YOUR IP ADDRESS IS: 15.235.98.223 This is your computer Internet Protocol Address A locator that leads to your very machine!

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

• Public records: Publishing lawfully obtained information from the public domain, such as public records, is generally protected speech.
• Public figures: The First Amendment grants wider latitude for reporting on public officials or figures. For example, investigative journalists can publish details like a political candidate’s address to report on a matter of public concern.
• Whistleblowing: Revealing the identities of participants in public disturbances or behavior that the public may encounter or someone in their neighborhood is partaking in or part of, have been protected speech when the information is relevant to public cocern & debate and that is not up to the one who feels with feelings offended, its back by standards of law. 

THERE IS NO LAW THAT CAN PREVENT PEACEFUL PUBLIC ASSEMBLY THAT IS NON VIOLENT PEACEFUL AND LAWFUL BEHAVIOR NOT TO DISTURB THE PEACE OR BLOCK THOROUGHFAIR OR WALKWAYS AND NOT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.

HOWEVER THERE IS THE 1ST AMENDMENT AND THIS IS A NEWSPAPER AND THIS IS MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST & CONCERN AND PUBLIC SAFETY AS ELDERLY NEED THEIR MONEY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTORNEY BACKED BY THE CALIFORNIA BAR DEFEND THEIR THEFT OF ELDERLY MONIES PAID FOR A TRUST NEVER RECIEVED TO THIS VERY DATE!

SO ENJOY OUR FREEDOMS BABY! The USA is one of a kind and deserves resepect!

Definition of “Doxing.” Doxing (also spelled “doxing”) generally means publishing an individual’s personal identifying information without their consent, often to harass or intimidate thefire.org. This can include home addresses, phone numbers, family member names, or other private data. Although doxing is widely criticized, U.S. law recognizes a strong presumption that truthful speech on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble” law.cornell.edu. Likewise, the California Constitution expressly states that “A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press” law.justia.com. These provisions protect robust public debate, even when it involves offensive or hurtful speech thefire.orglaw.justia.com.

Free Speech and Public Concern. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that publishing truthful information on public matters enjoys the highest protection. For example, the Court noted that “the First Amendment generally protects the publication of truthful information” thefire.org, reflecting the principle that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards” thefire.org. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), the Court struck down a state law that barred naming juvenile offenders, emphasizing that newspapers and other speakers cannot be punished for publishing lawfully obtained facts (the so-called “Daily Mail principle”) thefire.org. Likewise, Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) held that the First Amendment protects a publisher who retransmits truthful information obtained unlawfully by a third party, so long as the publisher itself did not participate in any wrongdoing thefire.org. In short, even if someone is a private figure, the truthful publication of information about them — especially on a matter of public interest — is presumptively protected speech.

Scope of Protected Speech. U.S. law also broadly protects speech that many find offensive. The flag‑burning decision Texas v. Johnson (1989) confirmed that protecting controversial or disturbing speech is a “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment thefire.org. Similarly, Snyder v. Phelps (2011) upheld Westboro Baptist Church’s right to picket military funerals with hateful signs, explaining that “we have chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues” because punishing it would stifle public debate thefire.org. And New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) famously declared a “profound national commitment” to uninhibited debate on public issues, tolerating even “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” thefire.org. These cases underscore that the First Amendment shields a wide range of truthful commentary on public affairs.

Exceptions: Limits on Speech. Not all speech is protected. Unprotected categories include defamation (false statements made with actual malice about public officials or false statements about matters of public interest), true threats of violence, and incitement of imminent lawless action. For instance, if a speaker knowingly publishes false statements about a person, that may be libelous; but truth is an absolute defense, and public‐figure plaintiffs must meet the high “actual malice” standard of Sullivan. Likewise, if a speaker’s actions constitute a true threat (e.g. Virginia v. Black), or if the speech is intended and likely to produce imminent violence (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969), then it falls outside First Amendment protection. Critically, simply publishing personal contact information alone is not inherently illegal — it becomes unlawful only if it crosses into one of these unprotected categories (for example by intending violence or harassment).

First Amendment

Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

• We also have the True Threats Test – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition
• We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
• We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment
• We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test
• We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test
• We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
• Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
• Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886) An unconstitutional “law ” is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
• Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States
• State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
• Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
• Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
• SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
• Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
  When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
• United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
• Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
• Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),  The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The     Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.

•  Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
   make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
   Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

  HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.
  

• People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
  
• A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
• Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
  speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
• Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
  The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
• Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
  A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
• Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
  The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
• Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974)  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
• City of Houston v. Hill (1987)  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
  
  
• STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
• STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant –  William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
• State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
• Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
• People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS  determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!
• Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”
• Zamos v. Stroud California Supreme Court, 2004 32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802 The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.\

The legal frame (U.S. + California)

• First Amendment (U.S.): Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., true threats, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. Congress.govLibrary of Congress Tile

• California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a): “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. JustiaCalifornia State University

California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech

• Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6): “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and “Constitutionally protected activity is not included”; “harassment” must seriously alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they cannot support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)

• Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9): Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says constitutionally protected activity is not included.

What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?

Protected (examples)

• Opinions, criticism, and advocacy on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. Snyder v. Phelps protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. Library of Congress Tile

• Speech without intent to threaten: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least recklessly disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (Counterman v. Colorado, 2023). Supreme Court

Not protected (examples)

• True threats/intimidation (Virginia v. Black), incitement to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg), obscenity (Miller), and defamation. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. Justia Law+1OyezFindlawJustia

• Targeted residential picketing, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral time, place, manner limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (Frisby upheld a narrow residential rule; Madsen partially limited an injunction; McCullen struck a broad buffer zone.) Justia Law+1Library of Congress Tile

How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech

• Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. Evans v. Evans reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen allowed a post-trial injunction limited to statements found defamatory. JustiaFindlaw

• In protest contexts, courts allow narrow restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (Huntingdon Life Sciences decisions illustrate drawing that line.) Findlaw

Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed

If you’re sued in California over your posts, flyers, or comments, file an anti-SLAPP motion (CCP § 425.16). It’s a two-step test: (1) show the claims arise from protected petitioning/speech; then (2) plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing. If they can’t, the court strikes the claims and awards you fees. California courts instruct that § 425.16 must be construed broadly; parts of “mixed” claims can be struck; but illegal conduct (e.g., extortion) isn’t protected. FindlawJustia+1CourtListener

Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!

1. “Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”
   “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it cannot satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. FindlawLegInfo

2. “No threats, no imminence, no crime.”
   Under Counterman, the State must prove at least recklessness as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. Supreme Court

3. “Prior restraint is disfavored.”
   Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite Evans (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish Balboa Island (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). JustiaFindlaw

4. “Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”
   Like Snyder v. Phelps, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. Library of Congress Tile

5. “Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.
   If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only narrow content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. Justia Law+1

6. Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.
   Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite Equilon (broad construction) and Baral (strike protected parts). Justia+1

The Value of Telling the Truth – Speaking Upright

I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”

Section 527.6 defines “harassment” as a “course of conduct” that seriously alarms/annoys and serves no legitimate purpose, but it expressly states: “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (CCP § 527.6(b)(1).) The same carve-out appears in the stalking statute. (Pen. Code § 646.9(k).) If the petition relies on Zullo’s non-threatening flyers/posts about public issues, the petition fails as a matter of law.

II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION

A speech-based restraining order requires more than repeated criticism. The First Amendment prohibits punishment of speech unless it is a true threat or otherwise unprotected; after Counterman, the speaker must have at least recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of the communication. (600 U.S. at 73–82.) Nothing in petitioner’s declarations meets that standard.

III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID

Broad bans on speech before any adjudication of falsity or illegality are unconstitutional prior restraints. (Evans, 162 Cal.App.4th at 1169–1173.) Only narrow, post-trial injunctive relief limited to statements adjudicated false may issue. (Balboa Island, 40 Cal.4th at 1156–1161.)

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200) / Secondary-Evidence Rule (Evid. Code § 1521): If the content of a writing (including digital posts; Evid. Code § 250) is offered for its truth, petitioner must lay the foundation or present the original/credible secondary evidence; partial, illegible images lacking context should be excluded or given no weight.

V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)

If the Court believes some conduct (not speech) crossed a line (e.g., trespass, targeted residential picketing), any order must be content-neutral and narrowly tailored time/place/manner relief. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474; McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464.) A broad ban on speaking, posting, or distributing literature would be unconstitutional.

Quick cite list (tables/points)

• Anti-SLAPP scope & mechanics: Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; FilmOn.com (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; Bonni (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.

• Fees: CCP § 425.16(c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.

• First Amendment protection: Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443; Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66; Milkovich (1990) 497 U.S. 1; Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767; New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.

• Prior restraint: Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; Balboa Island (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.

• Harassment carve-out: CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).

• Aiding/Conspiracy limits: Applied Equipment (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.

• Authentication: Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.

