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What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

The Truth News — Tue, 26 Dec 2023 19:11:48 +0000

What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

Probable Cause

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Probable Cause.—The concept of “probable cause” is central to the meaning of the warrant clause. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the federal statutory provisions relevant to the area define “probable cause”; the definition is entirely a judicial construct. An applicant for a warrant must present to the magistrate facts sufficient to enable the officer himself to make a determination of probable cause. “In determining what is probable cause . . . [w]e are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit . . . for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.”¹¹⁶ Probable cause is to be determined according to “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”¹¹⁷ Warrants are favored in the law and their use will not be thwarted by a hypertechnical reading of the supporting affidavit and supporting testimony.¹¹⁸ For the same reason, reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less “judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant.”¹¹⁹ Courts will sustain the determination of probable cause so long as “there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that” there was probable cause.¹²⁰

Much litigation has concerned the sufficiency of the complaint to establish probable cause. Mere conclusory assertions are not enough.¹²¹ In United States v. Ventresca,¹²² however, an affidavit by a law enforcement officer asserting his belief that an illegal distillery was being operated in a certain place, explaining that the belief was based upon his own observations and upon those of fellow investigators, and detailing a substantial amount of these personal observations clearly supporting the stated belief, was held to be sufficient to constitute probable cause. “Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential,” the Court said, observing that “where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause,” the reliance on the warrant process should not be deterred by insistence on too stringent a showing.¹²³

Requirements for establishing probable cause through reliance on information received from an informant has divided the Court in several cases. Although involving a warrantless arrest, Draper v. United States¹²⁴ may be said to have begun the line of cases. A previously reliable, named informant reported to an officer that the defendant would arrive with narcotics on a particular train, and described the clothes he would be wearing and the bag he would be carrying; the informant, however, gave no basis for his information. FBI agents met the train, observed that the defendant fully fit the description, and arrested him. The Court held that the corroboration of part of the informer’s tip established probable cause to support the arrest. A case involving a search warrant, Jones v. United States,¹²⁵ apparently considered the affidavit as a whole to see whether the tip plus the corroborating information provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, but the affidavit also set forth the reliability of the informer and sufficient detail to indicate that the tip was based on the informant’s personal observation. Aguilar v. Texas¹²⁶ held insufficient an affidavit that merely asserted that the police had “reliable information from a credible person” that narcotics were in a certain place, and held that when the affiant relies on an informant’s tip he must present two types of evidence to the magistrate. First, the affidavit must indicate the informant’s basis of knowledge—the circumstances from which the informant concluded that evidence was present or that crimes had been committed—and, second, the affiant must present information that would permit the magistrate to decide whether or not the informant was trustworthy. Then, in Spinelli v. United States,¹²⁷ the Court applied Aguilar in a situation in which the affidavit contained both an informant’s tip and police information of a corroborating nature.

The Court rejected the “totality” test derived from Jones and held that the informant’s tip and the corroborating evidence must be separately considered. The tip was rejected because the affidavit contained neither any information which showed the basis of the tip nor any information which showed the informant’s credibility. The corroborating evidence was rejected as insufficient because it did not establish any element of criminality but merely related to details which were innocent in themselves. No additional corroborating weight was due as a result of the bald police assertion that defendant was a known gambler, although the tip related to gambling. Returning to the totality test, however, the Court in United States v. Harris¹²⁸ approved a warrant issued largely on an informer’s tip that over a two-year period he had purchased illegal whiskey from the defendant at the defendant’s residence, most recently within two weeks of the tip. The affidavit contained rather detailed information about the concealment of the whiskey, and asserted that the informer was a “prudent person,” that defendant had a reputation as a bootlegger, that other persons had supplied similar information about him, and that he had been found in control of illegal whiskey within the previous four years. The Court determined that the detailed nature of the tip, the personal observation thus revealed, and the fact that the informer had admitted to criminal behavior by his purchase of whiskey were sufficient to enable the magistrate to find him reliable, and that the supporting evidence, including defendant’s reputation, could supplement this determination.

subject and returned to the “totality of the circumstances” approach to evaluate probable cause based on an informant’s tip in Illinois v. Gates.¹²⁹ The main defect of the two-part test, Justice Rehnquist concluded for the Court, was in treating an informant’s reliability and his basis for knowledge as independent requirements. Instead, “a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”¹³⁰ In evaluating probable cause, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”¹³¹

¹¹⁶ Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 439, 441 (1925). “[T]he term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.” Lock v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 339, 348 (1813). See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504–05 (1925). It may rest upon evidence that is not legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107–08 (1965). An “anticipatory” warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as there is probable cause to believe that the condition precedent to execution of the search warrant will occur and that, once it has occurred, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a specified place.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). “An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specified place.’” 547 U.S. at 94.

¹¹⁷ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).

¹¹⁸ United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1965).

¹¹⁹ Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270–71 (1960). Similarly, the preference for proceeding by warrant leads to a stricter rule for appellate review of trial court decisions on warrantless stops and searches than is employed to review probable cause to issue a warrant. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (determinations of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to search without a warrant should be subjected to de novo appellate review).

¹²⁰ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). It must be emphasized that the issuing party “must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a [complainant] to show probable cause.” Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). An insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony after issuance concerning information possessed by the affiant but not disclosed to the magistrate. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).

¹²¹ Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (affiant stated he “has good reason to believe and does believe” that defendant has contraband materials in his possession); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (complainant merely stated his conclusion that defendant had committed a crime). See also Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).

¹²² 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

¹²³ 380 U.S. at 109.

¹²⁴ 358 U.S. 307 (1959). For another case applying essentially the same probable cause standard to warrantless arrests as govern arrests by warrant, see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informant’s statement to arresting officers met Aguilar probable cause standard). See also Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (standards must be “at least as stringent” for warrantless arrest as for obtaining warrant).

¹²⁵ 362 U.S. 257 (1960).

¹²⁶ 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

¹²⁷ 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Both concurring and dissenting Justices recognized tension between Draper and Aguilar.See id. at 423 (Justice White concurring), id. at 429 (Justice Black dissenting and advocating the overruling of Aguilar).

¹²⁸ 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (approving warrantless stop of motorist based on informant’s tip that “may have been insufficient” under Aguilar and Spinelli as basis for warrant).

¹²⁹ 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Justice Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.

¹³⁰ 462 U.S. at 213.

¹³¹ 462 U.S. at 238. For an application of the Gates “totality of the circumstances” test to the warrantless search of a vehicle by a police officer, see, e.g. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–817, slip op. (2013). source

Probable Cause: Definition, Legal Requirements

What Is Probable Cause?

Probable cause is a requirement in criminal law that must be met before a police officer can make an arrest, conduct a search, seize property, or get a warrant.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Probable cause is a requirement in criminal law that must be met before a police officer can make an arrest, conduct a search, seize property, or get a warrant.
The probable cause requirement stems from the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that citizens have the right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion into their persons, homes, and businesses.
Illinois v. Gates is a landmark case in the evolution of probable cause and search warrants.1

Understanding Probable Cause

Probable cause requires that the police have more than just suspicion—but not to the extent of absolute certainty—that a suspect committed a crime. The police must have a reasonable basis in the context of the totality of the circumstances for believing that a crime was committed. The probable cause requirement stems from the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides for the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusion into their persons, homes, and businesses.

Probable cause is important in two aspects of criminal law:

Police must have probable cause before they search a person or property, and before they arrest a person.
The court must find that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime before they are prosecuted.

When a search warrant is in effect, police must generally search only for the items described in the warrant, although they can seize any contraband or evidence of other crimes that they find. However, if the search is deemed to be illegal, any evidence found becomes subject to the “exclusionary rule” and cannot be used against the defendant in court.

What is malicious prosecution California?

CACI No. 1501. Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings

“The tort of malicious prosecution lies to compensate an individual who is maliciously hailed into court and forced to defend against a fabricated cause of action.” Pace v Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 CA3d 476, 478. To establish the cause of action, a plaintiff must plead and prove that (CACI 1500, 1501):

Malicious prosecution is when someone sues or files criminal charges against someone else without probable cause and with harmful intent. It can be a civil or criminal lawsuit.

Some examples of malicious prosecution include:

Providing false evidence to the police that someone committed a crime
Suing someone for hurting them even if they never caused harm
A police officer or government official filing criminal charges against someone because of personal animosity, bias, or another reason outside the interests of justice

“The tort of malicious prosecution lies to compensate an individual who is maliciously hailed into court and forced to defend against a fabricated cause of action.” Pace v Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 CA3d 476, 478.

CA Penal Code § 170 (2022) – Misuse of the Warrant System – Crimes Against Public Justice

CA Penal Code § 170 (2022) click here

Penal Code § 170 . Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant or warrant of arrest to be issued and executed, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard^[1] by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when “whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.”^[2]

It is also the standard by which grand juries issue criminal indictments. The principle behind the standard is to limit the power of authorities to perform random or abusive searches (unlawful search and seizure), and to promote lawful evidence gathering and procedural form during criminal arrest and prosecution. The standard also applies to personal or property searches.^[3]

The Supreme Court in Berger v. New York 1967 explained that the purpose of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed.^[4] The term probable cause itself comes from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Probable in this case may relate to statistical probability or to a general standard of common behavior and customs. The context of the word probable here is not exclusive to community standards, and could partially derive from its use in formal mathematical statistics as some have suggested;^[5] but cf. probō, Latin etymology.

In U.S. immigration proceedings, the “reason to believe” standard has been interpreted as equivalent to probable cause.^[6]

Probable cause should not be confused with reasonable suspicion, which is the required criteria to perform a Terry stop in the United States of America. The criteria for reasonable suspicion are less strict than those for probable cause. source

The Constitution protects you from having your person or property searched without probable cause. But what is probable cause?

This guide explains how probable cause is defined and what probable cause requirements means for you. You’ll also see some examples of probable cause so you can better understand how this legal rule applies in the real world.

The Probable Cause Requirement

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects people against being unlawfully searched or unfairly arrested by police. The text of the amendment reads as follows:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

Because of this amendment, police cannot conduct a search without probable cause of wrongdoing. And they cannot arrest you unless there is probable cause of a crime being committed.

If you are searched without probable cause, any evidence collected must be suppressed. This means it cannot be used against you in court. If you are arrested without probable cause, the arrest is considered invalid and any evidence collected as a result of it will be suppressed.

Amdt4.5.3 Probable Cause Requirement

Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The concept of probable cause is central to the meaning of the Warrant Clause. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the federal statutory provisions relevant to the area define probable cause; the definition is entirely a judicial construct. An applicant for a warrant must present to the magistrate facts sufficient to enable the officer himself to make a determination of probable cause. In determining what is probable cause . . . [w]e are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit . . . for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.¹ Probable cause is to be determined according to the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.² Warrants are favored in the law and their use will not be thwarted by a hypertechnical reading of the supporting affidavit and supporting testimony.³ For the same reason, reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant.⁴ Courts will sustain the determination of probable cause so long as there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that there was probable cause.⁵

Footnotes

Jump to essay-1Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 439, 441 (1925). [T]he term ‘probable cause’. . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. Lock v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 339, 348 (1813). See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504–05 (1925). It may rest upon evidence that is not legally competent in a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), and it need not be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107–08 (1965). An anticipatory warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as there is probable cause to believe that the condition precedent to execution of the search warrant will occur and that, once it has occurred, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a specified place. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specified place.’ 547 U.S. at 94.
Jump to essay-2Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Jump to essay-3United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1965).
Jump to essay-4Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270–71 (1960). Similarly, the preference for proceeding by warrant leads to a stricter rule for appellate review of trial court decisions on warrantless stops and searches than is employed to review probable cause to issue a warrant. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (determinations of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to search without a warrant should be subjected to de novo appellate review).
Jump to essay-5Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). It must be emphasized that the issuing party must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a [complainant] to show probable cause. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958). An insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony after issuance concerning information possessed by the affiant but not disclosed to the magistrate. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
source

read ALL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BELOW JUST CLICK THE LINK

Fourth Amendment – Search and Seizure

What Is the Definition of Probable Cause?

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, probable cause exists when the “facts and circumstances” that police officers know about, based on “reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed.”

In other words, if a reasonably cautious person was provided with the information the police officers had at the time, that person would have a valid reason to believe that a crime was taking place. This reasonable belief of criminal activity is sufficient to justify either a search or an arrest.

Probable cause is determined based on the totality of the circumstances, so all available information can be considered in deciding if there is valid justification to either conduct a search or to arrest a suspect.

Satisfying the Probable Cause Requirement

Law enforcement officials must obtain a search warrant before conducting a search when it is possible to do so. A judge should only issue a search warrant if there is probable cause, which means there is enough credible information to suggest evidence of a crime will be discovered during the search.

Law enforcement officials must also obtain an arrest warrant before arresting someone when it is possible and practical to do so. Again, there must be probable cause or credible information suggesting someone most likely committed a criminal offense before an arrest warrant is issued.

Warrantless searches and warrantless arrests can occur in certain circumstances such as when police see evidence of a crime in plain view or when there are exigent circumstances because failure to act could result in the destruction of evidence or harm to others.

When a warrantless search or arrest occurs, law enforcement officials need to provide proof of probable cause after the fact. If law enforcement cannot satisfy the probable cause requirement, the evidence collected will be suppressed or the arrest will be deemed invalid.

Exceptions to the Probable Cause Requirement

There are very limited exceptions when evidence is still admissible even if it was obtained without probable cause.

Exceptions include circumstances where police were acting in good faith, but there was a problem they were unaware of. For example, if police arrest someone because they believe there is a valid warrant, but it turns out a mistake was made and there wasn’t, then evidence collected after the arrest would still be admissible.

Examples of Probable Cause

There are many different examples of probable cause that could justify a search or justify an arrest. Here are some common examples:

A law enforcement officer pulls someone over for a traffic violation. The officer notices drug paraphernalia on the front seat or notices the driver is slurring their words and is visibly intoxicated and likely committing a DUI. The drug paraphernalia or the obvious intoxication provides probable cause for a search of the vehicle and/or for an arrest.
A law enforcement officer observes someone pointing a gun at a convenience store employee in an apparent robbery. This unlawful act the officer observed provides probable cause for arrest.
A law enforcement officer visits a person’s home after a report of domestic violence and observes weapons in the home and bruises on the alleged victim. This provides probable cause for a search of the home and, if the available evidence creates a reasonable suspicion of a crime, also probable cause for an arrest.

Probable cause may come from officers directly observing evidence suggestive of criminal activity or from credible reports of criminal misconduct from trustworthy sources.

What If an Arrest or Search Occurs Without Probable Cause?

If you believe you were searched or arrested without probable cause, you can argue your constitutional rights were violated.

If a judge determines there was no probable cause and no exceptions such as the good faith exception apply, evidence collected as a result of the unlawful search or unlawful arrest will not be admissible in court against you.

In some cases, you may also have grounds for a lawsuit if you were searched or arrested without probable cause. However, suing the government can be a challenge even in situations where you believe your rights were violated as a result of sovereign immunity rules.

When you suspect a violation of your rights, it is very important to talk with an experienced attorney. If you have been charged with a crime, a lawyer can also help you to determine if you may be able to get evidence suppressed based on a constitutional violation. You should reach out to an attorney ASAP to protect yourself as you navigate the criminal justice system. source

California Penal Code § 170 – Misuse of the Warrant System – Crimes Against Public Justice

Probable Cause – Definition

Probable cause is a requirement found in the Fourth Amendment that must usually be met before police make an arrest, conduct a search, or receive a warrant. Courts usually find probable cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been committed (for an arrest) or when evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for a search). Under exigent circumstances, probable cause can also justify a warrantless search or seizure. Persons arrested without a warrant are required to be brought before a competent authority shortly after the arrest for a prompt judicial determination of probable cause.

Overview

Constitutional Basis

Although the Fourth Amendment states that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”, it does not specify what “probable cause” actually means. The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the meaning of the term on several occasions, while recognizing that probable cause is a concept that is imprecise, fluid and very dependent on context. In Illinois v. Gates, the Court favored a flexible approach, viewing probable cause as a “practical, non-technical” standard that calls upon the “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men […] act”.1 Courts often adopt a broader, more flexible view of probable cause when the alleged offenses are serious.

