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		<title>Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &#038; Emotional Distress Cases</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &#38; Emotional Distress Cases Anti-SLAPP statutes are laws intended to curb – and, often, penalize – the filing of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or a “SLAPP.” A SLAPP is a lawsuit that, on its face, attempts to impose liability on a defendant for harm arising from speech Anti-SLAPP and [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;">Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &amp; Emotional Distress Cases</h1>
<blockquote>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;">Anti-SLAPP statutes are laws intended to curb – and, often, penalize – the filing of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or a “SLAPP.” <b>A SLAPP is a lawsuit that, on its face, attempts to impose liability on a defendant for harm arising from speech</b></span></h3>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<h1 class="" data-start="0" data-end="69">Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &amp; Emotional Distress Cases</h1>
<p class="" data-start="71" data-end="639">California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16) provides a powerful tool to early-dismiss lawsuits targeting speech on matters of public concern. Below, we survey key published, precedential cases from the past decade (2015–2025) – with a few landmark earlier cases – in which defendants (often journalists, media outlets, or online speakers) prevailed on anti-SLAPP motions against defamation and emotional distress claims. We organize the cases by court and highlight the facts, outcomes, and legal significance, followed by overarching themes and trends.</p>
<h2 class="" data-start="641" data-end="668">California Supreme Court</h2>
<ul data-start="670" data-end="5024">
<li class="" data-start="670" data-end="1508">
<p class="" data-start="672" data-end="1508"><strong data-start="672" data-end="692">Baral v. Schnitt</strong>, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) – <em data-start="722" data-end="762">Anti-SLAPP procedure for mixed claims.</em> The Court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may target specific allegations within a cause of action arising from protected speech, rather than the entire cause of action. This clarified that courts can strike the protected activity allegations (e.g. statements) while allowing any unprotected claims to proceed​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Baral%20v,3d%20604" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="672" data-end="1508">. <strong data-start="1161" data-end="1173">Outcome:</strong> The defendant’s motion was ultimately granted in part, striking the allegations based on an audit report that constituted protected speech. <strong data-start="1314" data-end="1331">Significance:</strong> Baral strengthened anti-SLAPP’s effectiveness by permitting partial strikes, preventing plaintiffs from evading the statute by embedding protected speech inside broader claims.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="1510" data-end="2387">
<p class="" data-start="1512" data-end="2387"><strong data-start="1512" data-end="1548">Park v. Board of Trustees of CSU</strong>, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) – <em data-start="1579" data-end="1628">Limiting scope to claims “arising from” speech.</em> The plaintiff sued a university for discrimination after being denied tenure, and the university filed an anti-SLAPP motion because the tenure decision was communicated in a letter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, clarifying that a lawsuit must be <em data-start="1882" data-end="1893">caused by</em> protected speech to fall under anti-SLAPP – merely communicating a decision is not enough​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=2%20Cal,3d%20905" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="1512" data-end="2387">. <strong data-start="2029" data-end="2041">Outcome:</strong> The anti-SLAPP motion was denied as the gravamen of the claim was discrimination, not the speech about it. <strong data-start="2149" data-end="2166">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="2167" data-end="2173">Park</em> refines prong one of the anti-SLAPP test by requiring a tight nexus between the challenged claim and the defendant’s speech. It ensures anti-SLAPP is focused on true First Amendment issues and not routine conduct.</p>
<p class="" data-start="2391" data-end="3378"><strong data-start="2391" data-end="2431">FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc.</strong>, 7 Cal.5th 133 (Cal. 2019) – <em data-start="2461" data-end="2497">“Public issue” defined in context.</em> A website operator sued a media metrics company for disparaging reports sent to its paying clients, and the defendant invoked anti-SLAPP. The Supreme Court articulated a context-specific test for whether speech is “in connection with” a public issue​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=FilmOn,3d%201156" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="2391" data-end="3378">. <strong data-start="2793" data-end="2805">Outcome:</strong> It held that while the subject of the reports (online content piracy) was a public issue, the <em data-start="2900" data-end="2909">context</em>—private subscriber reports—meant the speech did not further public debate, so anti-SLAPP protection was denied​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=California%20Supreme%20Court%2C%202019%207,3d%201156" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="2391" data-end="3378">. <strong data-start="3066" data-end="3083">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="3084" data-end="3092">FilmOn</em> imposes a nuanced, multi-factor inquiry into context, audience, and speaker intent in prong one. It narrowed the scope of what communications qualify as public-interest speech, focusing on whether the speech contributes to public discussion​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=FilmOn,3d%201156" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="2391" data-end="3378">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="3380" data-end="4499">
<p class="" data-start="3382" data-end="4499"><strong data-start="3382" data-end="3420">Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.</strong>, 7 Cal.5th 871 (Cal. 2019) – <em data-start="3450" data-end="3498">Media employer’s speech vs. employment claims.</em> A former CNN journalist sued for race discrimination and defamation after being fired. CNN’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied on the discrimination claims, and the Supreme Court agreed. It reasoned the firing was not “in furtherance” of free speech rights – the lawsuit was about unlawful discrimination, not the content of CNN’s news reporting​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=,was%20anything%20other%20than%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="3382" data-end="4499">. <strong data-start="3885" data-end="3897">Outcome:</strong> The Court held anti-SLAPP did <em data-start="3928" data-end="3933">not</em> apply to the non-defamation claims (wrongful termination, etc.), though the accompanying defamation claim (challenging statements about the firing) did arise from protected news commentary. <strong data-start="4124" data-end="4141">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="4142" data-end="4150">Wilson</em> (building on <em data-start="4164" data-end="4170">Park</em>) underscores that employment or harassment claims against media companies won’t be struck simply because the employer is engaged in speech business. Only claims truly based on speech on issues of public interest (e.g. a defamatory explanation given to the public) trigger the statute​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=,was%20anything%20other%20than%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="3382" data-end="4499">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="4501" data-end="5024">
<p class="" data-start="4503" data-end="5024"><strong data-start="4503" data-end="4538">Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter</strong>, 7 Cal.5th 781 (Cal. 2019) – <em data-start="4568" data-end="4606">Attorney speech and public interest.</em> Although not a defamation case, this decision held that a lawyer’s public statements about a product liability settlement were protected petitioning speech. <strong data-start="4764" data-end="4776">Outcome:</strong> The suit against the lawyer was dismissed. <strong data-start="4820" data-end="4837">Significance:</strong> It highlights how anti-SLAPP protects attorneys and participants speaking about litigation in the public arena, reinforcing protections for legal advocacy in the court of public opinion.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p class="" data-start="5026" data-end="5069"><em data-start="5026" data-end="5068">(Major earlier Supreme Court precedents)</em>:</p>
<ul data-start="5071" data-end="7394">
<li class="" data-start="5071" data-end="5789">
<p class="" data-start="5073" data-end="5789"><strong data-start="5073" data-end="5116">Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc.</strong>, 34 Cal.4th 679 (Cal. 2004) – A TV network aired a true-crime documentary about a man’s criminal past. He sued for invasion of privacy (having dropped defamation). The Court held the broadcast was newsworthy and protected by the First Amendment, making it “impossible for Gates to prevail”​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Gates%20had%20been%20convicted%20of,Amendment%20and%20current%20case%20law" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="5073" data-end="5789">. <strong data-start="5452" data-end="5464">Outcome:</strong> Anti-SLAPP struck the privacy claim. <strong data-start="5502" data-end="5519">Significance:</strong> Even a harmful depiction of someone’s past crimes was shielded as a matter of public interest; truthful, newsworthy publications cannot give rise to liability for emotional distress or privacy when public concern is involved​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Gates%20had%20been%20convicted%20of,would%20prevail%20on%20his%20complaint" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="5073" data-end="5789">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="5791" data-end="6365">
<p class="" data-start="5793" data-end="6365"><strong data-start="5793" data-end="5813">Flatley v. Mauro</strong>, 39 Cal.4th 299 (Cal. 2006) – An attorney’s pre-suit letter threatening to expose a rape allegation unless paid was deemed extortion, which is illegal conduct not protected by free speech. <strong data-start="6003" data-end="6015">Outcome:</strong> The lawyer’s anti-SLAPP motion was denied under the narrow exception for speech <em data-start="6096" data-end="6127">“illegal as a matter of law.”</em> <strong data-start="6128" data-end="6145">Significance:</strong> This carved out a <em data-start="6164" data-end="6174">“narrow”</em> exception to anti-SLAPP for egregious conduct like extortion, ensuring genuinely criminal speech cannot hide behind First Amendment protections​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=allegation,SLAPP%20motion%20was%20properly%20denied" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="5793" data-end="6365">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="6367" data-end="6888">
<p class="" data-start="6369" data-end="6888"><strong data-start="6369" data-end="6393">Navellier v. Sletten</strong>, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) – Established that a defendant can invoke anti-SLAPP even if the underlying dispute wasn’t initially about free speech. Here, a counterclaim alleging fraud in the context of exercising settlement rights was struck as a SLAPP​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Navellier%20v,Court%2C%202002" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="6369" data-end="6888">. <strong data-start="6693" data-end="6710">Significance:</strong> The anti-SLAPP law is to be construed broadly; even claims “incidental” to expressive conduct (like signing a release or filing a lawsuit) can be protected petitioning activity.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="6890" data-end="7394">
<p class="" data-start="6892" data-end="7394"><strong data-start="6892" data-end="6918">Briggs v. Eden Council</strong>, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) – The Court’s first anti-SLAPP case, holding the statute protects <em data-start="7014" data-end="7095">“any lawsuit arising from the exercise of the right to petition or free speech”</em> regardless of public significance​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=The%20Briggses%2C%20landlords%2C%20sued%20our,more%20than%20%24425%2C000%20for%20attorneys" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="6892" data-end="7394">. <strong data-start="7177" data-end="7194">Significance:</strong> Confirmed the Legislature’s intent that anti-SLAPP be applied broadly to protect all manner of petitioning speech, not only speech on government matters​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=disputes%2C%20alleging%20that%20the%20organization,for%20attorneys%20fees%20and%20costs" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="6892" data-end="7394">.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 class="" data-start="7396" data-end="7426">California Courts of Appeal</h2>
<p class="" data-start="7428" data-end="7694"><strong data-start="7428" data-end="7481">Media Defendants (Journalists &amp; News Publishers):</strong> California courts have consistently protected journalists and news outlets from defamation suits over reporting on matters of public concern – especially when the content is true or sourced from official records.</p>
<ul data-start="7696" data-end="13672">
<li class="" data-start="7696" data-end="8802">
<p class="" data-start="7698" data-end="8802"><strong data-start="7698" data-end="7738">Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc.</strong>, 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) – A newspaper reported on SEC accusations of stock fraud against the plaintiff, who sued for defamation. The court affirmed dismissal under anti-SLAPP: the articles plainly involved a public issue (securities enforcement) and were protected as fair and true reports of official proceedings​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=The%20Securities%20and%20Exchange%20Commission,complaint%20as%20required%20by%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="7698" data-end="8802">. The defendant was also immune under California’s fair report privilege (Civ. Code § 47), and plaintiff offered no credible evidence of actual malice​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=damages,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="7698" data-end="8802">. <strong data-start="8361" data-end="8373">Outcome:</strong> Anti-SLAPP motion granted; case dismissed. <strong data-start="8417" data-end="8434">Significance:</strong> Accurate news reports on government allegations are firmly protected. The decision underscores that <em data-start="8535" data-end="8542">truth</em> and <em data-start="8547" data-end="8558">privilege</em> are complete defenses – if the content was based on public records and the plaintiff cannot show it’s false or published with <em data-start="8685" data-end="8702">“actual malice”</em>, a defamation claim has no probability of prevailing​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=damages,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
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<p class="" data-start="8806" data-end="10348"><strong data-start="8806" data-end="8831">Jackson v. Mayweather</strong>, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – Celebrity boxer Floyd Mayweather’s ex-fiancée sued him for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after he publicly posted on Facebook about her abortion and discussed her cosmetic surgeries in a radio interview. The Court of Appeal held Mayweather’s statements were made in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest – namely, a high-profile couple’s relationship and a celebrity’s image​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2017/b266466.html#:~:text=Shantel%20Jackson%20filed%20suit%20against,arose%20from%20protected%20activity%20under" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">law.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="8806" data-end="10348">. It found the claims arose from protected speech and that the plaintiff failed to show a probability of prevailing. <strong data-start="9520" data-end="9532">Outcome:</strong> The defamation, false light, and public-disclosure claims were stricken (the court only left intact a narrow portion of the privacy claim)​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2017/b266466.html#:~:text=section%20426,affirmed%20in%20all%20other%20respects" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">law.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="8806" data-end="10348">. <strong data-start="9719" data-end="9736">Significance:</strong> Even speech about <em data-start="9755" data-end="9773">personal matters</em> can be a public issue if it involves public figures or online discourse that the public is following. The decision acknowledged that Mayweather’s social media commentary, though deeply offensive to the plaintiff, was part of public conversation about a celebrity couple, and the plaintiff could not prove the statements false (in fact, she had undergone the procedures)​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2017/b266466.html#:~:text=%28the%20Anti,affirmed%20in%20all%20other%20respects" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">law.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="8806" data-end="10348">. This highlights that <em data-start="10212" data-end="10233">“negative but true”</em> content – even very private facts – may be protected when the individuals are famous or the subject is newsworthy.</p>
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<li class="" data-start="10350" data-end="12213">
<p class="" data-start="10352" data-end="12213"><strong data-start="10352" data-end="10372">Daniel v. Wayans</strong>, 8 Cal.App.5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – Actor Marlon Wayans was sued by an extra (Pierre Daniel) for racial harassment, misappropriation, and IIED after Wayans joked on Twitter that Daniel looked like a cartoon character and even used a racial slur in a teasing manner on set. The court granted Wayans’s anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that his “allegedly harassing and offensive” tweets and remarks were protected free speech made in connection with an issue of public interest​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20most%20recent%20win%20was,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="10352" data-end="12213">. Wayans was in the midst of creating and promoting a comedy film; his on-set banter and tweet were part of his <em data-start="11051" data-end="11069">creative process</em> and social commentary in the comedy context, which the court deemed protected expression​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=Wayans%E2%80%99%20conduct%20was%20protected%20by,to%20his%20large%20Twitter%20following" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="10352" data-end="12213">. <strong data-start="11206" data-end="11218">Outcome:</strong> The lawsuit was dismissed and Wayans recovered his attorneys’ fees. The court found that the tweet – <em data-start="11320" data-end="11403">“Tell me this n&#8212;- don’t look like…THIS n&#8212;-!!! Ol Cleveland Brown ass looking”</em> – was protected satire and opinion, not a statement of fact, and that using the extra’s photo in a comic tweet was transformative fair use​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20court%20dismissed%20the%20extra%E2%80%99s,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="10352" data-end="12213">It also held the conduct was not “outrageous” beyond First Amendment protection. <strong data-start="11671" data-end="11688">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="11689" data-end="11707">Daniel v. Wayans</em> illustrates that artistic and comedic expression, even if crass or insulting, can qualify as speech on a matter of public interest (here, a film and its characters) when disseminated publicly. The court emphasized the need to protect creative works and promotion of entertainment under the anti-SLAPP law, noting that holding such speech liable (absent false assertions of fact) would chill comedians and artists​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=Wayans%E2%80%99%20conduct%20was%20protected%20by,to%20his%20large%20Twitter%20following" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="10352" data-end="12213">​</p>
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<p class="" data-start="12217" data-end="13672"><strong data-start="12217" data-end="12236">Cross v. Cooper</strong>, 197 Cal.App.4th 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) – A resident created and distributed a flyer titled “Meet Your New Neighbor” with the photo and Megan’s Law sex-offender registry information of the plaintiff, warning the community about him. The plaintiff sued for defamation and emotional distress. The court struck the suit under the anti-SLAPP statute, finding the conduct was quintessential speech on a matter of public concern: <em data-start="12663" data-end="12760">“the strong and widespread public interest in knowing the location of registered sex offenders”</em><a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1810305.html#:~:text=The%20State%20DOJ%20contends%20the,For%20reasons%20we" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">caselaw.findlaw.com</span></a></p>
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<p class="" data-start="12217" data-end="13672">. Because the flyer’s factual content about the plaintiff’s convictions was true and obtained from a public registry, he could not show a likelihood of prevailing on any defamation or IIED claim. <strong data-start="13048" data-end="13060">Outcome:</strong> Anti-SLAPP granted, dismissing the lawsuit. <strong data-start="13105" data-end="13122">Significance:</strong> This case confirms that republishing <em data-start="13160" data-end="13202">publicly available, truthful information</em> – even if highly stigmatizing – is protected. Using a person’s publicly posted photo and record to alert the community was deemed lawful and protected speech about public safety. The decision reinforced that truth is an absolute defense and that the First Amendment does not permit liability for emotional distress when the underlying facts are true and concern public welfare​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1810305.html#:~:text=The%20State%20DOJ%20contends%20the,For%20reasons%20we" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">caselaw.findlaw.com</span></a></p>
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</li>
</ul>
<p class="" data-start="13674" data-end="14057"><strong data-start="13674" data-end="13728">Online Reviews, Bloggers, and Social Media Speech:</strong> Many defamation/IIED SLAPP suits in the last decade have targeted consumer reviews or Internet posts. Courts have largely sided with defendants, recognizing online platforms as public forums and the posts as commentary on issues that can be of public interest (e.g. consumer protection, professional quality, community matters).</p>
<ul data-start="14059" data-end="18312">
<li class="" data-start="14059" data-end="15060">
<p class="" data-start="14061" data-end="15060"><strong data-start="14061" data-end="14077">Wong v. Jing</strong>, 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) – A Yelp review by parents criticizing a dentist’s treatment of their child led to the dentist suing for libel and emotional distress. The Court of Appeal held the review was made on a public Internet forum and concerned the quality of dental services – a matter of interest to other consumers. It ruled that <strong data-start="14430" data-end="14493">six of the seven causes of action should have been stricken</strong> under the anti-SLAPP law​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=Wong%20v,SLAPP%20law.%20%20623" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="14061" data-end="15060">(one minor claim was remanded). <strong data-start="14643" data-end="14660">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="14661" data-end="14667">Wong</em> set an early example that outspoken consumer reviews on sites like Yelp are generally protected opinion or at least subject to anti-SLAPP. Statements about a professional’s services affect the public (prospective patients) and thus meet the public-interest requirement. Unless a reviewer’s factual assertions are provably false and made with actual malice, defamation claims will likely fail.</p>
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<li class="" data-start="15062" data-end="16817">
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817"><strong data-start="15064" data-end="15083">Chaker v. Mateo</strong>, 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) – In a contentious personal dispute, a woman (and her mother) posted negative comments about her ex-boyfriend on RipoffReport and Topix, accusing him of being a fraud, a deadbeat dad, and having a shady business. The court had <em data-start="15354" data-end="15372">“little problem”</em> finding these online postings protected by the anti-SLAPP statute​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=Chaker%20and%20Nicole%20Mateo%20had,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817">​</p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817">The Internet is a <em data-start="15550" data-end="15574">“classic public forum”</em> open to billions, and the posts about Chaker’s character and business practices fell within <em data-start="15667" data-end="15705">“the rubric of consumer information”</em> intended as a warning to others about his trustworthiness​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=,in%20a%20single%20small%20neighborhood" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817">​</p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817"><strong data-start="15857" data-end="15869">Outcome:</strong> The defamation claim was struck. The court noted that even though the dispute was personal, the content – allegations of dishonest business practices – could inform consumers and thus was an issue of public interest​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=The%20court%20then%20notes%20the,and%20services%20in%20our%20economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817"><strong data-start="16133" data-end="16150">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="16151" data-end="16159">Chaker</em> broadened the interpretation of “public interest” to include internet discussions blending personal grievances with consumer caution. It confirmed that online forums facilitate an exchange on everything from <em data-start="16368" data-end="16438">“great issues of war [to] the relative quality of chicken pot pies,”</em> and that posts aiming to flag someone’s reliability in commerce qualify as speech on a matter of public concern​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=,in%20a%20single%20small%20neighborhood" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="15064" data-end="16817">This case is frequently cited to argue that consumer review sites and complaint boards are public fora and that criticism of a person’s business conduct is protected speech​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=The%20court%20then%20notes%20the,and%20services%20in%20our%20economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
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<li class="" data-start="16819" data-end="17632">
<p class="" data-start="16821" data-end="17632"><strong data-start="16821" data-end="16842">Grenier v. Taylor</strong>, 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) – Former parishioners accused their church pastor of wrongdoing on an internet blog, and the pastor sued for defamation and emotional distress. The court struck some claims and allowed others, illustrating the line between opinion and fact. <strong data-start="17126" data-end="17138">Outcome:</strong> Allegations that could be seen as opinion or religious matters (thus non-verifiable) were protected, but one specific factual accusation was allowed to proceed since the plaintiff showed it was likely false. <strong data-start="17347" data-end="17364">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="17365" data-end="17374">Grenier</em> shows courts will parse each statement in an online post – protecting harsh opinions or rhetoric about public figures (even religious leaders) while allowing truly defamatory factual allegations (if provably false and damaging) to go forward past prong two.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="17634" data-end="18312">
<p class="" data-start="17636" data-end="18312"><strong data-start="17636" data-end="17663">Cross v. Facebook, Inc.</strong>, 14 Cal.App.5th 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) – After <em data-start="17713" data-end="17730">Cross v. Cooper</em> (the Megan’s Law case above) was dismissed, the plaintiff attempted to sue Facebook for hosting the content. That suit was defeated not only by Section 230 immunity but also characterized as a SLAPP. The court noted that holding platforms liable for users’ protected posts would undermine online speech. <strong data-start="18035" data-end="18052">Significance:</strong> While not a traditional anti-SLAPP merits victory (it was dismissed on immunity grounds), it underscores that plaintiffs sometimes try to circumvent anti-SLAPP wins by targeting platforms, an approach courts have rejected in favor of broad speech protections.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="18314" data-end="18601"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="18314" data-end="18374">SLAPP back: Suits Against Malicious Litigants or Lawyers:</strong> California law permits a prevailing SLAPP defendant to sue back for malicious prosecution (sometimes called a “SLAPPback”) if the original suit was baseless and filed with malice. Several cases demonstrate this accountability:</span></h1>
<ul data-start="18603" data-end="21713">
<li class="" data-start="18603" data-end="20157">
<p class="" data-start="18605" data-end="20157"><strong data-start="18605" data-end="18624">Jay v. Mahaffey</strong>, 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) – After a real estate dispute, attorney Mahaffey had added 45 limited partners (innocent third parties) as defendants in a lawsuit solely to pressure the main defendant. When that suit failed, those individuals sued Mahaffey and her firm for malicious prosecution. The defendants (the lawyers) filed anti-SLAPP motions, but the courts found the limited partners had established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution (no probable cause for the prior suit and evidence of malice)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/1239/AllNews/AwardsAccolades#:~:text=In%20Jay%20v,Mahaffey%20and%20his%20associate%2C%20Ghormley" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">ocbar.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="18605" data-end="20157">. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motions, ruling that Mahaffey’s aggressive tactic of suing uninvolved parties was grounds for a malicious prosecution claim​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/1239/AllNews/AwardsAccolades#:~:text=In%20Jay%20v,Mahaffey%20and%20his%20associate%2C%20Ghormley" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">ocbar.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="18605" data-end="20157">. <strong data-start="19428" data-end="19440">Outcome:</strong> The malicious prosecution case proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment holding the attorney liable for roughly $400,000 in damages and fees. <strong data-start="19586" data-end="19603">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="19604" data-end="19621">Jay v. Mahaffey</em> is a cautionary tale for attorneys: those who file frivolous, harassing lawsuits can not only lose under anti-SLAPP but also face personal liability for malicious prosecution. It highlights that California courts will protect targets of SLAPPs by allowing them to seek redress against lawyers who abuse the court system. As the court noted, a plaintiff must have a legitimate cause of action – suing “clearly non-liable” parties just to exert leverage invites a malicious prosecution suit​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/1239/AllNews/AwardsAccolades#:~:text=In%20Jay%20v,Mahaffey%20and%20his%20associate%2C%20Ghormley" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">ocbar.org</span></a></p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="20159" data-end="21118">
<p class="" data-start="20161" data-end="21118"><strong data-start="20161" data-end="20183">Daniels v. Robbins</strong>, 182 Cal.App.4th 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) – In an earlier notable case, a lawyer was sued for malicious prosecution for pursuing an underlying lawsuit that lacked merit. The court held the anti-SLAPP statute did apply (malicious prosecution suits arise from petitioning activity), but that the plaintiff had shown a probability of success (the prior case ended in his favor and without probable cause). <strong data-start="20587" data-end="20599">Outcome:</strong> The anti-SLAPP motion by the attorney was denied and that denial affirmed on appeal, allowing the suit to go forward. <strong data-start="20718" data-end="20735">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="20736" data-end="20745">Daniels</em> (and later cases like <em data-start="20768" data-end="20773">Jay</em>) establish that a well-founded malicious prosecution claim can overcome an anti-SLAPP motion – in other words, the law <em data-start="20893" data-end="20938">shields the wrongly sued, not the wrongdoer</em>. California even has a specific provision (CCP §425.18) limiting anti-SLAPP delays in “SLAPPback” cases, reflecting the Legislature’s intent to let victims of SLAPPs seek damages.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="21120" data-end="21713">
<p class="" data-start="21122" data-end="21713"><strong data-start="21122" data-end="21142">Paiva v. Nichols</strong>, 168 Cal.App.4th 1007 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) – Here, former defendants sued a plaintiff’s lawyers for malicious prosecution after winning a SLAPP dismissal in the underlying case. The court emphasized that anti-SLAPP protections don’t bar a malicious prosecution claim if the prior suit was ultimately resolved in defendants’ favor. <strong data-start="21474" data-end="21491">Significance:</strong> It confirms that the <em data-start="21513" data-end="21536">favorable termination</em> of a SLAPP – e.g. dismissal on the merits or via anti-SLAPP – can tee up a new claim against the instigators, incentivizing truthfulness and discouraging truly frivolous suits.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="" data-start="21715" data-end="22093">In sum, California appellate courts have routinely upheld anti-SLAPP motions for speakers ranging from newspaper publishers to Yelp reviewers, while also permitting “countersuit” remedies against those who misuse the courts. The common thread is a robust protection of speech, especially speech involving public participation, coupled with consequences for meritless litigation.</p>
<h2 class="" data-start="22095" data-end="22116">U.S. Supreme Court</h2>
<p class="" data-start="22118" data-end="22552">Although there is no federal anti-SLAPP statute, U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence provides the backbone principles that often determine SLAPP outcomes. Several landmark Supreme Court cases – some recent, some decades-old – establish strong freedom-of-speech protections in defamation and IIED (intentional infliction of emotional distress) cases, which California courts in turn apply through the anti-SLAPP framework:</p>
<ul data-start="22554" data-end="29596">
<li class="" data-start="22554" data-end="23951">
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951"><strong data-start="22556" data-end="22590">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</strong>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) – This seminal case constitutionalized defamation law. The Supreme Court held that public officials (and later, public figures) must prove “actual malice” – that a defamatory statement was made with <strong data-start="22811" data-end="22862">knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth</strong> – to recover damages​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/#:~:text=Brennan%20held%20that%20the%20First,gross%20recklessness%20rather%20than%20intent" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">supreme.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">​</p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">. The Court recognized that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected to give breathing space to the First Amendment​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=fame%2C%20shape%20events%20in%20areas,that%20does%20have%20constitutional%20value" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">. <strong data-start="23170" data-end="23187">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="23188" data-end="23198">Sullivan</em> greatly raised the plaintiff’s burden in defamation suits, especially for media defendants. It shifted the proof of falsity onto the plaintiff and shielded publishers from liability for mere negligent mistakes​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/#:~:text=This%20case%20clarified%20the%20scope,for%20plaintiffs%20in%20libel%20claims" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">supreme.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">. This doctrine is echoed in anti-SLAPP prong two analyses – many defamation claims against news outlets fail because the plaintiff cannot show evidence of actual malice​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=complaint%2C%20and%20the%20appellate%20court,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">. <em data-start="23671" data-end="23681">Sullivan</em>’s legacy, as one court noted, was to give “substantial protections to defendants such as newspapers” by requiring robust proof of fault​<a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/#:~:text=This%20case%20clarified%20the%20scope,for%20plaintiffs%20in%20libel%20claims" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">supreme.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="22556" data-end="23951">, thereby thwarting the vast majority of SLAPP-style defamation suits by public figures.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="23953" data-end="25738">
<p class="" data-start="23955" data-end="25738"><strong data-start="23955" data-end="23986">Hustler Magazine v. Falwell</strong>, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) – The magazine Hustler ran a parody ad depicting evangelist Jerry Falwell in a lewd, false scenario. Falwell sued for IIED (having already lost his libel claim because the parody was patently fictitious). The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the emotional-distress verdict in Falwell’s favor. It held that a public figure <strong data-start="24333" data-end="24392">cannot recover for IIED based on a caricature or parody</strong> without showing the publication contained a false statement of fact made with actual malice​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=To%20be%20sure%2C%20in%20other,This%20was" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="23955" data-end="25738">. Simply put, <strong data-start="24590" data-end="24638">outrageousness is not a sufficient benchmark</strong> when free speech is at stake​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=To%20be%20sure%2C%20in%20other,This%20was" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="23955" data-end="25738">. The Court warned that allowing liability for speech intended to inflict emotional harm – in the absence of any falsity – <em data-start="24836" data-end="24918">“would subject political cartoonists and other satirists to large damage awards”</em> for doing what satirists do: exaggerating and ridiculing​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=fame%2C%20shape%20events%20in%20areas,that%20does%20have%20constitutional%20value" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="23955" data-end="25738">. <strong data-start="25069" data-end="25086">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="25087" data-end="25107">Hustler v. Falwell</em> extends Sullivan’s shield to emotional distress torts, protecting even speech that is intentionally caustic or offensive, so long as it does not state actual defamatory falsehoods. It cemented the principle that public figures cannot use IIED claims as an “end-run” around First Amendment safeguards for satire and opinion. This ruling is frequently invoked in SLAPP cases to defend harsh criticism and parody. For example, California courts citing <em data-start="25557" data-end="25566">Hustler</em> have refused to find speech “outrageous” enough to lose protection unless it also includes provably false assertions of fact​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20court%20dismissed%20the%20extra%E2%80%99s,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="25740" data-end="27380">
<p class="" data-start="25742" data-end="27380"><strong data-start="25742" data-end="25762">Snyder v. Phelps</strong>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) – In a modern echo of Falwell, the Court held that the Westboro Baptist Church’s offensive funeral picketing (with signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”) was protected by the First Amendment against tort claims by the fallen soldier’s family. The speech, however hurtful, addressed matters of public concern (the nation’s morality, the military, etc.) in a public place. Therefore, it <strong data-start="26172" data-end="26235">could not form the basis of liability for IIED or intrusion</strong> as a matter of law​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="25742" data-end="27380">. The Court emphasized that speech on public issues, to which the listeners could avert their eyes, occupies <em data-start="26455" data-end="26518">“the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”</em>. <strong data-start="26520" data-end="26537">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="26538" data-end="26546">Snyder</em> reaffirmed that speech cannot be punished simply because it causes pain or outrage, if it is on political or social issues. Even a private plaintiff (not a public figure) could not recover for emotional distress because the defendants spoke on a public matter at a public event​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="25742" data-end="27380">. This decision resonates in anti-SLAPP analyses: it draws a bright line that <strong data-start="26994" data-end="27094">speech on public affairs – however unpleasant – is immune from tort liability for emotional harm</strong>. California courts have cited <em data-start="27125" data-end="27133">Snyder</em> in holding that vehement online commentary or protests on public concerns are protected from IIED claims. Essentially, if speech is about a broader issue and not a targeted private harassment, <em data-start="27327" data-end="27335">Snyder</em> instructs that the First Amendment prevails.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="27382" data-end="28538">
<p class="" data-start="27384" data-end="28538"><strong data-start="27384" data-end="27415">Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</strong>, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) – The Supreme Court balanced the rights of private individuals and media defendants. It held that private-figure defamation plaintiffs need not prove actual malice to recover <em data-start="27612" data-end="27620">actual</em> damages, but they must show at least negligence, and <strong data-start="27674" data-end="27731">cannot recover punitive damages without actual malice</strong>. It also declared there is no constitutional value in false statements, but <strong data-start="27808" data-end="27856">States cannot impose liability without fault</strong>. <strong data-start="27858" data-end="27875">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="27876" data-end="27883">Gertz</em> is reflected in California law by distinguishing public vs. private plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP prong two: a private figure may have an easier path to show probability of success (no malice requirement) unless the speech was about a public issue. But California’s anti-SLAPP still often shields defendants if the private figure cannot show the statements were false or made negligently. Moreover, if the speech is on a public matter, <em data-start="28315" data-end="28322">Gertz</em>’s logic combined with <em data-start="28345" data-end="28355">Sullivan</em> means even private plaintiffs often effectively need to prove malice to get presumed or punitive damages – a high hurdle in SLAPP cases​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=complaint%2C%20and%20the%20appellate%20court,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="27384" data-end="28538">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="28540" data-end="29596">
<p class="" data-start="28542" data-end="29596"><strong data-start="28542" data-end="28577">Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.</strong>, 497 U.S. 1 (1990) – The Court clarified that there is no wholesale exemption for “opinion” in defamation law; rather, a statement of opinion can be actionable if it implies an assertion of objective fact. However, pure opinions or subjective critiques that <em data-start="28836" data-end="28896">“cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts”</em> are fully protected. <strong data-start="28918" data-end="28935">Significance:</strong> This principle is a staple in SLAPP defenses: defendants often argue that their allegedly defamatory remarks were non-actionable opinion or hyperbole. For example, calling someone a fraud or comparing them to a cartoon character can be defended as opinion in context​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20court%20dismissed%20the%20extra%E2%80%99s,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="28542" data-end="29596">, especially on Internet forums where rhetorical flourish is common. California courts, following <em data-start="29346" data-end="29357">Milkovich</em>, assess the totality of circumstances – a key factor in prong two – to decide if a statement was factual enough to be proven true/false or just opinion. If it’s the latter, the plaintiff cannot meet the burden of showing probable success.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p class="" data-start="29598" data-end="30634"><em data-start="29598" data-end="29630">(Additional relevant rulings):</em> <strong data-start="29631" data-end="29654">Bartnicki v. Vopper</strong> (2001) protected the publication of truthful information on a public issue even if obtained unlawfully by a third party, reinforcing that media defendants are insulated when disseminating matters of public concern. <strong data-start="29870" data-end="29898">Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn</strong> (1975) and <strong data-start="29910" data-end="29936">Florida Star v. B.J.F.</strong> (1989) held that publishing publicly available information (like a rape victim’s name from court records or police reports) cannot lead to liability, as the First Amendment shields the press’s right to report official public proceedings​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Gates%20had%20been%20convicted%20of,Amendment%20and%20current%20case%20law" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="29598" data-end="30634">. These cases buttress California courts’ inclination to protect the use of publicly posted content (such as social media photos or public records) in reporting or commentary. If a plaintiff voluntarily exposed information or it’s a matter of public record, any privacy or emotional distress claim will likely fail under First Amendment scrutiny, as seen in outcomes like <em data-start="30591" data-end="30611">Gates v. Discovery</em> and <em data-start="30616" data-end="30633">Cross v. Cooper</em>.</p>
<h2 class="" data-start="30636" data-end="30701">Federal Courts in California (Ninth Circuit &amp; District Courts)</h2>
<p class="" data-start="30703" data-end="31086">Federal courts in California (applying state anti-SLAPP law in diversity cases) have similarly favored defendants in defamation and related suits implicating free speech. The Ninth Circuit generally permits the use of California’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal suits (for state law claims), and several high-profile cases in the last decade underscore the trend of protecting speech:</p>
<ul data-start="31088" data-end="37132">
<li class="" data-start="31088" data-end="32448">
<p class="" data-start="31090" data-end="32448"><strong data-start="31090" data-end="31112">Sarver v. Chartier</strong>, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016) – A U.S. Army sergeant sued the makers of the film <em data-start="31194" data-end="31211">The Hurt Locker</em>, claiming a character was based on him and defamed him. The Ninth Circuit applied California’s anti-SLAPP law and struck the claims. It held that the film’s depiction of the Iraq War and a bomb disposal technician touched on issues of public interest – <em data-start="31465" data-end="31496">“the conduct of the Iraq War”</em> – satisfying prong one​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=during%20the%20Iraq%20War,on%20a%20brief%20dialogue%20reference" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="31090" data-end="32448">. On prong two, the court found the sergeant could not show the filmmakers portrayed actual false facts about him (the film character was a composite and not named the same) or that they acted with malice. <strong data-start="31771" data-end="31783">Outcome:</strong> The defamation and false-light claims were dismissed as a SLAPP. <strong data-start="31849" data-end="31866">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="31867" data-end="31875">Sarver</em> affirmed that creative works based on real events are protected by the First Amendment. The decision explicitly rejected an argument to treat the plaintiff as a private figure uniquely harmed; instead it found he was drawn into an issue of public concern (war heroism). This case is often cited for the proposition that sharing someone’s story as part of commentary on a public event is protected speech, and plaintiffs cannot claim emotional distress for how they were depicted if no provable falsity or actual malice exists​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=during%20the%20Iraq%20War,on%20a%20brief%20dialogue%20reference" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="31090" data-end="32448">.</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="32450" data-end="34432">
<p class="" data-start="32452" data-end="34432"><strong data-start="32452" data-end="32488">Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow</strong>, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021) – One America News Network (OAN) sued MSNBC host Rachel Maddow for defamation after she exclaimed on-air that OAN <em data-start="32677" data-end="32725">“really literally is paid Russian propaganda.”</em> The federal court granted Maddow’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the case, finding her statement was hyperbolic opinion based on disclosed facts (an article reporting an OAN employee also worked for Sputnik, a Russian state outlet). The court ruled that <strong data-start="32982" data-end="33064">“reasonable viewers would consider the contested statement to be her opinion,”</strong> not an assertion of actual fact​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://casetext.com/case/herring-networks-inc-v-maddow#:~:text=Herring%20Networks%2C%20Inc,statement%20to%20be%20her%20opinion" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casetext.com</span></a> <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="32452" data-end="34432">. OAN itself conceded the segment was about a matter of public interest (media and foreign influence)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/herring-networks-v-maddow/#:~:text=Herring%20Networks%20v.%20Maddow%20,concerned%20a%20public%20issue%2C%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="32452" data-end="34432">. <strong data-start="33337" data-end="33349">Outcome:</strong> The defamation claim was struck and Maddow was awarded attorney’s fees. The Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable viewer would take the “paid Russian propaganda” line as a literal factual accusation, especially coming from an opinionated talk show​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="32452" data-end="34432">. <strong data-start="33717" data-end="33734">Significance:</strong> This case highlights how courts analyze context and tone in media defamation claims – a fiery political commentary on cable news was deemed protected, as it “cannot serve as the basis for a defamation claim” when understood as exaggeration or opinion​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="32452" data-end="34432">. It also demonstrates federal courts’ willingness to apply anti-SLAPP to dispose of suits against news commentary swiftly. Maddow’s win (and the fee-shifting) reinforces the idea that defamation suits brought by public figures or corporations (here, a news network) face an uphill battle if the challenged speech is opinion based on disclosed true facts​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="34434" data-end="35829">
<p class="" data-start="34436" data-end="35829"><strong data-start="34436" data-end="34472">Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC</strong>, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013) – In an earlier notable case, a consumer (Makaeff) wrote online complaints accusing Trump University of fraudulent practices. Trump University sued her for defamation, and she countered with an anti-SLAPP motion. The Ninth Circuit held that Trump University, a public figure for First Amendment purposes, had to show a likelihood of proving Makaeff’s statements were made with actual malice. The court ultimately found Trump University could not meet that burden, and it <em data-start="34974" data-end="35016">dismissed the defamation suit as a SLAPP</em>, also awarding fees​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=damages,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="34436" data-end="35829">. (Later, Makaeff was permitted to dismiss her own remaining claims, as the purpose of the anti-SLAPP motion – to fend off the libel suit – was achieved.) <strong data-start="35237" data-end="35254">Significance:</strong> <em data-start="35255" data-end="35264">Makaeff</em> was significant for recognizing that large companies engaged in public controversy (here, allegations of scamming students) are treated like public figures. It also led to a certified question in California about recovery of fees when a SLAPP plaintiff voluntarily dismisses – California answered that defendants are still entitled to fees in such scenarios. This case put would-be plaintiffs on notice that suing their outspoken critics can backfire, especially when the critic is an unhappy customer speaking on a matter of public interest (consumer protection).</p>
</li>
<li class="" data-start="35831" data-end="37132">
<p class="" data-start="35833" data-end="37132"><strong data-start="35833" data-end="35855">La Liberte v. Reid</strong>, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020) – (Not a California court, but involving California law and worth noting) In this case, a woman sued MSNBC host Joy Reid in New York federal court over posts accusing the plaintiff of yelling racist slurs at a public meeting. Reid tried to invoke California’s anti-SLAPP law, but the Second Circuit held California’s law <strong data-start="36205" data-end="36248">conflicts with federal procedural rules</strong> and could not be applied in federal court​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/la-liberte-v-reid-and-anti-slapp-split#:~:text=La%20Liberte%20v,suits%20under%20the%20Erie%20Doctrine" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">lawreview.uchicago.edu</span></a> <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.cahill.com/publications/client-alerts/2020-08-24-second-circuit-holds-californias-anti-slapp-statute-inapplicable-in-federal-court-proceedings/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Second%20Circuit%20Holds%20Californias%20Anti-SLAPP%20Statute%20Inapplicable%20in%20Federal%20Court%20Proceedings.pdf#:~:text=,in%20federal%20courts%2C%20which" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">cahill.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="35833" data-end="37132">. This created a circuit split (the Ninth Circuit <em data-start="36432" data-end="36438">does</em> allow anti-SLAPP motions in federal court). Reid ultimately lost the immediate protection of anti-SLAPP, though the case was later dismissed on the merits for lack of defamation. <strong data-start="36618" data-end="36635">Significance:</strong> The <em data-start="36640" data-end="36652">La Liberte</em> saga underscores a trend: most federal courts in California (Ninth Circuit) embrace anti-SLAPP, but elsewhere its applicability varies. Despite this procedural hiccup, even in <em data-start="36829" data-end="36841">La Liberte</em>, the core First Amendment analysis prevailed – the statements were deemed opinion or not made with malice, so Reid prevailed without the anti-SLAPP statute. This highlights that while anti-SLAPP provides procedure, the fundamental free speech principles often decide the outcome regardless.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p class="" data-start="37134" data-end="37710">Overall, in federal courts applying California law, we see the same pattern: when plaintiffs sue over speech on political or societal issues (even sharp-edged or unflattering speech), the courts tend to characterize the speech as opinion or public commentary and dismiss the claims early. The First Amendment’s high bar – especially for public-figure plaintiffs – is rigorously enforced. Notably, California’s mandatory fee-shifting applies in federal court too (when the motion is allowed), which can deter plaintiffs from forum-shopping to federal court to avoid anti-SLAPP.</p>
<h2 class="" data-start="37712" data-end="37732">Themes and Trends</h2>
<p class="" data-start="37734" data-end="38944"><strong data-start="37734" data-end="37787">1. Robust Protection for Speech on Public Issues:</strong> Across the board, courts prioritize free speech and press rights, especially where the content in question involves a matter of public concern. Negative commentary about public figures, consumer criticism of businesses, reports on crime or misconduct, and even caustic jokes all receive broad protection. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, <em data-start="38127" data-end="38215">“speech on a matter of public concern…cannot be banned simply because it is offensive” </em><a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="37734" data-end="38944">. California decisions echo this – if the speech even arguably contributes to public debate or informs others (from community safety in <em data-start="38397" data-end="38404">Cross</em>, to war and politics in <em data-start="38429" data-end="38437">Sarver</em>, to consumer vigilance in <em data-start="38464" data-end="38472">Chaker</em>), the anti-SLAPP statute’s first prong is usually satisfied. This has shielded journalists, activists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens who speak out. The flip side is that truly private disputes not tied to any broader interest (for example, purely personal gripes unconnected to any public issue) are less likely to get anti-SLAPP protection​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=6%20Cal,Id" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a>, ensuring the law targets genuine SLAPPs and not garden-variety private squabbles.</p>
<p class="" data-start="38946" data-end="40606"><strong data-start="38946" data-end="38996">2. Truth and Opinion as Impenetrable Defenses:</strong> A recurring theme is that <em data-start="39023" data-end="39040">truthful speech</em> or <em data-start="39044" data-end="39068">non-actionable opinion</em> cannot form the basis of liability – a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence reinforced through anti-SLAPP. Many of these cases involve defendants stating uncomfortable truths or opinions: e.g., stating someone has a criminal record (<em data-start="39310" data-end="39317">Cross</em>), or giving a scathing opinion on a service (<em data-start="39363" data-end="39369">Wong</em>, <em data-start="39371" data-end="39379">Chaker</em>). If the plaintiff cannot show the statement is false (or cannot overcome a privilege like fair report), the claim will be stricken​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=damages,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="38946" data-end="40606">. In <strong data-start="39562" data-end="39587">Colt v. Freedom Comm.</strong>, the media defendant prevailed because the reporting was privileged and no malice was shown​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=damages,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="38946" data-end="40606">. In <strong data-start="39730" data-end="39760">Herring Networks v. Maddow</strong>, the court found the challenged remark was figurative opinion, not a literal assertion, and thus not provably false​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="38946" data-end="40606">. Over and over, courts emphasize that <em data-start="39961" data-end="39990">it’s the plaintiff’s burden</em> to demonstrate a probability of proving falsity and fault at an early stage – a burden most cannot meet absent clear fabrication. Consequently, <em data-start="40135" data-end="40156">“negative but true”</em> content is generally safe from defamation liability. Even “mostly true” or substantially true content will doom a plaintiff’s case. And pure opinion or obvious exaggeration (like parody or epithets) is protected as well, since it cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com </span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="38946" data-end="40606">. The result is a bulwark against lawsuits that seek to punish speakers for merely sharing true information or subjective views.</p>
<p class="" data-start="40608" data-end="42586"><strong data-start="40608" data-end="40678">3. Public Forum and Social Media – New Platforms, Same Protection:</strong> The rise of the Internet and social media in the last decade appears frequently in these cases, and courts treat online speech with the same seriousness as traditional journalism. California courts have explicitly recognized the Internet as a vast public forum open to “literally billions”​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=,in%20a%20single%20small%20neighborhood" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="40608" data-end="42586">, and thus online posts are often considered speech in a public forum concerning public interest (CCP § 425.16(e)(3)). Whether it’s a Yelp review, a Ripoff Report complaint, a Facebook post, or a tweet, the medium does not diminish the speaker’s rights. <em data-start="41268" data-end="41285">Chaker v. Mateo</em> was a trailblazer in 2012, ruling that posts on consumer gripe sites about someone’s business practices were in the public interest because they serve as warnings to other consumers​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=The%20court%20then%20notes%20the,and%20services%20in%20our%20economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="40608" data-end="42586">. In <em data-start="41518" data-end="41541">Jackson v. Mayweather</em>, social media was the vehicle for a celebrity’s personal revelations, and the court still found a public interest due to the public figure status and widespread audience​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2017/b266466.html#:~:text=Shantel%20Jackson%20filed%20suit%20against,arose%20from%20protected%20activity%20under" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">law.justia.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="40608" data-end="42586">. Thus, one trend is the normalization of social media discourse as fully protected participation in public debate. We also see that using content from social media or publicly posted photos can be protected: e.g., Wayans using an image of the plaintiff next to a cartoon was deemed transformative fair use in satire​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20court%20dismissed%20the%20extra%E2%80%99s,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="40608" data-end="42586">; journalists using photos from a public Facebook profile for a news story would likewise be shielded as long as the story is newsworthy (consistent with <em data-start="42319" data-end="42326">Gates</em> and U.S. Supreme Court precedents on public information). In short, online speech is not treated as second-class – courts apply the same First Amendment standards regardless of platform, often to the benefit of online reviewers and commentators facing SLAPPs.</p>
<p class="" data-start="42588" data-end="43924"><strong data-start="42588" data-end="42634">4. Anti-SLAPP’s Expansion and Limitations:</strong> Procedurally, the anti-SLAPP law in California has been interpreted expansively in some ways (broad coverage of speech activities) but also subject to careful limits. The California Supreme Court has in recent years fine-tuned the doctrine: <em data-start="42876" data-end="42883">Baral</em> allows filtering out unprotected claims early, preventing artful pleading; <em data-start="42959" data-end="42965">Park</em> and <em data-start="42970" data-end="42978">Wilson</em> ensure that claims not truly based on speech (like discrimination or ordinary business disputes) aren’t struck, preventing overreach​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=,was%20anything%20other%20than%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="42588" data-end="43924">. Meanwhile, the Legislature added exceptions (like §425.17 for purely commercial speech and §425.18 for SLAPPbacks) to curb misuse. Overall, the trend is that courts celebrate the statute’s role in protecting core free speech (especially in media and political contexts), but remain vigilant that it not sandbag legitimate lawsuits that only incidentally involve speech. The federal courts’ split (highlighted by <em data-start="43571" data-end="43591">La Liberte v. Reid</em>) is an example of this dialectic – some see anti-SLAPP as procedural and hesitate to apply it federally. In the Ninth Circuit, however, it is fully embraced, and the trend there is extending anti-SLAPP to as many scenarios as possible in service of First Amendment interests (as evidenced by cases like <em data-start="43895" data-end="43903">Maddow</em> and <em data-start="43908" data-end="43921">Trump Univ.</em>).</p>
<p class="" data-start="43926" data-end="45500"><strong data-start="43926" data-end="43971">5. Fee Shifting and Deterrence of SLAPPs:</strong> A crucial aspect of California’s anti-SLAPP scheme evident from these cases is the fee-shifting provision – a successful movant gets their attorney’s fees. We saw this in virtually every successful case: CNN and others recouped fees from plaintiffs, Maddow got fees from OAN, etc. For example, in <em data-start="44269" data-end="44293">Briggs v. Eden Council</em>, the defendants ultimately recovered over $425,000 in fees after defeating the SLAPP​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=disputes%2C%20alleging%20that%20the%20organization,for%20attorneys%20fees%20and%20costs" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="43926" data-end="45500">. In <em data-start="44429" data-end="44440">Rosenthal</em> (an earlier case involving an Internet repost, referenced in CASP materials), a defendant even obtained <strong data-start="44545" data-end="44557">$434,000</strong> in fees after winning on Section 230 grounds in an anti-SLAPP context​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Barry%20v,3d%20788" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></p>
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<p class="" data-start="43926" data-end="45500">. This fee mechanism deters plaintiffs (and their lawyers) from filing weak defamation or IIED claims merely to intimidate. Moreover, the advent of malicious prosecution “SLAPPback” suits (as in <em data-start="44914" data-end="44931">Jay v. Mahaffey</em> and <em data-start="44936" data-end="44953">Soukup v. Hafif</em>) ups the stakes: a SLAPP filer might not only pay fees but also damages for harm caused. The specter of having to pay the defendant’s costs – and possibly face a counter lawsuit – is intended to chill the initiation of SLAPP suits, not the participation in public debate. The cases show this policy in action: the <em data-start="45268" data-end="45276">Wayans</em> case ended with the plaintiff owing fees for a frivolous claim about a joke, and in <em data-start="45361" data-end="45373">Mayweather</em>, the celebrity likely recovered fees for the portions he won. Themes of <em data-start="45446" data-end="45462">accountability</em> run parallel to themes of protection.</p>
<p class="" data-start="45502" data-end="46987"><strong data-start="45502" data-end="45554">6. Freedom of the Press and Press-Like Speakers:</strong> Many of these decisions, especially in the last decade, reinforce traditional press freedoms but also extend them to non-traditional speakers. Courts frequently cite First Amendment ideals – e.g., the <em data-start="45756" data-end="45765">Hustler</em> court’s paean to the <em data-start="45787" data-end="45852">“free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest” </em><a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=,or%2C%20by%20reason%20of%20their" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<p class="" data-start="45502" data-end="46987">– and they do not distinguish between a professional news outlet and an individual blogger or social media user when the content is comparable. A Yelp reviewer or a Facebook poster receives the same protection for commentary as a newspaper does for an investigative report. By the same token, anti-SLAPP protections have been invoked by large media companies and celebrities (leading some to argue the law meant for the “little guy” is now also a tool for powerful speakers​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20entertainment%20industry%20just%20chalked,legal%20tool%3A%20California%E2%80%99s%20SLAPP%20law" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></p>
<div class="relative inline-flex items-center"></div>
<p class="" data-start="45502" data-end="46987">). Still, courts apply the statute neutrally: what matters is whether the <em data-start="46538" data-end="46547">subject</em> of the speech is of public significance and whether the <em data-start="46604" data-end="46612">nature</em> of the speech is protected, not the identity or size of the speaker. So while <em data-start="46691" data-end="46699">Murphy</em> or <em data-start="46703" data-end="46708">CNN</em> can use anti-SLAPP against a meritless suit, so can an average citizen blogger. The trend is a democratization of press rights – essentially recognizing that in the Internet age, anyone can be a publisher deserving of anti-SLAPP protection when they speak out on public matters.</p>
<p class="" data-start="46989" data-end="48272">In conclusion, the past ten years of California defamation and emotional distress litigation – viewed through published anti-SLAPP decisions – reveal a judicial system steadfast in shielding free expression. Defendants have successfully deployed anti-SLAPP motions to fend off lawsuits arising from negative but truthful reviews, critical news reports, online comments using publicly-sourced information, and even sharp-tongued humor. The First Amendment values of truth-seeking, debate on public issues, and tolerance for criticism consistently prevail in these cases​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></p>
<div class="relative inline-flex items-center"></div>
<p class="" data-start="46989" data-end="48272">. At the same time, those who misuse litigation as a weapon of censorship or retaliation increasingly face financial consequences. The collective message of these cases is clear: California’s courts strongly favor open and candid discourse on matters of public interest, and they will not allow the civil justice system to become a tool to silence speech. This is in keeping with the highest ideals articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court – that we must protect even unpleasant speech to ensure <em data-start="48142" data-end="48180">“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”</em> debate – and it is given practical effect by the anti-SLAPP law in California’s courtrooms.</p>