• Statute: Penal Code §653m(a)–(e) (text incl. good-faith and return-call provisions). California.Public.Law

• Constitutionality & scope: People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) & (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). Justia

• Return-call pleading: People v. Lampasona, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). Justia

• First Amendment “true threats”: Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Justia Law+1

• Public-concern/petitioning: Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Justia Law+1

• Demurrer standard: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. closeupsblog.com

OUR INTENT SO ITS VERY CLEAR

• THERE IS NO THREAT OF VIOLENCE OR HARM
• THERE IS ONLY INTENT OF PEACE AND CONEYING OUR MESSAGE
• TO USE THE 1ST AMENDMENT IN EVERY FACET, PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLY AND ADDRESS GRIEVANCES TO POST IN OUR NEWSPAPER
• TO ADDRESS BEHAVIORS OR MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN;
• THESE MATTERS INVOLVE PUBLIC FIGURES AND/ PUBLIC OFFICIALS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO GOVERMENT EMPLOYEES
• TO USE WEBPAGE (LEAFLETS) WITH THE INTENT TO PEACEFULY ASSEMBLE WITHOUT PHYSICAL ALTERCATION AND WITHOUT TRESSPASSING ONTO ANY PERSON’S PROPERTY
• THERE IS NO THREAT TO PERSON, THERE IS NOT THREAT TO INJURY, THERE IS NO INCITEMENT.

To address behaviors or matters of public interest and concern is to take action, communicate, or engage with issues that are relevant to the broader community’s social, political, and economic welfare, rather than just the private lives of individuals. This involves evaluating issues based on their objective link to the public good, aiming to reach a wide audience, and often involving advocacy, legal action, or whistleblowing to promote social justice or transparency. 

DISHONESTY, FAILING FIDICIARY DUTIES, LYING, STEALING OR ANY BEHAVIORS THAT GO AGAINST PUBLIC TRUST OR PENAL CODE OR OTHER PUBLIC NOTICES LIKE THOSE WHO HELP OR HARBOR THESE TYPE PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW WHO HELPS THOSE BREAK THE LAW, COMMIT DECIET, ETC… ETC…

Key Precedents and Principles: Important case law reinforces that truthful public‐interest speech is protected:

• Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979): Held that criminalizing publication of a juvenile offender’s name violated the First Amendment, reaffirming that truthfully reporting information (even if sensitive) is usually constitutionally safeguarded thefire.org.

• Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001): Upheld the right to publish truthful information obtained by a third party, even if that party’s original acquisition was illegal – so long as the publisher is innocent of the illegal act thefire.org.

• Texas v. Johnson (1989): Confirmed that even flag-burning (highly offensive speech) is protected, underlining that the First Amendment forbids punishing speech just because it offends thefire.org.

• Snyder v. Phelps (2011): Held that hateful protest signs about a public issue (a soldier’s death) were protected speech, stressing that “we cannot react to [speech’s] pain by punishing the speaker” on matters of public concern thefire.org.

• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964): Established that public discourse must remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” tolerating even harsh attacks on public officials as long as falsehood and malice are not shown thefire.org.

Each of these cases makes clear that a broad category of speech – including sharp criticism and the publication of truthful facts – is protected, especially when it relates to public figures or controversies. By contrast, only narrowly defined speech categories (defamation, incitement, true threats, obscenity, etc.) can be punished without violating the First Amendment thefire.orgthefire.org.

Application to a Public-Interest Campaign. Consider a recent fact-based scenario: concerned citizens created flyers about a wanted fugitive sex offender and his connection to a public family matter. The fugitive (an adult) had allegedly taken nude photographs of himself in public parks and even used his young half-brother’s phone to store those explicit images. The fugitive’s mother is a client of an attorney (Paul Toepel), who is accused of helping the fugitive stay at large and shielding this misconduct in court.

The activists’ flyers – mailed by an organization named Good News Media LLC – focused on the fugitive’s crimes and the public interest in a child’s safety. The flyer directed readers to a newspaper-style website. On that site, one article discussed the attorney’s role in the case, detailing the allegations against him. Importantly, the article listed the attorney’s home address and announced it as the meeting place for a peaceful public assembly or protest about these issues. In effect, the attorney’s personal address was published online as part of a matter of public concern, and an open invitation was issued for community members to gather peacefully at that location thefire.orgthefire.org.

Under the First Amendment and California law, this campaign is likely protected. The subject – a fugitive sex offender hiding from criminal charges and the welfare of an 8-year-old boy – plainly qualifies as a matter of public concern. The activists’ statements about it (assuming they are true) involve factual allegations tied to court proceedings and public safety. Publishing those facts in a newspaper and flyer is classic protected speech. Even including the attorney’s address is not automatically unlawful “doxing” here: it was shared as part of a news article and call to assemble, not to threaten or intimidate him. California’s anti-doxing statute (§653.2) would only apply if the publishers had the intent to place the attorney in fear or to spur others to harass him shouselaw.com. Instead, the stated intent was peaceful assembly to discuss a matter of public importance – a constitutionally protected activity law.cornell.eduthefire.org.

Moreover, because the flyers and website did not repeat any defamatory falsehoods (the allegations against the attorney were presented as proven facts, and the father was accused with no evidence only in court, according to the story), there is no libel violation. Truthful statements (even critical ones) cannot be punished thefire.orgthefire.org. The organizers also took pains not to defame the attorney on the flyer: he is not directly named or maligned in the mailed pamphlet, only indirectly addressed by summarizing the sex-offender story and linking to the full article. This careful approach further insulates them from legal risk. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the remedy for disagreeable but true speech is more speech and debate, not suppression thefire.orgthefire.org.

Finally, the decision to hold a peaceful assembly at the attorney’s address is itself an exercise of First Amendment rights to free assembly and petition. California law (and the First Amendment) explicitly protect the right “peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. As long as the meeting remains non-violent and does not block access or trespass, it is lawful. Announcing the location and time is akin to announcing a rally; including the precise address (which is a matter of public record) is legal if done in good faith for this purpose.

Conclusion. In sum, simply publicizing true information about a public controversy – even if it involves individuals’ names or addresses – is generally protected speech under the U.S. and California Constitutions law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. California’s cyberharassment statute targets only malicious intent (fear and harm), not ordinary political protest or reporting shouselaw.comthefire.org. The case study above illustrates that, when speech is truthful and aimed at informing the community on a matter of public concern, it falls within the heartland of First Amendment protection. Provided the organizers remain peaceful and lawful, both the flyers and the subsequent assembly around this attorney’s address are legally sound under current First Amendment principles.

Sources: U.S. Const. amend. I law.cornell.edu; Cal. Const. art. I, §2 law.justia.com; Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) thefire.org; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) thefire.org; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) thefire.org; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) thefire.org; Cal. Pen. Code §653.2 shouselaw.com.

The right to “peacefully assemble” is a fundamental right, primarily under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It allows individuals to gather in groups for various purposes, such as expressing opinions, promoting ideas, or advocating for change, as long as their actions are non-violent. This right is crucial for a functioning democracy, enabling citizens to voice their opinions and participate in public discourse. 

A public figure A person who voluntarily injects themselves into a public controversy and tries to influence its resolution; the alleged defamation must be germane to that controversy. (Gertz; Waldbaum v. Fairchild).

Civil Harassment

In general, civil harassment is abuse, threats of abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or serious harassment by someone you have not dated and do NOT have a close family relationship with, like a neighbor, a roommate, or a friend (that you have never dated). It is also civil harassment if the abuse is from a family member that is not included in the list under domestic violence. So, for example, if the abuse is from an uncle or aunt, a niece or nephew, or a cousin, it is considered civil harassment and NOT domestic violence.
The civil harassment laws say “harassment” is:

• Unlawful violence, like assault or battery or stalking, OR
• A credible threat of violence, AND
• The violence or threats seriously scare, annoy, or harass someone and there is no valid reason for it.

“Credible threat of violence” means intentionally saying something or acting in a way that would make a reasonable person afraid for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. A “credible threat of violence” includes following or stalking someone or making harassing calls or sending harassing messages (by phone, mail, or e-mail) over a period of time (even if it is a short time).

Read about the law in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 .

Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

• We also have the True Threats Test – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition
• We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
• We also have the Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment
• We also have the Clear and Present Danger Test
• We also have the Gravity of the Evil Test
• We also have the Miller v. California – 3 Prong Obscenity Test (Miller Test) – 1st Amendment 1st
• Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
• Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886) An unconstitutional “law ” is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
• Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States
• State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
• Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
• Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
• SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
• Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
  When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
• United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
• Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
• Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),  The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The     Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.

•  Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
   make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
   Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

  HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.
  

• People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
  
• A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
• Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
  speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
• Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
  The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
• Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
  A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
• Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
  The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
• Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974)  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
• City of Houston v. Hill (1987)  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
  
  
• STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
• STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant –  William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
• State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
• Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
• People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS  determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!
• Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

Zamos v. Stroud

California Supreme Court, 2004
32 Cal.4th 958, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802

The tort of malicious prosecution includes continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause. (This decision expands the tort, which previously was limited to commencing an action without probable cause.) Evidence to this effect is sufficient to defeat a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution.