Application to Arrests

The Fourth Amendment requires that any arrest be based on probable cause, even when the arrest is made pursuant to an arrest warrant. Whether or not there is probable cause typically depends on the totality of the circumstances, meaning everything that the arresting officers know or reasonably believe at the time the arrest is made.2 However, probable cause remains a flexible concept, and what constitutes the “totality of the circumstances” often depends on how the court interprets the reasonableness standard.3

A lack of probable cause will render a warrantless arrest invalid, and any evidence resulting from that arrest (physical evidence, confessions, etc.) will have to be suppressed.4 A narrow exception applies when an arresting officer, as a result of a mistake by court employees, mistakenly and in good faith believes that a warrant has been issued. In this case, notwithstanding the lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence obtained may be admissible.5 Unlike court clerks, prosecutors are part of a law enforcement team and are not “court employees” for purposes of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.6

Application to Search Warrants

Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that a search will result in evidence of a crime being discovered.7 For a warrantless search, probable cause can be established by in-court testimony after the search. In the case of a warrant search, however, an affidavit or recorded testimony must support the warrant by indicating on what basis probable cause exists.8

A judge may issue a search warrant if the affidavit in support of the warrant offers sufficient credible information to establish probable cause.9 There is a presumption that police officers are reliable sources of information, and affidavits in support of a warrant will often include their observations.10 When this is the case, the officers’ experience and training become relevant factors in assessing the existence of probable cause.11 Information from victims or witnesses, if included in an affidavit, may be important factors as well.12

The good faith exception that applies to arrests also applies to search warrants: when a defect renders a warrant constitutionally invalid, the evidence does not have to be suppressed if the officers acted in good faith.13 Courts evaluate an officer’s good faith by looking at the nature of the error and how the warrant was executed.14

Probable Cause in the Digital Age

While the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement has historically been applied to physical seizures of tangible property, the issue of searches and seizures as applied to data has come to the Supreme Court’s attention in recent years.

In Riley v California (2014), the Supreme Court held: “The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cellphone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” This would seem to group cell phones in with traditional items subject to traditional court tests and rules for searches and seizures.

Riley, however, did not end the inquiry into digital data’s interaction with the Fourth Amendment. For the 2018 term, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear Carpenter v. United States. Carpenter, accused of several robberies, was arrested after “his phone company shared data on his whereabouts with law-enforcement agents.”

Mr. Carpenter is challenging the “constitutionality of the Stored Communications Act, a law permitting phone companies to divulge information when there are ‘specific and articulable facts’ that are ‘relevant and material’ to a criminal investigation.” His complaint states that “his privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated when his phone company shared data on his whereabouts with law-enforcement agents.” This case will likely have a significant impact on the role that probable cause plays in the ability of data companies to share user information with law enforcement.

1. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
2. United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2004).
3. Prosecutor’s Manual for Arrest, Search and Seizure, § 6-6(b) (2004).
4. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), at 648, 655.
5. See Ariz. v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
6. People v. Boyer, 305 Ill. App. 3d 374 (1999), at 379-80.
7. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
8. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971).
9. Prosecutor’s Manual for Arrest, Search and Seizure, § 3-2(c) (2004).
10. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
11. See United States v. Mick, 263 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir. 2001).
12. See United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
13. See United States v. White, 356 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2004).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 100–05 (2d Cir. 2011)
source

Supreme Court Interpretation of Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures generally means law enforcement must have a warrant or “probable cause” to search someone’s property or make an arrest. But probable cause can come in many forms, and what qualifies as probable cause is something the Supreme Court has grappled with for many years.

What the Fourth Amendment Says

What is probable cause?

How is probable cause established?

How Does Law Enforcement Establish Probable Cause?

United States Library of Congress, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation

Much litigation has concerned the sufficiency of the complaint to establish probable cause. Mere conclusory assertions are not enough.¹ In United States v. Ventresca,² however, an affidavit by a law enforcement officer asserting his belief that an illegal distillery was being operated in a certain place, explaining that the belief was based upon his own observations and upon those of fellow investigators, and detailing a substantial amount of these personal observations clearly supporting the stated belief, was held to be sufficient to constitute probable cause. Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential, the Court said, observing that where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the reliance on the warrant process should not be deterred by insistence on too stringent a showing.³

Probable Cause Based on Tips from Informants

Requirements for establishing probable cause through reliance on information received from an informant has divided the Court in several cases. Although involving a warrantless arrest, Draper v. United States⁴ may be said to have begun the line of cases. A previously reliable, named informant reported to an officer that the defendant would arrive with narcotics on a particular train, and described the clothes he would be wearing and the bag he would be carrying; the informant, however, gave no basis for his information. FBI agents met the train, observed that the defendant fully fit the description, and arrested him. The Court held that the corroboration of part of the informer’s tip established probable cause to support the arrest. A case involving a search warrant, Jones v. United States,⁵ apparently considered the affidavit as a whole to see whether the tip plus the corroborating information provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, but the affidavit also set forth the reliability of the informer and sufficient detail to indicate that the tip was based on the informant’s personal observation. Aguilar v. Texas⁶ held insufficient an affidavit that merely asserted that the police had reliable information from a credible person that narcotics were in a certain place, and held that when the affiant relies on an informant’s tip he must present two types of evidence to the magistrate. First, the affidavit must indicate the informant’s basis of knowledge—the circumstances from which the informant concluded that evidence was present or that crimes had been committed—and, second, the affiant must present information that would permit the magistrate to decide whether or not the informant was trustworthy. Then, in Spinelli v. United States,⁷ the Court applied Aguilar in a situation in which the affidavit contained both an informant’s tip and police information of a corroborating nature.

The Court rejected the totality test derived from Jones and held that the informant’s tip and the corroborating evidence must be separately considered. The tip was rejected because the affidavit contained neither any information which showed the basis of the tip nor any information which showed the informant’s credibility. The corroborating evidence was rejected as insufficient because it did not establish any element of criminality but merely related to details which were innocent in themselves. No additional corroborating weight was due as a result of the bald police assertion that defendant was a known gambler, although the tip related to gambling. Returning to the totality test, however, the Court in United States v. Harris⁸ approved a warrant issued largely on an informer’s tip that over a two-year period he had purchased illegal whiskey from the defendant at the defendant’s residence, most recently within two weeks of the tip. The affidavit contained rather detailed information about the concealment of the whiskey, and asserted that the informer was a prudent person, that defendant had a reputation as a bootlegger, that other persons had supplied similar information about him, and that he had been found in control of illegal whiskey within the previous four years. The Court determined that the detailed nature of the tip, the personal observation thus revealed, and the fact that the informer had admitted to criminal behavior by his purchase of whiskey were sufficient to enable the magistrate to find him reliable, and that the supporting evidence, including defendant’s reputation, could supplement this determination.

The Court expressly abandoned the two-part Aguilar–Spinelli test and returned to the totality of the circumstances approach to evaluate probable cause based on an informant’s tip in Illinois v. Gates.⁹ The main defect of the two-part test, Justice Rehnquist concluded for the Court, was in treating an informant’s reliability and his basis for knowledge as independent requirements. Instead, a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.¹⁰ In evaluating probable cause, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.¹¹

Probable Cause vs. First Amendment Rights

Where the warrant process is used to authorize the seizure of books and other items that may be protected by the First Amendment, the Court has required the government to observe more exacting standards than in other cases.¹² Seizure of materials arguably protected by the First Amendment is a form of prior restraint that requires strict observance of the Fourth Amendment. At a minimum, a warrant is required, and additional safeguards may be required for large-scale seizures. Thus, in Marcus v. Search Warrant,¹³the seizure of 11,000 copies of 280 publications pursuant to warrant issued ex parte by a magistrate who had not examined any of the publications but who had relied on the conclusory affidavit of a policeman was voided. Failure to scrutinize the materials and to particularize the items to be seized was deemed inadequate, and it was further noted that police were provided with no guide to the exercise of informed discretion, because there was no step in the procedure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.¹⁴A state procedure that was designed to comply with Marcus by the presentation of copies of books to be seized to the magistrate for his scrutiny prior to issuance of a warrant was nonetheless found inadequate by a plurality of the Court, which concluded that since the warrant here authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of the specified titles, and since [appellant] was not afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity even of the seven novels [seven of 59 listed titles were reviewed by the magistrate] before the warrant issued, the procedure was constitutionally deficient.¹⁵

Confusion remains, however, about the necessity for and the character of prior adversary hearings on the issue of obscenity. In a later decision the Court held that, with adequate safeguards, no pre-seizure adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity is required if the film is seized not for the purpose of destruction as contraband (the purpose in Marcus and A Quantity of Books), but instead to preserve a copy for evidence.¹⁶ It is constitutionally permissible to seize a copy of a film pursuant to a warrant as long as there is a prompt post-seizure adversary hearing on the obscenity issue. Until there is a judicial determination of obscenity, the Court advised, the film may continue to be exhibited; if no other copy is available either a copy of it must be made from the seized film or the film itself must be returned.¹⁷

The seizure of a film without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant is invalid; seizure cannot be justified as incidental to arrest, as the determination of obscenity may not be made by the officer himself.¹⁸ Nor may a warrant issue based solely on the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the magistrate into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions.¹⁹ Instead, a warrant must be supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may ‘focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.’²⁰ This does not mean, however, that a higher standard of probable cause is required in order to obtain a warrant to seize materials protected by the First Amendment. Our reference in Roaden to a ‘higher hurdle of reasonableness’ was not intended to establish a ‘higher’ standard of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize books or films, but instead related to the more basic requirement, imposed by that decision, that the police not rely on the ‘exigency’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but instead obtain a warrant from a magistrate.’²¹

In Stanford v. Texas,²² the Court voided a seizure of more than 2,000 books, pamphlets, and other documents pursuant to a warrant that merely authorized the seizure of books, pamphlets, and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas. The constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain. . . . No less a standard could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms.²³

However, the First Amendment does not bar the issuance or execution of a warrant to search a newsroom to obtain photographs of demonstrators who had injured several policemen, although the Court appeared to suggest that a magistrate asked to issue such a warrant should guard against interference with press freedoms through limits on the type, scope, and intrusiveness of the search.²⁴

Footnotes

1. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (affiant stated he has good reason to believe and does believe that defendant has contraband materials in his possession); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (complainant merely stated his conclusion that defendant had committed a crime). See also Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).

2. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

3. 380 U.S. at 109.

4. 8 U.S. 307 (1959). For another case applying essentially the same probable cause standard to warrantless arrests as govern arrests by warrant, see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informant’s statement to arresting officers met Aguilar probable cause standard). See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (standards must be at least as stringent for warrantless arrest as for obtaining warrant).

5. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).

6. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

7. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Both concurring and dissenting Justices recognized the tension between Draper and Aguilar. See id. at 423 (Justice White concurring), id. at 429 (Justice Black dissenting and advocating the overruling of Aguilar).

8. 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (approving warrantless stop of motorist based on informant’s tip that may have been insufficient under Aguilar and Spinelli as basis for warrant).

9. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Justice Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.

10. 462 U.S. at 213.

11. 462 U.S. at 238. For an application of the Gates totality of the circumstances test to the warrantless search of a vehicle by a police officer, see, e.g. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).

12. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1961); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). For First Amendment implications of seizures under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see First Amendment: Obscenity and Prior Restraint.

13. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). See Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).

14. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).

15. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964).

16. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).

17. Id. at 492–93. But cf. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6 (1986), rejecting the defendant’s assertion, based on Heller, that only a single copy rather than all copies of allegedly obscene movies should have been seized pursuant to warrant.

18. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). See also Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). These special constraints are inapplicable when obscene materials are purchased, and there is consequently no Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).

19. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per curiam).

20. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1986) (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).

21. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6 (1986).

22. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).

23. 379 U.S. at 485–86. See also Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).

24. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See id. at 566 (containing suggestion mentioned in text), and id. at 566 (Justice Powell concurring) (more expressly adopting that position). In the Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, Congress provided extensive protection against searches and seizures not only of the news media and news people but also of others engaged in disseminating communications to the public, unless there is probable cause to believe the person protecting the materials has committed or is committing the crime to which the materials relate.

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What Is Reasonable Doubt?

Reasonable doubt is legal terminology referring to insufficient evidence that prevents a judge or jury from convicting a defendant of a crime. It is the traditional standard of proof that must be exceeded to secure a guilty verdict in a criminal case in a court of law.

In a criminal case, it is the job of the prosecution to convince the jury that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he has been charged and, therefore, should be convicted. The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” means that the evidence presented and the arguments put forward by the prosecution establish the defendant’s guilt so clearly that they must be accepted as fact by any rational person.

If the jury cannot say with certainty based on the evidence presented that the defendant is guilty, then there is reasonable doubt and they are obligated to return a non-guilty verdict.

The Reasonable Doubt Standard

Penal Code Title 7, Chapter 2, Section 1096 of the California Penal Code states that a defendant in a criminal trial must be proven guilty to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 1096 also states that a defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. If there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, they are entitled to an acquittal.

1096. A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: “It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.” source

“Beyond a reasonable doubt” means that the prosecution must convince the jury that there is no other reasonable explanation that can come from the evidence presented at trial. In other words, the jury must be virtually certain of the defendant’s guilt in order to render a guilty verdict.

California law establishes standards which must be met when making an arrest. Section 836 of Title 3, Chapter 5 (“Making of Arrest”) of the California Penal Code (PC) states that a peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

• Whenever he/she has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his or her presence; or

• When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his or her presence; or

• Whenever he/she has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.

As defined by Black”s Law Dictionary, reasonable or probable cause is the state of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe and suspect that the person sought is guilty of a crime. In other words, there must be more evidence for than against the prospect that the suspect has committed a crime, yet reserving some possibility for doubt. Case law pursuant to PC Section 836 further states that probable cause does not require evidence to convict but only to show that the person should stand trial.

Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 836, peace officers are authorized to make an arrest based on probable cause. As such, the Police must believe that there is more evidence for than against the prospect that the person sought is guilty of a crime, yet reserving some possibility for doubt. source

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Reasonable doubt is insufficient evidence that prevents a judge or jury from convicting a defendant of a crime.
If it cannot be proved without a doubt that a defendant in a criminal case is guilty, then that person should not be convicted.
Each juror must walk into the courtroom presuming the accused is innocent and it is the job of the prosecutor to convince them otherwise.
Reasonable doubt is used exclusively in criminal cases because the consequences of a conviction are severe.
Other commonly used standards of proof in criminal cases are probable cause, reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion, and credible evidence.

Understanding Reasonable Doubt

Under U.S. law, a defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty. Reasonable doubt stems from insufficient evidence. If it cannot be proved without a doubt that the defendant is guilty, that person should not be convicted. Verdicts do not necessarily reflect the truth, they reflect the evidence presented. A defendant’s actual innocence or guilt may be an abstraction.

Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof used in any court of law and is widely accepted around the world. It is used exclusively in criminal cases because the consequences of a conviction are severe—a criminal conviction could deprive the defendant of liberty or even life.

Difference Between Belief And Certainty

It isn’t unusual for a juror to believe that the defendant is a criminal but not be convinced with certainty that they committed the particular crime they are charged with. That isn’t good enough to find the defendant guilty.

Reasonable doubt comes from certainty rather than belief. Belief and instinct are important in many instances in life but cannot be used to convict a defendant if not based on fact.2

Unreasonable Doubt

The reasonable doubt standard forces jurors to ignore doubts considered unreasonable when determining if a defendant is guilty. Unreasonable doubt, which often stems from the possibility that nonexistent or unpresented evidence might explain a defendant’s actions and lead to exoneration, is not enough to acquit the defendant.3

Exculpatory Evidence

Evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal trial can also create reasonable doubt as to whether the accused committed the crime. The defendant’s team should not be viewed with more skepticism than the prosecutor’s team. Each shred of evidence should be given the same consideration. This is important as any reasonable doubt, however small, that the defendant did not do it is grounds for an acquittal.4

Other Standards of Proof

Other commonly used standards of proof in criminal cases are:

Probable Cause: A requirement found in the Fourth Amendment that the police have more than just suspicion that a suspect committed a crime before making an arrest, conducting a search, or serving a warrant.5
Reasonable Belief and reasonable suspicion: A reasonable presumption by a police officer that a crime was, is, or will be committed. This is more than a hunch and less than probable cause and is used to determine the legality of a police officer’s decision to take action.
Credible Evidence: Evidence that is deemed worthy of being presented in a court and to the jury.

Meanwhile, evidentiary standards in civil cases include:

Clear and convincing evidence: The judge or jurors have concluded that there is a high probability that the facts of the case as presented by one party represent the truth. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is used in some civil cases, and it may appear in some aspects of a criminal case, such as a decision on whether a defendant is fit to stand trial.6 The language appears in several U.S. state laws.
Preponderance of the evidence: Both sides have presented their cases, and one side seems more likely to be true. Most civil cases require a “preponderance of the evidence,” as this is a lower standard of proof.

