prosecutor, in connection with sentencing, to disclose to the defendant and the court “all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,” unless disclosure is barred by a protective order.

And a prosecutor’s disclosure duties do not end with a conviction. When a prosecutor knows of new, credible information that creates a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense for which the defendant was convicted, Rule 3.8(g) requires the prosecutor to disclose that information to the defendant or the defendant’s counsel and the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services (or the federal public defender if a federal conviction).

2. A prosecutor may not prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause. See North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a), Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor. Thus, if a trial court enters an order suppressing evidence that bars the prosecutor from establishing probable cause that a crime occurred, the only proper course of action is for the prosecutor to dismiss the charge. Likewise, a prosecutor may not seek the filing of charges that are precluded by established law. See North Carolina State Bar v. Paul, 12 DHC 33 (October 17, 2012) (suspending assistant district attorney from the practice of law for one year for instructing law enforcement to seek warrants for charges that she should have known were precluded by established law). The State Bar cautioned in Paul: “It is imperative to the proper administration of justice that prosecutors maintain objectivity and exercise their powers cautiously. Even the best of intentions is insufficient to justify causing a person to be arrested on charges unsupported by law.” Id.

3. A prosecutor may not offer special treatment to a person charged with a crime in exchange for a charitable contribution. While a prosecutor may engage in plea negotiations with a defendant, including negotiations that require a defendant to pay statutorily-authorized restitution, a prosecutor may not reduce or dismiss charges or seek prayers for judgment continued (PJCs) in exchange for a charitable contribution. See RPC 204, Prosecutor’s Offer of Special Treatment to Defendants Who Make Charitable Contributions (July 21, 1995) (ruling that it is prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to offer special treatment to individuals charged with traffic offenses or minor crimes in exchange for a direct charitable contribution to the local school system). The State Bar has explained that “[t]he offer of special treatment from a prosecutor to individuals charged with traffic violations or minor criminal offenses in exchange for direct donations to even the most worthy charity implies that justice can be purchased.” Id. This type of conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice and contravenes a prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, not merely to convict. Id.

4. A prosecutor may not intentionally fail to inform the court of prior convictions that affect a defendant’s sentence. See 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 5, Participating in Misrepresentation of Prior Record Level in Sentencing Proceeding. To so misinform the court would violate a prosecutor’s duty under Rule 3.3 of candor toward the tribunal. Moreover, a prosecutor may not under-report a defendant’s criminal history even with the permission of the court. 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 5 (explaining that a prosecutor may not collude with a judge to avoid the requirements of the Structured Sentencing Act; such conduct violates Rule 8.4 as it involves dishonesty and misrepresentation, is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and knowingly assists a judge in violating the rules of judicial conduct).

5. A prosecutor should not publicly comment before trial on the possibility that the defendant will plead guilty, the results of any examinations or tests, the contents of any statement given by the defendant, or the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of the defendant or a witness. And, while a prosecutor may publicly state that a named defendant has been charged with a crime, the prosecutor should include a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

Rule 3.6 prohibits an attorney, including a prosecutor, from making an extrajudicial statement that the attorney knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. The commentary to the rule recognizes that, of all such proceedings, criminal jury trials are the most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Rule 3.6(a) sets forth a safe harbor for extrajudicial speech, permitting prosecutors to state the following:

• (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
• (2) the information contained in a public record;
• (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
• (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
• (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
• (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
• (7) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
• (8) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
• (9) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
• (10) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.

The commentary to Rule 3.6 lists “certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding,” particularly when they refer to a criminal matter. These subjects include commentary relating to:

• • (1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a suspect or witness in a criminal investigation, the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a witness;
  • (2) the possibility of a guilty plea or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement;

• (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
• (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; and
• (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.

The commentary notes that a prosecutor may state the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, but notes that such a statement is likely to have a material prejudicial effect unless it is accompanied by a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.source

7A-66. Removal of district attorneys.

The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth

CACI No. 425. “Gross Negligence” Explained
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2023 edition)

Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009

The Prosecutor’s Duty t s Duty to Truth

Learn more about these sujects

• Malicious Prosecution
• Prosecutional Misconduct
• Vindictive Prosecution
• Retaliatory Prosecution
• Abuse of Process

Selected Issues in Malicious Prosecution Cases

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct

Vindictive Prosecution – Georgetown University

VINDICTIVE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

What is Abuse of Process?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution?

Malicious Prosecution Actions Arising Out Of Family Law Proceedings: Proceed Carefully

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution

SCOTUS Makes It Easier To Sue Police And Prosecutors For Malicious Prosecution

Prosecutional Misconduct – SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors

National District Attorneys Association – National Prosecution Standards – NDDA

What Happens If Charges Are Dropped Before Trial?

Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Possible courses of action Prosecutorial Misconduct

Misconduct by Judges & Prosecutor – Rules of Professional Conduct

PC 1385 – Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise

Thomp$on v. Clark – Maliciou$ Pro$ecution 

Reichle v. Howards (2012) – Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials –1st Amendment

People v. Superior Court (Greer) 5th & 8th Amendment – Bias / Malicious Persecutor

Hartman v. Moore (2006) –Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Epic SCOTUS Decisions

National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards
National Prosecution Standards – NDD can be found here

The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence

Prosecutor’s Duty Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Fordham Law Review PDF

Chapter 14 Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information PDF

EVERYTHING YOU WILL NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

Imagine you get hurt because a federal employee did something wrong, but you don’t know what you can do about it. They are employed by the government, so who do you even report to?

The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed in 1946 to allow the federal government to be sued in cases of wrongdoing. This means that federal employees are to be held responsible for any mistakes that result in injury to others.

Have you had to deal with this type of situation in the past? Are you currently recovering from the misdoings of a federal employee?

Keep reading to find out more about what you can do.

What is a Tort?

Simply put, a tort is a wrongful act that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm in some way. It is a civil wrong and there are three types of torts that may cause this harm to other people. Each of them has distinct differences that help to tell them apart.

Intentional Tort

Intentional torts are when someone does something wrong to another person on purpose. Examples of this could be assault, false imprisonment, or fraud.

For the most part, this is when someone does something illegal and harmful with intent to harm.

Negligence Tort

Negligence torts occur when harm is inflicted upon another person due to failure to meet specific standards meant to keep everyone safe and happy.

These are typically due to carelessness and are actually the most common of the three types of torts.

Strict Liability Tort

Strict liability torts are a little different because they happen when responsibility for harm can be applied to someone or something without any evidence of it being their fault.

The harm has to be directly caused by the someone or something in order for the law to see the person as being the victim in these cases.

The Federal Tort Claims Act

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the government is self-insured and will recognize liability when a federal employee does something that results in injury to another person or their property.

If someone is injured or harmed in some way as a result of a federal employee’s actions, you may have the chance to file a claim against the government.

What Do You Need?

You have to be able to show that the federal employee was the one that harmed you or your property.

You also need to be able to prove that the employee was doing something within the realm of duties he or she is meant to be doing for the government when the harm happened.

Lastly, you will need to be able to demonstrate the employee acted wrongfully and this wrongdoing directly resulted in harm to you.

For instance, you may file a FTCA claim if you are a veteran being treated at a Veterans Administration and the doctor employed there misdiagnoses and, as a result, mistreats you.

Is This Like Any Other Lawsuit?

This type of tort claim is a little bit more challenging than a civil suit, because the FCTA is a really complex law.

It is always better to file the claim sooner rather than later in order to have the best chance of winning the case. A written claim must be filed within two years of your knowledge of the negligence or intent to harm.

Hiring an expert-level lawyer is going to be important at this stage. .source

Understanding Tort Law

Tort law can be split into three categories: negligent torts, intentional torts, and strict liability torts.