<p class="" data-start="48274" data-end="48286"><strong data-start="48274" data-end="48286">Sources:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li data-start="48290" data-end="48381">Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Baral%20v,3d%20604" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48384" data-end="48490">Park v. Bd. of Trustees of CSU, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=2%20Cal,3d%20905" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48493" data-end="48604">FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (Cal. 2019)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=FilmOn,3d%201156" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48607" data-end="48716">Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 871 (Cal. 2019)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=,was%20anything%20other%20than%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48719" data-end="48818">Briggs v. Eden Council, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=The%20Briggses%2C%20landlords%2C%20sued%20our,more%20than%20%24425%2C000%20for%20attorneys" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48821" data-end="48932">Gates v. Discovery Comm’cns, Inc., 34 Cal.4th 679 (Cal. 2004)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Gates%20had%20been%20convicted%20of,Amendment%20and%20current%20case%20law" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="48935" data-end="49029">Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (Cal. 2006)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=allegation,SLAPP%20motion%20was%20properly%20denied" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49032" data-end="49203">Colt v. Freedom Comm’cns, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=The%20Securities%20and%20Exchange%20Commission,complaint%20as%20required%20by%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49206" data-end="49367">Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2017/b266466.html#:~:text=Shantel%20Jackson%20filed%20suit%20against,arose%20from%20protected%20activity%20under" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">law.justia.com</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49370" data-end="49524">Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal.App.5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=A%20California%20Court%20of%20Appeal,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49527" data-end="49682">Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal.App.4th 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1810305.html#:~:text=The%20State%20DOJ%20contends%20the,For%20reasons%20we" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">caselaw.findlaw.com</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49685" data-end="49790">Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=The%20trial%20court%20denied%20an,3d%20624%29%20%20624" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49793" data-end="49901">Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=The%20court%20then%20notes%20the,and%20services%20in%20our%20economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></li>
<li data-start="49904" data-end="50012">Jay v. Mahaffey, 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/1239/AllNews/AwardsAccolades#:~:text=In%20Jay%20v,Mahaffey%20and%20his%20associate%2C%20Ghormley" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">ocbar.org</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50015" data-end="50229">Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394 (Cal. 1996) (Section 230 immunity in anti-SLAPP context)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Barry%20v,3d%20788" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50232" data-end="50415">Soukup v. Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (Cal. 2006) (SLAPPback malicious prosecution allowed)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-supreme-court/#:~:text=Nicole%20Taus%20sued%20defendant%20authors,improper%20intrusion%20into%20private%20matters" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50418" data-end="50567">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/#:~:text=Brennan%20held%20that%20the%20First,gross%20recklessness%20rather%20than%20intent" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">supreme.justia.com</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50570" data-end="50715">Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hustler_Magazine_v._Falwell#:~:text=fame%2C%20shape%20events%20in%20areas,that%20does%20have%20constitutional%20value" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50718" data-end="50853">Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a> <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snyder_v._Phelps#:~:text=Snyder%20v,viewed%20as%20offensive%20or%20outrageous" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">en.wikipedia.org</span></a></li>
<li data-start="50856" data-end="50954">Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=complaint%2C%20and%20the%20appellate%20court,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li>Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.dwt.com/blogs/media-law-monitor/2017/01/the-2016-roundup-of-key-california-antislapp-decis#:~:text=during%20the%20Iraq%20War,on%20a%20brief%20dialogue%20reference" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">dwt.com</span></a></li>
<li>Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></li>
<li>Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.casp.net/california-anti-slapp-first-amendment-law-resources/caselaw/california-courts-of-appeal-cases/#:~:text=complaint%2C%20and%20the%20appellate%20court,SLAPP%20statute" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">casp.net</span></a></li>
<li>La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/la-liberte-v-reid-and-anti-slapp-split#:~:text=La%20Liberte%20v,suits%20under%20the%20Erie%20Doctrine" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">lawreview.uchicago.edu</span></a></li>
<li><em data-start="51754" data-end="51764">The Wrap</em> – Susan Seager, <em data-start="51781" data-end="51842">Hollywood’s Dirty Little Secret to Beat Defamation Lawsuits</em> (Mar. 3, 2017)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.thewrap.com/hollywood-defamation-slapp-law-marlon-wayans/#:~:text=The%20most%20recent%20win%20was,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">thewrap.com</span></a></li>
<li>Eric Goldman, <em data-start="51969" data-end="52012">Ripoff Report…Protected – Chaker v. Mateo</em> (Oct. 8, 2012)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/ripoff_report_a.htm#:~:text=The%20court%20then%20notes%20the,and%20services%20in%20our%20economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">blog.ericgoldman.org</span></a></li>
<li>Gibson Dunn Client Alert, <em data-start="52103" data-end="52141">Recent Developments in CA Anti-SLAPP</em> (July 19, 2021)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/recent-developments-in-california-anti-slapp-case-law-summer-2021/#:~:text=others%20as%20well%20as%20publication,filed%20a%20notice%20of%20appeal" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">gibsondunn.com</span></a></li>
<li>Loeb &amp; Loeb report on <em data-start="52277" data-end="52285">Maddow</em> case (May 22, 2020)​ <a class="ml-1 inline-flex h-[22px] items-center rounded-xl bg-[#f4f4f4] px-2 text-[0.5em] font-medium text-token-text-secondary dark:bg-token-main-surface-secondary !text-token-text-secondary uppercase hover:bg-token-text-primary hover:!text-token-main-surface-secondary dark:hover:bg-token-text-primary group" href="https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/05/herring-networks-v-rachel-maddow#:~:text=District%20court%20dismisses%20defamation%20claim,as%20basis%20for%20defamation%20claim" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="truncate">loeb.com</span></a></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h3><strong>California Supreme Court Cases</strong></h3>
<ol start="1">
<li><strong>Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809</strong>
<ul>
<li>Early anti-SLAPP case establishing that defendants can strike meritless suits targeting free speech on public issues.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82</strong>
<ul>
<li>Held that anti-SLAPP applies even if the lawsuit includes both protected and non-protected activity, requiring plaintiffs to show minimal merit for claims to survive.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376</strong>
<ul>
<li>Clarified that anti-SLAPP motions can target specific claims within a lawsuit, not just entire causes of action.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133</strong>
<ul>
<li>Applied anti-SLAPP to commercial speech, emphasizing the statute’s broad protection for speech in the public interest.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><strong>California Appellate Court Cases</strong></h3>
<ol start="1">
<li><strong>Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260</strong>
<ul>
<li>Anti-SLAPP applied to dismiss defamation claims against attorneys, reinforcing protections for litigation-related speech.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354</strong>
<ul>
<li>Upheld emotional distress damages in a defamation case but dismissed under anti-SLAPP due to lack of evidence of actual malice.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Aguilar v. Hutton (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110</strong>
<ul>
<li>Discussed emotional distress as damages in defamation, requiring clear evidence of harm for claims to survive anti-SLAPP.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><strong>Federal District Courts (California)</strong></h3>
<ol start="1">
<li><strong>Makaeff v. Trump University LLC (N.D. Cal. 2013)</strong>
<ul>
<li>Applied California’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal court, dismissing defamation claims against a consumer review platform.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Hilton v. Hallmark Cards (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 894</strong>
<ul>
<li>9th Circuit precedent allowing anti-SLAPP motions in federal courts, influencing district courts in California to apply state anti-SLAPP standards.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><strong>U.S. Supreme Court Cases</strong></h3>
<ol start="1">
<li><strong>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254</strong>
<ul>
<li>Established &#8220;actual malice&#8221; standard for defamation of public officials, foundational for media defense.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323</strong>
<ul>
<li>Ruled that private figures must prove negligence (not actual malice) but cannot recover punitive damages without showing malice.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989) 491 U.S. 657</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced that reckless disregard for truth satisfies actual malice, critical in defamation suits against media.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><strong>Key Themes</strong></h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Anti-SLAPP</strong>: California courts robustly apply anti-SLAPP to dismiss defamation suits against journalists unless plaintiffs demonstrate minimal merit.</li>
<li><strong>Emotional Distress</strong>: Often tied to defamation claims but requires specific proof of harm; anti-SLAPP may dismiss claims lacking evidence of malice.</li>
<li><strong>Federal vs. State</strong>: Federal courts in the 9th Circuit (including California districts) may apply anti-SLAPP, guided by constitutional standards from SCOTUS.</li>
</ul>
<p>This framework highlights the interplay between state protections (anti-SLAPP) and federal constitutional standards (actual malice) in defending press freedom.</p>
<hr />
<p>Here’s a targeted analysis of cases addressing <strong>truthful but negative reviews</strong>, <strong>use of public social media content</strong>, and <strong>creative aggregation of photos/videos</strong>, with a focus on anti-SLAPP, defamation, and emotional distress claims in the jurisdictions you specified:</p>
<h3><strong>1. Truthful Negative Reviews &amp; Anti-SLAPP Protections</strong></h3>
<h4><strong>Key Cases</strong>:</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Yelp Inc. v. Hassell Law Group (2018) 247 Cal.App.4th 1156 (California Appellate Court)</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: A law firm sued Yelp to remove negative but truthful reviews.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP protected Yelp and the reviewers because truthful criticism on matters of public interest (legal services) is protected speech. Emotional distress claims tied to truthful reviews were dismissed.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: An employer sought to unmask anonymous employees who posted critical but truthful reviews.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP barred disclosure of identities; truthful reviews on workplace conditions are protected under the First Amendment and California law.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Matin v. AOL Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 2016 WL 5807456</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: A doctor sued over negative reviews that were factually accurate.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP applied in federal court; truthful statements cannot support defamation or emotional distress claims, even if harmful.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong>2. Use of Public Social Media Content</strong></h3>
<h4><strong>Key Cases</strong>:</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1146</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Use of publicly posted images (thumbnails) by Google.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Transformative use of public content (e.g., search engines) is fair use under copyright law. Applied to aggregation of social media content.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Scraping public LinkedIn profiles for data analytics.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Publicly available social media data is not protected by privacy laws; its use is permissible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).</li>
<li><strong>Note</strong>: While not a defamation case, it reinforces that public posts are fair game for repurposing.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Garcia v. Google, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 786 F.3d 733</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Use of a publicly posted performance in a video.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Limited copyright protection for social media content unless it meets originality standards. Creators can use public content if it’s transformative.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong>3. Emotional Distress Claims &amp; Truthful Speech</strong></h3>
<h4><strong>Key Cases</strong>:</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443 (U.S. Supreme Court)</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Emotional distress claims against protesters for offensive but truthful speech.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Truthful speech on public issues is protected, even if it inflicts emotional harm. Applied to media/journalists using truthful criticism.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Publication of a rape victim’s name (truthfully obtained from public records).</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Truthful information lawfully obtained is protected; emotional distress claims cannot override First Amendment rights.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Yeager v. Bowlin (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1076</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Emotional distress claims over truthful reporting of criminal history.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP dismissed the suit; truthful reporting is not &#8220;outrageous conduct,&#8221; even if distressing.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong>4. Creative Use of Public Social Media Content</strong></h3>
<h4><strong>Key Cases</strong>:</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015) 801 F.3d 1126</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Use of a YouTube video (including public content) for commentary.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Fair use protects transformative creations (e.g., parody, criticism) using public material.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens (4th Cir. 2011) 619 F.3d 301</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Use of copyrighted logos in historical videos.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Creative reuse of public content (even copyrighted) in transformative works is fair use.</li>
<li><strong>Note</strong>: While not a California case, it informs federal courts’ approach to social media content reuse.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CrossFit, Inc. v. National Strength and Conditioning Ass’n (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 5622281</strong>
<ul>
<li><strong>Issue</strong>: Use of public social media posts in a critical documentary.</li>
<li><strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP protected the filmmakers; truthful compilation of public posts for commentary is protected speech.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong>Key Takeaways</strong>:</h3>
<ol start="1">
<li><strong>Truthful Criticism</strong>: Courts consistently protect negative reviews/posts if factual, even if emotionally harmful (anti-SLAPP dismisses claims).</li>
<li><strong>Public Social Media Content</strong>:
<ul>
<li>No expectation of privacy or copyright control over public posts (fair use applies to transformative works).</li>
<li>Anti-SLAPP protects aggregation/repurposing for commentary (e.g., documentaries, reviews).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Emotional Distress</strong>: Claims fail unless the defendant’s conduct is independently wrongful (e.g., harassment), not just truthful speech.</li>
</ol>
<hr />
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">Anti Slapp Law Resources:</span></h1>
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		<title>Doxing VS the First Amendment: U.S. and California Law</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/doxing-vs-the-first-amendment-u-s-and-california-law/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Aug 2025 23:38:24 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Doxing VS the First Amendment: U.S. and California Law YOUR IP ADDRESS IS: This is your computer Internet Protocol Address A locator that leads to your very machine! The freedoms of speech are not doxxing at all but an expression of free speech. The ability to publish materials that make others uncomfortable or unhappy is [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 data-start="0" data-end="57">Doxing VS the First Amendment: U.S. and California Law</h1>
<h4>YOUR IP ADDRESS IS: <em><span style="color: #008000;">148.113.130.200</span></em><span style="color: #ff00ff;"> This is your computer Internet Protocol Address A locator that leads to your very machine!</span></h4>
<div class="AdPoic" role="heading" aria-level="3" data-processed="true">The freedoms of speech are not doxxing at all but an expression of free speech. The ability to publish materials that make others uncomfortable or unhappy is the freedoms afforded to us in and by the US constitution. The material do not violated the constitution as long as they do not instruct others to committ any violence or civil unrest or destruction.  All peaceful assembly is allowed, we must not obstuct highways or sidewalks but allow others to pass while conveying our message peacefully and without intent to cause incitement or harm.  Matters of public interest are not decided by the person who the matter is about but by those who believe it is of interst. The line of public interest stops with the truth&#8230; no one can lie or commit defamation using false words.</div>
<div role="heading" aria-level="3" data-processed="true"></div>
<blockquote>
<div role="heading" aria-level="3" data-processed="true"><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em class="nd">Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.</em></span></strong></div>
</blockquote>
<div role="heading" aria-level="3" data-processed="true"></div>
<div class="Y3BBE" data-hveid="CAAQBQ" data-processed="true">First Amendment protections for doxxing are strongest in cases involving truthful information on matters of public concern.<span class="" data-wiz-rootname="ohfaMd" data-processed="true"><span class="vKEkVd" data-animation-atomic="" data-processed="true"> </span></span></div>
<ul class="U6u95" data-processed="true">
<li data-hveid="CAAQBw" data-processed="true"><span class="T286Pc" data-processed="true"><b class="Yjhzub" data-processed="true">Public records:</b> Publishing lawfully obtained information from the public domain, such as public records, is generally protected speech.</span></li>
<li data-hveid="CAAQCA" data-processed="true"><span class="T286Pc" data-processed="true"><b class="Yjhzub" data-processed="true">Public figures:</b> The First Amendment grants wider latitude for reporting on public officials or figures. For example, investigative journalists can publish details like a political candidate&#8217;s address to report on a matter of public concern.</span></li>
<li data-hveid="CAAQCQ" data-processed="true"><span class="T286Pc" data-processed="true"><b class="Yjhzub" data-processed="true">Whistleblowing:</b> Revealing the identities of participants in public disturbances or behavior that the public may encounter or someone in their neighborhood is partaking in or part of, have been protected speech when the information is relevant to public cocern &amp; debate and that is not up to the one who feels with feelings offended, its back by standards of law.</span><span class="" data-wiz-rootname="ohfaMd" data-processed="true"><span class="vKEkVd" data-animation-atomic="" data-processed="true"> </span></span></li>
</ul>
<h3></h3>
<p>THERE IS NO LAW THAT CAN PREVENT PEACEFUL PUBLIC ASSEMBLY THAT IS NON VIOLENT PEACEFUL AND LAWFUL BEHAVIOR NOT TO DISTURB THE PEACE OR BLOCK THOROUGHFAIR OR WALKWAYS AND NOT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">HOWEVER THERE IS THE 1ST AMENDMENT AND THIS IS A NEWSPAPER AND THIS IS MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST &amp; CONCERN AND PUBLIC SAFETY AS ELDERLY NEED THEIR MONEY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTORNEY BACKED BY THE CALIFORNIA BAR DEFEND THEIR THEFT OF ELDERLY MONIES PAID FOR A TRUST NEVER RECIEVED TO THIS VERY DATE!</span></strong></p></blockquote>
<p>SO ENJOY OUR FREEDOMS BABY! The USA is one of a kind and deserves resepect!</p>
<div style="width: 640px;" class="wp-video"><video class="wp-video-shortcode" id="video-21581-1" width="640" height="360" autoplay preload="metadata" controls="controls"><source type="video/mp4" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Hahaha-fuck-you-Mr-Chow-The-Hangover.mp4?_=1" /><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Hahaha-fuck-you-Mr-Chow-The-Hangover.mp4">https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Hahaha-fuck-you-Mr-Chow-The-Hangover.mp4</a></video></div>
<p data-start="59" data-end="1112"><strong data-start="59" data-end="86">Definition of “Doxing.”</strong> <em data-start="88" data-end="96">Doxing</em> (also spelled “doxing”) generally means publishing an individual’s personal identifying information without their consent, often to harass or intimidate <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Doxxing%20,numbers%2C%20and%20names%20of%20employers" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. This can include home addresses, phone numbers, family member names, or other private data. Although doxing is widely criticized, U.S. law recognizes a strong presumption that truthful speech on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment.<span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong> The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: <em data-start="604" data-end="735">“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble” </em></strong></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Likewise, the California Constitution expressly states that <strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em data-start="835" data-end="899">“A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press”</em></span></strong><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. These provisions protect robust public debate, even when it involves offensive or hurtful speech<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="1114" data-end="2367"><strong data-start="1114" data-end="1149">Free Speech and Public Concern.</strong> The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that publishing truthful information on public matters enjoys the highest protection. For example, the Court noted that<span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong> “the First Amendment generally protects the publication of truthful information”</strong></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=First%2C%20anti,and%20other%20publishers%20and%20speakers" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>, reflecting the principle that <span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><em data-start="1459" data-end="1569">“state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards” </em></strong></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%C2%A0Smith%20v,than%20intercepting%20the%20material%20illegally" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. In <span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><em data-start="1612" data-end="1648">Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.</em> (1979)</strong></span>, the Court struck down a state law that barred naming juvenile offenders, emphasizing that newspapers and other speakers cannot be punished for publishing lawfully obtained facts (the so-called “Daily Mail principle”) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%C2%A0Smith%20v,than%20intercepting%20the%20material%20illegally" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Likewise, <strong><em data-start="1923" data-end="1944">Bartnicki v. Vopper</em> (2001)</strong> held that the First Amendment protects a publisher who retransmits truthful information obtained unlawfully by a third party, so long as the publisher itself did not participate in any wrongdoing<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20also%20protects,the%20information%20from%20the%20source" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. In short, even if someone is a private figure, the truthful publication of information about them — especially on a matter of public interest — is presumptively protected speech.</p>
<p data-start="2369" data-end="3361"><strong data-start="2369" data-end="2399">Scope of Protected Speech.</strong> U.S. law also broadly protects speech that many find offensive. The flag‑burning decision <em data-start="2492" data-end="2510">Texas v. Johnson</em> (1989) confirmed that protecting controversial or disturbing speech is a “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Second%2C%20many%20anti,dead%20soldiers%E2%80%9D%20%E2%80%94%20was%20protected" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Similarly, <strong><em data-start="2677" data-end="2695">Snyder v. Phelps</em> (2011)</strong> upheld Westboro Baptist Church’s right to picket military funerals with hateful signs, explaining that <em data-start="2806" data-end="2872">“we have chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues”</em> because punishing it would stifle public debate <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. And <strong><em data-start="2966" data-end="2998">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em> (1964)</strong> famously declared a “profound national commitment” to uninhibited debate on public issues, tolerating even “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. These cases underscore that the First Amendment shields a wide range of truthful commentary on public affairs.</p>
<p data-start="3363" data-end="4324"><strong data-start="3363" data-end="3396">Exceptions: Limits on Speech.</strong> Not all speech is protected. Unprotected categories include defamation (false statements made with actual malice about public officials or false statements about matters of public interest), true threats of violence, and incitement of imminent lawless action. For instance, if a speaker knowingly publishes false statements about a person, that may be libelous; but truth is an absolute defense, and public‐figure plaintiffs must meet the high “actual malice” standard of <em data-start="3849" data-end="3859">Sullivan</em>. Likewise, if a speaker’s actions constitute a <em data-start="3908" data-end="3921">true threat</em> (e.g. <em data-start="3928" data-end="3947">Virginia v. Black</em>), or if the speech is intended and likely to produce imminent violence (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969), then it falls outside First Amendment protection. Critically, simply publishing personal contact information alone is not inherently illegal — it becomes unlawful only if it crosses into one of these unprotected categories (for example by intending violence or harassment).</p>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="Vtf4kqfDtW"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-first-amendment/">First Amendment</a></p></blockquote>
<p><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;First Amendment&#8221; &#8212; Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech &amp; Political Content" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-first-amendment/embed/#?secret=PNWW9JPTLi#?secret=Vtf4kqfDtW" data-secret="Vtf4kqfDtW" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/us-v-popa-187-f-3d-672-court-of-appeals-dist-of-columbia-circuit-1999/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Ion Popa</span></a> left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”</p>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/true-threats-virginia-v-black-is-most-comprehensive-supreme-court-definition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">True Threats Test</a> &#8211; <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-decision/">Virginia v. Black</a> <span style="color: #ff0000;">is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition</span></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miller-v-california-obscenity-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Miller v. California &#8211; 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) &#8211; 1st Amendment 1st</span></a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Watts v. United States</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">True Threat Test</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff00ff;">1st Amendment</span></a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/clear-and-present-danger-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Clear and Present Danger Test</a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/gravity-of-the-evil-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Gravity of the Evil Test</a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miller-v-california-obscenity-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Miller v. California &#8211; 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) &#8211; 1st Amendment 1st</span></a></strong></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=2693&amp;preview=true"><strong><em>Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489</em></strong></a> The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/norton-v-shelby-county-118-us-178-1886/"><strong><em>Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886)</em></strong></a> An unconstitutional &#8220;law &#8221; is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/marbury-v-madison/"><strong><em>Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803)</em></strong></a> All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States</li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-v-sutton-63-minn-167-65-nw-262-30-lra-630/"><strong><em>State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459</em></strong></a></span> When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/norton-v-shelby-county-118-us-178-1886/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><em>Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. </em></strong></a>&#8220;An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.&#8221;</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/bell-v-hood/"><strong><em>Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. &#8212; So. Dist. CA.</em></strong></a> History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/simmons-v-united-states/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">SIMMONS v US, supra.</a> </em></strong>&#8220;We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/sable-communications-of-california-v-federal-communications-commission-1989/"><strong><em>Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)</em></strong></a><strong><br />
</strong>When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rosenfeld-v-new-jersey-1972/"><strong><em>United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972)</em></strong></a> it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment&#8221;<em><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rosenfeld-v-new-jersey-1972/"> State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889</a></strong></em></li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miranda-vs-arizona-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Miranda vs Arizona</a>, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 </em></strong>&#8220;Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cohen-v-california-1971/">Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),</a>  </em></strong>The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The     Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.</li>
<li>
<pre><em> Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
</em><em> make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
 Pp. <span class="l-normaldigitafter"><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/#22">403 U. S. 22</a></span>-26.</em><em> Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)</em><em><a class="related-case" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/1/94.html">1 Cal. App. 3d 94</a>, <a class="related-case" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/1/94.html">81 Cal. Rptr. 503</a>, reversed.</em></pre>
<p><em> HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. <span class="l-normaldigitafter"><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/#27">403 U. S. 27</a></span>.<br />
</em></li>
<li><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/people-v-boomer-mich-ct-app-2002/"><strong>People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002)</strong></a> “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”<br />
</em></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rav-v-st-paul-1992/"><strong><em>A.V v St Paul 1992</em></strong></a> Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as <a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/967/hate-speech">hate speech</a>words “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/karlan-v-city-of-cincinnati-1974/"><strong><em>Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974)</em></strong></a> Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reno-v-american-civil-liberties-union-1997/"><strong><em>Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)</em></strong></a><br />
<a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1119/internet">speech on the Internet</a>is entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/bible-believers-…nty-6th-cir-2015/"><strong>Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)</strong></a><br />
The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a <a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/968/heckler-s-veto">heckler’s veto</a>.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/albert-krantz-v-city-of-fort-smith/"><strong>Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith</strong></a><em><strong><br />
</strong></em>A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the<strong> distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. </strong>In this ruling informed by the <strong>First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.</strong></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/lucas-v-arkansas-1974/"><strong><em>Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)</em></strong></a><strong><em><br />
</em></strong>The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/uzuegbunam-v-preczewski-2021/"><strong><em>Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021)</em></strong></a> authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/lewis-v-city-of-new-orleans-1974/"><strong><em>Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) </em></strong></a><em> The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman&#8217;s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).</em></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/city-of-houston-v-hill-1987/"><strong><em>City of Houston v. Hill (1987)</em></strong></a>  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.<br />
<strong><br />
</strong></li>
<li><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-nebraska-appellee-v-darren-j-drahota-appellant/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA</a> &#8211;</strong> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-nebraska-appellee-v-darren-j-drahota-appellant/">Darren <strong>Drahota</strong></a> sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)</li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-iowa-appellee-v-william-james-fratzke/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant</a></span> &#8211;</strong>  <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-iowa-appellee-v-william-james-fratzke/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>William</strong> Fratzke</a> was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.</li>
<li><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-v-thomas-g-smith/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span style="color: #0000ff;">State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith</span></em></a> &#8211;</strong> <a href="https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&amp;seqNo=115994" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Thomas Smith</a> was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)</li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/commonwealth-v-harvey-j-bigelow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><em>Commonwealth v. Bigelow</em></strong></a> &#8211; </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/commonwealth-v-harvey-j-bigelow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Harvey Bigelow</span></a> sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/insulting-letters-to-politicians-home-are-constitutionally-protected/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>read the newspaper article of his exact doings here</em></a></li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-people-v-david-thomas-powers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166</a></strong></em>.</span> (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-people-v-david-thomas-powers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS </a> determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/us-v-popa-187-f-3d-672-court-of-appeals-dist-of-columbia-circuit-1999/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Ion Popa</span></strong></em></a> left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”</li>
<li><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/zamos-v-stroud-district-attorney-liable-for-bad-faith-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zamos v. Stroud</a> </strong>California Supreme Court, 2004 32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802 <span style="color: #008000;"><strong><em>The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.\</em></strong></span></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h1 data-start="472" data-end="509">The legal frame (U.S. + California)</h1>
<ul data-start="511" data-end="1122">
<li data-start="511" data-end="828">
<p data-start="513" data-end="828"><strong data-start="513" data-end="539">First Amendment (U.S.)</strong>: Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., <em data-start="653" data-end="667">true threats</em>, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Congress.gov</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="829" data-end="1122">
<p data-start="831" data-end="1122"><strong data-start="831" data-end="874">California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a)</strong>: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.calstate.edu/csu-system/administration/general-counsel/Documents/FreeSpeechHandbook.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">California State University</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="1124" data-end="1200">California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech</h1>
<ul data-start="1202" data-end="1770">
<li data-start="1202" data-end="1568">
<p data-start="1204" data-end="1568"><strong data-start="1204" data-end="1238">Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6)</strong>: “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and <strong data-start="1281" data-end="1338">“Constitutionally protected activity is not included”</strong>; “harassment” must <em data-start="1358" data-end="1369">seriously</em> alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they <strong data-start="1456" data-end="1466">cannot</strong> support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)</p>
</li>
<li data-start="1569" data-end="1770">
<p data-start="1571" data-end="1770"><strong data-start="1571" data-end="1604">Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9)</strong>: Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says <strong data-start="1676" data-end="1731">constitutionally protected activity is not included</strong>.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="1772" data-end="1822">What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?</h1>
<h1><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class=" wp-image-21525 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment.jpg" alt="" width="680" height="380" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment.jpg 780w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment-400x224.jpg 400w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment-768x429.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 680px) 100vw, 680px" /></h1>
<p data-start="1824" data-end="1844">Protected (examples)</p>
<ul data-start="1845" data-end="2535">
<li data-start="1845" data-end="2191">
<p data-start="1847" data-end="2191"><strong data-start="1847" data-end="1884">Opinions, criticism, and advocacy</strong> on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. <em data-start="2041" data-end="2059">Snyder v. Phelps</em> protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="2192" data-end="2535">
<p data-start="2194" data-end="2535"><strong data-start="2194" data-end="2231">Speech without intent to threaten</strong>: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least <strong data-start="2332" data-end="2346">recklessly</strong> disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (<em data-start="2465" data-end="2489">Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 2023). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Supreme Court</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p data-start="2537" data-end="2561">Not protected (examples)</p>
<ul data-start="2562" data-end="3305">
<li data-start="2562" data-end="2935">
<p data-start="2564" data-end="2935"><strong data-start="2564" data-end="2593">True threats/intimidation</strong> (Virginia v. <em data-start="2607" data-end="2614">Black</em>), <strong data-start="2617" data-end="2658">incitement to imminent lawless action</strong> (<em data-start="2660" data-end="2673">Brandenburg</em>), <strong data-start="2676" data-end="2689">obscenity</strong> (<em data-start="2691" data-end="2699">Miller</em>), and <strong data-start="2706" data-end="2720">defamation</strong>. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/492?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Oyez</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="2936" data-end="3305">
<p data-start="2938" data-end="3305"><strong data-start="2938" data-end="2972">Targeted residential picketing</strong>, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral <strong data-start="3028" data-end="3051">time, place, manner</strong> limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (<em data-start="3143" data-end="3151">Frisby</em> upheld a narrow residential rule; <em data-start="3186" data-end="3194">Madsen</em> partially limited an injunction; <em data-start="3228" data-end="3238">McCullen</em> struck a broad buffer zone.) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/474/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep512/usrep512753/usrep512753.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="3307" data-end="3368">How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech</h1>
<ul data-start="3370" data-end="4010">
<li data-start="3370" data-end="3731">
<p data-start="3372" data-end="3731">Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. <em data-start="3491" data-end="3507">Evans v. Evans</em> reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; <em data-start="3579" data-end="3615">Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen</em> allowed a <strong data-start="3626" data-end="3640">post-trial</strong> injunction limited to statements found defamatory. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="3732" data-end="4010">
<p data-start="3734" data-end="4010">In protest contexts, courts allow <strong data-start="3768" data-end="3778">narrow</strong> restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (<em data-start="3903" data-end="3929">Huntingdon Life Sciences</em> decisions illustrate drawing that line.) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1391486.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="4012" data-end="4077">Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed</h1>
<p data-start="4079" data-end="4611">If you’re sued in California over your posts, flyers, or comments, <strong data-start="4146" data-end="4175">file an anti-SLAPP motion</strong> (CCP § 425.16). It’s a two-step test: (1) show the claims arise from protected petitioning/speech; then (2) plaintiff must show a <strong data-start="4306" data-end="4335">probability of prevailing</strong>. If they can’t, the court strikes the claims and awards you fees. California courts instruct that § 425.16 <strong data-start="4443" data-end="4472">must be construed broadly</strong>; parts of “mixed” claims can be struck; but <strong data-start="4517" data-end="4554">illegal conduct (e.g., extortion)</strong> isn’t protected. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-425-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/29/53.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2600567/flatley-v-mauro/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">CourtListener</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
<h1 data-start="4613" data-end="4691"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!</span></h1>
<ol data-start="4693" data-end="6652">
<li data-start="4693" data-end="5141">
<p data-start="4696" data-end="5141"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="4696" data-end="4753">“Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”</strong></span><br data-start="4753" data-end="4756" />“Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it <strong data-start="4984" data-end="4994">cannot</strong> satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-527-6/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=646.9" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">LegInfo</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="5143" data-end="5396">
<p data-start="5146" data-end="5396"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5146" data-end="5187">“No threats, no imminence, no crime.”</strong></span><br data-start="5187" data-end="5190" />Under <em data-start="5199" data-end="5211">Counterman</em>, the State must prove at least <strong data-start="5243" data-end="5259">recklessness</strong> as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Supreme Court</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="5398" data-end="5753">
<p data-start="5401" data-end="5753"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5401" data-end="5437">“Prior restraint is disfavored.”</strong></span><br data-start="5437" data-end="5440" />Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite <em data-start="5613" data-end="5620">Evans</em> (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish <em data-start="5663" data-end="5678">Balboa Island</em> (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="5755" data-end="5985">
<p data-start="5758" data-end="5985"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5758" data-end="5809">“Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”</strong></span><br data-start="5809" data-end="5812" />Like <em data-start="5820" data-end="5838">Snyder v. Phelps</em>, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="5987" data-end="6272">
<p data-start="5990" data-end="6272"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5990" data-end="6034">“Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.</strong></span><br data-start="6034" data-end="6037" />If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only <strong data-start="6121" data-end="6131">narrow</strong> content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/474/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="6274" data-end="6652">
<p data-start="6277" data-end="6652"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="6277" data-end="6328">Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.</strong></span><br data-start="6328" data-end="6331" />Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite <em data-start="6544" data-end="6553">Equilon</em> (broad construction) and <em data-start="6579" data-end="6586">Baral</em> (strike protected parts). <span class="" data-state="delayed-open" aria-describedby="radix-«rhn»"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill" aria-describedby="radix-«rhn»"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium bg-token-text-primary! text-token-main-surface-primary! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/29/53.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F] text-token-main-surface-tertiary">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ol>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="gDIjNmI245"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-value-of-telling-the-truth-speaking-upright/">The Value of Telling the Truth &#8211; Speaking Upright</a></p></blockquote>
<p><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;The Value of Telling the Truth &#8211; Speaking Upright&#8221; &#8212; Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech &amp; Political Content" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-value-of-telling-the-truth-speaking-upright/embed/#?secret=pflJaU0dDD#?secret=gDIjNmI245" data-secret="gDIjNmI245" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<hr />
<h2 data-start="4865" data-end="4920">I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”</h2>
<p data-start="4921" data-end="5397">Section 527.6 defines “harassment” as a “course of conduct” that seriously alarms/annoys and serves <strong data-start="5021" data-end="5046">no legitimate purpose</strong>, but it expressly states: “<strong data-start="5074" data-end="5129">Constitutionally protected activity is not included</strong> within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (CCP § 527.6(b)(1).) The same carve-out appears in the stalking statute. (Pen. Code § 646.9(k).) If the petition relies on Zullo’s non-threatening flyers/posts about public issues, the petition <strong data-start="5368" data-end="5397">fails as a matter of law.</strong></p>
<h2 data-start="5399" data-end="5438">II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION</h2>
<p data-start="5439" data-end="5816">A speech-based restraining order requires more than repeated criticism. The First Amendment prohibits punishment of speech unless it is a <strong data-start="5577" data-end="5592">true threat</strong> or otherwise unprotected; after <em data-start="5625" data-end="5637">Counterman</em>, the speaker must have at least recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of the communication. (600 U.S. at 73–82.) Nothing in petitioner’s declarations meets that standard.</p>
<h2 data-start="5818" data-end="5875">III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID</h2>
<p data-start="5876" data-end="6166">Broad bans on speech before any adjudication of falsity or illegality are unconstitutional prior restraints. (<em data-start="5986" data-end="5993">Evans</em>, 162 Cal.App.4th at 1169–1173.) Only <strong data-start="6031" data-end="6053">narrow, post-trial</strong> injunctive relief limited to statements adjudicated false may issue. (<em data-start="6124" data-end="6139">Balboa Island</em>, 40 Cal.4th at 1156–1161.)</p>
<h2>IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS</h2>
<p><strong data-start="6445" data-end="6523">Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200) / Secondary-Evidence Rule (Evid. Code § 1521):</strong> If the content of a writing (including digital posts; Evid. Code § 250) is offered for its truth, petitioner must lay the foundation or present the original/credible secondary evidence; partial, illegible images lacking context should be excluded or given no weight.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2 data-start="7524" data-end="7589">V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)</h2>
<p data-start="7590" data-end="7970">If the Court believes some <strong data-start="7617" data-end="7628">conduct</strong> (not speech) crossed a line (e.g., trespass, targeted residential picketing), any order must be <strong data-start="7725" data-end="7744">content-neutral</strong> and <strong data-start="7749" data-end="7770">narrowly tailored</strong> time/place/manner relief. (<em data-start="7798" data-end="7817">Frisby v. Schultz</em> (1988) 487 U.S. 474; <em data-start="7839" data-end="7860">McCullen v. Coakley</em> (2014) 573 U.S. 464.) A broad ban on speaking, posting, or distributing literature would be unconstitutional.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h2 data-start="9222" data-end="9265">Quick cite list (tables/points)</h2>
<ul data-start="9266" data-end="10240">
<li data-start="9266" data-end="9523">
<p data-start="9268" data-end="9523"><strong data-start="9268" data-end="9301">Anti-SLAPP scope &amp; mechanics:</strong> <em data-start="9302" data-end="9347">Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.</em> (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; <em data-start="9370" data-end="9392">Navellier v. Sletten</em> (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; <em data-start="9415" data-end="9433">Baral v. Schnitt</em> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; <em data-start="9456" data-end="9468">FilmOn.com</em> (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; <em data-start="9491" data-end="9498">Bonni</em> (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9524" data-end="9600">
<p data-start="9526" data-end="9600"><strong data-start="9526" data-end="9535">Fees:</strong> CCP § 425.16(c)(1); <em data-start="9556" data-end="9574">Ketchum v. Moses</em> (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9601" data-end="9831">
<p data-start="9603" data-end="9831"><strong data-start="9603" data-end="9634">First Amendment protection:</strong> <em data-start="9635" data-end="9653">Snyder v. Phelps</em> (2011) 562 U.S. 443; <em data-start="9675" data-end="9699">Counterman v. Colorado</em> (2023) 600 U.S. 66; <em data-start="9720" data-end="9731">Milkovich</em> (1990) 497 U.S. 1; <em data-start="9751" data-end="9758">Hepps</em> (1986) 475 U.S. 767; <em data-start="9780" data-end="9808">New York Times v. Sullivan</em> (1964) 376 U.S. 254.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9832" data-end="9942">
<p data-start="9834" data-end="9942"><strong data-start="9834" data-end="9854">Prior restraint:</strong> <em data-start="9855" data-end="9871">Evans v. Evans</em> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; <em data-start="9901" data-end="9916">Balboa Island</em> (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9943" data-end="10013">
<p data-start="9945" data-end="10013"><strong data-start="9945" data-end="9970">Harassment carve-out:</strong> CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).</p>
</li>
<li data-start="10014" data-end="10089">
<p data-start="10016" data-end="10089"><strong data-start="10016" data-end="10045">Aiding/Conspiracy limits:</strong> <em data-start="10046" data-end="10065">Applied Equipment</em> (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="10090" data-end="10240">
<p data-start="10092" data-end="10240"><strong data-start="10092" data-end="10111">Authentication:</strong> Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; <em data-start="10148" data-end="10166">People v. Valdez</em> (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; <em data-start="10196" data-end="10217">People v. Goldsmith</em> (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li data-start="8347" data-end="8491">
<p data-start="8349" data-end="8491"><strong data-start="8349" data-end="8360">Statute</strong>: <strong data-start="8362" data-end="8389">Penal Code §653m(a)–(e)</strong> (text incl. <strong data-start="8402" data-end="8416">good-faith</strong> and <strong data-start="8421" data-end="8436">return-call</strong> provisions). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://california.public.law/codes/penal_code_section_653m" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">California.Public.Law</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8492" data-end="8693">
<p data-start="8494" data-end="8693"><strong data-start="8494" data-end="8523">Constitutionality &amp; scope</strong>: <strong data-start="8525" data-end="8548">People v. Hernandez</strong>, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) &amp; (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/231/1376.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8694" data-end="8852">
<p data-start="8696" data-end="8852"><strong data-start="8696" data-end="8720">Return-call pleading</strong>: <strong data-start="8722" data-end="8745">People v. Lampasona</strong>, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/71/884.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8853" data-end="9025">
<p data-start="8855" data-end="9025"><strong data-start="8855" data-end="8889">First Amendment “true threats”</strong>: <strong data-start="8891" data-end="8917">Watts v. United States</strong>, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); <strong data-start="8940" data-end="8961">Virginia v. Black</strong>, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/705/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="9026" data-end="9198">
<p data-start="9028" data-end="9198"><strong data-start="9028" data-end="9058">Public-concern/petitioning</strong>: <strong data-start="9060" data-end="9080">Snyder v. Phelps</strong>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); <strong data-start="9103" data-end="9134">NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware</strong>, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/562/443/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="9199" data-end="9325">
<p data-start="9201" data-end="9325"><strong data-start="9201" data-end="9222">Demurrer standard</strong>: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.closeupsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2020/09/Velyvis-decision.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">closeupsblog.com</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h2 data-start="5285" data-end="6115"><strong><span style="color: #3366ff;">OUR INTENT<span style="color: #000000;"> SO ITS</span> <em><span style="color: #ff6600;">VERY</span> CLEAR</em></span></strong></h2>
<ul>
<li>THERE IS NO THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR HARM</li>
<li>THERE IS ONLY INTENT OF PEACE AND CONEYING OUR MESSAGE</li>
<li>TO USE THE 1ST AMENDMENT IN EVERY FACET, PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES TO POST IN OUR NEWSPAPER</li>
<li>TO ADDRESS BEHAVIORS OR MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN;</li>
<li>THESE MATTERS INVOLVE PUBLIC FIGURES AND/ PUBLIC OFFICIALS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO GOVERMENT EMPLOYEES</li>
<li>TO USE WEBPAGE (LEAFLETS) WITH THE INTENT TO PEACEFULY ASSEMBLE WITHOUT PHYSICAL ALTERCATION AND WITHOUT TRESSPASSING ONTO ANY PERSON&#8217;S PROPERTY</li>
<li>THERE IS NO THREAT TO PERSON, THERE IS NOT THREAT TO INJURY, THERE IS NO INCITEMENT.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span data-huuid="14336605915669242140">To address behaviors or matters of public interest and concern is to take action, communicate, or engage with issues that are relevant to the broader community&#8217;s social, political, and economic welfare, rather than just the private lives of individuals. </span><span data-huuid="14336605915669242623">This involves evaluating issues based on their objective link to the public good, aiming to reach a wide audience, and often involving advocacy, legal action, or whistleblowing to promote social justice or transparency.<span class="pjBG2e" data-cid="e22604ea-ffcf-48e3-b18e-a845b064825e"><span class="UV3uM"> </span></span></span></p>
<p>DISHONESTY, FAILING FIDICIARY DUTIES, LYING, STEALING OR ANY BEHAVIORS THAT GO AGAINST PUBLIC TRUST OR PENAL CODE OR OTHER PUBLIC NOTICES LIKE THOSE WHO HELP OR HARBOR THESE TYPE PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW WHO HELPS THOSE BREAK THE LAW, COMMIT DECIET, ETC&#8230; ETC&#8230;</p>
<hr />
<p data-start="6117" data-end="6233"><strong data-start="6117" data-end="6151">Key Precedents and Principles:</strong> Important case law reinforces that truthful public‐interest speech is protected:</p>
<ul data-start="6235" data-end="7574">
<li data-start="6235" data-end="6532">
<p data-start="6237" data-end="6532"><strong data-start="6237" data-end="6283">Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979):</strong> Held that criminalizing publication of a juvenile offender’s name violated the First Amendment, reaffirming that truthfully reporting information (even if sensitive) is usually constitutionally safeguarded <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%C2%A0Smith%20v,than%20intercepting%20the%20material%20illegally" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="6533" data-end="6797">
<p data-start="6535" data-end="6797"><strong data-start="6535" data-end="6566">Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001):</strong> Upheld the right to publish truthful information obtained by a third party, even if that party’s original acquisition was illegal – so long as the publisher is innocent of the illegal act <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20also%20protects,the%20information%20from%20the%20source" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="6798" data-end="7030">
<p data-start="6800" data-end="7030"><strong data-start="6800" data-end="6828">Texas v. Johnson (1989):</strong> Confirmed that even flag-burning (highly offensive speech) is protected, underlining that the First Amendment forbids punishing speech just because it offends <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Second%2C%20many%20anti,dead%20soldiers%E2%80%9D%20%E2%80%94%20was%20protected" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="7031" data-end="7306">
<p data-start="7033" data-end="7306"><strong data-start="7033" data-end="7061">Snyder v. Phelps (2011):</strong> Held that hateful protest signs about a public issue (a soldier’s death) were protected speech, stressing that “we cannot react to [speech’s] pain by punishing the speaker” on matters of public concern <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="7307" data-end="7574">
<p data-start="7309" data-end="7574"><strong data-start="7309" data-end="7351">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964):</strong> Established that public discourse must remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” tolerating even harsh attacks on public officials as long as falsehood and malice are not shown <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p data-start="7576" data-end="8027">Each of these cases makes clear that a broad category of speech – including sharp criticism and the publication of truthful facts – is protected, especially when it relates to public figures or controversies. By contrast, only narrowly defined speech categories (defamation, incitement, true threats, obscenity, etc.) can be punished without violating the First Amendment <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=If%20doxxing%20falls%20into%20one,protected%20by%20the%20First%20Amendment" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="8029" data-end="8560"><strong data-start="8029" data-end="8075">Application to a Public-Interest Campaign.</strong> Consider a recent fact-based scenario: concerned citizens created flyers about a <em data-start="8158" data-end="8188">wanted fugitive sex offender</em> and his connection to a public family matter. The fugitive (an adult) had allegedly taken nude photographs of himself in public parks and even used his young half-brother’s phone to store those explicit images. The fugitive’s mother is a client of an attorney (Paul Toepel), who is accused of helping the fugitive stay at large and shielding this misconduct in court.</p>
<p data-start="8562" data-end="9324">The activists’ flyers – mailed by an organization named Good News Media LLC – focused on the fugitive’s crimes and the public interest in a child’s safety. The flyer directed readers to a newspaper-style website. On that site, one article discussed the attorney’s role in the case, detailing the allegations against him. Importantly, the article listed the attorney’s home address and announced it as the meeting place for a <em data-start="8990" data-end="9016">peaceful public assembly</em> or protest about these issues. In effect, the attorney’s personal address was published online as part of a matter of public concern, and an open invitation was issued for community members to gather peacefully at that location <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Doxxing%20,numbers%2C%20and%20names%20of%20employers" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="9326" data-end="10362">Under the First Amendment and California law, this campaign is likely protected. The subject – a fugitive sex offender hiding from criminal charges and the welfare of an 8-year-old boy – plainly qualifies as a matter of <em data-start="9547" data-end="9563">public concern</em>. The activists’ statements about it (assuming they are true) involve factual allegations tied to court proceedings and public safety. Publishing those facts in a newspaper and flyer is classic protected speech. Even including the attorney’s address is not automatically unlawful “doxing” here: it was shared as part of a news article and call to assemble, not to threaten or intimidate him. California’s anti-doxing statute (§653.2) would only apply if the publishers had the intent to place the attorney in fear or to spur others to harass him <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/653-2/#:~:text=1,contact%2C%20injury%20or%20harassment%3B%20and" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">shouselaw.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Instead, the stated intent was peaceful assembly to discuss a matter of public importance – a constitutionally protected activity <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="10364" data-end="11268">Moreover, because the flyers and website did not repeat any defamatory falsehoods (the allegations against the attorney were presented as proven facts, and the father was accused with no evidence only in court, according to the story), there is no libel violation. Truthful statements (even critical ones) cannot be punished <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=First%2C%20anti,and%20other%20publishers%20and%20speakers" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. The organizers also took pains <em data-start="10801" data-end="10806">not</em> to defame the attorney on the flyer: he is not directly named or maligned in the mailed pamphlet, only indirectly addressed by summarizing the sex-offender story and linking to the full article. This careful approach further insulates them from legal risk. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the remedy for disagreeable but true speech is more speech and debate, not suppression <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="11270" data-end="11938">Finally, the decision to hold a peaceful assembly at the attorney’s address is itself an exercise of First Amendment rights to free assembly and petition. California law (and the First Amendment) explicitly protect the right “peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. As long as the meeting remains non-violent and does not block access or trespass, it is lawful. Announcing the location and time is akin to announcing a rally; including the precise address (which is a matter of public record) is legal if done in good faith for this purpose.</p>
<p data-start="11940" data-end="12827"><strong data-start="11940" data-end="11955">Conclusion.</strong> In sum, simply publicizing true information about a public controversy – even if it involves individuals’ names or addresses – is generally protected speech under the U.S. and California Constitutions <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. California’s cyberharassment statute targets only malicious intent (fear and harm), not ordinary political protest or reporting <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/653-2/#:~:text=1,contact%2C%20injury%20or%20harassment%3B%20and" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">shouselaw.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>. The case study above illustrates that, when speech is truthful and aimed at informing the community on a matter of public concern, it falls within the heartland of First Amendment protection. Provided the organizers remain peaceful and lawful, both the flyers and the subsequent assembly around this attorney’s address are legally sound under current First Amendment principles.</p>
<p data-start="12829" data-end="13408" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node=""><strong data-start="12829" data-end="12841">Sources:</strong> U.S. Const. amend. I <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>; Cal. Const. art. I, §2 <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="12967" data-end="12988">Smith v. Daily Mail</em>, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); <em data-start="13010" data-end="13042">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13104" data-end="13125">Bartnicki v. Vopper</em>, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20also%20protects,the%20information%20from%20the%20source" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13187" data-end="13205">Snyder v. Phelps</em>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13267" data-end="13285">Texas v. Johnson</em>, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Second%2C%20many%20anti,dead%20soldiers%E2%80%9D%20%E2%80%94%20was%20protected" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; Cal. Pen. Code §653.2<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.shouselaw.com/ca/defense/penal-code/653-2/#:~:text=1,contact%2C%20injury%20or%20harassment%3B%20and" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">shouselaw.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p><span data-huuid="7523893523627811623">The right to <strong>&#8220;peacefully assemble&#8221;</strong> is a fundamental right, primarily under the <a class="DTlJ6d" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-first-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-hveid="CCUQAQ">First Amendment</a> of the U.S. Constitution. </span><span data-huuid="7523893523627813708">It <mark class="QVRyCf">allows individuals to gather in groups for various purposes, such as expressing opinions, promoting ideas, or advocating for change, as long as their actions are non-violent</mark>. </span><span data-huuid="7523893523627811697">This right is crucial for a functioning democracy, enabling citizens to voice their opinions and participate in public discourse.<span class="pjBG2e" data-cid="69ea4a79-4d92-4498-a727-9938444d193e"><span class="UV3uM"> </span></span></span></p>
<p>A public figure A person who <strong data-start="953" data-end="976">voluntarily injects</strong> themselves into a <strong data-start="995" data-end="1017">public controversy</strong> and tries to <strong data-start="1031" data-end="1044">influence</strong> its resolution; the alleged defamation must be <strong data-start="1092" data-end="1103">germane</strong> to that controversy. (<em data-start="1126" data-end="1133">Gertz</em>; <em data-start="1135" data-end="1158">Waldbaum v. Fairchild</em>).</p>
<hr />
<h1></h1>