The legal frame (U.S. + California)

• First Amendment (U.S.): Government can’t impose civil or criminal liability for speech except in narrow, well-defined categories (e.g., true threats, incitement, obscenity, defamation). Speech on matters of public concern in public forums gets the strongest protection. Congress.govLibrary of Congress Tile

• California Constitution, art. I, § 2(a): “Every person may freely speak, write and publish … A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” California courts treat this clause as at least as protective as the federal First Amendment. JustiaCalifornia State University

California “harassment” and stalking statutes don’t reach protected speech

• Civil harassment (CCP § 527.6): “Course of conduct” requires 2+ acts and “Constitutionally protected activity is not included”; “harassment” must seriously alarm/annoy and “serve no legitimate purpose.” If the acts are protected speech, they cannot support an order. (The statute says this in black-and-white.)

• Stalking (Penal Code § 646.9): Also defines “course of conduct” and “credible threat” and again says constitutionally protected activity is not included.

What is “clear First Amendment-safe” literature?

Protected (examples)

• Opinions, criticism, and advocacy on matters of public concern (even harsh or offensive), said in public forums (streets/sidewalks/online) without targeting private homes or making threats. Snyder v. Phelps protected vile funeral-picket signs because they addressed public issues in a public place. Library of Congress Tile

• Speech without intent to threaten: The Supreme Court held you can’t criminalize speech as a “true threat” unless the speaker at least recklessly disregarded its threatening nature. This raised the bar for stalking/harassment prosecutions resting on words alone. (Counterman v. Colorado, 2023). Supreme Court

Not protected (examples)

• True threats/intimidation (Virginia v. Black), incitement to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg), obscenity (Miller), and defamation. After a final adjudication that statements are defamatory, courts may enjoin repeating them; before trial, broad speech gags are usually an unconstitutional prior restraint. Justia Law+1OyezFindlawJustia

• Targeted residential picketing, or broad buffer zones around clinics: content-neutral time, place, manner limits can be imposed, but they must be narrowly tailored; sweeping bans get struck down. (Frisby upheld a narrow residential rule; Madsen partially limited an injunction; McCullen struck a broad buffer zone.) Justia Law+1Library of Congress Tile

How “harassment” claims and injunctions collide with speech

• Courts repeatedly warn against prior restraints and speech-based “harassment” injunctions that are vague or overbroad. Evans v. Evans reversed a pretrial speech gag as an unconstitutional prior restraint; Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen allowed a post-trial injunction limited to statements found defamatory. JustiaFindlaw

• In protest contexts, courts allow narrow restraints aimed at unlawful conduct (trespass, threats, targeted home picketing) while leaving protected advocacy intact. (Huntingdon Life Sciences decisions illustrate drawing that line.) Findlaw

Anti-SLAPP: your fastest path to get a speech-based case tossed

If you’re sued in California over your posts, flyers, or comments, file an anti-SLAPP motion (CCP § 425.16). It’s a two-step test: (1) show the claims arise from protected petitioning/speech; then (2) plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing. If they can’t, the court strikes the claims and awards you fees. California courts instruct that § 425.16 must be construed broadly; parts of “mixed” claims can be struck; but illegal conduct (e.g., extortion) isn’t protected. FindlawJustia+1CourtListener

Somtimes principle of an argument upsets betas and losers that does not mean we have to care!

1. “Protected speech cannot be the ‘course of conduct.’”
   “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct’” in both CCP § 527.6 and Pen. Code § 646.9. If petitioner’s evidence is your nonthreatening posts/flyers about a public issue, it cannot satisfy the statute. Ask the court to deny/dissolve any TRO and deny an order after hearing on that basis. FindlawLegInfo

2. “No threats, no imminence, no crime.”
   Under Counterman, the State must prove at least recklessness as to a statement’s threatening nature for “true threats.” Mere repeated criticism isn’t enough. Supreme Court

3. “Prior restraint is disfavored.”
   Pretrial orders banning speech are presumptively invalid. If the other side seeks an injunction restricting your speech before any finding of falsity or illegality, cite Evans (invalid prior restraint) and distinguish Balboa Island (post-trial, falsity adjudicated). JustiaFindlaw

4. “Public-issue advocacy is specially protected.”
   Like Snyder v. Phelps, speech on public issues said in a public forum is shielded from tort liability, even if highly offensive. Library of Congress Tile

5. “Time, place, manner” limits are narrow.
   If your opponent argues “harassment” based on where you spoke, courts allow only narrow content-neutral limits (e.g., targeted residential picketing, clinic access) and strike broad zones. Justia Law+1

6. Use Anti-SLAPP if they filed a civil complaint.
   Move under § 425.16, attach your posts/flyers, and argue prong one (protected activity). Then force them to prove actual merit (e.g., falsity and actual malice if they claim defamation on a public issue). Cite Equilon (broad construction) and Baral (strike protected parts). Justia+1

anti-SLAPP

California law provides for early dismissal of such suits “brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech” and mandates that § 425.16 “shall be construed broadly.”

California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants” and “any issue in which the public is interested.” Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008).

public commentary is protected under CCP § 425.16(e) and the 1^st amendment of the US Constitution.

​Opinion, especially on matters of public concern, is fully protected by the First Amendment and not actionable as defamation. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (statements not provably false or that reasonably cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts are safeguarded by the First Amendment); Vogel v. Felice, 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (2005) (categorically ranking someone among a list of “Top Ten Dumb Asses” held non-actionable as hyperbolic opinion, and noting that even “‘epithets’ which by themselves may sound derogatory, such as ‘idiot’ or ‘traitor,’ can be mere hyperbole or vituperation” and not provable facts).

Under the First Amendment, public figures who sue for defamation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the alleged false statement with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending Sullivan standard to public figures)).

See Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 244, 252–53 (1984) (if plaintiff is a public figure, summary judgment or dismissal is mandated unless the plaintiff can produce evidence that a jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing proof, as “summary judgment is a favored remedy in defamation cases” to avoid chilling speech​.

Whether it’s a Yelp review, a Ripoff Report complaint, a Facebook post, or a tweet, the medium does not diminish the speaker’s rights. Chaker v. Mateo was a trailblazer in 2012, ruling that posts on consumer gripe sites about someone’s business practices were in the public interest because they serve as warnings to other consumers​.
Yelp Inc. v. Hassell Law Group (2018) 247 Cal.App.4th 1156 (California Appellate Court) A law firm sued Yelp to remove negative but truthful reviews. Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected Yelp.
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 An employer sought to unmask anonymous employees who posted critical but truthful reviews.
Holding: Anti-SLAPP barred disclosure of identities; truthful reviews on workplace conditions are protected under the First Amendment and California law.
Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton – Public Internet Posts & Public Criticisms – Bad Reviews
Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal.App.5th 1240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013)
Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016)
Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F.Supp.3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 8 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)

As a public figure, A PLAINTIFF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that DEFENDANTt made the alleged false statement with “actual malice” – that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). No such evidence exists, nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged actual malice.

Bartnicki v. Vopper: “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” More specifically, “the First Amendment protects the right to publish highly personal information of private individuals, such as the names of rape victims and juveniles involved in legal proceedings, when they relate to matters of public concern.

Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred. Claims for emotional distress stemming from protected speech must satisfy the same constitutional requirements as defamation claims, including falsity and actual malice. Emotional Distress Claim is Constitutionally Barred. Claims for emotional distress stemming from constitutionally protected speech must meet stringent standards, including proof of falsity and actual malice, which Plaintiff cannot demonstrate see (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46).   (“public figure cannot recover for IIED without showing New York Times actual malice”); Flynn v. Higham, 149 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 (1983) (where defamation claim is barred, IIED claim based on the same publication is also barred, otherwise a plaintiff could do indirectly “what he could not do directly,” which would “render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege”​ Therefore, Plaintiff cannot meet this burden.

In Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits holding speakers liable for IIED (or similar torts) for speech on a matter of public concern made in a public place, even if the speech is offensive or upsetting

Yeager v. Bowlin (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1076 Emotional distress claims over truthful reporting of criminal history. Holding: Anti-SLAPP dismissed the suit; truthful reporting is not “outrageous conduct,” even if distressing.

Use of Publicly Available Images is Protected. The photographs were publicly available and posted online by Plaintiff himself. Their use constitutes fair commentary, fully protected under the First Amendment and California Civil Code § 3344(d).
Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Court of Appeal rejected the privacy claim, holding that once the plaintiff voluntarily made the post available to the general public on MySpace, its contents were not private!

California courts have protected creators who depict real individuals in films or media when commenting on matters of public interest: “the First Amendment safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life — including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary — and transform them into art. (De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 861 (2018)). While Mr. Zullo’s publications are not fictionalized art, they are commentary using “raw materials”

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1146 Use of publicly posted images (thumbnails) by Google. Holding: Transformative use of public content (e.g., search engines) is fair use under copyright law. Applied to aggregation of social media content.

HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985 Scraping public LinkedIn profiles for data analytics.  Holding: Publicly available social media data is not protected by privacy laws; its use is permissible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).

Garcia v. Google, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 786 F.3d 733 Use of a publicly posted performance in a video. Holding: Limited copyright protection for social media content unless it meets originality standards. Creators can use public content if it’s transformative.

Similarly, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860 (1979), the California Supreme Court (in Justice Bird’s concurring opinion, which has since been taken as the court’s rationale) stated that “fictional treatments” of real people (there, a film about Rudolph Valentino) or in this case Plaintiff Paul Toepel, are constitutionally protected, because suppressing such expression would inhibit the creation of valuable works about actual events and figures.
A false light claim, like defamation, requires a false implication and, for a public figure, actual malice (Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).