Presumption of Innocence

The criminal justice system seeks to unearth the truth, convict the guilty, and let the innocent walk free. In order for this to work, each juror must walk into the courtroom presuming the accused is innocent.7

“It is better that 100 guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.”—Benjamin Franklin 8

This presumption requires that jurors have a skeptical mindset that must be overcome before they can reach a guilty verdict. The jurors must not just want to believe something or be swayed by prejudices. They must view each shred of evidence presented by the prosecution with skepticism.

Why Is Reasonable Doubt Important?

The reasonable doubt standard aims to reduce the chances of an innocent person being convicted. Criminal cases can result in hefty convictions, including death or life sentences, so a person should only be charged if the jurors are 100% confident, based on the evidence presented, of their guilt.

How Do You Prove Reasonable Doubt?

The jurors must walk into the courtroom presuming the accused is innocent. Reasonable doubt exists unless the prosecution can prove that the accused is guilty. This can be achieved by supplying evidence and inviting people to testify on the stand.

What Are the Three Burdens of Proof?

The three burdens of proof for criminal cases are “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “probable cause,” and “reasonable suspicion.”

What Is the Difference Between Doubt and Reasonable Doubt?

A doubt can be considered reasonable when it’s connected to evidence or an absence of evidence. Sympathies or prejudices are not reasonable grounds for doubt.

The Bottom Line

Reasonable doubt is an important legal standard that strives to prevent innocent people from getting convicted for a crime they didn’t commit. If it cannot be proved without a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then they should not be convicted of the crime as charged. source

Reasonable suspicion

Overview

Reasonable suspicion is a standard used in criminal procedure. Reasonable suspicion is used in determining the legality of a police officer’s decision to perform a search.

When an officer stops someone to search the person, courts require that the officer has either a search warrant, probable cause to search, or a reasonable suspicion to search. In descending order of what gives an officer the broadest authority to perform a search, courts have found that the order is search warrant, probable cause, and then reasonable suspicion.

Reasonable Suspicion As Applied to a Stop & Frisk

In Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that if a police officer believes that an individual has a weapon which poses a danger to the officer, the officer may stop that individual to search the individual for a weapon. The Court held that to determine whether the police officer acted reasonably in the stop, a court should not look at whether he has a hunch, but rather “to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”

In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), a Nevada state statute “requires a person detained by an officer [during a Terry stop] to identify himself” by providing his name. In Hiibel, the Supreme Court held that because the statute only asked for a name, not identification, and because it did “not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing neither its duration nor its location,” the statute “properly balances the intrusion on the individual’s interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests.” Thus the Court held that the statute is constitutional. source

Probable Cause vs Reasonable suspicion

Definition of Probable Cause – Probable cause means that a reasonable person would believe that a crime was in the process of being committed, had been committed, or was going to be committed.

Legal Repercussions of Probable Cause – Probable cause is enough for a search or arrest warrant. It is also enough for a police officer to make an arrest if he sees a crime being committed.

Definition of Reasonable Suspicion – Reasonable suspicion has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as “the sort of common-sense conclusion about human behavior upon which practical people . . . are entitled to rely.” Further, it has defined reasonable suspicion as requiring only something more than an “unarticulated hunch.” It requires facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion.

Reasonable suspicion means that any reasonable person would suspect that a crime was in the process of being committed, had been committed or was going to be committed very soon.

Legal Repercussions of Reasonable Suspicion – If an officer has reasonable suspicion in a situation, he may frisk or detain the suspect briefly. Reasonable suspicion does not allow for the searching of a person or a vehicle unless the person happens to be on school property. Reasonable suspicion is not enough for an arrest or a search warrant.

Stop and Frisk – In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the court recognized that a limited stop and frisk of an individual could be conducted without a warrant based on less than probable cause. The stop must be based on a reasonable, individualized suspicion based on articulable facts, and the frisk is limited to a pat-down for weapons. An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, by itself, sufficient to justify a stop and frisk. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).

Florida v. Bostick 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) – A person’s refusal to cooperate is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000). – A person’s flight in a high crime area after seeing police was sufficient for reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk.

The same requirement of founded suspicion for a “person” stop applies to stops of individual vehicles. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). The scope of the “frisk” for weapons during a vehicle stop may include areas of the vehicle in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The police may order passengers and the driver out of or into the vehicle pending completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). The passengers may not be detained longer than it takes the driver to receive his citation. Once the driver is ready to leave, the passengers must be permitted to go as well. During a stop for traffic violations, the officers need not independently have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to justify frisking passengers, but they must have reason to believe the passengers are armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S Court. 781, 784 (2009).

The Difference Between the Two – The terms probable cause and reasonable suspicion are often confused and misused. While both have to do with a police officer’s overall impression of a situation, the two terms have different repercussions on a person’s rights, the proper protocol and the outcome of the situation.

Reasonable suspicion is a step before probable cause. At the point of reasonable suspicion, it appears that a crime may have been committed. The situation escalates to probable cause when it becomes obvious that a crime has most likely been committed.

Probable Cause to Search
In order to obtain a search warrant, the court must consider whether based on the totality of the information there is a fair probability that contraband, evidence or a person will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

Probable Cause to Arrest
In order to arrest a suspect the officer must have a good faith belief that a crime has been committed and the individual he is arresting committed the crime. In Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). In Pringle, an officer was permitted to arrest three individuals in a vehicle where marijuana was discovered. The court reasoned that, even though the officers did not have evidence that any one of the three occupants was responsible for the drugs, probable cause existed as to all of them because co-occupants of a vehicle are often engaged in a common enterprise and all three denied knowing anything about the drugs.

Texas – Goldberg v. State, 95 SW.3d 345 (Tex. App. 2002).

An arrest is proper when it is based upon article 14.03 (a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the person is found in a suspicious place and under circumstances that reasonably show that such person has been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace.

Facts: Mr. Goldberg was accused of entering a wig store, punching one attendant in the throat, and cutting the other attendant’s wrist and stabbing her when she attempted to call for help. The assailant quickly left the store. A witness in the parking lot followed the assailant to his vehicle. The witness provided police with a license plate number for the vehicle. The police traced the vehicle and located the defendant, the son of the owner of the vehicle. The police handcuffed Mr. Goldberg, performed a pat down and informed him of his rights. Mr. Goldberg stated he was willing to talk to the officers. He was later uncuffed.

The officer felt the hood of the vehicle and it was still warm. Mr. Goldberg denied driving the vehicle or knowledge of the crime. The officers also noticed a blood stain on Mr. Goldberg’s shirt and a red mark on his chest. Goldberg consented to a search of the house, his apartment and the vehicle. The officers found fibers matching the wigs at the wig shop. Mr. Goldberg claimed that the vehicle had been stolen several times but the person always returned the vehicle to the residence. Mr. Goldberg was taken to the police station and consented to a police interrogation. He later was released to his mother. Mr. Goldberg challenged the arrest as unlawful.

The court found that even if the detention rose to the level of an arrest when the defendant was transported to the police station it was proper. Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense. Guzman v. State, 955 SW.2d at 87; Amores v. State, 816 SW.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.1991). Probable cause deals with probabilities; it requires more than mere suspicion but far less evidence than that needed to support a conviction or even that needed to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Guzman, 955 SW.2d at 87. source

Principles of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion

Although there is certainly more to probable cause and reasonable suspicion than just principles, it’s a good place to start, so that is where we will begin this four-part series. In part two, which begins on page 9, we will explain how officers can prove that the information they are relying upon to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion was sufficiently reliable that is has significance. Then, in the Fall 2014 edition we will cover probable cause to arrest, including the various circumstances that officers and judges frequently consider in determining whether it exists. The series will conclude in the Winter 2015 edition with an discussion of how officers can determine whether they have probable cause to search.

It is ordinarily a bad idea to begin an article by admitting that the subjects to be discussed cannot be usefully defined. But when the subjects are probable cause and reasonable suspicion1, and when the readership is composed of people who have had some experience with them, it would be pointless to deny it. Consider that the Seventh Circuit once tried to provide a good legal definition but concluded that, when all is said and done, it just means having “a good reason to act.”2 Even the Supreme Court— whose many powers include defining legal terms— decided to pass on probable cause because, said the Court, it is “not a finely-tuned standard”3 and is actually an “elusive” and “somewhat abstract” concept.4 As for reasonable suspicion, the uncertainty is even worse. For instance, in United States v. Jones the First Circuit would only say that it “requires more than a naked hunch.”5

But this imprecision is actually a good thing because probable cause and reasonable suspicion are ultimately judgments based on common sense, not technical analysis. Granted, they are important judgments because they have serious repercussions. But they are fundamentally just rational assessments of the convincing force of information, which is something the human brain does all the time without consulting a rule book. So instead of being governed by a “neat set of rules,”6 these concepts mainly require that officers understand certain principles— principles that usually enable them to make these determinations with a fair degree of consistency and accuracy.

First, however, it is necessary to explain the basic difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion, as these terms will be used throughout this series. Both are essentially judgments as to the existence and importance of evidence. But they differ as to the level of proof that is required. In particular, probable cause requires evidence of higher quality and quantity than reasonable suspicion because it permits officers to take actions that are more intrusive, such as arresting people and searching things. In contrast, reasonable suspicion is the standard for lesser intrusions, such as detentions and pat searches. As the Supreme Court explained:

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quality or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.7

What Probability is Required?

When people start to learn about probable cause or reasonable suspicion, they usually want a number: What probability percentage is required?8 Is it 80%? 60%? 50%? Lower than 50? No one really knows, which might seem strange because, even in a relatively trivial venture such as sports betting, people would not participate unless they had some idea of the odds.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to assign a probability percentage to these concepts because it views them as nontechnical standards based on common sense, not mathematical precision.9 “The probable cause standard,” said the Court, “is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of circumstances.”10 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit observed, “Besides the difficulty of agreeing on a single number, such an enterprise would, among other things, risk diminishing the role of judgment based on situation-sense.”11 Still, based on inklings from the United States Supreme Court, it is possible to provide at least a ballpark probability percentage for probable cause.

Reasonable suspicion, on the other hand, remains an enigma.

Probable cause

Many people assume that probable cause requires at least a 51% probability because anything less would not be “probable.” While this is technically true, the Supreme Court has ruled that, in the context of probable cause, the word “probable” has a somewhat different meaning. Specifically, it has said that probable cause requires neither a preponderance of the evidence nor “any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false,”12 and that it requires only a “fair” probability, not a statistical probability.13 Thus, it is apparent that probable cause requires something less than a 50% chance.14 How much less? Although no court has tried to figure it out, we suspect it is not much lower than 50%.

Reasonable suspicion

As noted, the required probability percentage for reasonable suspicion is a mystery. Although the Supreme Court has said that it requires “considerably less [proof] than preponderance of the evidence”15 (which means “considerably less” than a 50.1% chance), this is unhelpful because a meager 1% chance is “considerably less” than 51.1% but no one seriously thinks that would be enough. Equally unhelpful is the Supreme Court’s observation that, while probable cause requires a “fair probability,” reasonable suspicion requires only a “moderate” probability.16 What is the difference between a “moderate” and “fair” probability? Again, nobody knows. What we do know is that the facts need not rise to the level that they “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”17 As the Court of Appeal explained, “The possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity.”18 We also know that reasonable suspicion may exist if the circumstances were merely indicative of criminal activity. In fact, the California Supreme Court has said that if the circumstances are consistent with criminal activity, they “demand“ an investigation.”19

Basic Principles

Having given up on a mathematical solution to the problem, we must rely on certain basic principles. And the most basic principle is this: Neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion can exist unless officers can cite “specific and articulable facts” that support their judgment.20 This demand for specificity is so important that the Supreme Court called it the “central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” 21 The question, then, is this: How can officers determine whether their “specific and articulable” facts are sufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion? That is the question we will address in the remainder of this article.

Totality of the circumstances

Almost as central as the need for facts is the requirement that, in determining whether officers have probable cause and reasonable suspicion, the courts will consider the totality of circumstances. This is significant because it is exactly the opposite of how some courts did things many years ago. That is, they would utilize a “divide-and-conquer”22 approach which meant subjecting each fact to a meticulous evaluation, then frequently ruling that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion because none of the individual facts were compelling. This practice officially ended in 1983 when, in the landmark decision in Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court announced that probable cause and reasonable suspicion must be based on an assessment of the convincing force of the officers’ information as a whole. “We must be mindful,” said the Fifth Circuit, “that probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers. We weigh not individual layers but the laminated total.23 Thus, in People v. McFadin the court responded to the defendant’s “divide-and-conquer” strategy by utilizing the following analogy:

Defendant would apply the axiom that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. Here, however, there are strands which have been spun into a rope. Although each alone may have insufficient strength, and some strands may be slightly frayed, the test is whether when spun together they will serve to carry the load of upholding [the probable cause determination].24

Here is an example of how the “totality of the circumstances” test works and why it is so important. In Maryland v. Pringle 25 an officer made a traffic stop on a car occupied by three men and, in the course of the stop, saw some things that caused him to suspect that the men were drug dealers. One of those things was a wad of cash ($763) that the officer had seen in the glove box. He then conducted a search of the vehicle and found cocaine. But a Maryland appellate court ruled the search was unlawful because the presence of money is “innocuous.” The Supreme Court reversed, saying the Maryland court’s “consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken.”

Common sense

Not only did the Court in Gates rule that probable cause must be based on a consideration of the totality of circumstances, it ruled that the significance of the circumstances must be evaluated by applying common sense, not hypertechnical analysis. In other words, the circumstances must be “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.”26 As the Court explained:

Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a practical, nontechnical conception. In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.27

Legal, but suspicious, activities

It follows from the principles discussed so far that it is significant that officers saw the suspect do something that, while not illegal, was suspicious in light of other circumstances.28 As the Supreme Court explained, the distinction between criminal and noncriminal conduct “cannot rigidly control” because probable cause and reasonable suspicion “are fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which they are being assessed.”29 For example, in Massachusetts v. Upton the state court ruled that probable cause could not have existed because the evidence “related to innocent, nonsuspicious conduct or related to an event that took place in public.” Acknowledging that no single piece of evidence was conclusive, the Supreme Court reversed, saying the “pieces fit neatly together.”30 Similarly, the Court of Appeal noted that seeing a man running down a street “is indistinguishable from the action of a citizen engaged in a program of physical fitness.” But it becomes “highly suspicious” when it is “viewed in context of immediately preceding gunshots.”31

Another example of how noncriminal activities can become highly suspicious is found in Illinois v. Gates.32 It started with an anonymous letter to a police department saying that a local resident, Lance Gates, was a drug trafficker; and it explained in some detail the procedure that Gates and his wife, Sue, would follow in obtaining drugs in Florida. DEA agents followed both of them (Gates flew, Sue drove) and both generally followed the procedure described by the letter writer. This information led to a search warrant and Gates’ arrest. On appeal, he argued that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because the agents did not see him or his wife do anything illegal. It didn’t matter, said the Supreme Court, because the “seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in light of the initial tip.”

Multiple incriminating circumstances

Here is a principle that, while critically important, is often overlooked or underappreciated: The chances of having probable cause or reasonable suspicion increase exponentially with each additional piece of independent incriminating evidence that comes to light. This is because of the unlikelihood that each “coincidence of information”33 could exist in the absence of a fair or moderate possibility of guilt.

For example, in a Kings County murder case probable cause to arrest the defendant was based on the following: When the crime occurred, a car similar to defendant’s “uniquely painted” vehicle had been seen in a rural area, two-tenths of a mile from where a 15-year old girl had been abducted. In addition, an officer saw “bootprints and tire prints” nearby and “he compared them visually with boots seen in, and the treads of the tires of, defendant’s car, which he knew was parked in front of defendant’s hotel and registered to defendant. He saw the condition of the victim’s body; he knew that defendant had a prior record of conviction for forcible rape. He also knew of the victim’s occasional employment as a babysitter at the farm where defendant worked.” In ruling that these pieces of independent incriminating evidence constituted probable cause, the California Supreme Court said:

The probability of the independent concurrence of these factors in the absence of the guilt of defendant was slim enough to render suspicion of defendant reasonable and probable.34

Similarly, in a case from Santa Clara County,35 a man named Anthony Spears, who worked at a Chili’s in Cupertino, arrived at the restaurant one morning and “discovered” that the manager had been shot and killed before the restaurant had opened for the day. In the course of their investigation, sheriff ’s deputies learned that Spears had left home shortly before the murder even though it was his day off, there were no signs of forced entry, and that Marlboro cigarette butts (the same brand that Spears smoked) had been found in an alcove near the manager’s office. Moreover, Spears had given conflicting statements about his whereabouts when the murder occurred; and, after “discovering” the manager’s body, he told other employees that the manager had been “shot” but the cause of death was not apparent from the condition of the body.