<h1>Civil Harassment</h1>
<p>In general, civil harassment is abuse, threats of abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or serious harassment by someone you have not dated and do NOT have a close family relationship with, like a neighbor, a roommate, or a friend (that you have never dated). It is also civil harassment if the abuse is from a family member that is not included in the list under domestic violence. So, for example, if the abuse is from an uncle or aunt, a niece or nephew, or a cousin, it is considered civil harassment and NOT domestic violence.<br />
The civil harassment laws say “<strong>harassment</strong>” is:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Unlawful violence, like assault or battery or stalking, OR</strong></li>
<li><strong>A credible threat of violence, AND</strong></li>
<li><strong>The violence or threats seriously scare, annoy, or harass someon</strong>e and there is<em><strong> no valid reason for it.</strong></em></li>
</ul>
<p>“Credible threat of violence” means intentionally saying something or acting in a way that would make a reasonable person afraid for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. A “credible threat of violence” includes following or stalking someone or making harassing calls or sending harassing messages (by phone, mail, or e-mail) over a period of time (even if it is a short time).</p>
<p>Read about the law in <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&amp;sectionNum=527.6." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6</a> .</p>
<blockquote>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/us-v-popa-187-f-3d-672-court-of-appeals-dist-of-columbia-circuit-1999/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Ion Popa</span></strong></em></a> left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”</h3>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/true-threats-virginia-v-black-is-most-comprehensive-supreme-court-definition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">True Threats Test</a> &#8211; <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-decision/">Virginia v. Black</a> <span style="color: #ff0000;">is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition</span></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miller-v-california-obscenity-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Miller v. California &#8211; 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) &#8211; 1st Amendment 1st</span></a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Watts v. United States</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">True Threat Test</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff00ff;">1st Amendment</span></a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/clear-and-present-danger-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Clear and Present Danger Test</a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/gravity-of-the-evil-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Gravity of the Evil Test</a></strong></li>
<li style="text-align: left;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miller-v-california-obscenity-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Miller v. California &#8211; 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) &#8211; 1st Amendment 1st</span></a></strong></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=2693&amp;preview=true"><strong><em>Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489</em></strong></a> The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/norton-v-shelby-county-118-us-178-1886/"><strong><em>Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886)</em></strong></a> An unconstitutional &#8220;law &#8221; is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/marbury-v-madison/"><strong><em>Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803)</em></strong></a> All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States</li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-v-sutton-63-minn-167-65-nw-262-30-lra-630/"><strong><em>State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459</em></strong></a></span> When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/norton-v-shelby-county-118-us-178-1886/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><em>Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. </em></strong></a>&#8220;An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.&#8221;</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/bell-v-hood/"><strong><em>Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. &#8212; So. Dist. CA.</em></strong></a> History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/simmons-v-united-states/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">SIMMONS v US, supra.</a> </em></strong>&#8220;We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/sable-communications-of-california-v-federal-communications-commission-1989/"><strong><em>Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)</em></strong></a><strong><br />
</strong>When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rosenfeld-v-new-jersey-1972/"><strong><em>United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972)</em></strong></a> it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment&#8221;<em><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rosenfeld-v-new-jersey-1972/"> State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889</a></strong></em></li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miranda-vs-arizona-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Miranda vs Arizona</a>, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 </em></strong>&#8220;Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cohen-v-california-1971/">Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),</a>  </em></strong>The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The     Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.</li>
<li>
<pre><em> Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
</em><em> make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
 Pp. <span class="l-normaldigitafter"><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/#22">403 U. S. 22</a></span>-26.</em><em> Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)</em><em><a class="related-case" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/1/94.html">1 Cal. App. 3d 94</a>, <a class="related-case" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/1/94.html">81 Cal. Rptr. 503</a>, reversed.</em></pre>
<p><em> HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. <span class="l-normaldigitafter"><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/#27">403 U. S. 27</a></span>.<br />
</em></li>
<li><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/people-v-boomer-mich-ct-app-2002/"><strong>People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002)</strong></a> “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”<br />
</em></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rav-v-st-paul-1992/"><strong><em>A.V v St Paul 1992</em></strong></a> Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as <a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/967/hate-speech">hate speech</a>words “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/karlan-v-city-of-cincinnati-1974/"><strong><em>Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974)</em></strong></a> Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reno-v-american-civil-liberties-union-1997/"><strong><em>Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)</em></strong></a><br />
<a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1119/internet">speech on the Internet</a>is entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/bible-believers-…nty-6th-cir-2015/"><strong>Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)</strong></a><br />
The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a <a href="https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/968/heckler-s-veto">heckler’s veto</a>.</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/albert-krantz-v-city-of-fort-smith/"><strong>Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith</strong></a><em><strong><br />
</strong></em>A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the<strong> distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. </strong>In this ruling informed by the <strong>First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.</strong></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/lucas-v-arkansas-1974/"><strong><em>Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)</em></strong></a><strong><em><br />
</em></strong>The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/uzuegbunam-v-preczewski-2021/"><strong><em>Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021)</em></strong></a> authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/lewis-v-city-of-new-orleans-1974/"><strong><em>Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) </em></strong></a><em> The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman&#8217;s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).</em></li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/city-of-houston-v-hill-1987/"><strong><em>City of Houston v. Hill (1987)</em></strong></a>  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.<br />
<strong><br />
</strong></li>
<li><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-nebraska-appellee-v-darren-j-drahota-appellant/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA</a> &#8211;</strong> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-nebraska-appellee-v-darren-j-drahota-appellant/">Darren <strong>Drahota</strong></a> sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)</li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-iowa-appellee-v-william-james-fratzke/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant</a></span> &#8211;</strong>  <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-of-iowa-appellee-v-william-james-fratzke/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>William</strong> Fratzke</a> was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.</li>
<li><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/state-v-thomas-g-smith/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span style="color: #0000ff;">State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith</span></em></a> &#8211;</strong> <a href="https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&amp;seqNo=115994" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Thomas Smith</a> was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)</li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/commonwealth-v-harvey-j-bigelow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><em>Commonwealth v. Bigelow</em></strong></a> &#8211; </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/commonwealth-v-harvey-j-bigelow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Harvey Bigelow</span></a> sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/insulting-letters-to-politicians-home-are-constitutionally-protected/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>read the newspaper article of his exact doings here</em></a></li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-people-v-david-thomas-powers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166</a></strong></em>.</span> (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-people-v-david-thomas-powers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS </a> determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!</li>
<li><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/us-v-popa-187-f-3d-672-court-of-appeals-dist-of-columbia-circuit-1999/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Ion Popa</span></strong></em></a> left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/zamos-v-stroud-district-attorney-liable-for-bad-faith-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zamos v. Stroud</a></h2>
<h2>California Supreme Court, 2004<br />
32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802</h2>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong><em>The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.</em></strong></span></p>
<hr />
<h1 data-start="472" data-end="509">The legal frame (U.S. + California)</h1>
<ul data-start="511" data-end="1122">
<li data-start="511" data-end="828">
<p data-start="513" data-end="828"><strong data-start="513" data-end="539">First Amendment (U.S.)</strong>: Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., <em data-start="653" data-end="667">true threats</em>, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Congress.gov</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="829" data-end="1122">
<p data-start="831" data-end="1122"><strong data-start="831" data-end="874">California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a)</strong>: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.calstate.edu/csu-system/administration/general-counsel/Documents/FreeSpeechHandbook.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">California State University</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="1124" data-end="1200">California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech</h1>
<ul data-start="1202" data-end="1770">
<li data-start="1202" data-end="1568">
<p data-start="1204" data-end="1568"><strong data-start="1204" data-end="1238">Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6)</strong>: “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and <strong data-start="1281" data-end="1338">“Constitutionally protected activity is not included”</strong>; “harassment” must <em data-start="1358" data-end="1369">seriously</em> alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they <strong data-start="1456" data-end="1466">cannot</strong> support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)</p>
</li>
<li data-start="1569" data-end="1770">
<p data-start="1571" data-end="1770"><strong data-start="1571" data-end="1604">Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9)</strong>: Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says <strong data-start="1676" data-end="1731">constitutionally protected activity is not included</strong>.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 data-start="1772" data-end="1822">What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?</h1>
<h1><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class=" wp-image-21525 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment.jpg" alt="" width="680" height="380" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment.jpg 780w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment-400x224.jpg 400w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/SR_FirstAmendment-768x429.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 680px) 100vw, 680px" /></h1>
<p data-start="1824" data-end="1844">Protected (examples)</p>
<ul data-start="1845" data-end="2535">
<li data-start="1845" data-end="2191">
<p data-start="1847" data-end="2191"><strong data-start="1847" data-end="1884">Opinions, criticism, and advocacy</strong> on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. <em data-start="2041" data-end="2059">Snyder v. Phelps</em> protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="2192" data-end="2535">
<p data-start="2194" data-end="2535"><strong data-start="2194" data-end="2231">Speech without intent to threaten</strong>: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least <strong data-start="2332" data-end="2346">recklessly</strong> disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (<em data-start="2465" data-end="2489">Counterman v. Colorado</em>, 2023). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Supreme Court</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p data-start="2537" data-end="2561">Not protected (examples)</p>
<ul data-start="2562" data-end="3305">
<li data-start="2562" data-end="2935">
<p data-start="2564" data-end="2935"><strong data-start="2564" data-end="2593">True threats/intimidation</strong> (Virginia v. <em data-start="2607" data-end="2614">Black</em>), <strong data-start="2617" data-end="2658">incitement to imminent lawless action</strong> (<em data-start="2660" data-end="2673">Brandenburg</em>), <strong data-start="2676" data-end="2689">obscenity</strong> (<em data-start="2691" data-end="2699">Miller</em>), and <strong data-start="2706" data-end="2720">defamation</strong>. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/492?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Oyez</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="2936" data-end="3305">
<p data-start="2938" data-end="3305"><strong data-start="2938" data-end="2972">Targeted residential picketing</strong>, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral <strong data-start="3028" data-end="3051">time, place, manner</strong> limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (<em data-start="3143" data-end="3151">Frisby</em> upheld a narrow residential rule; <em data-start="3186" data-end="3194">Madsen</em> partially limited an injunction; <em data-start="3228" data-end="3238">McCullen</em> struck a broad buffer zone.) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/474/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep512/usrep512753/usrep512753.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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</ul>
<h1 data-start="3307" data-end="3368">How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech</h1>
<ul data-start="3370" data-end="4010">
<li data-start="3370" data-end="3731">
<p data-start="3372" data-end="3731">Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. <em data-start="3491" data-end="3507">Evans v. Evans</em> reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; <em data-start="3579" data-end="3615">Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen</em> allowed a <strong data-start="3626" data-end="3640">post-trial</strong> injunction limited to statements found defamatory. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="3732" data-end="4010">
<p data-start="3734" data-end="4010">In protest contexts, courts allow <strong data-start="3768" data-end="3778">narrow</strong> restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (<em data-start="3903" data-end="3929">Huntingdon Life Sciences</em> decisions illustrate drawing that line.) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1391486.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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</ul>
<h1 data-start="4012" data-end="4077">Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed</h1>
<p data-start="4079" data-end="4611">If you’re sued in California over your posts, flyers, or comments, <strong data-start="4146" data-end="4175">file an anti-SLAPP motion</strong> (CCP § 425.16). It’s a two-step test: (1) show the claims arise from protected petitioning/speech; then (2) plaintiff must show a <strong data-start="4306" data-end="4335">probability of prevailing</strong>. If they can’t, the court strikes the claims and awards you fees. California courts instruct that § 425.16 <strong data-start="4443" data-end="4472">must be construed broadly</strong>; parts of “mixed” claims can be struck; but <strong data-start="4517" data-end="4554">illegal conduct (e.g., extortion)</strong> isn’t protected. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-425-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/29/53.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2600567/flatley-v-mauro/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">CourtListener</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
<h1 data-start="4613" data-end="4691"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!</span></h1>
<ol data-start="4693" data-end="6652">
<li data-start="4693" data-end="5141">
<p data-start="4696" data-end="5141"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="4696" data-end="4753">“Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”</strong></span><br data-start="4753" data-end="4756" />“Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it <strong data-start="4984" data-end="4994">cannot</strong> satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-527-6/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&amp;sectionNum=646.9" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">LegInfo</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="5143" data-end="5396">
<p data-start="5146" data-end="5396"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5146" data-end="5187">“No threats, no imminence, no crime.”</strong></span><br data-start="5187" data-end="5190" />Under <em data-start="5199" data-end="5211">Counterman</em>, the State must prove at least <strong data-start="5243" data-end="5259">recklessness</strong> as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Supreme Court</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="5398" data-end="5753">
<p data-start="5401" data-end="5753"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5401" data-end="5437">“Prior restraint is disfavored.”</strong></span><br data-start="5437" data-end="5440" />Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite <em data-start="5613" data-end="5620">Evans</em> (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish <em data-start="5663" data-end="5678">Balboa Island</em> (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2008/d051144/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1298900.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Findlaw</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="5755" data-end="5985">
<p data-start="5758" data-end="5985"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5758" data-end="5809">“Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”</strong></span><br data-start="5809" data-end="5812" />Like <em data-start="5820" data-end="5838">Snyder v. Phelps</em>, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep562/usrep562443/usrep562443.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Library of Congress Tile </span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
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<li data-start="5987" data-end="6272">
<p data-start="5990" data-end="6272"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="5990" data-end="6034">“Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.</strong></span><br data-start="6034" data-end="6037" />If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only <strong data-start="6121" data-end="6131">narrow</strong> content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/474/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="6274" data-end="6652">
<p data-start="6277" data-end="6652"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong data-start="6277" data-end="6328">Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.</strong></span><br data-start="6328" data-end="6331" />Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite <em data-start="6544" data-end="6553">Equilon</em> (broad construction) and <em data-start="6579" data-end="6586">Baral</em> (strike protected parts). <span class="" data-state="delayed-open" aria-describedby="radix-«rhn»"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill" aria-describedby="radix-«rhn»"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium bg-token-text-primary! text-token-main-surface-primary! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/29/53.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F] text-token-main-surface-tertiary">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ol>
<h2><strong>anti-SLAPP</strong></h2>
<p>California law provides for early dismissal of such suits “brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech” and mandates that § 425.16 <strong>“shall be construed broadly.”</strong></p>
<p>California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also <strong>“conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”</strong> and <strong>“any issue in which the public is interested.”</strong> <strong><em>Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula</em>, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008).</strong></p>
<p><strong>public commentary is protected under CCP § 425.16(e) and the 1<sup>st</sup> amendment of the US Constitution.</strong></p>
<p>​Opinion, especially on matters of public concern, is <strong>fully protected by the First Amendment</strong> and not actionable as defamation. <em>See</em> <strong><em>Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.</em>, 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (</strong>statements not provably false or that <strong>reasonably cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts</strong> are safeguarded by the First Amendment<strong>); <em>Vogel v. Felice</em>, 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (2005)</strong> (categorically ranking someone among a list of “Top Ten Dumb Asses” held non-actionable as hyperbolic opinion, and noting that <strong>even “‘epithets’ which by themselves may sound derogatory, such as ‘idiot’ or ‘traitor,’ can be mere hyperbole or vituperation”</strong> and not provable facts).</p>
<p>Under the First Amendment, <strong>public figures</strong> who sue for defamation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the alleged false statement <strong>with “actual malice” – </strong>that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.<strong> (<em>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em>, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); <em>Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts</em>, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending <em>Sullivan</em> standard to public figures)).</strong></p>
<p><em>See</em> <strong><em>Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Superior Court</em>, 37 Cal.3d 244, 252–53 (1984)</strong> (if plaintiff is a public figure, summary judgment or dismissal is mandated unless the plaintiff can <strong>produce evidence that a jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing proof</strong>, as “summary judgment is a favored remedy in defamation cases” to avoid chilling speech​.</p>
<p>Whether it’s a Yelp review, a Ripoff Report complaint, a Facebook post, or a tweet, the medium does not diminish the speaker’s rights. <strong><em>Chaker v. Mateo</em></strong> was a trailblazer in 2012, ruling that posts on consumer gripe sites about someone’s business practices were in the public interest because they serve as warnings to other consumers​.<br />
<strong>Yelp Inc. v. Hassell Law Group (2018) 247 Cal.App.4th 1156 (California Appellate Court)</strong> A law firm sued Yelp to remove negative but truthful reviews. <strong>Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected Yelp.<br />
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 </strong>An employer sought to unmask anonymous employees who posted critical but truthful reviews.<strong><br />
Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP barred disclosure of identities; truthful reviews on workplace conditions are protected under the First Amendment and California law.<br />
<strong>Paglia &amp; Associates Construction v. Hamilton</strong> – Public Internet Posts &amp; Public Criticisms – Bad Reviews<br />
<strong>Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)<br />
Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC</strong>, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013)<br />
<strong>Sarver v. Chartier</strong>, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016)<br />
<strong>Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow</strong>, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)<br />
<strong>Snyder v. Phelps</strong>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)<br />
<strong>Grenier v. Taylor</strong>, 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)<br />
<strong>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</strong>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)<br />
<strong>Hustler Magazine v. Falwell</strong>, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)</p>
<p>As a public figure, A PLAINTIFF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that DEFENDANTt made the alleged false statement <strong>with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.</strong> <strong>(<em>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em>, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); <em>Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts</em>, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). </strong>No such evidence exists, nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged actual malice.</p>
<p><strong>Bartnicki v. Vopper:</strong> “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” More specifically, “<strong>the First Amendment protects the right to publish highly personal information of private individuals, such as the names of rape victims and juveniles involved in legal proceedings, when they relate to matters of public concern.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred.</strong> Claims for emotional distress stemming from protected speech <strong>must satisfy</strong> the <strong>same constitutional requirements as defamation claims</strong>, including falsity and actual malice.<strong> Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred. </strong>Claims for emotional distress stemming from constitutionally protected speech must meet stringent standards, including proof of falsity and actual malice,<strong> which Plaintiff cannot demonstrate </strong><em>see</em><strong> (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46).  </strong> (“public figure cannot recover for IIED without showing New York Times actual malice”); <strong><em>Flynn v. Higham</em>, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 (1983)</strong> (where defamation claim is barred, IIED claim based on the same publication is also barred, otherwise a plaintiff could do indirectly “what he could not do directly,” which would “render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege”​ Therefore, Plaintiff cannot meet this burden.</p>
<p>In <strong><em>Snyder v. Phelps</em>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011</strong>), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits holding speakers liable for IIED (or similar torts) for speech on a matter of public concern made in a public place, even if the speech is offensive or upsetting</p>
<p><strong>Yeager v. Bowlin (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1076 </strong>Emotional distress claims over truthful reporting of criminal history. <strong>Holding: </strong>Anti-SLAPP dismissed the suit; truthful reporting is not &#8220;outrageous conduct,&#8221; even if distressing.</p>
<p><strong>Use of Publicly Available Images is Protected</strong>. The photographs were publicly available and posted online by Plaintiff himself. Their use constitutes fair commentary, <strong>fully protected under the First Amendment and California Civil Code § 3344(d)</strong>.<br />
<strong><em>Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc.</em> (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).</strong> Court of Appeal rejected the privacy claim, holding that <strong>once the plaintiff voluntarily made the post available to the general public on MySpace, its contents were not private</strong>!</p>
<p>California courts have protected creators who depict real individuals in films or media when commenting on matters of public interest: “the First Amendment safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life — including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary — and transform them into art<strong><em>. (De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 861 (2018)).</em></strong> While Mr. Zullo’s publications are not fictionalized art, they are <strong>commentary using “raw materials” </strong></p>
<p><strong>Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1146</strong> Use of publicly posted images (thumbnails) by Google. <strong>Holding</strong>: Transformative use of public content (e.g., search engines) is fair use under copyright law. Applied to aggregation of social media content.</p>
<p><strong>HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985</strong> Scraping public LinkedIn profiles for data analytics.  <strong>Holding</strong>: Publicly available social media data is not protected by privacy laws; its use is permissible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).</p>
<p><strong>Garcia v. Google, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 786 F.3d 733</strong> Use of a publicly posted performance in a video. <strong>Holding</strong>: Limited copyright protection for social media content unless it meets originality standards. Creators can use public content if it’s transformative.</p>
<p>Similarly, in <strong><em>Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.</em>, 25 Cal.3d 860 (1979), </strong>the California Supreme Court (in Justice Bird’s concurring opinion, which has since been taken as the court’s rationale) stated that <strong>“fictional treatments”</strong> of <strong>real people</strong> (there, a film about Rudolph Valentino) or in this case Plaintiff Paul Toepel, are constitutionally protected, because suppressing such expression would inhibit the creation of valuable works about actual events and figures.<br />
A false light claim, like defamation, requires a false implication and, for a public figure, actual malice<strong> (<em>Time, Inc. v. Hill</em>, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).</strong></p>
<p><strong>Transformative Use Test:</strong> The California Supreme Court in <strong><em>Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup</em> (2001)</strong> established that a work which contains <em>“significant transformative elements”</em>—i.e. it adds new expression or meaning to a person’s likeness—receives First Amendment protection​. But if the person’s image is only one part of a new message, commentary, or creative work, the use is <em>transformative</em> and not an actionable violation of the right of publicity​.<br />
<strong>Fair use</strong> can protect the non-commercial reuse of social media content (like a publicly-posted Facebook photo) when used for commentary, criticism, or parody.  Fair use is a federal copyright doctrine <strong>(17 U.S.C. § 107)<br />
<em>Sedlik v. Drachenberg</em> (C.D. Cal. 2022)</strong> – a case involving a photograph reused as a tattoo and shown on Instagram – the court weighed fair use and noted the tattoo artist had added a new aesthetic and meaning to the image.<br />
<strong><em>Cross v. Facebook, Inc.</em> (Cal. Ct. App. 2017):</strong> A country-rap artist (Knight) sued Facebook over a user-created page critical of him (“Families Against [Artist]”) that used his name and images. Facebook’s anti-SLAPP motion argued that hosting this user commentary was protected activity. <strong>In <em>Summit Bank v. Rogers</em> (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),</strong> a bank sued an online commenter who posted rants on Craigslist. The appellate court struck the suit under anti-SLAPP.</p>
<p><strong>Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015) 801 F.3d 1126 </strong>Use of a YouTube video (including public content) for commentary.  <strong>Holding</strong>: Fair use protects transformative creations (e.g., parody, criticism) using public material.</p>
<p><strong>CrossFit, Inc. v. National Strength and Conditioning Ass’n (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 5622281</strong> Use of public social media posts in a critical documentary. <strong>Holding</strong>: Anti-SLAPP protected the filmmakers; truthful compilation of public posts for commentary is protected speech.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>No Violation of Penal Code or Statutory Provisions.</strong> Plaintiff&#8217;s allegations of statutory violations <em>(Penal Code §§ 632, 637.2, and §502, California Business &amp; Professions Code §17525, and 15 U.S.C. §1125)</em> <strong>lack merit and supporting evidence. </strong>Defendant did not unlawfully record or intercept communications, improperly access computer systems, or engage in cybersquatting. Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of these claims.<br />
<strong>No Commercial Advantage:</strong> California’s publicity rights law targets <em>commercial</em> exploitation, not incidental or expressive use. In <strong><em>Cross v. Facebook, Inc.<br />
</em></strong>California Supreme Court issued its first decision addressing the necessary evidentiary showing under the second prong, <em>i.e.</em>, whether a plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on the claim. <em>See</em><strong> <em>Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co.</em> (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>The plaintiff must proffer admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case and show that the claim is <strong>“legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.”</strong> <strong><em>Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 88–89 (2002). </em></strong>If the plaintiff cannot carry this burden – for example, if the claim is barred as a matter of law by constitutional defenses or fails due to lack of evidence on an essential element – the claim is stricken.</p>
<p>California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also <strong>“conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”</strong> and <strong>“any issue in which the public is interested.”</strong> <strong>Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008)</strong>.</p>
<hr />
<h1 data-start="0" data-end="66">Public Figures and Public Interest in Defamation and Privacy Law</h1>
<p data-start="68" data-end="2091"><strong data-start="68" data-end="125">Public Figures (General-purpose and Limited-purpose).</strong> Under the First Amendment, individuals fall into different categories. A <strong data-start="201" data-end="234">general-purpose public figure</strong> is one who “has assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society,” or otherwise enjoys “pervasive fame or notoriety” such that he is public in <em data-start="392" data-end="406">all contexts</em>. More commonly, a <strong data-start="426" data-end="459">limited-purpose public figure</strong> is one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” and thus becomes a public figure only with respect to that issue <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=The%20court%20also%20recognized%20the,812" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. As the Supreme Court explained in <em data-start="688" data-end="717"><strong>Gertz v. Robert Welch</strong>, Inc.</em>, “absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in ordering the affairs of society,” a person is <strong data-start="863" data-end="870">not</strong> a public figure “for all aspects of his life”; rather, the question is “determined by reference to [his] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation” <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/323/#:~:text=,352" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Recognizing%20that%20Gertz%20had%20been,giving%20rise%20to%20the%20defamation" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. California law follows the same test. In <strong><em data-start="1169" data-end="1189">Vegod Corp. v. ABC</em></strong>, the<strong><em> California Supreme Court</em></strong>, quoting <strong><em data-start="1229" data-end="1236">Gertz</em></strong>, reaffirmed that some individuals (e.g. celebrities or high‑ranking officials) are public figures in all contexts, but more often a person becomes a public figure only by voluntarily thrusting himself into a public issue <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=The%20court%20also%20recognized%20the,812" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Recognizing%20that%20Gertz%20had%20been,giving%20rise%20to%20the%20defamation" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Likewise, in<strong> <em data-start="1547" data-end="1571">Hutchinson v. Proxmire</em> (1979),</strong> the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that public figures are those who either (1) occupy positions of such power and influence that they are public figures for all purposes, <strong data-start="1751" data-end="1757">or</strong> (2) have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies” to influence outcomes<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=Hutchinson%20v,323%2C%20345%20%281974" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Thus, simply being newsworthy or tangentially involved in an issue does <strong data-start="1972" data-end="1979">not</strong> make one a public figure; there must be either widespread fame or voluntary invocation of the public spotlight.</p>
<p data-start="2093" data-end="3796"><strong data-start="2093" data-end="2132">Matters of Public Interest/Concern.</strong> The term “public interest” or “public concern” applies not to persons but to topics. Courts look at whether the speech at issue relates to an issue “of public or general interest.” Generally, information about crime, politics, public health, or safety on public property (e.g., a helicopter rescue on a public highway) qualifies as a matter of public concern <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=that%20Mercy%20Air%20was%20dispatched,matters%20of%20public%20interest%20that" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, speech on matters of public concern is given the highest protection. In the privacy context, the press has a privilege to publish newsworthy facts even when they touch on private lives, because the public has a “legitimate interest” in such events<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=drawn%20between%20properly%20private%20events%2C,297%20P.%2091" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. In <strong><em data-start="2862" data-end="2894">Shulman v. Group W Productions</em> (Cal. 1998)</strong>, for example, the California Supreme Court emphasized that information about an emergency rescue was newsworthy, and thus publication of the facts (though private in nature) was protected by the First Amendment<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=drawn%20between%20properly%20private%20events%2C,297%20P.%2091" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=legal%20error%20on%20the%20trial,18" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in <strong><em data-start="3228" data-end="3260">Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn</em></strong>, even a state law cannot punish a reporter for publishing truthful information (the identity of a rape victim) that was obtained from public court records <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/420/469/#:~:text=It%20is%20unconstitutional%20under%20the,an%20immediate%20appeal%20to%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Similarly, in <strong><em data-start="3471" data-end="3492">Bartnicki v. Vopper</em></strong>, the Court recognized that a private telephone conversation about public-school labor negotiations was a “matter of public concern,” and accordingly the<span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong> First Amendment shielded its disclosure even though the tape had been intercepted illegally</strong> by a third party<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/532/514/#:~:text=,525" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</span></p>
<p data-start="3798" data-end="4367">In short, speech on matters of public concern is presumptively protected. Courts often hold that in defamation cases involving public concern, the plaintiff must bear additional burdens (see below). In privacy cases, the newsworthiness of the subject generally trumps privacy claims. The California Supreme Court has noted that the First Amendment “greatly circumscribes” the right of even a private person to recover damages for the publication of private facts when those facts involve public or legitimate newsworthy events<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=holdings%2C%20,to%20obtain%20damages%20for%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<h2 data-start="4369" data-end="4417">Defamation Law and the Actual Malice Standard</h2>
<p data-start="4419" data-end="5313">Under <strong><em data-start="4425" data-end="4457">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em> (1964),</strong> the Supreme Court set the rule for defamation involving public officials or figures. <em data-start="4552" data-end="4562">Sullivan</em> held that the First Amendment forbids a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with “actual malice” – i.e. knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. That is, public officials (and by extension public figures) cannot recover for defamation unless the speaker acted with conscious falsity or a high degree of awareness that the statement was probably false <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. As the Court explained, this stringent standard is necessary so that critics will not be deterred from “free and open debate” even if they make some factual errors <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="5315" data-end="5932">In <strong><em data-start="5318" data-end="5350">Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts</em> (1967)</strong>, the Court extended <em data-start="5378" data-end="5388">Sullivan</em>’s actual‑malice rule to public figures in addition to public officials <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Three%20years%20later%20in%20Curtis,of%20another%20university%20and%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. The Court did not provide a single formula for public figures, but clarified that persons who thrust themselves into public controversies (or otherwise achieve wide renown) must likewise prove the speaker’s knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity.<strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"> As <em data-start="5756" data-end="5763">Vegod</em> (CA) summarized, <em data-start="5781" data-end="5788">Butts</em> “held that public figures – like public officials – must prove actual malice to recover for defamation”</span> </strong><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Three%20years%20later%20in%20Curtis,of%20another%20university%20and%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="5934" data-end="6983">By contrast, for <strong data-start="5951" data-end="5974">private individuals</strong> the Court has allowed states some leeway. In<strong> <em data-start="6021" data-end="6050">Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</em> (1974),</strong> the Court refused to extend <em data-start="6087" data-end="6097">Sullivan</em>’s standard to a lawyer who was a private person. Instead, it held that states may impose liability for defamation of private individuals (subject to at least negligence), so long as they do not impose strict liability <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/323/#:~:text=,352" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/323/#:~:text=that%20plaintiffs%2C%20even%20private%20individuals%2C,reason%2C%20the%20majority%20ordered%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. The Court emphasized that private individuals are more vulnerable and deserve more protection; hence, it allowed recovery without proof of actual malice, provided the defendant was at least negligent about the truth <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/323/#:~:text=that%20plaintiffs%2C%20even%20private%20individuals%2C,reason%2C%20the%20majority%20ordered%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. <em data-start="6654" data-end="6661">Gertz</em> did insist, however, that a plaintiff who is a private figure suing a media defendant must prove the falsity of the statement to recover damages on matters of public interest, and that punitive damages still require a showing of actual malice <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/418/323/#:~:text=that%20plaintiffs%2C%20even%20private%20individuals%2C,reason%2C%20the%20majority%20ordered%20a" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=by%20private%20figures,establish%20falsity%20in%20addition%20to" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="6985" data-end="7752">The interplay between “public concern” and defamation burdens was further refined in <strong><em data-start="7070" data-end="7110">Dun &amp; Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders</em> (1985)</strong> and <strong><em data-start="7122" data-end="7156">Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps</em> (1986)</strong>. <em data-start="7166" data-end="7173">Hepps</em> held that when a defamation claim involves speech on a matter of public concern, the private plaintiff must prove the statement’s falsity as part of his case, overriding the common-law presumption of falsity<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=by%20private%20figures,establish%20falsity%20in%20addition%20to" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. And <em data-start="7427" data-end="7445">Dun &amp; Bradstreet</em> emphasized that <em data-start="7462" data-end="7469">Gertz</em>’s restrictions on presumed and punitive damages apply only where the speech involves a public interest; in that case, selling credit reports was deemed <strong data-start="7622" data-end="7629">not</strong> a matter of public concern, so the First Amendment did not compel the <em data-start="7700" data-end="7707">Gertz</em> rule<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=475%20U,dissented%20in%20Gertz%2C%20added%20brief" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="7754" data-end="8419"><strong data-start="7754" data-end="7780">Actual Malice Defined.</strong> The Supreme Court has made clear that “actual malice” under <em data-start="7842" data-end="7852">Sullivan</em> is a constitutional term of art. It means publishing with knowledge of falsity or “reckless disregard for the truth,” which is a high standard – much more than ordinary negligence <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Three%20years%20later%20in%20Curtis,of%20another%20university%20and%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Reckless disregard requires more than an ordinary failure to investigate; it requires a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity”<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span> (see <strong><em data-start="8293" data-end="8316">St. Amant v. Thompson</em>, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968))</strong>. The Court has rejected efforts to lower the standard in subsequent cases.</p>
<p data-start="8421" data-end="9033">In California, defamation law parallels the federal framework in practice. For libel or slander actions by public figures, the plaintiff must show actual malice. Notably, <span style="color: #000000;"><strong>California’s Civil Code §45a codifies this: it requires that a plaintiff prove “clear and convincing” evidence of actual malice in order to recover punitive damages against a media defendant</strong></span>. The <em data-start="8791" data-end="8798">Vegod</em> decision (CA) explicitly adopted the <em data-start="8836" data-end="8843">Gertz</em> definitions of public figure, and held that California grants no broader privilege to media than federal law <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=The%20court%20also%20recognized%20the,812" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Recognizing%20that%20Gertz%20had%20been,giving%20rise%20to%20the%20defamation" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<h2 data-start="9035" data-end="9077">Privacy and the Public Interest Defense</h2>
<p data-start="9079" data-end="10005">Privacy torts (such as intrusion upon seclusion or publication of private facts) intersect with public interest when the defendant claims the material was newsworthy. The First Amendment constrains liability for publishing truthful information about private individuals on matters of public interest. In <strong><em data-start="9385" data-end="9411">Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn</em>,</strong> the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that punished a TV station for printing a rape victim’s name (obtained from public trial records), holding it unconstitutional to bar the press from reporting information in the public record <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/420/469/#:~:text=It%20is%20unconstitutional%20under%20the,an%20immediate%20appeal%20to%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Similarly, <strong><em data-start="9701" data-end="9725">Florida Star v. B.J.F.</em> (1989)</strong> barred a civil suit against a newspaper that inadvertently published a victim’s name from a police report. These cases establish that where the subject matter is of public concern, privacy claims based on publication of true, lawfully obtained information generally fail.</p>
<p data-start="10007" data-end="11274">In <strong>California, <em data-start="10022" data-end="10054">Shulman v. Group W Productions</em> (1998)</strong> illustrates the balance between privacy and public interest. The court recognized a “fundamental legal problem” in drawing the line between “private” and “public and general interest” <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=drawn%20between%20properly%20private%20events%2C,297%20P.%2091" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. In that case a helicopter rescue was videotaped and broadcast without consent. The California Supreme Court held that the rescue events were newsworthy and of legitimate public interest <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=that%20Mercy%20Air%20was%20dispatched,matters%20of%20public%20interest%20that" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Accordingly, the broadcast of those facts (public disclosure of private facts) was protected by the First Amendment, and summary judgment for the media was proper on the publication claim. However, the court also held that the <strong data-start="10744" data-end="10757">intrusion</strong> itself – the act of filming the victims without consent – was not justified by newsworthiness and could be actionable <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=legal%20error%20on%20the%20trial,18" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Thus, California recognizes that newsworthiness can defeat a privacy (publication) claim but does not automatically immunize invasive newsgathering methods. As the Shulman court noted, Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star together “greatly circumscribe” a private figure’s privacy rights in publication of private facts <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=holdings%2C%20,to%20obtain%20damages%20for%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="11276" data-end="12189">Additionally, courts have developed a “newsworthiness privilege” in privacy law. Under this doctrine, media defendants have a conditional privilege to publish true information of public interest. For example, California’s <em data-start="11500" data-end="11521">Civil Code § 1708.8</em> (the privacy law) does not explicitly create a constitutional defense, but California jurisprudence treats newsworthy material differently. If a lawful recording or observation captures matters of public concern, courts have declined to impose liability (e.g.<strong> <em data-start="11783" data-end="11802">People v. Buckley</em>, 6 Cal.4th 289 (1993),</strong> immunizing reporters who overhear police radio dispatches;<strong> <em data-start="11885" data-end="11896">Bartnicki</em>, 532 U.S. at 522-25).</strong> As a leading treatise put it, “[t]he news media’s right to investigate and relate facts about the events and individuals of our time” may override an individual’s privacy interest when those facts are of legitimate public concern <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=drawn%20between%20properly%20private%20events%2C,297%20P.%2091" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<h2 data-start="12191" data-end="12224">Criminal and Civil Enforcement</h2>
<p data-start="12226" data-end="12940"><strong data-start="12226" data-end="12250">Criminal Defamation.</strong> Criminal defamation laws (libel/slander as crimes) have largely been curtailed by constitutional law. In <strong><em data-start="12358" data-end="12381">Garrison v. Louisiana</em> (1964)</strong>, decided the same day as <em data-start="12414" data-end="12424">Sullivan</em>, the Supreme Court invalidated a state criminal libel statute because it lacked an actual-malice requirement <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=Court%20apply%20the%20concept%20of,too%20vague%20to%20be%20constitutional" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Shortly thereafter,<strong> <em data-start="12595" data-end="12615">Ashton v. Kentucky</em> (1966) <span style="color: #ff6600;">struck down a vague criminal libel common-law definition</span></strong>. These decisions mean that speech which might give rise to criminal defamation must also satisfy First Amendment safeguards. In practice, criminal defamation prosecutions are rare, and courts have read <em data-start="12884" data-end="12894">Sullivan</em>’s standards into any review of such statutes.</p>
<p data-start="12942" data-end="13904"><strong data-start="12942" data-end="12979">Civil Enforcement and Privileges.</strong> Civilly, defendants to defamation or privacy suits often invoke privileges grounded in public interest. The First Amendment itself is treated as a privilege for speech on public matters; if the plaintiff is a public figure, the <em data-start="13210" data-end="13220">Sullivan</em> standard is essentially a constitutional privilege. In addition, many states have enacted statutory privileges (e.g. fair-report privilege) and notice statutes requiring corrections. California law specifically provides an absolute privilege for publication of judicial proceedings and certain official actions, and a qualified privilege for reporting “public proceedings” under Civil Code § 47. These reflect the same policy: transparency in matters of public concern. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that a newspaper’s publication of the details of a police investigation was privileged so long as the report was accurate and related to a public proceeding.</p>
<p data-start="13906" data-end="14559">Furthermore, in <span style="color: #ff6600;"><strong>California the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16)</strong> </span>provides a procedural shield for statements made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” Thus, if speech is on a public-issue (broadly defined), a defamation suit can be struck unless the plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing. In <strong><em data-start="14230" data-end="14263">Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting</em> (Cal. Ct. App. 2002),</strong> for instance, the court held that a radio program’s mocking of a reality TV contestant was “in connection with an issue of public interest” (the show and the contestant’s conduct), and the insults were not actionable under anti-SLAPP <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/97/798.html#:~:text=motion,order%20of%20the%20trial%20court" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="14561" data-end="15399"><strong data-start="14561" data-end="14597">Other Privacy and Speech Crimes.</strong> California and federal law also intersect on newsgathering crimes. Penal laws against eavesdropping or wiretapping (e.g. <strong>California Penal Code § 632</strong>) impose criminal sanctions on unauthorized recording of communications.<strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;"> But again, the newsworthiness of the communication can affect enforcement.</span> </strong>In <em data-start="14901" data-end="14912">Bartnicki</em>, the Supreme Court held that even though the interception was illegal, a third-party who lawfully obtained the tape was immune when the content was of public concern <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/532/514/#:~:text=,525" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Likewise, in <strong><em data-start="15133" data-end="15152">People v. Buckley</em> (1993),</strong> California’s high court refused to convict reporters who overheard police radio transmissions of private conversations, noting that imposing liability on the press would unduly infringe on the free flow of information about public safety.</p>
<h2 data-start="15401" data-end="15446">California Law: Convergence and Divergence</h2>
<p data-start="15448" data-end="16147">California’s courts have largely adopted the federal approach but have also asserted independent state-law protections. On defamation, California Civil Code §§44–46 track the <em data-start="15624" data-end="15640">Sullivan/Gertz</em> framework; notably, §45a requires actual malice for punitive damages against media. California has recognized that <em data-start="15757" data-end="15764">Gertz</em>’s distinction between public and private figures is constitutionally grounded, and it uses that analysis for both libel and slander actions <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=The%20court%20also%20recognized%20the,812" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/25/763.html#:~:text=Recognizing%20that%20Gertz%20had%20been,giving%20rise%20to%20the%20defamation" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Thus, a California state court will not allow punitive damages for defaming a private person unless <em data-start="16085" data-end="16100">actual malice</em> is shown (per <em data-start="16115" data-end="16133">Civil Code § 45a</em> and <em data-start="16138" data-end="16145">Gertz</em>).</p>
<p data-start="16149" data-end="16511">On privacy, California historically gave strong protection to privacy under its state constitution, but modern decisions like <em data-start="16275" data-end="16284">Shulman</em> align more with federal free-speech values: truth and newsworthiness are powerful defenses.<em><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;"> The California Constitution’s Speech Clause (Art. I, §2(a)) has been interpreted coextensively with the First Amendment in this area.</span></strong></em></p>
<p data-start="16513" data-end="17521">One notable California development is the explicit legislative <em data-start="16576" data-end="16588">anti-SLAPP</em> framework, which requires early dismissal of suits that chill public participation. California courts have read “public interest” expansively under this statute, protecting even satirical commentary on entertainment events as matters of public debate <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/97/798.html#:~:text=motion,order%20of%20the%20trial%20court" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. This is broader than any federal analogue. On the other hand, California civil law still allows private plaintiffs somewhat more recovery in some contexts. For example, California law (unlike federal) does not impose the <em data-start="17105" data-end="17112">Gertz</em> requirement of proving falsity on private plaintiffs in all cases; although federal courts require falsehood be proven in public-concern cases <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=by%20private%20figures,establish%20falsity%20in%20addition%20to" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>, California law has not wholly abrogated the common-law presumption of falsity for private plaintiffs (though defendants can often force plaintiff to prove truth under California’s jury instructions and policy of free debate).</p>
<p data-start="17523" data-end="18391">In sum, California defamation and privacy law generally track the federal standards for public figures and public issues, but California’s Constitution, statutes, and cases provide additional procedural mechanisms (like anti-SLAPP) and have carved out specific rules (e.g. punitive-damage thresholds) that strengthen First Amendment protections. Outside the speech context, California also recognizes intrusion upon seclusion as a privacy tort; unlike publication claims, intrusion claims often have no First Amendment privilege, as shown in <em data-start="18066" data-end="18075">Shulman</em>. Thus, while California’s approach aligns with <em data-start="18124" data-end="18140">Sullivan/Gertz</em> on the key question of public status and malice, it sometimes extends protections for free expression beyond federal law and sometimes imposes state-law duties (e.g. invasion of privacy claims) that must be analyzed under First Amendment constraints.</p>
<h2 data-start="18393" data-end="18421">Constitutional Principles</h2>
<p data-start="18423" data-end="19847">The bedrock principle is that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” and constitutional doctrine must tolerate some defamation to ensure robust public discourse <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. The First Amendment firmly places political and public-issue speech at the core of protected expression. Criticism of public officials and figures – even harsh or personally damaging criticism – is part of the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate that the Amendment was designed to protect<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"> <a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=robust%2C%20and%20wide,at%20271" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Commenting on a person’s fitness for public office, or matters touching on public welfare, is virtually always protected speech; courts have rejected distinctions between public and private attributes when those attributes bear on fitness or honesty in office <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=observed%3A%20%E2%80%9COf%20course%2C%20any%20criticism,public%20office%2C%20the%20Court%20has" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span>. Indeed, in <strong><em data-start="19289" data-end="19318">Hustler Magazine v. Falwell</em> (1988),</strong> the Court underscored that public figures cannot claim injury to emotional privacy from a parody or satire unless they satisfy the actual-malice standard: “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures… from recovering damages… without showing… that the publication contains a false statement of fact… made with actual malice”<span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/46/#:~:text=Held%3A%20In%20order%20to%20protect,and%20is%20intended%20to%20inflict" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">supreme.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>. This reflects the high premium given to debate on matters of public concern, even when that debate includes crude or offensive commentary.</p>
<p data-start="19849" data-end="20664">In all these contexts, the key inquiry is whether the person or subject is sufficiently public and the speech sufficiently of public interest to warrant heightened protection. When it is, defamation and privacy claims face the <strong data-start="20077" data-end="20094">actual malice</strong> hurdle and other constitutional limits (no liability without fault, proof of falsity, etc.). When it is not (private person and purely private matter), the state has more leeway. But in either case, courts must balance any <em data-start="20320" data-end="20354">reputational or privacy interest</em> against the constitutional value of free expression. The Supreme Court and California courts have repeatedly emphasized that speech relating to public issues and public figures lies at the core of the First Amendment’s protection <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/defamation#:~:text=376%20U,479" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.cornell.edu</span></span></span></a></span></span><span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/18/200.html#:~:text=drawn%20between%20properly%20private%20events%2C,297%20P.%2091" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>.</p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node=""><strong data-start="20666" data-end="20678">Sources:</strong></p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">Key U.S. Supreme Court cases include <em data-start="20717" data-end="20749">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);<em data-start="20772" data-end="20804">Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts</em>, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); <em data-start="20827" data-end="20856">Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</em>, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); <em data-start="20879" data-end="20919">Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps</em>, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); <em data-start="20942" data-end="20988">Dun &amp; Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders</em>, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); <em data-start="21011" data-end="21043">Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn</em>, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); <em data-start="21066" data-end="21087">Bartnicki v. Vopper</em>, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); and <em data-start="21114" data-end="21149">Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell</em>, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Cal. Const. art. I, §2 <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/constitution/california/article-i/section-2/#:~:text=SEC" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">law.justia.com</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="12967" data-end="12988">Smith v. Daily Mail</em>, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); <em data-start="13010" data-end="13042">New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=Finally%2C%20anti,%E2%80%9D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13104" data-end="13125">Bartnicki v. Vopper</em>, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20also%20protects,the%20information%20from%20the%20source" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13187" data-end="13205">Snyder v. Phelps</em>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/doxxing-free-speech-and-first-amendment#:~:text=,do%20not%20stifle%20public%20debate" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">thefire.org</span></span></span></a></span></span>; <em data-start="13267" data-end="13285">Texas v. Johnson</em>, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)</p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">California Supreme Court authorities include <em data-start="21217" data-end="21237">Vegod Corp. v. ABC</em>, 25 Cal.3d 763 (1979); <em data-start="21261" data-end="21299">Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.</em>, 18 Cal.4th 200 (1998); and related anti-SLAPP jurisprudence such as <em data-start="21369" data-end="21408">Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp.</em>, 97 Cal.App.4th 798 (2002).</p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">These cases define and illustrate the standards discussed above. All principles are grounded in the First Amendment’s free-speech protections as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.</p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node=""> in <a href="https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/smith-judge-et-al-v-daily-mail-publishing-co-et-al" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.</em></a> (1979), the Court held that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” This so-called “Daily Mail principle” ensures the press, or others who post truthful information, cannot face punishment for publishing the names of rape victims and juvenile offenders, as well as other sensitive information obtained lawfully. “Lawfully obtained” means the publisher obtained the information from, for example, a public record or material in the public domain, rather than intercepting the material illegally.</p>
<p data-start="20666" data-end="21623" data-is-last-node="" data-is-only-node="">The First Amendment also protects publication of truthful information received from a human source. As the Supreme Court explained in <a href="https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/bartnicki-v-vopper" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Bartnicki v. Vopper</em></a><em> </em>(2001), it doesn’t matter if the <em>source</em> obtained the material unlawfully, as long as the publisher did not participate in the illegal action and merely received the information from the source.</p>
<p dir="ltr">First Amendment protects much offensive, obnoxious, and even repugnant speech. Justice William Brennan famously referred to this as “the bedrock principle” of the first freedom in the flag-burning case <a href="https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/texas-v-johnson" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Texas v. Johnson</em></a> (1989). Current Chief Justice John Roberts expressed this principle poignantly in <a href="https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/albert-snyder-petitioner-v-fred-w-phelps-sr-et-al" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Snyder v. Phelps</em></a> (2011), stating that even the inflammatory rhetoric of the Westboro Baptist Church — known for picketing military funerals with signs that read “God hates fags” and “Thank God for dead soldiers” — was protected:</p>
<blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course — to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">First Amendment principles, a concept from the celebrated libel law decision <a href="https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/new-york-times-co-v-sullivan" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em></a> (1964): Namely, the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”</p>
<blockquote>