Transformative Use Test: The California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup (2001) established that a work which contains “significant transformative elements”—i.e. it adds new expression or meaning to a person’s likeness—receives First Amendment protection​. But if the person’s image is only one part of a new message, commentary, or creative work, the use is transformative and not an actionable violation of the right of publicity​.
Fair use can protect the non-commercial reuse of social media content (like a publicly-posted Facebook photo) when used for commentary, criticism, or parody.  Fair use is a federal copyright doctrine (17 U.S.C. § 107)
Sedlik v. Drachenberg (C.D. Cal. 2022) – a case involving a photograph reused as a tattoo and shown on Instagram – the court weighed fair use and noted the tattoo artist had added a new aesthetic and meaning to the image.
Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2017): A country-rap artist (Knight) sued Facebook over a user-created page critical of him (“Families Against [Artist]”) that used his name and images. Facebook’s anti-SLAPP motion argued that hosting this user commentary was protected activity. In Summit Bank v. Rogers (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), a bank sued an online commenter who posted rants on Craigslist. The appellate court struck the suit under anti-SLAPP.

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (9th Cir. 2015) 801 F.3d 1126 Use of a YouTube video (including public content) for commentary.  Holding: Fair use protects transformative creations (e.g., parody, criticism) using public material.

CrossFit, Inc. v. National Strength and Conditioning Ass’n (S.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 5622281 Use of public social media posts in a critical documentary. Holding: Anti-SLAPP protected the filmmakers; truthful compilation of public posts for commentary is protected speech.

1. No Violation of Penal Code or Statutory Provisions. Plaintiff’s allegations of statutory violations (Penal Code §§ 632, 637.2, and §502, California Business & Professions Code §17525, and 15 U.S.C. §1125) lack merit and supporting evidence. Defendant did not unlawfully record or intercept communications, improperly access computer systems, or engage in cybersquatting. Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of these claims.
   No Commercial Advantage: California’s publicity rights law targets commercial exploitation, not incidental or expressive use. In Cross v. Facebook, Inc.
   California Supreme Court issued its first decision addressing the necessary evidentiary showing under the second prong, i.e., whether a plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on the claim. See Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.

The plaintiff must proffer admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case and show that the claim is “legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.” Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 88–89 (2002). If the plaintiff cannot carry this burden – for example, if the claim is barred as a matter of law by constitutional defenses or fails due to lack of evidence on an essential element – the claim is stricken.

California courts have held that “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute includes not only government matters and official proceedings, but also “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants” and “any issue in which the public is interested.” Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008).

Public Figures and Public Interest in Defamation and Privacy Law

Public Figures (General-purpose and Limited-purpose). Under the First Amendment, individuals fall into different categories. A general-purpose public figure is one who “has assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society,” or otherwise enjoys “pervasive fame or notoriety” such that he is public in all contexts. More commonly, a limited-purpose public figure is one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” and thus becomes a public figure only with respect to that issue law.justia.com. As the Supreme Court explained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., “absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in ordering the affairs of society,” a person is not a public figure “for all aspects of his life”; rather, the question is “determined by reference to [his] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation” supreme.justia.comlaw.justia.com. California law follows the same test. In Vegod Corp. v. ABC, the California Supreme Court, quoting Gertz, reaffirmed that some individuals (e.g. celebrities or high‑ranking officials) are public figures in all contexts, but more often a person becomes a public figure only by voluntarily thrusting himself into a public issue law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Likewise, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that public figures are those who either (1) occupy positions of such power and influence that they are public figures for all purposes, or (2) have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies” to influence outcomes law.cornell.edu. Thus, simply being newsworthy or tangentially involved in an issue does not make one a public figure; there must be either widespread fame or voluntary invocation of the public spotlight.

Matters of Public Interest/Concern. The term “public interest” or “public concern” applies not to persons but to topics. Courts look at whether the speech at issue relates to an issue “of public or general interest.” Generally, information about crime, politics, public health, or safety on public property (e.g., a helicopter rescue on a public highway) qualifies as a matter of public concern law.justia.com. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, speech on matters of public concern is given the highest protection. In the privacy context, the press has a privilege to publish newsworthy facts even when they touch on private lives, because the public has a “legitimate interest” in such events law.justia.com. In Shulman v. Group W Productions (Cal. 1998), for example, the California Supreme Court emphasized that information about an emergency rescue was newsworthy, and thus publication of the facts (though private in nature) was protected by the First Amendment law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, even a state law cannot punish a reporter for publishing truthful information (the identity of a rape victim) that was obtained from public court records supreme.justia.com. Similarly, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court recognized that a private telephone conversation about public-school labor negotiations was a “matter of public concern,” and accordingly the First Amendment shielded its disclosure even though the tape had been intercepted illegally by a third party supreme.justia.com.

In short, speech on matters of public concern is presumptively protected. Courts often hold that in defamation cases involving public concern, the plaintiff must bear additional burdens (see below). In privacy cases, the newsworthiness of the subject generally trumps privacy claims. The California Supreme Court has noted that the First Amendment “greatly circumscribes” the right of even a private person to recover damages for the publication of private facts when those facts involve public or legitimate newsworthy eventslaw.justia.com.

Defamation Law and the Actual Malice Standard

Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), the Supreme Court set the rule for defamation involving public officials or figures. Sullivan held that the First Amendment forbids a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with “actual malice” – i.e. knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth law.cornell.edu. That is, public officials (and by extension public figures) cannot recover for defamation unless the speaker acted with conscious falsity or a high degree of awareness that the statement was probably false law.cornell.edu. As the Court explained, this stringent standard is necessary so that critics will not be deterred from “free and open debate” even if they make some factual errors law.cornell.edu.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), the Court extended Sullivan’s actual‑malice rule to public figures in addition to public officials law.justia.com. The Court did not provide a single formula for public figures, but clarified that persons who thrust themselves into public controversies (or otherwise achieve wide renown) must likewise prove the speaker’s knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. As Vegod (CA) summarized, Butts “held that public figures – like public officials – must prove actual malice to recover for defamation” law.justia.com.

By contrast, for private individuals the Court has allowed states some leeway. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court refused to extend Sullivan’s standard to a lawyer who was a private person. Instead, it held that states may impose liability for defamation of private individuals (subject to at least negligence), so long as they do not impose strict liability supreme.justia.comsupreme.justia.com. The Court emphasized that private individuals are more vulnerable and deserve more protection; hence, it allowed recovery without proof of actual malice, provided the defendant was at least negligent about the truth supreme.justia.com. Gertz did insist, however, that a plaintiff who is a private figure suing a media defendant must prove the falsity of the statement to recover damages on matters of public interest, and that punitive damages still require a showing of actual malice supreme.justia.comlaw.cornell.edu.

The interplay between “public concern” and defamation burdens was further refined in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) and Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1986). Hepps held that when a defamation claim involves speech on a matter of public concern, the private plaintiff must prove the statement’s falsity as part of his case, overriding the common-law presumption of falsitylaw.cornell.edu. And Dun & Bradstreet emphasized that Gertz’s restrictions on presumed and punitive damages apply only where the speech involves a public interest; in that case, selling credit reports was deemed not a matter of public concern, so the First Amendment did not compel the Gertz rulelaw.cornell.edu.

Actual Malice Defined. The Supreme Court has made clear that “actual malice” under Sullivan is a constitutional term of art. It means publishing with knowledge of falsity or “reckless disregard for the truth,” which is a high standard – much more than ordinary negligence law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com. Reckless disregard requires more than an ordinary failure to investigate; it requires a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity”law.cornell.edu (see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). The Court has rejected efforts to lower the standard in subsequent cases.

In California, defamation law parallels the federal framework in practice. For libel or slander actions by public figures, the plaintiff must show actual malice. Notably, California’s Civil Code §45a codifies this: it requires that a plaintiff prove “clear and convincing” evidence of actual malice in order to recover punitive damages against a media defendant. The Vegod decision (CA) explicitly adopted the Gertz definitions of public figure, and held that California grants no broader privilege to media than federal law law.justia.comlaw.justia.com.

Privacy and the Public Interest Defense

Privacy torts (such as intrusion upon seclusion or publication of private facts) intersect with public interest when the defendant claims the material was newsworthy. The First Amendment constrains liability for publishing truthful information about private individuals on matters of public interest. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that punished a TV station for printing a rape victim’s name (obtained from public trial records), holding it unconstitutional to bar the press from reporting information in the public record supreme.justia.com. Similarly, Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) barred a civil suit against a newspaper that inadvertently published a victim’s name from a police report. These cases establish that where the subject matter is of public concern, privacy claims based on publication of true, lawfully obtained information generally fail.