Based on this evidence, detectives obtained a warrant to search Spears’ apartment and the search netted, among other things, “large amounts of bloodstained cash.” On appeal, Spears argued that the detectives lacked probable cause for the warrant but the court disagreed, saying, “[W]e believe that all of the factors, considered in their totality, supplied a degree of suspicion sufficient to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.”

While this principle also applies to reasonable suspicion to detain, a lesser amount of independent incriminating evidence will be required. The following are examples from various cases:

The suspect’s physical description and his clothing were similar to that of the perpetrator.36
In addition to a description similarity, the suspect was in a car similar in appearance to that of the perpetrator.37
The suspect resembled the perpetrator and he was in the company of a person who was positively identified as one of two men who had just committed the crime.38
The suspect resembled the perpetrator plus he was detained shortly after the crime occurred at the location where the perpetrator was last seen or on a logical escape route.39
In addition to resembling the perpetrator, the suspect did something that tended to demonstrate consciousness of guilt; e.g., he lied to officers or made inconsistent statements, he made a furtive gesture, he reacted unusually to the officer’s presence, he attempting to elude officers.40
The suspect resembled the perpetrator and possessed fruits of the crime.41
The number of suspects in the vehicle corresponded with the number of people who had just committed the crime, plus they were similar in age, sex, and nationality.42

Unique circumstances

The odds of having reasonable suspicion or probable cause also increase dramatically if the matching or similar characteristics were unusual or distinctive. As the Court of Appeal observed, “Uniqueness of the points of comparison must also be considered in testing whether the description would be inapplicable to a great many others.”43

For example, the courts have taken note of the following unique circumstances:

The suspect and perpetrator both had bandages on their left hands;44
The suspect and perpetrator were in vehicles of the same make and model with tinted windows and a dark-colored top with light-colored side.45 Conversely, the Second Circuit noted that “when the points of similarity are less unique or distinctive, more similarities are required before the probability of identity between the two becomes convincing.”46

Inferences based on circumstantial evidence As noted earlier, probable cause and reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts.” However, the courts will also consider an officer’s inferences as to the meaning or significance of the facts so long as the inference appeared to be reasonable. It is especially relevant that the inference was based on the officer’s training and experience.47 In the words of the Supreme Court, “The evidence must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”48 Or, as the Court explained in United States v. Arvizu:

The process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.49

For example, in People v. Soun 50 the defendant and three other men killed the owner of a video store in San Jose during a botched robbery. The men were all described as Asian, but witnesses provided conflicting descriptions of the getaway car. Some said it was a two-door Japanese car, but one said it was a Volvo “or that type of car.” Two of the witnesses provided a partial license plate number. One said he thought it began with 1RCS, possibly 1RCS525 or 1RCS583. The other said he thought it was 1RC(?)538.

A San Jose PD officer who was monitoring these developments at the station made two inferences:

(1) the actual license plate probably began with 1RCS, and (2) the last three numbers included a 5 and an 8. So he started running these combinations through DMV until he got a hit on 1RCS558, a 1981 Toyota registered in Oakland. Because the car was last seen heading toward Oakland, officers notified OPD and, the next day, OPD officers stopped the car and eventually arrested the occupants for the murder. This, in turn, resulted in the seizure of the murder weapon. On appeal, one of the occupants, Soun, argued that the weapon should have been suppressed because the detention was based on nothing more than “hunch and supposition.” On the contrary, said the court, what Soun labeled “hunch and supposition” was actually “intelligent and resourceful police work.”

Similarly, in People v. Carrington 51 the California Supreme Court ruled that police in Los Altos reasonably inferred that two commercial burglaries were committed by the same person based on the following: “the two businesses were located in close proximity to each other, both businesses were burglarized on or about the same date, and in both burglaries blank checks were stolen.”

Hunches and unsupported conclusions

It is well known that hunches play an important role in solving crimes. “A hunch,” said the Ninth Circuit, “may provide the basis for solid police work; it may trigger an investigation that uncovers facts that establish reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or even grounds for a conviction.”52 Still, hunches are absolutely irrelevant in determining the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In other words, a hunch “is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion.”53

The same is true of unsupported conclusions.54 For example, in ruling that a search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the court in U.S. v. Underwood 55 noted that much of the affidavit was “made up of conclusory allegations” that were “entirely unsupported by facts.” Two of these allegation were that officers had made “other seizures” and had “intercepted conversations” that tended to prove the defendant was a drug trafficker. “[T]hese vague explanations,” said the court, “add little if any support because they do not include underlying facts.”

Information known to other officers

Information is ordinarily irrelevant unless it had been communicated to the officer who acted on it; i.e., the officer who made the detention, arrest, or search, or the officer who applied for the search or arrest warrant.56 To put it another way, a search or seizure made without sufficient justification cannot be rehabilitated in court by showing that it would have been justified if the officer had been aware of information possessed by a colleague. As the California Supreme Court explained, “The question of the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct is determined on the basis of the information possessed by the officer at the time a decision to act is made.”57

There is, however, an exception to this rule known as the “official channels rule” by which officers may detain, arrest, or sometimes search a suspect based solely on an official request to do so from another officer or agency. Under this rule, officers may also act based on information transmitted via a law enforcement database, such as NCIC and CLETS.58

Although the officers who act upon such transmissions are seldom aware of many, if any, of the facts known to the originating officer, this does not matter because, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, “[E]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information.”59

For example, in U.S. v. Lyons 60 state troopers in Michigan stopped and searched the defendant’s car based on a tip from DEA agents that the driver might be transporting drugs. On appeal, Lyons argued that the search was unlawful because the troopers had no information as to why she was a suspected of carrying drugs. But the court responded “it is immaterial that the troopers were unaware of all the specific facts that supported the DEA’s reasonable suspicion analysis. The troopers possessed all the information they needed to act—a request by the DEA (subsequently found to be well-supported).”

Note that, although officers “are entitled to presume the accuracy of information furnished to them by other law enforcement personnel,”61 the officers who disseminated the information may later be required to prove in court that they had received such information and that they reasonably believed it was reliable.62

Information inadmissible in court

In determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exist, officers may consider both hearsay and privileged communications.63 For example, although a victim’s identification of the perpetrator might constitute inadmissible hearsay or fall within the marital privilege, officers may rely on it unless they had reason to believe it was false. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that hearsay information will support issuance of a search warrant…. Indeed, the usual search warrant, based on a reliable police informer’s or citizen-informant’s information, is necessarily founded upon hearsay.”64 On the other hand, information may not be considered if it was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights; e.g., an illegal search or seizure.65

Mistakes of fact and law

If probable cause was based on information that was subsequently determined to be inaccurate or false, the information may nevertheless be considered if the officers reasonably believed it was true. As the Court of Appeal put it, “If the officer’s belief is reasonable, it matters not that it turns out to be mistaken.”66 Or, in the words of the Supreme Court, “[W]hat is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”67

The courts are not, however, so forgiving with mistakes of law. This is because officers are expected to know the laws they enforce and the laws that govern criminal investigations. Consequently, information will not be considered if it resulted from such a mistake, even if the mistake was made in good faith.68 As the California Supreme Court explained, “Courts on strong policy grounds have generally refused to excuse a police officer’s mistake of law.”69 Or, as the Ninth Circuit put it, “If an officer simply does not know the law and makes a stop based upon objective facts that cannot constitute a violation, his suspicions cannot be reasonable.”70

References

Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 695.
Hanson v. Dane County (7th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 335. 338.
Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 695.
United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 [“abstract”]; United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417 [“elusive”].
U.S. v. Jones (1st Cir. 2012) 700 F.3d 615, 621.
See United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7; United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274; Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 33; In re Rafael V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 977, 982; In re Louis F. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 611, 616.
Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330.
See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 231 “In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.”].
See Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742; Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232.
See Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371.
U.S. v. Ludwig (10th Cir. 2011) 641 F.3d 1243, 1251.
Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742. Also see People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 163.
See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009) 557 U.S. 364, 371.
See U.S. v. Melvin (1st Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 492, 495 [“appellant reads the phrase ‘probable cause’ with emphasis on the word ‘probable’ and would define it mathematically to mean more likely than not or by a preponderance of the evidence. This reading is incorrect.”]; People v. Alcorn (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 652, 655; U.S. v. Garcia (5th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 265, 269.
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123. Also see United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009) 557 U.S. 364, 371.
United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277.
People v. Brown (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1442, 1449 [edited].
In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894. Also see United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277.
U.S. v. Pontoo (1st Cir. 2011) 666 F.3d 20, 27. Also see Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 239.
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21, fn.18.
United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.
U.S. v. Edwards (5th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 883, 895. Also see U.S. v. Valdes-Vega (9th Cir. 2013) 739 F.3d 1074.
(1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 751, 767.
(2003) 540 U.S. 366. Also see Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) 466 U.S. 727, 734 [“The informant’s story and the surrounding facts possessed an internal coherence that gave weight to the whole.”].
Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 231. Also see United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 418.
See United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 9 [“Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.”]; People v. Glenos (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1207; U.S. v. Ruidiaz (1st Cir. 2008) 529 F.3d 25, 30 [“a fact that is innocuous in itself may in combination with other innocuous facts take on added significance”].
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009) 557 U.S. 364, 371.
(1984) 466 U.S. 727, 731-32.
People v. Juarez (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 631, 636.
(1983) 462 U.S. 213.
Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 26. Also see People v. Pranke (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 935, 940 [“when such remarkable coincidences coalesce, they are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant has committed an offense”]; U.S.v. Abdus-Price (D.C. Cir. 2008) 518 F.3d 926, 930 [a “confluence” of factors]; U.S. v. Carney (6th Cir. 2012) 675 F.3d 1007 [“interweaving connections”].
People v. Hillery (1967) 65 Cal.2d 795, 804.
People v. Spears (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1.
See Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 46-47; People v. Adams (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 855, 861; People v. Anthony (1970)7 Cal.App.3d 751, 763.
See People v. Hill (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 48, 55; People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1524-25; People v. Watson (1970)12 Cal.App.3d 130, 134-35; People v. Davis (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 230, 237; People v. Huff (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 549, 557; In re Dung T. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 697, 712-13; People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91; People v. Jones (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 308, 313-14; People v. Moore (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 610, 617; People v. Adams (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 855, 861; People v. Orozco (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435, 445.
See People v. Bowen (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 269, 274; In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 CA3 1087, 1092; In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 CA3 372, 382 [“[W]here, as here, a crime is known to have involved multiple suspects, some of whom are specifically described and others whose descriptions are generalized, a defendant’s proximity to a specifically described suspect, shortly after and near the site of the crime, provides reasonable grounds to detain for investigation a defendant who otherwise fits certain general descriptions.”].
People v. Atmore (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 244, 246.
People v. Fields (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 555, 564; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 186; People v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005.
People v. Hagen (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 35, 43; People v. Morgan (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1384, 1389; People v. Anthony (1970) 7Cal.App.3d 751, 763; People v. Rico (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 124, 129.
People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1524. Also see People v. Brian A. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1174 [“Where there were two perpetrators and an officer stops two suspects who match the descriptions he has been given, there is much greater basis to find sufficient probable cause for arrest. The probability of there being other groups of persons with the same combination of physical characteristics, clothing, and trappings is very slight.”]; People v. Britton (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-19 [“This evasive conduct by two people instead of just one person, we believe, bolsters the reasonableness of the suspicion”]. Compare In re Dung T. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 697, 713.
In re Brian A. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1174
People v. Joines (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 259, 264. Also see P v. Hill (2001) 89 CA4 48, 55 [medallion and scar].
U.S. v. Abdus-Price (D.C. Cir. 2008) 518 F.3d 926, 930-31. Also see P v. Orozco (1981) 114 CA3 435, 440 [a “cream, vinyl top over a cream colored vehicle”]; P v. Flores (1974) 12 C3 85, 92 [a “unique” paint job].
U.S. v. Jackson (2nd Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 59, 64.
See United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 418; People v. Ledesma (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857, 866; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240-41; U.S. v. Lopez-Soto (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 [“An officer is entitled to rely on his training and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he observes, but those inferences must also be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation.”].
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232.
(2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.
(1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499. Also see Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371-72 [it was reasonable to believe that all three occupants of a vehicle possessed five baggies of cocaine that were behind the back-seat armrest because they were stopped at 3:16 A.M., there was $763 in rolled-up cash in the glove box, and none of the men offered “any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money”]; People v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005; People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 704, 712-13.
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 145.
U.S. v. Thomas (9th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3d 1186, 1192.
Ibid. Also see U.S. v. Cash (10th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 1264, 1274 [reasonable suspicion “must be based on something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch”].
See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 239 [a “wholly conclusory statement” is irrelevant]; People v. Leonard (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 878, 883 [“Warrants must be issued on the basis of facts, not beliefs or legal conclusions.”]; U.S. v. Garcia-Villalba (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3d 1223, 1234; Gentry v. Sevier (7th Cir. 2010) 597 F.3d 838, 845 [“The officer was acting solely upon a general report of a ‘suspicious person,’ which did not provide any articulable facts that would suggest the person was committing a crime or was armed.”].
(9th Cir. 2013) 725 F.3d 1076.
See Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 40, fn.12 [“It goes without saying that in determining the existence of probable cause we may concern ourselves only with what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry.” Edited.]; Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 85 [“But we must judge the constitutionality of [the officers’] conduct in light of the information available to them at the time they acted.”]; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 216, 222 [officer “had not been told that Harris and Ellis had identified the car from which shots were fired as a 1960 or 1961 Dodge.”]; People v. Adams (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 855, 862 [“warrantless arrest or search cannot be justified by facts of which the officer was wholly unaware at the time”]; People v. Superior Court (Haflich) (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 759. 766 [“The issue of probable cause depends on the facts known to the officer prior to the search.”]; John v. City of El Monte (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3d 936, 940 [“The determination whether there was probable cause is based upon the information the officer had at the time of making the arrest.”]; U.S. v. Ellis (7th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d 686, 690 [“As there was no communication from Officers Chu and McNeil at the front door to [Officer] Lopez at the side door, it was improper to imputer their knowledge to Lopez.”].
People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795.
See Whiteley v. Warden (1971) 401 U.S. 560, 568; People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1521; U.S. v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3d 1026, 1037
United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 232.
(6th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 754, 768.
U.S. v. Lyons (6th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 754, 768.
See United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 232. Also see People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017.
See United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108; People v. Navarro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 146, 147.
People v. Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 463, 472.
See Lozoya v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1332, 1340; U.S. v. Barajas-Avalos (9th Cir. 2004) 377 F.3d 1040, 1054.
Cantrell v. Zolin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 128, 134. Also see Hill v. California (1971) 401 U.S. 797, 802.
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 185. Edited.
See People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 863; People v. Cox (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 702, 710.
People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822, 831.
U.S. v. Mariscal (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3d 1127, 113
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To Read the Penal Code § 11164-11166 – Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Act – California Penal Code 11164-11166Article 2.5. (CANRA) Click Here

Mandated Reporter formMandated ReporterFORM SS 8572.pdf – The Child Abuse

ALL POLICE CHIEFS, SHERIFFS AND COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS INFO BULLETIN:
Click Here Officers and DA’s for (Procedure to Follow)

It Only Takes a Minute to Make a Difference in the Life of a Child learn more below

You can learn more here California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Law its a PDF file

Learn More About True Threats Here below….

We also have the The Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) – 1st Amendment

CURRENT TEST = We also have the The ‘Brandenburg test’ for incitement to violence – 1st Amendment

We also have the The Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action Test– 1st Amendment

We also have the True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment

We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Elonis v. United States (2015) – Threats – 1st Amendment

Learn More About What is Obscene…. be careful about education it may enlighten you

We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment

We also have the Obscenity and Pornography – 1st Amendment

Learn More About Police, The Government Officials and You….

$$ Retaliatory Arrests and Prosecution $$

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment 2023 SCOTUS

We also have the Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee – 1st Amendment – Posting Police Address

We also have the Publius v. Boyer-Vine –1st Amendment – Posting Police Address

We also have the Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida (2018) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests

We also have the Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests

We also have the Hartman v. Moore (2006) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

We also have the Reichle v. Howards (2012) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1$t Amendment – Learn More Here

Vermont’s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers – 1st Amendment Protected Speech

We also have the Insulting letters to politician’s home are constitutionally protected, unless they are ‘true threats’ – Letters to Politicians Homes – 1st Amendment

We also have the First Amendment Encyclopedia very comprehensive – 1st Amendment

Sanctions and Attorney Fee Recovery for Bad Actors

FAM § 3027.1 – Attorney’s Fees and Sanctions For False Child Abuse Allegations – Family Code 3027.1 – Click Here

FAM § 271 – Awarding Attorney Fees– Family Code 271 Family Court Sanction Click Here

Awarding Discovery Based Sanctions in Family Law Cases – Click Here

FAM § 2030 – Bringing Fairness & Fee Recovery – Click Here

Zamos v. Stroud – District Attorney Liable for Bad Faith Action – Click Here

Malicious Use of Vexatious Litigant – Vexatious Litigant Order Reversed

Mi$Conduct – Pro$ecutorial Mi$Conduct Prosecutor$

Attorney Rule$ of Engagement – Government (A.K.A. THE PRO$UCTOR) and Public/Private Attorney

What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Attorney’s Sworn Oath

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct – Know What it is!