<h2 dir="ltr"><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">“Thinking Outside the Dox: The First Amendment and the Right to Disclose Personal Information” that “[h]arassment and threat laws already exist to penalize people who cross the line from disclosing information to actually acting on the information” and engaging in unprotected conduct such as stalking.  </span></em></h2>
</blockquote>
<p>If the poster falls into one of the other existing narrow categories of <a href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/unprotected-speech-synopsis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unprotected speech</a>, it is also not protected. For example, if a poster utters a <a href="https://www.thefire.org/news/supreme-court-establishes-higher-standard-true-threat-prosecutions" target="_blank" rel="noopener">true threat</a> then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment. Likewise, if a poster or bloogger incites <a href="https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/unprotected-speech-synopsis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imminent lawless action</a> — intentionally provoking others to<span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong> engage in immediate unlawful action</strong></span> — then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment.  <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-test/">True Threat Test</a> <a class="row-title" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment” (Edit)">Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment</a></p>
<hr />
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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<hr />
<h2 data-start="4865" data-end="4920">I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”</h2>
<p data-start="4921" data-end="5397">Section 527.6 defines “harassment” as a “course of conduct” that seriously alarms/annoys and serves <strong data-start="5021" data-end="5046">no legitimate purpose</strong>, but it expressly states: “<strong data-start="5074" data-end="5129">Constitutionally protected activity is not included</strong> within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (CCP § 527.6(b)(1).) The same carve-out appears in the stalking statute. (Pen. Code § 646.9(k).) If the petition relies on Zullo’s non-threatening flyers/posts about public issues, the petition <strong data-start="5368" data-end="5397">fails as a matter of law.</strong></p>
<h2 data-start="5399" data-end="5438">II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION</h2>
<p data-start="5439" data-end="5816">A speech-based restraining order requires more than repeated criticism. The First Amendment prohibits punishment of speech unless it is a <strong data-start="5577" data-end="5592">true threat</strong> or otherwise unprotected; after <em data-start="5625" data-end="5637">Counterman</em>, the speaker must have at least recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of the communication. (600 U.S. at 73–82.) Nothing in petitioner’s declarations meets that standard.</p>
<h2 data-start="5818" data-end="5875">III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID</h2>
<p data-start="5876" data-end="6166">Broad bans on speech before any adjudication of falsity or illegality are unconstitutional prior restraints. (<em data-start="5986" data-end="5993">Evans</em>, 162 Cal.App.4th at 1169–1173.) Only <strong data-start="6031" data-end="6053">narrow, post-trial</strong> injunctive relief limited to statements adjudicated false may issue. (<em data-start="6124" data-end="6139">Balboa Island</em>, 40 Cal.4th at 1156–1161.)</p>
<h2>IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS</h2>
<p><strong data-start="6445" data-end="6523">Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200) / Secondary-Evidence Rule (Evid. Code § 1521):</strong> If the content of a writing (including digital posts; Evid. Code § 250) is offered for its truth, petitioner must lay the foundation or present the original/credible secondary evidence; partial, illegible images lacking context should be excluded or given no weight.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h2 data-start="7524" data-end="7589">V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)</h2>
<p data-start="7590" data-end="7970">If the Court believes some <strong data-start="7617" data-end="7628">conduct</strong> (not speech) crossed a line (e.g., trespass, targeted residential picketing), any order must be <strong data-start="7725" data-end="7744">content-neutral</strong> and <strong data-start="7749" data-end="7770">narrowly tailored</strong> time/place/manner relief. (<em data-start="7798" data-end="7817">Frisby v. Schultz</em> (1988) 487 U.S. 474; <em data-start="7839" data-end="7860">McCullen v. Coakley</em> (2014) 573 U.S. 464.) A broad ban on speaking, posting, or distributing literature would be unconstitutional.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h2 data-start="9222" data-end="9265">Quick cite list (tables/points)</h2>
<ul data-start="9266" data-end="10240">
<li data-start="9266" data-end="9523">
<p data-start="9268" data-end="9523"><strong data-start="9268" data-end="9301">Anti-SLAPP scope &amp; mechanics:</strong> <em data-start="9302" data-end="9347">Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.</em> (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; <em data-start="9370" data-end="9392">Navellier v. Sletten</em> (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; <em data-start="9415" data-end="9433">Baral v. Schnitt</em> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; <em data-start="9456" data-end="9468">FilmOn.com</em> (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; <em data-start="9491" data-end="9498">Bonni</em> (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9524" data-end="9600">
<p data-start="9526" data-end="9600"><strong data-start="9526" data-end="9535">Fees:</strong> CCP § 425.16(c)(1); <em data-start="9556" data-end="9574">Ketchum v. Moses</em> (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9601" data-end="9831">
<p data-start="9603" data-end="9831"><strong data-start="9603" data-end="9634">First Amendment protection:</strong> <em data-start="9635" data-end="9653">Snyder v. Phelps</em> (2011) 562 U.S. 443; <em data-start="9675" data-end="9699">Counterman v. Colorado</em> (2023) 600 U.S. 66; <em data-start="9720" data-end="9731">Milkovich</em> (1990) 497 U.S. 1; <em data-start="9751" data-end="9758">Hepps</em> (1986) 475 U.S. 767; <em data-start="9780" data-end="9808">New York Times v. Sullivan</em> (1964) 376 U.S. 254.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9832" data-end="9942">
<p data-start="9834" data-end="9942"><strong data-start="9834" data-end="9854">Prior restraint:</strong> <em data-start="9855" data-end="9871">Evans v. Evans</em> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; <em data-start="9901" data-end="9916">Balboa Island</em> (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="9943" data-end="10013">
<p data-start="9945" data-end="10013"><strong data-start="9945" data-end="9970">Harassment carve-out:</strong> CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).</p>
</li>
<li data-start="10014" data-end="10089">
<p data-start="10016" data-end="10089"><strong data-start="10016" data-end="10045">Aiding/Conspiracy limits:</strong> <em data-start="10046" data-end="10065">Applied Equipment</em> (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="10090" data-end="10240">
<p data-start="10092" data-end="10240"><strong data-start="10092" data-end="10111">Authentication:</strong> Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; <em data-start="10148" data-end="10166">People v. Valdez</em> (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; <em data-start="10196" data-end="10217">People v. Goldsmith</em> (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li data-start="8347" data-end="8491">
<p data-start="8349" data-end="8491"><strong data-start="8349" data-end="8360">Statute</strong>: <strong data-start="8362" data-end="8389">Penal Code §653m(a)–(e)</strong> (text incl. <strong data-start="8402" data-end="8416">good-faith</strong> and <strong data-start="8421" data-end="8436">return-call</strong> provisions). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://california.public.law/codes/penal_code_section_653m" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">California.Public.Law</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8492" data-end="8693">
<p data-start="8494" data-end="8693"><strong data-start="8494" data-end="8523">Constitutionality &amp; scope</strong>: <strong data-start="8525" data-end="8548">People v. Hernandez</strong>, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) &amp; (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/231/1376.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8694" data-end="8852">
<p data-start="8696" data-end="8852"><strong data-start="8696" data-end="8720">Return-call pleading</strong>: <strong data-start="8722" data-end="8745">People v. Lampasona</strong>, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/71/884.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="8853" data-end="9025">
<p data-start="8855" data-end="9025"><strong data-start="8855" data-end="8889">First Amendment “true threats”</strong>: <strong data-start="8891" data-end="8917">Watts v. United States</strong>, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); <strong data-start="8940" data-end="8961">Virginia v. Black</strong>, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/705/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="9026" data-end="9198">
<p data-start="9028" data-end="9198"><strong data-start="9028" data-end="9058">Public-concern/petitioning</strong>: <strong data-start="9060" data-end="9080">Snyder v. Phelps</strong>, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); <strong data-start="9103" data-end="9134">NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware</strong>, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/562/443/?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">Justia Law</span><span class="-me-1 flex h-full items-center rounded-full px-1 text-[#8F8F8F]">+1</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
<li data-start="9199" data-end="9325">
<p data-start="9201" data-end="9325"><strong data-start="9201" data-end="9222">Demurrer standard</strong>: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. <span class="" data-state="closed"><span class="ms-1 inline-flex max-w-full items-center relative top-[-0.094rem] animate-[show_150ms_ease-in]" data-testid="webpage-citation-pill"><a class="flex h-4.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl px-2 text-[9px] font-medium text-token-text-secondary! bg-[#F4F4F4]! dark:bg-[#303030]! transition-colors duration-150 ease-in-out" href="https://www.closeupsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2020/09/Velyvis-decision.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="relative start-0 bottom-0 flex h-full w-full items-center"><span class="flex h-4 w-full items-center justify-between overflow-hidden"><span class="max-w-full grow truncate overflow-hidden text-center">closeupsblog.com</span></span></span></a></span></span></p>
</li>
</ul>
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<p>ITS IS OUR FIRM OPINION that We believe</p>
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<p>Lawyers are not that special, a high IQ is not needed a mere 100-130 can become this shithole career, they come in at average IQ of 100 all the way to 130 Moderately gifted and that would be a top tier lawyer., but the most successful people on the planet HAVE NO DEGREE FROM A COLLEGE, yet high IQs with fast learning minds. The high aptitude of an inttellect wwith an IQ score of 168, like the authors is considered exceptionally high and falls within the &#8220;exceptionally gifted&#8221;</p>
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<div>An IQ score of 168 is considered exceptionally high, indicating a very high level of cognitive ability</div>
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<li data-hveid="CAAQBQ" data-processed="true"><span class="T286Pc" data-processed="true">An IQ of 168 places an individual in the <b class="Yjhzub" data-processed="true">top 0.03%</b> of the population, <a class="H23r4e" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IQ_classification" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-processed="true">according to Wikipedia</a>.</span></li>
<li data-hveid="CAAQBw" data-processed="true"><span class="T286Pc" data-processed="true">It signifies intelligence greater than 99.9% of humanity, <a class="H23r4e" href="https://www.quora.com/How-smart-comparatively-is-someone-with-an-IQ-of-168" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-processed="true">notes Quora</a>.</span></li>
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		<title>Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm</title>
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		<category><![CDATA[Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm Attorneys can face liability for initiating or continuing meritless litigation that causes harm, potentially facing sanctions like fines, professional discipline, or being held liable for the opposing party&#8217;s costs and fees.  Sanctions and Liability for Frivolous Litigation: Frivolous Litigation Defined: Meritless litigation, also known as frivolous litigation, [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm</strong></h1>
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<h3 class="rPeykc" data-hveid="CAMQAQ" data-ved="2ahUKEwiElNHrkbaMAxU7D0QIHdiVJKMQo_EKegQIAxAB"><strong><em><span style="color: #339966;" data-huuid="5731075296544927979">Attorneys can face liability for initiating or continuing meritless litigation that causes harm, potentially facing sanctions like fines, professional discipline, or being held liable for the opposing party&#8217;s costs and fees.<span class="pjBG2e" data-cid="bf4d8b7c-0da3-45cd-85d9-d69f373be7ab"><span class="UV3uM"> </span></span></span></em></strong></h3>
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<h2 class="kHtcsd"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Sanctions and Liability for Frivolous Litigation:</span></strong></h2>
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<div class="Gur8Ad"><span data-huuid="13447863012440431065"><strong>Frivolous Litigation Defined:</strong></span></div>
<div class="vM0jzc"><span data-huuid="13447863012440431272">Meritless litigation, also known as frivolous litigation, involves lawsuits or arguments that lack a reasonable basis in law or fact, or are brought primarily to harass, delay, or cause unnecessary costs.</span></div>
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<div class="Gur8Ad"><span data-huuid="13447863012440431686"><strong>Attorney&#8217;s Duty:</strong></span></div>
<div class="vM0jzc"><span data-huuid="13447863012440431893">Attorneys have a professional and ethical obligation to not pursue claims or defenses without a reasonable basis in law or fact.</span></div>
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<div class="Gur8Ad"><span data-huuid="13447863012440432307"><strong>Consequences for Attorneys:</strong></span></div>
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<li><span data-huuid="13447863012440428832"><strong>Monetary Sanctions:</strong></span><span data-huuid="13447863012440429039">Courts can impose fines or require attorneys to pay the opposing party&#8217;s costs and attorney&#8217;s fees.</span></li>
<li><span data-huuid="13447863012440429453"><strong>Professional Discipline:</strong></span><span data-huuid="13447863012440429660">Engaging in frivolous litigation can lead to disciplinary action from the bar, such as reprimands, suspensions, or even disbarment.</span></li>
<li><span data-huuid="13447863012440430074"><strong>Liability for Costs and Fees:</strong></span><span data-huuid="13447863012440430281">Attorneys can be held personally liable for the &#8220;excess costs, expenses, and attorneys&#8217; fees reasonably incurred&#8221; by the opposing party due to their misconduct.</span></li>
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<p><strong>Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm</strong></p>
<p>Attorneys have been held accountable in certain cases for pursuing frivolous or meritless lawsuits that cause harm – whether financial, emotional, or even physical (e.g. stress-related medical injuries). In California, this usually falls under <strong>legal malpractice</strong> (if a client sues their own attorney for negligence) or the tort of <strong>malicious prosecution</strong> (if a wrongfully sued party sues the attorney for bringing a baseless case). Below are key legal precedents, rulings, and principles from California courts and the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue, including case names, reasoning, and outcomes.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>​In California, there have been legal cases where stress induced by one person led to another person suffering a stroke, resulting in lawsuits. Notably:​</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Keillor v. County of Sacramento</strong>: In this case, the plaintiff, Tracie Keillor, experienced significant work-related stress, which allegedly led to atrial fibrillation and subsequently a stroke. She pursued a civil lawsuit against her employer, the County of Sacramento, claiming that the stress from her employment caused her stroke. The jury found in her favor, determining that her stroke was indeed caused by the stress related to her job. This verdict was later used in her workers&#8217; compensation claim, where the principle of collateral estoppel prevented the employer from contesting the industrial causation of her stroke, as it had been conclusively determined in the prior civil proceeding. ​<a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/wcab/Panel-Decisions-2021/Tracie-KEILLOR-ADJ8835024-ADJ8996815.pdf">dir.ca.gov</a></li>
<li><strong>Mills v. State Compensation Insurance Fund</strong>: Rebecca Mills, employed as a claims adjuster, suffered a cerebrovascular accident (stroke) after experiencing increased stress at work due to deadlines, mandatory training, and an increased caseload. Her primary care physician, Dr. Kamrath, noted that the stress she experienced at work was a contributing factor to her stroke. The Workers&#8217; Compensation Appeals Board considered this medical opinion, among others, in determining the compensability of her claim. ​<a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/wcab/Panel-Decisions-2023/Rebecca-MILLS-ADJ10774716.pdf">dir.ca.gov</a></li>
</ol>
<p>These cases illustrate that in California, if an individual suffers a stroke due to stress induced by another person, such as an employer or supervisor, they may have legal grounds to pursue compensation, either through civil litigation or workers&#8217; compensation claims.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Legal Malpractice for Frivolous or Unwinnable Cases (Attorney-Client)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Dawson v. Toledano (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)</strong> – A client (who was actually a lawyer himself) was sanctioned for a frivolous appeal and then sued his appellate attorney for legal malpractice, arguing the filing of a frivolous appeal was malpractice per se. The California Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment that had favored the client. The court held that <strong>an attorney’s pursuit of a case later deemed frivolous is not automatically malpractice</strong> – the mere fact a claim was adjudged frivolous “does not per se indicate that the attorney committed malpractice”​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/dawson-v-toledano#:~:text=holding%20that%20the%20mere%20fact,that%20the%20attorney%20committed%20malpractice">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. In other words, <strong>there is no automatic negligence simply because a court labeled the case meritless</strong>. The client must still prove the attorney breached the standard of care (for example, by advising or pursuing a claim that no competent lawyer would have pursued) and that this caused the client harm. In Dawson, the outcome was that the attorney was <em>not</em> found negligent as a matter of law; the case was sent back for further proceedings because the trial court had wrongly treated the frivolousness finding as conclusive proof of malpractice​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/dawson-v-toledano#:~:text=holding%20that%20the%20mere%20fact,that%20the%20attorney%20committed%20malpractice">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Legal Principle – Duty of Competence and Advising on Merits:</strong> California attorneys have a duty to competently advise clients and not pursue claims that lack any legal or factual basis. However, courts also recognize that attorneys are allowed to pursue novel or aggressive arguments in good faith. The California Supreme Court in <em>In re Marriage of Flaherty</em> noted that counsel have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if unlikely to succeed, without fear of malpractice liability or sanctions, to avoid a chilling effect on advocacy​<a href="https://www.minyardmorris.com/media-center/case-updates/filing-frivolous-appeal-not-malpractice-matter-law/#:~:text=malpractice,for%20the%20personal%20injury%20plaintiff">minyardmorris.com</a></li>
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<p>. Thus, bringing a weak case isn’t automatically negligence – it must be shown that <strong>no reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable</strong>, which is the same standard used in malicious prosecution​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=Lowered%3F%20www,at%20886">ocbar.org</a></p>
<p>. If an attorney <em>affirmatively misleads a client</em> about the merits or <em>ignores clear signs</em> that a case is groundless, that could breach the duty of care. But California courts require a case-by-case analysis rather than a per se rule of negligence for every lost or sanctionable case.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Consequences for Clients:</strong> If an attorney’s negligence in pursuing a baseless case causes direct harm to the client – such as the client incurring hefty sanctions, attorney fee awards to the opponent, or other losses – the client may recover those losses in a malpractice action. For example, if a lawyer unreasonably advises a client to file a meritless lawsuit and the client ends up owing the opponent’s legal fees or suffers severe emotional distress from the ordeal, those damages could potentially be claimed. However, proving causation can be tricky; the client must show that <strong>but for</strong> the attorney’s poor advice or conduct, they would not have pursued the harmful litigation. (Notably, if the underlying case was unwinnable to begin with, a client might have trouble proving damages, since a competent attorney would have refused the case and the client wouldn’t have won anything anyway.) The bottom line is that California law <em>does</em> allow clients to sue attorneys for negligently initiating or continuing meritless cases, but success requires meeting the standard elements of malpractice (duty, breach, causation, damage) and is not automatic simply because the case was lost or labeled frivolous​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/dawson-v-toledano#:~:text=holding%20that%20the%20mere%20fact,that%20the%20attorney%20committed%20malpractice">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>.</p>
<p><strong>Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys (By Adverse Parties)</strong></p>
<p>When an attorney brings a meritless lawsuit against someone (on behalf of a client) with malice and without probable cause, the attorney can be sued by the former defendant for <strong>malicious prosecution</strong>. California courts have established important precedents on holding attorneys liable in these cases:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Bertero v. National General Corp. (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1974)</strong> – This landmark case recognized that a person maliciously sued without probable cause can recover <strong>compensatory damages for all harm proximately caused</strong>, including legal expenses, loss of reputation, and mental or emotional distress​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></li>
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<p>. In <em>Bertero</em>, a corporation had filed a cross-complaint against Bertero with no basis, and after Bertero prevailed, he sued for malicious prosecution. The California Supreme Court upheld a verdict in Bertero’s favor, emphasizing that the tort of malicious prosecution exists to compensate victims of baseless litigation and to deter abuse of the judicial system​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/8/666.html#:~:text=the%20cause%20of%20action%20for,50">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>. <strong>Outcome:</strong> Bertero won significant damages, and the court affirmed that <strong>emotional distress (such as anxiety, stress) caused by being sued is a recoverable harm</strong><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. This establishes that if being embroiled in a baseless lawsuit causes someone health problems (e.g. stress-induced illness), those are legitimate damages in a malicious prosecution claim.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Crowley v. Katleman (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1994)</strong> – The court held that a malicious prosecution action can be maintained even if only part of the prior lawsuit was frivolous. In this case, an estate executor (Crowley) was subjected to a will contest with multiple grounds; he alleged that at least one of the grounds was brought without probable cause and maliciously by the opposing party and her attorneys​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/8/666.html#:~:text=is%20whether%20a%20malicious%20prosecution,of%20action%20alleges%20that%20defendants">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The defense argued that because other grounds of the will contest had arguable merit, the attorneys shouldn’t be liable. The California Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming <em>Bertero</em> and ruling that <strong>“it is not necessary that the <em>whole</em> proceeding be utterly groundless” – a malicious prosecution claim can be based on any claims that were filed in bad faith without probable cause, even if coupled with others that had merit​</strong><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/8/666.html#:~:text=show%20,on%20that%20account%20less%20injurious"><strong>law.justia.com</strong></a></p>
<p><strong>.</strong> This prevents attorneys from escaping liability simply by including one plausible claim alongside meritless ones. <strong>Outcome:</strong> Crowley was allowed to pursue malicious prosecution against the attorneys for the groundless portions of the case.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Zamos v. Stroud (Cal. Supreme Ct. 2004)</strong> – This case extended attorney liability to situations where the lawsuit might have been initially filed with some basis, but the attorney <strong>continued litigating after discovering the case was meritless</strong>. The California Supreme Court explicitly held that an attorney <strong>“may be held liable for malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause”</strong></li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/zamos-v-stroud-33398#:~:text=The%20question%20presented%20by%20this,conclude%20an%20attorney%20may%20be">scocal.stanford.edu</a></p>
<p>. In <em>Zamos</em>, an attorney had evidence partway through the case that his client’s fraud claims were unfounded, yet he kept pursuing the lawsuit. The court reasoned that once an attorney knows a claim has no probable cause, they have a duty to discontinue it; failing to do so, and prolonging baseless litigation, can meet the malice and lack-of-probable-cause elements for malicious prosecution​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/zamos-v-stroud-33398#:~:text=The%20question%20presented%20by%20this,conclude%20an%20attorney%20may%20be">scocal.stanford.edu</a></p>
<p>. <strong>Outcome:</strong> The ruling made it clear that attorneys can be sued if they <strong>learn of a case’s lack of merit and do not stop</strong> – reinforcing that an attorney’s <em>ongoing</em> conduct in litigation is subject to scrutiny, not just the initial filing.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &amp; Oliker (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1989)</strong> – In malicious prosecution cases, the court in <em>Sheldon Appel</em> defined the <strong>“probable cause”</strong> standard and assigned its determination to judges (not juries). The court held that probable cause is judged by an objective standard of whether <strong>“any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable”</strong> given the facts and law​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=Lowered%3F%20www,at%20886">ocbar.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. If any reasonable lawyer could have seen the claim as arguably valid, then there was probable cause and no malicious prosecution liability, even if the claim ultimately fails. This protective threshold is one reason malicious prosecution is considered a disfavored action – it’s reserved for truly baseless lawsuits. In practice, <em>Sheldon Appel</em> makes clear that to hold an attorney liable, the prior case must have lacked even a <em>tenable</em> argument for any claim, reinforcing that <strong>malicious prosecution requires a clear absence of merit (objective lack of probable cause) and malice</strong>. <strong>Outcome:</strong> In <em>Sheldon Appel</em> itself, the court found the underlying lawsuit was objectively tenable, so the malicious prosecution claim failed. This case is often cited by later decisions to ensure that courts strike a balance: discourage baseless suits but avoid punishing lawyers for reasonable (if aggressive) advocacy​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=Lowered%3F%20www,at%20886">ocbar.org</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<p><strong>Key Legal Principles:</strong> An attorney who brings a frivolous case can be held liable for malicious prosecution if the plaintiff proves <strong>(1) the prior case terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, (2) it was brought without probable cause, and (3) it was initiated with malice</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=Masterson%20v,Law%20%288th">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. California explicitly allows suing attorneys for this – they are <strong>not immune</strong> from malicious prosecution suits. Courts have noted this tort is “disfavored” (to avoid a chilling effect on legitimate claims), but as the California Supreme Court stated, calling it disfavored is just a cautionary phrase and <strong>“should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action”</strong><a href="https://www.jpands.org/vol26no2/huntoon.pdf#:~:text=,new%20limitations%20on%20the">jpands.org</a></p>
<p>. In sum, while the bar is high, <strong>California precedent holds attorneys accountable if they abuse the courts by pursuing meritless claims with improper motives</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Sanctions, Ethical Duties, and U.S. Supreme Court Perspectives</strong></p>
<p>Apart from civil liability, attorneys face <strong>ethical and procedural sanctions</strong> for meritless filings. Both California and federal courts have mechanisms to penalize frivolous litigation, reflecting the legal principle that lawyers must act in good faith and with at least a plausible basis in law and fact:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>California Ethics Rule &amp; Sanctions:</strong> California’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 prohibits lawyers from asserting positions in court <strong>“without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or causing unnecessary delay or expense.”</strong> California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7 (similar to Federal Rule 11) allow judges to impose monetary sanctions (fines, or orders to pay the other side’s attorney fees) on attorneys who file actions or motions that are completely without merit or filed for an improper purpose​<a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/code-of-civil-procedure/ccp-sect-128-5/#:~:text=California%20Code%2C%20Code%20of%20Civil,to%20this%20section%20shall">codes.findlaw.com</a> <a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_3.1-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf#:~:text=,faith%20argument%20for%20an%20extension">calbar.ca.gov</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. For example, in <em>In re Marriage of Flaherty</em> (Cal. 1982), the state supreme court defined a frivolous appeal as one prosecuted for an improper motive or so lacking in merit that any reasonable attorney would agree it’s totally untenable. While these sanctions don’t directly compensate the injured party for stress or medical harm, they serve as <strong>deterrents</strong> and official rebukes of the attorney’s misconduct.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1991)</strong> – The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s use of its <strong>inherent power</strong> to sanction a party (and effectively his attorney) for bad-faith litigation conduct. In that case, an attorney engaged in egregious tactics to delay and derail proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed that federal courts can assess attorneys’ fees against the responsible party or counsel as a sanction for bad faith or frivolous litigation conduct​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/32/#:~:text=Chambers%20v.%20Nasco%2C%20Inc.%20,and%20related%20expenses%20paid">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. <strong>Significance:</strong> Even at the highest level, the judiciary has authority to punish meritless litigation behavior. While <em>Chambers</em> was about a party’s misconduct, it underscored that attorneys who <strong>willfully abuse the judicial process</strong> can be made to bear the costs. This case illustrates a legal principle: courts can invoke inherent powers to address litigation abuses beyond normal rules, ensuring there is accountability for causing needless litigation chaos (which often correlates with stress and harm to the victims of such lawsuits).</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Cooter &amp; Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (U.S. Supreme Ct. 1990)</strong> – This case involved Rule 11 sanctions for a frivolous antitrust lawsuit that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. The question was whether dropping the case insulated the attorneys from sanctions. The Supreme Court ruled that a <strong>voluntary dismissal does not erase the wrongdoing</strong>; a trial court may still impose Rule 11 sanctions for filing a baseless complaint even after the case is dismissed​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/496/384/#:~:text=match%20at%20L325%20paper%20is,395">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The Court reasoned that allowing attorneys to escape sanctions by abandoning a frivolous suit would undermine the deterrent purpose of Rule 11​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/496/384/#:~:text=match%20at%20L692%20Inc,to%20consider%20whether%20there%20has">supreme.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. <strong>Outcome:</strong> The attorneys in <em>Cooter &amp; Gell</em> faced sanctions despite the case ending, reinforcing that <strong>there are professional consequences for bringing meritless cases</strong>. This precedent from the Supreme Court aligns with California’s stance that attorneys can’t just walk away from a frivolous filing to avoid responsibility.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>No Absolute Immunity for Attorneys:</strong> The U.S. Supreme Court has also made clear that, unlike judges or prosecutors, ordinary attorneys generally <strong>do not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability</strong> for litigation conduct. In <em>Ferri v. Ackerman</em> (1979), the Court held that a court-appointed defense attorney could be sued for legal malpractice, rejecting the idea that performing a quasi-judicial function shielded the lawyer from negligence claims. This principle implies that when an attorney’s <em>negligence</em> causes harm – whether by mishandling a valid case or pursuing a baseless one – the attorney may be held to account in civil court. There is no special federal protection that insulates lawyers who engage in frivolous litigation or other malpractice.</li>
<li><strong>“Stress-Induced” Injuries as Damages:</strong> When a lawyer’s misconduct in litigation causes someone to suffer extreme stress or health issues, the legal system can recognize those injuries. California malicious prosecution law, as noted, permits recovery for mental and emotional distress​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. Courts have acknowledged that being wrongfully sued can lead to serious consequences: <em>Bertero</em> cited earlier California precedent that the victim of a malicious claim “may suffer the same mental or emotional distress” as if accused of a crime​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=514%2C%20526%20,fn.%201">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. In extreme cases, this distress can manifest physically. For example, in one out-of-state case, <em>Beecy v. Pucciarelli</em> (Mass. 1982), an attorney’s erroneous debt collection lawsuit caused the innocent target to suffer a <strong>stroke</strong> two days after being served​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=deputy%20sheriff%20to%20recall%20the,Pucciarelli%27s%20actions">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. The plaintiffs in that case alleged the stress of the baseless suit led to the stroke and permanent disabilities​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=deputy%20sheriff%20to%20recall%20the,Pucciarelli%27s%20actions">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. (The Massachusetts court ultimately dismissed their claims on legal grounds, noting the strict requirements for malicious prosecution and the litigation privilege​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=The%20Beecys%27%20first%20contention%20is,recognize%20that%20there%20are%20compelling">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>, but the facts illustrate the real-world medical harm that frivolous litigation can inflict.) In California, if similar facts arose, the stroke and related suffering would be elements of damage in a malicious prosecution or negligence claim against the attorney. The key is proving causation and that the attorney’s actions were wrongful under the law (malicious or negligent). When those elements are met, <strong>courts do compensate for severe emotional distress and resultant health issues caused by an attorney’s misconduct in bringing meritless cases</strong></p>
<p>.</p>
<p><strong>Summary of Key Findings</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Attorneys Owing Duty of Care:</strong> Attorneys have a duty to exercise reasonable judgment about what claims to pursue. Bringing a completely meritless case can breach this duty to a client, but <strong>California does not impose automatic malpractice liability</strong> just because a case was unsuccessful or sanctioned – the context and attorney’s decision-making are examined (as in <em>Dawson v. Toledano</em> where frivolous litigation wasn’t per se malpractice)​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/dawson-v-toledano#:~:text=holding%20that%20the%20mere%20fact,that%20the%20attorney%20committed%20malpractice">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Malicious Prosecution Liability:</strong> An attorney <em>can</em> be held liable by the opposing party if they pursued a civil case <strong>without probable cause and with malice</strong>. California Supreme Court cases like <em>Bertero</em> and <em>Crowley</em> established this, allowing recovery for all damages including attorney fees spent defending the bogus case and emotional distress​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. Even if part of a lawsuit had merit, the attorney may be liable for the portions that were baseless (<em>Crowley</em>). And under <em>Zamos</em>, liability extends to <strong>continuing</strong> a lawsuit after it becomes clear it lacks merit​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/zamos-v-stroud-33398#:~:text=The%20question%20presented%20by%20this,conclude%20an%20attorney%20may%20be">scocal.stanford.edu</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Probable Cause Standard:</strong> The threshold for suing an attorney for a frivolous case is high – courts use an objective test (from <em>Sheldon Appel</em>) asking if <strong>any reasonable attorney</strong> could have thought the claim was arguable​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=Lowered%3F%20www,at%20886">ocbar.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. This protects attorneys from hindsight second-guessing, ensuring only truly groundless actions lead to liability. <em>Sheldon Appel</em> and subsequent cases also emphasize that judges, not juries, decide if probable cause existed, acting as gatekeepers to prevent a flood of retaliatory suits.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Damages and Medical Injury:</strong> If an attorney is found liable (either for malpractice or malicious prosecution), the damages can include compensation for <strong>stress-induced illnesses</strong>. California precedent (e.g. <em>Bertero</em>) confirms that mental anguish and resulting health problems caused by being dragged into baseless litigation are compensable​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. Thus, a negligence or malicious prosecution verdict against an attorney could cover medical bills and pain and suffering for a stroke or other stress-related injury, so long as the lawsuit’s wrongfulness is the proximate cause.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Sanctions and Deterrence:</strong> Both California and federal courts impose sanctions to curb frivolous filings. The U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Cooter &amp; Gell</em> and <em>Chambers v. NASCO</em> affirmed that attorneys can be fined or ordered to pay the other side’s fees for bad-faith litigation conduct​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/32/#:~:text=Chambers%20v.%20Nasco%2C%20Inc.%20,and%20related%20expenses%20paid">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. These rulings underscore a broader legal principle: <strong>misusing the courts has consequences</strong>, and an attorney’s professional license is no shield against discipline or liability when they negligently or intentionally pursue meritless cases that harm others.</p>
<p><strong>Sources:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Dawson v. Toledano, 109 Cal. App. 4th 387 (2003) – frivolous appeal not automatically malpractice​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/dawson-v-toledano#:~:text=holding%20that%20the%20mere%20fact,that%20the%20attorney%20committed%20malpractice">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>.</p>
<ul>
<li>Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43 (1974) – landmark malicious prosecution case, allowing recovery of attorney fees and emotional distress​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/13/43.html#:~:text=defending%20the%20prior%20action%20and,13%20Cal">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (1994) – malicious prosecution lies for baseless claims even if other claims had merit​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/8/666.html#:~:text=show%20,on%20that%20account%20less%20injurious">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal. 4th 958 (2004) – attorney liable for continuing to prosecute case after discovering lack of probable cause​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/zamos-v-stroud-33398#:~:text=The%20question%20presented%20by%20this,conclude%20an%20attorney%20may%20be">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
<li>Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &amp; Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863 (1989) – defines probable cause (objective “reasonable attorney” test)​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=Lowered%3F%20www,at%20886">ocbar.org</a></li>
<li><em>In re Marriage of Flaherty</em>, 31 Cal. 3d 637 (1982) – defines frivolous appeals and cautions against chilling advocacy​<a href="https://www.minyardmorris.com/media-center/case-updates/filing-frivolous-appeal-not-malpractice-matter-law/#:~:text=malpractice,for%20the%20personal%20injury%20plaintiff">minyardmorris.com</a></li>
<li>Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) – courts’ inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation (upheld large sanctions)​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/32/#:~:text=Chambers%20v.%20Nasco%2C%20Inc.%20,and%20related%20expenses%20paid">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Cooter &amp; Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) – Rule 11 sanctions allowed even after voluntary dismissal of frivolous suit​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/496/384/#:~:text=match%20at%20L325%20paper%20is,395">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589 (1982) – (Massachusetts case) attorney sued for wrongful collection action; plaintiffs alleged the stress caused a stroke​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=deputy%20sheriff%20to%20recall%20the,Pucciarelli%27s%20actions">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>(illustrates potential medical harm from baseless litigation).</p>
<ul>
<li>California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 – sanctions for frivolous filings​<a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_3.1-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf#:~:text=,faith%20argument%20for%20an%20extension">calbar.ca.gov</a></li>
</ul>
<p>; California Rules of Prof. Conduct 3.1 – duty to avoid meritless claims.</p>
<p><strong>Attorney Negligence for Frivolous Lawsuits Causing Harm – Key Cases and Principles</strong></p>
<p>When lawyers file <strong>meritless lawsuits</strong> that cause serious harm (including medical injuries like stress-induced strokes), courts have addressed their liability through the tort of <em>malicious prosecution</em> and related doctrines. Below we summarize published case law from California and U.S. Supreme Court on this issue – covering civil suits (including those with underlying medical injury claims) and relevant criminal-case contexts. We include outcomes (judgments or settlements) and the legal principles or precedents each case established.</p>
<p><strong>Malicious Prosecution in California – Attorney Liability in Frivolous Suits</strong></p>
<p><strong>Malicious prosecution</strong> is the primary civil cause of action used to hold attorneys (and their clients) liable for initiating or continuing baseless litigation. To succeed, the plaintiff must prove: <strong>(1)</strong> the prior lawsuit was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; <strong>(2)</strong> the prior suit was brought <strong>without probable cause</strong>; <strong>(3)</strong> it was initiated with <strong>malice</strong> (improper purpose)​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=Dr,mental%20distress%2C%20and%2For%20injury%20to">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>. If these elements are met, the victim can recover damages for legal costs, lost reputation, emotional distress, and even resulting physical harm​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=intentional%20infliction%20of%20emotional%20distress,reputation%20or%20impairment%20of%20his">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>. Key California cases include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Babb v. Superior Court (Cal. 1971)</strong> – The California Supreme Court made clear that <strong>attorneys have no immunity from malicious prosecution suits</strong>. It allowed a physician to sue an opposing party <em>and her attorney</em> for maliciously prosecuting a baseless malpractice case (once that case ended favorably for the doctor)​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/babb-v-superior-court-30181#:~:text=prosecution%20action,the%20hiring%20of%20separate%20counsel">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. <em>Babb</em> confirmed that a lawyer who knowingly pursues an unfounded claim can be held to answer for malicious prosecution just like their client.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Bertero v. National General Corp. (Cal. 1974)</strong> – A landmark California Supreme Court decision upholding a large verdict against a company and its lawyers for maliciously filing a baseless cross-complaint. The plaintiff, Bertero, had been hit with a frivolous fraud cross-claim during litigation, which caused him severe emotional distress. A jury awarded Bertero <strong>$553,952 in compensatory damages</strong> (including attorney fees and emotional harm) and <strong>$625,000 in punitive damages</strong><a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/bertero-v-national-general-corp-27794#:~:text=Defendants%20National%20General%20Corporation%20,modified%20and%2C%20as%20modified%2C%20affirmed">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The Supreme Court affirmed most of the $1.18 million judgment, solidifying that <strong>maliciously prosecuting a meritless claim carries liability for all foreseeable harm</strong>, including mental anguish​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=intentional%20infliction%20of%20emotional%20distress,reputation%20or%20impairment%20of%20his">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>. <em>Bertero</em> also held that each claim in a lawsuit can be evaluated for probable cause – a concept later expanded in <em>Crowley</em> (below).</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Crowley v. Katleman (Cal. 1994)</strong> – The California Supreme Court ruled that a malicious prosecution plaintiff can base their claim on <strong>a single baseless cause of action</strong> in a prior multi-claim lawsuit​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=with%20actions%20for%20malicious%20prosecution,326%20P.2d%20912">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. In other words, even if some claims had merit, an attorney may be liable for malicious prosecution if they included <strong>one groundless claim</strong> with malice. This put attorneys on notice that adding a frivolous theory to a lawsuit can lead to liability, even if the rest of the case had arguable merit.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &amp; Oliker (Cal. 1989)</strong> – This case set the standard for <strong>“probable cause”</strong> in California. The Supreme Court held that whether an attorney had probable cause to sue is an <strong>objective legal question</strong> for the judge, not a subjective inquiry into the lawyer’s intent​ <a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=The%20standard%20for%20determining%20probable,at%20886">ocbar.org</a> ​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The test is <strong>whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim was tenable</strong> (i.e. not “totally and completely without merit”​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>). If reasonable lawyers could disagree, no liability attaches even if the claim ultimately fails. <em>Sheldon Appel</em> thus protects attorneys from liability for borderline or debatable claims, but still allows actions against truly frivolous lawsuits. (Notably, in <em>Sheldon Appel</em> the jury had hit the law firm with $1 million punitive damages for a frivolous lien claim, but the Supreme Court vacated that verdict because the probable cause issue should have been decided by the court under the objective standard​ <a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=The%20standard%20for%20determining%20probable,at%20886">ocbar.org</a> <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>.)</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Williams v. Coombs (Cal. App. 1986)</strong> – An example of a <em>physician’s countersuit</em> against an attorney. A doctor (Dr. Williams) was sued for malpractice/wrongful death after a patient’s suicide; he won at trial, then sued the plaintiff’s lawyer (Coombs) for malicious prosecution. The appellate court reinstated the doctor’s claim, finding triable issues on whether the lawsuit lacked probable cause​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=Karleen%20Rhey,%E2%80%9D%20This%20appeal%20followed">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. This case illustrates that <strong>doctors wrongfully sued can hold the opposing attorney liable</strong> if the suit was utterly baseless and malicious. (The record shows Dr. Williams suffered significant stress and reputational harm; his malicious prosecution claim sought damages for those injuries​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=Dr,902">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>, though the emotional distress claim was barred by litigation privilege in that case​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=grounds%20that%20%E2%80%9Cas%20a%20matter,%E2%80%9D%20This%20appeal%20followed">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>.) The case was sent back for trial on malicious prosecution, and it ultimately encouraged physicians to pursue recourse against frivolous medical malpractice suits​<a href="https://academic.oup.com/asj/article/20/4/337/273780#:~:text=Lawyers%20Successfully%20Sued%20by%20Doctors,the%20doctor%20won%20the%20case">academic.oup.com</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Zamos v. Stroud (Cal. 2004)</strong> – A California Supreme Court decision that <strong>extended attorney liability to the <em>continuation</em> of a frivolous case</strong>. It held that even if an attorney had probable cause at the start, they <strong>must drop the case once they discover it has no merit</strong>. Failing to do so can support a malicious prosecution claim​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. In <em>Zamos</em>, a client sued her former lawyers for fraud; new evidence showed the fraud claim was baseless, but the <strong>successor attorneys persisted with the lawsuit</strong>, allegedly causing the defendants needless harm. The court concluded “an attorney may be held liable for malicious prosecution for <strong>continuing to prosecute</strong> a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause”​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. This ruling set a clear precedent: a lawyer’s duty of care includes <strong>abandoning a meritless case</strong> rather than pressing on and injuring the target of the suit.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Soukup v. Hafif (Cal. 2006)</strong> – Peggy Soukup, a former employee, had been sued by her ex-employer (a law firm) in an effort to intimidate her. She got that suit dismissed via California’s anti-SLAPP statute (as an illegitimate SLAPP suit) and then sued the firm and its attorneys for malicious prosecution​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2006/s126715.html#:~:text=litigant%20whose%20action%20was%20dismissed,The%20superior%20court">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The California Supreme Court allowed her malicious prosecution claim (a “SLAPPback”) to proceed, rejecting the defendants’ attempt to escape via another anti-SLAPP motion​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2006/s126715.html#:~:text=litigant%20whose%20action%20was%20dismissed,The%20superior%20court">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. This case confirmed that <strong>victims of frivolous suits meant to chill their rights can sue for malicious prosecution</strong>, and it clarified procedural rules so that the malicious prosecution “SLAPPback” is not itself struck as a SLAPP. Soukup reportedly suffered career and emotional damage from the baseless lawsuit, and California law now expressly permits recovery in such scenarios (with anti-SLAPP protections inapplicable to verified malicious prosecution claims).</p>
<p><strong>Damages and Settlements:</strong> In malicious prosecution cases, California courts recognize a broad range of recoverable damages. These include <strong>legal defense costs, harm to reputation, emotional distress, and resulting physical injuries</strong>. The California Supreme Court in <em>Bertero</em> stressed that a maliciously sued person may recover for <strong>“injury to his reputation or impairment of&#8230; standing&#8230;, and for mental or emotional distress.”</strong>​</p>
<p><a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=intentional%20infliction%20of%20emotional%20distress,reputation%20or%20impairment%20of%20his">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>. In extreme cases, stress from being wrongfully sued can lead to serious health problems – for example, a party’s stroke or heart attack – and those would be compensable as damages caused by the malicious lawsuit (as long as adequately linked by evidence).</p>
<p>Several high-profile California cases have resulted in <strong>significant judgments or settlements</strong> against those who brought frivolous suits:</p>
<ul>
<li><em>Bertero</em> (1974) as noted saw a <strong>$1.15 million judgment</strong> (including punitives) against the defendants and their attorneys​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/bertero-v-national-general-corp-27794#:~:text=Defendants%20National%20General%20Corporation%20,modified%20and%2C%20as%20modified%2C%20affirmed">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
</ul>
<p>– a then-record award that underscored the <strong>punitive consequences</strong> for malicious litigation.</p>
<ul>
<li>In <strong>Parrish v. Latham &amp; Watkins / FLIR Systems</strong> (underlying case 2011, Cal. Supreme Court review 2017), two former employees were falsely accused of trade-secret theft by their ex-employer (FLIR) in a “bad faith” lawsuit that ruined their new business​<a href="https://www.panish.law/case-results/parrish-v-flir-systems-inc/#:~:text=misappropriating%20trade%20secrets,prosecution%20settlement%20in%20California%20history">panish.law</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. After winning the underlying case, the employees sued FLIR and its law firm for malicious prosecution. The litigation against the law firm was ultimately barred by a procedural rule (the <strong>“interim adverse judgment” rule, see next section</strong>), but FLIR itself agreed to a massive <strong>$39 million settlement</strong> in 2011 to resolve the malicious prosecution claims​<a href="https://www.panish.law/case-results/parrish-v-flir-systems-inc/#:~:text=sued%20FLIR%20alleging%20it%20had,prosecution%20settlement%20in%20California%20history">panish.law</a></p>
<p>. This is reportedly <strong>the largest malicious-prosecution settlement in California history</strong><a href="https://www.panish.law/case-results/parrish-v-flir-systems-inc/#:~:text=sued%20FLIR%20alleging%20it%20had,prosecution%20settlement%20in%20California%20history">panish.law</a></p>
<p>. Such an extraordinary payout highlights the scale of harm a baseless lawsuit can inflict (here, destroying an entire business) and that attorneys and clients may face <strong>huge financial exposure</strong> if they pursue meritless claims maliciously.</p>
<ul>
<li>In <em>Soukup</em>, the plaintiff not only won her malicious prosecution suit at trial, but also was awarded <strong>attorney’s fees</strong> from the defendants under the anti-SLAPP statute for having to defeat their improper motions​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1123283.html#:~:text=under%20the%20anti,for%20malicious%20prosecution%20and">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>(the case helped establish that a prevailing malicious-prosecution plaintiff can get fees if the defense raised a frivolous SLAPP motion). This emphasizes that attorneys may bear not just damage awards but also fee-shifting penalties when they engage in bad-faith litigation tactics.</p>
<p><strong>Takeaway (Civil Cases):</strong> California law firmly establishes that <strong>an attorney owes a duty not to abuse the legal system by pursuing frivolous litigation</strong>. If they breach this duty – by filing or continuing a meritless lawsuit with no probable cause and with malice – they can be held liable for <strong>negligence/malpractice toward their own client and malicious prosecution toward the adversary</strong>. Victims can recover full compensatory damages (including for serious stress-related injuries like strokes, if proved) and sometimes punitive damages to punish egregious conduct​<a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/bertero-v-national-general-corp-27794#:~:text=Defendants%20National%20General%20Corporation%20,modified%20and%2C%20as%20modified%2C%20affirmed">scocal.stanford.edu</a></p>
<p>. The key legal principles are: an objective standard for probable cause (<em>any</em> reasonable lawyer standard​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>), requirement of favorable termination for the victim​ <a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/babb-v-superior-court-30181#:~:text=,against%20an">scocal.stanford.edu</a></p>
<p>, and the allowance of actions against attorneys <strong>for each baseless claim</strong> and for <strong>continuing litigation after it becomes baseless</strong><a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. California’s precedents like <em>Bertero</em> and <em>Zamos</em> have set a strong deterrent against frivolous lawsuits.</p>
<p><strong>Frivolous Criminal Proceedings – Malicious Prosecution &amp; Immunities</strong></p>
<p>In the context of <strong>baseless criminal charges</strong> (as opposed to civil lawsuits), the same fundamental principles apply – no one should face maliciously instituted proceedings – but additional immunities come into play. Key points and cases include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Malicious Prosecution of Criminal Cases:</strong> A person wrongly prosecuted without probable cause can sue for malicious prosecution once the charges end in their favor (e.g. acquittal or dismissal). All the same elements apply (termination in favor of accused, lack of probable cause, malice). For instance, California has long allowed such suits against <strong>private individuals who deliberately instigate false criminal charges</strong>. An early example is <em>Jaffe v. Stone</em> (Cal. 1941), where the court noted that favorable termination (acquittal) helps show the innocence of the accused and, with lack of probable cause and malice, “establishes the tort”​ <a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/babb-v-superior-court-30181#:~:text=146%20%2C%20149%20,%28Jaffe%20v">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. California courts have held that a person who <strong>“sought out the police and falsely reported facts”</strong> to initiate a criminal case can be liable for malicious prosecution​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=with%20actions%20for%20malicious%20prosecution,326%20P.2d%20912">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<p><em>Illustration:</em> If an attorney (acting as a private complainant, not a prosecutor) files a police report or complaint leading to someone’s arrest without any reasonable basis, and did so out of malice, that attorney could face a malicious prosecution claim. However, such scenarios are less common; more often the target is a vindictive private accuser.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Immunity for Prosecutors:</strong> <strong>Prosecuting attorneys</strong> are generally <strong>immune</strong> from civil liability for bringing charges, even if those charges were meritless or motivated by malice. The U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Imbler v. Pachtman</em>, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) held that a state prosecutor acting within the scope of their duties is <strong>absolutely immune</strong> from suits for damages​ <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/409/#:~:text=Held%3A%20A%20state%20prosecuting%20attorney,431"> supreme.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. The Court acknowledged this rule can leave a wrongfully accused person without civil redress against a malicious prosecutor, but it reasoned that exposing prosecutors to liability would undermine their independent judgment and “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of [their] duty”​ <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/409/#:~:text=,prejudice%20criminal%20defendants%20by%20skewing">supreme.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. In short, public policy favors giving prosecutors freedom to pursue charges without fear of personal liability, even at the cost of denying relief to those harmed by a prosecutor’s abuse of authority​ <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/409/#:~:text=,prejudice%20criminal%20defendants%20by%20skewing">supreme.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. (Prosecutors are still subject to internal discipline and can be disbarred or criminally charged for egregious misconduct, but <strong>cannot be sued for negligence or malicious prosecution</strong> in the course of their official role.)</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Immunity for Witnesses:</strong> Similarly, witnesses (including complaining witnesses) have immunity from liability for their testimony. For example, if an attorney swears out a criminal complaint or testifies falsely, the <strong>witness immunity</strong> doctrine may shield them from a later lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Briscoe v. LaHue</em> (1983) held that even false testimony in court cannot form the basis of a civil damages claim against the witness, due to absolute witness immunity. California follows this as well​ <a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=The%20court%20held%20that%20Taylor,LaHue%20%281983%29%20460">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. (Notably, in <em>Zamos</em> the defendant attorneys tried to invoke witness immunity because part of the claim against them involved their statements in court, but the court rejected immunity for <em>continuing the prosecution</em> itself​</p>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=The%20court%20held%20that%20Taylor,LaHue%20%281983%29%20460">casetext.com</a> <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-supreme-court/1239834.html#:~:text=ZAMOS%20v.%20STROUD%20%282004%29%20,LaHue%20%281983%29%20460">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Public Entity Immunity in California:</strong> California law (Gov. Code §821.6) grants public employees immunity from tort liability for instituting or prosecuting judicial proceedings, which has been applied to shield police and investigators from malicious-prosecution-type claims in many situations​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=720,immunity%20for%20malicious%20prosecution%3A%20Dawson">law.justia.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>However, this immunity <strong>does not extend to false imprisonment</strong> (e.g. keeping someone in custody without legal authority)​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=match%20at%20L326%20liability%20for,2d">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>​</p>
<p>. In <em>Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles</em> (Cal. 1974), the plaintiff had been wrongfully held in jail after his case was dismissed. The county argued immunity, but the Supreme Court held the county was <strong>not immune from a false imprisonment claim</strong> for detaining someone without basis after charges were dropped​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20which%20follow,from%20liability%20for%20false%20imprisonment">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. The court distinguished this from a pure malicious prosecution claim (which would have been barred by immunity)​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=liability%20for%20malicious%20prosecution%2C%20they,2d">law.justia.com</a></p>
<p>. The upshot is that <strong>California public entities and employees are generally immune from suits claiming they maliciously brought a criminal case</strong>, but they can be liable if they <strong>negligently or wrongfully continue to hold someone</strong> beyond legal authority​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=liability%20for%20malicious%20prosecution%2C%20they,2d">law.justia.com</a></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Law Enforcement Liability:</strong> While prosecutors have absolute immunity, <strong>police officers</strong> and other law enforcement do not have absolute immunity for initiating a baseless prosecution. They have only <strong>qualified immunity</strong> under federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Malley v. Briggs</em>, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) held that an officer who causes an arrest by submitting a complaint/warrant with no probable cause <strong>can be civilly liable</strong> under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The Court reasoned that a reasonably well-trained officer should know not to seek a warrant without adequate facts, and if they do so, the shield of qualified immunity is lost​ <a href="https://ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/police-immunity-civil-suit-malley-v-briggs#:~:text=Police%20Immunity%20From%20Civil%20Suit,the%20issuance%20of%20an">ojp.gov</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. Thus, an officer (or by extension, any government attorney acting as an investigator) who <strong>“unreasonably” initiates charges without probable cause</strong> may be sued for violating the victim’s Fourth Amendment rights (a constitutional analog to malicious prosecution). In practice, this means an attorney in a <em>prosecutorial</em> role is immune (per <em>Imbler</em>), but if an attorney steps outside that role – say, fabricating evidence or acting as a complaining witness – they could lose immunity (see <em>Kalina v. Fletcher</em>, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), where a prosecutor was denied immunity for swearing a false affidavit in support of charges).</p>
<p><strong>Damages in Criminal Malicious Prosecution:</strong> When a malicious criminal case <em>is</em> actionable (typically against a private instigator or police officer), the plaintiff can recover similar damages as in civil cases: lost income, legal fees, emotional distress, and any physical harm suffered (for example, health issues from the stress or from wrongful incarceration). One California case, <em>Jackson v. Yarbray</em> (Cal. App. 2009), involved a man who suffered health problems after being falsely prosecuted at the behest of a vindictive neighbor – he was able to sue the neighbor for malicious prosecution and claim those consequential damages. (By contrast, if a health issue like a stroke stems from mere <strong>negligence</strong> by an attorney without malice – e.g. a lawyer suing the wrong person by mistake – courts have been reluctant to impose liability. For instance, in <em>Beecy v. Pucciarelli</em> (Mass. 1982), a couple was wrongly sued for debt by an attorney and the husband suffered a stroke from the stress, but the court refused to hold the attorney liable in negligence or emotional-distress, absent malice or extreme wrongdoing​ <a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=plaintiffs%20stated%20no%20claim%20upon,against%20whom%20he%20erroneously%20commenced">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. The suit was dismissed because the attorney’s conduct, though mistaken, wasn’t intentional enough to exceed litigation immunity. In California, such scenarios would typically fall under malicious prosecution only if malice and lack of probable cause are shown; mere mistake or negligence by opposing counsel usually isn’t actionable by the adversary.)</p>
<p><strong>Key Precedent (Federal):</strong> <em>Hartman v. Moore</em>, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) – While not a traditional tort case, the U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Hartman</em> addressed a First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim and held that the plaintiff must plead and prove <strong>lack of probable cause</strong> for the underlying charges. This effectively imported the malicious prosecution standard into constitutional law: there is no liability for a retaliatory criminal charge if the officials had objectively probable cause. <em>Hartman</em> underscores the high bar for suing over baseless prosecutions: even in civil rights cases, the absence of probable cause is a <strong>“critical element”</strong> to establish that a prosecution was wrongful.</p>
<p><strong>Other Deterrents: Sanctions and Ethical Duties</strong></p>
