Epic SCOTUS Decisions

To learn more about the awesome new ruling that allows for going after a tyrant government office or government officer read below 2022 ruling!!!!

20-659 Thompson v. Clark (04-04-2022) – Suing the Government Officially Personally tapping into their financial life legally

NOW, AS OF APRIL 4, 2022 YOU HAVE A RIGHT UNDER FEDERAL LAW TO SUE FOR YOUR MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
FEDERAL MALICIOUS PROSECUTION LAW FROM 1994 TO 2017

Pro$ecutor‘$ Duty to the citizen

20-659 Thompson v. Clark (04-04-2022) – Suing the Government Officially Personally tapping into their financial life legally

In its landmark decision, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal officials can be sued personally for money damages for on-the-job conduct that violates the Constitution. Cases in which federal employees face personal liability cut across everything the government does in all three branches of government. Whether they are engaging in every-day law enforcement, protecting our borders, addressing national security, or implementing other critical government policies and functions, federal employees of every rank face the specter of personal liability.

This ruling has a complexity to it, that does not favor a malicious prosecutor or police force. it holds them accountable! New Supreme Court Ruling makes it easier to sue police when criminal charges are dropped or dismissed. This hold the prosecutor accountable because an attorney has a fiduciary duty to his client, meaning that a relation “exist[s] between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith in the benefit of the other party. Such a relation ordinarily arises when a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he [or she] voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his [or her] acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter’s knowledge or consent. . . . ”

An attorney may not seek, accept or continue employment where it is not substantiated by probable cause, thus an attorney may not prosecute any case that is not well – 1 Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 1-400. 2 Id. 3 McKinnery State Bar, 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 (1964); Culter v. State Bar of California, 71 Cal.2d 241, 249 (1969); see also Coulello v. State of California, 45 Cal.2d 57 (1955); Hallinan v. State Bar of California, 33 Cal.2d 246 (1948). Clearly, this duty applies not only with reference to the client but also with regard to the court, opposing counsel. 4 Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 3 -200; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

6068(c). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.1 & 4.4, also impose a duty to the legal system which requires both that the
attorney bring only meritorious claims and that they not use inappropriate means in the representation of their client that embarrass, bur den, delay or violate legal rights.

Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal.App.3d 369 (1983) (citing Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 483 (1937); Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal.App. 428, 434 (1912)

Zamos v. Stroud

California Supreme Court, 2004
32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802

The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.

learn about how NOT TO violate your employers rights, after all civil servants work for the people, the tax payer. Got it DA  Federal Civil Right$ $tatute$

Thompson vs Clark new-supreme-court-ruling-makes-it-easier-to-sue-police/

California Supreme Court Rules: Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines $ubject to Open Records Requests

Other Pro$ecutor Caselaw:

NOW, AS OF APRIL 4, 2022 YOU HAVE A RIGHT UNDER FEDERAL LAW TO SUE FOR YOUR MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

FEDERAL MALICIOUS PROSECUTION LAW FROM 1994 TO 2017

THE NINTH CIRCUIT COMES TO THE RESCUE AND REFUSES TO FOLLOW THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL IN THEIR AD NAUSEUM EXPANSION OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 821.6.

On July 5, 2016, the Ninth Circuit handed down the seminal case of Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016), which rejected the California Court of Appeal’s ad nauseam expansion of Section 821.6 immunity and refused to immunize police officers pursuant to that section. In that Opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that they are only bound to follow state law on state law issues when either the highest court in a state (i.e. the California Supreme Court on California law) has decided that issue, or, when the state Courts of Appeals have decided an issue and the federal court finds that the state Supreme Court would have held otherwise. In reaching that holding that Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the California Supreme Court already interpreted [California Government Code] section 821.6 as ‘confining its reach to malicious prosecution actions.’ “Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865, 871 (1974), and that in their opinion, the California Supreme Court would adhere to Sullivan, notwithstanding many Opinions of the California Courts of Appeal holding otherwise. Accordingly, the state of the law is that if you have the same case with the same parties and your case is in a California state court, that Section 821.6 immunizes many actions of peace officers other than malicious prosecution, but if you are in federal court, Section 821.6 immunity only immunizes claims for malicious prosecution under California state law.

NOW, AS OF APRIL 4, 2022 YOU HAVE A RIGHT UNDER FEDERAL LAW TO SUE FOR YOUR MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

FEDERAL MALICIOUS PROSECUTION LAW FROM 1994 TO 2017

On the basis of dicta expressed by the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), there has been a political and practical acceptance of a federal constitutional right to be free of a malicious criminal prosecution; a frame-up by state actors.

In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that although a malicious criminal prosecution is not a 14th Amendment substantive due process violation, that is might be considered an unreasonable seizure of one’s person under the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, if the subsequent malicious prosecution was accompanied by the actual physical arrest of the person.

In reality, these words were crafted by the Supreme Court to permit persons who are falsely and maliciously accused of a crime by the police that resulted in a bogus criminal prosecution, to sue the police who attempted to frame them. It’s judicial “newspeak“.

If there is anything that would constitute what the courts call substantive due process (i.e. outrageous police conduct that shocks the conscience), attempting to frame an innocent is it. However, the Supreme Court could not agree on whether a malicious criminal prosecution was a substantive due process violation in Albright v. Oliver, but the Justices did not want to leave one who the police attempted to frame without a remedy.

Accordingly, in Manuel v. City,  of Joliett, 580 U.S. _____ (2017), the Supreme Court held that one who was physically arrested and confined in custody by way of the false arrest of a police officer, can obtain damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for that person’s continued confinement in jail, after the point in time when the District Attorney (prosecutor) formally filed criminal charges against the person. In other words, the accused person can collect damages for being kept in jail before trial, pursuant to criminal charges, filed by the prosecutor, that were procured by the arresting police officer having authored a false police report, that the prosecutor relied upon in  deciding to file the very criminal charges that kept the false accused person in jail before trial.

However, this still didn’t establish a Naked Constitutional Tort of a Malicious Criminal Prosecution; only a damages remedy for a false arrest, and for confinement in jail after the point in time when the prosecutor formally filed criminal charges against the confined person.

Following both Albright v. Oliver and Manuel v. City of Joliet, most United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeals (the federal intermediate level appellate courts) permitted a Section 1983 remedy for a malicious criminal prosecution by a peace officer.  The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits composed the “Tort Circuits,” wherein plaintiffs pleading malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983, were required to satisfy the common law elements of a malicious prosecution claim in addition to proving a constitutional violation. The “Constitutional Circuits”—the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth— concentrated on whether a constitutional violation exists.

Most of the Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, allowed for an aggrieved person the right to sue for being subjected to a malicious criminal prosecution, federal remedy for the same, via 42 U.S.C. §  1983. They did so, on various theories, since the right to be free from a malicious criminal prosecution is not described in the federal Constitution, but the pure evil and outrageousness of such government action compels appellate judges to find some Constitutional foundation for that right, in order to allow a person who the government attempted to frame, some sort of remedy.

Although sister circuits categorized the Third Circuit as a “Tort Circuit”, the Third Circuit more recently acknowledged that “[o]ur law on this issue is unclear”; however, it continued to encourage plaintiffs to address each common law element. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has avoided defining the required elements of a claim, although it appears to recognize a Fourth Amendment right against malicious prosecution and continued detention without probable cause.  The Ninth Circuit lies on both sides of the divide; seemingly turning on whether they want the malicious prosecution plaintiff to prevail.

In Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002.)  held that a malicious criminal prosecution was a naked constitutional tort, and was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the 4th Amendment. They just said it, basically out of thin air.

The Ninth Circuit also continued its pre-Galbraith malicious prosecution jurisprudence and held that in in addition to constituting a 4th Amendment violation, that one could sue for a malicious criminal prosecution if the prosecution was brought to deprive the innocent of some other constitutional right, such as attempting to frame an innocent in retaliation for protected exercise of First Amendment free speech, or, as a naked constitutional tort. See, Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069–72 (9th Cir. 2004.) i

FEDERAL LAW NOW PROVIDES A REMEDY FOR A MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

In Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. _______ (April 4, 2022) for the first time in the history of the Americann Republic, the U.S. Supreme Court finally held that there is a Constitutional Tort of Malicious Criminal Prosecution. The Supreme Court also went on to hold that in order to sue for a Malicious Criminal Prosecution, that the underlying criminal action only need not result in a conviction of the accused for the accused (and  now plaintiff), for the underlying criminal case to be considered to be “favorably terminated”; a “favorable termination” of the underlying criminal case being a required element of that claim.

Although under California law you may not recover damages for your malicious criminal prosecution because of immunity provided in Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6  (See, Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744 (1997), at least now there is a federal remedy for the police attempting to frame you; finally.

https://steeringlaw.com/police-misconduct-articles/can-you-sue-the-police-for-malicious-criminal-prosecutions/

Constitutional Tort Law and Legal Definition

Constitutional torts are violation of one’s constitutional rights by a government servant. Constitutional tort actions are brought under 42 USCS § 1983 against government employees seeking damages for the violation of federal constitutional right, particularly those arising under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights.

42 USCS § 1983 reads as follows:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the U.S. or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Introducing the DA’s & Cops TEXTs & EMAIL as Digital Evidence

California Supreme Court Rules: Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines Subject to Open Records Requests

City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government  Employees

Employer$ Beware: La $upreme Court Open$ Line for Direct Negligence Claim$ from Employee Action$​

Malicious Prosecution / Prosecutorial Misconduct – Know What it is!

New Supreme Court Ruling Makes it easier to Sue PROSECUTORS & POLICE

42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.” Trezevant v. City of Tampa (1984) 741 F.2d 336, hn. 5 Mattox v. U.S., 156 US 237,243. (1895) “We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted.”

S. Carolina v. U.S., 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).“The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when it was adopted, it means now.”

SHAPIRO vs. THOMSON, 394 U. S. 618 April 21, 1969 .Further, the Right to TRAVEL by private conveyance for private purposes upon the Common way can NOT BE INFRINGED. No license or permission is required for TRAVEL when such TRAVEL IS NOT for the purpose of [COMMERCIAL] PROFIT OR GAIN on the open highways operating under license IN COMMERCE.

Murdock v. Penn., 319 US 105, (1943) “No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it.”

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 US 262, (1969) “If the state converts a liberty into a privilege, the citizen can engage in the right with impunity.”

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966) “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation, which would abrogate them.”

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, (1886) “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d. 486 ,489 “The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.”

Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748,(1970) “Waivers of Constitutional Rights, not only must they be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness.”

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The law requires the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. Because they are Constitutional obligations, Brady and Giglio evidence must be disclosed regardless of whether the defendant makes a request for exculpatory or impeachment evidence. 

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.” The constitutional theory is that we the people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents.”

Alexander v.Bothsworth, 1915. “Party cannot be bound by contract that he has not made or authorized. Free consent is an indispensable element in making valid contracts.”

Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906) HALE v. HENKEL 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906) Hale v. Henkel was decided by the united States Supreme Court in 1906. The opinion of the court states: “The “individual” may stand upon “his Constitutional Rights“ as a CITIZEN. He is entitled to carry on his “private” business in his own way. “His power to contract is unlimited.” He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and property. “His rights” are such as “existed” by the Law of the Land (Common Law) “long antecedent” to the organization of the State”, and can only be taken from him by “due process of law”, and “in accordance with the Constitution.” “He owes nothing” to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.”

Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906) Hale v. Henkel is binding on all the courts of the United States of America until another Supreme Court case says it isn’t. No other Supreme Court case has ever overturned Hale v. Henkel None of the various issues of Hale v. Henkel has ever been overruled Since 1906, Hale v. Henkel has been cited by the Federal and State Appellate Court systems over 1,600 times! In nearly every instance when a case is cited, it has an impact on precedent authority of the cited case. Compared with other previously decided Supreme Court cases, no other case has surpassed Hale v. Henkel in the number of times it has been cited by the courts. Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906 Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633

None of the various issues of Hale v. Henkel has ever been overruled Since 1906, Hale v. Henkel has been cited by the Federal and State Appellate Court systems over 1,600 times! In nearly every instance when a case is cited, it has an impact on precedent authority of the cited case.  Compared with other previously decided Supreme Court cases, no other case has surpassed Hale v. Henkel in the number of times it has been cited by the courts. Basso v. UPL, 495 F. 2d 906 Brook v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 633

Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) ”

20-659 Thompson v. Clark (04-04-2022) – Suing the Government Officially Personally tapping into their financial life legally

thompson-v-clark-364-f-supp-3d-178/

thompson-v-clark-holds-fourth-amendment-claim-under-%c2%a7-1983-for-malicious-prosecution

Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles – 12 Cal.3d 710 – Mon, 11_04_1974 – MALICIOUS PROSECUTOR & OFFICER

Section 815.2 provides: "(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee
or his personal representative.

[8] Malicious prosecution "consists of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of another under lawful process,
    but from malicious motives and without probable cause. ... [Italics in original.] The test is whether the defendant was
    actively instrumental in causing the prosecution." (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 242, pp. 2522-2523.)
    Cases dealing with actions for malicious prosecution against private persons require that the defendant has at least sought
    out the police or prosecutorial authorities and falsely reported facts to them indicating that plaintiff has committed a crime.
    (Rupp v. Summerfield (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 657, 663 [326 P.2d 912]; Centers v. Dollar Markets (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 534, 544-545 [222 P.2d 136].)
    Similarly the suits against government employees or entities cited by the Senate Committee in commenting upon section 821.6
    all involve the government employees' acts in filing charges or swearing out affidavits of criminal activity against the plaintiff.
    fn. 9 No case has predicated a finding of malicious prosecution on the holding of a person in jail beyond his term or beyond the completion
    of all criminal proceedings against him.United States v. Wiltberger

cited https://goodshepherdmedia.net/sullivan-v-county-of-los-angeles/

Bias – Removal of Prosecutor People v. Superior Court (Greer)

Abuse – Removal of Prosecutor People v. Superior Court (Greer)

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal officials can be sued personally for money damages for on-the-job 
conduct that violates the Constitution. Cases in which federal employees face personal liability cut across everything the government
does in all three branches of government. Whether they are engaging in every-day law enforcement, protecting our borders,
addressing national security, or implementing other critical government policies and functions, federal employees of every rank face the
specter of personal liability.