New Supreme Court Ruling – makes it easier to sue police

Possible courses of action Prosecutorial Misconduct

Misconduct by Judges & Prosecutor – Rules of Professional Conduct

Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations – Prosecutorial Investigations

Information On Prosecutorial Discretion

Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves

Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation – Forensic & Investigative Accounting – Click Here

Criminal Motions § 1:9 – Motion for Recusal of Prosecutor

Pen. Code, § 1424 – Recusal of Prosecutor

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards
National Prosecution Standards – NDD can be found here

The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Prosecutor’s Duty Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Fordham Law Review PDF

Chapter 14 Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information PDF

Mi$Conduct – Judicial Mi$Conduct Judge$

Prosecution Of Judges For Corrupt Practice$

Code of Conduct for United States Judge$

Disqualification of a Judge for Prejudice

Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability

Recusal of Judge – CCP § 170.1 – Removal a Judge – How to Remove a Judge

l292 Disqualification of Judicial Officer – C.C.P. 170.6 Form

How to File a Complaint Against a Judge in California?

Commission on Judicial Performance – Judge Complaint Online Form

Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

DUE PROCESS READS>>>>>>

Due Process vs Substantive Due Process learn more HERE

Understanding Due Process – This clause caused over 200 overturns in just DNA alone Click Here

Mathews v. Eldridge – Due Process – 5th & 14th Amendment Mathews Test – 3 Part Test– Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test

“Unfriending” Evidence – 5th Amendment

At the Intersection of Technology and Law

We also have the Introducing TEXT & EMAIL Digital Evidence in California Courts – 1st Amendment
so if you are interested in learning about Introducing Digital Evidence in California State Courts
click here for SCOTUS rulings

Right to Travel freely – When the Government Obstructs Your Movement – 14th Amendment & 5th Amendment

What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170 – Crimes Against Public Justice

What Is Traversing a Warrant (a Franks Motion)?

Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar – Police Warrant – Immunity Fail – 4th, 5th, & 14th Amendment

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?

Penal Code 135 PC – Destroying or Concealing Evidence

Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

Penal Code 142 PC – Peace Officer Refusing to Arrest or Receive Person Charged with Criminal Offense

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 32 PC – Accessory After the Fact

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

What is Abuse of Process?

What is a Due Process Violation? 4th & 14th Amendment

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

The Use and Abuse of Power by Prosecutors (Justice for All)

ARE PEOPLE LYING ON YOU?
CAN YOU PROVE IT? IF YES…. THEN YOU ARE IN LUCK!

Penal Code 118 PC – California Penalty of “Perjury” Law

Federal Perjury – Definition by Law

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Penal Code 118.1 PC – Police Officer$ Filing False Report$

Spencer v. Peters– Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment

Penal Code 148.5 PC – Making a False Police Report in California

Penal Code 115 PC – Filing a False Document in California

Misconduct by Government Know Your Rights Click Here

Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983 – Recoverable Damage$

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Right$

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of Right$ Under Color of Law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against Right$

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct? (Tort Claim Forms here as well)

Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

What is Sua Sponte and How is it Used in a California Court?

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

How to Recover “Punitive Damages” in a California Personal Injury Case

Pro Se Forms and Forms Information(Tort Claim Forms here as well)

What is Tort?

Tort Claims Form
File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (see below)

Federal – Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

Appealing/Contesting Case/Order/Judgment/Charge/ Suppressing Evidence

First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What it Takes to Get Started – Click Here

Options to Appealing– Fighting A Judgment Without Filing An Appeal Settlement Or Mediation

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1008 Motion to Reconsider

Penal Code 1385 – Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise

Penal Code 1538.5 – Motion To Suppress Evidence in a California Criminal Case

CACI No. 1501 – Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings

Penal Code “995 Motions” in California – Motion to Dismiss

WIC § 700.1 – If Court Grants Motion to Suppress as Evidence

Suppression Of Exculpatory Evidence / Presentation Of False Or Misleading Evidence – Click Here

Notice of Appeal — Felony (Defendant) (CR-120) 1237, 1237.5, 1538.5(m) – Click Here

California Motions in Limine – What is a Motion in Limine?

Petition for a Writ of Mandate or Writ of Mandamus (learn more…)

Retrieving Evidence / Internal Investigation Case

Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) of the Orange County District Attorney OCDA – Click Here

Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation – Forensic & Investigative Accounting – Click Here

Orange County Data, BodyCam, Police Report, Incident Reports,
and all other available known requests for data below:

APPLICATION TO EXAMINE LOCAL ARREST RECORD UNDER CPC 13321 Click Here

Learn About Policy 814: Discovery Requests OCDA Office – Click Here

Request for Proof In-Custody Form Click Here

Request for Clearance Letter Form Click Here

Application to Obtain Copy of State Summary of Criminal HistoryForm Click Here

Request Authorization Form Release of Case Information – Click Here

Texts / Emails AS EVIDENCE: Authenticating Texts for California Courts

Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages

How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines
Subject to Open Records Requests

case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government Employees

Public Records Practices After the San Jose Decision

The Decision Briefing Merits After the San Jose Decision

CPRA Public Records Act Data Request – Click Here

Here is the Public Records Service Act Portal for all of CALIFORNIA Click Here

Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule – Confronting Evidence

Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence

Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims

Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Police BodyCam Footage Release

Electronic Audio Recording Request of OC Court Hearings

Cleaning Up Your Record

Tossing Out an Inferior Judgement – When the Judge Steps on Due Process – California Constitution Article VI – Judicial Section 13

Penal Code 851.8 PC – Certificate of Factual Innocence in California

Petition to Seal and Destroy Adult Arrest Records – Download the PC 851.8 BCIA 8270 Form Here

SB 393: The Consumer Arrest Record Equity Act – 851.87 – 851.92 & 1000.4 – 11105 – CARE ACT

Expungement California – How to Clear Criminal Records Under Penal Code 1203.4 PC

How to Vacate a Criminal Conviction in California – Penal Code 1473.7 PC

Seal & Destroy a Criminal Record

Cleaning Up Your Criminal Record in California (focus OC County)

Governor Pardons –What Does A Governor’s Pardon Do

How to Get a Sentence Commuted (Executive Clemency) in California

How to Reduce a Felony to a Misdemeanor – Penal Code 17b PC Motion

PARENT CASE LAW

RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR CHILDREN &
YOUR CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT$ + RULING$

YOU CANNOT GET BACK TIME BUT YOU CAN HIT THOSE IMMORAL NON CIVIC MINDED PUNKS WHERE THEY WILL FEEL YOU = THEIR BANK

Family Law Appeal – Learn about appealing a Family Court Decision Here

9.3 Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant as (Individuals) — 14th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

Amdt5.4.5.6.2 – Parental and Children’s Rights“> – 5th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

9.32 – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship – 14th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

California Civil Code Section 52.1
Interference with exercise or enjoyment of individual rights

Parent’s Rights & Children’s Bill of Rights
SCOTUS RULINGS FOR YOUR PARENT RIGHTS

SEARCH of our site for all articles relating for PARENTS RIGHTS Help!

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

Are You From Out of State (California)? FL-105 GC-120(A)
Declaration Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)

Learn More:Family Law Appeal

Necessity Defense in Criminal Cases

Can You Transfer Your Case to Another County or State With Family Law? – Challenges to Jurisdiction

Venue in Family Law Proceedings

GRANDPARENT CASE LAW

Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
Family Law Packet SB Resource Center

Motion to vacate an adverse judgment

Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?

Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848

Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

Family Treatment Court Best Practice Standards

Download Here this Recommended Citation

Epic Criminal / Civil Right$ SCOTUS Help – Click Here

Epic Parents SCOTUS Ruling – Parental Right$ Help – Click Here

Judge’s & Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction– SCOTUS RULINGS on

Prosecutional Misconduct – SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors

Please take time to learn new UPCOMING

The PROPOSED Parental Rights Amendment
to the US CONSTITUTION Click Here to visit their site

The proposed Parental Rights Amendment will specifically add parental rights in the text of the U.S. Constitution, protecting these rights for both current and future generations.

The Parental Rights Amendment is currently in the U.S. Senate, and is being introduced in the U.S. House.

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170 – Crimes Against Public Justice

The Truth News — Tue, 26 Dec 2023 08:07:22 +0000

California Penal Code § 170 – Misuse of the Warrant System – Crimes Against Public Justice

2022 California Code
Penal Code – PEN
PART 1 – OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
TITLE 7 – OF CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE
CHAPTER 7 – Other Offenses Against Public Justice
Section 170.

Universal Citation: CA Penal Code § 170 (2022)

170. Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant or warrant of arrest to be issued and executed, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Enacted 1872.)

Malicious Procurement of A Search or Arrest Warrant

Penal Code 170. Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant or warrant of arrest to be issued and executed, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Enacted 1872.)

Penal Code Section 170 – Malicious Procurement of A Search or Arrest Warrant

Under Penal Code Section 170¹, any person who “maliciously” procures a search or arrest warrant without “probable cause” is guilty of a misdemeanor.

A person acts “maliciously” if he intends to injure, annoy, or vex another person. A person acting with malice holds an “ill will” towards the victim. ²

Police officers may submit an “affidavit” to a judge which sets for the officer’s justification to request a search warrant or an arrest warrant. An affidavit is a written declaration made under oath. A judge may only authorize a search warrant or arrest warrant upon a finding of “probable cause.”² When a judge determines whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant, he or she “must make a practical, common-sense decision whether given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”⁴ A similar analysis occurs when a judge issues an arrest warrant. The judge must examine an officer’s affidavit in support of the arrest warrant and determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime occurred.

READ UP MORE….. on Malicious Prosecution and Thompson Vs. Clark and other SCOTUS Rulings here

This is a violation of the process also known as abuse of process not to be confused Due Process which is another part of this violation

The term ‘process’ refers to the proceedings in any civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution and usually describes the formal notice or writ used by a court to exercise jurisdiction over a person or property. Such process compels the defending party to appear in court, or comply with an order of the Court. It may take the form of a summons, mandate, subpoena, warrant, or other written demand issued by a court. When one files suit, one normally has a summons issued by the court which compels the defendant to appear within thirty days to contest the matter.

Abuse of process refers to the improper use of a civil or criminal legal procedure for an unintended, malicious, or perverse reason. It is the malicious and deliberate misuse of regularly issued civil or criminal court process that is not justified by the underlying legal action. to learn more about ABUSE of PROCESS click here and to learn abusing the Constitutinal Right to Due Process click here which involves several Constutional Rights afforded by the Amendments

Fourth Amendment
Fifth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment
Malicious Prosecution and Thompson Vs. Clark and other SCOTUS Rulings click here
Prosecutorial misconduct – When prosecutors abuse their power by breaking the law or breaching a professional code of conduct.

Sources Cited / Notes:

¹ Blog Article Published June 12, 2018.
² In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1027-1028.
³ People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715.
⁴ People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 721.

How We Got the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule and Why We Need It

The exclusionary rule evolved because of the ineffectiveness of the warrant procedure in preventing illegal searches and seizures, and it remains effective as a means of preventing the government from achieving the ends of its illegal activity and as a symbol of the justice system’s commitment to the citizen rights mandated in the fourth amendment.

The fourth amendment provides for a warrant system intended to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures; however, there is no specific constitutional provision for the exclusion of evidence illegally acquired. The framers of the Constitution exaggerated the effectiveness of the warrant procedure, but it does not follow that they were not serious about preventing the evils the warrant procedure was designed to address. The exclusionary rule was adopted by the courts as a rule of evidence to deal with the failure of the warrant system to address after-the-fact fourth amendment violations.

California Search Warrants – 7 Key Things to Know

In California, a search warrant is issued by a judge and authorizes law enforcement to search a person, a residence, a vehicle, a place of business, or any other specified area suspected of containing evidence of illegal activity.

Once police find the evidence they are seeking, the search warrant allows officers to seize that evidence.

Unless a search is

authorized by your consent,
incident to a lawful arrest, or
under some other recognized exception,

it must be executed pursuant to a valid search warrant.

That said, there are many restrictions on when and how cops may execute California search warrants. Violations of these rules may result in a reduction (or even a dismissal) of your criminal charges.

In order to help you understand the law, our criminal defense attorneys will explain 7 key things to know about search warrants in California:

A judge issues and signs a search warrant.

1. Who can authorize a search warrant?

Although a search warrant is issued on behalf of the state (that is, by the prosecuting agency), the judge actually issues and signs it. ^{1 2} ³ The purpose of having a judge issue the warrant instead of the police or a prosecutor is to ensure that a neutral, detached individual evaluates the circumstances of the criminal investigation.⁴

Before the judge can sign off, two requirements must be met: The judge must reasonably believe

that a misdemeanor or felony has been committed, and
that evidence of that criminal case is likely to be found in the place(s) described in the search warrant.⁵

If the facts presented in the warrant application are convincing, the judge must sign and issue the search warrant.⁶

Also, we should clarify the distinction between search warrants and two other common types of warrants.

A California arrest warrant is usually issued when criminal charges have been filed, and it authorizes the police to arrest you on the charges.
A California bench warrant is issued by a judge for violating some rule of court, such as failing to appear for your court hearing or failing to pay a fine that was required as a condition of probation.

2. What are the search warrant requirements for police in California?

There are certain requirements that law enforcement must meet in order to obtain a search warrant in California. They must show probable cause that the locations to be searched contain evidence, instruments or fruits of criminal activity.

The following are examples of the types of grounds on which a California search warrant may be issued:

if the sought property was allegedly stolen
if the sought property was allegedly used as a means to commit a felony
if the sought property is evidence of the fact that a felony has occurred or that you have committed a felony
if the sought property is in possession of someone who intends to use it to commit a crime or in the possession of another to whom they may have delivered it for the purpose of concealing it or keeping it from being discovered
if the sought property reveals child pornography
if an arrest warrant has already issued.⁷

It should be noted that if the sought property is held by an attorney, doctor, psychotherapist, or member of the clergy, a special procedure will be held before that evidence may be seized. Even then, the attorney, doctor, therapist, or clergyman must be the individual suspected of engaging in the alleged criminal activity.⁸

Before a judge issues a search warrant, they must have probable cause to do so.

Probable cause

“Probable cause” is a legal phrase. It refers to a “reasonable” belief that criminal activity is taking (or has taken) place.

So before a judge issues a search warrant, they must have a reasonable belief that the person/property specifically described in the warrant application (otherwise known as an “affidavit“) will be found in the searched location.⁹

Before finding that probable cause exists, the judge may question (under oath)

the officer,
prosecutor, or
state investigator¹⁰ who applied for the warrant, and
any witnesses that the requesting individual relied on to determine that a warrant was necessary.

These affidavits may be written or oral, and presented in person, via the telephone, by fax, or even e-mail.¹¹ They also must contain the facts that establish the grounds for the application or the probable cause for believing that they exist.

Affidavits are under penalty of perjury.¹²

Search warrants v. other types of warrants

	Search warrant	Arrest warrant	Bench warrant
Purpose	To search a location to seize evidence of a crime	To arrest you for committing a crime	To arrest you for defying court orders
Party requesting the warrant	Law enforcement	Law enforcement	Judge or law enforcement
Basis for issuance	Probable cause that there is evidence of a crime at a specified location	Probable cause that you committed a crime	Your failure to comply with court orders
Timeframe of issuance	Usually at the beginning of a criminal case	Usually at the beginning of a criminal case	Anytime during an open case

3. Are there rules as to the use of informants?

Police routinely rely on information provided by informants. Informants are individuals who provide information about people, organizations, or activities to the police without the consent of those people or organizations.

That said, the judge must be informed of some of the facts that led the informant to their conclusion that there is alleged criminal activity.¹³ A mere opinion that a person or property is involved in a crime is therefore insufficient without evidence to support it.