• Negligent torts are harms done to people through the failure of another to exercise a certain level of care, usually defined as a reasonable standard of care. Accidents are a standard example of negligent torts.
• Intentional torts are harms that have been caused by the willful misconduct of another, such as assault, fraud, and theft.
• Strict liability torts, unlike negligence and intentional torts, are not concerned with the culpability of the person doing the harm. Instead, such cases focus on the act itself. If someone or some entity commits a certain act—for example, producing a defective product—that person or company is responsible for the damage done, regardless of the level of care exercised or their intentions.

Examples of Tort Law

A Liability Case

In February 2016, a self-driving car made by Google crashed into a bus in Mountain View, Calif. The car sensed a group of sandbags positioned around a storm drain and swerved into another lane to avoid them, slamming into the side of a public transit bus. This was the first reported case of a self-driving car causing an accident, not just being a part of one.

According to liability tort law, drivers can seek compensation from a manufacturer for a faulty part of a car, usually an airbag or a tire. However, this liability tort now extends to self-driving cars, and Google and others in the nascent self-driving vehicle business could be found liable for the damages.1

A Negligence Case

Amy Williams filed a negligence lawsuit against Quest Diagnostics and its subsidiary Athena Diagnostics for the wrongful death of her two-year-old son, Christian Millare.

In 2007, Athena Diagnostics misclassified a mutation in Millare’s gene. The plaintiff argued that the misclassification led the child’s doctors to use the wrong treatment for his symptoms. The mutation directly resulted in his seizure and death in 2008.

In 2018, 11 years after the child’s death, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a genetic testing lab could be classified as a healthcare provider under state law.2

An Intentional Tort Case

An example of an intentional tort is the ruling between the website Gawker and pro wrestler Hulk Hogan on March 18, 2016.

Hogan was awarded $140 million in damages since it was deemed that Gawker intentionally invaded his privacy in order to obtain video evidence of a private act. source

What to Know About Tort Laws in California

In California, those who believe that they have been harmed by another person, company or government agency may pursue civil litigation. A civil case may also be referred to as a tort case, and unlike a criminal proceeding, no one will go to jail after a ruling is made in the matter. Instead, the defendant will likely be ordered to provide compensation to the plaintiff to help that person recover any financial losses incurred because of the defendant’s negligent behavior.

California Law Recognizes Three Different Types of Torts

In California, a tort may be classified as an intentional tort, a negligent tort or a strict liability case. An intentional tort takes place when the defendant engages in an act that he or she knew was wrong. Let’s say that the defendant in a personal injury case saw you walking on the side of the road. Upon seeing you, that person decided to hit you with his or her car despite knowing that doing so would be a violation of his or her duty of care.

A negligent tort occurs when a person unintentionally engages in an act that would constitute negligence on his or her behalf. Let’s say that the driver of the car that hit you did so while driving too fast for road conditions. Although that person should have known that driving above the posted speed limit was risky, there was no actual intent to cause you harm.

In a strict liability case, it doesn’t matter what the defendant’s intentions were. As long as it can be shown that another party’s actions caused you to incur a financial loss, you will likely obtain a favorable outcome in court. Strict liability laws often apply in cases involving vicious animals or defective products.

What to Know About Reckless Misconduct Cases

If a person acts in a reckless manner, he or she may face additional penalties in a civil case. Reckless activity occurs when an individual engages in acts that have a wanton disregard for a person’s life. As a general rule, it is considered to be a cross between an intentional tort and a negligent tort. However, typically, reckless behavior is seen as more severe than negligent behavior.

It’s possible for a defendant to face a reckless misconduct charge even if he or she didn’t intend to cause a specific amount of property damage or a specific type of injury. For example, a person may have acted in a reckless manner by driving 65 miles per hour through a residential street. Despite that, it doesn’t mean that the defendant intended to run you over or drive a car through your house.

How Do You Prove Negligence Occurred?

To obtain a financial award in any type of civil case, you’ll need to prove that the defendant acted in a negligent manner. To do this, you will first need to show that the defendant violated his or her duty of care in allowing your injuries to happen.

In a car accident case, you may be able to establish that by showing that he or she was driving while impaired or was operating an improperly maintained vehicle when the crash occurred. In a premises liability case, you might be able to use witness statements or security camera footage to establish that a hazard wasn’t dealt with properly.

After establishing that a duty of care was violated, you must show that the defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of your injuries. This is why it’s generally in your best interest to seek treatment immediately following any type of accident.

By doing so, you can establish a stronger link between a defendant’s actions and your injuries. Otherwise, it may be possible for that person to assert that a back injury occurred years ago at work or that your pain was caused by some other condition that you have failed to treat.

Finally, you’ll need to show that the defendant’s actions resulted in some sort of financial loss. For instance, if you went to the hospital after a car accident, you would likely be charged for services rendered. Presenting the bill that you received into evidence would generally be enough to satisfy this requirement.

What Types of Damages Might You Be Entitled To?

California tort laws allow you to collect a variety of damages based on the facts of your case. For instance, if you have to go to the hospital, you will likely be able to recover the cost of prior, current or future treatment. If you were forced to miss work, you’ll likely be able to recoup any wages that were lost, and in the event that you can’t go back to work, a settlement will likely include lost future earnings.

If you have to refurbish your home or car to make them easier to use, the defendant in your case may have to pay to make that happen. The defendant may also need to pay to repair or replace any items that were damaged or lost as a result of that person’s negligence.

Finally, you may be entitled to reimbursement for the cost of in-home care or any other costs that are somehow related to a defendant’s irresponsible behavior. In the event that your case goes to trial, it’s possible that the defendant may appeal an unfavorable jury verdict.

If that happens, interest will likely accumulate on the balance of any award that a jury says that you’re entitled to. In some cases, appeals take years to resolve, which means that the final amount that you’re paid may be significantly higher than what you were initially awarded.

Your personal injury attorney may be able to provide more information about the types of compensation that you may receive in your case. An attorney may also be able to talk more about the steps involved in calculating the size of your award.

How Long Do You Have to File a Lawsuit?

Under California tort laws, you have two years from the date of a negligent action to file a personal injury lawsuit. California law does generally toll the statute of limitations clock for a number of reasons. For instance, if you were under the age of 18 when you were hurt, you’ll typically have two years from your 18th birthday to take legal action.

If you are incapacitated, mentally deficient or incarcerated after an accident occurs, the statute of limitations tolls until your situation changes. For example, if you’re in a coma for three years after being hit in the head by the defendant in your case, you would have two years after emerging from it to file a lawsuit. Of course, this assumes that you have the mental capacity to do so on your own.

This clock may also toll if you aren’t immediately sure that you were hurt as the result of a defendant’s actions. It isn’t uncommon for symptoms of a concussion, internal bleed or other injuries to take days or weeks to present themselves. In such a scenario, you’ll be given two years from the date that a reasonable person would have figured out how they were injured.

It’s worth noting that you may have significantly less time to take legal action against a government agency. Under the California Tort Claims Act, you must generally provide up to six months advance notice before filing a lawsuit. A personal injury attorney may be able to provide more information about your rights as it relates to taking such a step.

If you are hurt for any reason through no fault of your own, it may be in your best interest to hire a personal injury attorney. source

California Tort Claims Act – How to Sue The Government

The California Tort Claims Act (CTCA) is a law enacted by the California Legislature with the intent to protect the state government from liability in certain personal injury cases. The law states that, generally, “a public entity is not liable for an injury” caused by that public entity or any of its employees. This is known as “sovereign immunity.”

However, the law has numerous exceptions that provide injury victims with a limited opportunity to bring a claim and seek monetary damages.

In most California Tort Claim Act claims, proper notice of a claim must be filed within six months of the injury or accident.

The Act allows the government to be held liable in limited circumstances. These provisions include premises liability where the government had notice of the dangerous condition, or where the government is vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee.