In California, Shulman v. Group W Productions (1998) illustrates the balance between privacy and public interest. The court recognized a “fundamental legal problem” in drawing the line between “private” and “public and general interest” law.justia.com. In that case a helicopter rescue was videotaped and broadcast without consent. The California Supreme Court held that the rescue events were newsworthy and of legitimate public interest law.justia.com. Accordingly, the broadcast of those facts (public disclosure of private facts) was protected by the First Amendment, and summary judgment for the media was proper on the publication claim. However, the court also held that the intrusion itself – the act of filming the victims without consent – was not justified by newsworthiness and could be actionable law.justia.com. Thus, California recognizes that newsworthiness can defeat a privacy (publication) claim but does not automatically immunize invasive newsgathering methods. As the Shulman court noted, Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star together “greatly circumscribe” a private figure’s privacy rights in publication of private facts law.justia.com.

Additionally, courts have developed a “newsworthiness privilege” in privacy law. Under this doctrine, media defendants have a conditional privilege to publish true information of public interest. For example, California’s Civil Code § 1708.8 (the privacy law) does not explicitly create a constitutional defense, but California jurisprudence treats newsworthy material differently. If a lawful recording or observation captures matters of public concern, courts have declined to impose liability (e.g. People v. Buckley, 6 Cal.4th 289 (1993), immunizing reporters who overhear police radio dispatches; Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522-25). As a leading treatise put it, “[t]he news media’s right to investigate and relate facts about the events and individuals of our time” may override an individual’s privacy interest when those facts are of legitimate public concern law.justia.com.

Criminal and Civil Enforcement

Criminal Defamation. Criminal defamation laws (libel/slander as crimes) have largely been curtailed by constitutional law. In Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), decided the same day as Sullivan, the Supreme Court invalidated a state criminal libel statute because it lacked an actual-malice requirement law.cornell.edu. Shortly thereafter, Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) struck down a vague criminal libel common-law definition. These decisions mean that speech which might give rise to criminal defamation must also satisfy First Amendment safeguards. In practice, criminal defamation prosecutions are rare, and courts have read Sullivan’s standards into any review of such statutes.

Civil Enforcement and Privileges. Civilly, defendants to defamation or privacy suits often invoke privileges grounded in public interest. The First Amendment itself is treated as a privilege for speech on public matters; if the plaintiff is a public figure, the Sullivan standard is essentially a constitutional privilege. In addition, many states have enacted statutory privileges (e.g. fair-report privilege) and notice statutes requiring corrections. California law specifically provides an absolute privilege for publication of judicial proceedings and certain official actions, and a qualified privilege for reporting “public proceedings” under Civil Code § 47. These reflect the same policy: transparency in matters of public concern. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that a newspaper’s publication of the details of a police investigation was privileged so long as the report was accurate and related to a public proceeding.

Furthermore, in California the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. §425.16) provides a procedural shield for statements made “in connection with an issue of public interest.” Thus, if speech is on a public-issue (broadly defined), a defamation suit can be struck unless the plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing. In Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), for instance, the court held that a radio program’s mocking of a reality TV contestant was “in connection with an issue of public interest” (the show and the contestant’s conduct), and the insults were not actionable under anti-SLAPP law.justia.com.

Other Privacy and Speech Crimes. California and federal law also intersect on newsgathering crimes. Penal laws against eavesdropping or wiretapping (e.g. California Penal Code § 632) impose criminal sanctions on unauthorized recording of communications. But again, the newsworthiness of the communication can affect enforcement. In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court held that even though the interception was illegal, a third-party who lawfully obtained the tape was immune when the content was of public concern supreme.justia.com. Likewise, in People v. Buckley (1993), California’s high court refused to convict reporters who overheard police radio transmissions of private conversations, noting that imposing liability on the press would unduly infringe on the free flow of information about public safety.

California Law: Convergence and Divergence

California’s courts have largely adopted the federal approach but have also asserted independent state-law protections. On defamation, California Civil Code §§44–46 track the Sullivan/Gertz framework; notably, §45a requires actual malice for punitive damages against media. California has recognized that Gertz’s distinction between public and private figures is constitutionally grounded, and it uses that analysis for both libel and slander actions law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Thus, a California state court will not allow punitive damages for defaming a private person unless actual malice is shown (per Civil Code § 45a and Gertz).

On privacy, California historically gave strong protection to privacy under its state constitution, but modern decisions like Shulman align more with federal free-speech values: truth and newsworthiness are powerful defenses. The California Constitution’s Speech Clause (Art. I, §2(a)) has been interpreted coextensively with the First Amendment in this area.

One notable California development is the explicit legislative anti-SLAPP framework, which requires early dismissal of suits that chill public participation. California courts have read “public interest” expansively under this statute, protecting even satirical commentary on entertainment events as matters of public debate law.justia.com. This is broader than any federal analogue. On the other hand, California civil law still allows private plaintiffs somewhat more recovery in some contexts. For example, California law (unlike federal) does not impose the Gertz requirement of proving falsity on private plaintiffs in all cases; although federal courts require falsehood be proven in public-concern cases law.cornell.edu, California law has not wholly abrogated the common-law presumption of falsity for private plaintiffs (though defendants can often force plaintiff to prove truth under California’s jury instructions and policy of free debate).

In sum, California defamation and privacy law generally track the federal standards for public figures and public issues, but California’s Constitution, statutes, and cases provide additional procedural mechanisms (like anti-SLAPP) and have carved out specific rules (e.g. punitive-damage thresholds) that strengthen First Amendment protections. Outside the speech context, California also recognizes intrusion upon seclusion as a privacy tort; unlike publication claims, intrusion claims often have no First Amendment privilege, as shown in Shulman. Thus, while California’s approach aligns with Sullivan/Gertz on the key question of public status and malice, it sometimes extends protections for free expression beyond federal law and sometimes imposes state-law duties (e.g. invasion of privacy claims) that must be analyzed under First Amendment constraints.

Constitutional Principles

The bedrock principle is that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” and constitutional doctrine must tolerate some defamation to ensure robust public discourse law.cornell.edu. The First Amendment firmly places political and public-issue speech at the core of protected expression. Criticism of public officials and figures – even harsh or personally damaging criticism – is part of the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate that the Amendment was designed to protect law.cornell.edu. Commenting on a person’s fitness for public office, or matters touching on public welfare, is virtually always protected speech; courts have rejected distinctions between public and private attributes when those attributes bear on fitness or honesty in office law.cornell.edu. Indeed, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Court underscored that public figures cannot claim injury to emotional privacy from a parody or satire unless they satisfy the actual-malice standard: “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures… from recovering damages… without showing… that the publication contains a false statement of fact… made with actual malice”supreme.justia.com. This reflects the high premium given to debate on matters of public concern, even when that debate includes crude or offensive commentary.

In all these contexts, the key inquiry is whether the person or subject is sufficiently public and the speech sufficiently of public interest to warrant heightened protection. When it is, defamation and privacy claims face the actual malice hurdle and other constitutional limits (no liability without fault, proof of falsity, etc.). When it is not (private person and purely private matter), the state has more leeway. But in either case, courts must balance any reputational or privacy interest against the constitutional value of free expression. The Supreme Court and California courts have repeatedly emphasized that speech relating to public issues and public figures lies at the core of the First Amendment’s protection law.cornell.edulaw.justia.com.

Sources:

Key U.S. Supreme Court cases include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Cal. Const. art. I, §2 law.justia.com; Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) thefire.org; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) thefire.org; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) thefire.org; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

California Supreme Court authorities include Vegod Corp. v. ABC, 25 Cal.3d 763 (1979); Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200 (1998); and related anti-SLAPP jurisprudence such as Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 97 Cal.App.4th 798 (2002).

These cases define and illustrate the standards discussed above. All principles are grounded in the First Amendment’s free-speech protections as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.

 in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), the Court held that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” This so-called “Daily Mail principle” ensures the press, or others who post truthful information, cannot face punishment for publishing the names of rape victims and juvenile offenders, as well as other sensitive information obtained lawfully. “Lawfully obtained” means the publisher obtained the information from, for example, a public record or material in the public domain, rather than intercepting the material illegally.

The First Amendment also protects publication of truthful information received from a human source. As the Supreme Court explained in Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001), it doesn’t matter if the source obtained the material unlawfully, as long as the publisher did not participate in the illegal action and merely received the information from the source.

First Amendment protects much offensive, obnoxious, and even repugnant speech. Justice William Brennan famously referred to this as “the bedrock principle” of the first freedom in the flag-burning case Texas v. Johnson (1989). Current Chief Justice John Roberts expressed this principle poignantly in Snyder v. Phelps (2011), stating that even the inflammatory rhetoric of the Westboro Baptist Church — known for picketing military funerals with signs that read “God hates fags” and “Thank God for dead soldiers” — was protected:

Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course — to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.

First Amendment principles, a concept from the celebrated libel law decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964): Namely, the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

“Thinking Outside the Dox: The First Amendment and the Right to Disclose Personal Information” that “[h]arassment and threat laws already exist to penalize people who cross the line from disclosing information to actually acting on the information” and engaging in unprotected conduct such as stalking.  

If the poster falls into one of the other existing narrow categories of unprotected speech, it is also not protected. For example, if a poster utters a true threat then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment. Likewise, if a poster or bloogger incites imminent lawless action — intentionally provoking others to engage in immediate unlawful action — then he beomces a doxxer and thus is not protected by the First Amendment.  True Threat Test Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

The Value of Telling the Truth – Speaking Upright

I. CORE RULE: PROTECTED SPEECH ≠ “COURSE OF CONDUCT”

Section 527.6 defines “harassment” as a “course of conduct” that seriously alarms/annoys and serves no legitimate purpose, but it expressly states: “Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (CCP § 527.6(b)(1).) The same carve-out appears in the stalking statute. (Pen. Code § 646.9(k).) If the petition relies on Zullo’s non-threatening flyers/posts about public issues, the petition fails as a matter of law.