Since it is the judge who must determine if there is probable cause to issue the warrant, they must believe that the informant’s information is reliable. This may be established by:

the identity of the informer,
past experiences with the informant in which they have proven to be reliable, and/or
corroboration by the officer’s personal observations or other evidence.¹⁴

The informant’s identity

The judge may require disclosure of the informant’s name or may require them to give a statement under oath as to the information they provided to the police.¹⁵ However, just because the informant’s identity is disclosed to the judge does not mean it will necessarily be disclosed to the defense.

A judge is allowed to seal any or all of the affidavit to protect the identity of a confidential informant if that testimony helped establish the probable cause that led the judge to issue the warrant.¹⁶

Although the judge will not reveal the informant’s identity simply because you wish to use it to attack the judge’s finding of probable cause, they may ask the prosecutor to disclose it if your motion to traverse and quash the search warrant has merit.¹⁷

A lawyer can challenge the validity of a search warrant in multiple ways.

4. How can a defense lawyer challenge the validity of a search warrant?

Although motions to quash and traverse would be more appropriately explained in the final section titled “Motion to Suppress Evidence“, they merit discussion here. They directly relate to informants and the probable cause required to obtain California search warrants.

A motion to “quash and traverse” challenges the affidavit (and underlying probable cause) that the judge relied on upon issuing the California search warrant:

A motion to traverse challenges the truth of the affidavit.
A motion to quash challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit (that is, even assuming the facts are true, whether they rise to the level of probable cause).

Although these motions may be filed separately or together, the terms are often used interchangeably. We will discuss them as one for the sake of simplicity.

California criminal defense lawyers may assert motions to traverse and quash a search warrant in three types of hearings:

in a Franks hearing (to assert that the author of the affidavit (otherwise known as the “affiant”) provided false information,
in a Luttenberger hearing (to assert that the informant provided false information), or
in a Hobbs hearing (which is based on a sealed affidavit).

Franks hearings

If you request a Franks hearing to quash and traverse a warrant because you believe the supporting affidavit contains false information, you must set forth the reasons why you believe that it is inaccurate.¹⁸ California criminal defense lawyers may do this by demonstrating that:

the affidavit contained a false statement,
the statement was made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, and
that the statement was necessary (that is, “material”) to establish probable cause.¹⁹

It should be noted that if the affiant intentionally leaves out material information, they will be deemed to have provided materially false information “by omission”.²⁰

The court must hold an “in camera” hearing if the judge believes that you have effectively challenged the truth of the affidavit.²¹ An in-camera hearing is a private hearing held in the judge’s chambers.

During this hearing, the judge may question the affiant or informant to determine whether the affidavit is accurate, false, or misleading.²²

If the criminal defense attorney succeeds in proving that

the affidavit contained false material information, and
the remaining information is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause,

the judge must quash the California search warrant.

Once the search warrant is quashed, any evidence that was seized under the warrant will be suppressed.²³

*Suppressed evidence is discussed in the section titled “Motion to Suppress Evidence”.

Luttenberger hearings

When the affidavit supplying the probable cause contains information from an undisclosed informant, it is extremely difficult to establish that the affidavit is false – which is the standard to get a Franks hearing.

If the informant is not a material witness with respect to your guilt or innocence (an eyewitness to the alleged crime, for example), the prosecution is under no duty to disclose their identity.²⁴

A Luttenberger hearing takes place when you want to attack the truth of the affidavit but do not know the identity of the informant. In this hearing, the California criminal attorney may request information about:

the informant’s reliability,
their motive for providing information (for example, was the informant paid or offered leniency in exchange for their testimony?), and
any statements that the informant made in connection with the case.

Although the burden of proof is less strict than a Franks hearing, the defense still must cast doubt as to the truthfulness of the informant’s testimony. If you accomplish this, the court will conduct an in camera hearing to determine if the statements are material.²⁵

If the statements are material, the court will redact (or remove) any information that may disclose the informant’s identity before it provides you with the

affidavit or
supporting document(s).²⁶

If, during this hearing, you discover that the informant is a material witness to your guilt or innocence, you would move to disclose their identity at a Hobbs hearing.

Hobbs hearings

At a Hobbes hearing, the defense asks the judge to reveal the identity of the confidential informant upon whose information the California search warrant got issued.

When the entire affidavit has been sealed to protect the informant’s identity, it may be too difficult even to qualify for a Luttenberger hearing. When this is the case, the court must conduct an in-camera hearing upon receipt of your motion to traverse or quash the California search warrant.²⁷

Unless the prosecutor agrees, the hearing takes place without you or your criminal defense attorney.²⁸ During this closed hearing, the judge must decide

whether to maintain the confidentiality of the informant, and
whether the affidavit has been properly sealed.²⁹

If the court believes that the affidavit was properly sealed but does not believe that the information contained in it was false or misleading, it will simply deny your motion.³⁰

If, however, the court believes that you may succeed in your motion, it will first give the prosecution the opportunity to disclose their informant or have the case dismissed if the judge rules in your favor.³¹

In our experience, the prosecution will generally dismiss the case before revealing or “burning” the police informant.

5. How are the police allowed to execute a warrant?

The contents of a California search warrant must be described with reasonable particularity.³²

Simply put, “reasonable particularity” means that the warrant should be so clear that nothing is left to the officer’s discretion when executing it.³³ This applies to both

the place to be searched, and
the person/property to be seized.³⁴

This means that a search warrant must be executed according to the exact details contained in the warrant³⁵ – warrants that are clear in their descriptions will be upheld and those that are unduly vague will not.

The following are some examples taken from actual California court cases regarding law enforcement agency searches:³⁶

Descriptions that were found not to be sufficiently clear —

“all of the financial records”
“other evidence”
“stolen property”
“certain personal property used as a means of committing larceny“

Items that were described with reasonable particularity —

“personal property tending to identify the person in control”
“bookmaking paraphernalia”
“illegal deer meat and/or elk meat, etc.”

The more specific the language, the more likely the California search warrant will be upheld.

Time of execution

A California search warrant must be executed within ten (10) days of its issuance. If it has not been executed within that timeframe, it becomes void.³⁷

If the warrant expires, it may be reissued as long as the judge still believes there is probable cause to support it.³⁸ It, therefore, follows that if the probable cause that existed at the time of the original issuance is no longer relevant, the judge will not reissue the warrant.

There are also restrictions on what time of day a warrant may be executed. As a general rule, a search warrant may only be executed between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m. If, however, the judge finds good cause, they may authorize service at any time of the day or night.³⁹

“Good cause” means that there is a factual basis for believing that a nighttime intrusion would be justified based on exigent circumstances.⁴⁰ If, for example, you have several outstanding warrants, service will be authorized whenever possible.

When establishing good cause, the judge must consider both

public safety and
the safety of the officers serving the warrant.⁴²

See our article on What happens after a search warrant is executed?

With respect to seized property…

The officer must provide a detailed receipt for any property that they seized during the search. The officer must leave the receipt with

the person from whom they took the property,
the person who possessed the property, or
where they found the property if it was taken without anyone being present.⁴²

Once taken, the officer must keep the property in police custody until they present it to the court.⁴³

All that said, the police are not permitted to search and seize anyone or anything until they have announced their presence.

6. What is the knock and announce rule?

Before an officer may execute a California search warrant at your home (or possibly your business⁴⁴), the officer must

knock on the door,
announce themself as a law enforcement officer,
inform you that they have a search warrant, and
give you enough time to open the door.⁴⁵

It should be noted that the third requirement may technically be completed after you open the door but in either event must be before the officer enters the home.⁴⁶

There is no steadfast rule as to exactly how these knock-notice (also referred to as the “knock and announce rule“) requirements should be executed. So in order to determine whether the executing officers have legally fulfilled their duties under California’s knock-notice law, the court will look for substantial compliance.

“Substantial compliance,” in its simplest terms, means that the policies underlying the knock and announce requirements are achieved under the circumstances.⁴⁷ These policies include:

protecting a homeowner’s privacy,
protecting innocent people on the premises,
preventing situations that may otherwise encourage a violent confrontation between a homeowner and those who enter their home without notice, and
protecting the police from a startled or fearful homeowner/occupant.⁴⁸

The knock-notice rules and the policies behind them are to ensure that if and when the police force entry into your home, it is only because you knowingly refused their entry.

Forced entry

When is it okay for law enforcement officers to enter a home without permission? After their entry has been refused.

If you (as the owner or occupant) refuse to

open the door for the officers, or
permit them into your home,

the police may break in through a door, window, or any other part of the house to execute the California search warrant.⁴⁹ The same holds true if no one is home.⁵⁰

Assuming you are home, there must be some evidence of a refusal before the police may legally force their way in. This is most typically evidenced by either

an unreasonable delay in responding to the officers’ request to enter⁵¹ (which must be determined based on the facts of the specific case), or
an outright refusal where you tell the police that you will not open the door.⁵²

Some examples of situations where California courts have held that unlawful forced entries took place include:

where knock-notice requirements were not fulfilled (for example, although the officer announced their presence, they did not state their purpose)⁵³
where the officer simultaneously announced their presence and forced entry without giving the homeowner the opportunity to comply or refuse⁵⁴
where the forceful entry was only 20 seconds after the officers otherwise complied with the knock-notice rules.⁵⁵
where knock and announce rules were not followed when the officer entered the home to secure it while the warrant was being obtained⁵⁶
where the officer announced that they were a police officer (without stating his purpose) and only after they had already forced entry.⁵⁷

There are, of course, certain times when officers are permitted to execute a California search warrant by forcing their entry even without complying with the knock-notice requirements.

Exceptions to California’s knock-notice rule

The following are some of the most common exceptions to the knock and announce requirement:

consent (if you consent to the officer’s entry, the officer does not need to proceed with knock-notice requirements)⁵⁸
public places (knock and announce rules are designed to respect your privacy in your home – there is no similar privacy right in a public place)⁵⁹
exigent circumstances (“exigent circumstances” basically mean that “time is of the essence”).

When exigent circumstances are present, the knock-notice requirements may be waived. This is most typically the case where police suspect that those inside the home

may arm themselves, or
destroy the drugs

if they first knock and announce their presence.

There is no blanket exception for exigent circumstances, as each case must be independently evaluated.⁶⁰ The judge will likely excuse a knock-notice violation

“[I]f the specific facts known to the officer before his entry are sufficient to support his good faith belief that compliance will increase his peril, frustrate the arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence[.]”⁶¹

Absent one of these recognized exceptions, a knock-notice violation may render any subsequent search and seizure unreasonable, and therefore, illegal.⁶² When a search and/or seizure is illegal, the prosecution will be prevented from using any of the seized evidence against you at trial.⁶³

7. What is a motion to suppress evidence?

The most common challenge to a search warrant lies in a California Penal Code 1538.5 PC motion to suppress evidence. This motion may be filed if you wish to

recover seized evidence, or
exclude seized evidence from your trial.

A California criminal defense attorney may file an “unreasonable search and seizure” Penal Code 1538.5 motion based on any of the following facts:

that the California search warrant was insufficient on its face (this issue could also be raised in a motion to quash the warrant)
that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant (raised in either a motion to quash or traverse)
that the seized property or other evidence was not specifically described in the search warrant (for example, the officers seized non-deadly weapons when the warrant specifically said deadly weapons)
that the execution of the search warrant was illegal.⁶⁴

If any part of the search was unlawful, any discovered evidence will typically be excluded under this section. As John Murray, one of Ventura’s top criminal defense attorneys, puts it,

“This ‘exclusionary rule’ is one of the most powerful defenses available.”

If your motion is granted, the prosecution will be prohibited from “using” the seized evidence against you at trial. A victory on this motion will often lead the prosecutor to dismiss (or at the very least significantly reduce) your charge(s).

Legal References:

Collins v. Lean, (1885) 68 Cal.284, 288 (“Under article 4 of the amendments to the U.S. constitution … , it is provided that no search-warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. To the same effect is section 19 of article 1 of our state constitution. As we read those instruments we do not find existent therein any prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant of the person of an individual in a proper case. Therefore, subject to the limitations of those constitutions, and subject also to the conditions that body may itself have prescribed, it is within the power of our state legislature to authorize the issuance of such a warrant. And this power it has exercised by the enactment in the Penal Code of sections 1523 to 1542 inclusive.”)
California Penal Code 1523 — Definition. (“A search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate.”)
See same. (“A search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate….”)
People of the State of California v. Escamilla, (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 558, 562 (“Adverting to the responsibility devolving upon a magistrate in the issuance of a search warrant, it has been said that “… an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” ( Shadwick v. City of Tampa (1972) 407 U.S. 345, 350.) The goal is to require an informed and deliberate review of the circumstances by one who is removed from “‘… the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”‘.”)
California Penal Code 1525 — Issuance; probable cause; supporting affidavits; contents of application. (“A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be searched.”)
California Penal Code 1528 — Issuance; magistrate satisfied as to grounds; formalities; command; duplicate original warrant. (“(a) If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied of the existence of the grounds of the application, or that there is probable cause to believe their existence, he or she must issue a search warrant, signed by him or her with his or her name of office, to a peace officer in his or her county, commanding him or her forthwith to search the person or place named for the property or things or person or persons specified, and to retain the property or things in his or her custody subject to order of the court as provided by [California Penal Code] Section 1536.”)
California Penal Code 1524 — Issuance; grounds; special master. See, for example, People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 448; People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 259.
See same — California Penal Code 1524(c). See also California Penal Code 1525 — Issuance; probable cause; supporting affidavits; contents of application. (“The application shall specify when applicable, that the place to be searched is in the possession or under the control of an attorney, physician, psychotherapist or clergyman.”)
California Penal Code 1525 — Issuance; probable cause; supporting affidavits; contents of application. (“A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be searched.”)
People v. Bell, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1054 (“Appellants readily agree Penal Code section 1526, subdivision (a), states: “The magistrate, before issuing the warrant, may examine on oath the person seeking the warrant and any witnesses the person may produce,” (italics added) and that no section of the code requires the person seeking a search warrant be a peace officer. Appellants note, however, that Penal Code section 1523 defines a search warrant as “an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property.” Appellants further note other sections of the code dealing with the execution of the warrant all mention peace officers or officers and make no reference to unsworn persons. (Pen.Code 1528, subd. (a), 1530, 1535.) Appellants contend these references to peace officers evidence an intent not only that officers must execute warrants, but that only they may seek them. We have found no case suggesting such an intent. While the reasons for requiring a search warrant only be served by a peace officer are obvious, there seems no reason why seeking one should be confined to peace officers instead of unsworn members of law enforcement. Seemingly the person who seeks the warrant or provides their affidavit should be the person with most direct knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. We see no reason why a deputy district attorney or an unsworn investigator for a police department, for example, cannot seek a search warrant.”)
California Penal Code 1526 — Issuance; examination of complainant and witnesses; taking and subscribing affidavits; transcribed statements or oath made using telephone and facsimile transmission equipment in lieu of written affidavit.
California Penal Code 1527 — Affidavits; contents. (“The affidavit or affidavits must set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application, or probable cause for believing that they exist.”)
People v. Aguilar, (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 508 (“In Aguilar v. Texas, supra (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 114 [84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 729], the United States Supreme Court said: “Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, …” … And in United States v. Ventresca, supra (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108 [85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 689], the court repeated that same admonition, saying: “This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant’s or an informer’s belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the ‘underlying circumstances’ upon which that belief is based. Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.”FN6”)
See same at 508. (“‘Although information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing emergency, an arrest may not be based solely on such information, and evidence must be presented to the court that would justify the conclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable. In some cases the identity of, or past experience with, the informer may provide such evidence, and in others it may be supplied by similar information from other sources or by the personal observations of the police.’”)
See same at 507. (“Although in cases where a search is based on an arrest without a warrant, the officer, if he relies for probable cause on information obtained from an informant, must, on request of defendant, disclose the name of the informant or the testimony will be stricken (Priestly v. Superior Court, supra (1958) 50 Cal.2d 812), the rule is different in cases where the search is made under a warrant. In warrant cases, it is the issuing magistrate who must be convinced of probable cause. If the magistrate thinks it necessary, he may require disclosure of the informant’s name, or may require that the informant be brought before him for the purpose of making a deposition under section 1526 of the [California] Penal Code. But, since it is the magistrate who determines reliability of the informant, the option to require disclosure is with him and his implied finding of reliability is conclusive on that point.”)
People v. Martinez, (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 233, 240 (“It is settled that “all or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the privilege [under [California] Evidence Code section 1041] and protect the identity of a confidential informant.” ( Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 971, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 651, 873 P.2d 1246; Evid.Code, 1042, subd. (b).)”). See also Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. v. Superior Court (Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, 2022) 83 Cal. App. 5th 407.
See same. (“Consequently, courts are not required to disclose “the identity of an informant who has supplied probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant … where such disclosure is sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause.”)
Franks v. Delaware, (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155 (“In the present case the Supreme Court of Delaware held, as a matter of first impression for it, that a defendant under no circumstances may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police to procure a search warrant. We reverse, and we hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”)
People v. Lewis, (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 988 (“…”a defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of a search warrant…. [T]he lower court must conduct an evidentiary hearing [only if] a defendant makes a substantial showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth; and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause…Innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not defeat a warrant.”)
People v. Luttenberger, (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 15 (“The Crabb court stated that for purposes of the issues presented, it would treat a claim of material omissions similarly to the Franks-type problem of material misstatements…This treatment is acceptable.”)
Franks v. Delaware, (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155 (“…where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”)
People v. Brown, (Court of Appeal, 1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1541, 1548 (“Here, because the court elected to conduct an in camera hearing to determine the truth or falsity of the information given to Meyer, we assume the court believed Brown’s affidavits raised sufficient questions to warrant further inquiry. The court correctly questioned the informants in camera to determine what they had told Meyer. As a result of this inquiry the court was satisfied that the preliminary showing was rebutted and the officer’s affidavit was not materially false. It therefore concluded there was no need for an evidentiary hearing. Through this procedure the court complied with [California] Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (d), and Franks v. Delaware.”)
See Franks, endnote 17 above at 156. (“In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.”)
People v. Hobbs, (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 959 (“In contrast to the situation where the defendant is seeking to discover whether a confidential informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, where the defendant merely seeks to discover the informant’s identity in connection with a challenge to the legality of a search based on information furnished by the informant, a critical distinction is drawn in the case law between searches conducted pursuant to warrant and warrantless searches. It has long been the rule in California that the identity of an informant who has supplied probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant need not be disclosed where such disclosure is sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause.”)
People v. Luttenberger, (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 21 (“To justify in camera review and discovery, preliminary to a subfacial challenge to a search warrant, a defendant must offer evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the affiant.”)
See same at 19. (“…to allow the court to determine materiality and delete information that might identify the informant, may impose a lesser burden on trial courts than such an in camera evidentiary hearing.”)
See Hobbs, endnote 24 above at 972. (“In contrast to the situation in which the informant’s privilege is asserted merely to avoid disclosure of the confidential informant’s name, where, as here, all or a major portion of the search warrant affidavit has been sealed in order to preserve the confidentiality of the informant’s identity, a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to make even the “preliminary showing” required for an in camera hearing under Luttenberger. For this reason, where the defendant has made a motion to traverse the warrant under such circumstances, the court should treat the matter as if the defendant has made the requisite preliminary showing required under this court’s holding in Luttenberger. On a properly noticed motion by the defense seeking to quash or traverse the search warrant, the lower court should conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to the guidelines set forth in section 915, subdivision (b), and this court’s opinion in Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 20-24, 265 Cal.Rptr. 690, 784 P.2d 633.”)
See same at 961. (“…where the defendant demands disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant “on the ground the informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt” (italics added), a hearing must be held, and it must be conducted in camera and outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel if the prosecution so requests.”)
See same. (“It must first be determined whether sufficient grounds exist for maintaining the confidentiality of the informant’s identity. It should then be determined whether the entirety of the affidavit or any major portion thereof is properly sealed, i.e., whether the extent of the sealing is necessary to avoid revealing the informant’s identity.”)
See same at 974. (“If the trial court determines that the materials and testimony before it do not support defendant’s charges of material misrepresentation, the court should simply report this conclusion to the defendant and enter an order denying the motion to traverse.”)
See same. (“If, on the other hand, the court determines there is a reasonable probability that defendant would prevail on the motion to traverse-i.e., a reasonable probability, based on the court’s in camera examination of all the relevant materials, that the affidavit includes a false statement or statements made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, which is material to the finding of probable cause ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156, 98 S.Ct. at pp. 2676-2677)-the district attorney must be afforded the option of consenting to disclosure of the sealed materials, in which case the motion to traverse can then proceed to decision with the benefit of this additional evidence, and a further evidentiary hearing if necessary ( Seibel, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1300, 269 Cal.Rptr. 313; People v. Brown (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1541, 1548, 256 Cal.Rptr. 11), or, alternatively, suffer the entry of an adverse order on the motion to traverse.”)
Constitution of the United States Amendment IV — Search and Seizure. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”) Almost identical language is duplicated in California Constitution Article I, section 13 and California Penal Code 1525 (endnote 7 above).
Marron v. U.S., (1927) 275 U.S. 192, 196 (“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”)
People v. Smith, (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 942, 948 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.” (Cal. Const., art. I, 13, italics added; see also Pen. Code, 1525, 1529.) The italicized portions plainly indicate that the particularity clause is, in realty, two clauses. The first is directed to the place or places to be searched. The second is directed to the persons and/or things to be seized.”)
Thompson v. Superior Court, (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 112 (“In summary, we hold that in determining the property to be seized pursuant to a warrant, we are confined to the four corners of the warrant.”)
People v. Superior Court (Williams), (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 (Overruled on different grounds) (“We are required by the Constitution to determine if the affidavit and the warrant describe the property with particularity, i.e., place a meaningful restriction on the objects to be seized. Whether the description in the warrant is sufficiently definite is a question of law on which an appellate court makes an independent judgment. ( Thompson v. Superior Court, supra., 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 108.) In determining whether a meaningful restriction has been placed on the objects to be seized, the courts have held as follows: “All of the financial records ” is insufficient ( Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238, 249; “any and all other business records and paraphernalia” connected with the business being searched is insufficient ( Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 789, 795-796; “certain personal property used as a means of committing … larceny” is insufficient ( People v. Mayen (1922) 188 Cal. 237, 242 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383]), overruled on different grounds, People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 445; personal property “tending to identify the person in control” is sufficient ( People v. Howard (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 373, 376; stolen merchandise is insufficient when an inventory could have been provided ( Lockridge v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 612, 625; “bank statements, checkbooks and other evidences of indebtedness” too broad ( Griffin v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 672, 695; “bookmaking paraphernalia” held sufficient ( People v. Barthel (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 827, 832; “illegal deer meat and/or elk meat, etc.” is sufficient ( Dunn v. Municipal Court (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 858, 868; “other evidence” is insufficient ( Stern v. Superior Court (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 772, 784; “stolen property” insufficient ( Thompson v. Superior Court, supra., 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 105); “… nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant” ( Marron v. United States (1927) 275 U.S. 192, 196 [72 L.Ed. 231, 237, 48 S.Ct. 74]).”)
California Penal Code 1534 — Time limit for execution and return. (“(a) A search warrant shall be executed and returned within 10 days after date of issuance. A warrant executed within the 10-day period shall be deemed to have been timely executed and no further showing of timeliness need be made. After the expiration of 10 days, the warrant, unless executed, is void. The documents and records of the court relating to the warrant need not be open to the public until the execution and return of the warrant or the expiration of the 10-day period after issuance. Thereafter, if the warrant has been executed, the documents and records shall be open to the public as a judicial record. (b) If a duplicate original search warrant has been executed, the peace officer who executed the warrant shall enter the exact time of its execution on its face. (c) A search warrant may be made returnable before the issuing magistrate or his court.”)
People v. Brocard, (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 239, 243 (“The case of People v. Sanchez (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 664 lends partial support to our conclusion a search warrant may be reissued as long as there is no staleness problem. The Sanchez court held, “[a]lthough there is no statutory authority for the revalidation and reissuance of a search warrant, we see no good reason why, within 10 days of the original issuance, an officer should be precluded from presenting supplemental information to the issuing magistrate, nor why the magistrate, based thereon, should not by appropriate endorsement revalidate and reissue the original warrant rather than issue an entirely new warrant. [Citation.]” (Italics added.) ( Id., at p. 682.) Admittedly Sanchez only upholds reissuance within 10 days of the original issuance. However, even the Sanchez rationale could potentially result in execution of a reissued warrant more than 10 days after the original issuance.) Finally, we do not find it absolutely necessary there be new information to support reissuance of a search warrant. In cases like this one, where the original affidavit contained recent information showing ongoing criminal activity, that affidavit alone may be sufficient to support a probable cause finding at the time of reissuance.”)
California Penal Code 1533 — Direction as to time for search; grounds for search at night; good cause. (“Upon a showing of good cause, the magistrate may, in his or her discretion, insert a direction in a search warrant that it may be served at any time of the day or night. In the absence of such a direction, the warrant shall be served only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.”)
People v. Ramirez, (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 425, 427 (“In the related context of nighttime search warrants, our Supreme Court recently defined the good cause rule as requiring “‘only some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the exigencies of the situation. …”)
See California Penal Code 1533 above. (“When establishing “good cause” under this section, the magistrate shall consider the safety of the peace officers serving the warrant and the safety of the public as a valid basis for nighttime endorsements.”)
California Penal Code 1535 — Receipt for property taken. (“When the officer takes property under the warrant, he must give a receipt for the property taken (specifying it in detail) to the person from whom it was taken by him, or in whose possession it was found; or, in the absence of any person, he must leave it in the place where he found the property.”)
California Penal Code 1536 — Disposition of property taken; retention subject to order of court in which offense triable. (“All property or things taken on a warrant must be retained by the officer in his custody, subject to the order of the court to which he is required to return the proceedings before him, or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken is triable.”)
People v. Pompa, (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1312 (“Livermore [(1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 1073] involved the search of a residence. Here, the entry was to an office which was part of a business establishment, premises entitled to a lesser expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment than that protection afforded a home. ( People v. Lee (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 743, 750, 231 Cal.Rptr. 45; United States v. Agrusa (8th Cir.1976) 541 F.2d 690, 700; United States v. Clayborne (10th Cir.1978) 584 F.2d 346.) Thus to the extent the knock-notice rule applies to business premises, it has less force than when applied to dwellings.”)
People v. Ramsey, (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 679 (“[California Penal Code] Section 1531 provides: “The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.” Under this section, police officers are required: “(1) to knock or utilize other means reasonably calculated to give adequate notice of their presence to the occupants, (2) to identify themselves as police officers, and (3) to explain the purpose of their demand for admittance.””)
People v. Mays, (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 972 (“In support of his suppression motion, Mays argued, and the court agreed, the officers had not announced their purpose until after Riley opened the front door in response to their knocks. The People contend the court erred in finding the officers’ announcement of purpose must precede the opening of the door in order to satisfy constitutional and statutory knock-notice requirements. We agree.”)
See same. (“The essential inquiry is whether under the circumstances the policies underlying the knock-notice requirements were served.”)
People v. Macioce, (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 262, 271 (“The purposes and policies supporting the ‘knock-notice’ rules are fourfold: (1) the protection of the privacy of the individual in his home; (2) the protection of innocent persons present on the premises; (3) the prevention of situations which are conducive to violent confrontations between the occupant and individuals who enter his home without proper notice; and (4) the protection of police who might be injured by a startled and fearful householder.”)
California Penal Code 1531 — Execution; authority to break in after admittance refused. (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.”)
Hart v. Superior Court, (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 496, 504 (“Prima facie, the statute [California Penal Code 1531] mandates that in executing a search warrant an officer must first determine whether anyone is present within the premises to be searched. If an affirmative determination is made, the officer must request admittance by giving notice of his authority and purpose. If, however, it is determined that no one is present and if that determination is supported by the evidence, the notice of authority and purpose requirement is not essential to the validity of the entry and subsequent search.”)
People v. Peterson, (1973) 9 Cal.3d 717, 723 (“Officer Kalm testified that he knocked several times, waited approximately one minute during which interval he observed two persons seated only a short distance inside the screen door. They gave no indication that they intended to respond. Such a delay with notice of the officer’s presence, would reasonably constitute a rejection of the officer’s demands.”) See also Jeter, endnote 38 above at 937. (“Thus, in both Elder and Gallo the police had first-hand concrete knowledge that someone was in the residence and was awake: in Elder the police had the residents on the phone, and in Gallo they had them in view. With such information it was not unreasonable for the officers in the Elder and Gallo situations to conclude that a failure to respond to their knocking and announcing of purpose was a refusal of permission to enter.”)
People v. Cressey, (1970) 2 Cal.3d 836, 840 (“The officer inquired, “Jesse Cressey?” and defendant responded, “Yes.” Properly explaining his purpose, the officer said, “I have two warrants for your arrest charging you with failure to provide, and a traffic warrant. Open the door. You’re under arrest.” The defendant answered, “I’m not going to open the door. You don’t have any failure to provide warrant for me. I sent my ex-wife one hundred dollars last week.” Although the officer did not at that time possess the warrant, he informed the defendant again that the police had such a warrant and ordered defendant to submit to arrest and open the door or he would force entry.FN4 Defendant declared: “Go ahead because I’m not going to open the door. If you break it down, I’ll sue the City.””)
People v. Cain, (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 383, 391 (“The court held that the failure of the officers to explain their purpose and demand admittance, as required by [California] Penal Code section 844, was fatal to the legality of the arrest. (Id. at 310, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489.) The mere announcement to the girl that they were police officers was not sufficient compliance with the statute. ‘That section requires that an officer explain his purpose before demanding admittance, not merely that he identify himself as an officer.’ (Id. at 310, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3, 437 P.2d 489, 491.) It is unchallenged in the case before us that Cozzalio did not fully comply with [California] Penal Code section 1531. He did not announce his purpose, nor was he refused admittance. (This refusal is required by Penal Code section 1531, but not by Penal Code section 844.) The Supreme Court has clearly established that variance from Penal Code section 844 and 1531 will be tolerated only in the exceptional situation. As shown above, this case is not the exceptional situation.”)
People v. Benjamin, (1969) 71 Cal.2d 296, 297 (“…for even if we assume that the officer’s ‘yell’ was an effort on his part to give ‘notice of his authority and purpose,’ it appears that that ‘yell’ was simultaneous with and a part of the entry and that the occupant of the apartment was given no opportunity to grant or refuse admittance. Finally, the record herein provides no basis for concluding that the officer was excused from compliance with the section under the common law exceptions to the rule of announcement. ‘Our decision in People v. Gastelo, Supra, 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706, clearly forecloses the propriety of noncompliance with section 844 or its counterpart section 1531 when such noncompliance is based solely upon an officer’s general experience relative to the disposability of the king of evidence sought and the propensity of offenders to effect disposal.’”)
Jeter v. Superior Court, (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 934, 936 (“Testimony at the preliminary hearing revealed that Officer Munoz, accompanied by four other police officers, arrived at 1224 Fruitvale Avenue about 11 a.m. on July 30, 1981, to serve a search warrant. No surveillance of the premises was undertaken. The officers drove up and parked. Then Officer Munoz knocked on the front door and yelled, “police officers, we have a search warrant.” He waited a “few seconds” and knocked and yelled again. After waiting “five or ten seconds”, he turned the handle and pushed open the door. Upon entering the residence he saw petitioner and Mr. Brown in a sleeping loft: petitioner was sitting on the bed unclad and Brown was asleep.”) The court pointed out that 20 seconds isn’t a steadfast rule but specifically applied to this case. In cases where the police knew that people were in the house and that criminal activity was taking place, a 20-second delay was permissible.
Machado v. Superior Court, (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 316, 320 (“Two recent cases have considered the applicability of [California Penal Code] sections 844 and 1531 to situations where a house was secured pending receipt of a search warrant. (People v. Freeny, 37 Cal.App.3d 20, 112 Cal.Rptr. 33; Ferdin v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.App.3d 774, 112 Cal.Rptr. 66.) The clear implication in both cases is that the courts felt that the knock-and-notice requirements had to be complied with when officers were entering to secure a house pending the arrival of a search warrant. Ferdin specifically recognized that the time the danger of violent confrontation exists is when the entry is made to secure the house and not when the warrant later arrives.”)
Parsley v. Superior Court, (1973) 9 Cal.3d 934, 938 (“FN3 Once inside the dwelling, the officer informed defendant Parsley, “We’re police officers.” This statement does not satisfy [California Penal Code] section 1531 because (1) it was made inside the house, and (2) it did not include a statement of purpose.”)
People v. Byrd, (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 941, 9 (“The trial court found that the evidence showed that Ms. Moser asked Mr. Benner to come in. [California Penal Code] Sections 844 and 1531 are inapplicable under such circumstances. “Since the officers’ entry here was consented to by persons present inside the house, the section does not apply.”)
People v. Lovett, (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 527, 531 (“Although the People cite no case to the effect that section 1531 of the [California]Penal Code does not apply where the premises to be searched are a store open to the public, a contrary rule would make little sense. None of the purposes of the statute would be advanced by requiring police officers to state their “authority and purpose” before crossing the threshold of a store into which the general public has been invited to enter.”)
People v. Scott, (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 268, 279 (“Strict compliance with the requirements of [California Penal Code] section 1531 is excused when the circumstances reasonably require it. (People v. Barthel (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 827, 832; People v. Villanueva (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 443, 447. An officer executing a warrant authorizing a search for narcotics does not, because the contraband is easily disposed of, enjoy a blanket authorization to make an unannounced forcible entry. (People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586) But here the officer had reason to believe that although appellant was outside in the car other parties were within the house. It was not unreasonable for him to believe that appellant sounded the car horn for the purpose of signaling someone inside the house to destroy the contraband and thus frustrate the search which had been authorized by the warrant. Under these circumstances it was proper for the officer to make immediate entry.”)
People v. Murphy, (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 497 (“…strict compliance with the knock-notice rule is excused “if the specific facts known to the officer before his entry are sufficient to support his good faith belief that compliance will increase his peril, frustrate the arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence.”)
People v. Pacheco, (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 70, 77 (“An entry of a house, in violation of the aforementioned section, renders any following search and seizure unreasonable within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.”)
People v. Rodriquez, (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 770, 773 (“…an unannounced entry by the police into a house, contrary to [California] Penal Code section 1531, is illegal and that evidence adduced therefrom is inadmissible as the product of an unreasonable search.”)
California Penal Code section 1538.5 — Motion to return property or suppress evidence.