If you are successful in your claim against the government, you can be awarded financial compensation for your injuries. Compensatory damages in a personal injury lawsuit can include:

• Medical bills,
• Loss of income,
• Property damage, and
• Pain & suffering.

1. What is the California Tort Claims Act?

If a government agency, employee, or the government itself is responsible for your injuries, there are very specific requirements you must follow in order to file a personal injury lawsuit against the government. Under the California Tort Claims Act, you are required to give notice to the government within a set period of time or you lose your opportunity to seek money damages from the party that injured you.

However, the law also carves out certain limited exceptions that allow the State of California to face liability. For those limited exceptions, a very strict filing claim procedure is in place which must be strictly followed for an injury victim to recover damages.

1.1 What is sovereign immunity?

Sovereign immunity is a legal concept created centuries ago in England, which protected the King from any lawsuit which caused damages to others. Over the many years since that time, the concept has been adopted by every state in various forms to protect public entities from lawsuits for injuries caused by them or their employees.¹

In most states, the sovereign immunity statutes carve out specific exceptions to the law by which a plaintiff can still sue the government or another public entity. These exceptions are usually governed by a strict procedure that must be followed.

1.2 What claims are covered under the California Tort Claims Act?

Under the California Tort Claims Act, all claims for civil liability or “money damages” are covered, meaning that cases that are covered may include:

• Car accidents;
• Bus accidents;
• Burn injuries;
• Slip and fall accidents;
• Medical negligence;
• Nuisance;
• Sports injuries at school;
• Breach of contract; and
• Intentional torts, like assault & battery.

Lawsuits against teachers and school districts in California generally proceed by way of the CTCA.

1.3 What types of claims are not permitted under the California Tort Claims Act?

The Act generally does not allow claims for almost any other reason, except those above. These include:

• Injuries caused by the failure to pass a regulation, ordinance, or law;
• Injuries caused by the California National Guard;
• Injuries caused by failure to enforce a specific law;
• An injury caused by an issuance or failure to issue any permit, license, certificate, or other governmental authorization;
• Any injury caused by a failure to inspect any property which the government itself does not own;
• Injuries caused by any misrepresentation; or
• Damages as a result of reporting identifying information of convicted drug offenders to local schools.

Moreover, punitive damages are generally not allowed in a claim against the government. These types of damages are rarely awarded in a personal injury claim, and may require a showing of recklessness, fraud, or intentional harm. However, these types of damages are specifically excluded from liability under the law.

Additionally, any claim which is not “for money or damages” cannot be filed under the California Tort Claims Act.

Example: Janet is a contractor who has agreed to build a shed for a customer by the end of next week. She goes through the paperwork for the necessary building permit and submits it but the permit is denied. Janet is unable to fulfill her contract, and is sued as a result. She cannot sue the government under the CTCA for denying her permit, even though that denial was the ultimate cause of her damages.

2. When can the government be held responsible for my injuries?

Under the Act, the government can be held legally responsible for personal injury damages in certain situations. These situations include:

• The negligent acts of employees,
• The negligent acts of independent contractors,
• Premises liability for dangerous conditions on government property, and
• When damages are caused by the public entities’ failure to carry out a duty imposed by law.

The entity responsible in a California Tort Claims Act claim is generally the government entity or agency responsible for the employee, property, or carrying out a duty. The CTCA applies to state, county, and local government agencies and departments, including city or municipality agencies.

2.1 When can the government be liable for acts of its employees?

A government entity or agency is responsible for any negligent acts committed by its employees, if:

• The employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment; or
• The employee was carrying out some government function.²

If a government employee is the cause of a person’s personal injury damages, the victim should file a claim under the California Tort Claims Act against the agency or entity that employs that negligent employee. The Act does not provide for a lawsuit against the employee personally but generally only against the employer.

2.2 When can the government be liable for the acts of independent contractors?

The government may be held responsible for the negligent acts of its independent contractors when:

• The independent contractor was acting within the scope of its assignment or agreed upon duties; or
• The independent contractor was carrying out a government function for which it had authority.

The same rules apply under the Act for independent contractors as they do for employees. Again, the independent contractor may not be sued individually under the California Tort Claims Act but instead the lawsuit must be against the government itself.

2.3 When can the government be liable for failure to carry out a legal duty?

If a law imposes a particular duty upon a government entity or agency, and that entity or agency fails to fulfill that legal duty, the government can be held liable for injuries caused as a result under the California Tort Claims Act.

Example: If a government agency is responsible for ensuring that roads are kept in a safe manner, and the agency negligently fails to correct a large pothole it has known about for months, a person injured by the unsafe road condition may be able to sue the agency for damages under the Act.

Note, however, that many government officials acting in their discretionary capacity are protected by qualified immunity.

2.4. Who is responsible for accidents that happen on government property?

When the government owns or controls the property, the government may be liable for injuries caused by any hazardous condition on the property. However, premises liability claims against public entities have a different standard.

In a premises liability claim against the government, the plaintiff has to show:

1. The property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury;
2. The injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition;
3. The dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which occurred; and either:
   1. The danger was created by a negligent or wrongful act of a public employee, or
   2. The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and enough time to correct or protect against the dangerous condition.³⁴

To establish notice, the dangerous condition may have existed for a period of time and was obvious enough that the government entity should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.⁵

3. How do I file a claim under the California Tort Claims Act?

To file a claim against the State of California, a county government, or a municipal government agency, the injury victim must give notice of his or her claim.⁶ This may include filing a report or sending a letter which may suffice as notice, so long as it contains all of the necessary requirements. However, many agencies and municipalities have claim forms that individuals can fill out to provide notice of the claim.

An attorney at the Shouse Law Group can ensure you meet all of the filing requirements, including making sure you file your claim in within the appropriate time limit. Failure to properly file a claim or filing the claim too late could mean your claim will be denied.

3.1 What information does my claim have to include?

The person seeking to file a lawsuit against the government agency or entity must file a claim which includes the following information:

• The name and postal office address of the claimant.
• The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent.
• The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.
• A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.
• The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.
• The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case. ⁷

Failure to include all of the necessary information can invalidate your claim. If a proper claim is not filed within the time period set forth by law, the claim may be denied.

3.2 What is a “limited case?”

If your claim exceeds $10,000, you may not be required to indicate the amount you seek in your claim, but you are required to indicate whether the claim is a “limited civil case.” A civil case is a “limited civil case” if the plaintiff is seeking less than $25,000, not including costs and reasonable attorney fees, and the plaintiff is not asking for any of the following:

• A permanent injunction: A court order which commands the government agency or entity to or prevents it from taking the complained of action or activity;
• An action which seeks a determination of title to real property;
• Enforcement of any order under the Family Code; or
• An action for declaratory relief: A case that asks the court to state and establish the rights and other legal obligations of the parties involved, but does not actually order enforcement.

It is important to discuss your case with an experienced attorney before filing a claim. Many injury victims under-value their case or do not take into account all their damages. Even minor injuries can require follow-up care or continuing medical treatment. Not asking for enough to fully compensate you for your injuries could leave you paying out of pocket for something that wasn’t your fault.

3.3 Do I have to file a lawsuit if I filed a claim?

If you file a proper notice of claim, you may not have to immediately file a lawsuit. By filing a claim, an injured victim leaves open the option of filing the later lawsuit. However, the party may not be required to follow through with the lawsuit if the government agency agrees to pay the claim.

Example: Carlos was injured as a result of a broken staircase while in a municipal building. Carlos and his attorney file a claim with all of the necessary information and within the time limit. Later, Carlos realizes that he does not want to go through with the lawsuit. He is not required to under the law, but he kept his options open by filing his claim.

4. What are the time limits for bringing a claim?

The act sets forth very strict guidelines for filing a claim against a government entity or agency. Failure to follow these strict guidelines may result in the dismissal of any late claim. This means that an otherwise proper lawsuit for which a plaintiff could receive damages may be invalidated because it was outside of the strict, and often short, time period in which to file.