Spencer v. Peters

After several unsuccessful appeals, the relevant facts of which will be discussed throughout this order, Mr. Spencer's prison 
sentence was commuted to community supervision in 2004 by then Governor Locke. Dkt. 63-18. Following his release from prison.

This is a great hearing you click below you can hear the proceedings audio and discussion. This an excellent source for young hungry new attorneys! good luck in your career, work hard, good ethics, good nature, respect God in your work and doings just as you steer clear of harming attorney client privilege respect the attorney God privilege and do right by him! use your fantastic mind to work around the obstacles while still respecting God and his expectations he has for all of us. Live right, you only live once! YOLO is not a reason to go nuts, its a reason to straighten ones morals inline with the creator before your time is up. Now that is a lottery ticket you don’t want to forget buy, heaven beats anything you get here…. and you pay for it by doing good here now for God!
spencer-v-peters/

Gerardo Rodarte v. Joseph Gutierrez – arises from the arrest and pretrial detention

you can read more on this gerardo-rodarte-v-joseph-gutierrez/

Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) “The practice of law is an occupation of common right.”

Employers Beware: La Supreme Court Opens Line for Direct Negligence Claims from Negligent Employee Actions

read case Martin v. Thomas et al. 2022 – Opens Line for Direct Negligence Claims from Employee Actions

Excerpts taken from SCOTUS around Robin v. Hardaway

Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790.
Biblical Law at “Common Law” supersedes all laws, and “Christianity is custom, custom is Law.”

Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) “The practice of law is an occupation of common right.”

424 F.2d 1021 US v.  Horton R. PRUDDEN,No. 28140. . United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.April 1970 Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.

DA Caitlyn Harrington did this to me above she is the dumb cunt i called her

U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297, 299, 300 (1977) Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. We cannot condone this shocking conduct… If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately.

Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480(1983). Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth. In regard to courts of inferior jurisdiction, “if the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be presumed not to have existed.”

NAFFE v. FREY It is uncontested that Naffe is domiciled in Massachusetts, Frey is domiciled in California, and the County of Los Angeles is a citizen of California for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, see Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717–18, 721–22 (1973). The parties are thus “completely diverse.” See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267–68 (1806).

Norman v. Zieber, 3 Or at 202-03 US v Will, 449 US 200,216, 101 S Ct, 471, 66 LEd2nd 392, 406 (1980) Cohens V Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5LEd 257 (1821) “When a judge acts where he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason.”

“The state citizen is immune from any and all government attacks and procedure, absent contract.” see, Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 or as the Supreme Court has stated clearly, “…every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowmen without his consent.” CRUDEN vs. NEALE, 2 N.C. 338 2 S.E. 70

FRAUD$ BY GOVERNMENT

McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987),  McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987), Quoting U.S. v. Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307: “Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit – and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) – includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them he is guilty of fraud. BURDEN OF PROOF ” 

The law creates a presumption, where the burden is on a party to prove a material fact peculiarly within his knowledge and he fails without excuse to testify, that his testimony, if introduced, would be adverse to his interests.” citing Meier v. CIR, 199 F 2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1952) quoting 20 Am Jur, Evidence, Sec 190, page 193  Notification of legal responsibility is “the first essential of due process of law”.  See also:U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d.297. “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.”  Clearfield Doctrine “Governments descend to the Level of a mere private corporation, and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen…where private corporate commercial paper [Federal Reserve Notes] and securities [checks] is concerned. … For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government.”

Please feel Free to read the excellent pamphlet to help you secure your RIGHT to contracts! 

FREEDOM OF CONTRACT by David E. Bernstein, George Mason University School of Law

and here is the Amendment to OUR US LAW that GRANTS YOU THESE RIGHTS 

Overview of Contract Clause

Lochner v. New York The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.Lochner v. New York The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.

Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) “The practice of law is an occupation of common right.”

In Leiberg v. Vitangeli, 70 Ohio App. 479, 47 N.E. 2d 235, 238-39 (1942)  “These constitutional provisions employ the word ‘person,’ that is. anyone whom we have permitted to peaceably reside within our borders may resort to our courts for redress of an injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation. The real party plaintiff for whom the nominal plaintiff sues is not shown to have entered our land in an unlawful manner. We said to her, you may enter and reside with us and be equally protected by our laws so long as you conform thereto. You may own property and our laws will protect your title. “We, as a people, have said to those of foreign birth that these constitutional guaranties shall assure you of our good faith. They are the written surety to you of our proud boast that the United States is the haven of refuge of the oppressed of all mankind.” Court will assign to common-law terms their common-law meaning unless legislature directs otherwise.

People v. Young (1983) 340 N.W.2d 805,418 Mich. 1. Common law, by constitution, is law of state.

Beech Grove Inv. Co. v. Civil Rights Com’n (1968) 157 N.W.2d 213, 380 Mich. 405. “Common law” is but the accumulated expressions of various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes. Semmens v. Floyd Rice Ford, Inc. (1965) 136 N.W.2d 704,1 Mich.App. 395.

The common law is in force in Michigan, except so far as it is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the Constitution or statutes of the state. Stout v. Keyes (1845) 2 Doug. 184, 43 Am. Dec. 465.

“The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes. If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the states.” Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another. seems to be intolerable on any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. See: Yick Wo v. Hopkins ,118 U.S. 356 (1886).

“He is not to substitute even his juster will for theirs; otherwise it would not be the ‘common will’ which prevails, and to that extent the people would not govern.” See: Speech by Judge Learned Hand at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. May 11,1919, entitled, “Is there a Common Will?”

“… The Congress cannot revoke the Sovereign power of the people to override itself as thus declared.” See: Perry v. United States , 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

“In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the Constitution.” See: Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 Dall 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 404, 405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins ,118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

“As men whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intent to convey; the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed the words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.” See: Gibbons v. Ogden,  27 U.S. 1

No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it. much less their servants. See: New Orleans Gas Co v. Louisiana Light Co ,115 U.S. 650 (1885).

People are supreme, not the state. See: Waring v. the Mayor of Savannah, 60 Georgia at 93.

Strictly speaking, in our republican form of government, the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation: and the residuary sovereignty of each state, not granted to any of its public functionaries, is in the people of the state. See: 2 Dall. 471; Bouv. Law Diet. (1870). The theory of the American political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom all legitimate authority springs, and the people collectively, acting through the medium of constitutions, create such governmental agencies, endow them with such powers, and subject them to such limitations as in their wisdom will best promote the common good. See: First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb.; 277 SW 762.

What is a constitution? It is the form of goverState v. Suttonnment, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established.” See: Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance , 2 U.S. 304(1795).

A constitution is designated as a supreme enactment, a fundamental act of legislation by the people of the state. A constitution is legislation direct from the people acting in their sovereign capacity, while a statute is legislation from their representatives, subject to limitations prescribed by the superior authority. See: Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336; 99 NE 1; 231 U.S. 250; 58 L. Ed. 206; 34 S. Ct. 92; Sage v. New York, 154 NY 61; 47 NE 1096.

The question is not what power the federal government ought to have, but what powers, in fact, have been given by the people…. The federal union is a government of delegated powers. It has only such as are expressly conferred upon it, and such as are reasonably to be implied from those granted. In this respect, we differ radically from nations where all legislative power, without restriction of limitation, is vested in a parliament or other legislative body subject to no restrictions except the discretion of its members. See: U.S. v. William M. Butler, 297 U.S. 1.

But it cannot be assumed that the framers of the Constitution and the people who adopted it did not intent that which is the plain import of the language used. When the language of the Constitution is positive and free from all ambiguity, all courts are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid hardships of particular cases, we must accept the Constitution as it reads when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign powers. See: State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147, 65 WX N.W., 262,101, N.W. 74; Cook v. Iverson, 122, N.M. 251.

The people themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal in arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory: It is not law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government: yet only his fellow citizens can convict him. They are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all powers of congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation. See: 2 Elliot’s Debates, 94; 2 Bancroft, History of the Constitution, 267.

In this state, as well as in all republics, it is not the legislation, however transcendent its powers, who are supreme— but the people— and to suppose that they may violate the fundamental law is, as has been most eloquently expressed, to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves: that the men acting by virtue of delegated powers may do. not only what then- powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. See: Warning v. the Mayor of Savannah, 60 Georgia, P. 93.

There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today. Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can “seize” and “search” him hi their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country. See: Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 39 (1967).

“Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property … and is regarded as inalienable.” 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

Sovereignty itself is. of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails., as being the essence of slavery itself.

(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, U.S. 356 (1886). “…The Congress cannot revoke the Sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.” Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935). “In the United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the Constitution.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 471; Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 Dall 54, 93; McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316,404,405; Yick Yo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370.”  The rights of the individuals are restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government.” City of Dallas v Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944

Supreme Court Justice  Bandeis  eloquently  affirmed  his  condemnation  of  abuses practiced by Government officials, who were defendants, acting as Government officials. In the case of  Olmstead vs. U.S. 277 US 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575; 72 L ED 944 (1928) he declared:  “Decency,  security,  and  liberty  alike  demand  that Government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of  conduct  that  are  commands  to  the  Citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to obsereve the laws scruplously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.   Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breads contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the law, the end justifies the means would bring a terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face.” To declare that in the administration of criminal laws the end justifies the means to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. …And so should every law enforcement student, practitioner, supervisor, and administrator ”

State v. Manuel, North Carolina, Vol. 20, Page 121 (1838) The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people – and he who before was a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State”.  “The People of a State are entitled to all rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.”

 “In the United States the People are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to the People by taking away their citizenship.” Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).

“The People of a State are entitled to all rights which formerly belonged to thePiper v. PearsonKing by his prerogative.” Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wendell 9, 20 (1829)

In Europe, the executive is synonymous with the sovereign power of a state…where it is too commonly acquired by force or fraud or both…In America, however the case is widely different. Our government is founded upon Compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the People. Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 Dall 6.(1794)

It is a Maxim {an established principle} of the Common Law that when an act of Parliament is made for the public good, the advancement of religion and justice, and to prevent injury and wrong, the King shall be bound by such an act, though not named; but when a Statute is general, and any prerogative Right, title or interest would be divested or taken from the King (or the People) in such case he shall not be bound. The People vs. Herkimer, 15 Am. Dec. 379, 4 Cowen 345 (N.Y. 1825).

Chisholm v. Georgia, Dallas Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 2, Pages 471, 472 (1793) “It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance… No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects… and have none to govern but themselves…”

Ex parte – Frank Knowles, California Reports, Vol. 5, Page 302 (1855) “A citizen of any one of the States of the Union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in the Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other provisions.”

Manchester v. Boston, Massachusetts Reports, Vol. 16, Page 235 (1819) “The term, citizens of the United States, must be understood to intend those who were citizens of a state, as such, after the Union had commenced, and the several states had assumed their sovereignties. Before this period there was no citizens of the United States…”

Butler v. Farnsworth, Federal Cases, Vol. 4, Page 902 (1821) “A citizen of one state is to be considered as a citizen of every other state in the union.”

Douglass, Adm’r., v. Stephens, Delaware Chancery, Vol. 1, Page 470 (1821) “When men entered into a State they yielded a part of their absolute rights, or natural liberty, for political or civil liberty, which is no other than natural liberty restrained by human laws, so far as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. The rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring and protecting reputation and property, – and, in general, of attaining objects suitable to their condition, without injury to another, are the rights of a citizen; and all men by nature have them.”

Allodial Land Barker v Dayton 28 Wisconsin 367 (1871): “All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited. On this point counsel contended, first, that one of the principal elements of feudal tenures was, that the feudatory could not independently alien or dispose of his fee; and secondly, that the term allodial describes free and absolute ownership, … independent ownership, in like manner as personal property is held; the entire right and dominion; that it applies to lands held of no superior to whom the owner owes homage or fealty or military service, and describes an estate subservient to the purposes of commerce, and alienable at the will of the owner; the most ample and perfect interest which can be owned in land.”

[Bowers v. DeVito, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 686F.2d 616 (1882)“… there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties: it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.”

Income taxes Gregory v. Helverging, 293 U.S. 465, 1935 “The legal Right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted” 1895: In Pollock vs Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co, the Supreme Court rules that general income taxes are unconstitutional because they are unapportioned direct taxes. To this day, the ruling has not been overturned. January 24, 1916: In Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad, the Supreme Court ruled: that the 16th Amendment doesn’t over-rule the Court’s ruling in the Pollock case which declared general income taxes unconstitutional; The 16th Amendment applies only to gains and profits from commercial and investment activities: The 16th Amendment only applies to excises taxes; The 16th Amendment did not Amend the U.S. Constitution; The 16th Amendment only clarified the federal governments existing authority to create excise taxes without apportionment. …the [16th] Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word direct had a broader significance since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution — a condition which clearly demonstrates that the purpose was not to change the existing interpretation except to the extent necessary to accomplish the result intended, that is, the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source itself and thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties and imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes… Indeed in the light of the history which we have given and of the decision in the Pollock Case and the ground upon which the ruling in that case was based, there is no escape from the Conclusion that the Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided, that is, of determining whether a tax on income was direct not by a consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it directly operated, but by taking into view the burden which resulted on the property from which the income was derived, since in express terms the Amendment provides that income taxes, from whatever source the income may be derived, shall not be subject to the regulation of apportionment… 1939: Congress passes the Public Salary tax, taxing the wages of federal employees.