II. NO “TRUE THREATS,” NO INJUNCTION

A speech-based restraining order requires more than repeated criticism. The First Amendment prohibits punishment of speech unless it is a true threat or otherwise unprotected; after Counterman, the speaker must have at least recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of the communication. (600 U.S. at 73–82.) Nothing in petitioner’s declarations meets that standard.

III. PRIOR RESTRAINT: PRETRIAL SPEECH GAGS ARE INVALID

Broad bans on speech before any adjudication of falsity or illegality are unconstitutional prior restraints. (Evans, 162 Cal.App.4th at 1169–1173.) Only narrow, post-trial injunctive relief limited to statements adjudicated false may issue. (Balboa Island, 40 Cal.4th at 1156–1161.)

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200) / Secondary-Evidence Rule (Evid. Code § 1521): If the content of a writing (including digital posts; Evid. Code § 250) is offered for its truth, petitioner must lay the foundation or present the original/credible secondary evidence; partial, illegible images lacking context should be excluded or given no weight.

V. OPTIONAL NARROW RELIEF (ONLY IF THE COURT FINDS MISCONDUCT)

If the Court believes some conduct (not speech) crossed a line (e.g., trespass, targeted residential picketing), any order must be content-neutral and narrowly tailored time/place/manner relief. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474; McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464.) A broad ban on speaking, posting, or distributing literature would be unconstitutional.

Quick cite list (tables/points)

• Anti-SLAPP scope & mechanics: Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376; FilmOn.com (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133; Bonni (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995.

• Fees: CCP § 425.16(c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122.

• First Amendment protection: Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443; Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66; Milkovich (1990) 497 U.S. 1; Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767; New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.

• Prior restraint: Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; Balboa Island (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141.

• Harassment carve-out: CCP § 527.6(b)(1); Pen. Code § 646.9(k).

• Aiding/Conspiracy limits: Applied Equipment (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.

• Authentication: Evid. Code §§ 1401, 403, 250, 1521; People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258.

• Statute: Penal Code §653m(a)–(e) (text incl. good-faith and return-call provisions). California.Public.Law

• Constitutionality & scope: People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal.App.3d 1376 (1991) (upholding (a) & (b), emphasizing narrow focus on intentional harassment). Justia

• Return-call pleading: People v. Lampasona, 71 Cal.App.3d 884 (1977) (old gap later addressed by §653m(d)). Justia

• First Amendment “true threats”: Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Justia Law+1

• Public-concern/petitioning: Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Justia Law+1

• Demurrer standard: Penal Code §1004; see order explaining face-of-pleading rule. closeupsblog.com

First Amendment

ITS IS OUR FIRM OPINION that We believe

Elonis v. United States (2015) – Threats – 1st Amendment

Counterman v. Colorado – Supreme Court sets higher bar for prosecuting threats under First Amendment

Watts v. United States – True Threat Test – 1st Amendment

Watts v. United States True Threat decision – 1st Amendment

True Threats – Virginia v. Black is most comprehensive Supreme Court definition – 1st Amendment

Insulting letters to politician’s home are constitutionally protected, unless they are ‘true threats’ – 1st Amendment

Anti-SLAPP Law Cases – Case Law Summaries & Citings

How Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Your Right to Free Speech

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

California Supreme Court Confirms that the “anti-SLAPP” Statute Applies to Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment

Attorney Liability for Meritless Litigation Leading to Harm

Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Social Media

Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16 California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

Life is Chess!, or…. Is Chess Life?

The Eagle and The Crow – The Ignorant Crow vs The Ascending Eagle

Lawyers are not that special, a high IQ is not needed a mere 100-130 can become this shithole career, they come in at average IQ of 100 all the way to 130 Moderately gifted and that would be a top tier lawyer., but the most successful people on the planet HAVE NO DEGREE FROM A COLLEGE, yet high IQs with fast learning minds. The high aptitude of an inttellect wwith an IQ score of 168, like the authors is considered exceptionally high and falls within the “exceptionally gifted”

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Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Anti-SLAPP and Free Speech in Defamation & Emotional Distress Cases

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Court tosses disbarred lawyer’s suit over newspaper article

THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA

Topics: Legal Terms and Concepts Related to Speech, Press, Assembly, or Petition

• Actual Malice Actual malice is the legal standard the Supreme Court uses to protect the media in libel cases in determining when public officials or figures may win damages…The words must meet the definition of Actual Malice
• Anti-SLAPP Law in California Protections and Responsibilities for Publishers
• Ad Hoc Balancing In First Amendment law, ad hoc balancing involves judging cases on their unique facts, rejecting formulaic tests to determine whether speech is protected or not…
• Advocacy of Illegal Conduct Mere advocacy of illegal conduct was not protected by the First Amendment until Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), which created the incitement to imminent lawless…
• Anonymous Speech The Supreme Court has protected anonymity under the First Amendment, but it has balanced this protection against competing interests, notably in the area of…
• Appropriation Appropriation is the unauthorized use of a person’s likeness for financial gain. Although appropriation may involve speech, it is not protected by the First…
• Bad Tendency Test The bad tendency test became the most influential standard used by courts to determine whether criticism of the government during World War I was protected by…
• The ‘Brandenburg test’ for incitement to violence Test for Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action
• Captive Audience The captive audience doctrine protects people in certain places and circumstances from unwanted speech. It is an exception to the First Amendment rule…
• Central Hudson Test The Supreme Court developed the Central Hudson test for determining when government could limit commercial speech without violating the First Amendment…
• Chilling Effect Chilling effect is the concept of deterring First Amendment free speech and association rights through laws or regulations that appear to target expression…
• Clear and Present Danger Test In the 20th century, the Supreme Court established the clear and present danger test as the predominate standard for determining when speech is protected by the…
• Commercial Speech Commercial speech is a form of protected communication under the First Amendment, but it does not receive as much free speech protection as forms of…
• Community Standards In 1973, the Supreme Court said that community standards must be taken into account in determining whether something was obscene or could be protected by the…
• Contempt of Court Civil contempt of court can be fixed by obeying court orders. Criminal contempt involves violating the dignity of the court and is more likely to raise First…
• Content Based A content-based law discriminates against speech based on the substance of what is communicated. In contrast, a content-neutral law applies without regard to…
• Content Neutral In First Amendment free speech cases, laws that are content neutral apply to all expression without regard to any particular message or substance…
• Corporate Speech Corporate speech refers to the rights of corporations to advertise their products and to speak to matters of public concern, including by spending money in…
• Counterspeech Doctrine The counterspeech doctrine, first articulated by Louis Brandeis in First Amendment jurisprudence in 1927, posits that the remedy for false speech is more speech…
• Criminal Libel In the United States, courts have based decisions regarding slanderous or libelous statements on the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the…
• Defamation Defamation lawsuits can have a chilling effect on free speech. The Supreme Court first applied First Amendment protection from state libel laws in 1964 in New…
• Exacting scrutiny Exacting scrutiny is a form of close judicial review used by the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate restrictions on speech in campaign finance, election law and…
• Express Advocacy Express advocacy is the use of words like “vote for” in political communications. It’s protected by the First Amendment, but the spending of money on such…
• Expressive Conduct Expressive conduct is behavior designed to convey a message; its function as speech means that it has increasingly been protected by the First Amendment…
• Fair Report Privilege The fair report privilege is a state-law defense to defamation claims used by journalists, although the level of protection may vary by state. Under the…
• Fair Use Fair use allows copyrighted works to be used in ways that would infringe on the copyright. Fair use is a way of preventing copyright from violating of the First…
• False Light False light invasion of privacy, portraying an individual unflatteringly in words or pictures as someone that person is not, is not protected by the First…
• False Speech Because the First Amendment is designed to further the truth, it may not protect individuals who engage in libel. Generally, the government does not stand as…
• Fighting Words The fighting words doctrine, an exception to First Amendment-protected speech, lets government limit speech when it is likely to incite immediate retaliation by…
• Government Speech Doctrine Under the government speech doctrine, the government has its own rights as speaker that can assert its own messages, immune from challenges of viewpoint…
• Gravity of the Evil TestThe gravity of the evil test is a refinement of the clear and present danger test to determine when First Amendment free speech may be subject to criminal…
• Group Libel Since the 1900s, group libel, the defamation of an entire group of people, has coexisted uneasily with the First Amendment’s emphasis on individual speech…
• Heckler’s Veto A heckler’s veto occurs when the government restricts speech because of the reactions of opponents of the speech. Courts have said hecklers’ vetoes violate…
• Hicklin Test The Hicklin Test, an obscenity standard originating in England, was initially used in America but did not survive constitutional challenges based on the First…
• Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action Many Supreme Court cases upholding restrictions on subversive speech have relied on the idea that such speech is forbidden because it incites violence or…
• Libel and Slander Libel and slander lawsuits can have a chilling effect on free speech. The First Amendment rights of free speech and free press often clash with the interests…
• Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is a concept that insulates a defendant from defamation liability for statements made about someone who has no good…
• Marketplace of Ideas The marketplace of ideas refers to the belief that the test of the truth or acceptance of ideas depends on their competition with one another and not on the…
• Miller Test The Miller Test is the primary legal test for determining whether expression constitutes obscenity.  It is named after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller…
• Narrowly Tailored Laws The term “narrowly tailored” refers to laws regulating First Amendment rights. These must be written to place as few restrictions as possible on First Amendment…
• Neutral Reportage Privilege Neutral reportage protects from libel claims media that accurately and objectively report newsworthy charges against public figures as part of an ongoing…
• Neutrality, Speech Laws restr1icting speech are subject to strict scrutiny to ensure they are neutral under the First Amendment. They can not discriminate against speech the…
• Noerr-Pennington Doctrine The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a judicially created defense against certain business torts (wrongful acts) for activity that implicates the First Amendment…
• Overbreadth Overbreadth provides that a regulation of speech can sweep too broadly and prohibit speech protected by the First Amendment as well as non-protected speech…
• Perjury Perjury is not protected by the First Amendment because it undermines the ability of courts to obtain truthful testimony and to effectively administer justice…
• Pickering Connick test The Pickering Connick test refers to a longstanding test in First Amendment law used by courts to determine whether a public employer violated an employee’s…
• Press Access The First Amendment appears to provide a special right for the press, however the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view of the “press clause” and held that the…
• Prior Restraint Prior restraint allows the government to review the content of printed materials and prevent their publication. Prior restraint usually violates the First…
• Professional Speech Doctrine The professional speech doctrine is a concept used by lower courts in recent years to define and often limit the free-speech rights of professionals when…
• Public Figures and Officials To promote First Amendment freedom of speech, libel plaintiffs who are public figures or officials must show a publisher acted with actual malice to collect…
• Public Forum Doctrine The public forum doctrine is an analytical tool used in First Amendment jurisprudence to determine the constitutionality of speech restrictions implemented on…
• Qualified Immunity Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials could violate a person’s First Amendment rights, but not face liability because the law was not…
• Rhetorical Hyperbole Rhetorical hyperbole is a First Amendment-based doctrine that the Court has used to provide protection to exaggerated, over-the-top speech in defamation cases…
• Right of Publicity The right of publicity is a right to legal action, designed to protect the names and likenesses of celebrities against unauthorized exploitation for commercial…
• Right to Receive Information and Ideas The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to receive information and ideas flows from the First Amendment protection of free speech…
• Right to Respond and Right of Reply The FCC’s right to respond and reply allowed those criticized on radio and TV broadcasts time to share their viewpoint on air to foster First Amendment…
• Safety Valve Theory Under the safety valve theory of the First Amendment theory, the ability of citizens to freely protest about government deters them from undertaking violent…
• Scarcity Rationale The scarcity rationale is a legal reasoning that provides for more government regulation and limited recognition of First Amendment freedoms for broadcasters…
• Secondary Effects Doctrine The secondary effects doctrine is used when content-based laws are aimed at the secondary effects of protected expression. The laws can more easily pass First…
• Self-government Rationale The self-government rationale justifies free speech protections of the First Amendment by reasoning that self-government depends on a free and robust democratic…
• Substantial Disruption Test The substantial disruption test is the standard developed by the Supreme Court to determine when public school officials may discipline students for their…
• Substantial Truth Doctrine The substantial truth doctrine, stemming from the First Amendment, allows individuals to avoid liability in libel claims if the gist of the statement was…
• Symbolic Speech Symbolic speech consists of nonverbal, nonwritten forms of communication. It is generally protected by the First Amendment unless it causes a specific, direct…
• Time, Place and Manner Restrictions Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity. These restrictions do not usually violate…
• True Threats A true threat is a statement meant to frighten people into believing they will be seriously harmed by the speaker. True threats are not protected by the First…
• Vagueness Courts in the United States give particular scrutiny to vague laws relative to First Amendment issues because of their possible chilling effect on protected…
• Watts Factors The Watts factors refers to three factors the Supreme Court identified in its true-threat decision to distinguish between speech protected by the First…