Most personal injury claims have a limited time to file a claim. However, the statute of limitations, or time allowed to file a claim against government entities is generally shorter than claims against private parties.

A notice must be filed within six months for claims that concern:

• Personal injury,
• Wrongful death,
• Damage to personal property, or
• Damage to crops.

The notice must be filed within six months of the date of the injury. In very limited circumstances, the six-month period may not begin to run until the plaintiff first discovers (or should have discovered) the injury. For example, in a medical negligence case, the victim may not be aware of an accident or injury until weeks or months later. ⁸

Claims which relate to all other causes must be brought within one year of the injury. These actions would include, but are not limited to:

• Breach of contract actions;
• Damage to real property; or
• Declaratory judgment actions not subject to a six-month limitation.

It is critical that the claim is filed within the appropriate time limit to protect the lawsuit from being dismissed.

4.1 Can I file a late claim?

Late claims without a qualifying reason will generally be denied. However, a late claim may sometimes be accepted when the claimant files their claim along with an “application for late filing.” There are four valid reasons for being late in filing a claim:

1. Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
2. Minority (claimant was a minor under the age of 18 during the entire six-month period);
3. Mental or physical incapacity; or
4. Death of a claimant.⁹

Filing a late claim is subject to further strict requirements, but with the help of an experienced personal injury attorney your chances of successfully filing your late claim may increase significantly.

5. What happens after I file my claim?

Once your claim is filed, the public agency generally has 45 days in which to respond or take action. This time is extended somewhat depending on if the claim is mailed and from where the claim is mailed.

There are 5 possible outcomes after a claim is filed:

1. The entity fails to respond within the appropriate time period. This means that the claim is deemed rejected.
2. The entity may approve the claim in whole or in part. The entity may offer a compromise to the claim, which may constitute a settlement of the whole case.
3. The entity may reject the claim.
4. The entity may state the claim does not have sufficient information. The claim can be amended within the time period set by law to fill in that missing information.
5. The entity may return the claim for being untimely.

6. What do I do if my claim is rejected?

If the claim is rejected, a claimant can file suit in state court against the government. To do so, a claimant files a petition with the Superior Court asking to be relieved from the claims requirement. ¹⁰

If the original claim was rejected in whole or in part by the government entity by some form of notice from that entity, the claimant has only six months to file the petition with the court.

If the original claim was rejected because the governmental entity failed to respond to the notice, the time in which to file the petition is two years from the date of rejection.

6.1 What if the court grants my petition?

If the court grants the petition to proceed without the claim requirement, the claimant must file his or her lawsuit within 30 days. Failure to file suit within this time period can result in the inability to ever file the suit again. ¹¹

6.2 What if the court denies my petition?

If the court denies the petition to proceed without the claim requirement, the order denying the petition may be appealed. Your California personal injury attorney can file the appeal on your behalf. If successful on appeal, you will be able to file your case against the government. source

Legal References

Helpful articles involving Torts

How to File a complaint of Police or Government Misconduct?

$uing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

California Attorney Misconduct Law – Suing your attorney

“Civility” Oath Rule Adopted by Supreme Court

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

Section 1983 Lawsuit   How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

Offsite Help 

• Civil Rights
• File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation site
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You may need assistance obtaining police reports, incident reports, bodycam footage etc..

Retrieving Police Data, their police line recordings, and bodycam Footage SB1421 form & learn here

Tort Claims Form File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death

• Federal –  Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

• California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

• Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

Can you imagine this SCUM BAG CRIMINAL DA allowed a MURDERER SNITCH (MAN GETTING SOMETHING IN HIS FAVOR TO STAB A MAN ON HIS SIDE IN THE BACK) TO GET A DEAL IF HE RATS OUT SOME MORE SHIT BAGS LIKE HIMSELF (MURDERER SNITCH).  Our tax dollars at work letting one scum off softly to catch another scum all while being scum yourself! wow, you are a piece of work!

Orange County District Attorney Todd Spitzer’s Office is Dirty and Corrupt from the TOP DOWN, the good one’s that work there have to fear their own boss! PURE EVIL SCUM SOCIOPATH TODD SPITZER

Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division announced today, based upon a thorough investigation focused on custodial informant activity from 2007 through 2016, that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department operated a custodial informant program that systematically violated criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

Specifically, the department found reasonable cause to believe that Orange County prosecutors and Sheriff deputies violated the Sixth Amendment by using jailhouse informants to elicit incriminating statements from people who had been arrested, after those individuals had been charged with a crime. The department also found that Orange County prosecutors violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence about those custodial informants to criminal defendants. The department believes that OCDA and OCSD stopped using informants as agents of law enforcement to obtain statements from charged defendants in the Orange County Jail in 2016.

The Justice Department provided a comprehensive, written report of its investigative findings to the Orange County District Attorney and Sheriff. The report explicitly acknowledges the reforms that the District Attorney’s Office and the Sheriff’s Department have implemented already, and identifies the additional remedial measures that the department believes are necessary to fully address its findings.

“All persons who are accused of a crime are guaranteed basic constitutional protections that are intended to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings and due process of law,” said Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke. “Prosecutors and law enforcement officers have an obligation to uphold these rights in their fight against crime and in their pursuit of justice, including in the way that they use custodial informants against criminal defendants. The failure to protect these basic constitutional guarantees not only deprives individual defendants of their rights, it undermines the public’s confidence in the fundamental fairness of criminal justice systems across the county.”

The evidence uncovered by the department reveals that custodial informants in the Orange County Jail system acted as agents of law enforcement to elicit incriminating statements from defendants represented by counsel, and that for years Orange County Sheriff deputies maintained and concealed systems to track, manage, and reward those custodial informants. The evidence also reveals that Orange County prosecutors failed to seek out and disclose exculpatory information regarding custodial informants to defense counsel.

The department opened this investigation in 2016. The department reviewed thousands of pages of documents, conducted numerous site visits and interviewed dozens of witnesses, including Orange County prosecutors. The department also monitored developments in criminal cases, including those that culminated recently. Orange County officials cooperated throughout the investigation.

The Special Litigation Section of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division in Washington, D.C., conducted the investigation pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which prohibits state and local governments from engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives individuals of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law. The statute allows the department to remedy such misconduct through civil litigation.

Click Here to read more about this corrupt criminal District Attorney Todd Spitzer’s Office by the ACLU

• IN (JUSTICE) in ORANGE COUNTY A Case for Change and Accountability ACLU REPORT or Here from GoodShepherdMedia.net

• IN (JUSTICE) in ORANGE COUNTY A Case for Change and Accountability ACLU CASE STUDY SUMMARY or Here from GoodShepherdMedia.net

New Orange County DA Concedes Evidence Disclosure Disaster

Orange County prosecutors have called Assistant Public Defender Scott Sanders crazy, paranoid, unhinged and a conspiracy theorist, leading the local daily newspaper several years ago to label him “polarizing.” Thin-skinned defense attorneys might have pouted or seethed, but the terms make Sanders chuckle. In addition to being a supreme multitasker, he possesses a self-deprecating sense of humor. 

But there’s one undeniable truth that emerged from the infamous jailhouse-informant scandal he exposed: Nobody creates more angst and anger inside 401, shorthand for the Santa Ana office building that houses the Orange County district attorney’s office (OCDA), than him. 

It’s understandable that former DA Tony Rackauckas and his executive team would loathe Sanders. His revelations led to their historic and embarrassing recusal from a death-penalty case stemming from the county’sworst mass shooting. His work also upended at least 20 felony cases tainted by law-enforcement corruption during Rackauckas’ final three years in office.  

Freshman DA Todd Spitzer won last November by campaigning on a reform platform that targeted his predecessor’s ethical woes. Yet, when Spitzer took over eight months ago, he kept in power many of the Rackauckas aides who were directly involved in the cheating or tried to cover it up. He has also maintained OCDA’s courthouse campaign against Sanders. 