<p>Beyond civil liability for damages, attorneys face other consequences for bringing frivolous lawsuits:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Court Sanctions:</strong> Both California and federal courts have rules authorizing sanctions (fines, fee awards) against attorneys who file frivolous or bad-faith claims. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 128.5 and 128.7 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 empower judges to penalize filings that are completely meritless or intended to harass. For example, in <em>Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper</em>, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that courts may require attorneys to pay the other side’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith litigation (under 28 U.S.C. §1927 or inherent power), although a pure negligence standard is not enough – there must be <strong>subjective bad faith or reckless conduct </strong><a href="https://casetext.com/case/stradtman-v-republic-servs-inc-4#:~:text=,not%20%E2%80%9Cmultiply%20the%20proceedings">casetext.com</a> <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-4th-circuit/1367322.html#:~:text=DeBAUCHE%20v,not%20engage%20in%20such%20conduct">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. In<strong> <em>Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.</em>, 501 U.S. 32 (1991),</strong> the Supreme Court upheld a sanction of nearly $1 million in attorney fees against a party (and effectively his lawyers) for <strong>extensive bad-faith litigation tactics</strong>, reaffirming that courts have <strong>inherent power</strong> to punish conduct that abuses the judicial process​ <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/90-256.ZS.html#:~:text=Law,fees%20and%20related%20expenses">law.cornell.edu</a></p>
<p>These rulings serve as precedent that even if a malicious prosecution suit isn’t filed, a lawyer who presses a frivolous case can be hit with fee-shifting sanctions to compensate the victim of the frivolous suit.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ethical and Disciplinary Rules:</strong> Attorneys are bound by ethics rules prohibiting frivolous actions. For instance, California’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 bars lawyers from asserting a claim “without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.” Violations can lead to State Bar discipline (suspension or disbarment). Notably, in <em>Williams v. Coombs</em> (above), besides facing the civil countersuit, attorney Coombs was also disciplined by the Bar for his misconduct in that case (filing a baseless cross-complaint to intimidate a witness). Thus, <em>official case law reflects not only civil liability but that such conduct may end legal careers</em>.</li>
<li><strong>Precedent Setting:</strong> The strong stance in California case law has influenced other jurisdictions. Some states have followed California in allowing malicious prosecution actions against attorneys (with similar high standards to prevent a chilling effect on legitimate advocacy). Courts often cite California’s cases like <em>Bertero</em> and <em>Zamos</em> as leading authority on balancing the right to access courts with protecting individuals from baseless suits​</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></p>
<p>. The precedent set by these cases is that <strong>frivolous litigation is an abuse of the legal system</strong> and that <strong>those who knowingly engage in it can be held accountable for the tangible harms they cause</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>In sum, <strong>published case law in California and the U.S. Supreme Court firmly establishes that attorneys may be found negligent or liable for damages if they pursue meritless lawsuits that harm others.</strong> In California, the malicious prosecution tort is the chief vehicle for recovery: an attorney who files or continues a baseless case with malice and without probable cause can be sued for all proximately caused damages – from legal fees to emotional distress and even consequential medical injuries like strokes brought on by the ordeal​ <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=intentional%20infliction%20of%20emotional%20distress,reputation%20or%20impairment%20of%20his">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></p>
<p>. Landmark cases such as <em>Bertero</em> and <em>Zamos</em> reinforced that standard, setting precedent that has deterred frivolous filings. These cases highlight key principles:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Probable Cause Threshold:</strong> Lawyers must have an objectively reasonable basis for a claim. If <strong>no reasonable attorney would think the claim tenable</strong>, it fails the probable cause test​ <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li><strong>Malice Requirement:</strong> Liability requires more than a mere mistake; it demands an improper purpose. This ensures attorneys are not punished for good-faith errors, only for <strong>knowing or reckless misuse of the courts</strong>.</li>
<li><strong>Duty to Withdraw:</strong> An attorney’s duty is ongoing – if evidence later shows the case is groundless, they must withdraw or face liability for continuing a meritless action​ <a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></li>
<li><strong>Damages and Accountability:</strong> Courts will fully compensate victims of frivolous suits – even for serious personal injuries resulting from stress – and impose punitive damages or sanctions to <strong>penalize egregious attorney misconduct </strong><a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/bertero-v-national-general-corp-27794#:~:text=Defendants%20National%20General%20Corporation%20,modified%20and%2C%20as%20modified%2C%20affirmed">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
</ul>
<p>The record $39 million settlement in the <em>FLIR</em> malicious prosecution saga exemplifies the extent of accountability for outrageous, bad-faith litigation​ <a href="https://www.panish.law/case-results/parrish-v-flir-systems-inc/#:~:text=sued%20FLIR%20alleging%20it%20had,prosecution%20settlement%20in%20California%20history">panish.law</a></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Criminal Case Nuance:</strong> While private individuals (and even police, under federal law) can be liable for maliciously initiating criminal proceedings without cause, <strong>prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity</strong>​</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/409/#:~:text=,prejudice%20criminal%20defendants%20by%20skewing">supreme.justia.com</a></p>
<p>.This draws a line between truly malicious abuse of the legal process by private actors (or attorneys in a civil role) – which courts will remedy – versus the policy shield around official prosecutorial decisions.</p>
<p>Every case reinforces a common theme: the legal system is meant to resolve genuine disputes, not to be a weapon of harassment. Attorneys are “officers of the court” and are expected to uphold that integrity. The <strong>precedents in California and from the U.S. Supreme Court strike a balance</strong> between allowing zealous advocacy and sanctioning abusive litigation. Frivolous lawsuits that recklessly endanger others’ well-being are met with stern judicial disapproval and liability. In practice, these rulings have set a powerful precedent that deters meritless litigation and provides redress when an attorney’s negligence or malice in filing a lawsuit causes real harm.</p>
<p><strong>Sources:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974) (upholding $1.178M verdict for malicious prosecution; attorneys liable for frivolous cross-complaint)​ <a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/bertero-v-national-general-corp-27794#:~:text=Defendants%20National%20General%20Corporation%20,modified%20and%2C%20as%20modified%2C%20affirmed">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
<li>Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 841 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1971) (attorney and client can be joint defendants in malicious prosecution; no attorney immunity)​ <a href="https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/babb-v-superior-court-30181#:~:text=prosecution%20action,the%20hiring%20of%20separate%20counsel">scocal.stanford.edu</a></li>
<li>Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &amp; Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1989) (probable cause is an objective legal question; defined “lack of probable cause” as no reasonable lawyer would think the claim tenable)​<a href="https://www.ocbar.org/All-News/News-View/ArticleId/281/November-2010-Malicious-Prosecution-Has-the-Bar-Been-Lowered#:~:text=The%20standard%20for%20determining%20probable,at%20886">ocbar.org</a> <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/47/863.html#:~:text=any%20reasonable%20attorney%20would%20have,f">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1994) (malicious prosecution can be based on a single baseless claim in a multi-claim suit)​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=with%20actions%20for%20malicious%20prosecution,326%20P.2d%20912">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) (attorney liable for continuing to prosecute a lawsuit after discovering it’s meritless)​<a href="https://casetext.com/case/zamos-v-stroud#:~:text=For%20the%20reasons%20stated%2C%20we,discovered%20to%20lack%20probable%20cause">casetext.com</a></li>
<li>Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal.App.3d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (doctor’s malicious prosecution suit against opposing counsel allowed to proceed – lack of probable cause in underlying wrongful death case was triable)​<a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1842417.html#:~:text=Karleen%20Rhey,%E2%80%9D%20This%20appeal%20followed">caselaw.findlaw.com</a></li>
<li>Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2006) (SLAPP suit dismissed; former employee’s malicious prosecution claim against attorneys survived anti-SLAPP; affirmed viability of “SLAPPback” actions)​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2006/s126715.html#:~:text=litigant%20whose%20action%20was%20dismissed,The%20superior%20court">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974) (discussing Gov’t Code immunities; public entities immune from malicious prosecution but not from false imprisonment for holding someone past dismissal of charges)​<a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/12/710.html#:~:text=liability%20for%20malicious%20prosecution%2C%20they,2d">law.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors from civil suits for malicious prosecution under §1983)​<a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/409/#:~:text=Held%3A%20A%20state%20prosecuting%20attorney,431">supreme.justia.com</a></li>
<li>Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1986) (no absolute immunity for officer who initiated baseless charges; could be liable if no reasonable officer would think probable cause exists)​<a href="https://ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/police-immunity-civil-suit-malley-v-briggs#:~:text=Police%20Immunity%20From%20Civil%20Suit,the%20issuance%20of%20an">ojp.gov</a></li>
<li><strong>Additional Reference:</strong> Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589 (Mass. SJC 1982) (attorney’s erroneous debt collection suit allegedly caused defendant’s stroke; court denied recovery absent malice, declining to extend negligence liability to adversary)​ <a href="https://casetext.com/case/beecy-v-pucciarelli#:~:text=collection%20action,Pucciarelli%27s%20actions">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<h3><strong><span style="color: #339966;">– contrasted with California’s requirement of malice for such claims.</span></strong></h3>
<ul>
<li>Parrish v. Latham &amp; Watkins, 3 Cal.5th 767 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2017) (reinforced “interim adverse judgment” rule – a preliminary courtroom victory, like defeating summary judgment, establishes probable cause even if the case later fails; used to defend attorneys in the FLIR malicious prosecution matter)​ <a href="https://casetext.com/case/parrish-v-watkins-2#:~:text=caused%20the%20commencement%20or%20continuation,interim%20adverse%20judgment%20rule">casetext.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>. <em>(After this ruling, FLIR’s direct liability remained, leading to the record $39 million settlement) </em><a href="https://www.panish.law/case-results/parrish-v-flir-systems-inc/#:~:text=sued%20FLIR%20alleging%20it%20had,prosecution%20settlement%20in%20California%20history">panish.law</a></p>
<ul>
<li>Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1991) (federal court’s inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation with fee awards, in addition to Rule 11 or §1927)​ <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/90-256.ZS.html#:~:text=Law,fees%20and%20related%20expenses">law.cornell.edu</a></li>
<li><strong>Statutory:</strong> Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §128.7 (attorney sanctions for frivolous filings)​ <a href="https://www.sdcba.org/?pg=Ethics-in-Brief-8-26-2013#:~:text=Ethics,or%20frivolous%20cases%20and%20contentions">sdcba.org</a></li>
</ul>
<p>; Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 3.1 (ethical duty against frivolous claims)​ <a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/Proposed-Formal-Opinion-Settling-Before-Withdrawal.pdf#:~:text=,by%20a%20good%20faith">calbar.ca.gov</a></p>
<p>.</p>
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">Anti Slapp Law Resources:</span></h1>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="NfqwW9h5uJ"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-in-california/">Anti-SLAPP Law in California</a></p></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="wKQbU5ZCQq"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-and-free-speech-in-defamation-emotional-distress-cases/">Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &#038; Emotional Distress Cases</a></p></blockquote>
<p><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation &#038; Emotional Distress Cases&#8221; &#8212; Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech &amp; Political Content" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-and-free-speech-in-defamation-emotional-distress-cases/embed/#?secret=uqYsqtfHXm#?secret=wKQbU5ZCQq" data-secret="wKQbU5ZCQq" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="LHlcia9Ihd"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/attorney-liability-for-meritless-litigation-leading-to-harm/">Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm</a></p></blockquote>
<p><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm&#8221; &#8212; Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech &amp; Political Content" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/attorney-liability-for-meritless-litigation-leading-to-harm/embed/#?secret=N5fr4uB02U#?secret=LHlcia9Ihd" data-secret="LHlcia9Ihd" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="SYOgxC17vb"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/court-tosses-disbarred-lawyers-suit-over-newspaper-article/">Court tosses disbarred lawyer&#8217;s suit over newspaper article</a></p></blockquote>
<p><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8220;Court tosses disbarred lawyer&#8217;s suit over newspaper article&#8221; &#8212; Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech &amp; Political Content" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/court-tosses-disbarred-lawyers-suit-over-newspaper-article/embed/#?secret=4wbIns7Mg8#?secret=SYOgxC17vb" data-secret="SYOgxC17vb" width="600" height="338" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<div>
<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="ny00qOlo0I"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-supreme-court-confirms-that-the-anti-slapp-statute-applies-to-claims-of-discrimination-and-retaliation/">California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation</a></p></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="nAv0Ejaaaw"><p><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-cases-case-law-summaries-citings/">Anti-SLAPP Law Cases &#8211; Case Law Summaries &#038; Citings</a></p></blockquote>
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		<title>How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-anti-slapp-laws-protect-your-right-to-free-speech/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 05:23:09 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[&#160; How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. We are free to speak out on issues we care about without fear that the government will stop us or punish us. But it can be risky to criticize public figures. Powerful people often have the financial resources to [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"></h1>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1 class="fl-heading"><span class="fl-heading-text">How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech</span></h1>
<p>The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. We are free to speak out on issues we care about without fear that the government will stop us or punish us.</p>
<p>But it can be risky to criticize public figures. Powerful people often have the financial resources to respond to criticism with a lawsuit.</p>
<p>This type of lawsuit is called a SLAPP, which stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. The goal of a SLAPP is to get a person to retract their criticism of the person or business. But there are now a growing number of anti-SLAPP laws designed to protect speakers from the threat of going to court to defend their First Amendment right to free speech.</p>
<h2>What are anti-SLAPP laws?</h2>
<p>Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to protect free speech from being threatened or shut down by people on the receiving end of critical speech. They are designed to prevent SLAPP lawsuits.</p>
<h2>What are SLAPP lawsuits?</h2>
<p>University of Denver professors Penelope Canan and George Pring created the term SLAPP in the 1980s to refer to a lawsuit whose primary purpose is harassment and intimidation.</p>
<p>The goal is to force someone to take back a critical statement – or not make it in the first place – or else face an expensive lawsuit.</p>
<p>Both the financial and emotional toll are often greater for the defendant than the plaintiff, the person bringing the suit. Most SLAPP suits are filed by powerful people or corporations to protect their reputations against criticism from average people. They are often well-resourced and able to rely on their legal teams to do all the work. Defendants have less money to pay lawyers and must actively participate in their own defense.</p>
<h2>How do SLAPP lawsuits affect people’s free expression?</h2>
<p>To end or prevent a SLAPP, people will frequently agree to apologize and change their statements and promise not to speak out in the future. This sends a clear message to others who might speak critically as well. The result is the chilling of free speech and healthy debate about important matters of public concern.</p>
<p>Most SLAPP suits are based on claims of defamation or damaging someone’s reputation. But they can also claim a breach of contract, civil rights violations, interfering with the right to do business, or copyright or trademark infringement. They range from complex lawsuits filed in federal court to individual disputes over purely local matters.</p>
<h2>How do anti-SLAPP laws protect free expression?</h2>
<p>An anti-SLAPP law is designed to prevent SLAPP lawsuits.</p>
<p>Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have anti-SLAPP laws. But despite repeated attempts, Congress has never passed a federal anti-SLAPP law. People in 17 states, and many people who are sued in federal court, lack protection from SLAPP suits.</p>
<p>Anti-SLAPP laws make it easier for someone who has been sued for exercising their First Amendment rights to get a SLAPP lawsuit dismissed quickly.</p>
<p>More important, anti-SLAPP laws deter people from trying to use lawsuits to silence others. While anti-SLAPP laws vary from state to state, all offer one or more of the following protections:</p>
<p><strong>1. They protect a wide range of First Amendment activities.</strong></p>
<p>Anti-SLAPP laws require that the person being sued show that the lawsuit is targeting their First Amendment rights. Some only apply to statements made in an official government proceeding, like allegations made during a public-school board meeting or in front of the city council. Others apply to any speech on a matter of public concern, no matter where, when or how it occurs. These strong anti-SLAPP laws will also give the speaker the benefit of the doubt that the speech is about a matter of public concern.</p>
<p><strong>2. They put the burden on the person suing.</strong></p>
<p>In most lawsuits, the person being sued can only get the case dismissed in its early stages if they can clearly show they will win; if not, the case can potentially continue for months or even years at great expense.</p>
<p>Anti-SLAPP laws recognize the importance of free speech by putting the burden on the person who is suing to demonstrate why the lawsuit needs to happen. Once the person being sued shows the lawsuit is challenging his or her free speech rights, an anti-SLAPP law requires the person bringing the lawsuit to demonstrate they are likely to win the case. If they cannot do so, the case will be dismissed.</p>
<p><strong>3. They accelerate a final decision.</strong></p>
<p>An initial step in most lawsuits is a long and expensive process where each side collects information from the other in advance of trial. There are often several pre-trial hearings on legal issues. Anti-SLAPP laws pause these time-consuming steps until the court decides who should win.</p>
<p><strong>4. They allow immediate appeal of the initial decision.</strong></p>
<p>Most court cases require that the entire process plays out before the losing party can appeal. Anti-SLAPP laws often say that a defendant can immediately appeal a decision, saving significant time and money.</p>
<p><strong>5. They award attorney fees and court costs to a winning defendant.</strong></p>
<p>The U.S. legal system doesn’t require that a person who unsuccessfully files a lawsuit pay the legal fees and costs of the person they sued. This means successfully defending yourself in a lawsuit is often a hollow victory. Yes, you won but you also had to pay tens of thousands of dollars to win. An anti-SLAPP law says that if the person suing to stop the speech loses, then they must pay the legal fees and court costs of the person being sued.</p>
<h2>What are some examples of SLAPP lawsuits?</h2>
<p>Some of the biggest First Amendment cases in our history meet the definition of a SLAPP:</p>
<ul>
<li>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) is considered the most important protector of press freedom. It set the high standard that a public figure filing a defamation lawsuit must show that an allegation made about them was false and that the speaker who made the mistake knew or should have known it was wrong. This standard makes it possible to challenge and criticize powerful people. The lawsuit involved a paid political advertisement in <em>The New York Times</em> designed to raise money for the civil rights movement by criticizing law enforcement response to civil rights protests. It was filed by L.B. Sullivan, Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner, even though he wasn’t named in the advertisement. Sullivan said that certain facts in the article were incorrect; the paper countered that they were minor mistakes and didn’t matter in terms of the public’s overall view of the treatment of civil rights protesters by southern law enforcement. The lawsuit was filed in Alabama where a jury would be more sympathetic to Sullivan than to the northern newspaper. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 to send a message to civil rights activists. But the U.S. Supreme Court later overturned the verdict and protected the newspaper.</li>
<li>NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) also had roots in the civil rights movement. In 1966, a local branch of the NAACP organized a boycott against white merchants who discriminated against Black people in Mississippi. The business owners sued the NAACP. Most protesters’ actions were protected by the First Amendment, but a few people took unprotected actions like threatening store owners. A Mississippi court ruled for the business owners, ordering the NAACP to pay $3.5 million in damages. It took 16 years before the Supreme Court overturned that verdict, saying “the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity” designed “to bring about political, social, and economic change.”</li>
</ul>
<p>Most SLAPP suits involve everyday speech by average people:</p>
<ul>
<li>In 2003, the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition picketed several buildings in New York where tenants lived in terrible conditions. Instead of fixing the problem, building owners sued the NWBCCC for trespass, libel and wrongful interference with business relationships. The court cases went on for several years. They were eventually dismissed but cost NWBCCC more than $1 million in legal fees and forced the organization to focus on defending the lawsuit rather than advocacy efforts.</li>
<li>In 2010, college student Justin Kurtz’s car was towed from his apartment complex. He started a Facebook group called “Kalamazoo Residents against T&amp;J Towing,” which criticized the towing company’s aggressive practices. T&amp;J Towing filed a lawsuit seeking $750,000 in damages from Kurtz for alleged defamation. The lawsuit lasted eight months before Kurtz and the company decided to resolve their case on their own, out of court. Kurtz was not reimbursed for his legal fees but did exact some measure of revenge: the case went viral with <em>The New York Times</em> eventually publishing a front-page article and the Facebook group grew to 14,000 members.</li>
<li>In 2010, the <em>Washington City Paper</em>, a free weekly newspaper, published an article that catalogued many alleged wrongdoings by Dan Snyder, the then-owner of Washington, D.C.’s professional football team. He was not amused and filed a defamation lawsuit. Snyder’s lawyers warned the corporate owners of the <em>City Paper</em> that “the cost of litigation would presumably quickly outstrip the asset value” of the newspaper. This letter, in effect, said it would be easier for the <em>City Paper</em> to apologize and go away than stand by its story. The paper did just that, and Snyder eventually dropped the lawsuit.</li>
<li>In 2019, then-Congressman Devin Nunes filed – and lost – a lawsuit against Twitter and the creators of two parody accounts “Devin Nunes’ Cow” (a mocking reference to his family farm) and “Devin Nunes’ Mom.” Nunes lived in California but filed his lawsuit in Virginia, where there aren’t anti-SLAPP laws. He demanded $250 million. He lost but has filed several different lawsuits since 2018 seeking more than $900 million from those he believes has wronged him. To date, he has not won any of them.</li>
</ul>
<h2>What are some examples of anti-SLAPP laws that protected free speech?</h2>
<p>Anti-SLAPP laws have successfully protected speakers in a variety of cases throughout the country:</p>
<ul>
<li>In 2003, a Baltimore developer tried to sue future tenants for $25 million after the tenants criticized changes to building plans. The lawsuit was dismissed under the Maryland anti-SLAPP law.</li>
<li>In 2015, Robert and Michele Duchouquette posted an unfavorable review of Pets for Care on Yelp. The pet-sitting company sued for defamation and for violation of a clause in their service contracts that says clients cannot make negative comments about them. Pets for Care sought up to $1 million and removal of the negative review. Using the Texas anti-SLAPP law, the Duchouquettes got the lawsuit dismissed. They were reimbursed for more than $23,000 in legal fees and other costs.</li>
<li>In 2017, Phoenix business owner Charlie Lai criticized commercial property owner True North’s remodeling plans. True North tried to sue. Lai used the Arizona anti-SLAPP law to get the lawsuit dismissed, and the court ordered True North to pay his attorney fees.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Anti-SLAPP laws and the First Amendment</h2>
<p>While the First Amendment provides strong legal protection for a free press and for our rights as individuals to speak, assemble and petition the government, when a lawsuit challenges these freedoms, it can get costly. Anti-SLAPP laws serve as a great equalizer. They protect those who might otherwise have to self-censor in the face of legal threats. They allow us to speak out on matters that affect our everyday lives. <a href="https://www.freedomforum.org/anti-slapp-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">Anti Slapp Law Resources:</span></h1>
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		<title>Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media</title>
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					<description><![CDATA[Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media by John Bandler NOTE: This is my original article after the events of 1/6/2021 and is not updated regularly and does not have the newer diagrams. So go read this article here which does not directly refer to those events and is updated more frequently. Here’s a quick primer on the [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<h1><strong>Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media</strong></h1>
<h6>by John Bandler</h6>
<ul>
<li><em>NOTE: This is my original article after the events of 1/6/2021 and is not updated regularly and does not have the newer diagrams. So go read <a href="https://johnbandler.com/free-speech-first-amendment-social-media-2/">this article here</a> which does not directly refer to those events and is updated more frequently.</em></li>
</ul>
<p>Here’s a quick primer on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, what it means for free speech, and how it applies to social media and other platforms for speech. Misconceptions exist because law can be confusing and some people disseminate inaccurate information. This short piece lays out the basics and ties it into the events of 1/6/2021.</p>
<h3>The U.S. Constitution</h3>
<p>The United States Constitution is the foundation of all laws in this country. It establishes our system of government and puts limits upon what government can do. It created a system of checks and balances by establishing three branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial. Our federal government is of limited powers (in theory), and any powers not specifically granted to it are reserved for the states and individuals. The Constitution does not say what private individuals and organizations can or cannot do (though other laws do).</p>
<h3>The First Amendment</h3>
<p>Within the U.S. Constitution are Amendments, and the first ten are known as the Bill of Rights. These grant rights and freedoms to the people and restrict what the federal government can do. These restrictions have also been applied to state and local governments. Relevant here is the First Amendment, which reads:</p>
<blockquote><p>Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.</p></blockquote>
<p>Of course this “freedom of speech” protection extends past the spoken word to other forms of expression, and includes writings, art, and more.</p>
<p>In the centuries since the First Amendment was enacted, courts have weighed in many times about what it means, and legal evolution progressed. Thousands of people have been criminally prosecuted or civilly sued after they said or wrote something, and then they raised a First Amendment defense. Judges made rulings, these rulings were appealed, and then other judges ruled. Occasionally, the U.S. Supreme Court (our country’s highest court) ruled. We now have a significant body of law and analysis &#8212; thousands of pages &#8212; interpreting those forty five words of the First Amendment.</p>
<p>The law is clear that the government must not violate the First Amendment, nor can the government be a tool to impinge upon rights guaranteed by it. This has implications for criminal and civil proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the full weight of government seeks to punish an individual. In civil proceedings, which are often between private parties, it is government that runs the courts which resolve these disputes.</p>
<h3>Three categories of speech</h3>
<p>It is helpful to think how particular speech might fall into one of three categories regarding what government can and cannot do:</p>
<ol>
<li>Fully protected free speech, from which no successful legal action (criminal or civil) can be brought,</li>
<li>Speech that might be civilly actionable (e.g., subject to a successful civil suit for defamation, or invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, etc.),</li>
<li>Speech that might be criminally actionable (subject to a successful criminal prosecution, such as harassment, stalking, menacing, or part of another crime).</li>
</ol>
<p>Note that these categories are about what government can (or cannot) do. Separate from this are private consequences &#8212; what a private party might think or do as a result of what we say. Our speech can always have private consequences, and that falls outside of the First Amendment.</p>
<p>The line between these three categories can be blurry. Any government restrictions upon speech must be “narrowly tailored” and “content neutral” to avoid violating the First Amendment, and not all speech is protected by the First Amendment.</p>
<p>Here are some examples of speech that might be the proper subject of a criminal prosecution:</p>
<ul>
<li>Menacingly stating “Give me your wallet or I’ll kill you”.</li>
<li>Falsely shouting “Fire!” or “Bomb!” in a crowded theatre causing panic and injury.</li>
<li>Saying words that incite violence or a riot (or perhaps even the storming of the U.S. Capitol).</li>
</ul>
<p>Civil lawsuits involving speech also face First Amendment scrutiny. A lawsuit (civil action) for defamation (libel or slander) will fail if the speech is true. Public figures face an additional hurdle because they must also show actual malice—that the writer knew the statement was false, or recklessly disregarded whether it might be false. Other civil lawsuits could include for invasion of privacy, depicting someone in a false light, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.</p>
<p>Thus the First Amendment is a limitation on how government can restrict speech. It provides freedoms (from government) to private individuals and entities about what they can say, or choose not to say.</p>
<p>Again, it would be a mistake to say that the First Amendment is a restriction upon what individuals or private organizations can do. And yet it seems that many individuals make this mistake—including some who know better.</p>
<h3>Senator Hawley&#8217;s book deal</h3>
<p>Josh Hawley is a United States Senator from Missouri, a Yale educated lawyer, former state attorney general and law professor. Despite these impressive bona fides, he falsely claimed (shortly after the riotous events of 1/6/2021) that the cancelation of his book contract by Simon &amp; Schuster was a violation of the First Amendment.</p>
<p>He was wrong, because the publisher is a private company, protected by the First Amendment not restricted by it. The publisher has a choice whether to print or not. It is nonsensical to argue that the First Amendment obligates a private company to do a Senator’s bidding. Senator Hawley remained free to find another publisher or self publish his book (he did indeed find another publisher for his book), and any legal claim he might have against Simon &amp; Schuster would need to be grounded in contract law, not constitutional law. His legal claim would likely fail, because chances are good that under the book contract Simon &amp; Schuster had ample cause to cancel publication.</p>
<p>Sen. Hawley surely knew the law around free speech better than he stated. And it is supremely ironic for a government official to claim that a private entity violated their First Amendment right. As a side note, we can evaluate the general credibility of a person when we identify instances where they knowingly tell an untruth. By debunking Sen. Hawley&#8217;s smaller untruth about the First Amendment, we can better evaluate his credibility for more serious lies about conspiracy theories and election fraud. A reckless disregard for the truth is evident.</p>
<h3>Former president Trump&#8217;s social media accounts</h3>
<p>On January 8th 2021, Twitter suspended the account of then soon-to-be former president Donald Trump, citing violation of their rules. Facebook did the same.</p>
<p>Some mistakenly claimed this also constituted a First Amendment violation, but that cannot be. Like Simon &amp; Schuster, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media companies are not government actors, but private entities. The First Amendment exists as a shield to <em>protect </em>private entities from government restrictions on speech. In no way could the First Amendment <em>restrict </em>private entities, or make private entities obligated to do a President’s bidding to allow or prohibit certain speech. Trump accepted Twitter’s Terms of Service (as all Twitter users have). Those terms are a contract, he was bound by them, violated them (repeatedly), and was banned according to it. It is not a First Amendment issue (though many other issues do exist).</p>
<h3>Social media regulation?</h3>
<p>If social media platforms are not restricted by the First Amendment as private entities, are they subject to other laws or regulations? Undoubtedly, but that’s getting more complex and beyond the scope here. But think of the growing field of privacy law (what the social media company can do with personal information about users) and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S. Code § 230).</p>
<p>Social media platforms bring complicated issues. There is a tension between allowing anyone to say whatever they want, versus creating some rules and moderating the platform. Most would agree such platforms should take reasonable steps to reduce criminal activity, reduce incitement to violence, limit hate speech, and even reduce the spread of conspiracy theories, propaganda, and disinformation. Platforms without any moderations become cesspools of disgusting speech and overt criminality.</p>
<p>Once we agree upon some of the basics, we can have a reasonable debate about how moderation should be done. Conversely, if we cannot agree upon basic facts or basic legal principles, or if we apply them selectively depending on whose side we want to champion, we are not going to have a reasonable debate.</p>
<p>There are also concerns about how social media monetize their platform—how they collect, use, and share user information. Users don’t pay for Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn or any of the other social media platforms, but that doesn’t mean it is free. As the saying goes, “If the service is free, the product is you”. All of these platforms seek to make money based upon information about their users. This is the subject of a growing area of regulation and law, and we should increase our awareness of the privacy policies we agree to, our privacy settings, and the companies who use our information.</p>
<h3>Consumers and voters remain the key</h3>
<p>Consumers and voters need to exercise their own diligence to obtain facts, and be resistant to appeals to anger and hate, conspiracy theories, propaganda, and lies. Decisions should be made based on facts, logic, and reason. We should vote for candidates who are truthful, and not support those who lie or who are unethical. As consumers, we make decisions about what we buy, click on, or watch, and those decisions should be thoughtful too. You can read more of my thoughts on that <a href="https://johnbandler.com/building-better-consumers-and-voters/">here</a>.</p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>While I am a lawyer and I teach about law, I am no expert in First Amendment and Constitutional law. This short article is for your introductory information but is not tailored to your circumstances, nor is it legal advice. Hopefully it makes some foundational concepts clear, and puts you on the road to better understanding.</p>
<p><a href="https://johnbandler.com/free-speech-first-amendment-social-media/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<h1><strong>Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media</strong></h1>
<h3 class="page-title">First Amendment things to know</h3>
<h6>by John Bandler</h6>
<p>Here’s a primer on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, what it means for free speech, and how it applies to social media and other platforms for speech. Misconceptions exist because law can be confusing and some disseminate false information. This short piece lays out the basics without tying it too closely to individuals or political events.*</p>
<p>Before we get into the details, let&#8217;s outline a way to categorize speech, starting with the biggest category (everything) and then smaller and smaller subsets of that.<img decoding="async" class=" wp-image-19654 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-1024x768.webp" alt="" width="395" height="296" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-1024x768.webp 1024w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-400x300.webp 400w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-768x576.webp 768w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-1536x1152.webp 1536w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled-1-2048x1536.webp 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 395px) 100vw, 395px" /></p>
<ul>
<li>All speech (any speech)</li>
<li>Annoying speech (annoys at least one person)</li>
<li>Unfriending speech (annoys a person enough that they take some type of action)</li>
<li>Civilly actionable speech (a very small subset of the above)</li>
<li>Criminally actionable speech (a tiny, infinitesimal subset of the above)</li>
</ul>
<p>This diagram lays it out, though not to scale (see later as I adjust that).</p>
<p>The First Amendment limits the scope of those last two categories, by protecting us from those types of government actions, as we will dive into now.</p>
<h3>The U.S. Constitution</h3>
<p>The United States Constitution is the foundation of all laws in this country. It establishes our system of government and puts limits upon what government can do. It created a system of checks and balances by establishing three branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial. Our federal government is of limited powers (in theory), and any powers not specifically granted to it are reserved for the states and individuals. The Constitution does not say what private individuals and organizations can or cannot do (though other laws do).</p>
<h3>The First Amendment</h3>
<p>Within the U.S. Constitution are Amendments, and the first ten are known as the Bill of Rights. These grant rights and freedoms to the people and restrict what the federal government can do. These restrictions have also been applied to state and local governments (via the Fourteenth Amendment). Relevant here is the First Amendment, which reads:</p>
<blockquote><p>Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.</p></blockquote>
<p>Of course this “freedom of speech” protection extends past the spoken word to other forms of expression, and includes writings, art, and more.</p>
<p>In the centuries since the First Amendment was enacted, courts have weighed in many times about what it means, and legal evolution progressed. Thousands of people have been criminally prosecuted or civilly sued after they said or wrote something, and then they raised a First Amendment defense. Judges made rulings, these rulings were appealed, and then other judges ruled. Occasionally, the U.S. Supreme Court (our country’s highest court) ruled. We now have a significant body of law and analysis &#8212; thousands of pages &#8212; interpreting those forty five words of the First Amendment.</p>
<p>The law is clear that the government must not violate the First Amendment, nor can the government be a tool to impinge upon rights guaranteed by it. This has implications for both criminal and civil proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the full weight of government seeks to punish an individual. In civil proceedings, which are often between private parties, it is government that runs the courts which resolve these disputes. The First Amendment still applies, though to a different degree.</p>
<h3>Three categories of speech and government action</h3>
<p>It is helpful to think how particular speech might fall into one of three categories regarding what government can and cannot do:<img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-19655 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22.webp" alt="" width="300" height="225" /></p>
<ol>
<li>Speech that might be criminally actionable (subject to a successful criminal prosecution, such as harassment, stalking, menacing, or part of another crime).</li>
<li>Speech that might be civilly actionable (e.g., subject to a successful civil suit for defamation, or invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, etc.),</li>
<li>Fully protected free speech, from which no successful legal action (criminal or civil) can be brought,</li>
</ol>
<p>Note that these categories are about what government can (or cannot) do. Often (but not always) annoying and unfriending speech is protected from government consequences by the First Amendment. The diagram here lays this out roughly and we see how large portions of all speech, annoying speech, and unfriending speech are protected.</p>
<p>The line between these three categories can be blurry. Any government restrictions upon speech must be “narrowly tailored” and “content neutral” to avoid violating the First Amendment, and not all speech is protected by the First Amendment.</p>
<p>Separate from the question of government action are private consequences &#8212; what a private party might think or do as a result of what we say. Our speech can always have private consequences, and that falls outside of the First Amendment.</p>
<p><strong>1. Potentially &#8220;criminal&#8221; speech</strong></p>
<p>This is a very small category of speech. Here are some examples of speech that might be the proper subject of a criminal prosecution:</p>
<ul>
<li>Menacingly stating “Give me your wallet or I’ll kill you”.</li>
<li>Other words that are part of a criminal act.</li>
<li>Falsely shouting “Fire!” or “Bomb!” in a crowded theatre causing panic and injury.</li>
<li>Saying words that incite violence or a riot.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2. Potentially civilly actionable speech</strong></p>
<p>This is a small category, but larger than the prior. Civil lawsuits involving speech also face First Amendment scrutiny. A lawsuit (civil action) for defamation (libel or slander) will fail if the speech is true. Public figures face an additional hurdle because they must also show actual malice—that the writer knew the statement was false, or recklessly disregarded whether it might be false. Other civil lawsuits could include for invasion of privacy, depicting someone in a false light, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.</p>
<p>An example of potentially civilly actionable speech includes statements made by Alex Jones, for which he is being sued in multiple forums. Also, another potential example includes statements attacking the integrity of certain voting systems, which is also the subject of various lawsuits which claim these statements were false and defamatory.</p>
<p><strong>3. Potentially &#8220;free speech&#8221; under the First Amendment</strong></p>
<p>Most speech is protected free speech under the First Amendment, including expressions of opinion. By this we mean the government cannot impose any sanction for that speech, either in the criminal courts or civil courts.</p>
<p>Thus the First Amendment is a limitation on how government can restrict speech. It provides freedoms (from government) to private individuals and entities about what they can say, or choose not to say.</p>
<p>Again, it would be a mistake to say that the First Amendment is a <em>restriction</em> upon what individuals or private organizations can do. And yet it seems that many individuals make this mistake—including some who probably know better.</p>
<p><strong>4. The prior diagrams were not to scale</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-19656 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22.webp" alt="" width="300" height="225" /><br />
The prior diagrams were not to scale at all, I wanted my text to be visible and show the general overlap.</p>
<p>Now it is worth emphasizing that the vast majority of speech is protected by the First Amendment. A small sliver could be subject to valid civil claims, and a really tiny piece could be criminally punished. Here I show it in a slightly better scale (still not perfect) and criminal speech is just a tiny dot.</p>
<h3>All speech can have a private consequence</h3>
<p>I mentioned this above and created this section just to make sure the point comes across.</p>
<p>Any speech or expression could have many consequences from private individuals and organizations, but this would not implicate The First Amendment. The First Amendment limits government interference with speech, it protects speech, and does not limit private reaction to that speech.</p>
<h3>Private book deals can be cancelled based on one&#8217;s speech</h3>
<p>Imagine a book deal an author has with a publisher. They have a contract, and the contract has many terms, and the publisher is a private company.</p>
<p>The author commits an act or says something that is inconsistent with the publisher&#8217;s values, or perhaps inconsistent with the publisher&#8217;s bottom line if they feel the books will not sell. The contract probably has a clause to address this (perhaps called a &#8220;morals clause&#8221;).</p>
<p>The publisher cancels the deal and the author claims a violation of their First Amendment rights.</p>
<p>The author is wrong, because the publisher is a private company, protected by the First Amendment not restricted by it. The publisher has a choice whether to print or not. The First Amendment does not obligate a private company to do someone else&#8217;s bidding.</p>
<p>Any legal claim against the publisher would need to be grounded in contract law, not constitutional law. And as indicated, it is probable the publisher inserted a clause in the contract allowing cancellation for certain circumstances.</p>
<p>If the author was also a government official, their claim of First Amendment violation would make even less sense. Since the First Amendment protects us from government interference, it would make no sense to claim it allows government officials to dictate what can or cannot be published.</p>
<h3>Social media accounts can be suspended or terminated based on one&#8217;s speech</h3>
<p>Users of social media such as Twitter and Facebook have complained that their First Amendment rights were violated following social media platform suspension or termination. Sometimes these users are government officials, even powerful ones.</p>
<p>Like a book publisher, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media companies are not government actors, but private entities. The First Amendment exists as a shield to <em>protect </em>private entities from government restrictions on speech. The First Amendment does not <em>restrict </em>private entities, or make private entities obligated to do certain things.</p>
<p>A claim of First Amendment violation is more ironic when it is a government official seeking to direct a private platform to allow or prohibit certain speech.</p>
<p>Platform users accept the Terms of Service and should abide by them. Most people agree that social media platforms should have some rules about what speech is acceptable, and what speech is not, and that there should be consequences for speech that falls outside of what is allowed.</p>
<p>These terms are a contract, and some users may be suspended or banned if they violate them.</p>
<p>It is not a First Amendment issue, though many other issues do exist. Hopefully we can have reasonable debate about (1) what the platform <em>rules </em>should be, and (2) how those rules should be <em>enforced</em>.</p>
<h3>Social media regulation?</h3>
<p>If social media platforms are not restricted by the First Amendment as private entities, are they subject to other laws or regulations? Undoubtedly, but that’s getting more complex and beyond the scope here. But think of the growing field of privacy law (what the social media company can do with personal information about users) and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S. Code § 230).</p>
<p>Social media platforms bring complicated issues. There is a tension between allowing anyone to say whatever they want, versus creating some rules and moderating the platform. Most would agree such platforms should take reasonable steps to reduce criminal activity, reduce incitement to violence, limit hate speech, and even reduce the spread of conspiracy theories, propaganda, and disinformation. Platforms without any moderations become cesspools of disgusting speech and overt criminality.</p>
<p>Once we agree upon some of the basics, we can have a reasonable debate about how moderation should be done. Conversely, if we cannot agree upon basic facts or basic legal principles, or if we apply them selectively depending on whose side we want to champion, we are not going to have a reasonable debate.</p>
<p>There are also concerns about how social media monetize their platform—how they collect, use, and share user information. Users don’t pay for Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn or any of the other social media platforms, but that doesn’t mean it is free. As the saying goes, “If the service is free, the product is you”. All of these platforms seek to make money based upon information about their users. This is the subject of a growing area of regulation and law, and we should increase our awareness of the privacy policies we agree to, our privacy settings, and the companies who use our information.</p>
<h3>Consumers and voters remain the key</h3>
<p>Consumers and voters need to exercise their own diligence to obtain facts. Be resistant to anger and hate, conspiracy theories, propaganda and lies. Decisions should be made based on facts, logic, and reason. We should vote for candidates who are truthful, and not support those who lie or who are unethical. As consumers, we make decisions about what we buy, click, watch, or scroll. All of those decisions are monetized and should be thoughtful. You can read more of my thoughts on that <a href="https://johnbandler.com/building-better-consumers-and-voters/">here</a>.</p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>This short article is for your introductory information but is not tailored to your circumstances, nor is it legal advice. Hopefully it makes some foundational concepts clear, and puts you on the road to better understanding.</p>
<p>Books have been written about the First Amendment, some people specialize in it, as do some law courses. This does not pretend to be the last word, feel free to continue your research.</p>
<h3><strong>Additional reading</strong></h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://johnbandler.com/things-to-know-first-amendment/">First Amendment things to know</a></li>
<li><a href="https://johnbandler.com/building-better-consumers-and-voters">Building Better Consumers and Voters</a>  My short article about what we need to do to get better at learning facts, putting aside disinformation, and making better choices about who leads our country.</li>
<li><a href="https://johnbandler.com/us-constitution/">U.S. Constitution</a></li>
<li><a href="https://johnbandler.com/students-teaching-learning/">Students, Learning, and Teaching</a></li>
<li>Communications Decency Act 47 U.S. Code § 230 &#8211; Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230</a></li>
<li>Cornell LII Wex on First Amendment, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment</a></li>
<li>I walk through the diagrams in the embedded video below (or find it on YouTube at <a href="https://youtu.be/Rl-QqR7lNsE" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://youtu.be/Rl-QqR7lNsE</a>)</li>
<li>* The original version of this article tied First Amendment to the events of 1/6/2021 and remains <a href="https://johnbandler.com/free-speech-first-amendment-social-media/">here</a>, but is not updated as frequently, lacks the diagrams, and I name names and include my opinion.</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://johnbandler.com/free-speech-first-amendment-social-media-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sourced</a></p>
</div>
</div>
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<div class="fluid-width-video-wrapper">
<h3>First Amendment Q&amp;A</h3>
<ul>
<li>What is the highest law in the U.S. regarding government&#8217;s restriction of speech and expression?
<ul>
<li>The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What does the First Amendment protect against?
<ul>
<li>The First Amendment is a limit on the powers of government to restrict speech, expression, and religion.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>If a judge decides police obtained evidence unlawfully, what might the judge do?
<ul>
<li>Suppress (exclude) the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What document contains the fundamental principles underlying all U.S. laws?
<ul>
<li>U.S. Constitution</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Why are case decisions important?
<ul>
<li>They establish law, precedent (stare decisis)</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What concept describes the weight given to a prior decision by a court?
<ul>
<li>Legal precedent (stare decisis, authority)</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>The First Amendment was ratified in 1791, thus is couldn&#8217;t possibly be applied to the complicated issues we face today regarding online speech. True/False
<ul>
<li>False</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>The First Amendment only says what Congress cannot do, but the the Executive and Judicial branches can do whatever they want. True/False
<ul>
<li>False</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>The First Amendment</h3>
<p>Here&#8217;s the First Amendment (I added the line breaks to separate each phrase).</p>
<p><em>Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,</em></p>
<p><em>or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;</em></p>
<p><em>or abridging the freedom of speech,</em></p>
<p><em>or of the press;</em></p>
<p><em>or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,</em></p>
<p><em>and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.</em></p>
<h3><strong>Interesting 1st Amendment facts and conclusions by John</strong></h3>
<ul>
<li>Ratified 1791</li>
<li>Word count: 45</li>
<li>Words unchanged since 1791 (232 years)</li>
<li>Number of words written since 1791 about what these 45 words mean?  Millions and probably billions!</li>
<li>The phrase &#8220;free speech&#8221; means totally different things to different people.</li>
<li>To be more precise, instead of talking about &#8220;free speech&#8221;, first consider what the First Amendment protects.</li>
<li>The First Amendment protects from government limitations upon speech.</li>
<li>Government limitations upon speech could be criminal (e.g. an arrest and criminal prosecution based on speech or expression)</li>
<li>Government limitations upon speech could be civil (e.g. using the power of the civil courts to make someone pay money because of their speech or expression, such as in a defamation lawsuit (libel, slander).</li>
<li>One of my frequent corrections is reminding students to capitalize <strong>F</strong>irst <strong>A</strong>mendment, since it is a proper noun.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Speech categories and my diagrams</h3>
<p>Let&#8217;s outline a way to categorize speech, starting with the biggest category (everything) and then smaller and smaller subsets of that.</p>
<p>I think my diagrams help categorize different types of speech, and what consequences might result from that speech. Think of these six categories.</p>
<ul>
<li>All speech (any speech or expression)</li>
<li>Annoying speech (speech that annoys at least one person)</li>
<li>Unfriending speech (speech that annoys a person enough that they take some type of action, like their speaking, unfriending, boycotting, etc.)</li>
<li>Protected speech (speech that is protected by the First Amendment in some way)</li>
<li>Civilly actionable speech (a very small subset of the above, speech that someone could sue for and make the person pay money in damages)</li>
<li>Criminally actionable speech (a tiny, infinitesimal subset of the above, speech that could get someone arrested and prosecuted).</li>
</ul>
<p>Within those six categories, three relate to government consequence, or not:</p>
<ul>
<li>Protected speech</li>
<li>Civilly actionable speech</li>
<li>Criminally actionable speech.</li>
</ul>
<h3>John&#8217;s diagram part 1 &#8211; the categories</h3>
<h3><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-8829 alignright" src="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" srcset="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1 300w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C576&amp;ssl=1 768w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1152&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1536&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?resize=1600%2C1200&amp;ssl=1 1600w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-2022-11-21-scaled.jpg?w=1376&amp;ssl=1 1376w" alt="Speech Categories and the First Amendment" width="300" height="225" data-recalc-dims="1" /></h3>
<p>Here we show the five main categories, but they are not to scale, they are big enough so you can see the color scheme, the labels, and a little bit of description.</p>
<p>The categories are:</p>
<ul>
<li>All speech</li>
<li>Annoying speech (might annoy someone)</li>
<li>Unfriending speech</li>
<li>Civilly actionable speech</li>
<li>Criminally actionable speech</li>
</ul>
<h3>John&#8217;s diagram part 2 &#8211; &#8220;Protected speech&#8221;</h3>
<h3><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-8837 alignright" src="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" srcset="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1 300w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C576&amp;ssl=1 768w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1152&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1536&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1600%2C1200&amp;ssl=1 1600w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-1A-Protected-vs-Not-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?w=1376&amp;ssl=1 1376w" alt="Speech categories 1st Amendment Protected or Not" width="300" height="225" data-recalc-dims="1" /></h3>
<p>Now we are highlighting &#8220;protected speech&#8221; with this diagram.</p>
<p>Of course, this is a bit of a simplification.</p>
<p>Note that certain speech might be &#8220;protected&#8221; from any criminal prosecution, but fair game for a civil litigation.</p>
<p>Remember the key point which is protection from government interference.</p>
<p>Just because speech is protected from government interference does not mean the speech can be made without any type of consequences at all. People might protest, boycott, and etc.</p>
<p>We can debate &#8220;cancel culture&#8221;, but if we are talking about the First Amendment, we need to remember the First Amendment is about what government can do, not about what &#8220;society&#8221; and individuals can or should do.</p>
<h3>John&#8217;s diagram part 3 &#8211; closer to scale!</h3>
<h3><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-8839 alignright" src="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" srcset="https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1 300w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C768&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C576&amp;ssl=1 768w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1152&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1536&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?resize=1600%2C1200&amp;ssl=1 1600w, https://i0.wp.com/johnbandler.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Speech-categories-a-better-scale-2022-11-22-scaled.jpg?w=1376&amp;ssl=1 1376w" alt="Speech categories - a better scale?" width="300" height="225" data-recalc-dims="1" /></h3>
<p>This diagram is a little bit closer to scale.</p>
<p>The main takeaway here is the vast majority of speech is protected by the First Amendment. A small sliver could be subject to valid civil claims, and a really tiny piece could be criminally punished.</p>
<h3>Let&#8217;s get lawyerly</h3>
<p>[This section is a work in progress]</p>
<p>Court decisions and the law need a process for deciding whether statements are criminally actionable or civilly actionable. And for deciding whether a government action regarding speech is lawful or violates the First Amendment.</p>
<p>So here are some principles.</p>
<ul>
<li>Is the government restriction on speech &#8220;content neutral&#8221; or &#8220;content based&#8221;?
<ul>
<li>Content neutral means the restriction does not depend on what the content of the speech is</li>
<li>Content based means the restriction is about certain types of speech</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Certain speech restrictions will get &#8220;strict scrutiny&#8221; by the courts</li>
<li>If the government restriction on speech is not content neutral, it needs to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and will get strict scrutiny</li>
<li>Government may restrict or punish speech that presents a &#8220;clear and present danger&#8221; or &#8220;imminent&#8221; danger</li>
<li>&#8220;Fighting words&#8221; are not protected speech. Fighting words are words that inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. (Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 1942)</li>
<li>Defamation: A civil cause of action for defamation. Defamation can include libel (written speech) or slander (spoken). A plaintiff must establish that the defendant said something false, and that it caused financial harm (damages). If the plaintiff is a public figure, they must also show actual malice.</li>
</ul>
<h3>First Amendment Chronology and Case Progression</h3>
<p>[This section is a work in progress]</p>
<p>An evolution of law and interpretation.</p>
<p><em>First Amendment ratified in 1791</em></p>
<p>Interesting concepts and cases that touch upon the First Amendment</p>
<p><strong><i>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</i>, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)</strong>. In this civil defamation case, the U.S. Supreme Court provides greater protection for speech about public officials and public figures, requiring a defamation case to show &#8220;actual malice&#8221;. Actual malice meaning the person knew what they said was false, or said it with a reckless disregard for whether it was false.</p>
<p><strong><em>Brandenburg v. Ohio</em>, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I</strong>n this criminal case, the U.S. Supreme Court limits what speech can be charged criminally as an incitement to violence, requiring intent and a likelihood of imminent lawless action.</p>
<h3>There is a lot of speech out there</h3>
<p>There is a lot of speech out there, and a lot of it contains false information, conspiracy theories, hateful speech, criminal speech, and more. Whether for profit, political gain, nation-state advantage or simple ignorance, there is lots of propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. <a href="https://johnbandler.com/things-to-know-first-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
</div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>New Report: How Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg and Judge Merchan Violated the Constitutional and Legal Rights of President Donald J. Trump</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/new-report-how-manhattan-da-alvin-bragg-and-judge-merchan-violated-the-constitutional-and-legal-rights-of-president-donald-j-trump/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2025 16:26:06 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[New Report: How Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg and Judge Merchan Violated the Constitutional and Legal Rights of President Donald J. Trump WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, the House Judiciary Committee and its Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government released an interim staff report titled, &#8220;Lawfare: How the Manhattan District Attorney&#8217;s Office and a New York State [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<h1 class="display-4">New Report: How Manhattan DA Alvin Bragg and Judge Merchan Violated the Constitutional and Legal Rights of President Donald J. Trump</h1>
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<p><strong>WASHINGTON, D.C.</strong> – Today, the House Judiciary Committee and its Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government released an interim staff report titled, &#8220;<a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-07-09%20Lawfare%20-%20How%20the%20Manhattan%20District%20Attorneys%20Office%20and%20a%20New%20York%20State%20Judge%20Violated%20the%20Constitutional%20and%20Lega.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lawfare: How the Manhattan District Attorney&#8217;s Office and a New York State Judge Violated the Constitutional and Legal Rights of President Donald J. Trump</a>.&#8221; The state or local prosecution of a current or former president by a popularly elected district attorney raises substantial federal interests and raises serious concerns about conflict between state and federal entities.</p>
<p>The report explains the several ways in which New York County District Attorney (DANY) Alvin Bragg&#8217;s prosecution of President Trump suffers from severe legal and procedural defects, including:</p>
</div>
<ul>
<li>Bragg&#8217;s unconstitutional and unprecedented Russian-nesting-doll theory of criminal liability, in which the jury never had to reach unanimity as to each element of the criminal offenses; and</li>
<li>Bragg&#8217;s usurpation of the federal government&#8217;s exclusive authority to prosecute alleged violations of federal campaign finance laws and the Biden-Harris Administration&#8217;s refusal to intercede to protect federal interests.</li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<div>The report also details Judge Merchan&#8217;s egregious legal rulings before and during the trial that all cut against President Trump&#8217;s rights, including:</div>
<ul>
<li>Judge Merchan&#8217;s failure to recuse himself for manifest political bias against President Trump;</li>
<li>The unconstitutional gag order he imposed on President Trump during the trial;</li>
<li>Judge Merchan&#8217;s admission of plainly inadmissible, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial testimony against President Trump; and</li>
<li>Judge Merchan&#8217;s refusal to permit former Federal Election Commission Chairman Bradley Smith to testify as to the meaning and complexities of the Federal Election Campaign Act.</li>
</ul>
<div>Every person admitted to practice law in New York, including elected district attorneys and appointed judges, must take a &#8220;constitutional oath of office,&#8221; swearing or affirming to &#8220;support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of New York.&#8221; By taking that oath, District Attorney Alvin Bragg and Judge Juan Merchan were legally &#8220;bound to a constitutional course of conduct.&#8221; In their politicized efforts to indict and convict President Trump, they failed their oaths of office.Given that President Trump&#8217;s indictment was conceived in legal and constitutional error and the trial exacerbated and compounded those errors, an honest review of the facts and the law will likely lead appellate courts to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment with prejudice. This will go a long way in restoring the American people&#8217;s trust and confidence in our justice system, although more work is ahead. In the meantime, the Committee and Select Subcommittee will continue our oversight of lawfare and its effect on the rule of law in the United States. <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/media/press-releases/new-report-how-manhattan-da-alvin-bragg-and-judge-merchan-violated" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
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<p><iframe src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2024-07-09-Lawfare-How-the-Manhattan-District-Attorneys-Office-and-a-New-York-State-Judge-Violated-the-Constitutional-and-Lega.pdf" width="1100" height="1100"></iframe></p>
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		<title>Michael A Simmrin: Southern California’s Premier Criminal Defense Attorney</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/michael-a-simmrin-southern-californias-premier-criminal-defense-attorney/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 10:13:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Discover why Michael A Simmrin, Southern California’s premier criminal defense attorney, is the trusted advocate you need. With over 20 years of experience, an impressive trial record, and a client-first approach, he delivers results in even the toughest legal battles.

Keywords: Michael A Simmrin, Simmrin Law Group, criminal defense attorney, DUI lawyer, trial attorney, Los Angeles criminal defense, Burbank lawyer, California legal expert, client-centered law firm, free legal consultation.