1940: Congress passes the Buck Act authorizing the federal government to tax federal workers living in the States. 1942, Congress passes the Victory Tax under Constitutional authority to support the WWII effort. President Roosevelt proposes a voluntary tax withholding program allowing workers across the nation to pay the tax in installments. The program is a success and the number of tax payers increases from 3 percent to 62 percent of the U.S. population. 1944: The Victory Tax and Voluntary Withholding laws are repealed as required by the U.S. Constitution, however, the federal government continues to collect the tax claiming it’s authority under the 1913 income tax and the 16th Amendment. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 1938 Supreme Court of the United States had decided on the basis of Commercial (Negotiable Instruments) Law: that Tompkins was not under any contract with the Erie Railroad, and therefore he had no standing to sue the company. Under the Common Law, he was damaged and he would have had the right to sue. Hence, all courts since 1938 are operating in an Admiralty Jurisdiction and not Common Law courts because lawful money (silver or gold coin) does not exist. Courts of Admiralty only has jurisdiction over maritime contracts on the high seas ad navigable water ways. In Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court held that punishment for two statutory offenses arising out of the same criminal act or transaction does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if ‘each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’ Id. at 304.

Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885) Justice Bradley, “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the Courts to be watchful for the Constitutional Rights of the Citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be Obsta Principiis.”

Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) “It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgement in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution.”

Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)  Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”

Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893), Citations Omitted “Undoubtedly it (the Fourteenth Amendment) forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights… It is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. …And due process of law within the meaning of the [Fifth and Fourteenth] amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”

Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885) “The rule of equality… requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constitutents of each class, so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances”.

Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882) “No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.”

Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438 “Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”

Mallowy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 “All rights and safeguards contained in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are equally applicable.”

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882) “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to obey it.” “It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives.”

Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859) “No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.”

U.S. v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993), the Court clarified the use of the ‘same elements test’ set forth in Blockburger when it over-ruled the ‘same conduct’ test announced in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions only when the previously concluded and subsequently charged offenses fail the ‘same elements’ test articulated in Blockburger. See also Gavieres v. U.S., 220 U.S. 338, 345 (1911)

(early precedent establishing that in a subsequent prosecution ‘[w]hile it is true that the conduct of the accused was one and the same, two offenses resulted, each of which had an element not embraced in the other’).

ENGLISH TORT LAW 61. Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 23. 62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-66 (1803) (“It is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded . . . . [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”).

ENGLISH TORT LAW Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. Facts Mr Ashby was prevented from voting at an election by the misfeasance of a constable, Mr White, on the apparent pretext that he was not a settled inhabitant. At the time, the case attracted considerable national interest, and debates in Parliament. It was later known as the Aylesbury election case. In the Lords, it attracted the interest of Peter King, 1st Baron King who spoke and maintained the right of electors to have a remedy at common law for denial of their votes, against Tory insistence on the privileges of the Commons. Sir Thomas Powys (c. 1649-1719) defended William White in the House of Lords. The argument submitted was that the Commons alone had the power to determine election cases, not the courts. Judgment Holt CJ was dissenting in his judgment in the High Court, but this was upheld by the House of Lords. He said at pp 273-4: “ “If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it, and, indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal… And I am of the opinion that this action on the case is a proper action. My brother Powell indeed thinks that an action on the case is not maintainable, because
there is no hurt or damage to the plaintiff, but surely every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary; for a damage is not merely pecuniary but an injury imports a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his rights. To allow this action will make publick officers more careful to observe the constitution of cities and boroughs, and not to be so partial as they commonly are in all elections, which is indeed a great and growing mischief, and tends to the prejudice of the peace of the nation.

[U.S. v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C.Ark. 1885)] In a criminal proceeding lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time by collateral attack.

[U.S. v. Gernie, 228 F.Supp. 329 (D.C.N.Y. 1964)] Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.

[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)] The United States District Court has only such jurisdiction as Congress confers. [Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin] [191 F.Supp 245 (D.C.N.Y. 1960)]

City of Canton v. Harris, 498 U.S. 378 (1989) “failure to train” train its officers adequately with respect to implementing the following Department policies:

Lochner v. New York The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power.

FLYER & NEWS WEBSITE LAW

Flyers  US constitutional rights, Freedom of Speech & Press

There shall be no Law passed to abridge or restrain freedom of speech or the press. Freedom of speech encompasses all manner of expression, both verbal and non-verbal

U.S. Supreme Court

• Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
• Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void.
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137,(1803) “The Constitution of these United States is the supreme law of the land. Any law that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void of law.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) “… the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”
  Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional. “In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank”. “All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID”. Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional.
  
• State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
• Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
• Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
• SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
• Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
  When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
• United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
• Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
• Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),  The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.
   Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense.  Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.

• People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
  
• A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speech words “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
• Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers cannot use “fighting words,” as an excuse to abuse because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
  speech on the Internet is entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
• Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
  The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
• Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
  A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
• Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
  The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
• Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974)  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
• City of Houston v. Hill (1987)  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
  
  
• STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
• STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant –  William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
• State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
• Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here

• People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS  determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!

• Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

  But the D.C. Circuit (1989) expressly held that the First Amendment prevented the statute from applying to “public or political discourse,”
   such as condemnation of political officials (even left expressly for that official).

• Vermont’s Top Court Weighs: Are KKK Fliers 1st Amendment Protected Speech? see also Vermont v. Schenk 2015 

Watch this different display of US RIGHTS in a JERSEY OFFICIAL MEETING by ANGRY CONSTITUTIONALIST https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wUH7GJjlYQ

It doesn’t look like our constitutional right of freedom of the press is going away any time soon.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS DEFINITION

The freedom of communication and expression through media and/or published material.  Flyers are communication and expression through published media material.

HANDBILL DEFINITION

A single page leaflet advertising events, services or other activities. Flyers are typically used by individuals or business’ to promote their product or services.

They are a form of mass marketing or small scale community communication. Information News Flyers are a legal form of community communication handbills by definition.  A Website is a Digital Handbill of leaflet, it is the digital form of handing them out, how else could one get a peacefully assembly organized in todays society 2022

LITTER DEFINITION

• Litter consists of waste products
• Information News Flyers (same as LA Times or LA Weekly or other Leaflet Information/News)  are not waste products or litter by legal definition and to claim or mislead holds no water to the law.
• Flyers are not trash by legal definition and to mislead and claim they are would hold no water to the law.

TRASH DEFINITION

• Unwanted or undesired waste material.

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly.  “The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.” —U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)

excerpts taken from NO Law requires you to record / pledge your private automobile

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, -‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: first, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit: second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”  Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).

There should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoilation of property. (Police power, Due Process) Barber v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31; Yick Yo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.

To Wit:

“As general rule men have natural right to do anything which their inclinations may suggest, if it be not evil in itself, and in no way impairs the rights of others.”  In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502.

Constitutional Law § 101 – right to travel – 5. The nature of the Federal Union and constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of the United States uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. 6. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Federal Constitution, the right freely to travel from one state to another is a basic right

Under the US Constitution.

Constitutional Law § 101 – law chilling assertion of rights – 7.  If a law has no other purpose than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it is patently unconstitutional.  Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600, 89 S Ct 1322.

So with all of that in mind, cite/deliver the cases above and

you have given the agency, etc. knowledge!

Under USC Title 42 §1986. Action for neglect to prevent …,  it states: Every person who, having knowledge that any wrongs conspired or to be done… and having power to prevent or aid in preventing … Neglects or refuses so to do … shall be liable to the party injured…  and; The means of “knowledge”, especially where it consists of public record is deemed in law to be “knowledge of the facts“.  As the means of “knowledge” if it appears that the individual had notice or information of circumstances which would put him on inquiry, which, if followed, would lead to “knowledge”, or that the facts were presumptively within his knowledge, he will have deemed to have had actual knowledge of the facts and may be subsequently liable for any damage or injury.  You, therefore, have been given “knowledge of the facts” as it pertains to this conspiracy to commit a fraud against me.

I state now that I will NOT waive any fundamental Rights as:
“waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowing, intentional, and voluntary acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. U.S. v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970);  U.S.v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947)”.

And that the agency committed fraud, deceit, coercion, willful intent to injure another, malicious acts, RICO activity and conspired by; Unconscionable “contract” – “One which no sensible man not under delusion, or duress, or in distress would make, and such as no honest and fair man would accept.”; Franklin Fire Ins. Co.  v.  Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949, 950.  and;  “Party cannot be bound by contract that he has not made or authorized.”  Alexander v. Bosworth (1915), 26 C.A. 589, 599, 147 P.607.

The State cannot diminish rights of the people.  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516.

“A state MAY NOT impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted (sic) by the Federal Constitution.” MURDOCK v PENNSYLVANIA, 319 US 105.

U.S. adopted Common laws of England with the Constitution. Caldwell vs. Hill, 178 SE 383 (1934).

“The phrase ‘common law‘ found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.”  Parsons v. Bedford, et al, 3 Pet 433, 478-9.

“If the  common law can try the cause, and give full redress, that alone takes away the admiralty jurisdiction.” Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 411.

Inferior Courts – The term may denote any court subordinate to the chief tribunal in the particular judicial system;  but it is commonly used as the designation of a court of  special,  limited, or  statutory jurisdiction, whose  record must show the  existence and  attaching of jurisdiction in any given case, in order to give  presumptive validity to its  judgment.  In re Heard’s Guardianship, 174 Miss. 37, 163, So. 685.

The high Courts have further decreed, that Want of Jurisdiction makes “…all acts of judges, magistrates, U.S. Marshals, sheriffs, local police, all void and not just voidable.”   Nestor  v.  Hershey,  425 F2d 504.

The binding shackles of Government is the Constitution, to wit:

If the state were to be given the power to destroy rights through taxation, then the framers of our constitutions wrote said documents in vain. A republic is not an easy form of government to live under, and when the responsibility of citizenship is evaded, democracy decays and authoritarianism takes over.  Earl Warren, “A Republic, If You Can Keep It”, p 13.

It is a fundamental principle in our institutions, indispensable to the preservation of public liberty, that one of the separate departments of government shall not usurp powers committed by the Constitution to another department.  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662.

An unconstitutional law is not a law, it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425.

“Primacy of position in our state constitution is accorded the Declaration of Rights; thus emphasizing the importance of those basic and inalienable rights of personal liberty and private property which are thereby reserved and guaranteed to the people and protected from arbitrary invasion or impairment from any governmental quarter. The Declaration of Rights constitutes a limitation upon the powers of every department of the state government. State ex rel. Davis v. Stuart. 64 A.L.R. 1307, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335.

“The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state, or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people’s rights are not derived from the government, but the government’s authority comes from the people. The Constitution but states again these rights already existing, and when legislative encroachment by the nation, state, or municipality invade these original and permanent rights, it is the duty of the courts to so declare, and to afford the necessary relief. City of Dallas, et al. v. Mitchell, 245 S. W. 944, 945-46 (1922).

The US Constitution is designated as a supreme enactment, a fundamental act of legislation by the people of the state.   The constitution is legislation direct from the people acting in their sovereign capacity, while a statute is legislation from their representatives, subject to limitations prescribed by the superior authority. Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind.  336; NE 1; 231 U.S. 250; 58 L. Ed. 206; 34 S. Ct. 92;  Sage v. New York, 154 NY 61; 47 NE 1096.

“Owner has constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his property.” Simpson v. Los Angeles(1935), 4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474.

“We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”. SIMMONS v US, supra.

“When rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 p. 491.

“The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.” Miller v. U.S. 230 F 2d 486, 489.

History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”                                Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA.

Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of cardinal constitutional guarantee.  Riley v. Certer, 165 Okal. 262; 25 P.2d 666; 79 ALR 1018.

When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it. (See 16 Ma. Jur. 2d 177, 178) State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147, 65 NW 262, 30 L.R.A. 630 Am. 459.

“The ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the constitution must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiar and known to the framers of the constitution. This liberty denotes the right of the individual to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to locomote, and generally enjoy those rights long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U .S. 390, 399; United States v. Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654.

“An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442.  “The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it.

“No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.”  16 Am Jur 2nd, Sec 177 late 2d, Sec 256.

All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Chief Justice Marshall, Marbury vs Madison, 5, U.S. (Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803).

It cannot be assumed that the framers of the constitution and the people who adopted it, did not intend that which is the plain import of the language used.   When the language of the constitution is positive and free of all ambiguity, all courts are not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to avoid the hardships of particular cases.  We must accept the constitution as it reads when its language is unambiguous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign power.  Cook vs Iverson, 122, N.M. 251.

“Right of protecting property, declared inalienable by constitution, is not mere right to protect it by individual force, but right to protect it by law of land, and force of body politic.” Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.

“Constitution of this state declares, among inalienable rights of each citizen, that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.  This is one of primary objects of government, is guaranteed by constitution, and cannot be impaired by legislation.”  Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.

State Constitution – “The state constitution is the mandate of a sovereign people to its servants and representatives.  Not one of them has a right to ignore or disregard these mandates...”  John F. Jelko Co. vs. Emery, 193 Wisc. 311;  214 N.W. 369, 53 A.L.R., 463;   Lemon vs. Langlin, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 273 P.2d 464.

The People are the Sovereign!

People are supreme, not the state.  Waring vs. the Mayor of Savannah, 60 Georgia at 93.

The people of the State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.  The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. (Added Stats. 1953, c. 1588, p.3270, sec. 1.)

The people are the recognized source of all authority, state or municipal, and to this authority it must come at last, whether immediately or by circuitous route. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 545 [23: 440, 441]. p 234.

“the government is but an agency to the state,” — the state being the sovereign people.      State v. Chase, 175 Minn, 259, 220 N.W. 951, 953.

Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.  And the law is the definition and limitation of power.

“…The Congress cannot revoke the Sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.”  Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935). “The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity is one of the Common-Law immunities and defenses that are available to the Sovereign…” Citizen of Minnesota. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, (1988) 491 U.S. 58, 105 L.Ed. 2d. 45, 109 S.Ct. 2304. “The people of the state, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the king by his own prerogative.” Lansing v. Smith, (1829) 4 Wendell 9, (NY).

Private Corporate State / Municipality Policy Enforcement Officer
  a.k.a Police Officer Duties and limitations of power

“Nothing is gained in the argument by calling it ‘police power.’” Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 2771 (1875); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 501 (1934).

“An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government.” Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.

Failure to obey the command of a police officer constitutes a traditional form of breach of the peace.  Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the constitution.  Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-2.