Instead of distancing itself from badged crooks, the new administration has been, like the previous one, working to thwart the public defender’s ability to represent his clients as well as expose additional scandals. 

If anything, those efforts have become more intense and bizarre. 

For example, in January, after Spitzer was sworn in, Deputy DA Andrew Bugman defended the hiding of impeachment material pertaining to snitch-scandal-tainted deputies at least 146 times. The upshot is that officers involved in that cheating have been taking the witness stand, claiming to tell the truth about arrests and relying on the credibility that comes with their uniforms. But because of the government’s refusal to surrender records, defense lawyers’ ability to challenge their honesty is hamstrung. To Sanders, OCDA has pretended to meet its discovery obligations.

But Bugman threw a series of shots back: Sanders could only “speculate”that the impeachment records would be helpful; that he was conducting a legally irrelevant “fishing expedition”; and that his discovery demands weren’t to benefit his client in People v. Oscar Garcia, but rather were evidence he’d betrayed attorney-client trust in hopes of carrying out his “personal agenda.” 

Bugman didn’t exactly define that agenda, but he finds it suspicious, if not alarming, that Sanders chose to represent indigent clients in West Court near Little Saigon. He claims it is “telling” that the public defender took such work in cases involving former Special Handling Unit deputies who ran illegal operations and either hid exculpatory records or maintained a code of silence about the existence of such evidence. The prosecutor also implied that Sanders had cheated Garcia, noting this defendant “is Spanish speaking” but apparently unaware the public defender is fluent in Spanish. 

Sanders complained to Superior Court Judge James Rogan that OCDA was faking its Brady obligations to surrender exculpatory evidence as proved by the aforementioned 146 cases. In response, Bugman assured the judge that his office was honoring its discovery duties. Rogan, a former prosecutor, then agreed to block the public defender’s related subpoena—but issued a caution. “My assumption and my expectation of Mr. Bugman would be that if indeed following this hearing, he found that [his assertions were] anything other than what he represented to the court, he would have an immediate obligation to report that to the court and to [defense] counsel,” the judge stated. 

But Rogan didn’t know and Bugman didn’t share the contents of a bombshell December 2018 OCDA letter to then-Sheriff Sandra Hutchens. The correspondence from Rackauckas outlined what can accurately be called a ruse prosecutors concocted. Two years earlier, the sheriff’s department had asked deputies if they personally possessed Special Handling Unit or Classification Unit records. When they answered that sham question in the negative, Rackauckas claimed that was all the proof he needed to keep the deputies off Brady disclosure lists for exhibiting dishonesty, regardless of any offending conduct.

“I understand the importance of this decision and its impact on the criminal-justice system, the rule of law, future cases and the lives of the [deputies] involved,” wrote Rackauckas, whom the California Court of Appeal blasted in 2016 for habitually protecting dirty cops who’d helped his office wins trials.

Release of that secret letter months after Rogan’s ruling in favor of OCDA left Sanders fuming. “The DA’s office knew it had been hit hard by our allegations that they were not performing meaningful Brady analysis on any of the deputies involved in the snitch scandal,” he said. “Yet Spitzer and Bugman stayed silent until after I lost the motion. That Rackauckas letter proves we were 100 percent right. They created a phony email test as a coverup that would allow them to claim, ‘We did Brady’ and, ‘There’s no material you should get.’ None of this passes constitutional muster.” 

R. SCOTT MOXLEY

Events turned downright nutty this month in Sanders’ People v. Mohamed Sayem, a case in which deputies last year pummeled the unarmed defendant after catching him intoxicated and sleeping in his parked vehicle. OCDA won a protective order in January from Superior Court Judge Kevin Haskins, a former prosecutor, that sealed a 2009 PowerPoint presentation the agency used to prosecute Christopher Hibbs, a deputy who’d fired his Taser multiple times at a handcuffed, restrained and seated suspect. With a deadlocked vote, a Fullerton jury refused to hold Hibbs accountable; he won promotion to sergeant and found himself the ranking officer at the Sayem scene, where deputies worked to fashion a justification for that beating. 

Deputy DA Matt Plunkett told Haskins there “is a compelling governmental interest” to keep the PowerPoint away from public consumption, a move he claimed would protect the integrity of the criminal-justice system by not undermining Hibbs’ credibility. Plunkett also accused Sanders of violating the order by conducting a Google search and finding the presentation available online. The PowerPoint must remain “confidential,” Plunkett argued.

But the PowerPoint in question has been in my possession for a decade. It was given to me by the OCDA. There’s even a photograph on Google showing Rackauckas standing in front of the presentation about Hibbs’ excessive use of force.

My May 14, 2009, column stated: “[A ranking DA] spent 45 minutes (he could have spent twice as long) meticulously detailing in a PowerPoint presentation how deputies had either lied under oath during the trial or developed sudden, severe cases of amnesia about what they’d told the grand jury that indicted Hibbs.”

Now, ironically, Spitzer is working to protect that deputy.

On the other hand, the DA is finally admitting that Rackauckas and the OCDA office used a test for determining whether to disclose evidence of deputy misconduct which was inconsistent with Brady.

“I do not believe that he used an appropriate analysis,” the DA told OC Weekly. “He clearly does not understand the legal test for adding a sworn peace officer to the Brady list where the bar is intentionally low and for good reason. . . .  I am working to restore the faith in this office and fighting to reverse the horrific damage Rackauckas did to our reputation.”

Spitzer, however, declined to answer two follow-up questions: Given your statement and that you’ve acknowledged you had Rackauckas’ faulty Brady analysis letter shortly after taking office, why wasn’t it made a part of, for example, in Garcia, and other cases where OCDA staff made disingenuous representations that the office had conducted proper reviews on the topic? And, Did OCDA managers under Rackauckas use the single-email test or did they use an appropriate Brady analysis about whether there should be disclosure pertaining to dishonest deputies?

“It’s an incredible moment,” reacted Sanders. “Spitzer admitted both that the OCDA didn’t honor its discovery obligations for years when it came to jail deputies and that it also created a phony test designed to withhold evidence. Hundreds of cases need real review now. Those prosecutors involved in the misconduct should be held accountable and Spitzer’s failure to answer your second set of questions also speaks volumes.”

The DA has placed four deputies’ names on the Brady list, but the public defender argues the move was almost meaningless because two of them have left the department and one has been on administrative leave for years.

It’s obvious Spitzer faces unyielding forces—inside and outside of his office—that are at odds with the public trust. There’s no doubt he wants to win the backing of the dirty-deputy protecting Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs in the next election. But to manage OCDA wisely, he has a duty to display genuine independence from that union and the sheriff’s department when it comes to officer corruption. So far—as exhibited by the Brady disaster plus the maneuvers of Bugman and Plunkett—he’s failing. 

R. SCOTT MOXLEY

CNN-featured investigative reporter R. Scott Moxley has won Journalist of the Year honors at the Los Angeles Press Club; been named Distinguished Journalist of the Year by the LA Society of Professional Journalists; obtained one of the last exclusive prison interviews with Charles Manson disciple Susan Atkins; won inclusion in Jeffrey Toobin’s The Best American Crime Reporting for his coverage of a white supremacist’s senseless murder of a beloved Vietnamese refugee; launched multi-year probes that resulted in the FBI arrests and convictions of the top three ranking members of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department; and gained praise from New York Times Magazine writers for his “herculean job” exposing entrenched Southern California law enforcement corruption.

CITED FROM https://www.ocweekly.com/todd-spitzer-corruption-deputies/

CHAPTER ONE

For bored cops seeking action, there’s probably no easier place to score than the Southern California motels where petty drug dealers rendezvous with users. At 12:45 p.m. on Feb. 15, 2016, that sweet spot for Deputy Nicholas Petropulos of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) was the parking lot at the Extended Stay of America in Yorba Linda near the 91 freeway. Though a fellow officer assigned to investigate events of that afternoon would later falsify an official record to help justify Petropulos’ deadly presence, the deputy had received no call for help.