https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/topic/18/legal-terms-and-concepts-related-to-speech-press-assembly-or-petition

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

The First Amendment and Free Speech Rights: FAQs

Americans care deeply about their constitutional rights, especially the right to speak their minds freely, guaranteed under the First Amendment. But there are many misconceptions and questions about free speech rights—including whether those constitutional protections apply to decisions by social media sites to take down content (or ban users entirely) based on what they were posting.This article explores some of the most common questions about the application, limits, and consequences of the First Amendment’s free-speech protections.

What Does the First Amendment Mean by “Speech?”

As humans, we have many different ways of expressing our thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. While the text of the First Amendment refers to “freedom of speech,” courts have recognized that this right includes many different kinds of expression, including:

• spoken and written words, including social media posts and comments
• theater, dance, visual art, movies, TV shows, videos, and video games
• actions that convey a message (known as “symbolic speech”) like burning a flag
• clothes that express an opinion or demonstrate faith, from T-shirts with slogans to religious headscarves
• signing a petition, and
• money, in the form independent spending related to political campaigns (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).

As technology changes, more ways of expressing ideas or opinions come under the “speech” umbrella. For instance, some courts have found that the protected speech includes:

• computer code, to the extent that it conveys information to human beings who understand it
• “liking” someone else’s social media page, post, or comment; and
• Google search results.

The First Amendment also protects the right not to speak (often referred to as a protection from “compelled speech”). In classic examples from U.S. Supreme Court opinions, this means that students may stay silent during the pledge of allegiance (West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)), and drivers may refuse to display a state’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plates (Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).)

Does the First Amendment Prohibit Speech Restrictions by Private Companies Like Social Media Providers?

Originally, the language in the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law … abridging freedom of speech”) applied only to the federal government. But as a result of several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early 20th century, the First Amendment now applies to actions by federal, state, and local government to outlaw speech (“prior restraint” in legalese) or to punish people after they’ve already expressed their views. Because that includes government agencies and officials, it might be a violation of free speech rights when a police department or elected official bans users from social media accounts for their opinions. (Learn more about when government officials may block critics from social media.)

As a general rule, however, private businesses, organizations, and individuals are free to limit speech however they wish, as long as they aren’t violating contracts or other laws (including federal antidiscrimination laws or state laws protecting political activity by employees). For example, it’s usually not considered a violation of the First Amendment if:

• a private employer fires a worker for expressing political opinions the boss doesn’t like
• a private religious school disciplines a student for wearing a T-shirt with a pro-LGBT message
• a private media company won’t publish content that doesn’t align with the owner’s political views
• a web hosting company refuses to host a platform that embraces white supremacy or allows calls to violence and insurrection, or
• a social media company enforces its policies on acceptable content by taking down posts or suspending users’ accounts.

Can Big Tech Companies Be Treated Like State Actors When They Restrict Free Speech?

As big tech has become more and more powerful, some commentators have called for the largest tech companies to be treated like government for purposes of the First Amendment, thus limiting their ability to restrain social media users’ speech. We heard more of these calls in the wake of actions by Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat and other providers to suspend or permanently ban Donald Trump’s social media accounts, based on fears that he would incite further violence following the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

Using the analogy of a company town, where a private corporation acts like government, these critics point to big tech’s control over the public conversation. This “state actor” argument is based on a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions holding that constitutional protections against government actions apply when private companies exercise “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State” (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975)).

So far, however, courts have found that the First Amendment does not prohibit social media providers from taking down users’ posts. Although the Supreme Court has characterized social media as “the modern public square” (Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)), it hasn’t directly addressed this question yet.

Does the First Amendment and Federal Law Protect Actions by Social Media?

Free speech arguments cut two ways. While some people complain that social media companies violate their constitutional rights by taking down posts or suspending their accounts, the companies argue that it would violate their own free speech rights if the government tried to regulate their decisions about what to publish on their sites. Not only that, but part of a federal law known as “Section 230” (47 U.S.C. § 230) protects social media providers from civil lawsuits for their good-faith actions to restrict access to objectionable content. (Another part of the law gives them immunity for content that users post on their platforms.)

Debates will continue over big tech’s ability to control online speech. Under current law, however, social media companies are free to apply their private moderation policies to restrict users’ access or ability to post content on their platforms.

What Kind of Speech Isn’t Protected Under the First Amendment?

As with all constitutional rights, there are limits to freedom of expression. Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has carved out a few exceptions to First Amendment protections, including speech that is intended to incite the listeners to take immediate illegal action, threatens someone with immediate violence, or meets the strict legal definition of obscenity. But the Court hasn’t recognized a general exception for hate speech. (Learn more about the exceptions to free speech protections and how the First Amendment applies to hate speech.)

Balancing Freedom of Expression With Other Constitutional Rights

Sometimes, free-speech rights compete with other constitutional rights—which can require a balancing act to make sure the different rights involved are protected as much as possible. For instance, judges may issue gag orders in order to control publicity during trials and protect the constitutional right to a fair trial with an impartial jury. But these orders shouldn’t be so broad that they unnecessarily limit free-speech rights.