Embrace the power of expert legal defense. With Michael A Simmrin on your side, you’re not just hiring a lawyer—you’re gaining a trusted partner dedicated to fighting for your freedom and future.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1><strong>Michael A Simmrin: Southern California’s Premier Criminal Defense Attorney</strong></h1>
<p>In today’s challenging legal landscape, finding an attorney who not only understands the law but also genuinely cares for his clients can make all the difference. Michael A Simmrin, founder and lead attorney of the Simmrin Law Group, is a powerhouse in criminal defense, renowned for his exceptional trial experience, relentless advocacy, and commitment to treating every client like family. With over 20 years of legal expertise serving Los Angeles, Burbank, and the broader Southern California region, Michael Simmrin stands out as the attorney you need when your future is on the line.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.simmrinlawgroup.com/about-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">simmrinlawgroup.com</a></p>
<p><strong>Proven Trial Experience &amp; Record of Success</strong></p>
<p>Michael Simmrin’s career is built on a formidable track record in the courtroom. Having tried over 100 jury trials—including challenging homicide and capital cases—his vast experience demonstrates an unwavering ability to deliver favorable outcomes even under the most pressure-filled circumstances. Clients trust him for his thorough preparation, courtroom finesse, and strategic thinking that turns complex cases into wins. His experience is a testament to his role as a leading trial attorney in California.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/91505-ca-michael-simmrin-323635.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">avvo.com</a></p>
<p><strong>A Client-Centric Approach</strong></p>
<p>What truly sets Michael apart is his unwavering dedication to his clients. Whether it’s a DUI arrest, a criminal charge, or a complicated legal dispute, he treats every case with the personal attention it deserves. Michael’s philosophy is simple: every client deserves to be heard and represented as if they were family. His 24/7 availability, free initial consultation, and transparent communication ensure that no client ever feels alone in the face of legal adversity. Clients frequently praise his ability to demystify the legal process, offering both reassurance and expert guidance when they need it most.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.avvo.com/attorneys/91505-ca-michael-simmrin-323635/reviews.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">avvo.com</a></p>
<p><strong>Comprehensive Legal Expertise<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-19418 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/mike-simmrin.webp" alt="" width="382" height="744" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/mike-simmrin.webp 382w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/mike-simmrin-205x400.webp 205w" sizes="(max-width: 382px) 100vw, 382px" /></strong></p>
<p>At the Simmrin Law Group, Michael Simmrin’s practice spans several critical areas of law:</p>
<ul>
<li><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Criminal Defense:</strong></span> Defending clients against a range of criminal charges—from DUI and white collar crimes to violent offenses.</li>
<li><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>DUI &amp; DWI Representation:</strong></span> Providing specialized strategies for those facing DUI arrests and ensuring every possible defense is explored.</li>
<li><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Personal Injury &amp; Family Law:</strong></span> Addressing cases that impact not just legal standings, but also personal lives and family dynamics.</li>
<li><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Expungements &amp; Federal Crimes:</strong> </span>Guiding clients through the complexities of clearing records and managing federal legal challenges.</li>
</ul>
<p>This focused expertise allows his firm to deliver customized legal strategies that meet the unique needs of each client.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.simmrinlawgroup.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">simmrinlawgroup.com</a></p>
<p><strong>Accolades, Associations &amp; Community Involvement</strong></p>
<p>Michael’s achievements extend beyond his courtroom victories. He has earned recognition as an outstanding advocate by legal organizations and actively participates in prestigious legal associations. His involvement includes:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Membership on the executive board of the Los Angeles Bar Association—Criminal Law Section.</strong></li>
<li><strong>Active roles in the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Criminal Courts Bar Association.</strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">A commitment to giving back through initiatives like the Simmrin Law Group Entrepreneurial Scholarship, which supports high-achieving students ready to lead the next generation.</span></strong></li>
</ul>
<p>These accolades not only underline his professional excellence but also reinforce his commitment to fostering a fairer legal system and a stronger community.</p>
<p><a href="https://hennessey.com/simmrin-law-group-law-firm-seo-case-study/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hennessey.com</a></p>
<p><strong>Why Choose Michael A Simmrin?</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decades of Expertise:</strong> With nearly two decades in the legal arena, Michael’s experience is unmatched when it comes to high-stakes criminal defense.</li>
<li><strong>Proven Track Record:</strong> A history of successful trials and satisfied clients underscores his ability to turn even the most daunting cases around.</li>
<li><strong>Personalized Service:</strong> His client-first approach means that every case is handled with care, integrity, and the utmost dedication.</li>
<li><strong>Community Advocate:</strong> Beyond the courtroom, Michael invests in the community, ensuring that his success benefits the future leaders of tomorrow.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Get the Representation You Deserve</strong></p>
<p>When facing legal challenges, having an attorney who is as determined as you are can be life-changing. Michael A Simmrin and his team at Simmrin Law Group stand ready to provide the expert representation you need. Whether you’re confronting criminal charges, navigating a DUI case, or seeking justice in a personal injury matter, Michael’s blend of legal prowess and compassionate advocacy ensures that your case is in the best hands.</p>
<p>Don’t let legal battles overwhelm you—reach out for a free consultation and discover how Michael A Simmrin can help you reclaim control over your future. <span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Contact the Simmrin Law Group t<span style="color: #000000;">oday at</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">(310) 896-2723</span></strong> </span>and take the first step toward a stronger defense and a brighter tomorrow.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.simmrinlawgroup.com/about-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">simmrinlawgroup.com</a></p>
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		<title>Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor &#8211; Prosecution Conduct</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/functions-and-duties-of-the-prosecutor-prosecution-conduct/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Feb 2025 08:00:33 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=8482</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor &#8211; Prosecution Conduct Civil Negligence vs Criminal Negligence Negligence is when someone acts in a way that puts the public at risk. It’s something a reasonable person in the same situation would not do. The law recognizes the difference between civil and criminal negligence. Civil negligence is what lawyers try [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="text-align: center;">Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor &#8211; Prosecution Conduct</h1>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em>Civil Negligence vs Criminal Negligence</em></span></h2>
<p><span style="color: #339966;"><strong><em>Negligence is when someone acts in a way that puts the public at risk. It’s something a reasonable person in the same situation would not do. The law recognizes the difference between civil and criminal negligence.</em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #339966;"><strong><em>Civil negligence is what lawyers try to prove in lawsuits. To meet this standard, lawyers must prove someone went over the boundaries of a duty of care by a preponderance of the evidence. It does not have to be extreme; a moment’s inattention while driving could be considered civil negligence.</em></strong></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #339966;"><strong><em>Criminal negligence takes it much further. It’s a drastic difference from how a normal person would act in the situation and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This means there is no other explanation for why the dangerous situation happened in the first place beyond negligence.</em></strong></span></p>
<h1 class="aba-article-header__headline">Prosecution Function</h1>
<p><b>Fourth Edition (2017) of the <i>CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS</i> for the <i>PROSECUTION FUNCTION</i></b></p>
<p>Copyright by the American Bar Association. This work (Criminal Justice Standards) may be used for non-profit educational and training purposes and legal reform (legislative, judicial, and executive) without written permission but with a citation to this source.  <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/products/products-search/?q=criminal%20justice%20standards&amp;hl=on&amp;hl.fl=title%2Cdescription&amp;wt=json&amp;start=0&amp;rows=10&amp;fl=title%3Atitle_s%2Cdescription%3Adescription_txt_en%2Curl%3Aurl_s%2CpublishedDate%3Apublished_date_dt%2CPublishing%20Entity%3APublishing_Entity%2CTopics%3ATopics%2CresourceType%3Asling_resource_type_s%2CcqTags%3Acq_tags%2CisProduct%3Ais_product_b%2Csku%3Aproduct_id_s%2CchildProducts%3Achild_product_ids_ss%2ClistPrice%3Alist_price_s%2CproductType%3Aproduct_class_code_description_s%2Cimagery%3Aimage_url_ss%2Cauthor%3Aauthor_ss&amp;fq=(id%3A%5C%2Fcontent%2Faba-cms-dotorg%2Fen%2Fproducts%2F*%20OR%20id%3A%5C%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Faba-cms-dotorg%2Fproducts%2F*)&amp;json.facet=%7B%22Topics%22%3A%7B%22type%22%3A%22terms%22%2C%22field%22%3A%22topics%22%7D%2C%22publishing_entity_tags%22%3A%7B%22type%22%3A%22terms%22%2C%22field%22%3A%22cq_tags%22%2C%22prefix%22%3A%22publishing_entity%3A%22%7D%7D&amp;facet=true&amp;searchDateFrom=&amp;searchDateTo=&amp;sort=score%20DESC">Some specific Standards can be purchased in book format</a>.</p>
<h2><i><b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b></i></h2>
<p>[Use the navigation bar on the left side to go to a specific Part or Standard.]</p>
<h2><b>PART I: GENERAL STANDARDS</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_1_1" name="BM_1_1"></a>1.1 The Scope and Function of These Standards</b></h2>
<p>(a) As used in these standards, “prosecutor” means any attorney, regardless of agency, title, or full or part-time assignment, who acts as an attorney to investigate or prosecute criminal cases or who provides legal advice regarding a criminal matter to government lawyers, agents, or offices participating in the investigation or prosecution of criminal cases. These Standards are intended to apply in any context in which a lawyer would reasonably understand that a criminal prosecution could result.</p>
<p>(b) These Standards are intended to provide guidance for the professional conduct and performance of prosecutors. They are written and intended to be entirely consistent with the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and are not intended to modify a prosecutor&#8217;s obligations under applicable rules, statutes, or the constitution. They are aspirational or describe “best practices,” and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted persons, to create a standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss a charge. For purposes of consistency, these Standards sometimes include language taken from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; but the Standards often address conduct or provide details beyond that governed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. No inconsistency is ever intended; and in any case a lawyer should always read and comply with the rules of professional conduct and other authorities that are binding in the specific jurisdiction or matter, including choice of law principles that may regulate the lawyer’s ethical conduct.</p>
<p>(c) Because the Standards for Criminal Justice are aspirational, the words “should” or “should not” are used in these Standards, rather than mandatory phrases such as “shall” or “shall not,” to describe the conduct of lawyers that is expected or recommended under these Standards. The Standards are not intended to suggest any lesser standard of conduct than may be required by applicable mandatory rules, statutes, or other binding authorities.</p>
<p>(d) These Standards are intended to address the performance of prosecutors in all stages of their professional work. Other ABA Criminal Justice Standards should also be consulted for more detailed consideration of the performance of prosecutors in specific areas.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_1_2" name="BM_1_2"></a>1.2 Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court. <em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor’s office should exercise sound discretion and independent judgment in the performance of the prosecution function.</span></strong></em></p>
<p>(b) <strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.</span> </em></strong>The <em><strong>prosecutor</strong> </em>serves the public interest and <em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">should act with integrity</span> </strong></em>and balanced judgment to increase public safety both <em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">by pursuing appropriate criminal charges</span> </strong></em>of <strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">appropriate severity</span></em></strong>, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor should seek to protect the innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should know and abide by the standards of professional conduct as expressed in applicable law and ethical codes and opinions in the applicable jurisdiction. The prosecutor should avoid an appearance of impropriety in performing the prosecution function.<i> </i>A prosecutor should seek out, and the prosecutor’s office should provide, supervisory advice and ethical guidance when the proper course of prosecutorial conduct seems unclear. A prosecutor who disagrees with a governing ethical rule should seek its change if appropriate, and directly challenge it if necessary, but should comply with it unless relieved by court order.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should make use of ethical guidance offered by existing organizations, and should seek to establish and make use of an ethics advisory group akin to that described in Defense Function Standard 4-1.11.</p>
<p>(e) <em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should be knowledgeable about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to prosecution or conviction</span></strong><strong><span style="color: #3366ff;"> that may be applicable in individual cases or classes of cases</span></strong></em>. The prosecutor’s office should be available to assist community efforts addressing problems that lead to, or result from, criminal activity or perceived flaws in the criminal justice system.</p>
<p>(f)<em><strong><span style="color: #3366ff;"> The prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also a problem-solver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal justice system.</span> </strong></em>The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice, and when inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor&#8217;s attention, the prosecutor should stimulate and support efforts for remedial action. The prosecutor should provide service to the community, including involvement in public service and Bar activities, public education, community service activities, and Bar leadership positions. A prosecutorial office should support such activities, and the office’s budget should include funding and paid release time for such activities.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.3 The Client of the Prosecutor</b></h2>
<h3>The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.</h3>
<blockquote>
<h3><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor does not represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter and such law enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor’s clients.</span></em></h3>
</blockquote>
<h3>The public’s interests and views should be determined by the chief prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.</h3>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.4 The Prosecutor’s Heightened Duty of Candor</b></h2>
<h3>(a) In light of the prosecutor’s public responsibilities, broad authority and discretion, <strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">the prosecutor has a heightened duty of candor to the courts</span> </em></strong>and in fulfilling other professional obligations. However, the prosecutor should be circumspect in publicly commenting on specific cases or aspects of the business of the office.</h3>
<h3>(b) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should not make a statement of fact or law, or offer evidence, <em><span style="color: #339966;">that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true</span></em>, to a court, lawyer, witness, or third party, except for lawfully authorized investigative purposes.</span></strong> In addition, while seeking to accommodate legitimate confidentiality, safety or security concerns, a prosecutor should correct a prosecutor’s representation of material fact or law that the prosecutor reasonably believes is, or later learns was, false, and should disclose a material fact or facts when necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act or to avoid misleading a judge or factfinder.</h3>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should disclose to a court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the prosecutor to be directly adverse to the prosecution’s position and not disclosed by others.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.5 Preserving the Record </b></h2>
<p>At every stage of representation, the prosecutor should take steps necessary to make a clear and complete record for potential review. Such steps may include: filing motions including motions for reconsideration, and exhibits; making objections and placing explanations on the record; requesting evidentiary hearings; requesting or objecting to jury instructions; and making offers of proof and proffers of excluded evidence.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.6 Improper Bias Prohibited </b></h2>
<h3>(a)<strong><span style="color: #339966;"> The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice</span></strong> based upon <span style="color: #ff0000;">race</span>, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,<span style="color: #ff0000;"> sexual orientation</span>, gender identity, or <span style="color: #ff0000;">socioeconomic status</span>. A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion. <em><span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor should strive to eliminate implicit biases</span></em>, and <span style="color: #339966;">act to mitigate any improper bias or prejudice </span>when credibly informed that it exists within the scope of the prosecutor’s authority.</h3>
<h3>(b) <span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor’s office should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate improper biases</span>, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of its work. <em><span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor’s office should regularly assess the potential for biased</span></em> or unfairly disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, <span style="color: #339966;"><em>and eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified.    </em></span><b></b></h3>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_1_3" name="BM_1_3"></a>3-1.7 Conflicts of Interest</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should know and abide by the ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest</span></strong> <span style="color: #339966;">that apply in the jurisdiction</span>, and be sensitive to facts that may raise conflict issues. <em><span style="color: #339966;">When a conflict requiring recusal exists and is non-waivable, or informed consent has not been obtained, the prosecutor should recuse from further participation in the matter.</span></em> <span style="color: #3366ff;">The office should not go forward until a non-conflicted prosecutor, or an adequate waiver, is in place.</span></h3>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should not represent a defendant in criminal proceedings in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.</p>
<h3>(c)<em><span style="color: #ff0000;"> The prosecutor should not participate in a matter in which the prosecutor previously</span> </em>participated, <em><span style="color: #008000;">personally </span></em>and substantially, as a non-prosecutor, unless the appropriate government office, and when necessary a former client, gives informed consent confirmed in writing.</h3>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should not be involved in the prosecution of a former client. A prosecutor who has formerly represented a client should not use information obtained from that representation to the disadvantage of the former client.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should not negotiate for private employment with an accused or the target of an investigation, in a matter in which the prosecutor is participating personally and substantially, or with an attorney or agent for such accused or target</p>
<h3>(f) The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political, financial, professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships. <span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor should not allow interests in personal advancement or aggrandizement to affect judgments regarding what is in the best interests of justice in any case.</span></h3>
<h3>(g) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should disclose to appropriate supervisory personnel any facts or interests that could reasonably be viewed as raising a potential conflict of interest.</span> If it is determined that the prosecutor should nevertheless continue to act in the matter, the prosecutor and supervisors should consider whether any disclosure to a court or defense counsel should be made, and make such disclosure if appropriate. <span style="color: #3366ff;">Close cases should be resolved in favor of disclosure to the court and the defense.</span></h3>
<p><span style="color: #000000;">(h) The prosecutor whose current relationship to another lawyer is parent, child, sibling, spouse or sexual partner should not participate in the prosecution of a person who the prosecutor knows is represented by the other lawyer. A prosecutor who has a significant personal, political, financial, professional, business, property, or other relationship with another lawyer should not participate in the prosecution of a person who is represented by the other lawyer, unless the relationship is disclosed to the prosecutor’s supervisor and supervisory approval is given, or unless there is no other prosecutor who can be authorized to act in the prosecutor&#8217;s stead. In the latter rare case, full disclosure should be made to the defense and to the court.</span></p>
<p>(i) The prosecutor should not recommend the services of particular defense counsel to accused persons or witnesses in cases being handled by the prosecutor’s office. If requested to make such a recommendation, the prosecutor should consider instead referring the person to the public defender, or to a panel of available criminal defense attorneys such as a bar association lawyer-referral service, or to the court. In the rare case where a specific recommendation is made by the prosecutor, the recommendation should be to an independent and competent attorney, and the prosecutor should not make a referral that embodies, creates or is likely to create a conflict of interest. A prosecutor should not comment negatively upon the reputation or abilities of a defense counsel to an accused person or witness who is seeking counsel in a case being handled by the prosecutor’s office.</p>
<h3>(j) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should promptly report to a supervisor all but the most obviously frivolous misconduct allegations made,</span> <span style="color: #339966;">publicly</span> or <span style="color: #008000;">privately</span>,<span style="color: #3366ff;"> against the prosecutor</span>. If a supervisor or judge initially determines that an allegation is serious enough to warrant official investigation, reasonable measures, including possible recusal, should be instituted to ensure that the prosecution function is fairly and effectively carried out. A mere allegation of misconduct is not a sufficient basis for prosecutorial recusal, and should not deter a prosecutor from attending to the prosecutor’s duties.<b></b></h3>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.8 Appropriate Workload</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should not carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size or complexity, interferes with providing quality representation, endangers the interests of justice in fairness, accuracy, or the timely disposition of charges, or has a significant potential to lead to the breach of professional obligations. A prosecutor whose workload prevents competent representation should not accept additional matters until the workload is reduced, and should work to ensure competent representation in existing matters. A prosecutor within a supervisory structure should notify supervisors when counsel’s workload is approaching or exceeds professionally appropriate levels.</p>
<h3>(b) <span style="color: #3366ff;">The prosecutor’s office should regularly review the workload of individual prosecutors, as well as the workload of the entire office</span>, and adjust workloads (including intake) <span style="color: #339966;">when necessary</span> to ensure the effective and<span style="color: #ff0000;"> ethical conduct of the prosecution function.</span></h3>
<p>(c) The chief prosecutor for a jurisdiction should inform governmental officials of the workload of the prosecutor’s office, and request funding and personnel that are adequate to meet the criminal caseload. The prosecutor should consider seeking such funding from all appropriate sources. If workload exceeds the appropriate professional capacity of a prosecutor or prosecutor’s office, that office or counsel should also alert the court(s) in its jurisdiction and seek judicial relief.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.9 Diligence, Promptness and Punctuality</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should act with diligence and promptness to investigate, litigate, and dispose of criminal charges, consistent with the interests of justice and with due regard for fairness, accuracy, and rights of the defendant</span>, victims, and witnesses. The prosecutor’s office should be organized and supported with adequate staff and facilities to enable it to <span style="color: #3366ff;">process and resolve criminal charges with fairness and efficiency.</span></h3>
<h3>(b) <span style="color: #ff0000;">When providing reasons for seeking delay, the prosecutor should not knowingly misrepresent facts or otherwise mislead.</span> The prosecutor should use procedures that will cause delay only when there is a legitimate basis for such use, and not to secure an unfair tactical advantage.</h3>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not unreasonably oppose requests for continuances from defense counsel.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should know and comply with timing requirements applicable to a criminal investigation and prosecution, so as to not prejudice a criminal matter.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should be punctual in attendance in court, in the submission of motions, briefs, and other papers, and in dealings with opposing counsel, witnesses and others. The prosecutor should emphasize to assistants and prosecution witnesses the importance of punctuality in court attendance.</p>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_1_4" name="BM_1_4"></a>3-1.10  Relationship with the Media</b></h2>
<p>(a) For purposes of this Standard, a “public statement” is any extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication or media, including social media. An extrajudicial statement is any oral, written, or visual presentation not made either in a courtroom during criminal proceedings or in court filings or correspondence with the court or counsel regarding criminal proceedings.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor’s public statements about the judiciary, jurors, other lawyers, or the criminal justice system should be respectful even if expressing disagreement.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not make, cause to be made, or authorize or condone the making of, a public statement that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding or heightening public condemnation of the accused, but the prosecutor may make statements that inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s or law enforcement actions and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The prosecutor may make a public statement explaining why criminal charges have been declined or dismissed, but must take care not to imply guilt or otherwise prejudice the interests of victims, witnesses or subjects of an investigation. A prosecutor’s public statements should otherwise be consistent with the ABA Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse.</p>
<p>(d) A prosecutor should not place statements or evidence into the court record to circumvent this Standard.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees, or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement or providing non-public information that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making or providing under this Standard or other applicable rules or law.</p>
<p>(f) The prosecutor may respond to public statements from any source in order to protect the prosecution’s legitimate official interests, unless there is a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding, in which case the prosecutor should approach defense counsel or a court for relief. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</p>
<p>(g) The prosecutor has duties of confidentiality and loyalty, and should not secretly or anonymously provide non-public information to the media, on or off the record, without appropriate authorization.</p>
<p>(h) The prosecutor should not allow prosecutorial judgment to be influenced by a personal interest in potential media contacts or attention.</p>
<p>(i) A prosecutor uninvolved in a matter who is commenting as a media source may offer generalized commentary concerning a specific criminal matter that serves to educate the public about the criminal justice system and does not risk prejudicing a specific criminal proceeding. A prosecutor acting as such a media commentator should make reasonable efforts to be well-informed about the facts of the matter and the governing law. The prosecutor should not offer commentary regarding the specific merits of an ongoing criminal prosecution or investigation, except in a rare case to address a manifest injustice and the prosecutor is reasonably well-informed about the relevant facts and law.</p>
<p>(j) During the pendency of a criminal matter, the prosecutor should not re-enact, or assist law enforcement in re-enacting, law enforcement events for the media. Absent a legitimate law enforcement purpose, the prosecutor should not display the accused for the media, nor should the prosecutor invite media presence during investigative actions without careful consideration of the interests of all involved, including suspects, defendants, and the public. However, a prosecutor may reasonably accommodate media requests for access to public information and events.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.11 Literary or Media Rights Agreements Prohibited</b></h2>
<p>(a) Before the conclusion of all aspects of a matter in which a prosecutor participates, the prosecutor should not enter into any agreement or informal understanding by which the prosecutor acquires an interest in a literary or media portrayal or account based on or arising out of the prosecutor’s involvement in the matter.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should not allow prosecutorial judgment to be influenced by the possibility of future personal literary or other media rights.</p>
<p>(c) In creating or participating in any literary or other media account of a matter in which the prosecutor was involved, the prosecutor’s duty of confidentiality must be respected even after government service is concluded. When protected confidences are involved, a prosecutor or former prosecutor should not make disclosure without consent from the prosecutor’s office. Such consent should not be unreasonably withheld, and the public’s interest in accurate historical accounts of significant events after a lengthy passage of time should be considered.</p>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_1_5" name="BM_1_5"></a>3-1.12   Duty to Report and Respond to Prosecutorial Misconduct</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor’s office should adopt policies to address allegations of professional misconduct, including violations of law, by prosecutors.</span> At a minimum such policies should require internal reporting of reasonably suspected misconduct to supervisory staff within the office, and authorize supervisory staff to quickly address the allegations. Investigations of allegations of professional misconduct within the prosecutor’s office should be handled in an independent and conflict-free manner.</h3>
<h3>(b) <span style="color: #ff0000;">When a prosecutor reasonably believes that another person associated with the prosecutor&#8217;s office intends or is about to engage in misconduct, the prosecutor should attempt to dissuade the person. If such attempt fails or is not possible, and the prosecutor reasonably believes that misconduct is ongoing, will occur, or has occurred, the prosecutor should promptly refer the matter to higher authority in the prosecutor&#8217;s office including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, to the chief prosecutor.</span></h3>
<h3>(c) <span style="color: #ff0000;">If, despite the prosecutor&#8217;s efforts in accordance with sections (a) and (b) above, the chief prosecutor permits, fails to address, or insists upon an action or omission that is clearly a violation of law, the prosecutor should take further remedial action, including revealing information necessary to address, remedy, or prevent the violation to appropriate judicial, regulatory, or other government officials not in the prosecutor&#8217;s office.</span></h3>
<h2><b>Standard 3-1.13 Training Programs</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor’s office should develop and maintain programs of training and continuing education for both new and experienced prosecutors and staff. The prosecutor’s office, as well as the organized Bar or courts, should require that current and aspiring prosecutors attend a reasonable number of hours of such training and education.</p>
<p>(b) In addition to knowledge of substantive legal doctrine and courtroom procedures, a prosecutor’s core training curriculum should address the overall mission of the criminal justice system. A core training curriculum should also seek to address: investigation, negotiation, and litigation skills; compliance with applicable discovery procedures; knowledge of the development, use, and testing of forensic evidence; available conviction and sentencing alternatives, reentry, effective conditions of probation, and collateral consequences; civility, and a commitment to professionalism; relevant office, court, and defense policies and procedures and their proper application; exercises in the use of prosecutorial discretion; civility and professionalism; appreciation of diversity and elimination of improper bias; and available technology and the ability to use it. Some training programs might usefully be open to, and taught by, persons outside the prosecutor’s office such as defense counsel, court staff, and members of the judiciary.</p>
<p>(c) A prosecution office’s training program should include periodic review of the office’s policies and procedures, which should be amended when necessary. Specialized prosecutors should receive training in their specialized areas. Individuals who will supervise attorneys or staff should receive training in how effectively to supervise.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor’s office should also make available opportunities for training and continuing education programs outside the office, including training for non-attorney staff.</p>
<p>(e) Adequate funding for continuing training and education, within and outside the office, should be requested and provided by funding sources.</p>
<h2><b>PART II: ORGANIZATION OF THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_2_1" name="BM_2_1"></a>3-2.1 Prosecution Authority to be Vested in Full-time, Public-Official Attorneys</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecution function should be performed by a lawyer who is</p>
<p>(i) a public official,</p>
<p>(ii) authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction, and</p>
<p>(iii) subject to rules of attorney professional conduct and discipline.</p>
<p>Prosecutors whose professional obligations are devoted full-time and exclusively to the prosecution function are preferable to part-time prosecutors who have other potentially conflicting professional responsibilities.</p>
<p>(b) A prosecutor’s office should have open, effective, and well-publicized methods for communicating with, and receiving communications from, the public in the jurisdiction that it serves.</p>
<p>(c) If a particular matter requires the appointment of a special prosecutor from outside the office, adequate funding for this purpose should be made available. Such special prosecutors should know and are governed by applicable conflict of interest standards for prosecutors. A private attorney who is paid by, or who has an attorney-client relationship with, an individual or entity that is a victim of the charged crime, or who has a personal or financial interest in the prosecution of particular charges, or who has demonstrated any impermissible bias relevant to the particular matter, should not be permitted to serve as prosecutor in that matter.</p>
<p>(d) Unless impractical or unlawful, the prosecutor’s office should implement a system for allowing qualified law students, cross-designated prosecutors from other offices, and private attorneys temporarily assigned to the prosecutor’s office, to learn about and assist with the prosecution function.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_2_3" name="BM_2_3"></a>2.2 Assuring Excellence and Diversity in the Hiring, Retention, and Compensation of Prosecutors</b></h2>
<p>(a) Strong professional qualifications and performance should be the basis for selection and retention for prosecutor positions. Effective measures to retain excellent prosecutors should be encouraged, while recognizing the benefits of some turnover. Supervisory prosecutors should select and promote personnel based on merit and expertise, without regard to partisan, personal or political factors or influence.</p>
<p>(b) In selecting personnel, the prosecutor’s office should also consider the diverse interests and makeup of the community it serves, and seek to recruit, hire, promote and retain a diverse group of prosecutors and staff that reflect that community.</p>
<p>(c) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The function of public prosecution requires highly developed professional skills</span></strong> and a variety of backgrounds, <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">talents</span> </strong>and <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">experience</span></strong>. The prosecutor’s office should promote continuing professional development and continuity of service, while providing prosecutors the opportunity to gain experience in all aspects of the prosecution function.</p>
<p>(d) Compensation and benefits for prosecutors and their staffs should be commensurate with the high responsibilities of the office, sufficient to compete with the private sector, and regularly adjusted to attract and retain well-qualified personnel. Compensation for prosecutors should be adequate and also comparable to that of public defense counsel in the jurisdiction.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_2_4" name="BM_2_4"></a>2.3 Investigative Resources and Experts</b></h2>
<p><b></b>    The prosecutor should be provided with funds for qualified experts as needed for particular matters. When warranted by the responsibilities of the office, funds should be available to the prosecutor’s office to employ professional investigators and other necessary support personnel, as well as to secure access to forensic and other experts.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_2_5" name="BM_2_5"></a>2.4 Office Policies and Procedures</b></h2>
<p>(a) Each prosecutor&#8217;s office should seek to develop general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and standard operating procedures for the office. The objectives of such policies and procedures should be to achieve fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the criminal law within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.</p>
<p>(b) In the interest of continuity and clarity, the prosecution office’s policies and procedures should be memorialized and accessible to relevant staff. The office policies and procedures should be regularly reviewed and revised. The office policies and procedures should be augmented by instruction and training, and are not a substitute for regular training programs.</p>
<p>(c) Prosecution office policies and procedures whose disclosure would not adversely affect the prosecution function should be made available to the public.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor’s office should have a system in place to regularly review compliance with office policies.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_2_10" name="BM_2_10"></a>2.5 Removal or Suspension and Substitution of Chief Prosecutor</b></h2>
<p>(a) Fair and objective procedures should be established by appropriate legislation that empowers the governor or other public official or body to suspend or remove, and supersede, a chief prosecutor for a jurisdiction and designate a replacement, upon making a public finding after reasonable notice and hearing that the prosecutor is incapable of fulfilling the duties of office due to physical or mental incapacity or for gross deviation from professional norms.</p>
<p>(b) The governor or other public official or body should be similarly empowered by law to substitute, in a particular matter or category of cases, special counsel in the place of the chief prosecutor, by consent or upon making a finding after fair process that substitution is required due to a serious conflict of interest or a gross deviation from professional norms.</p>
<p>(c) Removal, suspension or substitution of a prosecutor should not be permitted for improper or irrelevant partisan or personal reasons.</p>
<h2><b>PART III: PROSECUTORIAL RELATIONSHIPS</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard 3-3.1 Structure of, and Relationships Among, Prosecution Offices</b></h2>
<p>(a) When possible, the geographic jurisdiction of a prosecution office should be determined on the basis of population, caseload, and other relevant factors sufficient to warrant at least one full-time prosecutor and necessary support staff.</p>
<p>(b) In all States, there should be coordination of the prosecution policies of local prosecution offices to improve the administration and consistency of justice throughout the State. To the extent needed, a central pool of supporting resources, forensic laboratories, and personnel such as investigators, additional prosecutors, accountants and other experts, should be maintained by the state government and should be available to assist local prosecutors. A coordinated forum for prosecutors to discuss issues of professional responsibility should also be available. In some jurisdictions, it may be appropriate to create a unified statewide system of prosecution, in which the state attorney general is the chief prosecutor and district or county or other local prosecutors are the attorney general’s deputies.</p>
<p>(c)<i> </i>Regardless of the statewide structure of prosecution offices, a state-wide association of prosecutors should be established. When questions or issues arise that could create important state-wide precedents, local prosecutors should advise and consult with the attorney general, the state-wide association, and the prosecutors in other local prosecution offices.</p>
<p>(d) Federal, state, and local prosecution offices should develop practices and procedures that encourage useful coordination with prosecutors within the jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions. Prosecutors should work to identify potential issues of conflict, coordinate with other prosecution offices in advance, and resolve inter-office disputes amicably and in the public interest.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-<a id="BM_2_7" name="BM_2_7"></a>3.2 Relationships With Law Enforcement</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should maintain respectful yet independent judgment when interacting with law enforcement personnel.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor may provide independent legal advice to law enforcement about actions in specific criminal matters and about law enforcement practices in general.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should become familiar with and respect the experience and specialized expertise of law enforcement personnel. The prosecutor should promote compliance by law enforcement personnel with applicable legal rules, including rules against improper bias. The prosecutor’s office should keep law enforcement personnel informed of relevant legal and legal ethics issues and developments as they relate to prosecution matters, and advise law enforcement personnel of relevant prosecution policies and procedures. Prosecutors may exercise supervision over law enforcement personnel involved in particular prosecutions when in the best interests of justice and the public.</p>
<p>(d) Representatives of the prosecutor’s office should meet and confer regularly with law enforcement agencies regarding prosecution as well as law enforcement policies. The prosecutor’s office should assist in developing and administering training programs for law enforcement personnel regarding matters and cases being investigated, matters submitted for charging, and the law related to law enforcement activities.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-3.3 Relationship With Courts, Defense Counsel and Others</b></h2>
<p>(a) In all contacts with judges, the prosecutor should maintain a professional and independent relationship. A prosecutor should not engage in unauthorized <i>ex parte</i> discussions with, or submission of material to, a judge relating to a particular matter which is, or is likely to be, before the judge. With regard to generalized matters requiring judicial discussion (for example, case-management or administrative matters), the prosecutor should invite a representative defense counsel to join in the discussion to the extent practicable.</p>
<p>(b) When <i>ex parte</i> communications or submissions are authorized, the prosecutor should inform the court of material facts known to the prosecutor, including facts that are adverse, sufficient to enable the court to make a fair and informed decision. Except when non-disclosure is authorized, counsel should notify opposing counsel that an <i>ex parte</i> contact has occurred, without disclosing its content unless permitted.</p>
<p>(c) In written filings, the prosecutor should respectfully evaluate and respond as appropriate to opposing counsel’s arguments and representations, and avoid unnecessary personalized disparagement.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should develop and maintain courteous and civil working relationships with judges and defense counsel, and should cooperate with them in developing solutions to address ethical, scheduling, or other issues that may arise in particular cases or generally in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors should cooperate with courts and organized bar associations in developing codes of professionalism and civility, and should abide by such codes that apply in their jurisdiction.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-3.4 Relationship With Victims and Witnesses</b></h2>
<p>(a) “Witness” in this Standard means any person who has or might have information about a matter, including victims.</p>
<h3>(b) <strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should know and follow the law and rules of the jurisdiction regarding victims</span> </em></strong>and witnesses. In communicating with witnesses, the prosecutor should know and abide by law and ethics rules regarding the use of deceit and engaging in communications with represented, unrepresented, and organizational persons.</h3>
<p>(c) The prosecutor or the prosecutor’s agents should seek to interview all witnesses, and should not act to intimidate or unduly influence any witness.</p>
<h3>(d)<span style="color: #ff0000;"> The prosecutor should not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to <span style="color: #339966;">embarrass</span>, <span style="color: #3366ff;">delay</span>, or <span style="color: #339966;">burden</span>, and not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate legal rights.</span> The prosecutor and prosecution agents should not misrepresent their status, identity or interests when communicating with a witness.</h3>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should be permitted to compensate a witness for reasonable expenses such as costs of attending court, depositions pursuant to statute or court rule, and pretrial interviews, including transportation and loss of income. No other benefits should be provided to witnesses unless authorized by law, regulation, or well-accepted practice. All benefits provided to witnesses should be documented and disclosed to the defense. A prosecutor should not pay or provide a benefit to a witness in order to, or in an amount that is likely to, affect the substance or truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.</p>
<p>(f) A prosecutor should avoid the prospect of having to testify personally about the content of a witness interview. The prosecutor’s interview of most routine or government witnesses (for example, custodians of records or law enforcement agents) should not require a third-party observer. But when the need for corroboration of an interview is reasonably anticipated, the prosecutor should be accompanied by another trusted and credible person during the interview. The prosecutor should avoid being alone with any witness who the prosecutor reasonably believes has potential or actual criminal liability, or foreseeably hostile witnesses.</p>
<p>(g) The prosecutor should advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against self-incrimination and the right to independent counsel when the law so requires. Even if the law does not require it, a prosecutor should consider so advising a witness if the prosecutor reasonably believes the witness may provide self-incriminating information and the witness appears not to know his or her rights. However, a prosecutor should not so advise, or discuss or exaggerate the potential criminal liability of, a witness with a purpose, or in a manner likely, to intimidate the witness, to influence the truthfulness or completeness of the witness’s testimony, or to change the witness’s decision about whether to provide information.</p>
<p>(h) The prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between witnesses and the defense counsel, other than the government’s employees or agents if consistent with applicable ethical rules. The prosecutor should not advise any person, or cause any person to be advised, to decline to provide defense counsel with information which such person has a right to give. The prosecutor may, however, fairly and accurately advise witnesses as to the likely consequences of their providing information, but only if done in a manner that does not discourage communication.</p>
<p>(i) Consistent with any specific laws or rules governing victims, the prosecutor should provide victims of serious crimes, or their representatives, an opportunity to consult with and to provide information to the prosecutor, prior to making significant decisions such as whether or not to prosecute, to pursue a disposition by plea, or to dismiss charges. The prosecutor should seek to ensure that victims of serious crimes, or their representatives, are given timely notice of:</p>
<p>(i) judicial proceedings relating to the victims’ case;</p>
<p>(ii) proposed dispositions of the case;</p>
<p>(iii) sentencing proceedings; and</p>
<p>(iv) any decision or action in the case that could result in the defendant’s provisional or final release from custody, or change of sentence.</p>
<p>(j) The prosecutor should ensure that victims and witnesses who may need protections against intimidation or retaliation are advised of and afforded protections where feasible.</p>
<p>(k) Subject to ethical rules and the confidentiality that criminal matters sometimes require, and unless prohibited by law or court order, the prosecutor should provide information about the status of matters in which they are involved to victims and witnesses who request it.</p>
<p>(l) The prosecutor should give witnesses reasonable notice of when their testimony at a proceeding is expected, and should not require witnesses to attend judicial proceedings unless their testimony is reasonably expected at that time, or their presence is required by law. When witnesses’ attendance is required, the prosecutor should seek to reduce to a minimum the time witnesses must spend waiting at the proceedings. The prosecutor should ensure that witnesses are given notice as soon as practicable of scheduling changes which will affect their required attendance at judicial proceedings.</p>
<p>(m) The prosecutor should not engage in any inappropriate personal relationship with any victim or other witness.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-3.5 Relationship with Expert Witnesses</b></h2>
<p>(a) An expert may be engaged for consultation only, or to prepare an evidentiary report or testimony. The prosecutor should know relevant rules governing expert witnesses, including possibly different disclosure rules governing experts who are engaged for consultation only.</p>
<h3>(b) A <span style="color: #ff0000;">prosecutor should evaluate all expert advice</span>, opinions, or testimony independently, and <span style="color: #339966;">not simply accept the opinion of a government</span> or other expert<span style="color: #339966;"> based on employer, affiliation or prominence alone.</span></h3>
<p>(c) Before engaging an expert, the prosecutor should investigate the expert’s credentials, relevant professional experience, and reputation in the field. The prosecutor should also examine a testifying expert’s background and credentials for potential impeachment issues. Before offering an expert as a witness, the prosecutor should investigate the scientific acceptance of the particular theory, method, or conclusions about which the expert would testify.</p>
<p>(d) A prosecutor who engages an expert to provide a testimonial opinion should respect the independence of the expert and should not seek to dictate the substance of the expert’s opinion on the relevant subject.</p>
<p>(e) Before offering an expert as a witness, the prosecutor should seek to learn enough about the substantive area of the expert’s expertise, including ethical rules that may be applicable in the expert’s field, to enable effective preparation of the expert, as well as effective cross-examination of any defense expert on the same topic. The prosecutor should explain to the expert that the expert’s role in the proceeding will be as an impartial witness called to aid the fact-finders, explain the manner in which the examination of the expert is likely to be conducted, and suggest likely impeachment questions the expert may be asked.</p>
<p>(f) The prosecutor should not pay or withhold any fee or provide or withhold a benefit for the purpose of influencing the substance of an expert’s testimony. The prosecutor should not fix the amount of the fee contingent upon the expert’s testimony or the result in the case. Nor should the prosecutor promise or imply the prospect of future work for the expert based on the expert’s testimony.</p>
<p>(g) The prosecutor should provide the expert with all information reasonably necessary to support a full and fair opinion. The prosecutor should be aware, and explain to the expert, that all communications with, and documents shared with, a testifying expert may be subject to disclosure to opposing counsel. The prosecutor should be aware of expert discovery rules and act to protect confidentiality and the public interest, for example by not sharing with the expert confidences and work product that the prosecutor does not want disclosed.</p>
<p>(h) The prosecutor should timely disclose to the defense all evidence or information learned from an expert that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense, even if the prosecutor does not intend to call the expert as a witness.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-3.6 When Physical Evidence With Incriminating</b> <b>Implications is Disclosed by the Defense </b></h2>
<p>When physical evidence is delivered to the prosecutor consistent with Defense Function Standard 4-4.7, the prosecutor should not offer the fact of delivery as evidence before a fact-finder for purposes of establishing the culpability of defense counsel’s client. The prosecutor may, however, offer evidence of the fact of such delivery in response to a foundational objection to the evidence based on chain-of-custody concerns, or in a subsequent proceeding for the purpose of proving a crime or fraud regarding the evidence.</p>
<h2><b>PART IV: INVESTIGATION; DECISIONS TO CHARGE, NOT CHARGE, OR DISMISS; AND GRAND JURY</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard 3-4.1 Investigative Function of the Prosecutor</b></h2>
<p>(a) When performing an investigative function, prosecutors should be familiar with and follow the ABA Standards on <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutorial-investigations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Prosecutorial Investigations</strong></a>.</p>
<p>(b) A prosecutor should not use illegal or unethical means to obtain evidence or information, or employ, instruct, or encourage others to do so. Prosecutors should research and know the law in this regard before acting, understanding that in some circumstances a prosecutor’s ethical obligations may be different from those of other lawyers.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-4.2 Decisions to Charge Are the Prosecutor’s</b></h2>
<p>(a) While the decision to arrest is often the responsibility of law enforcement personnel, the decision to institute formal criminal proceedings is the responsibility of the prosecutor. Where the law permits a law enforcement officer or other person to initiate proceedings by complaining directly to a judicial officer or the grand jury, the complainant should be required to present the complaint for prior review by the prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding the complaint should be communicated to the judicial officer or grand jury.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(b) The prosecutor’s office should establish standards and procedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether formal criminal proceedings should be instituted. </span></strong></p>
<p>(c) In determining whether formal criminal charges should be filed, prosecutors should consider whether further investigation should be undertaken. After charges are filed the prosecutor should oversee law enforcement investigative activity related to the case.</p>
<p><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(d) If the defendant is not in custody when charged, the prosecutor should consider whether a voluntary appearance rather than a custodial arrest would suffice to protect the public and ensure the defendant’s presence at court proceedings.</span></strong></p>
<h2><b><span style="color: #339966;">Standard 3-4.3</span> Minimum Requirements for Filing and Maintaining Criminal Charges </b></h2>
<p>(a) <span style="color: #339966;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction</span> <em>beyond a reasonable doubt</em></strong>,</span> and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.</p>
<p>(b)<strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"> After criminal charges are filed, a prosecutor should maintain them only if the prosecutor continues to reasonably believe that probable cause exists and that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.</span></strong></p>
<p>(c) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">If a prosecutor has significant doubt about the guilt of the accused or the quality, truthfulness, or sufficiency of the evidence in any criminal case assigned to the prosecutor, the prosecutor should disclose those doubts to supervisory staff. The prosecutor’s office should then determine whether it is appropriate to proceed with the case.</span></strong></p>
<p>(d) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor’s office should not file or maintain charges if it believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.</span></strong></p>
<h2><b><span style="color: #339966;">Standard 3-4.4 </span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Discretion in Filing, Declining, Maintaining, and Dismissing Criminal Charges </span><i><span style="color: #ff0000;">  </span>        </i></b></h2>
<p>(a) In order to fully implement the prosecutor’s functions and duties, including the obligation to enforce the law while exercising sound discretion, the prosecutor is not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support. Among the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge, even though it meets the requirements of Standard 3-4.3, are:</p>
<h3>(i) <span style="color: #ff0000;">the strength of the case;</span></h3>
<h3>(ii) <span style="color: #ff0000;">the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;</span></h3>
<h3>(iii) <span style="color: #ff0000;">the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense;</span></h3>
<h3>(iv) <span style="color: #ff0000;">the impact of prosecution or non-prosecution on the public welfare;</span></h3>
<p>(v) the background and characteristics of the offender, including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation;</p>
<p>(vi) whether the authorized or likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the offender;</p>
<h3>(vii) <span style="color: #ff0000;">the views and motives of the victim or complainant;</span></h3>
<h3>(viii) <span style="color: #339966;">any improper conduct by law enforcement;</span></h3>
<h3>(ix)<span style="color: #339966;"> unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons;</span></h3>
<h3>(x)<span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> potential collateral</span> impact on third parties (children involved, etc..) , <span style="color: #000000;">including witnesses or victims;</span></span></h3>
<p>(xi) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others;</p>
<p>(xii) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases;</p>
<p>(xiii) changes in law or policy;</p>
<p>(xiv) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;</p>
<p>(xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and</p>
<p>(xvi) whether the public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.</p>
<p>(b) In exercising discretion to file and maintain charges, the prosecutor should not consider:</p>
<p>(i) partisan or other improper political or personal considerations;</p>
<h3>(ii)<span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> hostility or personal animus towards a potential subject</span>, or any other improper motive of the prosecutor; or</span></h3>
<p>(iii) the impermissible criteria described in Standard 1.6 above.</p>
<p>(c) A prosecutor may file and maintain charges even if juries in the jurisdiction have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.</p>
<h3>(d) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should not file or maintain charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence</span> at trial and are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or deter similar conduct.</h3>
<p>(e) A prosecutor may condition a dismissal of charges, <i>nolle</i> <i>prosequi</i>, or similar action on the accused&#8217;s relinquishment of a right to seek civil redress only if the accused has given informed consent, and such consent is disclosed to the court. A prosecutor should not use a civil waiver to avoid a bona fide claim of improper law enforcement actions, and a decision not to file criminal charges should be made on its merits and not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver.</p>
<h3>(f) <em><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should consider the possibility of a noncriminal disposition, formal or informal, or a deferred prosecution or other diversionary disposition, when deciding whether to initiate or prosecute criminal charges</span></em>. The prosecutor should be familiar with the services and resources of other agencies, public or private, that might assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion or deferral from the criminal process.</h3>
<h2><b>Standard 3-4.5 Relationship with a Grand Jury</b></h2>
<p>(a) In presenting a matter to a criminal grand jury, and in light of its <i>ex parte</i> character, the prosecutor should respect the independence of the grand jury and should not preempt a function of the grand jury, mislead the grand jury, or abuse the processes of the grand jury.</p>
<p>(b) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as a legal advisor to the grand jury, the prosecutor should appropriately explain the law and may, if permitted by law, express an opinion on the legal significance of the evidence, but should give due deference to the grand jury as an independent legal body.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments to a grand jury in an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner that would be impermissible in a trial.</p>
<p>(d) The entirety of the proceedings occurring before a grand jury, including the prosecutor’s communications with and presentations and instructions to the grand jury, should be recorded in some manner, and that record should be preserved. The prosecutor should avoid off-the-record communications with the grand jury and with individual grand jurors.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-4.6 Quality and Scope of Evidence Before a Grand Jury</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <span style="color: #ff0000;">A prosecutor should not seek an indictment unless the prosecutor reasonably believes the charges are supported by probable cause</span> and <span style="color: #339966;">that there will be admissible evidence sufficient to support the charges beyond reasonable doubt at trial.</span> A prosecutor should advise a grand jury of the prosecutor’s opinion that it should not indict if the prosecutor believes the evidence presented does not warrant an indictment.</h3>
<p>(b) In addition to determining what criminal charges to file, a grand jury may properly be used to investigate potential criminal conduct, and also to determine the sense of the community regarding potential charges.</p>
<p>(c) A prosecutor should present to a grand jury only evidence which the prosecutor believes is appropriate and authorized by law for presentation to a grand jury. The prosecutor should be familiar with the law of the jurisdiction regarding grand juries, and may present witnesses to summarize relevant evidence to the extent the law permits.</p>
<p>(d) When a new grand jury is empanelled, a prosecutor should ensure that the grand jurors are appropriately instructed, consistent with the law of the jurisdiction, on the grand jury’s right and ability to seek evidence, ask questions, and hear directly from any available witnesses, including eyewitnesses.</p>
<p>(e) A prosecutor with personal knowledge of evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation should present or otherwise disclose that evidence to the grand jury. The prosecutor should relay to the grand jury any request by the subject or target of an investigation to testify before the grand jury, or present other non-frivolous evidence claimed to be exculpatory.</p>
<p>(f) If the prosecutor concludes that a witness is a target of a criminal investigation, the prosecutor should not seek to compel the witness’s testimony before the grand jury absent immunity. The prosecutor should honor, however, a reasonable request from a target or subject who wishes to testify before the grand jury.</p>
<p>(g) Unless there is a reasonable possibility that it will facilitate flight of the target, endanger other persons, interfere with an ongoing investigation, or obstruct justice, the prosecutor should give notice to a target of a grand jury investigation, and offer the target an opportunity to testify before the grand jury. Prior to taking a target’s testimony, the prosecutor should advise the target of the privilege against self-incrimination and obtain a voluntary waiver of that right.</p>
<p>(h) The prosecutor should not seek to compel the appearance of a witness whose activities are the subject of the grand jury’s inquiry, if the witness states in advance that if called the witness will claim the constitutional privilege not to testify, and provides a reasonable basis for such claim. If warranted, the prosecutor may judicially challenge such a claim of privilege or seek a grant of immunity according to the law.</p>
<p>(i) The prosecutor should not issue a grand jury subpoena to a criminal defense attorney or defense team member, or other witness whose testimony reasonably might be protected by a recognized privilege, without considering the applicable law and rules of professional responsibility in the jurisdiction.</p>
<p>(j) Except where permitted by law, a prosecutor should not use the grand jury in order to obtain evidence to assist the prosecution’s preparation for trial of a defendant who has already been charged. A prosecutor may, however, use the grand jury to investigate additional or new charges against a defendant who has already been charged.</p>
<p>(k) Except where permitted by law, a prosecutor should not use a criminal grand jury solely or primarily for the purpose of aiding or assisting in an administrative or civil inquiry.</p>
<h2><b>PART V: PRETRIAL ACTIVITIES and NEGOTIATED DISPOSITIONS</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_3_10" name="BM_3_10"></a>3-5.1 Role in First Appearance and Preliminary Hearing</b></h2>
<p>(a) A prosecutor should be present at any first appearance of the accused before a judicial officer, and at any preliminary hearing.</p>
<p>(b) At or before the first appearance, the prosecutor should consider:</p>
<p>(i) whether the accused has counsel, and if not, whether and when counsel will be made available or waived;</p>
<p>(ii) whether the accused appears to be mentally competent, and if not, whether to seek an evaluation;</p>
<p>(iii) whether the accused should be released or detained pending further proceedings and, if released, whether supervisory conditions should be imposed; and</p>
<p>(iv) what further proceedings should be scheduled to move the matter toward timely resolution.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor handling the first appearance should ensure that the charges are consistent with the conduct described in the available law enforcement reports and any other information the prosecutor possesses.</p>
<p>(d) If the accused does not yet have counsel and has not waived counsel, the prosecutor should ask the court not to engage in substantive proceedings, other than a decision to release the accused. The prosecutor should not obtain a waiver of other important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing, from an unrepresented accused unless that person has been judicially authorized to proceed <i>pro se</i>.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should not approach or communicate with an accused unless a voluntary waiver of counsel has been entered or the accused’s counsel consents. If the accused does not have counsel, the prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel, and is given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.</p>
<p>(f) If the prosecutor believes pretrial release is appropriate, or it is ordered, the prosecutor should cooperate in arrangements for release under the prevailing pretrial release system.</p>
<p>(g) If the prosecutor has reasonable concerns about the accused’s mental competence, the prosecutor should bring those concerns to the attention of defense counsel and, if necessary, the judicial officer.</p>
<p>(h) The prosecutor should not seek to delay a prompt judicial determination of probable cause for criminal charges without good cause, particularly if the accused is in custody.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.2  The Decision to Recommend Release or Seek Detention </b></h2>
<p>(a)<span style="color: #ff0000;"> The prosecutor should favor pretrial release of a criminally accused, unless detention is necessary to protect individuals or the community or to ensure the return of the defendant for future proceedings.</span></p>
<p>(b) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor’s decision to recommend pretrial release or seek detention should be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant and the offense, rather than made categorically.</span> The prosecutor should consider information relevant to these decisions from all sources, including the defendant.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should cooperate with pretrial services or other personnel who review or assemble information to be provided to the court regarding pretrial release determinations.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should be open to reconsideration of pretrial detention or release decisions based on changed circumstances, including an unexpectedly lengthy period of detention.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.3 Preparation for Court Proceedings, and Recording and Transmitting Information </b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should prepare in advance for court proceedings unless that is impossible. Adequate preparation depends on the nature of the proceeding and the time available, and will often include: reviewing available documents; considering what issues are likely to arise and the prosecution’s position regarding those issues; how best to present the issues and what solutions might be offered; relevant legal research and factual investigation; and contacting other persons who might be of assistance in addressing the anticipated issues. If the prosecutor has not had adequate time to prepare and is unsure of the relevant facts or law, the prosecutor should communicate to the court the limits of the prosecutor’s knowledge or preparation.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should make effort to appear at all hearings in cases assigned to the prosecutor. A prosecutor who substitutes at a court proceeding for another prosecutor assigned to the case should make reasonable efforts to be adequately informed about the case and issues likely to come up at the proceeding, and to adequately prepare.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor handling any court appearance should document what happens at the proceeding, to aid the prosecutor’s later memory and so that necessary information will be available to other prosecutors who may handle the case in the future.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should take steps to ensure that any court order issued to the prosecution is transmitted to the appropriate persons necessary to effectuate the order.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor’s office should be provided sufficient resources and be organized to permit adequate preparation for court proceedings.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.4 Identification and Disclosure of Information and Evidence</b></h2>
<h3><b></b> (a) <span style="color: #ff0000;">After charges are filed if not before, the prosecutor should diligently seek to identify all information in the possession of the prosecution or its agents that tends to <em><span style="color: #339966;">negate the guilt of the accused</span></em></span><span style="color: #339966;">,</span> mitigate the offense charged, <em><span style="color: #339966;">impeach the government’s witnesses or evidence</span></em>, or reduce the likely punishment of the accused if convicted.</h3>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should diligently advise other governmental agencies involved in the case of their continuing duty to identify, preserve, and disclose to the prosecutor information described in (a) above.</p>
<p>(c) Before trial of a criminal case, a prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the defense of information described in (a) above that is known to the prosecutor, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes it is likely to change the result of the proceeding, unless relieved of this responsibility by a court’s protective order. (Regarding discovery prior to a guilty plea, see Standard 3-5.6(f) below.) A prosecutor should not intentionally attempt to obscure information disclosed pursuant to this standard by including it without identification within a larger volume of materials.</p>
<p>(d) The obligations to identify and disclose such information continue throughout the prosecution of a criminal case.</p>
<p>(e) A prosecutor should timely respond to legally proper discovery requests, and make a diligent effort to comply with legally proper disclosure obligations, unless otherwise authorized by a court. When the defense makes requests for specific information, the prosecutor should provide specific responses rather than merely a general acknowledgement of discovery obligations. Requests and responses should be tailored to the case and “boilerplate” requests and responses should be disfavored.</p>
<h3>(f) <span style="color: #339966;">The prosecutor should make prompt efforts to identify and disclose to the defense any physical evidence that has been gathered in the investigation, and provide the defense a reasonable opportunity to examine it.</span></h3>
<h3>(g) <span style="color: #339966;">A prosecutor should not avoid pursuit of information or evidence because the prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution&#8217;s case or aid the accused.</span></h3>
<p>(h) A prosecutor should determine whether additional statutes, rules or caselaw may govern or restrict the disclosure of information, and comply with these authorities absent court order.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.5   Preservation of Information and Evidence</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to preserve, and direct the prosecutor’s agents to preserve, relevant materials during and after a criminal case, including</p>
<p>(i) evidence relevant to investigations as well as prosecutions, whether or not admitted at trial;</p>
<p>(ii) information identified pursuant to Standard 3-5.4(a); and</p>
<p>(iii) other materials necessary to support significant decisions made and conclusions reached by the prosecution in the course of an investigation and prosecution.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor’s office should develop policies regarding the method and duration of preservation of such materials. Such policies should be consistent with applicable rules and laws (such as public records laws) in the jurisdiction. These policies, and individual preservation decisions, should consider the character and seriousness of each case, the character of the particular evidence or information, the likelihood of further challenges to judgments following conviction, and the resources available for preservation. Physical evidence should be preserved so as to reasonably preserve its forensic characteristics and utility.</p>
<p>(c) Materials should be preserved at least until a criminal case is finally resolved or is final on appeal and the time for further appeal has expired. In felony cases, materials should be preserved until post-conviction litigation is concluded or time-limits have expired. In death penalty cases, information should be preserved until the penalty is carried out or is precluded.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should comply with additional statutes, rules or caselaw that may govern the preservation of evidence.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.6 Conduct of Negotiated Disposition Discussions</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <span style="color: #3366ff;">The prosecutor should be open, at every stage of a criminal matter, to discussions with defense counsel concerning disposition of charges by guilty plea or other negotiated disposition.</span></h3>
<p>(b) A prosecutor should not engage in disposition discussions directly with a represented defendant, except with defense counsel&#8217;s approval. Where a defendant has properly waived counsel, the prosecutor may engage in disposition discussions with the defendant, and should make and preserve a record of such discussions.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not enter into a disposition agreement before having information sufficient to assess the defendant’s actual culpability. The prosecutor should consider collateral consequences of a conviction before entering into a disposition agreement. The prosecutor should consider factors listed in Standard 3-4.4(a), and not be influenced in disposition discussions by inappropriate factors such as those listed in Standards 3-1.6 and 3-4.4(b).</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should not set unreasonably short deadlines, or demand conditions for a disposition, that are so coercive that the voluntariness of a plea or the effectiveness of defense counsel is put into question. A prosecutor may, however, set a reasonable deadline before trial or hearing for acceptance of a disposition offer.</p>
<h3>(e)<span style="color: #339966;"> A prosecutor should not knowingly make false statements of fact or law in the course of disposition discussions.</span></h3>
<p>(f) Before entering into a disposition agreement, the prosecutor should disclose to the defense a factual basis sufficient to support the charges in the proposed agreement, and information currently known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is likely to reduce punishment.</p>
<h3>(g)<span style="color: #3366ff;"> A prosecutor should not agree to a guilty plea if the prosecutor reasonably believes that sufficient admissible evidence to support conviction beyond reasonable doubt would be lacking if the matter went to trial.</span></h3>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.7 Establishing and Fulfilling Conditions of Negotiated Dispositions</b></h2>
<p>(a) A prosecutor should not demand terms in a negotiated disposition agreement that are unlawful or in violation of public policy.</p>
<p>(b)<strong><span style="color: #3366ff;"> The prosecutor may properly promise the defense that the prosecutor will or will not take a particular position concerning sentence and conditions.</span></strong> The prosecutor should not, however, imply a greater power to influence the disposition of a case than is actually possessed.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should memorialize all promises and conditions that are part of the agreement, and ensure that any written disposition agreement accurately and completely reflects the precise terms of the agreement including the prosecutor’s promises and the defendant’s obligations. At any court hearing to finalize a negotiated disposition, the prosecutor should ensure that all relevant details of the agreement have been placed on the record. The presumption is that the hearing and record will be public, but in some cases the hearing or record (or a portion) may be sealed for good cause.</p>
<p>(d) Once a disposition agreement is final and accepted by the court, <strong><span style="color: #3366ff;">the prosecutor should comply with, and make good faith efforts to have carried out, the government’s obligations.</span> </strong>The prosecutor should construe agreement conditions, and evaluate the defendant’s performance including any cooperation, in a good-faith and reasonable manner.</p>
<p>(e) If the prosecutor believes that a defendant has breached an agreement that has been accepted by the court, the prosecutor should notify the defense regarding the prosecutor’s belief and any intended adverse action. If the defense presents a good-faith disagreement and the parties cannot quickly resolve it, the prosecutor should not act before judicial resolution.</p>
<p>(f) If the prosecutor reasonably believes that a court is acting inconsistently with any term of a negotiated disposition, the prosecutor should raise the matter with the court.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-5.8 Waiver of Rights as Condition of Disposition Agreements </b></h2>
<p>(a) A prosecutor should not condition a disposition agreement on a waiver of the right to appeal the terms of a sentence which exceeds an agreed-upon or reasonably anticipated sentence. Any waiver of appeal of sentence should be comparably binding on the defendant and the prosecution.</p>
<p>(b) A prosecutor should not suggest or require, as a condition of a disposition agreement, any waiver of post-conviction claims addressing ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or destruction of evidence, unless such claims are based on past instances of such conduct that are specifically identified in the agreement or in the transcript of proceedings that address the agreement. If a proposed disposition agreement contains such a waiver regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecutor should ensure that the defendant has been provided the opportunity to consult with independent counsel regarding the waiver before agreeing to the disposition.</p>
<p>(c) A prosecutor may propose or require other sorts of waivers on an individualized basis if the defendant’s agreement is knowing and voluntary. No waivers of any kind should be accepted without an exception for manifest injustice based on newly-discovered evidence, or actual innocence.</p>
<p>(d) Although certain claims may have been waived, a prosecutor should not condition a disposition agreement on a complete waiver of the right to file a habeas corpus or other comparable post-conviction petition.</p>
<p>(e) A prosecutor should not request or rely on waivers to hide an injustice or material flaw in the case which is undisclosed to the defense.</p>
<hr />
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><b>Standard 3-5.9 Record of Reasons for Dismissal of Charges</b></span></h2>
<p>When criminal charges are dismissed on the prosecution’s motion, including by plea of <i>nolle prosequi </i>or its equivalent, the prosecutor should make and retain an appropriate record of the reasons for the dismissal, and indicate on the record whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.</p>
<h2><b>PART VI: COURT HEARINGS AND TRIAL</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.1    Scheduling Court Hearings</b></h2>
<p>Final control over the scheduling of court appearances, hearings and trials in criminal matters should rest with the court rather than the parties. When the prosecutor is aware of facts that would affect scheduling, the prosecutor should advise the court and, if the facts are case-specific, defense counsel.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.2    Civility With Courts, Opposing Counsel, and Others</b></h2>
<h3>(a) As an officer of the court, <span style="color: #3366ff;">the prosecutor</span> should support the authority of the court and the <span style="color: #ff0000;">dignity of the courtroom</span> by <span style="color: #3366ff;">adherence to codes</span> of <span style="color: #339966;">professionalism and civility</span>, and by manifesting a professional and courteous attitude toward the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses, <span style="color: #ff0000;">defendants</span>, jurors, court staff and others. In court as elsewhere, the prosecutor should not display or act out of any <span style="color: #ff0000;">improper or unlawful bias.</span></h3>
<p>(b) When court is in session, unless otherwise permitted by the court, the prosecutor should address the court and not address other counsel or the defendant directly on any matter related to the case.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should comply promptly and civilly with a court’s orders or seek appropriate relief from such order. If the prosecutor considers an order to be significantly erroneous or prejudicial, the prosecutor should ensure that the record adequately reflects the events. The prosecutor has a right to make respectful objections and reasonable requests for reconsideration, and to seek other relief as the law permits. If a judge prohibits making an adequate objection, proffer, or record, the prosecutor may take other lawful steps to protect the public interest.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.3 Selection of Jurors</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor’s office should be aware of legal standards that govern the selection of jurors, and train prosecutors to comply. The prosecutor should prepare to effectively discharge the prosecution function in the selection of the jury, including exercising challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. The prosecutor’s office should also be aware of the process used to select and summon the jury pool and bring legal deficiencies to the attention of the court.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should not strike jurors based on any criteria rendered impermissible by the constitution, statutes, applicable rules of the jurisdiction, or these standards, including race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity. The prosecutor should consider contesting a defense counsel’s peremptory challenges that appear to be based upon such criteria.</p>
<p>(c) In cases in which the prosecutor conducts a pretrial investigation of the background of potential jurors, the investigative methods used should not harass, intimidate, or unduly embarrass or invade the privacy of potential jurors. Absent special circumstances, such investigation should be restricted to review of records and sources of information already in existence and to which access is lawfully allowed. If the prosecutor uses record searches that are unavailable to the defense, such as criminal record databases, the prosecutor should share the results with defense counsel or seek a judicial protective order.</p>
<p>(d) The opportunity to question jurors personally should be used solely to obtain information relevant to the well-informed exercise of challenges. The prosecutor should not seek to commit jurors on factual issues likely to arise in the case, and should not intentionally present arguments, facts or evidence which the prosecutor reasonably should know will not be admissible at trial. Voir dire should not be used to argue the prosecutor’s case to the jury, or to unduly ingratiate counsel with the jurors.</p>