First as a cop in Brea, and then, beginning in 2012, with the OCSD, Petropulos knew that Extended Stay, located a few miles from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, was his proverbial shooting-fish-in-a-barrel site. During his career, he’d conducted approximately 100 investigations there, usually involving minor transactions and yielding an average of 20 arrests per year.

On that February afternoon, Petropulos returned to his favorite hunting ground and, sure enough, observed what he considered highly suspicious activity: Two people talking to each other in the parking lot. Brandon Lee Witt was sitting in the driver’s seat of a gold, four-door Toyota Avalon, while Manuel Drought stood nearby. Neither man screamed, ran or brandished a weapon. But Petropulos’ suspicion intensified when the men made what he considered another eyebrow-raising move: They dared to look at him as he slowly drove his patrol vehicle by while staring at them.

In the end, that reasoning wasn’t necessary to explore what horrific crimes could be under way, as Petropulos had found his legal hook for escalation. Witt’s car didn’t show a front license plate, a California Vehicle Code infraction. The deputy drove out of view, stopped and waited. When nothing more happened, he returned to the scene. “I decided to investigate,” he eventually explained under oath.

After parking the OCSD cruiser at an angle that allowed his patrol video-recording system (PVS) to catch the upcoming encounter’s audio, but thwarted it from capturing meaningful video, Petropulos approached Witt, who’d remained in his car. The deputy asked, “What’s going on, man?”

Witt replied, “I’m in the middle of moving.”

“Do you have anything in the car illegal?”

“No.”

“Anything I need to worry about?”

“Not at all.”

“Is this your car?”

“Yeah. . . . Did I do anything wrong?”

“You had no front plate on the car when I looked at it earlier.”

“It’s right here.”

Having been previously victimized by a person impersonating an officer, Witt was frightened to obey commands to exit the car. He asked the deputy, “Can I verify your identity?” And, “Can I at least call your sergeant?”

Petropulos wasn’t happy with the questions. “You’re lucky I haven’t ripped you right out.”

Voicing concern that Witt might be using his right hand to reach for a weapon, the deputy began grabbing him.

“Hey, there’s no need to touch me like that,” Witt said.

“Dude, I swear to God,” Petropulos replied.

“Look, stop,” Witt said. “Why are you assaulting me?”

Claiming he wasn’t getting full compliance with his commands, the deputy launched a series of lethal threats, saying, “I’m going to shoot you!”

Witt pleaded, “No.”

“I’m going to fucking shoot you,” said Petropulos, who would unholster his department-issued Glock handgun.

“I’m scared,” said Witt. “I’m scared.”

The banter continued with Witt alarmed by the deputy’s aggression and the deputy frustrated that his suspect allegedly wouldn’t keep his right hand in plain sight.

“You’re going to get shot, motherfucker!” Petropulos declared.

“No, please don’t!” Witt cried. “Please!”

Neither the deputy nor Brian Callagy, a fellow cop who arrived as backup, saw the suspect holding a knife or a gun or even the appearance of a weapon anywhere inside the car. If anyone should have been in fear for his life, it was the 39-year-old Witt, who’d consumed methamphetamines that day. Unarmed and surrounded by two deputies, he posed no immediate threat.

Petropulos said, “Fuck it,” placed the Glock at point-blank range on Witt’s left shoulder and fired.

There was a moan, and then nothing. According to an autopsy, the 40 mm bullet ripped through the victim’s arm, chest, ribs, heart, diaphragm and liver. Witt’s right foot had hit the gas in reaction, causing the Toyota to race over a curb and crash into a concrete drainage ditch. Though still-spinning tires produced smoke, there was no movement inside the vehicle. Bleeding profusely and unconscious, a dying Witt was left unattended for a period of time because, the deputy claims, he still believed Witt might reach for a gun.

In the aftermath, Petropulos—who makes more than $255,000 annually in public funds—told a tale at odds with the audio recording and probability. According to the deputy, a seated and miraculously strong Witt used his left hand to “pull parts of my shoulder and upper body through the window of the vehicle” while his right hand extended in the opposite direction searching for that nonexistent gun.

Petropulos hoped that people would believe Witt tried to drive away with him hanging halfway out the Toyota’s window. He also declared himself the victim of a felony assault by an “aggressive” suspect. He noted he’d suffered a light bruise and scratch on his right arm. It was enough to make him “fear for my life,” the deputy said.

Employment of that well-worn catchphrase, whether genuine or not, often acts as a legal prophylactic for police seeking immunity from courthouse accountability, but additional chapters in the Witt saga were yet to be written.

CHAPTER TWO

Chicago police were on the lookout in October 2014 for an auto burglary suspect when they spotted 17-year-old Laquan McDonald acting bizarrely on the street while holding a 3-inch knife.

McDonald, who was high on PCP, disobeyed commands to drop the knife. But nine of the 10 cops on the scene saw no reason to gun him down.

Officer Jason Van Dyke, however, wasn’t in any mood for de-escalation. He waited all of six seconds after exiting his patrol vehicle to shoot McDonald in the back, driving him to the pavement. With the suspect still down, the cop emptied the rest of his magazine, firing 15 more bullets from his 9 mm semi-automatic handgun. An autopsy determined McDonald had been shot in his chest, neck, head, both arms, right leg and back.

The follow-up investigation by the Chicago Police Department ruled the homicide “justified” after rewriting history. The department accepted Van Dyke’s story that McDonald had pointed the knife blade and “lunged” at him. That tale bolstered the cop’s report that he’d been scared and feared for his life.

Months later, police weren’t able to keep wraps on all the videos of the shooting, footage that contradicted Van Dyke’s version of events. The knife in McDonald’s hand had been folded when found at the scene, and he’d never lunged. There was also evidence that cops destroyed valuable dash-cam videos and “intentionally damaged” audio recordings of the killing.

Disgusted by the incident, community groups hosted numerous emotional street protests. The City Council gave McDonald’s family a $5 million settlement and hoped there would be no further embarrassing revelations of police corruption tied to the case that a civil trial might uncover. Van Dyke’s prosecutor told a jury that none of the shots was necessary. The panel convicted Van Dyke for murder and 16 counts of battery for each fired bullet. During a January sentencing hearing, he received a prison punishment of six years and nine months.

But there’s a fascinating twist: Not everybody agreed on who’d been victimized. Embedded among cop ranks were people in denial. A cop-union official told a reporter the jury was “duped” and had “stabbed” police “in the back.” Another said, “The Chicago Police Department is standing with an officer we think acted as an officer.”

It’s not just in Chicago where police routinely protect their own scoundrels with lies, doctored evidence and media campaigns.

CHAPTER THREE

“Each deputy must be entrusted with well-reasoned discretion in determining the appropriate use of force in each incident,” OCSD policy states. “The use of force to accomplish unlawful objectives is prohibited. The Department will not tolerate excessive and/or punitive force.”

Those statements are noble theories—not reality. Excessive force is often celebrated in the department run by Sheriff Donald Barnes. Beating someone unconscious or taking a life can be a precursor to career advancement and bigger salaries.

Deputy Michael Devitt bolstered his résumé about 30 minutes before sunrise on Aug. 19, 2018, when he approached a passed-out man who was slumped over in the driver’s seat of a black Jeep. Mohamed Sayem had been out drinking the night before and decided to sleep off his insobriety in the parking lot of a pool hall and bar. Devitt’s verbal efforts didn’t wake Sayem, so the deputy opened the car door, removed the key from the ignition and began shaking the suspect, who was clearly inebriated. Asked for identification, a mumbling Sayem handed the officer his Bic lighter.