That an officer or employee of a state or one of its subdivisions is deemed to be acting under “color of law” as to those deprivations of right committed in the fulfillment of the tasks and obligations assigned to him. Monroe v. Page, 1961, 365 U.S. 167.         (Civil law)

Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority, can be actions under “color of law.”    Stringer v. Dilger, 1963, Ca. 10 Colo., 313 F.2d 536.  (Civil law)

“The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution.” Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60;  Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613.

•   Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under “color of law” include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official’s lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials. It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim.

“With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.” Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O’Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887.

Call Recording In California

Improperly filed no facts and filed as felony it can only be a misdemeanor

objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded. Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 768, 774–776; Vera v. O’Keefe (S.D.Cal.2011) 791 F.Supp.2d 959; 1396;.  Whether there exists a reasonable expectation that no one is secretly recording or listening to a phone conversation is generally a question of fact.  See Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (4th Dist. 2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1396-97; Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 169.

Frio v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1480, 1488 (citation omitted).  A person’s subjective belief that the call should not be recorded or monitored is not the test.

Courts that have analyzed the issue of whether a communication is confidential under § 632 have considered the totality of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the parties had an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation would not be recorded or overheard.  Kight, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at 1397.

Factors relevant to determining whether an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists (that is, that no one is secretly recording or listening to a phone conversation) include, but are not limited to:

• who initiated the call,
• the purpose and duration of the call,
• the customer’s prior relationships, experiences and communications,
• whether confidential information was conveyed,  and, or course
• whether an admonition/disclosure/warning was given during the call at the outset, or otherwise.  See Kight, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at 1397 (citing Kearney); see also Flanagan, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 776–77 (remanding for consideration whether son had objectively reasonable expectation that his private telephone conversations with his father were not being recorded by the father’s wife); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp. (C.D.Cal.2002) 180 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1093–94 (conversations between counsel concerning litigation related matters were deemed confidential communications within the meaning of Section 632); People v. Pedersen (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 987, 994 (“The nature of the meeting and the manner in which it was carried out are such that the court could reasonably conclude that it was no different than other business meetings of the parties that were not”).

The supposed victim did not have a reasonable expectation that his or her call would not be overheard or recorded.  Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 117-118.

As a corollary to this element, obtaining consent to record or monitor is its own defense, but, of course, notification and consent also undermine the expectation of privacy element.  See Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 100, 118.

plaintiff probably needs not to have suffered appreciable, compensable, or even nominal “damage” to assert a viable claim.  But compare FAA v. Cooper (2012) ___ U.S.____, 132 S.Ct. 144

“The statute of limitations in which to commence an action for invasion of privacy is one year.”  Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 880.  The statute of limitations on a cause of action under Penal Code § 632 commences when the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the defendant’s unlawful acts.  Montalti v. Catanzariti (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 96, 97-98.

Where a caller is made aware that the call or conversation was, or is, being monitored or recorded, there is no violation of § 632 because there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 100, 118; Weiner, supra, 2012 WL 3632025 at *3, fn. 2.Moreover, by continuing with the conversation after being so warned, consent is given by implication.   See Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 100, 118.

In any event, where the plaintiff knows the call is being recorded and goes forward without objection and participates anyway, consent should be implied.  See Kearney, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 100, 118.

Under restricted circumstances, even an illegal recording can be used in a court of law. While it could not be used to present affirmative evidence in the case or to prove a point, it can be used to prevent perjury of a witness. In Frio v Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3e 1480, the Court of Appeal held that any testifying witness cannot use the exclusionary provisions of Penal Code Section 632 as a shield for perjury.

the limits on use of that evidence. In People v Crow (1994), the court stated, “Evidence of confidential conversations obtained by eavesdropping or recording in violation of Penal Code Section 632 is generally inadmissible in any proceeding…but can be used to impeach inconsistent testimony by those seeking to exclude the evidence..”

Prior decisions in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 907 explain that “while privacy expectations may diminish significantly in the workplace, in the workplace, they are not lacking altogether.” Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos.

My workplace cameras record 24/7 in safe workplace areas

https://goodshepherdmedia.net/a-brief-overview-of-call-recording-in-california/

learn more

• Right to Truth – Victims’ Bill of Rights – Prop 8 1982

Government / Public Servants / Officers / Judges Not Immune from suit!

“The officers of the law, in the execution of process, are required to know the requirements of the law, and if they mistake them, whether through ignorance or design, and anyone is harmed by their error, they must respond in damages.” Roger v. Marshall (United States use of Rogers v. Conklin), 1 Wall. (US) 644, 17 Led 714.

“It is a general rule that an officer, executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise, who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction, and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.”  Cooper v. O`Conner, 69 App DC 100, 99 F (2d)

“Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights.      “AFLCIO v. Woodard, 406 F 2d 137 t.

“Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people.”   (Civil Rights) Rabon vs Rowen Memorial Hospital, Inc. 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.

Government Immunity – “In  Land  v.  Dollar, 338 US 731 (1947), the court noted, “that when the government entered into a commercial field of activity, it left immunity behind.”  Brady  v.  Roosevelt, 317 US 575 (1943);  FHA  v.  Burr, 309 US 242 (1940);  Kiefer  v.  RFC, 306 US 381 (1939).

The high Courts, through their citations of authority, have frequently declared,  that  “…where  any  state  proceeds  against  a  private individual in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding the matters involved.”  Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308;

“When  enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially (and thus are not protected by “qualified” or “limited immunity,” – SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662;  Bothke  v.  Terry, 713 F2d 1404)

– – “but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved  agency  —  but  only  in  a  “ministerial”  and  not  a “discretionary capacity…”  Thompson  v.  Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.

Thompson v. Clark 2022 Holding: Larry Thompson’s showing that his criminal prosecution ended without a conviction satisfies the requirement to demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution in a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution; an affirmative indication of innocence is not needed.

Immunity for judges does not extend to acts which are clearly outside of their jurisdiction.  Bauers v. Heisel, C.A. N.J. 1966, 361 F.2d 581, Cert. Den. 87 S.Ct. 1367, 386 U.S. 1021, 18 L.Ed. 2d 457 (see also Muller v. Wachtel, D.C.N.Y. 1972, 345 F.Supp. 160;  Rhodes v. Houston, D.C. Nebr. 1962, 202 F.Supp. 624 affirmed 309 F.2d 959, Cert. den 83 St. 724, 372 U.S. 909, 9 L.Ed. 719, Cert. Den 83 S.Ct. 1282, 383 U.S. 971, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 311, Motion denied 285 F.Supp. 546).

“Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held liable for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney’s fees.” Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.

“The immunity of judges for acts within their judicial role is beyond cavil.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1957). Keyword within their role, outside of that role they are not.

At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity bar to such relief, and in situations where in their judgment an injunction against a judicial officer is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner’s constitutional rights, courts will grant that relief.  “There is no common law judicial immunity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 104S.Ct. 1970; cited in Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.

“Judges, members of city council, and police officers as well as other public officials, may utilize good faith defense of action for damages under 42-1983, but no public official has absolute immunity from suit under the 1871 civil rights statute.” (Samuel vs University of Pittsburg, 375 F.Supp. 1119, ‘see also, White vs Fleming 374 Supp. 267.)

NO IMMUNITY
“Sovereign immunity does not apply where (as here) government is a lawbreaker or jurisdiction is the issue.” Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622

“Knowing failure to disclose material information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are actionable as fraud under law.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 1990

[a] “Party in interest may become liable for fraud by mere silent acquiescence and partaking of benefits of fraud.” Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 1994

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. Out of fraud no action arises; fraud never gives a right of action. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. As found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 509.

“Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,” Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S 426.

“Fraud vitiates everything” Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210

“Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgments.” U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882) “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. “

When a Citizen challenges the acts of a federal or state official as being illegal, that official cannot just simply avoid liability based upon the fact that he is a public official. In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.196, 220, 221, 1 S.Ct. 240, 261, the United States claimed title to Arlington, Lee’s estate, via a tax sale some years earlier, held to be void by the Court. In so voiding the title of the United States, the Court declared:
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. “Shall it be said… that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country,
it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights.”

See Pierce v. United States (“The Floyd Acceptances”), 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 666, 677 (“We have no officers in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority”);
Cunningham v. Macon, 109 U.S. 446, 452, 456, 3 S.Ct. 292, 297 (“In these cases he is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts authority as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him… It is no answer for the defendant to say I am an officer of the government and acted under its authority unless he shows the sufficiency of that authority”); and Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287, 5 S.Ct. 903, 912

WHEREAS, officials and even judges have questioned immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

“When lawsuits are brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their “individual” capacity not their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity.” Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).

“Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” (Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988).

“The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 533

“If you’ve relied on prior decisions of the Supreme Court you have a perfect defense for willfulness.” U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346

Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous. Accordingly that which Chief Justice Marshall has called ‘the tenderness of the law Page 11 of 48 for the rights of individuals’ [FN1] entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the confines of the statute. United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S.  624, 628, 10 S. Ct. 625, 626, 33 L. Ed. 1080; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,485, 37 S. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857. FN1 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37.

We do not overlook those constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, established by Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168,196 [26: 377, 386].
We said in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 [29: 746, 751]—and it cannot be too often repeated—that the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sancity of a man’s home, and the privacies of his life.
As said by Mr. Justice Field in Re Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241,250, “of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value.”

Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326 When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.

JURISDICTION NOTE: It is a fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.

Albrecht v. U.S. Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) “The United States District Court is not a true United States Court, established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court.”

“Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.” [U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]

Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349. Some Defendants urge that any act “of a judicial nature” entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing. A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.

Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) “Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.”

Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100 Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, “If (federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said, “Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and punished for crimes… The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution“.

Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938) A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.

“Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250

Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.”

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: See also, 42 USC 1983 – Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion – he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act. Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States” and “No state shall… grant any Title of Nobility.” Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesn’t understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges. Article III, Sec. 1, “The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.”

Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, “Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants’ civil rights.” – Robert Craig Waters.

TAKE DUE NOTICE ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, SERVANTS, JUDGES, LAYERS, CLERKS, EMPLOYEES:

“Ignorance of the law does not excuse misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn officer of the law.”   In re McCowan (1917), 177 C. 93, 170 P. 1100.

“All are presumed to know the law.”  San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641; Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124 P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223 P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A. 35, 271 P. 1107;  San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard (1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.

“It is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no one.”  Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.

Jurisdiction challenged to all, at any and all times

“Judge acted in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of (personal) jurisdiction would be liable.” Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488 (1984).  “In such case the judge has lost his judicial function, has become a mere private person, and is liable as a trespasser for damages resulting from his unauthorized acts.”

“Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68;
also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351.” Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.

“A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” Bradley v.Fisher,13 Wall 335, 351, 352.

The laws of nature are the laws of God, whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth.  A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us.  All human constitutions which contradict his cannot protect us.  All human constitutions which contradict his (God’s) laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey.  1772, Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109. Supreme court cases from digging around Robin v. Hardaway 1790. Biblical Law at “Common Law” supersedes all laws, and “Christianity is custom, custom is Law.”

(I, Me, Myself am a “state”, with standing, standing in “original jurisdiction” know as the common law, Gods Law, a neutral traveling in itinerary, demanding all of my rights under God’s Natural Law, recorded in part in the Bible, which law is recognized in US Public Law 97-280 as “the word of God and all men are admonished to learn and apply it” so I demand anyone and everyone to notice God’s Laws, which are My Makers Laws and therefore My Laws!)

• – Article 1 of the Bill of Rights – guarantees freedom of religion-
  Constitution for the United States of America ARTICLE IV, sect. 1, Full faith and credit among states. (Self-executing constitutional provisions) Section 1.  Full faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state.

And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

for true knowledge of how sophisticated the legal minds of our forefathers were read how intricate their minds worked absent of all modern inventions including modern internet free schooling.

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

to read the full statute click link below
cited

42-us-code-1983-civil-action-for-deprivation-of-rights/

Recoverable Damages Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of rights under color of law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against rights

9.3 Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant in Individual Capacity —Elements and Burden of Proof

How to file a complaint of Police or other Government Official Misconduct Click Here

Penal Code §§ 146 [unlawful detention or arrest by peace officer] 149 [beating / torturing prisoners], 236 [false imprisonment], 192 [manslaughter], 187 [murder] and 245 [assault with deadly weapon / by means resulting in great bodily injury]), civil liability (i.e. federal civil remedy for violation of federal and statutory rights under color of state law [42 U.S.C. § 1983]), and California state law claims for battery, assault, false arrest / false imprisonment, wrongful death, violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 (retaliation for exercise of, or in attempt to, dissuade prevent another from exercising Constitutional rights), or administrative discipline (i.e. reprimand, suspension, rank reduction, and termination.)

Notwithstanding the absurd and cruel creation of immunity for peace officers that went well beyond the literal wording  and clear meaning of Section 821.6 by the California Courts of Appeal, in 2061 in  Tort claims are typically matters of state law, raising no federal question. However, the conduct complained of may also violate the federal Constitution. In such a case, relief may be available in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes “constitutional torts”, by creating a private right of action in federal court (Congress even allowing federal claims in a state court), against any person who, “under color of [state law],” causes injuries by violating an individual’s federal Constitutional or statutory rights.  Section 1983, however, “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979.) Therefore, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a malicious criminal prosecution must be deemed a deprivation of a right “secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT COMES TO THE RESCUE AND REFUSES TO FOLLOW THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL IN THEIR AD NAUSEUM EXPANSION OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 821.6.

On July 5, 2016, the Ninth Circuit handed down the seminal case of Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016), which rejected the California Court of Appeal’s ad nauseam expansion of Section 821.6 immunity and refused to immunize police officers pursuant to that section. In that Opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that they are only bound to follow state law on state law issues when either the highest court in a state (i.e. the California Supreme Court on California law) has decided that issue, or, when the state Courts of Appeals have decided an issue and the federal court finds that the state Supreme Court would have held otherwise. In reaching that holding that Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the California Supreme Court already interpreted [California Government Code] section 821.6 as ‘confining its reach to malicious prosecution actions.’ “Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865, 871 (1974), and that in their opinion, the California Supreme Court would adhere to Sullivan, notwithstanding many Opinions of the California Courts of Appeal holding otherwise. Accordingly, the state of the law is that if you have the same case with the same parties and your case is in a California state court, that Section 821.6 immunizes many actions of peace officers other than malicious prosecution, but if you are in federal court, Section 821.6 immunity only immunizes claims for malicious prosecution under California state law.