<p>(e) During voir dire, the prosecutor should seek to minimize any undue embarrassment or invasion of privacy of potential jurors, for example by seeking to inquire into sensitive matters outside the presence of other potential jurors, while still enabling fair and efficient juror selection.</p>
<p>(f) If the court does not permit voir dire by counsel, the prosecutor should provide the court with suggested questions in advance, and request specific follow-up questions during the selection process when necessary to ensure fair juror selection.</p>
<p>(g) If the prosecutor has reliable information that conflicts with a potential juror’s responses, or that reasonably would support a “for cause” challenge by any party, the prosecutor should inform the court and, unless the court orders otherwise, defense counsel.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.4 Relationship With Jurors</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should not communicate with persons the prosecutor knows to be summoned for jury duty or impaneled as jurors, before or during trial, other than in the lawful conduct of courtroom proceedings. The prosecutor should avoid even the appearance of improper communications with jurors, and minimize any out-of-court proximity to or contact with jurors. Where out-of-court contact cannot be avoided, the prosecutor should not communicate about or refer to the specific case.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should treat jurors with courtesy and respect, while avoiding a show of undue solicitude for their comfort or convenience.</p>
<p>(c) After discharge of a juror, a prosecutor should avoid contacts that may harass or embarrass the juror, that criticize the jury’s actions or verdict, or that express views that could otherwise adversely influence the juror’s future jury service. The prosecutor should know and comply with applicable rules and law governing the subject.</p>
<p>(d) After a jury is discharged, the prosecutor may, if no statute, rule, or order prohibits such action, communicate with jurors to investigate whether a verdict may be subject to legal challenge, or to evaluate the prosecution’s performance for improvement in the future. The prosecutor should consider requesting the court to instruct the jury that, if it is not prohibited by law, it is not improper for jurors to discuss the case with the lawyers, although they are not required to do so. Any post-discharge communication with a juror should not disparage the criminal justice system and the jury trial process, and should not express criticism of the jury’s actions or verdict.</p>
<p>(e) A prosecutor who learns reasonably reliable information that there was a problem with jury deliberations or conduct that could support an attack on a judgment of conviction and that is recognized as potentially valid in the jurisdiction, should promptly report that information to the appropriate judicial officer and, unless the court orders otherwise, defense counsel.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.5 Opening Statement at Trial</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should give an opening statement before the presentation of evidence begins.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor’s opening statement at trial should be confined to a fair statement of the case from the prosecutor’s perspective, and discussion of evidence that the prosecutor reasonably believes will be available, offered and admitted to support the prosecution case. The prosecutor’s opening should avoid speculating about what defenses might be raised by the defense unless the prosecutor knows they will be raised.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor’s opening statement should be made without expressions of personal opinion, vouching for witnesses, inappropriate appeals to emotion or personal attacks on opposing counsel. The prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any comment on a defendant’s right to remain silent.</p>
<p>(d) When the prosecutor has reason to believe that a portion of the opening statement may be objectionable, the prosecutor should raise that point with defense counsel and, if necessary, the court, in advance. Similarly, visual aids or exhibits that the prosecutor intends to use during opening statement should be shown to defense counsel in advance.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.6 Presentation of Evidence</b></h2>
<h3>(a) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should not offer evidence that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses.</span> <span style="color: #339966;">When a prosecutor has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of particular evidence</span>,<span style="color: #3366ff;"> the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to determine that the evidence is reliable, or not present it.</span></h3>
<h3>(b) <span style="color: #3366ff;">If the prosecutor reasonably believes there has been misconduct by</span> opposing counsel, <span style="color: #3366ff;">a witness,</span> the court or other persons that affects the fair presentation of the evidence,<span style="color: #ff0000;"> the prosecutor should challenge the perceived misconduct by appealing or objecting to the court or through other appropriate avenues</span>, and not by engaging in retaliatory conduct that the prosecutor knows to be improper.</h3>
<h3>(c) <span style="color: #ff0000;">During the trial, if the prosecutor discovers that false evidence or testimony has been introduced by the prosecution, the prosecutor should take reasonable remedial steps.</span> If the witness is still on the stand, <span style="color: #ff0000;">the prosecutor should attempt to correct the error</span> through further examination. If the falsity remains uncorrected or is not discovered until the witness is off the stand, the prosecutor should notify the court and opposing counsel for determination of an appropriate remedy.</h3>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should not bring to the attention of the trier of fact matters that the prosecutor knows to be inadmissible, whether by offering or displaying inadmissible evidence, asking legally objectionable questions, or making impermissible comments or arguments. If the prosecutor is uncertain about the admissibility of evidence, the prosecutor should seek and obtain resolution from the court before the hearing or trial if possible, and reasonably in advance of the time for proffering the evidence before a jury.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should exercise strategic judgment regarding whether to object or take exception to evidentiary rulings that are materially adverse to the prosecution, and not make every possible objection. The prosecutor should not make objections without a reasonable basis, or for improper reasons such as to harass or to break the flow of opposing counsel’s presentation. The prosecutor should make an adequate record for appeal, and consider the possibility of an interlocutory appeal regarding significant adverse rulings if available.</p>
<p>(f) The prosecutor should not display tangible evidence (and should object to such display by the defense) until it is admitted into evidence, except insofar as its display is necessarily incidental to its tender, although the prosecutor may seek permission to display admissible evidence during opening statement. The prosecutor should avoid displaying even admitted evidence in a manner that is unduly prejudicial.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.7 Examination of Witnesses in Court</b></h2>
<p><b></b>(a) The prosecutor should conduct the examination of witnesses fairly and with due regard for dignity and legitimate privacy concerns, and without seeking to intimidate or humiliate a witness unnecessarily.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should not use cross-examination to discredit or undermine a witness’s testimony, if the prosecutor knows the testimony to be truthful and accurate.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not call a witness to testify in the presence of the jury, or require the defense to do so, when the prosecutor knows the witness will claim a valid privilege not to testify. If the prosecutor is unsure whether a particular witness will claim a privilege to not testify, the prosecutor should alert the court and defense counsel in advance and outside the presence of the jury.</p>
<p>(d) The prosecutor should not ask a question that implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith belief is lacking.</p>
<h2><b>Standard <a id="BM_5_8" name="BM_5_8"></a>3-6.8 Closing Arguments to the Trier of Fact</b></h2>
<p>(a) In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), the prosecutor should present arguments and a fair summary of the evidence that proves the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record, unless the prosecutor knows an inference to be false. The prosecutor should, to the extent time permits, review the evidence in the record before presenting closing argument. The prosecutor should not knowingly misstate the evidence in the record, or argue inferences that the prosecutor knows have no good-faith support in the record. The prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any reference to a defendant’s decision not to testify.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should not argue in terms of counsel’s personal opinion, and should not imply special or secret knowledge of the truth or of witness credibility.</p>
<p>(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to improper prejudices of the trier of fact. The prosecutor should make only those arguments that are consistent with the trier’s duty to decide the case on the evidence, and should not seek to divert the trier from that duty.</p>
<p>(d) If the prosecutor presents rebuttal argument, the prosecutor may respond fairly to arguments made in the defense closing argument, but should not present or raise new issues. If the prosecutor believes the defense closing argument is or was improper, the prosecutor should timely object and request relief from the court, rather than respond with arguments that the prosecutor knows are improper.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.9 <span style="color: #ff0000;">Facts Outside the Record</span></b></h2>
<p>When before a jury, the prosecutor should not knowingly refer to, or argue on the basis of, facts outside the record, unless such facts are matters of common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience, or are matters of which a court clearly may take judicial notice, or are facts the prosecutor reasonably believes will be entered into the record at that proceeding. In a nonjury context the prosecutor may refer to extra-record facts relevant to issues about which the court specifically inquires, but should note that they are outside the record.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-6.10 Comments by Prosecutor After Verdict or Ruling</b></h2>
<p>(a)<em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"> The prosecutor should respectfully accept acquittals.</span></strong></em> Regarding other adverse rulings (including the rare acquittal by a judge that is appealable), while the prosecutor may publicly express respectful disagreement and an intention to pursue lawful options for review, the prosecutor should refrain from public criticism of any participant.  Public comments after a verdict or ruling should be respectful of the legal system and process.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor may publicly praise a jury verdict or court ruling, compliment government agents or others who aided in the matter, and note the social value of the ruling or event. The prosecutor should not publicly gloat or seek personal aggrandizement regarding a verdict or ruling.</p>
<h2><b>PART VII: POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND SENTENCING</b></h2>
<h2><b>Standard 3-7.1 Post-trial Motions </b></h2>
<p>The prosecutor should conduct a fair evaluation of post-trial motions, determine their merit, and respond accordingly and respectfully. The prosecutor should not oppose motions at any stage without a reasonable basis for doing so.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-7.2 Sentencing</b></h2>
<p>(a) The severity of sentences imposed should not be used as a measure of a prosecutor’s effectiveness.</p>
<p>(b) <span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should be familiar with relevant sentencing laws, rules, consequences and options, including alternative non-imprisonment sentences.</span> Before or soon after charges are filed, and throughout the pendency of the case, the prosecutor should evaluate potential consequences of the prosecution and available sentencing options, such as forfeiture, restitution, and immigration effects, and be prepared to actively advise the court in sentencing.</p>
<p>(c) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The prosecutor should seek to assure that a fair and informed sentencing judgment is made, and to avoid unfair sentences and disparities.</span></strong></p>
<p>(d) In the interests of uniformity, the prosecutor’s office should develop consistent policies for evaluating and making sentencing recommendations, and not leave complete discretion for sentencing policy to individual prosecutors.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor should know the relevant laws and rules regarding victims’ rights, and facilitate victim participation in the sentencing process as the law requires or permits.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-7.3 Information Relevant to Sentencing</b></h2>
<p>(a) The prosecutor should assist the court in obtaining complete and accurate information for use in sentencing, and should cooperate fully with the court’s and staff’s presentence investigations. The prosecutor should provide any information that the prosecution believes is relevant to the sentencing to the court and to defense counsel. A record of such information provided to the court and counsel should be made, so that it may be reviewed later if necessary. If material incompleteness or inaccuracy in a presentence report comes to the prosecutor&#8217;s attention, the prosecutor should take steps to present the complete and correct information to the court and defense counsel.</p>
<p>(b) The prosecutor should disclose to the defense and to the court, at or before the sentencing proceeding, all information that tends to mitigate the sentence and is known to the prosecutor, unless the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a court order.</p>
<p>(c) Prior to sentencing, the prosecutor should disclose to the defense any evidence or information it provides, whether by document or orally, to the court or presentence investigator in aid of sentencing, unless contrary to law or rule in the jurisdiction or a protective order has been sought.</p>
<hr />
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">Rule 3.8 $</span>pecial Re<span style="color: #339966;">$</span>pon<span style="color: #339966;">$</span>ibilitie<span style="color: #339966;">$</span> of a Pro<span style="color: #339966;">$</span>ecutor</span></h2>
<blockquote><p><em><strong>Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</strong></em></p></blockquote>
<p><em><strong>The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:</strong></em></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong><em>(a) not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows* is not</em> supported by probable cause;</strong></span></li>
<li>(b) make reasonable* efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable* opportunity to obtain counsel;</li>
<li>(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal* has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;</li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known* to</span> the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows* or reasonably should know* tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;* and</strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(e) exercise reasonable* care to prevent persons* under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons* assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 3.6.</span></strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(f) When a prosecutor knows* of new, credible and material evidence creating a </span></strong><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">reasonable* likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of </span></strong><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:</span></strong>
<ul>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and</span></strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,</span></strong></em>
<ul>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court</span></strong></em><br />
<em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">authorizes delay, and</span></strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable* efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.</span></strong></em></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">(g) When a prosecutor knows* of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.</span></strong> The repealed prior version of this rule that was effective from November 1, 2018 to May 31, 2020, and the Executive Summary concerning those amendments can be found here.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Comment</strong><br />
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.* This rule is intended to achieve those results. All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3.1 and 3.4.</p>
<p>[2] Paragraph (c) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly* waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (c) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable* waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused’s voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.</p>
<p>[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (d) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by<em><strong> Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194]</strong></em> and its progeny. For example, these obligations include, at a minimum, the<br />
duty to disclose impeachment evidence or information that a prosecutor knows* or reasonably should know* casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (d) does not<br />
require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (d) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.</p>
<p>[4] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal* if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial* harm to an individual or to the public interest.</p>
<p>[5] Paragraph (e) supplements rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial* likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (e) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).</p>
<p>[6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rules 5.1 and 5.3.) Ordinarily, the reasonable* care standard of paragraph (e) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate<br />
cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.</p>
<p>[7] When a prosecutor knows* of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable* likelihood that a person* outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person* did not commit, paragraph (f) requires prompt disclosure to  the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (f) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable* efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 4.2.) Statutes may require a prosecutor to preserve certain types of evidence in criminal matters. <strong><em>(See Pen. Code, §§ 1417.1-1417.9.)</em> </strong>In addition, prosecutors must obey file preservation orders concerning rights of discovery guaranteed by the Constitution and statutory provisions. <strong><em>(See People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2</em> Cal.5th 523 [213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581]; Shorts v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 709 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 392].)</strong></p>
<p>[8] Under paragraph (g), once the prosecutor knows* of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the<br />
circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.</p>
<p>[9] A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (f) and (g), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this rule. <a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_3.8.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<hr />
<h2><b>PART VIII: APPEALS AND OTHER CONVICTION CHALLENGES  </b></h2>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><b>Standard 3-8.1 Duty To Defend Conviction Not Absolute </b></span></h2>
<p>The prosecutor has a duty to defend convictions obtained after fair process. This duty is not absolute, however, and the prosecutor should temper the duty to defend with independent professional judgment and discretion. The prosecutor should not defend a conviction if the prosecutor believes the defendant is innocent or was wrongfully convicted, or that a miscarriage of justice associated with the conviction has occurred.<b></b></p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-8.2 Appeals &#8212; General Principles  </b></h2>
<p>(a)<strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"> All prosecutors should be sufficiently knowledgeable about appellate practice to be able to make a record sufficient to preserve issues and arguments for appeal, and should make such a record at the trial court level.</span></strong></p>
<p>(b) When the prosecutor receives an adverse ruling, the prosecutor should consider whether it may be appealed. If the ruling may be appealed, the prosecutor should consider whether an appeal should be filed, and refer it to an appellate prosecutor if appropriate for decision.</p>
<p>(c) When considering whether an adverse ruling should be appealed, the prosecutor should evaluate not only the legal merits, but also whether it is in the interests of justice to pursue such an appeal, taking into account the benefits to the prosecution, the judicial system, and the public, as well as the costs of the appellate process and of delay to the prosecution, defendant, victims and witnesses.</p>
<p>(d) A prosecutor handling a criminal appeal should know the specific rules, practices and procedures that govern appeals in the jurisdiction.</p>
<p>(e) The prosecutor’s office should designate one or more prosecutors in the office to develop expertise regarding appellate law and procedure, and should develop contacts with other offices’ prosecutors who have such expertise. The prosecutor’s office should develop consistent policies and positions regarding issues that are common or recurring in the appellate process or court. The prosecutor’s office should regularly notify its prosecutors and law enforcement agents about new developments in the law or judicial decisions, and should provide regular training to such personnel on such topics.</p>
<p>(f) A prosecutor handling a criminal appeal who was not counsel in the trial court should consult with the trial prosecutor, but should exercise independent judgment in reviewing the record and the defense arguments. The appellate prosecutor should not make or oppose arguments in an appeal without a reasonable legal basis.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-8.3 Responses to New or Newly-Discovered Evidence or Law</b></h2>
<blockquote>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;">If a prosecutor learns of credible and material information creating a reasonable likelihood that a defendant was wrongfully convicted or sentenced or is actually innocent, the prosecutor should comply with ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h). The prosecutor’s office should develop policies and procedures to address such information, and take actions that are consistent with applicable law, rules, and the duty to pursue justice.</span></h3>
</blockquote>
<h2><b>Standard 3-8.4 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Defense Counsel  </b></h2>
<p>(a) In any post-conviction challenge to the effectiveness of defense counsel, the prosecutor should be cognizant of the defendant’s potential attorney-client privilege with former defense counsel as well as former defense counsel’s other ethical or legal obligations, and not seek to abrogate such privileges or obligations without an unambiguous legal basis, or court order.</p>
<p>(b) If a prosecutor observes, at any stage of a criminal proceeding, defense counsel conduct or omission that might reasonably constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to preserve the defendant’s right to effective assistance as well as the public’s interest in obtaining a valid conviction, while not intruding on a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. During an ongoing defense representation, the prosecutor should not express concerns regarding possible ineffective assistance on the public record without an unambiguous legal basis or court order, and should not communicate any such concerns directly to the defendant.</p>
<h2><b>Standard 3-8.5 Collateral Attacks on Conviction </b></h2>
<p>If required to respond to a collateral attack on a conviction, the prosecutor should consider all lawful responses, including applicable procedural or other defenses. The prosecutor need not, however, invoke every possible defense to a collateral attack, and should consider potential negotiated dispositions or other remedies, if the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s office reasonably conclude that the interests of justice are thereby served.</p>
<p>sourced <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/</a></p>
<hr />
<h2>Rule 3-110 <span style="color: #ff0000;">Failing to Act Competently</span></h2>
<h3 class="standard">(A) <span style="color: #ff0000;">A member shall not intentionally, <span style="color: #339966;">recklessly</span>, or <span style="color: #3366ff;">repeatedly fail</span> to perform legal services with <span style="color: #339966;">competence</span>.</span></h3>
<p class="standard">(B) For purposes of this rule, &#8220;competence&#8221; in any legal service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.</p>
<p class="standard">(C) If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required.</p>
<p><strong><em>Discussion:</em></strong></p>
<p class="standard">The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. <em><strong>(See, e.g., Waysman v. State Bar (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; Trousil v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; Palomo v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; Crane v. State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; Vaughn v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; Moore v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)</strong></em></p>
<p class="standard">In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances. (Amended by order of Supreme Court, operative September 14, 1992.) <a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Previous-Rules/Rule-3-110#:~:text=(A)%20A%20member%20shall%20not,perform%20legal%20services%20with%20competence." target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 36pt; color: #ff0000;">Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</span></h1>
<h1>Rule 5-110<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Special Responsibilities</span> of a Prosecutor</h1>
<h2><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em>Rules of Professional Conduct</em></span></h2>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;">Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</span></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>(Rule approved by the Supreme Court, effective Nov. 2, 2017)</p>
<p>The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:</p>
<ul>
<li>(A) <strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</span></strong></li>
<li>(B) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;</li>
<li>(C) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;</li>
<li>(D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and</li>
<li>(E) Exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 5-120.</li>
<li><strong><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">(F) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:</span></em></strong>
<ul>
<li>(1) <strong><span style="color: #339966;">Promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and</span></strong></li>
<li>(2) If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
<ul>
<li>(a) Promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and</li>
<li>(b) Undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>(G) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><em>Discussion:</em></strong></p>
<ul>
<li>[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons. <strong>Rule 5-110</strong> <strong>is intended to achieve those results.</strong> <strong><em>All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3-200 and 5-220.</em></strong></li>
<li>[2] Paragraph (C) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (C) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused’s voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.</li>
<li>[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by <em>Brady v. Maryland</em> (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S. Ct. 1194] and its progeny. For example, these obligations include, at a minimum, the duty to disclose impeachment evidence or information that a prosecutor knows or reasonably should know casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (D) does not require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (D) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.</li>
<li>[4] The exception in paragraph (D) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.</li>
<li>[5] Paragraph (E) supplements rule 5-120, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (E) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 5-120(B) or 5-120(C).</li>
<li>[6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rule 3-110, Discussion.) Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard of paragraph (E) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.</li>
<li>[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (F) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (F) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 2-100.)</li>
<li>[8] Under paragraph (G), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.</li>
<li>[9] A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (F) and (G), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of rule 5-110. (Amended by order of Supreme Court, operative Nov. 2, 2017.)</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Previous-Rules/Rule-5-110">https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Previous-Rules/Rule-5-110</a></p>
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<h2 class="post-title" style="text-align: center;">Five Ethics Rules Every Prosecutor Should Know</h2>
<p><strong>1. In addition to a prosecutor’s constitutional and statutory duties to disclose evidence, a prosecutor must, after making a reasonably diligent inquiry, timely disclose to the defense all evidence all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense.</strong> <em>See</em> North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(d), <em>Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</em>.</p>
<p>How does this rule differ from a prosecutor’s constitutional obligation pursuant to <em>Brady v. Maryland</em>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and <em>Kyles v. Whitley</em>, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), to learn of and disclose to the defendant materially favorable evidence? The ethical requirement is broader. That is because, unlike a prosecutor’s due process obligation, the ethics rule does not include a materiality requirement. <em>North Carolina State Bar v. Brewer</em>, 05 DHC 37 Reprimand at 26 n.9 (April 4, 2008) (citing Richard A. Rosen, <em>Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger</em>, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 714 (1987) (noting that to fulfill ethical obligations under modern ethics codes “the prosecutor must disclose all exculpatory evidence . . . whether or not the evidence presented or omitted is important enough, in the context of all of the evidence presented at trial, to warrant a reversal of the conviction”; concluding that “[a]n ethical violation can, and often will, be present even when due process is not violated.”).</p>
<p>Rule 3.8(d) also requires a prosecutor, in connection with sentencing, to disclose to the defendant and the court “all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,” unless disclosure is barred by a protective order.</p>
<p>And a prosecutor’s disclosure duties do not end with a conviction. When a prosecutor knows of new, credible information that creates a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense for which the defendant was convicted, Rule 3.8(g) requires the prosecutor to disclose that information to the defendant or the defendant’s counsel and the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services (or the federal public defender if a federal conviction).</p>
<p><strong>2</strong>. <strong>A prosecutor may not prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.</strong> <em>See</em> North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a), <em>Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</em>. Thus, if a trial court enters an order suppressing evidence that bars the prosecutor from establishing probable cause that a crime occurred, the only proper course of action is for the prosecutor to dismiss the charge. Likewise, a prosecutor may not seek the filing of charges that are precluded by established law. <em>See</em> <em>North Carolina State Bar v. Paul</em>, 12 DHC 33 (October 17, 2012) (suspending assistant district attorney from the practice of law for one year for instructing law enforcement to seek warrants for charges that she should have known were precluded by established law). The State Bar cautioned in <em>Paul</em>: “It is imperative to the proper administration of justice that prosecutors maintain objectivity and exercise their powers cautiously. Even the best of intentions is insufficient to justify causing a person to be arrested on charges unsupported by law.” <em>Id</em>.</p>
<p><strong>3. A prosecutor may not offer special treatment to a person charged with a crime in exchange for a charitable contribution.</strong> While a prosecutor may engage in plea negotiations with a defendant, including negotiations that require a defendant to pay statutorily-authorized restitution, a prosecutor may not reduce or dismiss charges or seek prayers for judgment continued (PJCs) in exchange for a charitable contribution. <em>See</em> RPC 204, <em>Prosecutor’s Offer of Special Treatment to Defendants Who Make Charitable Contributions</em> (July 21, 1995) (ruling that it is prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to offer special treatment to individuals charged with traffic offenses or minor crimes in exchange for a direct charitable contribution to the local school system). The State Bar has explained that “[t]he offer of special treatment from a prosecutor to individuals charged with traffic violations or minor criminal offenses in exchange for direct donations to even the most worthy charity implies that justice can be purchased.” <em>Id.</em> This type of conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice and contravenes a prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, not merely to convict. <em>Id.</em></p>
<p><strong>4. A prosecutor may not intentionally fail to inform the court of prior convictions that affect a defendant’s sentence.</strong> <em>See</em> 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 5, <em>Participating in Misrepresentation of Prior Record Level in Sentencing Proceeding</em>. To so misinform the court would violate a prosecutor’s duty under Rule 3.3 of candor toward the tribunal. Moreover, a prosecutor may not under-report a defendant’s criminal history even with the permission of the court. 2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 5 (explaining that a prosecutor may not collude with a judge to avoid the requirements of the Structured Sentencing Act; such conduct violates Rule 8.4 as it involves dishonesty and misrepresentation, is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and knowingly assists a judge in violating the rules of judicial conduct).</p>
<p><strong>5. A prosecutor should not publicly comment before trial on the possibility that the defendant will plead guilty, the results of any examinations or tests, the contents of any statement given by the defendant, or the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of the defendant <em>or</em> a witness. </strong>And, while a prosecutor may publicly state that a named defendant has been charged with a crime, the prosecutor should include a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/rules-of-professional-conduct/rule-36-trial-publicity/">Rule 3.6</a> prohibits an attorney, including a prosecutor, from making an extrajudicial statement that the attorney knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. The commentary to the rule recognizes that, of all such proceedings, criminal jury trials are the most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Rule 3.6(a) sets forth a safe harbor for extrajudicial speech, permitting prosecutors to state the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li>
<li>(2) the information contained in a public record;</li>
<li>(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li>
<li>(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li>
<li>(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li>
<li>(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;</li>
<li>(7) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li>
<li>(8) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li>
<li>(9) the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li>
<li>(10) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The commentary to Rule 3.6 lists “certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding,” particularly when they refer to a criminal matter. These subjects include commentary relating to:</p>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a suspect or witness in a criminal investigation, the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a witness;</li>
<li>(2) the possibility of a guilty plea or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li>
<li>(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; and</li>
<li>(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.</li>
</ul>
<p>The commentary notes that a prosecutor may state the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, but notes that such a statement is likely to have a material prejudicial effect unless it is accompanied by a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.<a href="https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/five-ethics-rules-every-prosecutor-should-know/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<hr />
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">7A-66. Removal of district attorneys.</span></h1>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">The Prosecutor&#8217;s Duty to Truth</span></h1>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<h1>CACI No. 425. “Gross Negligence” Explained<br />
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2023 edition)<iframe title="CACI No. 425. “Gross Negligence” Explained" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/trials-litigation-caci.pdf#page=352" width="1300" height="1100"><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></h1>
<hr />
<h1>Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009<iframe title="Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Preventable-Error_-A-Report-on-Prosecutorial-Misconduct-in-Califo.pdf" width="1300" height="1100"><span data-mce-type="bookmark" style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></h1>
<hr />
<h1><span style="color: #ff0000;">The Prosecutor&#8217;s Duty t s Duty to Truth</span><br />
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn more about these sujects</span></h3>
<ul>
<li><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Malicious Prosecution</span></strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Prosecutional Misconduct</span></strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Vindictive Prosecution</span></strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Retaliatory Prosecution </span></strong></li>
<li><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Abuse of Process</span></strong></li>
</ul>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/selected-issues-in-malicious-prosecution-cases/">Selected Issues in Malicious Prosecution Cases</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/malicious-prosecution-prosecutorial-misconduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Malicious Prosecution / </strong>Prosecutorial Misconduct</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/vindictive-prosecution-georgetown-university/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Vindictive Prosecution &#8211; Georgetown University</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/vindictive-and-selective-prosecution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">VINDICTIVE AND SELECTIVE PROSECUTION</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-abuse-of-process-when-the-government-fails-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">What is Abuse of Process?</span></a></h3>
<h3 class="entry-title"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/defeating-extortion-and-abuse-of-process-in-all-their-ugly-disguises/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises</a></h3>
<h3 class="entry-header"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/whats-the-difference-between-abuse-of-process-malicious-prosecution-and-false-arrest/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">What’s the Difference</span> between <span style="color: #ff0000;">Abuse of Process</span> and <span style="color: #ff0000;">Malicious Prosecution</span>?</a></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/malicious-prosecution-actions-arising-out-of-family-law-proceedings-proceed-carefully/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Malicious Prosecution Actions Arising Out Of Family Law Proceedings: Proceed Carefully</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/frivolous-meritless-or-malicious-prosecution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution</a></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3 class="entry-title"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/scotus-makes-it-easier-to-sue-police-and-prosecutors-for-malicious-prosecution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">SCOTUS Makes It Easier To Sue Police And Prosecutors For Malicious Prosecution</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutional-misconduct-scotus-rulings-re-prosecutors/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecutional Misconduct &#8211; SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/national-district-attorneys-association-national-prosecution-standards-ndda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National District Attorneys Association &#8211; National Prosecution Standards &#8211; NDDA</a></h3>
<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/when-the-prosecution-drops-charges/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What Happens If Charges Are Dropped Before Trial?</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/functions-and-duties-of-the-prosecutor-prosecution-conduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor &#8211; Prosecution Conduct</a></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Possible courses of action</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/possible-courses-of-action-prosecutorial-misconduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecutorial <span style="color: #339966;">Misconduct</span></a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Misconduct by Judges &amp; Prosecutor</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/misconduct-by-judges-prosecutor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Rules of Professional Conduct</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 class="heading-1"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/pc-1385-dismissal-of-the-action-for-want-of-prosecution-or-otherwise/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">PC 1385 &#8211; Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise</a></h3>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/thompson-v-clark-holds-fourth-amendment-claim-under-%c2%a7-1983-for-malicious-prosecution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span style="color: #008000;">Thomp$on v. Clark</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Maliciou$ Pro$ecution</span> </em></a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reichle-v-howards-2012-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/">Reichle v. Howards (2012) &#8211; </a><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reichle-v-howards-2012-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/"><span style="color: #339966;">Retaliatory Prosecution Claims </span></a><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reichle-v-howards-2012-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Against</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">G</span>o<span style="color: #0000ff;">v</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span>n<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>t <span style="color: #0000ff;">O</span>f<span style="color: #0000ff;">f</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">c</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">a</span>l<span style="color: #0000ff;">s</span></span> &#8211;<em><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">1st</span> Amendment</span></em></a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/people-v-superior-court-greer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">People v. Superior Court (Greer) 5th &amp; 8th Amendment &#8211; Bias / Malicious Persecutor</a></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/hartman-v-moore-2006-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/">Hartman v. Moore (2006) &#8211;</a><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/hartman-v-moore-2006-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/"><span style="color: #339966;">Retaliatory Prosecution Claims</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Against</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">G</span>o<span style="color: #0000ff;">v</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span>n<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>t <span style="color: #0000ff;">O</span>f<span style="color: #0000ff;">f</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">c</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">a</span>l<span style="color: #0000ff;">s</span></span> &#8211; </a><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/hartman-v-moore-2006-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">1st</span> Amendment</span></em></a></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-a-fiduciary-duty-breach-of-fiduciary-duty/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/epic-scotus-decisions#MisConduct" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">E</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">p</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">i</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">c</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">S</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">C</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">O</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">T</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">U</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">S</span> <span style="color: #3366ff;">Decisions</span></span></a></em></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;">National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards<br />
<span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/national-district-attorneys-association-national-prosecution-standards-ndda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Prosecution Standards</a></span> &#8211; NDD can be <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/national-district-attorneys-association-national-prosecution-standards-ndda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">found here</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">The <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Ethical-Obligations-of-Prosecutors-in-Cases-Involving-Postcon.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors</a></span> in Cases Involving <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Ethical-Obligations-of-Prosecutors-in-Cases-Involving-Postcon.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Postconviction Claims of Innocence</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecutor&#8217;s Duty Duty </span>to<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Disclose Exculpatory Evidence</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Prosecutors-Duty-to-Disclose-Exculpatory-Evidence.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fordham Law Review PDF</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">Chapter 14 <span style="color: #ff0000;">Disclosure of Exculpatory</span> and <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Brady-Chapter14-2020.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Impeachment Information PDF</a></span></h3>
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<p><iframe title="How to GAIN Courage !" width="640" height="480" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mBsU20SDBp0?start=1211&#038;feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
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<p>DISTRICT ATTORNEY &amp; PAUL TOEPEL PLAY THESE VIDEOS</p>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Rule 1.1 &#8211; Competence (DA REPRESENTS THE STATE)</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Rule 1.2 &#8211; Assisting in a Crime</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Rule 3.1 &#8211; Meritorious Claims &amp; Contentions</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Rule 3.4 &#8211; Fairness to Opposing Party and Council</h1>
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<p>PAUL TOEPEL PLAY THE NEXT VIDEO REMEMBER SUGGESTING ME TO BE MADE A VEXATIOUS LITAGANT YOU PUNK FUCK</p>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 3.8 pt.2 &#8211; Special Duties of Prosecutors</h1>
<h3 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Learn More: <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutorial-investigations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecutorial Investigations</a></span></h3>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 4.1 &#8211; Truthfulness in Statements to Others</h1>
<p>PAUL TOEPEL PLAY THE NEXT VIDEO</p>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 4.4 &#8211; Respect for the Rights of Others</h1>
<p>PAUL &amp; Mathew TOEPEL LISTEN TO THE NEXT VIDEO</p>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 8.1 Bar Admission &amp; Disciplinary Matters</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 8.2 &#8211; Judicial &amp; Legal Officials</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 8.3 &#8211; Reporting Professional Misconduct</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 8.4 pt.1 &#8211; Lawyer Misconduct</h1>
<p>PAUL TOEPEL LISTEN TO THE NEXT VIDEO</p>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">ABA Formal Op. 493 pt.1 &#8211; Rule 8.4(g): Purpose, Scope &amp; Application</h1>
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<h1 class="style-scope ytd-watch-metadata">Model Rule 8.4 pt.2 &#8211; Discrimination &amp; Harassment</h1>
<p>ECONOMIC STATUS ATTACKS!</p>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 24pt;"><em><span style="color: #ff00ff;">To</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">Learn More</span><span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8230;.</span> Read <span style="color: #0000ff;">MORE</span> Below <span style="color: #ff00ff;">and</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">click <span style="color: #ff00ff;">the</span> links Below </span></em></span></h1>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Abuse</span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;"> &amp;</span> Neglect<span style="color: #000000;"> &#8211;</span> The Mandated <span style="color: #008000;">Reporters  (<span style="color: #0000ff;">Police, D<span style="color: #000000;">.</span>A</span></span> <span style="color: #000000;">&amp;</span> M<span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span>d<span style="color: #0000ff;">i</span>c<span style="color: #0000ff;">a</span>l <span style="color: #000000;">&amp;</span></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"> the Bad <span style="color: #0000ff;">Actors)</span></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong><a style="color: #ff00ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mandated-reporter-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mandated Reporter Laws &#8211; Nurses, District Attorney&#8217;s, and Police should listen up</a><br />
</strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">If You Would Like</span> to<span style="color: #000000;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mandated-reporter-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"> Learn</span></a> More About</span>:</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">The California Mandated Reporting Law</span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mandated-reporter-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">To <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Read the <span style="color: #000000;">Penal Code</span></span> § 11164-11166 &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Act</span> &#8211; California Penal Code 11164-11166Article 2.5. <span style="color: #ff0000;">(CANRA</span>) <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/article-2-5-child-abuse-and-neglect-reporting-act-11164-11174-3/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ss_8572.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Mandated Reporter form</a></span></strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Mandated Reporter</span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ss_8572.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">FORM SS 8572.pdf</a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff00ff;">The Child Abuse</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">ALL <span style="color: #0000ff;">POLICE CHIEFS</span>, <span style="color: #008000;">SHERIFFS</span> AND <span style="color: #ff00ff;">COUNTY WELFARE</span> DEPARTMENTS  </span></strong><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/bcia05-15ib-ALL-POLICE-CHIEFS-SHERIFFS-AND-COUNTY-WELFARE-DEPARTMENTS-.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">INFO BULLETIN</a>:</span><br />
<a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/bcia05-15ib-ALL-POLICE-CHIEFS-SHERIFFS-AND-COUNTY-WELFARE-DEPARTMENTS-.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Click Here</em></a> Officers and <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/bcia05-15ib-ALL-POLICE-CHIEFS-SHERIFFS-AND-COUNTY-WELFARE-DEPARTMENTS-.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">DA&#8217;s </a></span></strong><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;"> for (Procedure to Follow)</span></strong></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>It Only Takes a Minute to Make a Difference in the Life of a Child learn more below<br />
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 12pt;">You can learn more here <a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/California-Child-Abuse-and-Neglect-Reporting-Law.pdf"><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Law</span></strong></a>  its a <a href="https://capc.sccgov.org/sites/g/files/exjcpb1061/files/document/GBACAPCv6.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">PDF file</a></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn</span> More About <span style="color: #0000ff;">True Threats</span> Here <span style="color: #ff0000;">below</span>&#8230;.</em></span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The </span></strong><a class="row-title" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/brandenburg-v-ohio-1969/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) – 1st Amendment” (Edit)"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)</span></a> – <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">CURRENT TEST =</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">The</span> ‘<span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-brandenburg-test-for-incitement-to-violence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Brandenburg test</a></span>’ <span style="color: #ff0000;">for incitement to violence </span></strong>– <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>The </strong>Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action Test</a></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">–</span> <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/true-threats-virginia-v-black-is-most-comprehensive-supreme-court-definition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment” (Edit)">True Threats – Virginia v. Black</a></span> is <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">most comprehensive</span> Supreme Court definition</span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/watts-v-united-states-true-threat-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Watts v. United States</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">True Threat Test</span> – <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/clear-and-present-danger-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Clear and Present Danger Test</span></a> – <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/gravity-of-the-evil-test/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Gravity of the Evil Test</span></a> – <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/elonis-v-united-states-2015-threats-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elonis v. United States (2015)</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Threats</span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff00ff; font-size: 18pt;"><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn</span> More About <span style="color: #000000;">What</span> is <span style="color: #ff0000;">Obscene&#8230;. <span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #000000;">be</span> careful <span style="color: #000000;">about</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">education</span> <span style="color: #000000;">it</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">may</span> <span style="color: #3366ff;">en<span style="color: #00ccff;">lighten</span></span> you</span></span></em></span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/miller-v-california-obscenity-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Miller v. California</a></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"> &#8211;</span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;"> 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test)</span></span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/obscenity-and-pornography/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Obscenity and Pornography</a></span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff00ff; font-size: 18pt;"><em><span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn More</span> About <span style="color: #0000ff;">Police</span>, The <span style="color: #0000ff;">Government Officials</span> and <span style="color: #ff0000;">You</span>&#8230;.</em></span></h2>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #339966;">$$ Retaliatory</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">Arrests</span> and <span style="color: #339966;">Prosecution $$</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-in-california/"><em>Anti-SLAPP</em></a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Law in California</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Freedom of Assembly</span> – <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/freedom-of-assembly-peaceful-assembly-1st-amendment-right/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Peaceful Assembly</a> – <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/freedom-of-assembly-peaceful-assembly-1st-amendment-right/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">1st Amendment Right</a></strong></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/brayshaw-vs-city-of-tallahassee-1st-amendment-posting-police-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee</span></a> – <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8211; </span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Posting <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police </span></em></mark><mark style="background-color: yellow;">Address</mark></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/publius-v-boyer-vine-1st-amendment-posting-police-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Publius v. Boyer-Vine</span></a> –<span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">&#8211; </span><span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Posting <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police</span></em> Address</mark></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/lozman-v-city-of-riviera-beach-florida-2018-1st-amendment-retaliation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida (2018)</a></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> – </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Retaliatory <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police</span></em> Arrests</mark></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/nieves-v-bartlett-2019-1st-amendment-retaliatory-arrests/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nieves v. Bartlett (2019)</a> &#8211; <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Retaliatory <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police</span></em> Arrests</mark></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/hartman-v-moore-2006-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hartman v. Moore (2006)</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Retaliatory <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police</span></em> Arrests</mark></span><span style="color: #339966;"><br />
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Against</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">G</span>o<span style="color: #0000ff;">v</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span>n<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>t <span style="color: #0000ff;">O</span>f<span style="color: #0000ff;">f</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">c</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">a</span>l<span style="color: #0000ff;">s</span></span> &#8211; <em><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">1st</span> Amendment</span></em></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/reichle-v-howards-2012-retaliatory-prosecution-claims-against-government-officials-1st-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Reichle v. Howards (2012)</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;"><mark style="background-color: yellow; color: red;">Retaliatory <em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police</span></em> Arrests</mark></span><span style="color: #339966;"><br />
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Against</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">G</span>o<span style="color: #0000ff;">v</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span>n<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>t <span style="color: #0000ff;">O</span>f<span style="color: #0000ff;">f</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">c</span>i<span style="color: #0000ff;">a</span>l<span style="color: #0000ff;">s</span></span> &#8211; <em><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">1st</span> Amendment</span></em></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/freedom-of-the-press/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">F<span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span>d<span style="color: #0000ff;">o</span>m <span style="color: #0000ff;">o</span>f t<span style="color: #0000ff;">h</span>e <span style="color: #0000ff;">P</span>r<span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span>s<span style="color: #0000ff;">s</span></span></a> &#8211;<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Flyers</span>, <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Newspaper</span>, <span style="color: #008000;">Leaflets</span>, <span style="color: #3366ff;">Peaceful Assembly</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff00ff;">1<span style="color: #008000;">$</span>t Amendment<span style="color: #000000;"> &#8211; Learn <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/freedom-of-the-press/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">More Here</a></span></span></span></h3>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/vermonts-top-court-weighs-are-kkk-fliers-protected-speech/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Vermont&#8217;s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #008000;">1st Amendment Protected Speech</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/insulting-letters-to-politicians-home-are-constitutionally-protected/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Insulting letters to politician’s home</span></span></a><span style="color: #ff0000;"> are constitutionally protected</span>, unless they are ‘true threats’ – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="background-color: #ffff00;">Letters to Politicians Homes</span></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #339966;"> &#8211; 1st Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">First</span> A<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>d<span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span>e<span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span>t </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-first-amendment-encyclopedia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Encyclopedia</span></a></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"> very comprehensive </span>– <span style="color: #339966;">1st Amendment</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #008000; font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/dwayne-furlow-v-jon-belmar-police-warrant-immunity-fail-4th-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar</a></span> &#8211; Police Warrant &#8211; Immunity Fail &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">4th, 5th, &amp; 14th Amendment</span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff00ff; font-size: 18pt;">ARE PEOPLE <span style="color: #ff0000;">LYING ON YOU</span>? CAN YOU PROVE IT? IF YES&#8230;. <span style="color: #ff0000;">THEN YOU ARE IN LUCK!</span></span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-118-pc-california-penalty-of-perjury-law/"><strong>Penal Code 118 PC</strong></a></span><strong> – California <span style="color: #ff0000;">Penalty</span> of “</strong><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Perjury</span>” Law</strong></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/perjury/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Federal</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Perjury</span></strong></a> – <span style="color: #ff00ff;"><strong>Definition <span style="color: #000000;">by</span> Law</strong></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-132-pc-offering-false-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Penal Code 132 PC</a></span> – <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Offering <span style="color: #ff0000;">False</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Evidence</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-penal-code-134-pc-preparing-false-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Penal Code 134 PC</a></span> – <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Preparing <span style="color: #ff0000;">False</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Evidence</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/118-1-pc-police-officers-filing-false-reports/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Penal Code 118.1 PC</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff00ff;"><em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police </span></em><span style="color: #339966;">Officer$</span> Filing <span style="color: #ff0000;">False</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Report$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #ff00ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/spencer-v-peters/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Spencer v. Peters – Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment” (Edit)"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Spencer v. Peters</span></a><span style="color: #000000;">– </span><em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police </span></em><span style="color: #ff0000;">Fabrication</span> of Evidence – <span style="color: #339966;">14th Amendment</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-148-5-pc-making-a-false-police-report-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Penal Code 148.5 PC</a></span> –  <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Making a <span style="color: #ff0000;">False </span><em><span style="color: #3366ff;">Police </span></em><span style="color: #ff0000;">Report</span> in California</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-115-pc-filing-a-false-document-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Penal Code 115 PC</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;">Filing a</span> False Document<span style="color: #ff00ff;"> in California</span></span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #008000;">Sanctions</span> <span style="color: #000000;">and</span> Attorney <span style="color: #008000;">Fee Recovery</span> <span style="color: #000000;">for</span> Bad <span style="color: #0000ff;">Actors</span></span></h2>
<h3 class="section-title inview-fade inview" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">FAM § 3027.1 &#8211; <span style="color: #008000;">Attorney&#8217;s Fees</span> and <span style="color: #008000;">Sanctions</span> For <span style="color: #ff6600;">False Child Abuse Allegations</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Family Code 3027.1 &#8211; <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fam-code-3027-1-attorneys-fees-and-sanctions-for-false-child-abuse-allegations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">FAM § 271 &#8211; <span style="color: #008000;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Awarding</span> Attorney Fees</span>&#8211; Family Code 271 <span style="color: #008000;">Family Court Sanction </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fam-271-awarding-attorney-fees-family-court-sanctions-family-code-271/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #008000;">Awarding</span> Discovery</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Based</span> <span style="color: #008000;">Sanctions</span> in Family Law Cases &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/discovery-based-sanctions-in-family-law-cases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">FAM § 2030 – <span style="color: #0000ff;">Bringing Fairness</span> &amp; <span style="color: #008000;">Fee</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Recovery</span> – <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fam-2030-bringing-fairness-fee-recovery-family-code-2030/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #008000;"><a style="color: #008000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/zamos-v-stroud-district-attorney-liable-for-bad-faith-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zamos v. Stroud</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;">District Attorney</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Liable</span> for <span style="color: #ff0000;">Bad Faith Action</span> &#8211; <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/zamos-v-stroud-district-attorney-liable-for-bad-faith-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/malicious-use-of-vexatious-litigant-vexatious-litigant-order-reversed/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Malicious Use of Vexatious Litigant &#8211; Vexatious Litigant Order Reversed</a></span></h3>
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<h2><span style="font-size: 24pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Mi$</span><span style="color: #339966;">Conduct </span><span style="color: #008000;">&#8211; </span><span style="color: #008000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">P<span style="color: #ff0000;">r</span>o</span>$<span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span>c<span style="color: #0000ff;">u</span>t<span style="color: #0000ff;">o</span>r<span style="color: #0000ff;">i</span>a<span style="color: #0000ff;">l Mi$</span></span></span><span style="color: #339966;">Conduct</span></span></h2>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 36pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">P</span>r<span style="color: #ff0000;">o</span>s<span style="color: #ff0000;">e</span>c<span style="color: #ff0000;">u</span>t<span style="color: #ff0000;">o</span>r<span style="color: #008000;">$</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #ff9900; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #339966;">Attorney Rule$ of Engagement</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;">G</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">o</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">v</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">e</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">n</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">m</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">e</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">n</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">t</span> <span style="color: #000000;">(<span style="color: #ff0000;">A</span>.<span style="color: #ff0000;">K</span>.<span style="color: #ff0000;">A</span>.</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">THE PRO<span style="color: #339966;">$</span>UCTOR</span><span style="color: #000000;">)</span> <span style="color: #3366ff;">and</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Public<span style="color: #000000;">/</span>Private Attorney</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-a-fiduciary-duty-breach-of-fiduciary-duty/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-attorneys-sworn-oath/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Attorney’s Sworn Oath</a></span></h3>
<p><strong><span style="color: #339966;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #339966;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-admin/post.php?post=1889&amp;action=edit" aria-label="“Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct” (Edit)"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Malicious</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecution</span> / <span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecutorial</span> Misconduct</a></span></strong><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> – </span><strong><span style="color: #0000ff;">Know What it is!</span></strong></p>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #008000;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #008000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/new-supreme-court-ruling-makes-it-easier-to-sue-police/" aria-label="“New Supreme Court Ruling makes it easier to sue police” (Edit)"><span style="color: #0000ff;">New</span> Supreme Court Ruling</a></span> – makes it <span style="color: #008000;">easier</span> to <span style="color: #008000;">sue</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">police</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Possible courses of action</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/possible-courses-of-action-prosecutorial-misconduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecutorial <span style="color: #339966;">Misconduct</span></a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Misconduct by Judges &amp; Prosecutor</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/misconduct-by-judges-prosecutor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Rules of Professional Conduct</a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/functions-and-duties-of-the-prosecutor-prosecution-conduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecution Conduct</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><b>Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations &#8211; </b></span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutorial-investigations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecutorial Investigations</a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/information-on-prosecutorial-discretion/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Information On Prosecutorial Discretion</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/why-judges-district-attorneys-or-attorneys-must-sometimes-recuse-themselves/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fighting-discovery-abuse-in-litigation-forensic-investigative-accounting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #339966;">Forensic &amp; Investigative Accounting</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fighting-discovery-abuse-in-litigation-forensic-investigative-accounting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></em></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">Criminal Motions § 1:9 &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/recusal-of-prosecutor-california-criminal-motions-%c2%a7-19/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Motion for Recusal of Prosecutor</a></span></h3>
<h3>Pen. Code, § 1424 &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/pc-1424-recusal-of-prosecutor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Recusal of Prosecutor</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/removing-corrupt-judges-prosecutors-jurors-and-other-individuals-fake-evidence-from-your-case/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals</a></span> &amp; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Fake Evidence from Your Case</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards<br />
<span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/national-district-attorneys-association-national-prosecution-standards-ndda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Prosecution Standards</a></span> &#8211; NDD can be <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/national-district-attorneys-association-national-prosecution-standards-ndda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">found here</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">The <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Ethical-Obligations-of-Prosecutors-in-Cases-Involving-Postcon.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors</a></span> in<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Cases Involving </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Ethical-Obligations-of-Prosecutors-in-Cases-Involving-Postcon.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Postconviction Claims of</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Innocence</span></a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">ABA &#8211; Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/functions-and-duties-of-the-prosecutor-prosecution-conduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecution Conduct</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecutor&#8217;s Duty Duty </span>to<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Disclose Exculpatory Evidence</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Prosecutors-Duty-to-Disclose-Exculpatory-Evidence.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fordham Law Review PDF</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">Chapter 14 <span style="color: #ff0000;">Disclosure of Exculpatory</span> and <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Brady-Chapter14-2020.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Impeachment Information PDF</a></span></h3>
<h2><span style="font-size: 24pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Mi$</span><span style="color: #339966;">Conduct </span><span style="color: #008000;">&#8211; </span><span style="color: #ff0000;">J<span style="color: #0000ff;">u</span>d<span style="color: #0000ff;">i</span>c<span style="color: #0000ff;">i</span>a<span style="color: #0000ff;">l </span></span><span style="color: #ff0000;">Mi$</span><span style="color: #339966;">Conduct</span></span></h2>
<h3><span style="font-size: 36pt; color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">J</span>u<span style="color: #0000ff;">d</span>g<span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span><span style="color: #008000;">$</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecution-of-judges-for-corrupt-practices/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prosecution Of Judges</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">For Corrupt <span style="color: #008000;">Practice$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/code-of-conduct-for-united-states-judges/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Code of Conduct</a></span> for<span style="color: #ff0000;"> United States Judge<span style="color: #008000;">$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/disqualification-of-a-judge-for-prejudice/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Disqualification of a Judge</a></span> for <span style="color: #ff0000;">Prejudice</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/judicial-immunity-from-civil-and-criminal-liability/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Judicial Immunity</span></a> from <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #008000;">Civil</span> <span style="color: #000000;">and</span> Criminal Liability</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Recusal of Judge &#8211; CCP § 170.1</span> &#8211; <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/recusal-of-judge-ccp-170-1-removal-a-judge/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Removal a Judge &#8211; How to Remove a Judge</span></a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">l292 Disqualification of Judicial Officer</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/BLANK-l292-DISQUALIFICATION-OF-JUDICIAL-OFFICER.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">C.C.P. 170.6 Form</a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-file-a-complaint-against-a-judge-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How to File a Complaint</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Against a Judge in California?</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Commission on Judicial Performance</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://cjp.ca.gov/online-complaint-form/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Judge Complaint Online Form</a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/why-judges-district-attorneys-or-attorneys-must-sometimes-recuse-themselves/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/removing-corrupt-judges-prosecutors-jurors-and-other-individuals-fake-evidence-from-your-case/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals</a></span> &amp; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Fake Evidence from Your Case</span></span></h3>
<div style="text-align: center;">
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<div style="text-align: center;">
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;">Misconduct by Government <span style="color: #ff0000;">Know Your Rights </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/misconduct-know-more-of-your-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a><span style="color: #ff00ff;"> (<span style="color: #339966;">must read!</span>)</span></span></h2>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/recoverable-damages-under-42-u-s-c-section-1983/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"> Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983</span></a> – <span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Recoverable</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Damage$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/42-us-code-1983-civil-action-for-deprivation-of-rights/">42 U.S. Code § 1983</a></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> – </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">Civil Action</span> for Deprivation of <span style="color: #339966;">Right$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/18-u-s-code-%c2%a7-242-deprivation-of-rights-under-color-of-law/"><span style="color: #0000ff;">18 U.S. Code § 242</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #339966;">Deprivation of Right$</span> Under Color of Law</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/18-u-s-code-%c2%a7-241-conspiracy-against-rights/">18 U.S. Code § 241</a></span> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Conspiracy against <span style="color: #339966;">Right$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/section-1983-lawsuit-how-to-bring-a-civil-rights-claim/"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Section 1983 Lawsuit</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">How to Bring a <span style="color: #339966;">Civil Rights Claim</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/misconduct-know-more-of-your-rights/"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">Suing</span> for Misconduct</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Know More of Your <span style="color: #339966;">Right$</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/police-misconduct-in-california-how-to-bring-a-lawsuit/"><span style="color: #008000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Police</span> Misconduct in California</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">How to Bring a <span style="color: #339966;">Lawsuit</span></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">How to File a complaint of </span><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-file-a-complaint-of-police-misconduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Police Misconduct?</a></span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"> (Tort Claim Forms </span><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-file-a-complaint-of-police-misconduct/">here as well)</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/deprivation-of-rights-under-color-of-law/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Deprivation of Rights</a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Under Color of the Law</span></span></h3>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">What is Sua Sponte</span> and <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-sua-sponte-and-how-is-it-used-in-a-california-court/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How is it Used in a California Court? </a></span></span></h1>
<h3><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors<br />
<span style="color: #000000;">and other Individuals &amp; Fake Evidence </span></span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/removing-corrupt-judges-prosecutors-jurors-and-other-individuals-fake-evidence-from-your-case/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">from Your Case </span></a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/anti-slapp-law-in-california/"><em>Anti-SLAPP</em></a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Law in California</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/freedom-of-assembly-peaceful-assembly-1st-amendment-right/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right</a></strong></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-recover-punitive-damages-in-a-california-personal-injury-case/">How to Recover “Punitive Damages”</a><span style="color: #ff0000;"> in a California Personal Injury Case</span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/pro-se-forms-and-forms-information/">Pro Se Forms and Forms Information</a><span style="color: #ff0000;">(Tort Claim Forms </span><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/complaint_for_violation_of_civil_rights_non-prisoner.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here as well)</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-a-tort/">What is</a><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-a-tort/"> Tort<span style="color: #ff0000;">?</span></a></span></h3>
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<h1><span style="color: #3366ff;">Tort Claims Form File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation</span></h1>
<p>Complete and submit the <strong><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/orim006.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Government Claim Form</a></strong>, including the required $25 filing fee or <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/orim005.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Fee<em> </em>Waiver<em> </em>Request</a>, and supporting documents, to the GCP.</p>
<p>See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.</p>
<h1><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Tort Claims &#8211; Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death</span></strong></h1>
<ul>
<li>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em><strong>Federal</strong></em></span><span style="color: #000000;"> &#8211;  Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online <a href="https://www.gsa.gov/Forms/TrackForm/33140" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a> or download it <a href="https://www.va.gov/OGC/docs/SF-95.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">here</span></a></span> or <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/SF95-07a.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here from us</a></h2>
</li>
<li>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><em><strong>California</strong></em></span> &#8211; California Tort Claims Act &#8211; <span style="color: #000000;">California Tort Claim </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/dgs/fmc/dgs/orim006.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Form Here</a></span> or <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/orim006.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here from us</a></h2>
</li>
<li>
<h2><em><strong><span style="color: #008000;"><a style="color: #008000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/complaint_for_violation_of_civil_rights_non-prisoner.pdf">Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint)</a> and also <a style="color: #008000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/14-Complaint-for-Violation-of-Civil-Rights-Non-Prisoner.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF</a></span></strong></em></h2>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms <a href="https://www.caed.uscourts.gov/CAEDnew/index.cfm/cmecf-e-filing/representing-yourself-pro-se-litigant/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 24pt;"><span style="color: #3366ff;">PARENT</span> CASE LAW </span></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">RELATIONSHIP </span><em>WITH YOUR </em><span style="color: #ff0000;">CHILDREN </span><em>&amp;<br />
YOUR </em><span style="color: #0000ff;">CONSTITUIONAL</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">RIGHT$</span> + RULING$</span></span></h2>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong><span style="color: #339966; font-size: 10pt;">YOU CANNOT GET BACK TIME BUT YOU CAN HIT THOSE<span style="color: #ff0000;"> IMMORAL NON CIVIC MINDED PUNKS</span> WHERE THEY WILL FEEL YOU = THEIR BANK</span></strong></p>