To be fair, there’s no doubt Devitt and his colleague on the scene, Eric Ota, had a duty to investigate the situation. But after telling Sayem to stay in the Jeep, Devitt began grabbing the suspect, who recoiled and said there was no reason for the aggression. “Don’t touch me like that,” Sayem said.

The deputy then yanked the wobbly suspect out of the vehicle, punched him in the stomach and violently slammed his fist into the man’s face six times. The third blow knocked Sayem unconscious. Ota then helped Devitt throw Sayem face-down to the pavement before handcuffing the man. Sayem regained consciousness and asked if they were going to shoot him.

“[I’d] like to,” said Ota.

Four minutes later, with the sun on the verge of rising, OCSD Sergeant Christopher Hibbs arrived and Devitt explained events. He said he’d grabbed an uncooperative Sayem and yanked him out of the Jeep “to control him.” He’d “punched him probably four times on the right side of his face” because Sayem was “basically standing over me now, and he is way taller than I am,” according to an audio recording.

He added that the suspect tried to “bear hug” him, though dash-cam video shows Sayem’s right hand clutching the steering wheel until he was punched unconscious.

Two other deputies arrived, Blake Blaney and Brant Lewis, and all five officers huddled around the hood of Devitt’s patrol vehicle. The topic of their conversation? Recent beatings of suspects. At one point, Blaney said, “That was a good fight!”

Lewis boasted, “I got in another good one last week.”

Moments later, the deputies realized that Hibbs’ body mic was still on. Lewis walked over to his superior officer and turned it off; the chatting resumed.

For a deputy trying to talk his way out of an excessive-force case, Hibbs was the ideal boss. In September 2007, near the Anaheim-Stanton border, he’d grown angry with Ignacio Lares, a suspect who refused to give his real name. Though Lares was handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car without leg room, Hibbs twice fired his Taser weapon. To justify his violence, he claimed he’d felt physically threatened and in danger. But prosecutors believed it was a classic case of excessive force and charged him after securing damning testimony from five other officers—Trent Hoffman, Robert Long, Bryan Thomas, Rob Gunzel and James Wicks—who’d witnessed the tasing. OCSD management, including then-Sheriff Sandra Hutchens, and the deputies’ union protested the Hibbs case as unfair.

At the Fullerton trial, which I covered, each of the law-enforcement witnesses diverted from their grand-jury testimony by claiming severe memory loss. Dozens and dozens of times, they testified, “I don’t recall” or, “I don’t remember.” An elderly, male-dominated jury then voted 11 to 1 for acquittal. In fact, three of the jurors told me afterward that Hibbs should have shot Lares. Disgusted prosecutors said they’d witnessed the police “code of silence” in action.

A bit more than a decade later, Hibbs heard Devitt’s first oral explanation for the attack on Sayem. In a newer version written when all the deputies had huddled at the scene and had turned off their mics, he embellished the danger he faced with acts that are not recorded on dash-cam video. Now, Sayem supposedly grabbed his utility vest and refused to let go, the implication being that the suspect was trying to grab a weapon. “I believed Sayem was going to continue to try to physically assault me,” he wrote to justify the beating.

Memory loss had aided Hibbs in his own excessive-force case. With Devitt’s altered tale on his desk, perhaps he thought he’d extend the same courtesy he’d received. He ignored the discrepancies and signed the official report as legitimate.

CHAPTER FOUR

It’s standard practice for deputies to conduct surveillance on a property long before a planned raid. But that’s not what happened at 6:30 on an April 2003 morning in North Orange County. About a dozen gun-pointing OCSD gang and narcotics deputies broke down the front door of Roberto “Pino” Peralez’s tiny 88-year-old home. If they’d followed procedure, they would have known the 69-year-old heroin addict had already left to comply with a court-ordered daily dose of methadone at a Stanton community clinic.

Pissed that he’d missed his target, Deputy Joe Balicki raced to the clinic in an unmarked vehicle and found Peralez driving his decades-old burgundy GMC Safari van toward him. The addict was on his way home, unaware of the raid.

But drug use had taken its toll. Peralez was a fragile figure at 5-foot-7 with bad eyes and bad hearing, according to his daughter.

Balicki jumped in front of the slow-moving, dilapidated van and pointed a 9 mm Sig Sauer handgun at Peralez. Seconds later, three bullets pierced the windshield and destroyed the unarmed man’s heart. He died instantly.

An exhilarated (some thought cocky) Balicki told fellow officers that he’d felt his life had been in danger. He then drove to a nearby McDonald’s for breakfast and to wait for the OCSD public-relations unit to spin its magic. It worked, at least in the Los Angeles Times, which published the headline “Driver, 69, Shot Dead as He Tries to Ram Deputies.”

This killer was never held accountable in either criminal or civil court. In fact, Balicki took delight in ending Peralez’s life. To celebrate his feat, the sniper-trained deputy placed a trophy of sorts on his OCSD desk: an enlarged photograph of the three tight bullet holes in the victim’s windshield.

CHAPTER FIVE

The unexpected, unnecessary death of Witt, a Garden Grove native, left his relatives in shock. The 6-foot-1, 165-pound Witt—who’d struggled with drug addiction, according to his Vietnamese American ex-girlfriend—loved to travel with friends and family. At a church memorial service, his relatively short life was celebrated.

Gary Witt and Kathy Craig, Witt’s separated parents, hired Scott D. Hughes of Newport Beach and Dale K. Galipo of Woodland Hills to represent them in a federal wrongful-death lawsuit against OCSD and Petropulos. Hughes and Galipo reported that deputies had punched and kicked Witt’s face and head after pulling his dying body from the crashed Toyota.

“Witt never attempted to punch, kick or verbally threaten anyone,” the attorneys told U.S. District Court Judge Cormac J. Carney in their March 2017 complaint. “He was unarmed and posed no imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to either Petropulos or any other person [throughout the incident]. . . . There was no objectively reasonable justification for [the deputy] to resort to the tactics that he did.”

Lawyers privately retained at taxpayer expense by the County of Orange on behalf of the defendants spent months trying to kill the lawsuit before it could reach a jury. They claimed the parents didn’t technically qualify for the right to sue. They sought immunity from accountability for Petropulos because he is a cop. They argued it had been a righteous killing, and therefore, a jury had no facts to consider opposite of their stance. They battled against the plaintiffs’ right to call a police expert who would testify the deputy’s conduct had been unprofessional. They even demanded that a future jury never learn that Witt had been unarmed.

When Carney rejected their points as meritless, the county’s Board of Supervisors appealed to the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. But they lost there, too. In May, a jury determined that Petropulos used excessive force, violated Witt’s constitutional rights and acted with “malice” in the killing. They awarded the parents $3.4 million.

CHAPTER SIX

When it comes to the daily protection of deputies caught in ethical messes, the job falls to Orange County’s County Counsel (OCCC). For example, in OCSD’s notorious jailhouse-informant scandal, the OCCC helped deputies disobey judicially demanded records that assisted in illustrating how they ran unconstitutional scams, hid or destroyed embarrassing evidence, and repeatedly committed perjury. At the height of the scandal in mid-2017, Catherine Irons, a then-retired lieutenant, testified that OCCC and OCSD secretly agreed to withhold key informant records.

In the Sayem case, the OCCC assigned Kayla Watson the task of shielding Devitt, Ota and Hibbs from accountability. Watson told Judge Kevin Haskins and Sayem defense attorney, Assistant Public Defender Scott Sanders, a lie at a pretrial hearing in December; she claimed that Hibbs had written only one report on the case and that the defense had already received it.

After an in-camera session between only Haskins, Watson and OCSD sergeant Anthony Patella, the judge emerged and announced he saw nothing the defense was entitled to receive. A surprised Sanders asked if he’d seen any use-of-force documents. Haskins said the sheriff’s department had surrendered no such evidence.