On the basis of dicta expressed by the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), there has been a political and practical acceptance of a federal constitutional right to be free of a malicious criminal prosecution; a frame-up by state actors.

In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that although a malicious criminal prosecution is not a 14th Amendment substantive due process violation, that is might be considered an unreasonable seizure of one’s person under the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, if the subsequent malicious prosecution was accompanied by the actual physical arrest of the person.

In reality, these words were crafted by the Supreme Court to permit persons who are falsely and maliciously accused of a crime by the police that resulted in a bogus criminal prosecution, to sue the police who attempted to frame them. It’s judicial “newspeak“.

If there is anything that would constitute what the courts call substantive due process (i.e. outrageous police conduct that shocks the conscience), attempting to frame an innocent is it. However, the Supreme Court could not agree on whether a malicious criminal prosecution was a substantive due process violation in Albright v. Oliver, but the Justices did not want to leave one who the police attempted to frame without a remedy.

Accordingly, in Manuel v. City,  of Joliett, 580 U.S. _____ (2017), the Supreme Court held that one who was physically arrested and confined in custody by way of the false arrest of a police officer, can obtain damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for that person’s continued confinement in jail, after the point in time when the District Attorney (prosecutor) formally filed criminal charges against the person. In other words, the accused person can collect damages for being kept in jail before trial, pursuant to criminal charges, filed by the prosecutor, that were procured by the arresting police officer having authored a false police report, that the prosecutor relied upon in  deciding to file the very criminal charges that kept the false accused person in jail before trial.

However, this still didn’t establish a Naked Constitutional Tort of a Malicious Criminal Prosecution; only a damages remedy for a false arrest, and for confinement in jail after the point in time when the prosecutor formally filed criminal charges against the confined person.

Following both Albright v. Oliver and Manuel v. City of Joliet, most United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeals (the federal intermediate level appellate courts) permitted a Section 1983 remedy for a malicious criminal prosecution by a peace officer.  The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits composed the “Tort Circuits,” wherein plaintiffs pleading malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983, were required to satisfy the common law elements of a malicious prosecution claim in addition to proving a constitutional violation. The “Constitutional Circuits”—the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth— concentrated on whether a constitutional violation exists.

Most of the Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, allowed for an aggrieved person the right to sue for being subjected to a malicious criminal prosecution, federal remedy for the same, via 42 U.S.C. §  1983. They did so, on various theories, since the right to be free from a malicious criminal prosecution is not described in the federal Constitution, but the pure evil and outrageousness of such government action compels appellate judges to find some Constitutional foundation for that right, in order to allow a person who the government attempted to frame, some sort of remedy.

Although sister circuits categorized the Third Circuit as a “Tort Circuit”, the Third Circuit more recently acknowledged that “[o]ur law on this issue is unclear”; however, it continued to encourage plaintiffs to address each common law element. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has avoided defining the required elements of a claim, although it appears to recognize a Fourth Amendment right against malicious prosecution and continued detention without probable cause.  The Ninth Circuit lies on both sides of the divide; seemingly turning on whether they want the malicious prosecution plaintiff to prevail.

In Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002.)  held that a malicious criminal prosecution was a naked constitutional tort, and was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the 4th Amendment. They just said it, basically out of thin air.

The Ninth Circuit also continued its pre-Galbraith malicious prosecution jurisprudence and held that in in addition to constituting a 4th Amendment violation, that one could sue for a malicious criminal prosecution if the prosecution was brought to deprive the innocent of some other constitutional right, such as attempting to frame an innocent in retaliation for protected exercise of First Amendment free speech, or, as a naked constitutional tort. See, Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069–72 (9th Cir. 2004.) i

FEDERAL LAW NOW PROVIDES A REMEDY FOR A MALICIOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

In Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S  (April 4, 2022) for the first time in the history of the Americann Republic, the U.S. Supreme Court finally held that there is a Constitutional Tort of Malicious Criminal Prosecution. The Supreme Court also went on to hold that in order to sue for a Malicious Criminal Prosecution, that the underlying criminal action only need not result in a conviction of the accused for the accused (and  now plaintiff), for the underlying criminal case to be considered to be “favorably terminated”; a “favorable termination” of the underlying criminal case being a required element of that claim.

Although under California law you may not recover damages for your malicious criminal prosecution because of immunity provided in Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6  (See, Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744 (1997), at least now there is a federal remedy for the police attempting to frame you; finally.

• To learn more about SB 2 Police Decertification Process – Changes to Government Code – senate-bill-2-police-decertification-process/
• SB 2, Expanding Civil Liability Exposure – sb-2-expanding-civil-liability-exposure/

Pro Se Case Law

Bruce Baldinger v. Antonio Ferri, No. 12-4529 (3d Cir. 2013)

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971)
Plaintiff-inmate filed pro se complaint against prison seeking compensation for damages sustained while placed in solitary confinement. In finding plaintiff’s complaint legally sufficient, Supreme Court found that pro se pleadings should be held to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by attorneys.

Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971)
Pro se petitioner who asserted complete ignorance of the law subsequently presented a brief that was manifestly written by a person with legal knowledge. Court held that a brief prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar must be signed by that member.

Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 601 (1993)
Plaintiff who consulted defendants’ law firms regarding workers’ compensation claim was not advised of potential for additional third party claim before statue of limitations expired. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s representation was limited only to filing workers’ compensation claim and no duty existed to advise plaintiff in any other matter. Court found that representation was not limited solely to workers compensation claim, and defendants should have advised plaintiff regarding third party claim.

Johnson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff’s official capacity. Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities. Entering such limited appearance is not competent and zealous representation as required by ethical rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants’ misrepresentation of pro se status in violation of ethical rules.

Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997)
Over a period of time, pro se plaintiffs submitted pleadings that had been written by attorneys pursuant to discrete-task representation contracts. The attorneys did not sign the pleadings, and in most cases did not appear as counsel of record. When ordered to show cause by the court as to why they should not be held in contempt of court, attorneys argued that the professional relationships created with the litigants ended once they had drafted the pleadings. Court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that the attorneys knowingly misled the court or intentionally violated ethical or procedural rules and declined to impose sanctions. However, court stated that the practice of ghostwriting pleadings without acknowledging authorship and without asking court approval to withdraw from representation was inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and Rule 83.1(G) of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Court stated that allowing attorneys to ghostwrite pleadings for pro se plaintiffs abused additional leeway given to pro se filings.

U.S. v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F.Supp. 361 (E.D.Pa. 1997)
Court finds that ghostwriting by attorney for a pro se litigant implicates an attorney’s duty of candor to the court, interferes with the court’s ability to supervise the litigation, and misrepresents the litigant’s right to more liberal construction as a pro se litigant.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 884 (D.Kan. 1997)
In suit brought by pro se plaintiff, defendants sought order requiring plaintiff to disclose whether she was an attorney or received the assistance of a lawyer. In expressing legal and ethical concerns regarding the ghostwriting of pleadings by attorneys, the court held the defendants were entitled to the order.

Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules of a federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro se litigant’s pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents. Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.

Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230 B.R. 426 (Bankr.D.Mont. 1999)
Paralegal who helped a business draft and file bankruptcy papers was found to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Court notes that if an attorney acted in the same manner as paralegal, that person would be guilty of “ghost writing,” which is described as the act of undisclosed attorney who assists a self-represented litigant by drafting his or her pleadings as part of “unbundled” or limited legal services. Court also notes that ghostwriting violates court rules, particularly Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, as well as ABA Standing Committee Opinion 1414 in Ethics and Professional Responsibility.

Jones v. Bresset, 2000 W: 3311607 (47 Pa. D. & C 4th 60)
Defendant was an attorney hired by plaintiff in the midst of plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plaintiff had already obtained counsel of record, and hired defendant solely for the purpose of securing an accounting in the bankruptcy proceeding. The defendant alerted plaintiff of limited scope of his representation, advising plaintiff that problems may arise outside the scope of his representation. Plaintiff commenced a legal malpractice suit against his attorney of record stating negligence, and included the defendant in the claim. The court found that since the defendant distinctly limited the scope of his representation and urged the plaintiff to hire separate counsel for other matters, the defendant had no legal duty to investigate or advise plaintiff on existence of malpractice by attorney of record.

Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, 2000 WL 1611123 (S.D. Ohio)
Respondent argues that the Petition should be stricken pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 because, although allegedly filed pro se, petitioner clearly received substantial assistance from counsel in the preparation and filing of the Petition. Court finds that if a pleading is prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it must be signed by that attorney to avoid misrepresentation.

Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal.App. 4th 441 (2000)
In a lawsuit, plaintiff’s counsel of record requested that another firm make a “special appearance” at a summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance represents the client’s interests and has a professional attorney-client relationship with the client. Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true “special appearance”.

Armor v. Lantz, 207 W. VA 672, 535 S.E.2d 737 (2000)
Appellants brought legal malpractice suit against local attorney retained by Ohio lawyer in products liability case. Appellants claimed that West Virginia lawyer who acted as local counsel was liable for malpractice of Ohio lawyer. Court found that, while it was difficult to clearly define the role of local counsel according to West Virginia rules, the local attorney had effectively entered a limited representation agreement and was therefore not responsible for all aspects of the case or for the Ohio lawyer’s conduct.

Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)
Lawyer participated in ghostwriting appellate brief for a pro se litigant. Court holds that participation by an attorney in drafting otherwise pro se appellate brief is per se substantial legal assistance, and must be acknowledged by signature. An attorney must refuse to provide ghostwriting assistance unless purported pro se client specifically commits to disclose attorney’s assistance to the court upon filing.

Lynne v. Laufer, No. A-2079-01T2, (N.J. Super. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2003)
Attorney, with matrimonial client’s consent after consultation, limited the scope of his representation to a review of the terms of a mediated agreement without going outside its four corners. Court holds that it is not a breach of the standard of care for an attorney under a signed precisely drafted consent agreement to limit the scope of representation to not perform such services in the course of representing a matrimonial client that he or she might otherwise perform absent such a consent.

Melvin Finance, Inc. v. Artis, 157 N.C. App. 716, 2003 WL 21153426 (N.C.App.)
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney agreed to file responsive pleadings and negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant received notice of a scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an arbitration award was entered for the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the defendant claimed the limited representation attorney’s failure to appear at the hearing amounted to excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found that since the defendant received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited representation attorney’s conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was affirmed.

Sharp v. Sharp, 2006 WL 3088067 (Va.Cir.Court)
Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery, but then hired an attorney who appeared in a limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the attorney could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorney’s appearance qualified him as official “attorney of record”. The court found that it was not bound by agreements made between client and attorney and that a court may “require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct”. The court found that the attorney could make a motion to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the court had ultimate discretion in granting the withdrawal.

Discover Bank v. McCullough, 2008 W: 248975 (Tenn. Ct. App.)
In a dispute over a bank card balance, cardholders chose to represent themselves after card issuer filed suit. The self-represented litigants mailed a response to court but then failed to appear at the hearing, which prompted the court to grant a default judgment to the card issuer. During the appeals process, the self represented filed papers not known within the jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the Court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the self represented litigants failed to file a court recognized notice. The court found that while it appreciated the difficulties encountered by self-represented litigants, it could not “abdicate its role as an impartial, neutral arbiter and become an advocate for the self-represented litigant”.

Burgess v. Vitola, 2008 WL 821539 (N.C.Super.)
In a legal dispute that surfaced over an alleged invasion of personal property, the plaintiff resided in North Carolina and the defendant resided in California. The defendant filed papers with the assistance of a California attorney but, on record, represented herself. The plaintiff sought recourse, arguing that assistance from counsel amounted to the unauthorized practice of law since the attorney was not licensed in North Carolina. As the Rules of Professional Conduct do not require an attorney who has provided drafting assistance to make an appearance as counsel of record, the court found that it had no authority to sanction the California attorney. It did, however, require that the defendant file an affidavit that she intended to proceed pro se and not seek legal assistance unless the attorney is licensed to practice in North Carolina.

Future Lawn, Inc v. Steinberg, 2008 Ohio 4127
Attorney was hired by appellant to handle a legal malpractice claim. The attorney was referred by appellant’s general counsel, to act in a in a matter concerning the handling of an environmental report in a real estate transaction several years prior. A settlement was reached in the matter and around the same time, general counsel was replaced. Following a dispute regarding unpaid legal fees, appellants were sued by former general counsel. Appellants responded with a separate suit, alleging counsel had committed malpractice. They implicated the limited representation attorney, suggesting the attorney had an obligation to advise them of issues surrounding claims of general counsel’s malpractice. The court found that representation by attorney was expressly limited to the original malpractice claim, and that no requirement existed for client consultation before limited the scope of representation. The attorney had no duty to investigate actions of general counsel.

Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
“… the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws.”

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’ pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.

Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
“Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment.”

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).

Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals
The plaintiff’s civil rights pleading was 150 pages and described by a federal judge as “inept”. Nevertheless, it was held “Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff’s Pleadings without regard to technicalities.”

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).

Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)
“Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices… the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law.”

Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
“There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional Rights.”

Schware v. Board of Examiners, United State Reports 353 U.S. pages 238, 239.
“The practice of law cannot be licensed by any state/State.”

Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925)
“The practice of law is an occupation of common right.”