<h3><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/family-law-appeal/">Family Law Appeal</a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn about appealing a Family Court Decision</span> <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/family-law-appeal/">Here</a></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/9-3-section-1983-claim-against-defendant-in-individual-capacity-elements-and-burden-of-proof/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>9.3 </strong><strong>Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant as (Individuals)</strong></a></span><strong> —</strong><span style="color: #008000;"><br />
14th Amendment </span><span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #000000;">this </span><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">CODE PROTECT$</span> <span style="color: #000000;">all <span style="color: #0000ff;">US CITIZEN$</span></span></strong></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/amdt5-4-5-6-2-parental-and-childrens-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Amdt5.4.5.6.2 &#8211; Parental and Children&#8217;s Rights</a></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #008000;"> &#8211;<br />
5th Amendment </span><span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #000000;">this </span><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">CODE PROTECT$</span> <span style="color: #000000;">all <span style="color: #0000ff;">US CITIZEN$</span></span></strong></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/9-32-particular-rights-fourteenth-amendment-interference-with-parent-child-relationship/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #008000;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">9.32 </span></span>&#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;">Interference with Parent / Child Relationship </span></a><span style="color: #008000;">&#8211;<br />
14th Amendment </span><span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #000000;">this </span><strong><span style="color: #ff00ff;">CODE PROTECT$</span> <span style="color: #000000;">all <span style="color: #0000ff;">US CITIZEN$</span></span></strong></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-civil-code-section-52-1/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>California Civil Code Section 52.1</strong></a><br />
</span><span style="color: #339966;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;">Interference</span> with exercise or enjoyment of <span style="color: #ff0000;">individual rights</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/parents-rights-childrens-bill-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Parent&#8217;s Rights &amp; Children’s Bill of Rights</span></a><br />
<span style="color: #339966;">SCOTUS RULINGS <span style="color: #ff00ff;">FOR YOUR</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">PARENT RIGHTS</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/category/motivation/rights/children/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">SEARCH</span></a> of our site for all articles relating </span></span>for <span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">PARENTS RIGHTS</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Help</span></span>!</span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/childs-best-interest-in-custody-cases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Child&#8217;s Best Interest</a></span> in <span style="color: #ff0000;">Custody Cases</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/fl105.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Are You From Out of State</a> (California)?  <a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/fl105.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">FL-105 GC-120(A)</a><br />
Declaration Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Learn More:</span><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/family-law-appeal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Family Law Appeal</a></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/necessity-defense-in-criminal-cases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Necessity Defense in Criminal Cases</a></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000; font-size: 24pt;"><span style="color: #3366ff;">GRANDPARENT</span> CASE LAW </span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/do-grandparents-have-visitation-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights?</a> </span><span style="color: #ff0000;">If there is an Established Relationship then Yes</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/third-presumed-parent-family-code-7612c-requires-established-relationship-required/">Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C)</a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Requires Established Relationship Required</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law </span>&#8211;<br />
<span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ThreeParentLaw-The-State-Bar-of-California-family-law-news-issue4-2017-vol.-39-no.-4.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf</a></span></strong></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/distinguishing-request-for-custody-from-request-for-visitation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Distinguishing Request for Custody</a></span> from Request for Visitation</h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/troxel-v-granville-grandparents/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)</a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Grandparents – 14th Amendment</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/s-f-human-servs-agency-v-christine-c-in-re-caden-c/">S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. </a><span style="color: #ff0000;">(In re Caden C.)</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/9-32-particular-rights-fourteenth-amendment-interference-with-parent-child-relationship/">9.32 Particular Rights</a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Fourteenth Amendment</span> – <span style="color: #339966;">Interference with Parent / Child Relationship</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/childs-best-interest-in-custody-cases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Child&#8217;s Best Interest</a> </span>in <span style="color: #ff0000;">Custody Cases</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/when-is-a-joinder-in-a-family-law-case-appropriate/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Reason for Joinder</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/joinder-in-family-law-cases-crc-rule-5-24/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Joinder In Family Law Cases</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">CRC Rule 5.24</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #008000;">GrandParents Rights</span> <span style="color: #339966;">To Visit<br />
</span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/SHC-FL-05.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Family Law Packet</a><span style="color: #ff6600;"> OC Resource Center</span><br />
</span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/grandparent_visitation_with_fam_law.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Family Law Packet</a> <span style="color: #ff0000;">SB Resource Center<br />
</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/motion-to-vacate-an-adverse-judgment/">Motion to vacate an adverse judgment</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mandatory-joinder-vs-permissive-joinder-compulsory-vs-dismissive-joinder/">Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/when-is-a-joinder-in-a-family-law-case-appropriate/">When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?</a></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/kyle-o-v-donald-r-2000-grandparents/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848</strong></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/punsly-v-ho-2001-87-cal-app-4th-1099-grandparents-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099</strong></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/zauseta-v-zauseta-2002-102-cal-app-4th-1242-grandparents-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242</strong></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/s-f-human-servs-agency-v-christine-c-in-re-caden-c/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)</a></strong></span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/ian-j-v-peter-m-grandparents-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ian J. v. Peter M</a></strong></span></p>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #3366ff;">DUE PROCESS READS&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;</span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/due-process-vs-substantive-due-process/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Due Process vs Substantive Due Process</a> learn more </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/due-process-vs-substantive-due-process/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">HERE</span></a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://ollkennedy.weebly.com/uploads/4/3/7/6/43764795/due_process_1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Understanding Due Process</a>  &#8211; <span style="color: #000000;"><strong>This clause caused over 200 overturns </strong>in just DNA alone </span></span><a href="https://ollkennedy.weebly.com/uploads/4/3/7/6/43764795/due_process_1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Mathews v. Eldridge</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Due Process</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">&#8211; 5th &amp; 14th Amendment</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mathews-v-eldridge-due-process-5th-14th-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mathews Test</a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mathews-v-eldridge-due-process-5th-14th-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">3 Part Test</a></span>&#8211; <a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/mathews-v-eldridge-due-process-5th-14th-amendment/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">“</span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/unfriending-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Unfriending</span></a><span style="color: #ff0000;">” </span><span style="color: #0000ff;">Evidence &#8211; </span><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/unfriending-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">5th Amendment</span></a></span></h3>
<h3 class="doc_name f2-ns f3 mv0" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;">At the</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Intersection</span> of <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/at-the-intersection-of-technology-and-law/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Technology and Law</a></span></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">We also have the </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;">Introducing TEXT &amp; EMAIL </span><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/introducing-text-email-digital-evidence-in-california-courts/">Digital Evidence</a> i<span style="color: #000000;">n</span> <span style="color: #ff00ff;">California Courts </span></span>–<span style="color: #339966;"> 1st Amendment<br />
<span style="color: #000000;">so if you are interested in learning about </span></span></span><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/introducing-text-email-digital-evidence-in-california-courts/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>I</strong></span><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">ntroducing Digital Evidence in California State Courts</span><br />
click here for SCOTUS rulings</strong></a></span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #3366ff; font-size: 18pt;">Retrieving Evidence / Internal Investigation Case </span></h2>
<h3><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/conviction-integrity-unit-ciu-of-the-orange-county-district-attorney-ocda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”)</a></span> of the <span style="color: #339966;">Orange County District Attorney OCDA</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/conviction-integrity-unit-ciu-of-the-orange-county-district-attorney-ocda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fighting-discovery-abuse-in-litigation-forensic-investigative-accounting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #339966;">Forensic &amp; Investigative Accounting</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fighting-discovery-abuse-in-litigation-forensic-investigative-accounting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a><br />
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><strong><span style="color: #ff6600;">Orange County</span> Data, <span style="color: #0000ff;">BodyCam</span>,<span style="color: #0000ff;"> Police</span> Report, <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Incident Reports</span>,<br />
and <span style="color: #008000;">all other available known requests for data</span> below: </strong></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">APPLICATION TO <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Application-to-Examine-Local-Arrest-Record.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EXAMINE LOCAL ARREST RECORD</a></span> UNDER CPC 13321 <em><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Application-to-Examine-Local-Arrest-Record.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Click Here</span></a></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Learn About <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/policy-814-discovery-requests-orange-county-sheriff-coroner-department/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Policy 814: Discovery Requests </a></span>OCDA Office &#8211; <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/policy-814-discovery-requests-orange-county-sheriff-coroner-department/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Request for <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Application-to-Examine-Local-Arrest-Record.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Proof In-Custody</span></span></a> Form <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/7399.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Request for <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Request-for-Clearance-Letter.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Clearance Letter</a></span> Form <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Request-for-Clearance-Letter.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></em></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Application to Obtain Copy of <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/BCIA_8705.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">State Summary of Criminal History</a></span>Form <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/BCIA_8705.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">Request Authorization Form </span><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Request-Authorization-Form-Release-of-Case-Information.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Release of Case Information</a></span> &#8211; <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Request-Authorization-Form-Release-of-Case-Information.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><em style="font-size: 16px;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Texts</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">/</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Emails</span> AS <span style="color: #0000ff;">EVIDENCE</span>: </em><a style="font-size: 16px;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/introducing-text-email-digital-evidence-in-california-courts#AuthenticatingTexts" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><b>Authenticating Texts</b></span></a><b style="font-size: 16px;"> for </b><a style="font-size: 16px;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/introducing-text-email-digital-evidence-in-california-courts#AuthenticatingTexts" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><b><span style="color: #008000;">California</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Courts</span></b></a></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/can-i-use-text-messages-in-my-california-divorce/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/two-steps-and-voila-how-to-authenticate-text-messages/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-your-texts-can-be-used-as-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?</span></a></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">California Supreme Court Rules:<br />
<span style="color: #ff0000;">Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines<br />
</span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-supreme-court-rules-text-messages-sent-on-private-government-employees-lines-subject-to-open-records-requests/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Subject to Open Records Requests</a></span></h3>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 14pt;">case law: <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/city-of-san-jose-v-superior-court-releasing-private-text-phone-records-of-government-employees/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">City of San Jose v. Superior Court</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Releasing Private Text/Phone Records</span> of <span style="color: #0000ff;">Government  Employees</span></span></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/League_San-Jose-Resource-Paper-FINAL.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Public Records Practices After</span></a> the <span style="color: #ff0000;">San Jose Decision</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/8-s218066-rpi-reply-brief-merits-062215.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Decision Briefing Merits</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">After</span> the San Jose Decision</span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Request-Authorization-Form-Release-of-Case-Information.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CPRA</a></span> Public Records Act Data Request &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Request-Authorization-Form-Release-of-Case-Information.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></h3>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Here is the <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://cdss.govqa.us/WEBAPP/_rs/(S(uty3grnyfii3noec0dj24qvr))/SupportHome.aspx?sSessionID=" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Public Records Service Act</a></span> Portal for all of <span style="color: #008000;">CALIFORNIA </span><em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://cdss.govqa.us/WEBAPP/_rs/(S(uty3grnyfii3noec0dj24qvr))/SupportHome.aspx?sSessionID=" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/rules-of-admissibility-evidence-admissibility/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Rules of Admissibility</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Evidence Admissibility</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/confrontation-clause/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Confrontation Clause</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Sixth Amendment</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/exceptions-to-the-hearsay-rule/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Confronting Evidence</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutors-obligation-to-disclose-exculpatory-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Exculpatory Evidence</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/successful-brady-napue-cases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence” (Edit)">Successful Brady/Napue Cases</a></span> –<span style="color: #ff0000;"> Suppression of Evidence</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cases-remanded-or-hearing-granted-based-on-brady-napue-claims/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims” (Edit)">Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Based on Brady/Napue Claims</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a class="row-title" style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-admin/post.php?post=6331&amp;action=edit" aria-label="“Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases” (Edit)">Unsuccessful But Instructive</a></span><span style="color: #ff0000;"> Brady/Napue Cases</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">ABA – <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/functions-and-duties-of-the-prosecutor-prosecution-conduct/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Prosecution Conduct</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a class="row-title" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/frivolous-meritless-or-malicious-prosecution/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" aria-label="“Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution” (Edit)">Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution</a><span style="color: #339966;"><strong> &#8211; fiduciary duty</strong></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/police-bodycam-footage-release-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Police BodyCam Footage Release</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/electronic-audio-recording-request-of-oc-court-hearings/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Electronic Audio Recording Request</a></span> of OC Court Hearings</h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #3366ff; font-size: 18pt;">Appealing/Contesting Case/</span><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Order</span></span><span style="font-size: 18pt;">/Judgment/</span><span style="font-size: 18pt;">Charge/</span><span style="color: #3366ff; font-size: 18pt;"> Suppressing Evidence</span></h2>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;">First Things First: <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Chapter_2_Appealability.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What Can Be Appealed</a></span> and <span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Chapter_2_Appealability.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What it Takes to Get Started</a></span> &#8211; <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Chapter_2_Appealability.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/fighting-a-judgment-without-filing-an-appeal-settlement-or-mediation-options-to-appealing/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Options to Appealing</a></span>– <span style="color: #ff0000;">Fighting A Judgment</span> <span style="color: #3366ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">Without Filing An Appeal Settlement Or Mediation </span><br />
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/motion-to-reconsider/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1008</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Motion to Reconsider</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/pc-1385-dismissal-of-the-action-for-want-of-prosecution-or-otherwise/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Penal Code 1385</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Dismissal of the Action for <span style="color: #339966;">Want of Prosecution or Otherwise</span></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/1538-5-motion-to-suppress-evidence-in-a-california-criminal-case/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Penal Code 1538.5</span></a> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Motion To Suppress Evidence</span><span style="color: #339966;"> in a California Criminal Case</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/caci-no-1501-wrongful-use-of-civil-proceedings/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">CACI No. 1501</span></a> – <span style="color: #ff0000;">Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-995-motion-to-dismiss-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Penal Code “995 Motions” in California</a></span> –  <span style="color: #ff0000;">Motion to Dismiss</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wic-%c2%a7-700-1-motion-to-suppress-as-evidence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">WIC § 700.1</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #000000;">If Court Grants</span> Motion to Suppress as Evidence</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/suppression-of-evidence-false-testimony/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Suppression Of Exculpatory Evidence</a> / Presentation Of False Or Misleading Evidence &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/suppression-of-evidence-false-testimony/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></em></span></span></h3>
<h3 class="jcc-hero__title"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cr-120-notice-of-appeal-felony-1237-1237-5-1538-5m/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Notice of Appeal<span style="color: #000000;"> —</span> Felony</a></span> (Defendant) <span class="text-no-wrap">(CR-120)  1237, 1237.5, 1538.5(m) &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cr-120-notice-of-appeal-felony-1237-1237-5-1538-5m/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></span></h3>
<h3><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">California Motions in Limine</span> – <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/california-motions-in-limine-what-is-a-motion-in-limine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What is a Motion in Limine?</a></span></span></h3>
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<h2 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #008080;">Cleaning</span> <span style="color: #0000ff;">Up Your</span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">Record</span></span></h2>
<h3 class="entry-title" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Penal Code 851.8 PC</span></span> – <span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/penal-code-851-8-pc-certificate-of-factual-innocence-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Certificate of Factual Innocence in California</a></em></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Petition to Seal and Destroy Adult Arrest Records</span> &#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/bcia-8270.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Download the PC 851.8 BCIA 8270 Form Here</a></span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">SB 393: <span style="color: #ff00ff;">The <span style="color: #ff0000;">Consumer Arrest Record Equity Act</span></span> &#8211; <em>851.87 &#8211; 851.92  &amp; 1000.4 &#8211; 11105</em> &#8211; <em><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/sb-393-the-consumer-arrest-record-equity-act/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CARE ACT</a></span></em></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/expungement-california-how-to-clear-criminal-records-under-penal-code-1203-4-pc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em>Expungement California</em></span></a> – How to <span style="color: #ff0000;">Clear Criminal Records </span>Under Penal Code<span style="color: #ff00ff;"> 1203.4 PC</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-vacate-a-criminal-conviction-in-california-penal-code-1473-7-pc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How to Vacate a Criminal Conviction in California</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Penal Code 1473.7 PC</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/seal-destroy-a-criminal-record/">Seal &amp; Destroy</a></span> a <span style="color: #ff0000;">Criminal Record</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/cleaning-up-your-criminal-record/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Cleaning Up Your Criminal Record</span></a> in <span style="color: #008000;">California</span> <span style="color: #ff6600;">(focus OC County)</span></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;"><strong><span style="color: #ff0000;">Governor Pardons &#8211;</span></strong><strong> </strong><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/governor-pardons/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">What Does A Governor’s Pardon Do</a></span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-get-a-sentence-commuted-executive-clemency-in-california/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How to Get a Sentence Commuted</a></span> <span style="color: #ff0000;">(Executive Clemency)</span> in California</span></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/how-to-reduce-a-felony-to-a-misdemeanor-penal-code-17b-pc-motion/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How to Reduce a Felony to a Misdemeanor</a></span> &#8211; <span style="color: #ff0000;">Penal Code 17b PC Motion</span></span></h3>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/epic-scotus-decisions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #ff00ff;"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-3607 alignnone" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/DEC22-Starr.jpg" alt="" width="112" height="75" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/DEC22-Starr.jpg 1000w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/DEC22-Starr-300x200.jpg 300w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/DEC22-Starr-768x512.jpg 768w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/DEC22-Starr-600x400.jpg 600w" sizes="(max-width: 112px) 100vw, 112px" /></span></a><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"> Epic <span style="color: #ff0000;">Criminal <span style="color: #000000;">/</span> Civil Right$</span> SCOTUS <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Help </span></span>&#8211; <span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/epic-scotus-decisions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></h1>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/parents-rights-childrens-bill-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-2679 alignnone" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/swearing_294391_1280_0.png" alt="At issue in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) was whether a conviction under state law prohibiting profane language in a public place violated a man's First Amendment's protection of free speech. The Supreme Court vacated the man's conviction and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its recent rulings about fighting words. The man had used profane language at a public school board meeting. (Illustration via Pixabay, public domain)" width="55" height="95" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/swearing_294391_1280_0.png 700w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/swearing_294391_1280_0-173x300.png 173w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/swearing_294391_1280_0-590x1024.png 590w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/swearing_294391_1280_0-600x1041.png 600w" sizes="(max-width: 55px) 100vw, 55px" /></a><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"> Epic <span style="color: #ff0000;">Parents SCOTUS Ruling </span></span></span><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;">&#8211; </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">Parental Right$ </span></span></span><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #ff0000;"><span style="color: #ff00ff;">Help </span></span></span></span><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><span style="color: #339966;">&#8211; <a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/parents-rights-childrens-bill-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></span></span></h1>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/parents-rights-childrens-bill-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-6721" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity-201x300.png" alt="" width="66" height="98" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity-201x300.png 201w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity.png 376w" sizes="(max-width: 66px) 100vw, 66px" /></a> <span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #0000ff;"><a style="color: #0000ff;" href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/jurisdiction-judges-immunity-judicial-ethics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Judge&#8217;s &amp; Prosecutor&#8217;s <span style="color: #339966;">Jurisdiction</span></a></span>&#8211; SCOTUS RULINGS on</span></h1>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/parents-rights-childrens-bill-of-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-6721" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity-201x300.png" alt="" width="66" height="98" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity-201x300.png 201w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Judges-Immunity.png 376w" sizes="(max-width: 66px) 100vw, 66px" /></a> <span style="font-size: 18pt;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/prosecutional-misconduct-scotus-rulings-re-prosecutors/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Prosecutional Misconduct</span></a> &#8211; SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors</span></h1>
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<h2>Family Treatment Court Best Practice Standards</h2>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/FTC_Standards.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Download Here</a> this <span style="color: #ff00ff;">Recommended Citation</span></h3>
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<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #3366ff;">Please take time to learn new UPCOMING </span></h1>
<h1 style="text-align: center;">The PROPOSED <em><span style="color: #3366ff;"><a style="color: #3366ff;" href="https://parentalrights.org/amendment/#" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Parental Rights Amendmen</a>t</span></em><br />
to the <span style="color: #3366ff;">US CONSTITUTION</span> <em><span style="color: #ff0000;"><a style="color: #ff0000;" href="https://parentalrights.org/amendment/#" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click Here</a></span></em> to visit their site</h1>
<h3 style="text-align: center;">The proposed Parental Rights Amendment will specifically add parental rights in the text of the U.S. Constitution, protecting these rights for both current and future generations.</h3>
<p style="text-align: center;">The Parental Rights Amendment is currently in the U.S. Senate, and is being introduced in the U.S. House.</p>
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<p><iframe title="Section 1983 -- Info about bringing a civil rights lawsuit" width="640" height="360" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/yZKvmEN3FB8?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
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<h3><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-11315" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Evidence.jpg" alt="" width="726" height="1121" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Evidence.jpg 564w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Evidence-259x400.jpg 259w" sizes="(max-width: 726px) 100vw, 726px" /></h3>
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		<title>What is Abuse of Process? When the Government Fails Us</title>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 05:21:17 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[What is Abuse of Process? Abuse of process is the intentional misuse of legal proceedings for a wrongful or unlaProbable cause is defined as the reasonable belief, foundedwful purpose. It can occur in civil or criminal cases &#160; Abuse of Process &#8211; The Basics and Practicalities Our legal system is a powerful tool and the [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-abuse-of-process-when-the-government-fails-us/"><span style="color: #ff0000;">What is Abuse of Process?</span></a></h1>
<p>Abuse of process is the intentional misuse of legal proceedings for a wrongful or unlaProbable cause is defined as the reasonable belief, foundedwful purpose. It can occur in civil or criminal cases</p>
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<h1 class="page-header">Abuse of Process &#8211; The Basics and Practicalities</h1>
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<p>Our legal system is a powerful tool and the ability to use it to redress wrongs is a cherished right of the average American. Even in the 19th Century Americans were famous for enjoying the use of the courts and employing them far more than the average European. Unlike most of the world, our courts are a powerful branch of our State and Federal governments and remain the most vital arena to protect individual liberties. See our articles on <strong>American Litigation</strong> and <strong>Criminal Law</strong>. The average American can use these powerful institutions to confront and seek relief against the largest entity and has the same rights to the legal process as the giant corporations-if the fight can be afforded. See our article on <strong>Buying Justice.</strong></p>
<p>The downside of such a system is that it can be abused. The turmoil and expense of litigation can cause significant harm in and of itself and may be a weapon to injure another even if the underlying case allegedly justifying the action is not considered viable by the very party bringing it. The case, itself, becomes the tool used to harm another.</p>
<p>That can be actionable but the care of the courts to assure ready access to the courts for all persons creates a tremendous practical burden on the plaintiff to prevail in such an action. They are not impossible to win. They are difficult and this article shall discuss the elements, the usual issues confronted and the practicalities of bringing…or defending…an action for abuse of process.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>The Basic Elements of the Action:</strong></p>
<p>The term ‘process’ refers to the proceedings in any civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution and usually describes the formal notice or writ used by a court to exercise jurisdiction over a person or property. Such process compels the defending party to appear in court, or comply with an order of the Court. It may take the form of a <strong>summons, mandate, subpoena, warrant</strong>, or other written demand issued by a court. When one files suit, one normally has a summons issued by the court which compels the defendant to appear within thirty days to contest the matter. See <strong>American Litigation.</strong></p>
<p><u>Abuse of process</u> refers to the improper use of a civil or criminal legal procedure for an unintended, malicious, or perverse reason. <strong>It is the malicious </strong><strong>and deliberate misuse of regularly issued civil </strong><strong>or criminal court process that is not justified by the underlying legal action</strong>.</p>
<p>Abuse of process includes litigation actions in bad faith that is meant to delay the delivery of justice. Examples include serving legal papers on someone which have not actually been filed with the intent to intimidate, or filing a lawsuit without a genuine legal basis in order to obtain information, force payment through fear of legal entanglement or gain an unfair or illegal advantage. <strong>The determination of what in unfair and wrong is for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.</strong></p>
<p>It is important to understand that simply because the other party has a weak case does not mean that there was abuse of process, even if that party eventually loses the case. The key elements of abuse of process is the malicious and deliberate misuseof regularly issued civil or criminal court process that is not justified by the underlying legal action, and that the abuser of process is interested only in accomplishing some improper purpose similar to the proper object of the process. Abuse of process is an intentional<strong> tort.</strong> Abuse of process encompasses the entire range of procedures incident to the litigation process such as discovery proceedings, the noticing of depositions and the issuing of subpoenas. <u>Pellegrino Food Prods. Co. v. City of Warren</u>, 136 F. Supp. 2d 391, 407 (W.D. Pa. 2000).</p>
<p>The key is state of mind and that is one reason such cases may be difficult to prove. Being wrong, being stubborn, indeed, being stupid is not enough. One must intentionally seek to abuse the system. As one client put it, “My problem is that the fellow was too stupid to plot against me. He simply really though his absurd claim was a good one. I wish he had been smart enough to plot against me!”</p>
<p>Lawyers who are proven guilty of intentional abuse of process can be subject to discipline and punishment. Sometimes abuse of process may occur accidentally, such as an honest belief in mistaken facts used to bring a lawsuit against an improper party, but such missteps may be corrected through voluntary measures. In short, once a mistake is discovered, if it is promptly corrected, abuse of process does not lie.</p>
<p>Note, however, that, no claim for abuse of process would lie where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. <u>Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder,</u> 434 Pa. Super. 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).</p>
<p>Cognizable injury for abuse of process is limited to the harm caused by the misuse of process. It does not include harm such as conviction and confinement resulting from the process’s being carried through to its lawful conclusion. <u>Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994).</u></p>
<p>In <u>McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn</u>. 177, 191, 134 A. 810, 815 (1926), the court held that expenses incurred by the plaintiff in defending herself against crimes charged against her were not compensable in a suit for abuse of process, since “damages for abuse of process must be confined to the damage flowing from such abuse, and be confined to the period of time involved in taking plaintiff, after her arrest, to [defendant&#8217;s] store, and the detention there.”</p>
<p>The following elements constitute the intentional tort of abuse of process.</p>
<ul>
<li>The malicious and deliberate misuse or of regularly issued civil or criminal court process that is not justified by the underlying legal action.</li>
<li>The abuser of process is interested only in accomplishingsome improper purpose similar to the proper object of the process.</li>
</ul>
<p>A wrongful use of processes such as attachment of property, unjustified arrest, subpoenas to testify, executions on property, unfounded criminal prosecution, and garnishee orders are considered as abuse of process.</p>
<p>A typical example is found at <u>In Drum v. Bleau, Fox &amp; Associates, </u>107 Cal. App. 4th 1009 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003), defendants represented a client in a legal malpractice action against plaintiff. Judgment was entered in favor of the client, but was stayed. Defendants obtained an execution order from the Court while the stay was in effect. As part of execution, all funds in the plaintiff’s accounts were frozen because of the levy. It was argued by the plaintiff that the defendant purposefully violated the stay for harming him and with the intention to deprive him of his property and legal rights. The court concluded that the defendants were liable for abuse of process.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>The Need to Win the First Round and Motive:</strong></p>
<p>In order to establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of either a criminal or civil proceeding, a plaintiff has to prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice. See <em>Babb </em>v.<em> Superior Court</em> (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 845 (92 Cal. Rptr.) 179, 479 P.2d 379; <em>Grant </em>v.<em> Moore</em> (1866) 29 Cal. 644, 648; <em>Albertson </em>v.<em> Raboff</em> (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 383 (295 P.2d 405).</p>
<p>The same set of facts may lead to different torts of malicious prosecution and malicious use of process. <u>Franco v. Mudford</u>, 2002 Mass. App. Div. 63, 2002 WL 539065 (2002). In some jurisdictions, the term “malicious prosecution” denotes the wrongful initiation of criminal proceedings, while the term “malicious use of process” denotes the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.</p>
<p><u>Motive as an Element:</u></p>
<p>It is important to note that ulterior motive or purpose required in an abuse of process action can be in the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage that is not properly involved in the proceeding.<em> Nienstedt v. Wetzel,</em> 133 Ariz. 348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). However, if the process is used only for the purpose for which it was designed and intended, then mere ill will or spite towards an adverse party in a proceeding will not constitute an ulterior or improper motive<em> Sage International, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co.,</em> 556 F. Supp. 381 ( E.D. Mich. 1982).</p>
<p>The question whether malice is an element of abuse of process depends upon the jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions malice is not considered as a necessary element of the tort of abuse of process except where punitive or exemplary damages are sought. In some other jurisdictions, proof of malice is required in order to sustain a claim for abuse of process.</p>
<p>In <em>Montgomery GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Nunn</em>, the plaintiff was the buyer and defendant was the truck dealer. The plaintiff purchased a truck from the defendant that was plagued with problems and was eventually subjected to a <strong>garagemans’ lien</strong> for repairs. The defendant refused to release the possession of the vehicle to the plaintiff until he paid the cost of repairs, while the plaintiff refused to pay the bill. The plaintiff took the truck while on a test drive and the defendant filed a criminal complaint.</p>
<p>The plaintiff contended that the defendant used the writ of attachment to attach the truck and trailer for the improper purpose of mental and financial draining of plaintiff and also an ulterior motive by coercing plaintiff to pay a false and inflated bill. The plaintiff claimed this to the tort of abuse of process.</p>
<p>The court observed that the defendant did nothing more than pursuing his claim for the repair bill. Moreover, plaintiff admitted that he owed some money to the defendant. The court found that the defendant used legal process to collect an unpaid account secured by a lien on plaintiff’s truck and held that there is no abuse of process.</p>
<p>What makes such cases often difficult is that malice or wrongful intent is an element requiring proof as to the state of mind of the accused. Malice denotes that condition of mind manifested by intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. <em>State v. Burlison,</em> 255 Neb. 190 (Neb. 1998). Malice is evidenced either when the accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind or committed any purposeful and cruel act without any provocation. <em>Branch v. Commonwealth,</em> 14 Va. App. 836 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).</p>
<p>However, the question whether malice is an element of abuse of process depends upon the jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions malice is not considered as a necessary element of the tort of abuse of process except where punitive or exemplary damages are sought. In other jurisdictions, proof of malice is required in order to sustain a claim for abuse of process.</p>
<p>Actual malice is often not required in an abuse of process claim. The improper purpose element of an abuse of process claim can take the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself. Therefore, it is the use of the process to coerce or extort that is the abuse, and need not be accompanied by any ill will<u>. Swicegood v. Lott</u>, 379 S.C. 346 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).</p>
<p>In <em>Gause v. First Bank of Marianna</em>, the appellee bank filed a suit against appellant demanding payment on a note. Appellant filed a counterclaim against appellee bank for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Appellant contended that malice was not an element of a cause of action in abuse of process. The court observed that malice is not an element of abuse of process in the particular case law.</p>
<p>Example: In one case known to the writer, a tenant negotiated to buy a grocery business and obtained an assignment of the lease from the landlord. The parties agreed to extend the lease for three years. The tenant signed the lease for a corporation that became nonexistent two days after execution of the lease. When the lease expired, the parties operated on a month to month lease. The landlord insisted the tenant sign a long term lease, but the tenant declined. The landlord notified the tenant to either sign a long term lease or vacate the property before a certain date and the tenant rejected both the conditions. The landlord filed an action for eviction and the tenant contended that the defendant was not him, but the corporation. The landlord later dismissed his action against the tenant and sued the corporation. The court found the evidence did not support findings of the wrongful use of the eviction process and the existence of malice necessary to show the landlord’s abuse of process.</p>
<p><u>Role of Probable Cause to Bring Action</u></p>
<p>Probable cause is defined as the reasonable belief, founded on known facts established after a reasonable pre filing investigation, that a claim can be established to the satisfaction of a court. <em>Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson</em>, 133 N.M. 114 (N.M. 2002). A want of probable cause need not be established in order to claim for abuse of process. <em>United States v. Chatham,</em> 415 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ga. 1976). However, facts which shows that the person commencing the litigation had knowledge or had reason to know that his/her claim was groundless will be relevant to prove that the process was used for an ulterior purpose <em>Fishman v. Brooks,</em> 396 Mass. 643 (Mass. 1986)].</p>
<p><u>Need for End of Original Action Favorable to Plaintiff as Requirement</u></p>
<p>According to common law rule, an action for abuse of process cannot be instituted by a party who is not discharged of guilt. However, favorable termination of prior proceedings is not always considered as an element of a cause of action for abuse of process in all jurisdictions. There can be a favorable settlement or abandonment of the claim. In most jurisdictions, however, favorable termination is required and as an element of practicality, if you failed to win the underlying claim, you will find the Trier of fact seldom impressed with your abuse of process claim.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Damages:</strong></p>
<p>It is usually required that a person who brings a claim for abuse of process will have to plead and prove that injury or damages resulted from the irregularity of the process. In such cases, mere vexation or harassment is <em>not</em> regarded as sufficient loss to give rise to the tort <em>Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson,</em> 110 Cal. App. 3d 868 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1980). Note that punitive damages may lie. See our article on <strong>Measurement of Damages.</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Persons Liable:</strong></p>
<p>Persons using a legal process with malice in order to attain a personal purpose not similar to what it the crux of the litigation are liable for intentional tort of abuse of process. Any person who procures unnecessary and improper initiation of a process by a third party will also be liable for damages for abuse of process. If a non-litigant who actively participate in a civil proceeding that results in an improper initiation of proceeding, s/he can be liable for damages for abuse of process.</p>
<p>The use of criminal process in the court system in an effort to collect a civil debt will support an action for abuse of process. <u>McCornell v. City of Jackson</u>, 489 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (S.D. Miss. 200).In an action for abuse of process, the injured person has a remedy against anyone who intentionally procures, participate in, aid, or abet the abuse of process. Anyone who advises or consents to, adopts or ratifies the abusive acts will also liable as joint tortfeasors.</p>
<p><u>IMMUNITY OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS</u></p>
<p>A judicial officer is generally exempted from civil liability for abuse of process if:</p>
<ul>
<li>The jurisdiction of the officer is complete and attaches to the person and the subject matter in connection with the alleged illegal acts that are committed;</li>
<li>The officer acts within the scope of his/her jurisdiction and in a judicial capacity.</li>
</ul>
<p>However, a judicial officer can be held liable for abuse of process if the officer acts without any jurisdiction and commits the abuse while acting under the pretense of his/her official capacity. In <em>Osbekoff v. Mallory</em>, 188 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1971), an owner’s vehicle was involved in an accident which was driven by another person. The owner appeared before the mayor who was acting in his role as magistrate, to answer certain criminal charges. The mayor ordered that the possession of the owner’s vehicle will be retained by the mayor until the owner pays off certain civil debts. The owner filed an action against the mayor alleging abuse of process.</p>
<p>The court observed that the mayor was not judicially immune from the owner’s lawsuit. The owner’s presence in the mayor’s court to answer to a criminal charge did not give the mayor any jurisdiction to hear and determine the owner’s property rights in the vehicle.</p>
<p><u>ATTORNEYS?</u></p>
<p>An attorney is protected from the liability for defamation that occurs during a judicial proceeding. However, such protection may not provide an attorney with an absolute defense to liability for abuse of process. <em>Alexandru v. Dowd</em>, 79 Conn. App. 434 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). Therefore, an attorney can be made liable for damages for abuse of process for acts that includes personal acts, or acts of others instigated and carried on by the attorney.<em> Lambert v. Breton,</em> 127 Me. 510 (Me. 1929).</p>
<p>A plaintiff has to establish that the alleged misconduct resulted primarily from the attorney’s ulterior motive or malice to state a claim for abuse of process against an attorney.<em> Journeymen, Inc. v. Judson</em>, 45 Ore. App. 249 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)</p>
<p>A mere institution of legal action by an attorney will not constitute abuse of process, even it is done with an improper purpose or motive. However, if it is proved that the attorney performed some additional act which is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings, then the attorney can be held liable of abuse of process.<em> Epps v. Vogel,</em> 454 A.2d 320 (D.C. 1982)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Practicalities:</strong></p>
<p>We often receive calls from outraged victims of our judicial system who, after spending tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars winning a case, see that the cost benefit did not justify the exercise and also realized they had no choice on spending the money since they were sued. Often they comment that the other side must have known that their case was nonsense and that they should be liable for all the fees incurred…doesn’t abuse of process apply?</p>
<p>First, attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party if the right homework was done in the contractual setting. See our article <strong>The Acid Test Clause</strong>. Planning for the conflicts that are inevitable in the world of business requires planning for the cost of legal conflict.</p>
<p>More importantly, the right to use our courts is jealously guarded by the courts and all judges and juries know that someone must lose in every case brought. Simply because you win does not mean abuse of process arose and you will need additional powerful evidence to achieve a good chance for prevailing in that cause of action.</p>
<p>Most successful cases now derive from access to documentation, such as e mail admissions in which a party admits knowing their case is groundless but states they will continue to “punish” the other side. See <strong>Measurement of Damages. </strong>Defendants sometimes make stupid admissions to third parties or act so outrageously that such evidence may be developed. But the simple fact is that bringing an abuse of action case is difficult and one must overcome the initial reaction of the courts that one is seeking to ban access to the courts or punish someone simply for losing the case. One must have effective evidence of inappropriate motivation…usually an admission…before one can have confidence in the case. Do not confuse your victory in the case with suddenly having a cause of action for abuse of process against the loser.</p>
<p>That said, there are those who see the courts as games and the use of the process as a tool to injure others not due to the verdict possible but due to the process itself. It is akin to a blocker in football who seeks to harm the other player, not to block the player out of the way of a running back. If it can be proven damages may lie. And if you are a potential defendant who has just lost a case and are worried about facing that danger, if your motives were simply to present your case and seek the relief sought, then you probably are not in peril. They remain difficult cases to win. J</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/abuse-process-basics-and-practicalities" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
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<blockquote>
<h1 style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">What is Abuse of Process? &#8211; </span><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em>When the Government Fails Us </em></span></h1>
</blockquote>
<p>An <b>abuse of process</b> is the unjustified or unreasonable use of legal proceedings or process to further a cause of action by an applicant or plaintiff in an action. It is a claim made by the respondent or defendant that the other party is misusing or perverting regularly issued court process (civil or criminal) not justified by the underlying legal action. In common law it is classified as a tort distinct from the intentional tort of malicious prosecution. It is a tort that involves misuse of the public right of access to the courts. In the United States it may be described as a legal process being commenced to gain an unfair litigation advantage.</p>
<p>The elements of a valid cause of action for abuse of process in most common law jurisdictions are as follows: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive underlying the use of process, and (2) some act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Abuse of process can be distinguished from malicious prosecution, in that abuse of process typically does not require proof of malice, lack of probable cause in procuring issuance of the process, or a termination favorable to the plaintiff, all of which are essential to a claim of malicious prosecution. Typically, the person who abuses process is interested only in accomplishing some improper purpose that is collateral to the proper object of the process and that offends justice, such as an unjustified arrest or an unfounded criminal prosecution. Subpoenas to testify, attachments of property, executions on property, garnishments, and other provisional remedies are among the types of &#8220;process&#8221; considered to be capable of abuse</p>
<h2 style="font-weight: 500;">abuse of process</h2>
<p>Abuse of process is a common law <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort">tort</a> that involves the misuse of legal process(es) for an ulterior purpose. Abuse of process is one of several <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/actionable">actionable</a> offenses aimed at discouraging bad-faith <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/litigation">litigation</a> attempts. Indeed, courts hold the authority to sanction parties for bringing <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/frivolous">frivolous action</a>, and parties also have a right to action under the claim of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/malicious_prosecution">malicious prosecution</a>.</p>
<p>Generally, the elements for abuse of process are: (1) the use of an illegal or improper use of process; (2) an ulterior motive or improper purpose; and in some jurisdictions (3) harm to a litigant. For the purposes of abuse of process, an <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/arbitration">arbitration</a> proceeding is a judicial proceeding. Abuse of process <a href="https://casetext.com/case/state-v-rendelman-1">has been described</a> as misusing a &#8220;criminal or civil process against another party for a purpose different than the proceeding&#8217;s intended purposes&#8221; and thereby causing the party damages (e.g., arrest, seizure of property, or economic injury).</p>
<p>A classic case of abuse of process entails an attempt by a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plaintiff">plaintiff</a> to coerce the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defendant">defendant</a> to do some collateral thing which they could not be legally and regularly compelled to do. <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ar-supreme-court/1258000.html">For example</a>, in a case where a former employer sought to bring criminal charges to its employee to recover stolen money, while knowing that the employee was not responsible for the theft, the court held the employer <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/liable">liable</a> for abuse of process for initiating criminal charges while knowing that the charges were unsupported by <a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-probable-cause-and-how-is-probable-cause-established/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">probable cause</a>.</p>
<p>In regard to defenses to abuse of process, there is disagreement among jurisdictions on whether good-faith reliance on an attorney&#8217;s advice in bringing action serves as a complete defense. Still, attorneys who bring the improper process can be held liable to the damaged party as well.  <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/abuse_of_process" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<h2><span id="Distinct_from_malicious_prosecution" class="mw-headline">Distinct from malicious prosecution</span></h2>
<p>A cause of action for abuse of process is similar to the action for malicious prosecution in that both actions are based on and involve the improper use of the courts and legal systems. The primary difference between the two legal actions is that malicious prosecution concerns the malicious or wrongful commencement of an action, while, on the other hand, abuse of process concerns the improper use of the legal process after process has already been issued and a suit has commenced. In abuse of process, the legal process is misused for some purpose which is considered improper under the law. Thus technically, the service of process itself—in the form of a summons—could be considered abuse of process under the right circumstances, e.g. fraudulent or malicious manipulation of the process itself, but in malicious prosecution, the wrongful act is the actual filing of the suit itself for improper and malicious reasons. The three requirements of malice, lack of probable cause in the issuance of the process, and a termination of the prior proceeding favorable to the plaintiff, are essential elements for malicious prosecution. Most jurisdictions do not require any of these three elements in order to make out a prima facie case for abuse of process.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><span style="color: #ff0000;">READ UP MORE&#8230;..</span> on <span style="color: #ff0000;">Malicious Prosecution</span> and <span style="color: #008000;">Thompson Vs. Clark</span> and other SCOTUS Rulings <a
</p>
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		<title>What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?</title>
		<link>https://goodshepherdmedia.net/whats-the-difference-between-abuse-of-process-malicious-prosecution-and-false-arrest/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Truth News]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Feb 2025 19:11:32 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution? &#160; Which of the following cases fits into the tort of abuse of process? and&#8230;  Which of the following cases fits into the tort of malicious prosecution? &#160; &#160; In February 2015, Dr. John Costino and his wife Barbara filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit against Cape [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1 class="entry-header" style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/whats-the-difference-between-abuse-of-process-malicious-prosecution-and-false-arrest/"><span style="color: #0000ff;">What’s the Difference</span> between <span style="color: #ff0000;">Abuse of Process</span> and <span style="color: #ff0000;">Malicious Prosecution</span>?</a></h1>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<blockquote>
<h2 class="entry-header" style="text-align: center;"><em><span style="color: #339966;">Which of the following cases fits into the tort of abuse of process? </span></em><br />
<em><span style="color: #339966;">and&#8230; </span></em><br />
<em><span style="color: #339966;">Which of the following cases fits into the tort of malicious prosecution?</span></em></h2>
</blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In February 2015, Dr. John Costino and his wife Barbara filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit against Cape May County. He was accused approximately six years prior to the lawsuit of distributing illegal painkillers. He was acquitted in 2012.</p>
<p>In 2007, the case of Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris resulted in the defendant obtaining a judgment for several thousands of dollars. Harris feared the plaintiff, Ritche, wouldn’t pay. So Harris obtained a preliminary injunction against Rictche and all companies he had ownership interests in, including Pinewood Homes. However, Pinewood wasn’t a part of Richie’s lawsuit because Ritchie was only a shareholder. Pinewood then sued Harris for trying to maliciously coerce it into paying Ritchie’s judgment. <img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-14029 alignright" src="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/6a00d83455b3db69e201bb0869a409970d-320wi.png" alt="" width="283" height="424" srcset="https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/6a00d83455b3db69e201bb0869a409970d-320wi.png 283w, https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/6a00d83455b3db69e201bb0869a409970d-320wi-267x400.png 267w" sizes="(max-width: 283px) 100vw, 283px" /></p>
<p>In 2014, a federal jury ruled Homicide Detective Dwayne violated Hephzibah Olivia Lord’s civil rights for maliciously arresting her. The arrest was for a murder she didn’t commit. Her boyfriend allegedly drank an energy drink, vodka, then committed suicide.</p>
<p>Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution are similar on the surface, but they have essential differences.</p>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Abuse of Process <span style="color: #000000;">aka</span><span style="color: #339966;"> </span></strong></span><span style="color: #339966;"><strong>Abu$e of Proce$$</strong></span></h2>
<p>Let’s say someone doesn’t have a reasonable basis to file a lawsuit against you. Maybe he subpoenas you, continuously files motions, or seeks a retaining order. These are examples of abuse of process. Abuse of process occurs when someone uses the legitimate judicial process for reasons not intended.</p>
<p>With this tort, a plaintiff has to prove four elements for a successful claim:</p>
<ol>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #339966;">The defendant used the process</span></strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #339966;">The defendant had an ulterior motive</span></strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #339966;">The defendant misused the process</span></strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong><span style="color: #339966;">The plaintiff incurred injuries and damages from the result of the abuse of process</span></strong></em></li>
</ol>
<p>To prove element one, you show the defendant used the “process” such as filing:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Counterclaims</strong></li>
<li><strong>Appeals</strong></li>
<li><strong>Motions for sanction</strong></li>
<li><strong>Summons requests</strong></li>
<li><strong>Change of location</strong></li>
<li>
<h3><span style="color: #339966;"><em><strong>trying to hold someone on warrants that are based on charges you plan on dropping as they are malicious but you still request them to turn themselves in and be held on the bond for those crimes for which you know have no merit!</strong></em></span></h3>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Showing facts and circumstances usually determine whether there was an ulterior motive. The court looks at the intent of the plaintiff and defendant. “Having an ulterior motive” is defined as attempting to gain an economic, business, or legal advantage.</p>
<p>A misuse of process generally exists if the defendant:</p>
<ul>
<li>Used the process in a way not intended, contemplated, or authorized by law</li>
<li>Used the process in an intentional way and knew it would be misused</li>
</ul>
<p>The best way to think about abuse of process is with two words: improper purpose. The defendant had an improper purpose when filing any lawsuit against the plaintiff.</p>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Malicious Prosecution <span style="color: #000000;">aka</span> </strong></span><span style="color: #339966;"><strong>Maliciou$ Prosecution</strong></span></h2>
<p>Let’s say you were at work at 4 p.m. on Tuesday. That day an individual robbed a bank near your workplace. It just happens to be where your ex-spouse worked. You have an alibi and witnesses who place you at work. You didn’t commit the crime. In fact, there’s no reasonable way you could have committed the crime. You’re charged and prosecuted for a committing a bank robbery. Later, the charges are dropped or you’re found not guilty. This is referred to as malicious prosecution.</p>
<h3><strong>This tort has four elements a plaintiff must show to win her case:</strong></h3>
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #339966;"><em><strong>The plaintiff was prosecuted for a crime she didn’t commit and found not guilty</strong></em></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #339966;"><em><strong>No probable cause existed to show the plaintiff was guilty of committing the crime</strong></em></span></li>
<li>
<h3><span style="color: #339966;"><em><strong>The prosecutor knew no probable cause existed and still continued to prosecute and try to prove guilt</strong></em></span></h3>
</li>
<li><span style="color: #000000;"><em>In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff must also prove she suffered injuries because of the criminal prosecution beyond typical mental distress.  </em></span></li>
</ol>
<p>You’ve probably figured out by now which of the cases are abuse of process or malicious prosecution. Just in case you’re not sure:</p>
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong>Malicious prosecution</strong></em></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong>Abuse of process</strong></em></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #0000ff;"><em><strong>Malicious prosecution</strong></em></span></li>
</ol>
<p><strong><em>Although both torts are similar, they are distinct. As you’ve read, malicious prosecution typically happens after a criminal case where a person was not guilty of the crime. However, they were still prosecuted for it anyway. With abuse of process, an individual is trying to gain an advantage by filing a frivolous lawsuit against someone. <a href="https://legalmatch.typepad.com/personalinjury/2015/08/whats-the-difference-between-abuse-of-process-and-malicious-prosecution.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></em></strong></p>
<hr />
<h1 id="page-title" style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #ff0000;">Malicious</span> <span style="color: #339966;">Prosecution</span>, <span style="color: #ff0000;">Abuse</span> of <span style="color: #339966;">Process</span>, and <span style="color: #ff0000;">False A</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">r</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">r</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">e</span><span style="color: #ff0000;">s</span><span style="color: #0000ff;">t</span></h1>
<blockquote>
<h2><em><span style="color: #008000; font-size: 24pt;">People falsely accused of crimes, and prosecuted as a result, have been severely harmed</span></em></h2>
</blockquote>
<h2><span style="color: #ff0000;"><strong>Malicious Prosecution</strong></span></h2>
<p>Criminal prosecution is malicious if law enforcement pursues groundless charges. Examples of malicious prosecutions include situations in which law enforcement:</p>
<ul>
<li><em><strong>charges a person with a crime to cover up police misconduct, such as excessive use of force or false imprisonment;</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>intends to punish a person by harassing them with criminal proceedings;</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>intends to ruin a person’s reputation by bringing unfounded criminal charges against them; or</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>charges a person with a crime to divert attention from the actual perpetrator.</strong></em></li>
</ul>
<p>A private person who lies to the police, and causes law enforcement to file false criminal charges, may also be liable for malicious prosecution.</p>
<p>A person forced to defend a groundless civil suit likewise suffers damages and may be able to recover for malicious prosecution.</p>
<p>To recover on a state-law malicious-prosecution claim, an Ohio plaintiff must prove:</p>
<ul>
<li><em><strong>(a) malice in instituting or continuing the criminal or civil legal proceeding;</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>(b) lack of probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe the allegations; and</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>(c) termination of the prosecution or civil lawsuit in favor of the accused.</strong></em></li>
</ul>
<p>Malice is defined as the state of mind under which a person intentionally does a wrongful act with the intent to inflict injury. But courts focus on the lack of probable cause, and malice may be inferred from its absence. Under Ohio law, a plaintiff cannot sue for malicious prosecution unless the underlying process or legal action has been revolved in the accused’s favor.</p>
<h3><strong>Relationship to “Abuse of Process” and “False Arrest”</strong></h3>
<p><strong><span style="color: #008000;">Another tort claim</span> </strong>for litigation misconduct is abuse of process. Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that a person can still sue for abuse of process where there were reasonable grounds to pursue the case, but the lawsuit was initiated with an improper or ulterior purpose. For example, trying to tie up property in a divorce proceeding for the purpose of getting the other spouse to agree to different child-visitation rights may constitute abuse of process. Abuse-of-process claims, however, are difficult to prove and rarely successful.</p>
<p>Other available claims include false arrest, which may lie where police arrest someone without probable cause. Probable cause requires that police have reasonable trustworthy information sufficient to warrant an officer of reasonable caution to believe the arrestee committed, or is in the process of committing, an offense. Typically, acting on a warrant is a complete defense to a false-arrest claim.</p>
<h3><strong>Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest as a Civil-Rights Violation</strong></h3>
<p>In addition to any state-law claims, both malicious (criminal) prosecution and false arrest are recognized as separate violations of a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, where malicious-prosecution claims involve an arrest or criminal proceeding, plaintiffs may be able to file in either state or federal court.</p>
<p>Proof of malice is not required to succeed on a claim of malicious criminal prosecution under the U.S. Constitution. But here a plaintiff must prove:</p>
<ul>
<li><em><strong>(a) criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute;</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>(b) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>(c) as a consequence of the legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure; and</strong></em></li>
<li><em><strong>(d) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.</strong></em></li>
</ul>
<h3><strong>What To Do If You Believe You Have Been a Victim of Malicious Prosecution</strong></h3>
<p>Especially in this class of cases, usually involving an abuse of power or oversight in the justice system, it can be unclear what options are available. With shaken confidence in the efficacy and access to justice provided by the judicial system, it may appear as if there is nowhere else to turn for help. But this is not the case. <a href="https://www.chandralaw.com/practice-areas/malicious-prosecution-abuse-of-process-and-false-arrest" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
<hr />
<div class="main-content">
<div id="region-title" class="region grid-region-title">
<h1 class="page-header">Lawsuits for Malicious Prosecution or Abuse of Process</h1>
</div>
</div>
<div class="large-paragraph">
<div id="region-abstract" class="region grid-region-abstract">
<h2 class="page-abstract">If someone has wrongfully sued you or prosecuted you for a crime, you may have a valid malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim.</h2>
<p>Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are related types of civil lawsuits where one person (the plaintiff) sues another person (the defendant) for, in a prior case, trying to use the legal system against the plaintiff in an inappropriate manner. The prior case can be either criminal or civil in nature. This article discusses the elements of a malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim.</p>
<h3>Difference between Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process</h3>
<p>While the two claims are similar, malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims have some essential differences.</p>
<p>A plaintiff can sue for abuse of process when a defendant starts legal proceedings with the intention of obtaining results for which the process was not designed. A plaintiff can sue for malicious prosecution when a defendant &#8220;maliciously&#8221; prosecutes a criminal case or uses a civil proceeding against the plaintiff when the defendant knows he or she doesn&#8217;t have a case. In addition, the plaintiff must have already obtained a &#8220;favorable termination&#8221; of the defendant&#8217;s malicious case (the case was dismissed or there was a ruling in the plaintiff&#8217;s favor, for example) before he or she can sue for malicious prosecution.</p>
<h3>Essential Elements of Abuse of Process</h3>
<p>As we mentioned, a plaintiff can sue for abuse of process when a defendant starts a legal process intending to obtain results for which the process was not designed.</p>
<p>A &#8220;legal process&#8221; can be any part of a lawsuit, not simply the entire lawsuit. For example, a defendant&#8217;s personal injury lawsuit might have been legitimate, but the use of a particular deposition or other smaller, discrete aspect of the lawsuit may not have been. Even though the lawsuit was valid, the plaintiff can still sue for abuse of process based on the illegitimate deposition.</p>
<p>The best way to think of the &#8220;improper purpose&#8221; requirement in an abuse of process claim is that, although the defendant had a technical right to use the legal process, he or she did so to extort something else from the plaintiff—or example, trying to tie up property in a divorce proceeding in order to get the other spouse to agree to different child visitation rights. It&#8217;s worth noting that abuse of process claims are notoriously difficult to prove and are often unsuccessful.</p>
<h3>Essential Elements of Malicious Prosecution</h3>
<p>A successful malicious prosecution claim usually requires all of the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>the defendant began or continued a criminal or civil legal proceeding without reasonable grounds to believe the basis for it (or the allegations made in it)</li>
<li>the defendant had a purpose other than simply getting a judgment in the proceeding, and</li>
<li>the proceeding has terminated in the favor of the person that was being prosecuted or sued (i.e. the future plaintiff in the malicious prosecution suit must first win the suit against him or her).</li>
</ul>
<p>Let&#8217;s look at these elements a little more closely.</p>
<h4>A Proceeding</h4>
<p>A criminal proceeding is any process where the government can punish a person for offenses ranging from homicide to a parking ticket.</p>
<p>A civil proceeding is typically where the plaintiff is not a governmental entity—although the defendant might be—and the plaintiff is suing for money damages or an injunction.</p>
<p>Even if the people bringing the criminal or civil proceeding think they have a winning case and are suing for a legitimate reason when they begin the case, they can be guilty of malicious prosecution if they discover a reason they cannot win during the case, and continue the case for improper motives anyway.</p>
<h4>Reasonable Grounds</h4>
<p>The person bringing the original prosecution or lawsuit must have reasonable grounds (also called probable cause), i.e. a reasonable person in their place would think that the legal action was legitimate and had a chance of winning.</p>
<p>However, if the person bringing the prosecution or lawsuit <em>knows</em> that the action is illegitimate, there is no need to prove that a hypothetical reasonable person would also think it was illegitimate.</p>
<h4>Improper Purpose</h4>
<p>Typically, if a lack of reasonable grounds is proved, an improper purpose will be assumed. This means that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action does not necessarily need to prove that the defendant had an improper purpose. However, if the defendant can prove that he or she had a proper purpose, the plaintiff will not win.</p>
<p>For example, if a defendant was only doing what his or her attorney recommended, even though the lawsuit had no probable cause, then the defendant may not be liable for malicious prosecution if she unreasonably, but <em>mistakenly</em> thought her lawsuit was legitimate.</p>
<h4>Favorable Termination</h4>
<p>Finally, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit must have successfully defended against and won the previous illegitimate lawsuit. In other words, if a person was convicted of criminal charges or had to pay damages in a civil lawsuit, he or she probably cannot sue for malicious prosecution based on that criminal or civil legal action. <a href="https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/lawsuits-malicious-prosecution-abuse-process.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<hr />
<header class="post__header">
<h1 class="post__title">Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process</h1>
</header>
<div class="post__content single-content">
<p>     Malicious prosecution is a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law">common law</a> intentional <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort">tort</a> aimed at actors, whether private or government, which commence or institute, or cause to be commenced or instituted, unwarranted or unjustified legal proceedings against a Defendant.  At common law, the elements of a Malicious Prosecution claim included:</p>
<ol>
<li>intentionally (and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malice">maliciously</a>) instituting and pursuing (or causing to be instituted or pursued) a legal action (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_law_%28common_law%29">civil</a> or <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_law">criminal</a>);</li>
<li>that is brought without <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probable_cause">probable cause</a> and;</li>
<li>that action is dismissed in favor of the victim of the malicious prosecution.</li>
</ol>
<p>In some jurisdictions, the term “malicious prosecution”, which denotes the wrongful initiation of criminal proceedings, is distinguished from the “malicious use of process” which denotes the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.</p>
<p>In Nevada, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, as outlined in Chapman v. City of Reno, are similar to the common law elements and are as follows:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ol>
<li>a lack of probable cause to commence the prior action;</li>
<li>malice;</li>
<li>favorable termination of the prior action; and</li>
<li>damages.</li>
</ol>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Generally, criminal prosecuting attorneys and judges are protected from tort liability for malicious prosecution by doctrines of prosecutorial immunity and judicial immunity.  However, a malicious prosecution claim will prevail where intentional conduct that rises to the level of either maliciousness or gross or reckless indifference to the consequences of a prosecutor or judges actions can be proved by clear and convincing evidence.</p>
<p><strong><em>Abuse of Process</em></strong></p>
<p>Abuse of process is a cause of action sounding in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort">tort</a> arising from one party making a malicious and deliberate misuse or perversion of the courts and the law not justified by the underlying legal action and is to be distinguished from malicious prosecution in that it is aimed at the use and misuse of legal process for illegitimate purposes, regardless of the merit of the underlying claim.</p>
<p>At common law, the elements of an abuse of process claim were as follows:</p>
<ol>
<li>the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive underlying the use of process, and</li>
<li>some act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.<a name="cite_ref-01"></a></li>
</ol>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Abuse of process can be distinguished from <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malicious_prosecution">malicious prosecution</a>, in that abuse of process typically does not require proof of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malice">malice</a>, lack of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probable_cause">probable cause</a> in procuring issuance of the process, or a termination favorable to the plaintiff, all of which are essential to a claim of malicious prosecution<a name="cite_ref-1"></a>.</p>
<p>In Nevada, the elements required to prevail on an abuse of process claim are similar to those existing at common law: (1) an ulterior purpose other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.  <em>Kovacs v. Acosta</em>.  An “ulterior purpose” includes any “improper motive” underlying the issuance of legal process.  <em>See</em> <em>Laxalt v. McClatchy</em>, 622 F. Supp. 737, (D. Nev. 1985).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>“Process,” as used here means any method used to acquire jurisdiction over a person or specific property that is issued under the official seal of a court<a name="cite_ref-2"></a>, administrative agency or government entity.  Subpoenas to testify, attachments of property, executions on property, garnishments, and other provisional remedies are among the types of “process” considered to be capable of abuse.</p>
<p>As discussed above, the distinguishing factor between abuse of process claims and malicious prosecution is the purpose for which the complained of legal proceedings are instituted; generally, the person who abuses process wishes only to harass, molest, bother, annoy, pester or otherwise injure the other by use of the law and courts in such a way and for such a purpose as offends justice, such as an unjustified arrest or an unfounded criminal prosecution. <a href="https://ericroylawfirm.com/personal_injury_arti/malicious-prosecution-and-abuse-of-process/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">source</a></p>
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<h1 class="entry-title">Differentiation of Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution</h1>
<h1>Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution Lawyer</h1>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-9179" src="https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Criminal-Defense-Process-300x189.jpg" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" srcset="https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Criminal-Defense-Process-300x189.jpg 300w, https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Criminal-Defense-Process-768x484.jpg 768w, https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Criminal-Defense-Process.jpg 809w" alt="Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution " width="300" height="189" /></p>
<p>There are differentiating factors between abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Abuse of process refers to the notion that the plaintiff can sue when a defendant starts legal proceedings with the intention of obtaining results for which the process was not designed. Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, can sue when a defendant “maliciously” prosecutes a criminal case or uses a civil proceeding against the plaintiff when the defendant knows he or she does not have a case.  Within this concept, the plaintiff must have obtained a “favorable termination” of the defendant’s malicious case before they can sue for malicious prosecution.</p>
<h3><b>Abuse of Process</b></h3>
<p>The elements of an abuse of process claim include an ulterior purpose by the defendant/defendants other than resolving a legal dispute, and a willful act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. The legal process portion can be within any part of the lawsuit, not simply the entire lawsuit. The ulterior purpose requirement of this notion can be thought up as even though the defendant has a technical right to use the legal process, they did so to extort something else from the plaintiff.</p>
<h3><b>Malicious Prosecution </b></h3>
<p>Malice refers to evil intent, which may be implied if the defendant acted in willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, wrongfully acted with a justifiable cause, or acted or omitted a duty betraying the willful disregard of a social duty. Malicious prosecution claims require several components. First, a proceeding. Even if an individual that has brought a criminal or civil proceeding thinks that they can have a winning case, suing for a legitimate reason at the beginning of the case, they can be guilty of malicious prosecution if a reason is discovered that they cannot win during the case, continuing the case for improper motives. Secondly, reasonable grounds is another notion that must be enacted to show malicious prosecution. An individual bringing the original prosecution or lawsuit must have probable cause to which the legal action was legitimate and has a chance of winning. Contrarily, if the individual bringing the lawsuit knows that the action is illegitimate, there is not a need to prove that a hypothetical reasonable person would share the idea that it was illegitimate.</p>
<p>Next, improper purpose is an additional concept that must be displayed. This notion is piggybacked with the </p>
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