About a week later, Watson reappeared in court. She conceded Hibbs had written a six-page use-of-force report and that she had known of its existence, but that the sheriff’s department didn’t want it released, even though the defense was entitled to see it. Sanders saw multiple reasons why the document had been hidden; it shows that Hibbs omitted Devitt’s first unhelpful explanation for the beating, and it also documented he’d obtained and reviewed Ota’s dash cam to reach his conclusions.

But that’s a huge problem for Watson and OCSD. They had failed to surrender Ota’s dash-cam video. When confronted by Sanders, Watson said there is no Ota footage. Haskins then forced Hibbs to sign a declaration backing up that assertion. The sergeant claimed he’d erroneously written he’d watched the video when he hadn’t because it doesn’t exist.

The Ota audio from the dash cam is, as department officials surely know, crucial. It would cover an 11-minute gap at the scene when Devitt revised his story while surrounded by the other four deputies. “Hibbs helped Devitt to conceal the truth about his assault on [Sayem],” said Sanders, who plans to press for more honest disclosures at a hearing this month. “The charge of felony resisting an officer against my client should have been dismissed long ago.”

CHAPTER SEVEN

The brutal September 2015 restaurant/bar murder of college student Shayan Mazroei by Craig Tanber shocked Laguna Niguel, where homicides are rare. The killing also set off a series of scandals. Did Tanber, once a member of the white-supremacist, criminal street gang Public Enemy Number One Death Squad (PEN1), commit a hate crime, as the victim’s family believes? Causing public protests, prosecutors declined to pursue that angle, but they found themselves in a nightmare as they watched OCSD deputies botch another simple case with stunning unprofessionalism.

When asked how he’d helped capture Tanber at a Garden Grove motel after days on the run, deputy Victor Valdez oddly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during a grand jury hearing. Valdez had given $300 during the manhunt to his confidential informant, Adriean Vasquez, the mother of Tanber’s son, and asked her to lure the wanted man to her motel room for an ambush. Vasquez is the daughter of Gina Peterson, who has ties to The Real Housewives of Orange County and once dated Dennis Rodman, the unofficial U.S. ambassador to North Korea and a legendary basketball player. 

Under oath, Valdez refused to say whether he’d conducted an illegal operation against Tanber on the grounds that his answer might incriminate him. Deputy Public Defender Alisha Montoro, who represents the accused killer, believes the evidence shows Valdez had a—politely put—romantic history with Vasquez and ordered her to buy heroin and inject a massive dose into Tanber’s arm as a way to subdue him in her motel room that was surrounded by surveillance conducted by OCSD’s North Gang Enforcement Team (NGET), a cowboy crew that enjoyed calling itself the “Jumpout Boys.” (These boys liked to chat amongst themselves about blowjobs, pornography, fornication and partying with female informants while on duty, according to court records.) Once officers had the handcuffed fugitive in their patrol vehicle, they launched an unconstitutional recorded interrogation despite him being exceptionally high. 

That pretrial murder case is still playing out inside Orange County’s Central Courtroom, but prosecutorial inspections into the conduct of Valdez, who’d erased his phone upon learning he was under investigation, and his partner, Phil Avalos, uncovered not only their cozy, personal relationships with Vasquez, who said OCSD gave her heroin as a snitch reward in addition to cash for squealing on her narcotics-trafficking pals, but also other highly suspicious activities.

This week, Montoro tried to ask Valdez, who is currently assigned to patrol Mission Viejo, questions about his conduct in Tanber, but he again invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. She then turned to Avalos, who’d become Vasquez’s “handler” after Valdez left the unit that focuses on Stanton area gangs such as Crow Village. Avalos conceded on the witness stand that he’d sent Vasquez—a heroin addict who called him “hon” and supplied him with breast pics—advance notice that undercover agents were snooping around her motel, looking to make drug arrests. He had to admit that fact because Montoro found proof in text messages. Avalos, who wears the best poker face I’ve ever seen, insisted he had been “joking.”

But this 17-year deputy and onetime high-school resources cop, falsified official crime reports on at least four occasions. In each case, he claimed he’d placed confiscated weapons, drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine or cocaine into the department’s evidence locker when he hadn’t. There’s no dispute. Asked by Montoro if he falsified reports, Avalos answered, “Correct.”

“I did not know I lost it until it was brought to my attention,” he testified. “It is by accident [I’d failed to book that evidence].”

Pressed by Montoro, the deputy admitted it is “possible” he placed the missing evidence with the wrong defendants, but he wouldn’t know how to discover who he might have smeared. 

During an June 5 hearing, Vasquez testified that deputy Valdez demanded she give him photographs of her vagina and that once, with Avalos standing watch outside the patrol vehicle, he angrily told her he wanted to “face fuck her.”

CHAPTER EIGHT

After the OCSD deputies’ chicanery or uses of force when facing imaginary threats, they suffered the following fates: Petropulos won “deputy of the year” honors; Barnes awarded Devitt a coveted assignment craved by his 2,000 sworn colleagues and, in recent weeks, promoted report-falsifier Avalos to sergeant; Hibbs also landed a pay raise and sergeant’s job; Valdez kept his job and Balicki rose high through the ranks. He now works as a commander on Barnes’ executive staff, the one lamely asserting that anyone who questions the department’s lack of ethics is “anti-law enforcement.”

R. SCOTT MOXLEY

CNN-featured investigative reporter R. Scott Moxley has won Journalist of the Year honors at the Los Angeles Press Club; been named Distinguished Journalist of the Year by the LA Society of Professional Journalists; obtained one of the last exclusive prison interviews with Charles Manson disciple Susan Atkins; won inclusion in Jeffrey Toobin’s The Best American Crime Reporting for his coverage of a white supremacist’s senseless murder of a beloved Vietnamese refugee; launched multi-year probes that resulted in the FBI arrests and convictions of the top three ranking members of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department; and gained praise from New York Times Magazine writers for his “herculean job” exposing entrenched Southern California law enforcement corruption.

cited from https://www.ocweekly.com/don-barnes-orange-county-sheriff/

HUNTINGTON BEACH – Yesterday, the ACLU of Southern and Northern California published a comprehensive report titled “IN(JUSTICE) in ORANGE COUNTY: A Case for Change and Accountability.” The report studied the practices of the Orange County District Attorney’s Office finding a complete lack of transparency, severe racial disparities, absent police accountability, and the continued prioritization of low-level charges. A summary of the report can be found here.

“At a time when homicides have reached a 22-year high, hate crimes are skyrocketing, and other violent crimes are up double digits, DA Spitzer continues to prioritize low-level offenses that increase recidivism and lead to stark racial disparities. The racial disparities are especially concerning considering Spitzer’s record of racism including making unsolicited, derogatory comments about Black people when discussing high-profile cases with colleagues. Spitzer’s racism undermines public trust in our criminal justice system which reduces the likelihood that crimes will be reported to law enforcement. That presents a danger to us all.”

While Todd Spitzer ran on ending the “win-at-all-costs mentality” and ensuring the fair administration of justice, the ACLU report further found that, “All available evidence suggests that the office’s policies and practices have not shifted substantially under the current OCDA.” Furthermore, in contradiction to his campaign promises to clean up the practices that led to the informant scandal, DA Spitzer’s recent “cover up” of his racist remarks showcase his inability to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by the U.S. Constitution.

• IN (JUSTICE) in ORANGE COUNTY A Case for Change and Accountability ACLU REPORT or Here from GoodShepherdMedia.net

• IN (JUSTICE) in ORANGE COUNTY A Case for Change and Accountability ACLU CASE STUDY SUMMARY or Here from GoodShepherdMedia.net

Justice Department Finds Civil Rights Violations by OCDA and Sheriff’s Department – Click Here to learn more

• Information specific to the Civil Rights Division’s Police Reform Work can be found here:

  Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work – 1994-Present: https://www.justice.gov. or off of our site here

• Attachment(s): https://www.justice.gov/ or here from out site here