CITED http://caught.net/prose/proserulings.htm

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Penal Code 115 PC – Filing a False Document in California

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Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

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Penal Code 118.1 PC – Police Officer$ Filing False Report$

Spencer v. Peters– Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment

Lying Cop or Citizen – PC 129 – Preparing False Statement or Report Under Oath

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

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Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

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PC 146 Penal Code – False Arrest

Penal Code 148.5 PC –  Making a False Police Report in California

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code § 236 PC – False Imprisonment

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

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Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

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Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

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Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case 

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WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

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Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

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How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
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case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government  Employees

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Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

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Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

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ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Section 832.7 – Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records

Senate Bill No. 1421 – California Public Records Act

Assembly Bill 748 Makes Video Evidence Captured by Police Agencies Subject to Disclosure as Public Records

SB 2, Creating Police Decertification Process and Expanding Civil Liability Exposure

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Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
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Motion to vacate an adverse judgment

Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?

Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848

Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

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]]> https://goodshepherdmedia.net/what-is-jurisdiction-jurisdition-vs-venue/ Mon, 01 Jul 2024 22:30:03 +0000 https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=18305 What Is Jurisdiction? Jurisdition vs Venue?

What Is Jurisdiction?

Jurisdiction refers in general to a court’s ability and authority to decide a case brought before it.

Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter

Subject matter jurisdiction pertains to the court’s ability to hear cases regarding specific types of claims. There are many different types of courts on the trial level, including criminal court, civil court, small claims court, Surrogate’s court, bankruptcy court, and family court. In some cases, it will be obvious which court should hear your claim, but for others, the plaintiff will need to submit their matter to a court that is authorized to hear the claim under the applicable law where the claim is filed.²

Why There Are Laws on Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is an important principle in criminal law. These laws ensure that a local community can police itself and dictact how crimes occurring in the area are prosecuted. In addition, prosecuting crimes locally is significantly more convenient for all parties, including victims, witnesses, police officers and even the defendant. This is why the law generally limits criminal prosecutions to the county in which the crime occurred.

What Is Venue?

Venue means the location—which district or county in a state or the U.S.—where the lawsuit will take place.¹ Venue is typically decided by the law, but will most often be where the events leading up to the claim took place.¹⁰

In a criminal case, “venue” refers to the county or district where a case will be decided. Jurisdiction is a related, but broader concept. It refers to the legal authority to hear a case. Venue, on the other hand, refers to the precise location where the case will be heard. So, for example, the state of California might have jurisdiction over a case, while a court within Los Angeles may be the venue for it.

Statutes, constitutional provisions, and court rules set the rules for venue. Many state constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to be tried by an impartial jury in the county where the crime occurred.

Proving Venue

Some states consider venue a fact that the prosecution must prove in order to obtain a valid conviction. So, the prosecution might have to prove, for example, that the county courthouse where the proceedings are occurring is the proper place. Some states don’t require the prosecutor to prove venue unless the defendant presents some evidence that the venue is wrong.

Other states view venue as nothing more than a choice of the most appropriate location—a choice that doesn’t affect the validity of the proceedings.

How to Prove It

In states that require the prosecution to prove venue (those that consider it a “jurisdictional fact”), failing to prove venue may lead to case dismissal or an invalid conviction.

Proving that venue is proper typically means proving where the alleged crime occurred. Circumstantial evidence may be enough to prove where the acts in question happened, or direct testimony might establish that venue is proper. For instance, a sheriff’s deputy might testify that:

• he works in a particular county
• his patrol area is from point X to point Y in the county, and
• he observed the crime while on patrol, in between points X and Y.

That testimony would probably be enough to prove venue.

In federal court, the prosecution must prove venue merely by a preponderance of evidence. (“Venue” in a federal criminal case typically refers to the “district” of prosecution; see this U.S. Courts overview.) Some states use the same standard, but most use “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under either standard, the prosecution can easily prove venue with one witness’s testimony that the crime occurred within the relevant city, county, or federal district.

Uncertain Venue

Again, venue is usually the county or district where the crime occurred. But what if a crime takes place in more than one place? In a state case, if different parts of a crime occur in different counties, the following may go toward determining venue:

• the nature of the offense
• where the elements of the crime took place
• where the criminal act took effect.

The Basics of Venue 

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law…” Federal Criminal Rule 18 echoes the same requirement: “Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.”

Because some statutes do not define where a crime is committed, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.”[1] Venue is proper only where the acts constituting the offense—the crime’s “essential conduct elements”—took place.[2]

The government must prove that venue is proper in the district of indictment and only by a preponderance of the evidence—not beyond a reasonable doubt. And it’s a question of law for the judge to decide before trial, not a question for the jury.

Defense lawyers should routinely scrutinize indictments, and investigate separately, whether venue is appropriate where DOJ brought the case. If there is a meritorious argument to dismiss the indictment, then that motion should be filed as soon as possible in the case. Rule 12(a)(3) says that improper venue motions “must be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.”

The Fortenberry Case

In 2004, Jeffrey Fortenberry was elected to Congress to represent Nebraska’s 1^st District. He was a very popular congressmember in his district: winning about 70% of the general election vote in 2014 and 2016, and then about 60% in 2018 and 2020.

In 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began an investigation into whether a foreign national had made illegal contributions to several election campaigns. According to the indictment, the foreign national made illegal “conduit” contributions to Mr. Fortenberry at a fundraiser he held in Los Angeles in 2016.

During the investigation, the FBI interviewed Mr. Fortenberry two times: once in Lincoln, Nebraska (not in California), and once in Washington, DC (also not in California). Mr. Fortenberry was indicted in the Central District of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements during those two interviews. His defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue. He noted that the Ninth Circuit had not addressed where venue is proper in a false statements case, but that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits had both held that venue was proper where the allegedly false statements were made because they were the “essential elements” of the offense.

The trial court denied the motion, finding that because the government had to prove that the false statements were “material” and because the government’s theory of “materiality” was that they had affected the California-based investigation, venue was proper in California. Here is the entirety of the facts that allowed DOJ to bring the case in California, according to the district court:

The investigation into Defendant’s activities by federal officials in this district arose out of a fundraiser that he conducted in Los Angeles. Defendant was interviewed twice—in Nebraska and Washington, D.C., respectively—about those activities in Los Angeles. And Defendant directed his activities to the Central District of California when he contacted federal investigators in this district to request a second interview.

The case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Mr. Fortenberry, the court sentenced him to two years of probation, and he resigned his seat in Congress. But Mr. Fortenberry continued to fight the convictions and appealed them to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit Decision

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.[3] It explained that the text of Section 1001 “plainly identifies the essential conduct of a Section 1001 offense to be the making of a false statement.” It rejected the government’s argument that materiality is an “essential conduct element” of Section 1001. It also found that DOJ should not have been permitted to prosecute these false statements based on the location of the government action that the statements could potentially influence.

The court of appeals explained that although prosecutors must prove the false statements’ materiality beyond a reasonable doubt, “the inquiry that determines venue is different.” The venue inquiry “turns on the action by the defendant that is essential to the offense, and where that specific action took place.”

In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that “materiality is not an essential conduct element of a Section 1001 violation” and thus the location of the false statement determines venue, not the location that supposedly makes the statement “material.”

Is This the End of the Prosecution of Mr. Fortenberry?

Even though the appellate court reversed his convictions in California, DOJ could indict him again in Nebraska or Washington DC. The statute of limitations is five years. But DOJ will have to move quickly. The Nebraska interview was in March 2019 and the Washington interview as in July 2019, so the respective statues will run in March 2024 and July 2024, respectively.

Practice Tips When Venue Is Questionable

Most white-collar investigations begin long before indictment. Defense counsel should always consider contesting venue during pre-indictment negotiations. This point is particularly salient in public corruption cases where a client may be well-known and well-liked in a particular jurisdiction. (The opposite could also be true; it goes without saying that you shouldn’t challenge venue in a place where your client is more popular than another possible place.) In a case like Mr. Fortenberry’s, though, where a client is popular in a particular place, challenging venue is an essential pretrial strategy.

Challenging venue may be a two-step process: a motion to dismiss for lack of venue and, if that fails, a motion to transfer venue. Even if venue is technically proper in two places, a defendant can move to transfer venue to a different location under Rule 21(b). Under that rule, “the court may transfer the proceeding, or one or more counts, against that defendant to another district for the convenience of the parties, any victim, and the witnesses, and in the interest of justice.”

The Supreme Court has established 10-factor test to evaluate venue transfer motions: (1) location of the defendant; (2) location of witnesses; (3) location of events likely to be in issue; (4) location of documents and records; (5) disruption of the defendant’s business; (6) expense to the parties; (7) location of counsel; (8) relative accessibility of place of trial; (9) docket conditions in each district; and (10) any other specific element which might affect the transfer.[4]

The trial court—unsurprisingly—denied Mr. Fortenberry’s motion to transfer venue. Still, it was a valid argument to make and defense counsel should make as many meritorious arguments before trial as possible to preserve issues for appeal.

One final note: The Department of Justice’s website contains a lengthy press release from 2021 touting Mr. Fortenberry’s indictment, and a second press release from 2022 about his conviction. Given the reversal of the convictions, DOJ should update this page to reflect that its convictions have been reversed. The fac that DOJ does not update its websites to reflect when convictions have been reversed—or with other information that surely relevant to any reader of their website—remains a travesty of justice that I’ve noted before on this blog.

[1] United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1998)

[2] See United States v. Rodriguez–Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 (1999).

[3] United States v. Fortenberry, 89 F.4th 702 (9th Cir. 2023).

[4] Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964).

Changing Venue

Despite the principles above, a defendant can ask a court to change venue. State laws and court rules explain how to seek a change of venue, and may also impose deadlines. source

It is always important to establish proper venue, and easy to overlook. A criminal scenario may have all the required elements, all the witnesses and evidence, and no viable defense, but if territorial jurisdiction is lacking, the case cannot move forward. And California’s patchwork of counties can make this issue a particularly thorny one for prosecutors.

Typically such situations are very fact-specific. In Orange County recently, a case was filed alleging felony violations of burglary in the second degree and identity theft against two defendants who had used credit cards in West Covina (Los Angeles County) that had previously been stolen in Dana Point (Orange County). The fraudulent purchases occurred on the same day as the original burglary. In the course of the investigation, the co-defendant was positively identified from store surveillance video, but his accomplice remained unknown. A week later, the named defendant returned to the store to make additional purchases with the stolen card, and was eventually identified through his rental car’s license plate number.

At the preliminary hearing, the Orange County burglary posed an obvious venue problem for the prosecution in Los Angeles County. Generally, venue is proper “in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which is committed.” (Pen. Code, § 777). In mixed-jurisdiction cases, Penal Code section 781 provides, “when a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another jurisdictional territory, or the acts thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction for the offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.” The magistrate, however, found that nothing tied the named defendant to crimes in Orange County, with no evidence that a burglary (or any preparatory act) was committed by him there.

On appeal, the Fourth Appellate District noted some identity theft-specific provisions in the general venue statutory scheme. For instance, Penal Code section 786, subdivision (b)(1) states that in such cases, venue is proper “’in the county where the theft of the personal identifying information occurred,’ among other places.” (See, e.g., People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193 at 218). But the court affirmed the magistrate’s holding, reasoning that there were simply no facts from which to conclude that the named defendant was in Orange County the day of the burglary, or that he had been involved in some way. The court even rejected the prosecution’s creative “reasonable inference” argument (unexplained possession of stolen property could lead a reasonable person to entertain a strong suspicion that the possessor either stole it or received it with knowledge of its stolen character), citing People v. Jackson(1970) 14 Cal.App.3d 57, 63.

Proper venue is a question of law to be determined by the court prior to trial. It may be challenged by demurrer, or it may be raised at the preliminary hearing. (Pen. Code, §1004, subd. (1); People v. Remington (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 423). The prosecution bears the burden to establish the facts underlying the venue by a preponderance of evidence. (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 213).

The lesson for prosecutors is that there are no shortcuts to building a case on both sides of the county line. Without evidence, the burglary charge in the neighboring county cannot meet even the relatively low burden of proof here.

The case is People v. Watkins (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 903. For more on venue and jurisdiction, see CEB’s California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice, chapter 15.

Paul Myslin

Content Attorney at CEB – Continuing Education of the Bar

It is always important to establish proper venue, and easy to overlook. A criminal scenario may have all the required elements, all the witnesses and evidence, and no viable defense, but if territorial jurisdiction is lacking, the case cannot move forward. And California’s patchwork of counties can make this issue a particularly thorny one for prosecutors.

Typically such situations are very fact-specific. In Orange County recently, a case was filed alleging felony violations of burglary in the second degree and identity theft against two defendants who had used credit cards in West Covina (Los Angeles County) that had previously been stolen in Dana Point (Orange County). The fraudulent purchases occurred on the same day as the original burglary. In the course of the investigation, the co-defendant was positively identified from store surveillance video, but his accomplice remained unknown. A week later, the named defendant returned to the store to make additional purchases with the stolen card, and was eventually identified through his rental car’s license plate number.

At the preliminary hearing, the Orange County burglary posed an obvious venue problem for the prosecution in Los Angeles County. Generally, venue is proper “in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which is committed.” (Pen. Code, § 777). In mixed-jurisdiction cases, Penal Code section 781 provides, “when a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another jurisdictional territory, or the acts thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction for the offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.” The magistrate, however, found that nothing tied the named defendant to crimes in Orange County, with no evidence that a burglary (or any preparatory act) was committed by him there.

On appeal, the Fourth Appellate District noted some identity theft-specific provisions in the general venue statutory scheme. For instance, Penal Code section 786, subdivision (b)(1) states that in such cases, venue is proper “’in the county where the theft of the personal identifying information occurred,’ among other places.” (See, e.g., People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193 at 218). But the court affirmed the magistrate’s holding, reasoning that there were simply no facts from which to conclude that the named defendant was in Orange County the day of the burglary, or that he had been involved in some way. The court even rejected the prosecution’s creative “reasonable inference” argument (unexplained possession of stolen property could lead a reasonable person to entertain a strong suspicion that the possessor either stole it or received it with knowledge of its stolen character), citing People v. Jackson(1970) 14 Cal.App.3d 57, 63.