To Learn More…. Read MORE Below and click the links Below

Abuse & Neglect – The Mandated Reporters (Police, D.A & Medical & the Bad Actors)

Mandated Reporter Laws – Nurses, District Attorney’s, and Police should listen up
If You Would Like to Learn More About: The California Mandated Reporting LawClick Here

To Read the Penal Code § 11164-11166 – Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Act – California Penal Code 11164-11166Article 2.5. (CANRA) Click Here

Mandated Reporter formMandated ReporterFORM SS 8572.pdf – The Child Abuse

ALL POLICE CHIEFS, SHERIFFS AND COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS INFO BULLETIN:
Click Here Officers and DA’s for (Procedure to Follow)

It Only Takes a Minute to Make a Difference in the Life of a Child learn more below

You can learn more here California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Law its a PDF file

Learn More About True Threats Here below….

We also have the The Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) – 1st Amendment

CURRENT TEST = We also have the The ‘Brandenburg test’ for incitement to violence – 1st Amendment

We also have the The Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action Test– 1st Amendment

We also have the True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment

We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Elonis v. United States (2015) – Threats – 1st Amendment

Learn More About What is Obscene…. be careful about education it may enlighten you

We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment

We also have the Obscenity and Pornography – 1st Amendment

Learn More About Police, The Government Officials and You….

$$ Retaliatory Arrests and Prosecution $$

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment 2023 SCOTUS

We also have the Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee – 1st Amendment – Posting Police Address

We also have the Publius v. Boyer-Vine –1st Amendment – Posting Police Address

We also have the Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida (2018) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests

We also have the Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests

We also have the Hartman v. Moore (2006) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

We also have the Reichle v. Howards (2012) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1$t Amendment – Learn More Here

Vermont’s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers – 1st Amendment Protected Speech

We also have the Insulting letters to politician’s home are constitutionally protected, unless they are ‘true threats’ – Letters to Politicians Homes – 1st Amendment

We also have the First Amendment Encyclopedia very comprehensive – 1st Amendment

Sanctions and Attorney Fee Recovery for Bad Actors

FAM § 3027.1 – Attorney’s Fees and Sanctions For False Child Abuse Allegations – Family Code 3027.1 – Click Here

FAM § 271 – Awarding Attorney Fees– Family Code 271 Family Court Sanction Click Here

Awarding Discovery Based Sanctions in Family Law Cases – Click Here

FAM § 2030 – Bringing Fairness & Fee Recovery – Click Here

Zamos v. Stroud – District Attorney Liable for Bad Faith Action – Click Here

Malicious Use of Vexatious Litigant – Vexatious Litigant Order Reversed

Mi$Conduct – Pro$ecutorial Mi$Conduct Prosecutor$

Attorney Rule$ of Engagement – Government (A.K.A. THE PRO$UCTOR) and Public/Private Attorney

What is a Fiduciary Duty; Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Attorney’s Sworn Oath

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct – Know What it is!

New Supreme Court Ruling – makes it easier to sue police

Possible courses of action Prosecutorial Misconduct

Misconduct by Judges & Prosecutor – Rules of Professional Conduct

Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations – Prosecutorial Investigations

Information On Prosecutorial Discretion

Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves

Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation – Forensic & Investigative Accounting – Click Here

Criminal Motions § 1:9 – Motion for Recusal of Prosecutor

Pen. Code, § 1424 – Recusal of Prosecutor

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards
National Prosecution Standards – NDD can be found here

The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Prosecutor’s Duty Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Fordham Law Review PDF

Chapter 14 Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information PDF

Mi$Conduct – Judicial Mi$Conduct Judge$

Prosecution Of Judges For Corrupt Practice$

Code of Conduct for United States Judge$

Disqualification of a Judge for Prejudice

Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability

Recusal of Judge – CCP § 170.1 – Removal a Judge – How to Remove a Judge

l292 Disqualification of Judicial Officer – C.C.P. 170.6 Form

How to File a Complaint Against a Judge in California?

Commission on Judicial Performance – Judge Complaint Online Form

Why Judges, District Attorneys or Attorneys Must Sometimes Recuse Themselves

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

DUE PROCESS READS>>>>>>

Due Process vs Substantive Due Process learn more HERE

Understanding Due Process – This clause caused over 200 overturns in just DNA alone Click Here

Mathews v. Eldridge – Due Process – 5th & 14th Amendment Mathews Test – 3 Part Test– Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test

“Unfriending” Evidence – 5th Amendment

At the Intersection of Technology and Law

We also have the Introducing TEXT & EMAIL Digital Evidence in California Courts – 1st Amendment
so if you are interested in learning about Introducing Digital Evidence in California State Courts
click here for SCOTUS rulings

Right to Travel freely – When the Government Obstructs Your Movement – 14th Amendment & 5th Amendment

What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170 – Crimes Against Public Justice

What Is Traversing a Warrant (a Franks Motion)?

Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar – Police Warrant – Immunity Fail – 4th, 5th, & 14th Amendment

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?

Penal Code 135 PC – Destroying or Concealing Evidence

Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

Penal Code 142 PC – Peace Officer Refusing to Arrest or Receive Person Charged with Criminal Offense

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 32 PC – Accessory After the Fact

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

What is Abuse of Process?

What is a Due Process Violation? 4th & 14th Amendment

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

The Use and Abuse of Power by Prosecutors (Justice for All)

ARE PEOPLE LYING ON YOU?
CAN YOU PROVE IT? IF YES…. THEN YOU ARE IN LUCK!

Penal Code 118 PC – California Penalty of “Perjury” Law

Federal Perjury – Definition by Law

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Penal Code 118.1 PC – Police Officer$ Filing False Report$

Spencer v. Peters– Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment

Penal Code 148.5 PC – Making a False Police Report in California

Penal Code 115 PC – Filing a False Document in California

Misconduct by Government Know Your Rights Click Here

Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983 – Recoverable Damage$

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Right$

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of Right$ Under Color of Law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against Right$

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct? (Tort Claim Forms here as well)

Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

What is Sua Sponte and How is it Used in a California Court?

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

How to Recover “Punitive Damages” in a California Personal Injury Case

Pro Se Forms and Forms Information(Tort Claim Forms here as well)

What is Tort?

Tort Claims Form
File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (see below)

Federal – Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

Appealing/Contesting Case/Order/Judgment/Charge/ Suppressing Evidence

First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What it Takes to Get Started – Click Here

Options to Appealing– Fighting A Judgment Without Filing An Appeal Settlement Or Mediation

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1008 Motion to Reconsider

Penal Code 1385 – Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise

Penal Code 1538.5 – Motion To Suppress Evidence in a California Criminal Case

CACI No. 1501 – Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings

Penal Code “995 Motions” in California – Motion to Dismiss

WIC § 700.1 – If Court Grants Motion to Suppress as Evidence

Suppression Of Exculpatory Evidence / Presentation Of False Or Misleading Evidence – Click Here

Notice of Appeal — Felony (Defendant) (CR-120) 1237, 1237.5, 1538.5(m) – Click Here

California Motions in Limine – What is a Motion in Limine?

Petition for a Writ of Mandate or Writ of Mandamus (learn more…)

Retrieving Evidence / Internal Investigation Case

Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) of the Orange County District Attorney OCDA – Click Here

Fighting Discovery Abuse in Litigation – Forensic & Investigative Accounting – Click Here

Orange County Data, BodyCam, Police Report, Incident Reports,
and all other available known requests for data below:

APPLICATION TO EXAMINE LOCAL ARREST RECORD UNDER CPC 13321 Click Here

Learn About Policy 814: Discovery Requests OCDA Office – Click Here

Request for Proof In-Custody Form Click Here

Request for Clearance Letter Form Click Here

Application to Obtain Copy of State Summary of Criminal HistoryForm Click Here

Request Authorization Form Release of Case Information – Click Here

Texts / Emails AS EVIDENCE: Authenticating Texts for California Courts

Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages

How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines
Subject to Open Records Requests

case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government Employees

Public Records Practices After the San Jose Decision

The Decision Briefing Merits After the San Jose Decision

CPRA Public Records Act Data Request – Click Here

Here is the Public Records Service Act Portal for all of CALIFORNIA Click Here

Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule – Confronting Evidence

Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence

Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims

Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Police BodyCam Footage Release

Electronic Audio Recording Request of OC Court Hearings

Cleaning Up Your Record

Tossing Out an Inferior Judgement – When the Judge Steps on Due Process – California Constitution Article VI – Judicial Section 13

Penal Code 851.8 PC – Certificate of Factual Innocence in California

Petition to Seal and Destroy Adult Arrest Records – Download the PC 851.8 BCIA 8270 Form Here

SB 393: The Consumer Arrest Record Equity Act – 851.87 – 851.92 & 1000.4 – 11105 – CARE ACT

Expungement California – How to Clear Criminal Records Under Penal Code 1203.4 PC

How to Vacate a Criminal Conviction in California – Penal Code 1473.7 PC

Seal & Destroy a Criminal Record

Cleaning Up Your Criminal Record in California (focus OC County)

Governor Pardons –What Does A Governor’s Pardon Do

How to Get a Sentence Commuted (Executive Clemency) in California

How to Reduce a Felony to a Misdemeanor – Penal Code 17b PC Motion

PARENT CASE LAW

RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR CHILDREN &
YOUR CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT$ + RULING$

YOU CANNOT GET BACK TIME BUT YOU CAN HIT THOSE IMMORAL NON CIVIC MINDED PUNKS WHERE THEY WILL FEEL YOU = THEIR BANK

Family Law Appeal – Learn about appealing a Family Court Decision Here

9.3 Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant as (Individuals) — 14th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

Amdt5.4.5.6.2 – Parental and Children’s Rights“> – 5th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

9.32 – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship – 14th Amendment this CODE PROTECT$ all US CITIZEN$

California Civil Code Section 52.1
Interference with exercise or enjoyment of individual rights

Parent’s Rights & Children’s Bill of Rights
SCOTUS RULINGS FOR YOUR PARENT RIGHTS

SEARCH of our site for all articles relating for PARENTS RIGHTS Help!

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

Are You From Out of State (California)? FL-105 GC-120(A)
Declaration Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)

Learn More:Family Law Appeal

GRANDPARENT CASE LAW

Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
Family Law Packet SB Resource Center

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

Family Treatment Court Best Practice Standards

Download Here this Recommended Citation

Epic Criminal / Civil Right$ SCOTUS Help – Click Here

Epic Parents SCOTUS Ruling – Parental Right$ Help – Click Here

Judge’s & Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction– SCOTUS RULINGS on

Prosecutional Misconduct – SCOTUS Rulings re: Prosecutors

Please take time to learn new UPCOMING

The PROPOSED Parental Rights Amendment
to the US CONSTITUTION Click Here to visit their site

The proposed Parental Rights Amendment will specifically add parental rights in the text of the U.S. Constitution, protecting these rights for both current and future generations.

The Parental Rights Amendment is currently in the U.S. Senate, and is being introduced in the U.S. House.

Abuse of the Warrant System Archives - Good Shepherd News - Fastest Growing Religious, Free Speech & Political Content

What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

What is Probable Cause? and.. How is Probable Cause Established?

Probable Cause

Probable Cause: Definition, Legal Requirements

What Is Probable Cause?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Understanding Probable Cause

What is malicious prosecution California?

CACI No. 1501. Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings

“The tort of malicious prosecution lies to compensate an individual who is maliciously hailed into court and forced to defend against a fabricated cause of action.” Pace v Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 CA3d 476, 478.

CA Penal Code § 170 (2022) – Misuse of the Warrant System – Crimes Against Public Justice

CA Penal Code § 170 (2022) click here

Penal Code § 170 . Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant or warrant of arrest to be issued and executed, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

The Probable Cause Requirement

Amdt4.5.3 Probable Cause Requirement

Footnotes

read ALL OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BELOW JUST CLICK THE LINK

Fourth Amendment – Search and Seizure

What Is the Definition of Probable Cause?

Satisfying the Probable Cause Requirement

Exceptions to the Probable Cause Requirement

Examples of Probable Cause

What If an Arrest or Search Occurs Without Probable Cause?

California Penal Code § 170 – Misuse of the Warrant System – Crimes Against Public Justice

Probable Cause – Definition

Overview

Constitutional Basis

Application to Arrests

Application to Search Warrants

Probable Cause in the Digital Age

Supreme Court Interpretation of Probable Cause

What the Fourth Amendment Says

What is probable cause?

How is probable cause established?

How Does Law Enforcement Establish Probable Cause?

Probable Cause Based on Tips from Informants

Probable Cause vs. First Amendment Rights

More on the Fourth Amendment

Footnotes

What Is Reasonable Doubt?

The Reasonable Doubt Standard

“Beyond a reasonable doubt” means that the prosecution must convince the jury that there is no other reasonable explanation that can come from the evidence presented at trial. In other words, the jury must be virtually certain of the defendant’s guilt in order to render a guilty verdict.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Understanding Reasonable Doubt

Difference Between Belief And Certainty

Unreasonable Doubt

Exculpatory Evidence

Other Standards of Proof

Presumption of Innocence

“It is better that 100 guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.”—Benjamin Franklin 8

Why Is Reasonable Doubt Important?

How Do You Prove Reasonable Doubt?

What Are the Three Burdens of Proof?

What Is the Difference Between Doubt and Reasonable Doubt?

The Bottom Line

Reasonable suspicion

Overview

Reasonable Suspicion As Applied to a Stop & Frisk

Probable Cause vs Reasonable suspicion

Principles of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion

References

To Learn More…. Read MORE Below and click the links Below

Abuse & Neglect – The Mandated Reporters (Police, D.A & Medical & the Bad Actors)

Mandated Reporter Laws – Nurses, District Attorney’s, and Police should listen up If You Would Like to Learn More About: The California Mandated Reporting LawClick Here

To Read the Penal Code § 11164-11166 – Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Act – California Penal Code 11164-11166Article 2.5. (CANRA) Click Here

Mandated Reporter formMandated ReporterFORM SS 8572.pdf – The Child Abuse

ALL POLICE CHIEFS, SHERIFFS AND COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS INFO BULLETIN: Click Here Officers and DA’s for (Procedure to Follow)

You can learn more here California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Law its a PDF file

Learn More About True Threats Here below….

We also have the The Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) – 1st Amendment

CURRENT TEST = We also have the The ‘Brandenburg test’ for incitement to violence – 1st Amendment

We also have the The Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action Test– 1st Amendment

We also have the True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment

We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test – 1st Amendment

We also have the Elonis v. United States (2015) – Threats – 1st Amendment

Learn More About What is Obscene…. be careful about education it may enlighten you

We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment

Mandated Reporter Laws – Nurses, District Attorney’s, and Police should listen up
If You Would Like to Learn More About: The California Mandated Reporting LawClick Here

ALL POLICE CHIEFS, SHERIFFS AND COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS INFO BULLETIN:
Click Here Officers and DA’s for (Procedure to Follow)

We also have the Hartman v. Moore (2006) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

We also have the Reichle v. Howards (2012) – 1st Amendment – Retaliatory Police Arrests
Retaliatory Prosecution Claims Against Government Officials – 1st Amendment

National District Attorneys Association puts out its standards
National Prosecution Standards – NDD can be found here

We also have the Introducing TEXT & EMAIL Digital Evidence in California Courts – 1st Amendment
so if you are interested in learning about Introducing Digital Evidence in California State Courts
click here for SCOTUS rulings