Proper venue is a question of law to be determined by the court prior to trial. It may be challenged by demurrer, or it may be raised at the preliminary hearing. (Pen. Code, §1004, subd. (1); People v. Remington (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 423). The prosecution bears the burden to establish the facts underlying the venue by a preponderance of evidence. (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 213).

The lesson for prosecutors is that there are no shortcuts to building a case on both sides of the county line. Without evidence, the burglary charge in the neighboring county cannot meet even the relatively low burden of proof here.

The case is People v. Watkins (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 903. For more on venue and jurisdiction, see CEB’s California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice, chapter 15. source

Which County Will Prosecute – Crime Happened in 2 Counties?

Which County Will Prosecute – Crime Happened in 2 Counties?

It is not uncommon in the Los Angeles area for a client of ours to make sales of narcotics in Orange, Los Angeles, Riverside, Ventura and / or San Bernardino County, especially when sales are made over the phone by text messages and delivery men are used.  The issue that naturally arises once one is caught is where will one be prosecuted?

In a Nutshell:  In a case where a police decoy in Ventura County agrees to buy heroin from someone located in Los Angeles County, venue was proper in Ventura County although the exchange of money for the drug and the delivery of the drug took place in Los Angeles County.

This is a significant issue because the various counties have significant differences in how they punish narcotics offenses.  However, other offenses also have widely varying punishment, too.

Penal Code Section § 777 gives some direction on this issue.  It states that “the jurisdiction of every public offense is in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is committed. 

Penal Code Section § 781 also clarifies the answer, saying that when the acts or effects constituting a requisite to the consummation of the offense take place in two counties, the jurisdiction for prosecution of such an offense is in either county.

Penal Code Section 784.7 – Assumption of Jurisdiction – It is a general legal principle that a person is tried in the local jurisdiction where the crime occurred

source

When the Case Was Initially Filed in An Improper County

The details of California’s choice-of-venue framework are beyond the scope of this article.  That said, upon initial receipt of a case, counsel should take a moment to carefully analyze the allegations of the complaint as to venue, to determine whether potential grounds for transfer via this method exist.

Code of Civil Procedure section 396b provides for mandatory transfer of a case that has been filed in the wrong court. Such a motion must be made at the outset of a case, in the time to file a responsive pleading.[i]  A motion to transfer on these grounds is made in the transferor court.[ii]

No default may be taken against a party that has filed a motion to transfer while the motion is pending.[iii]  On such a motion it is the moving defendant’s burden to present declarations to establish why the filing court was improper.[iv]  The motion is granted when the defendant negates the grounds for a venue in the county of filing by the plaintiff.[v]

A situation can arise when a plaintiff selects a venue under Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), which allows an action to be filed in the county in which the defendant resides. Importantly, under this provision, in a multiple defendant case, the action can be filed in a county where any defendant resides.[vi]  This creates a potential for a plaintiff to name a “sham” defendant—a defendant against which the plaintiff does not intend to actually prevail, but rather was named solely to permit filing in that defendant’s county of residence.

California caselaw is thin on a defendant’s ability to overcome this tactic, but at least one older case exists, Minyard v. Superior Court.[vii]  In Minyard, the plaintiff, Holt, filed a complaint in the City & County of San Francisco, alleging she had been injured when the taxicab in which she was riding collided with a pickup truck in the City of Napa, located in Napa County.[viii]  She named as defendants Yellow Cab Company, Minyard, Titmus, and Langer.[ix]  She alleged Yellow Cab Company, Minyard, and Titmus owned and operated the taxi in which she was riding, and that Langer owned and operated the pickup truck.[x]  Langer moved to change venue to Napa County, and the trial court denied his motion.[xi]  The court of appeal then granted a writ of mandate and ultimately held the motion should have been granted.[xii]

Minyard based its decision on the uncontested evidence which was presented with the motion.  This evidence established the accident occurred in Napa County; Minyard was the owner of the taxi; his employee, Titmus, was driving it at the time of the accident; Langer was the owner and driver of the pickup truck; and Minyard, Titmus, and Langer were residents of Napa County.[xiii]  The evidence further established that, while the corporate defendant Yellow Cab Company was a resident of San Francisco, Minyard had been operating his own separate business called “Yellow Cab Co.” in the City of Napa.[xiv]  The motion was also supported by an affidavit from an officer of Yellow Cab Company, stating it did not own the taxi involved in the accident.

Thus, as Minyard explained, “[w]ithout the inclusion of Yellow Cab Company, a corporation, as a defendant there could not possibly be any question that Langer had a clear right to the requested change of venue.”[xv]  The trial court had, however, concluded because the face of the complaint alleged that Yellow Cab Company was responsible for the accident, it was bound to treat venue in San Francisco as proper.[xvi]

Minyard held this was error.  Rather, as Code of Civil Procedure section 395 provides, “if any person is improperly joined as a defendant, …his residence must not be considered in determining the proper place for trial of the action.”[xvii]  Minyard explained how this applies in two situations, both when a complaint fails to state a cause of action against a defendant, and “where the nonresident moving party concedes that a cause of action is formally alleged against the resident defendant but claims that the cause of action, in reality, does not exist.”[xviii]  As the uncontroverted evidence before the court established that the sole defendant creating venue in San Francisco had been improperly sued, Minyard concluded that the matter should have been transferred.[xix]  Minyard itself followed two older cases, Karst v. Seller, and Lachman Co. v. Central Cal. Berry Growers’ Assn.[xx], in reaching its conclusion.  Minyard does not appear to have ever been cited a subsequent case, and no known case appears to contradict its conclusion or approach. It thus remains mandatory, binding authority.[xxi]  Accordingly, in a “sham” defendant situation, if available at the first outset of a case, defense counsel should consider obtaining appropriate supporting declarations to argue under Minyard the “sham” defendant should not be considered for venue purposes.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (a), also provides for discretionary transfer of a case filed in the wrong county.  The important difference of this mechanism—besides its discretionary instead of mandatory nature—is that it may be filed at any reasonable time, unaffected by the strict timing requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 396b.[xxii]  Transfer under this statute may therefore be viable when later factual development establishes grounds to attack a “sham” defendant.

For the Convenience of Non-Party Witnesses

Code of Civil Procedure section 397, subdivision (c), together with Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (d), also provides for discretionary transfer for “the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.”[xxiii]  A motion to transfer on these grounds is made in the transferor court.[xxiv]

There is a critical limitation on transfer on these grounds, however: the parties’ conveniences are not considered—even if they are to testify.[xxv]  Similarly, the convenience of counsel[xxvi], expert witnesses[xxvii], and employees of parties are not considered[xxviii].  Note, however, this limitation does not apply when the employee is being called to testify by the opposing party.[xxix]

An important procedural consideration on a motion for transfer for convenience of witnesses is it must be made within a “reasonable” time after all defendants have answered; note therefore in a multi-defendant case it is necessary to wait for all defendants to resolve any potential pre-answer law and motion and answer.[xxx]  What constitutes a “reasonable” time depends on the facts of each case.[xxxi]

Accordingly, when defense counsel believes there is a potential for transfer on these grounds, they should endeavor to identify and make contact with potentially cooperative non-party witnesses.  The goal is to obtain declarations from these witnesses to support a motion to transfer.  Please note these supporting declarations are required to show (1) the names of each witness expected to testify for both parties; (2) the substance of their expected testimony; (3) whether the witness has been deposed or has given a statement regarding the facts of the case (and if so, the date of the deposition or statement); (4) the reasons why it would be “inconvenient” for the witnesses to appear locally; and (5) the reasons why the “ends of justice” would be promoted by transfer to a different county.[xxxii]  The declarations in support of the motion to transfer must contain admissible evidence; a change of venue cannot be based on declarations consisting of hearsay and conclusions.[xxxiii]  Accordingly, a motion should not be supported by a declaration by counsel alone—rather, declarations from the witnesses themselves should be obtained.

When a Related Case Is Pending in Another County

On some occasions, a case will be filed when a related case is already pending in another county.  There is a critical gateway question for transfer on these grounds: whether one or both of the cases has been designated as “complex” under the criteria given by California Rules of Court rule 3.400.  The transfer of complex cases is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 404, and the transfer of non-complex cases is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 403.

Inter-county transfer of complex cases under Code of Civil Procedure section 404 is a cumbersome procedure, and results in the formation of a Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding.  This procedure is initiated by a petition for coordination submitted to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council and will ultimately result in the assignment of all related cases to specific judge in a specific county, referred to as the Coordination Trial Judge.  Further discussion of the procedural intricacies of initiating a Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding is beyond the scope of this article.

A significantly more streamlined procedure, however, exists for the transfer of related non-complex cases under Code of Civil Procedure 403.  A motion for transfer under this statute is made before the transferee judge. The standard for transfer and coordination pursuant to Section 403 is given by Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1, which provides:

Coordination of civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.[xxxiv]

Procedurally, before bringing a motion to transfer on these grounds, a party is required to make a “good-faith effort” to obtain the agreement of all parties to the proposed transfer and coordination and notify all parties of an obligation to disclose to the court any information they have concerning any other motions requesting transfer of any case that would be affected by the motion.[xxxv]  When filing such a motion, in addition to being filed to be ruled upon by the transferee court, must be served on all parties to each action, and on the transferor court.[xxxvi]  Additionally, the motion must be supported by a declaration establishing (1) the cases involved meet the criteria for coordination set forth in the statute, (2) the cases are non-complex, (3) the moving party complied with the meet-and-confer requirement discussed above, and (4) the moving party provided the notification regarding other potentially related cases discussed above.

There is a third scenario, not clearly contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure—whether a non-complex case be transferred for coordination with a complex case.  Tyson & Mendes attorneys have successfully argued this is indeed possible.

The relevant portion of Code of Civil Procedure section 403 reads:

A judge may, on motion, transfer an action or actions from another court to that judge’s court for coordination with an action involving a common question of fact or law within the meaning of Section 404. The motion shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1, are not complex as defined by the Judicial Council and that the moving party has made a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer from all parties to each action.[xxxvii]

Most notably, the word “actions” is pluralized in Code of Civil Procedure section 403.  On a plain reading, therefore, Section 403 could potentially permit the transfer of a non-complex case for coordination with a complex case.  There appears to be no published decision by any California court addressing the construction of Code of Civil Procedure section 403.

Arguing from general rules of statutory construction, Tyson & Mendes attorneys have successfully argued the choice of the legislature to pluralize the word “actions” in Code of Civil Procedure section 403 means the statute can be to be used to transfer a non-complex case for coordination with a complex case. Thus, a defendant may be able to transfer a non-complex case for coordination with a complex case while avoiding the cumbersome procedures involving the Judicial Council under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.  With careful analysis of the specific factual and procedural circumstances of a case, defense counsel may be able to neutralize plaintiff’s inherent advantage of initial choice of venue, and effect transfer of case to a more favorable county. source

read more on Jurisdiction below:

Judge’s Jurisdiction – Judicial Ethics for Pro Se Litigants (click here)

If I want to change a custody or visitation order, do I have to go back to the same court that made the order?

Change Of Venue California Family Law Code Of Civil Procedure 397.5

Family Law Code of Civil Procedure 397.5 is a pretty specific code section that says;
In any proceeding for dissolution or nullity of marriage or legal separation of the parties under the Family Code, where it appears that both petitioner and respondent have moved from the county rendering the order, the court may, when the ends of justice and the convenience of the parties would be promoted by the change, order that the proceedings be transferred to the county of residence of either party. source

A court may, in its discretion, choose to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction to hear a case if the case may be more appropriately tried elsewhere. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744).

On a motion for forum non conveniens 

“Forum non conveniens” is a Latin phrase that means “an inconvenient forum”. It’s a common law doctrine that allows a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when another court or forum may more conveniently hear a case. The doctrine allows a court to dismiss a case if it believes that the case would be better heard in another court. For example, a court might dismiss a lawsuit arising from an accident if the plaintiff files the complaint in their home state, but the witnesses and doctors are in the state where the accident occurred.

California codified this principle, known as forum non conveniens, in Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30.” Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, subdivision (a),(2) provides as follows: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may by just.“ Courts sometimes reframe the question as whether the chosen forum is “seriously” inconvenient. The party seeking change venue has the burden of proof.

When a motion to change venue is made on the grounds of “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice” pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §396b, the party tendering that issue bears the burden of showing through affidavits, declarations or other admissible evidence, both the reasons it would be inconvenient for witnesses to attend, and the materiality of their anticipated testimony. (Flanagan v. Flanagan (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 641, 643, 346 P.2d 418.)

The declarations must be competent evidence, i.e. should not consist solely of hearsay, generalities and conclusions. (Lieppman v. Lieber (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 914, 919, 225 Cal.Rptr. 845). 

Child custody: where is the proper venue for deciding child custody matters; change of venue

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN CUSTODY MATTERS.

Jurisdiction refers to the power of courts in a particular state to make decisions about custody.  Venue refers to the particular judicial geographic area,  usually the County, within a state where the action should be filed and heard. learn more about venue here

JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY ISSUES

Any California court has jurisdiction to make an initial decision about the custody and visitation for a minor child if the child has been living continuously in California with a parent or person acting as a parent for the six months immediately before the commencement of the proceeding involving child custody matters.

Once a California court has issued a custody order and/or judgment, California has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent issues involving custody and visitation.  California’s jurisdiction over the modification or enforcement of the order continues until a court determines that the child and the parents no longer reside in California, or a California court determines that the child and one of the parents does not have a significant connection to California, and substantial evidence is no longer available in California concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships.

VENUE OVER CUSTODY ISSUES

Assuming the child has been living in California for six months, any California court will have jurisdiction to handle such a case, however, the county in which the action should be brought, i.e. the venue, is where at least one of the parties has resided for at least three months in the case of a divorce, and for an initial petition involving custody without a divorce, the county where the child and a parent or person acting as a parent resides.

Any post judgment issues involving custody should be brought in the county where the underlying order or judgment has been issued, subject to a motion for change of venue in appropriate circumstances.

CHANGING VENUE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DIVORCE OR OTHER CUSTODY PROCEEDING

Assuming jurisdiction and venue is otherwise appropriate, a party may ask the court to change venue “when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.“ [California Code of Civil Procedure section 397 subdivision [c], & subdivision (e).]  Note that it is the convenience of the witnesses, and not the convenience of the parties. [Although it could be argued that the convenience of the party would fall under the ends of justice rationale].

Factors considered by the court include where evidence and witnesses concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships can be found, where the children and parties reside and the general convenience of keeping or changing venue. Courts have broad discretion in making decisions around changing venue [assuming that venue is not otherwise prohibited by statute], and they are largely fact driven determinations, dependent on the particular circumstances of each case.

Typically, the motion for a change of venue must be brought early in the action, and in any and event, “within a reasonable time” after commencement of the action, or from when the reasons for the change of venue become apparent.

CHANGING VENUE AFTER THE DIVORCE JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED.

Change of venue after a divorce judgment has been issued is appropriate when both parties have moved from the county that issued the divorce judgment, “when the ends of justice and the convenience of the parties would be promoted by the change.” [California Code of Civil Procedure section 397.5] Note in this situation it is the convenience of the parties, and not just witnesses.

It is an open question whether a post judgment motion for change of venue would be appropriate when only one of the parties has moved out of the county where the divorce judgment was entered.

It certainly could be argued that since the statute dealing with a post-judgment change of venue covers situations where both parties have moved out of the county, it is implied that it is not appropriate to change the venue where only one party has moved out of the county because the legislature could have said only one party need have moved if that’s they intended to allow a change of venue in either situation.

On the other hand, if the party who has moved out of County has sole or primary custody, it is arguable that a change of venue might be warranted under the general statute dealing with the grounds for a change of venue [California Code of Civil Procedure section 397], assuming those grounds, such as the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice, support such a move.

Since the courts have broad discretion in deciding change of venue motions, it is likely the court’s decision either way would be upheld if challenged on appeal. source

if you are failing to get the rights you deserve and change of venue is denied and all other avenues are exhausted try looking into

CHANGE OF VENUE  [CCP §396b] – Change of Venue Form

or download the editable word file .doc here motionchangevenue

forum non conveniens

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Forum non conveniens refers to a court’s discretionary power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction where another court, or forum, may more conveniently hear a case. Dismissing a case on forum non conveniens grounds is not a bar for res judicata purposes and, therefore, does not prevent a plaintiff from re-filing their case in the more appropriate forum. This doctrine may be invoked by either the defendant, or sua sponte by the court.

Even if a plaintiff brings a case in an inconvenient forum, a court will not grant a forum non conveniens dismissal unless there is another forum that could hear the case and potentially recover damages. Additionally, courts will not grant a forum non conveniens dismissal where the alternative forum’s judicial system is grossly inadequate. For example, an American court would not grant a forum non conveniens dismissal where the alternative forum was Cuba.

Courts typically use a 2-part test to determine whether they will grant a defendant’s forum non conveniens motion. The first part is a balancing test of both private and public factors, and the second part looks at what adequate alternative courts are available.

• Balancing Test

  • Private Factors
    • Ease of access to evidence
    • Interest of the two parties in their connections with the respective forums
    • The plaintiff’s chosen court would be burdensome to the defendant
    • If a court finds this factor to be true, then that is often sufficient to dismiss the case and accept a forum non conveniens claim
    • Ease of obtaining witnesses
    • Enforceability of judgment
  • Public Factors
    • Whether the trial would involve multiple sets of laws, thus potentially confusing a jury
    • Having juries who may have a connection to the case
    • Local interest in having local interests heard at home
    • Having the trial in a place where state laws govern

• Adequate Alternative Inquiry Test

  • The defendant must offer an alternate court that is able to hear the case
  • The alternate court must have the ability to provide a remedy to the plaintiff

A court will typically only invoke forum non conveniens sua sponte if it meets a 2-step test:

1. The court is a seriously inappropriate forum.
2. There is a substantially more appropriate court that is available for the plaintiff’s claim.

Sometimes, courts attach conditions to forum non conveniens dismissals. For example, the court might require the defendant to waive defenses that would prevent the plaintiff from re-filing the suit in the alternative forum. Alternatively, a court might dismiss the case in favor of a foreign court, but only on the condition that the defendant allow discovery.

On appeal, forum non conveniens decisions are evaluated using an abuse of discretion standard.

The Supreme Court considered forum non conveniens in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). In that case, the Court held that so long as there was a remedy available in the alternate forum, it did not matter if the remedy was clearly insufficient. However, lower courts do not strictly follow this rule. Instead, they usually consider the adequacy of the alternative forum’s remedy as another factor to be balanced when deciding whether or not to grant a forum non conveniens dismissal.

The Supreme Court has heard two cases on the issue of forum non conveniens in recent years:

In Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp, the Supreme Court held that that a federal court may hear and pass a ruling on a forum non conveniens motion even if that court does not necessarily have subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the case in front of the court. The Court decided that while courts typically need to consider personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction before hearing a case on the merits, this procedure does not necessarily apply when considering non merits issues.

The second case was Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which determined that courts should use 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), which allows for the transfer of cases between jurisdiction, for the purposes of granting a forum non conveniens motion. source

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?

Penal Code 135 PC – Destroying or Concealing Evidence

Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

Penal Code 142 PC – Peace Officer Refusing to Arrest or Receive Person Charged with Criminal Offense

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 32 PC – Accessory After the Fact

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

What is Abuse of Process? When the Government Fails Us

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

The Use and Abuse of Power by Prosecutors (Justice for All)

DUE PROCESS READS>>>>>>

Due Process vs Substantive Due Process learn more HERE

Understanding Due Process  – This clause caused over 200 overturns in just DNA alone Click Here

Mathews v. Eldridge – Due Process – 5th & 14th Amendment Mathews Test – 3 Part Test– Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test

“Unfriending” Evidence – 5th Amendment

At the Intersection of Technology and Law

 Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983 – Recoverable Damage$

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Right$

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of Right$ Under Color of Law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against Right$

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

 Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct? (Tort Claim Forms here as well)

Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

What is Sua Sponte and How is it Used in a California Court? 

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case 

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

How to Recover “Punitive Damages” in a California Personal Injury Case

Pro Se Forms and Forms Information(Tort Claim Forms here as well)

What is Tort?

Tort Claims Form File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death

Federal –  Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

GRANDPARENT CASE LAW 

Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
Family Law Packet SB Resource Center

Motion to vacate an adverse judgment

Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?

Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848

Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages

How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines
Subject to Open Records Requests

case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government  Employees

Public Records Practices After the San Jose Decision

The Decision Briefing Merits After the San Jose Decision

Here is the Public Records Service Act Portal for all of CALIFORNIA Click Here

Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule – Confronting Evidence

Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence

Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims

Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Police BodyCam Footage Release

Electronic Audio Recording Request of OC Court Hearings

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE IN CUSTODY MATTERS.

Jurisdiction refers to the power of courts in a particular state to make decisions about custody.  Venue refers to the particular judicial geographic area,  usually the County, within a state where the action should be filed and heard. learn more about venue here

JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY ISSUES

Any California court has jurisdiction to make an initial decision about the custody and visitation for a minor child if the child has been living continuously in California with a parent or person acting as a parent for the six months immediately before the commencement of the proceeding involving child custody matters.

Once a California court has issued a custody order and/or judgment, California has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent issues involving custody and visitation.  California’s jurisdiction over the modification or enforcement of the order continues until a court determines that the child and the parents no longer reside in California, or a California court determines that the child and one of the parents does not have a significant connection to California, and substantial evidence is no longer available in California concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships. source

VENUE OVER CUSTODY ISSUES

Assuming the child has been living in California for six months, any California court will have jurisdiction to handle such a case, however, the county in which the action should be brought, i.e. the venue, is where at least one of the parties has resided for at least three months in the case of a divorce, and for an initial petition involving custody without a divorce, the county where the child and a parent or person acting as a parent resides.

Any post judgment issues involving custody should be brought in the county where the underlying order or judgment has been issued, subject to a motion for change of venue in appropriate circumstances. learn more about venue here

If I want to change a custody or visitation order, do I have to go back to the same court that made the order?

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)

Can You Transfer Your Case to Another County or State With Family Law? –
Challenges to Jurisdiction

A jurisdictional challenge is when a respondent makes a submission to challenge the adjudicator’s jurisdiction to determine a dispute. A lack of jurisdiction occurs when a court lacks the authority over a person or the subject matter of a lawsuit, or when the prerequisites for its jurisdiction have not been met.

How to Transfer Your Family Law Case to Another County or State

Family law matters can take time to resolve, anywhere between several months to over a year. During that time, your family could go through many changes. What happens in a divorce or child custody case if your spouse or co-parent moves? What if you both move away?

If the venue you originally chose for your family law case is no longer a convenient location, you can petition the court to transfer your case somewhere else. This applies to:

• Divorce, domestic partnership dissolution, or legal separation cases
• Family law cases that determine child custody or child support
• Petitions to change a previously set final divorce order or child support order

The court where you originally filed your case will approve a transfer if:

• Whoever first filed the case chose the wrong venue,
• Continuing with the current location would result in an unfair trial,
• The current venue doesn’t have a judge who is qualified to hear your case,
• You live in a different county and that court is better suited to handle your case,
• The current location is not convenient for the parties or witnesses involved, or
• Both you and your spouse, domestic partner, or co-parent agree to the transfer.

So how do you get a change of venue? The rules are slightly different if you’re moving counties versus states. The laws also change if there are any issues involving child custody or support.

How to File a Change of Venue in California Family Law

“Venue” describes the specific court where your case is filed and ultimately resolved.

U.S. law has extensive jurisdictional rules for what qualifies as a “proper” venue to file a case, depending on the people and facts involved. A knowledgeable family lawyer would be intimately familiar with these rules and can help steer you in the right direction. Your family law attorney can also help with the process of changing the venue of your case, if necessary.

To get a change of venue in a California family law case, you must file a motion for change of venue with the court where your case is currently filed. The court will consider your motion (otherwise known as a “request for order”) along with your supporting declaration.

How to Transfer Your Court Case to Another County in California

Your supporting declaration is the most important part of your motion and should not be overlooked. A well-written declaration can be the reason your transfer request gets approved.

In your supporting declaration, you must tell the court the reasons why your family’s case should be moved to another county within the state.

When deciding whether or not to allow the transfer, California courts will consider:

• The residence of the parties, witnesses, and any children who are involved,
• The physical location of most of the evidence relevant to the case, and
• The general convenience of transferring the case versus keeping it in place.

Once you’ve submitted your motion to the court, you must notify the other party, who will then get a chance to file a response if they oppose your transfer request. In their response, they can include reasons why the change of venue should not be granted.

Once the court receives the transfer motion, it will set a hearing date for both parties to answer any questions by the judge. This process is much simpler if both parties agree to the transfer.

As soon as the judge approves the transfer order, you can continue your case over at the new county where it’s been moved. You will have to pay another first appearance court filing fee.

How Do You Transfer Jurisdiction From One State to Another?

Transferring family law cases between states can get much more complicated.

Divorce and property division laws vary greatly between states. So where you file your case could make a huge impact on what you get out of the proceedings – including how much of the marital estate you keep or how much spousal support you receive. Each state also has residency requirements that you must meet before you can file there.

For example, to file a divorce petition in California, you must be a resident of the state for at least 6 months and the county where you file for 3 months. In contrast, you may be able to move to Washington state and file for divorce the next day.

The first step to transferring a divorce or legal separation between states is to establish residency according to the rules of the state you’re moving to. Only one person needs to meet the residency requirements to file in their chosen state.

However, if your case involves child custody or child support issues, the rules are different.

What About Child Support or Custody Cases?

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) is a federal law that governs how almost every state handles child custody and support. If your divorce or legal separation involves questions of child support or custody, UCCJEA rules will apply.

The UCCJEA technically does not allow cases to be transferred from one state to another. The location of your case will depend on your child’s home state – the state where the child and at least one parent have lived for at least 6 months. If the child has lived in multiple states during that time, their home state will be the one with the “strongest ties.”

Although uncommon, your child’s home state could decline jurisdiction if you’re able to convince the court that the location would be an “inconvenient forum.” In making this decision, the court will look at where the child currently lives and the financial situation of the parents. This can happen if a child has moved to a new state within the last 6 months.

Under the UCCJEA, you can also exercise emergency jurisdiction in certain situations – for example, if your child is in danger or if the custodial parent is no longer able to care for them. In these cases, a court outside the child’s home state could take their case. However, emergency custody orders issued by a non-home state are usually temporary.

The stakes are high in family law cases and the law can get complex when you need to change the location of your case. No matter your situation, a family law attorney can help you navigate federal and state laws in order to find a convenient venue. source

Family Law Jurisdiction in California

In Rem Jurisdiction in California

In rem jurisdiction is the authority a California court has over a particular item which is the subject of the lawsuit. A family law case is an in rem proceeding, because the res or the thing is the marriage.

Can the parties involved limit the court’s authority?

In rem jurisdiction can be waived by the parties. The parties can agree in writing to waive in rem jurisdiction allowing a court to make a ruling over property.

In Rem Jurisdiction in California

In rem jurisdiction is the authority a California court has over a particular item which is the subject of the lawsuit. A family law case is an in rem proceeding, because the res or the thing is the marriage.

Can the parties involved limit the court’s authority?

In rem jurisdiction can be waived by the parties. The parties can agree in writing to waive in rem jurisdiction allowing a court to make a ruling over property. source

How to Transfer a Family Law Case to Another California County

If you’re looking to transfer a family law case to another county, you must first understand how California determines the accepted circumstances for this change.

For example, a party may seek to move any of the following types of family law cases to another venue:

• Divorce, legal separation, or annulment
• Petition to change child support order entered in a divorce
• Petition to change a final divorce order

Personal Jurisdiction

Court system

IF YOU CHILD WAS LIVING WITH YOU THAT IS THE JURISDICTION IT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO.

if you are failing to get the rights you deserve and change of venue is denied and all other avenues are exhausted try looking into

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?