Do Some People Have Limited Free Speech Rights?

Not all U.S. residents enjoy the same level of constitutional protection when they speak their minds. For different reasons, the Supreme Court has given government more authority than usual to restrict speech by public school students, public employees, and prisoners. Also, while legal immigrants have the same basic right to freedom of expression as citizens, some people who aren’t legal permanent residents—including undocumented immigrants and temporary visa holders—may face certain limits on their freedom of expression. (Learn more about immigrants’ free speech rights.)

K-12 Public School Students

As the Supreme Court has said, public school students don’t “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). But the Court also recognized that First Amendment rights for children in public K-12 schools may be more limited than for adults in other settings, because schools have an obligation to keep students safe and provide a good learning environment. (Learn more about freedom of expression for students.)

Members of the U.S. Military

People don’t lose all of their First Amendment rights when they join the military. But when courts look at whether military rules violate those rights, they generally apply different standards than they would in civilian contexts. As the U.S. Supreme Court has reasoned, “the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,” with special disciplinary needs (Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)). So, for instance, courts have upheld military discipline against service members for speech that advocates disloyalty to the United States or expressive conduct that is disrespectful to the flag—both of which would generally be protected under the First Amendment for civilians.

Public Employees

Similarly, civilian employees don’t give up all of their free speech rights just because they work for the government. Still, public employers may discipline or fire employees for what they say, write, or post online in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has set out guidelines for deciding when government employees have the right to speak their minds without interference from their bosses, depending on the context and content of their communications.

• On-duty communications. The First Amendment doesn’t protect anything employees say or write as part of their job. This is true even when they’re communicating about important issues like government misconduct. (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).) However, even when public employees are talking about information they learned at work, the Garcetti rule won’t apply if their communications aren’t within the scope of their official duties. Some states have laws protecting whistleblowers, but their safeguards vary.
• Off-duty speech on public issues. The First Amendment might protect public employees when they speak out as private citizens about matters that would concern the general population—such as corruption, inefficiency, mismanagement, or discriminatory policies at governmental agencies. In a situation like this, courts will balance the employee’s free speech rights against the employer’s need to carry out its public service efficiently and without disruption. In practice, however, courts generally defer to the public employers’ judgment. As a result, public employees are often disciplined or fired for off-duty posts on their private social media accounts that shed a bad light on the agencies they work for.
• Public employees’ private gripes. Government employees generally don’t have a constitutional right to air their private grievances with their employers, particularly when their speech undermines office relationships and the boss’s authority.

Prisoners

Prisoners have the right to express their political views, but prison and jail administrators have a lot of leeway to restrict how and when inmates can express themselves and what they can read. Those restrictions must be related to “neutral” goals like security rather than an attempt to censor certain viewpoints. For instance, prisons can censor incoming mail, limit and monitor phone calls, and prevent prisoners from books that are dangerous or pornographic. source

Personalizing First Amendment Jurisprudence:
Shifting Audiences & Imagined Communities to Determine Message Protection in Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Defamation- Download PDF University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy

Foundations of Free Expression: Historic Cases

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed.2d. (1919): Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in this case his famous aphorism about “falsely shouting fire in a theatre” and set forth a “clear and present danger test” to judge whether speech is protected by the First Amendment. “The question,” he wrote, “is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of the defendants for conspiring to violate certain federal statutes by attempting to incite subordination in the armed forces and interfere with recruitment and enlistment. During wartime, the defendants mailed to new recruits and enlisted men leaflets that compared military conscription to involuntary servitude and urged them to assert constitutional rights.

Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927): Since Anita Whitney did not base her defense on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court, by a 7 to 2 decision, upheld her conviction of being found guilty under the California’s 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act for allegedly helping to establish the Communist Labor Party, a group the state argued taught the violent overthrow of government.

“The Whitney case is most noted for Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s concurrence, which many scholars have lauded as perhaps the greatest defense of freedom of speech ever written by a member of the high court.”–Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy. Below–all quotes from Justice Brandeis–are a few reasons why.

Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.

Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.

Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931): In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted the First and Fourteenth Amendments to forbid “previous restraints” upon publication of a newspaper. “Previous restraints”–or in current terminology, “prior restraints–suppress the freedom of the press to publish without obstruction, and recognize that lawsuits or prosecutions for libel are “subsequent punishments.” The Court invalidated as an infringement of constitutional guarantees a Minnesota statue allowing specified government officials or private citizens to maintain a lawsuit in the name of the State to suppress a public nuisance and enjoin the publication of future issues of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,” unless the publisher can prove “the truth was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.”

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d. 430 (1969): The Supreme Court established the modern version of the “clear and present danger” doctrine, holding that states only could restrict speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action.”

more on Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment

The Right to Read Freely

Evans v. Selma Union High School District of Fresno County, 222 P. 801 (Ca. 1924): The California State Supreme Court held that the King James version of the Bible was not a “publication of a sectarian, partisan, or denominational character” that a State statute required a public high school library to exclude from its collections. The “fact that the King James version is commonly used by Protestant Churches and not by Catholics” does not “make its character sectarian,” the court stated. “The mere act of purchasing a book to be added to the school library does not carry with it any implication of the adoption of the theory or dogma contained therein, or any approval of the book itself, except as a work of literature fit to be included in a reference library.”

Rosenberg v. Board of Education of City of New York, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949): After considering the charge that Oliver Twist and the Merchant of Venice are “objectionable because they tend to engender hatred of the Jew as a person and as a race,” the Supreme Court, Kings County, New York, decided that these two works cannot be banned from the New York City schools, libraries, or classrooms, declaring that the Board of Education “acted in good faith without malice or prejudice and in the best interests of the school system entrusted to their care and control, and, therefore, that no substantial reason exists which compels the suppression of the two books under consideration.”

Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 200 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972): In deciding that Slaughterhouse-Five could not be banned from the libraries and classrooms of the Michigan schools, the Court of Appeals of Michigan declared: “Vonnegut’s literary dwellings on war, religion, death, Christ, God, government, politics, and any other subject should be as welcome in the public schools of this state as those of Machiavelli, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Melville, Lenin, Joseph McCarthy, or Walt Disney. The students of Michigan are free to make of Slaughterhouse-Five what they will.”

Minarcini v. Strongsville (Ohio) City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976): The Strongsville City Board of Education rejected faculty recommendations to purchase Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 and Kurt Vonnegut’s God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater and ordered the removal of Catch-22 and Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle from the library. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled against the School Board, upholding the students’ First Amendment right to receive information and the librarian’s right to disseminate it. “The removal of books from a school library is a much more serious burden upon the freedom of classroom discussion than the action found unconstitutional in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.”

Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of the City of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978): The Chelsea, Mass. School Committee decided to bar from the high school library a poetry anthology, Male and Female under 18, because of the inclusion of an “offensive” and “damaging” poem, “The City to a Young Girl,” written by a fifteen-year-old girl. Challenged in U.S. District Court, Joseph L. Tauro ruled: “The library is ‘a mighty resource in the marketplace of ideas.’ There a student can literally explore the unknown, and discover areas of interest and thought not covered by the prescribed curriculum. The student who discovers the magic of the library is on the way to a life-long experience of self-education and enrichment. That student learns that a library is a place to test or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom. The most effective antidote to the poison of mindless orthodoxy is ready access to a broad sweep of ideas and philosophies. There is no danger from such exposure. The danger is mind control. The committee’s ban of the anthology Male and Female is enjoined.”

Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979): MS magazine was removed from a New Hampshire high school library by order of the Nashua School Board. The U.S. District Court decided for the student, teacher, and adult residents who had brought action against the school board, the court concluding: “The court finds and rules that the defendants herein have failed to demonstrate a substantial and legitimate government interest sufficient to warrant the removal of MS magazine from the Nashua High School library. Their action contravenes the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and as such it is plainly wrong.”

Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980): When the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board refused to approve Mississippi: Conflict and Change for use in Mississippi public schools, on the grounds that it was too concerned with racial matters and too controversial, the authors filed suit. U.S. District Judge Orma R. Smith ruled that the criteria used were not justifiable grounds for rejecting the book. He held that the controversial racial matter was a factor leading to its rejection, and thus the authors had been denied their constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech and the press.

Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992): In detailed analysis, the court of appeals held that a municipal public library was a limited public forum, meaning open to the public for the specified purposes of exercising their First Amendment rights to read and receive information from library materials. Such exercise could not interfere with or disrupt the library’s reasonable rules of operation. The court then upheld three library rules which: 1) required patrons to read, study, or otherwise use library materials while there; 2) prohibited noisy or boisterous activities which might disturb other patrons; and 3) permitted the removal of any patron whose offensive bodily hygiene was a nuisance to other patrons.

Case v. Unified School District No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kan. 1995): When the Olathe, Kansas, School Board voted to remove the book Annie on My Mind, a novel depicting a lesbian relationship between two teenagers, from the district’s junior and senior high school libraries, the federal district court in Kansas found they violated the students’ rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Kansas State Constitution. Despite the fact that the school board testified that they had removed the book because of “educational unsuitability,” which is within their rights under the Pico decision, it became obvious from their testimony that the book was removed because they disapproved of the book’s ideology. In addition, it was found that the school board had violated their own materials selection and reconsideration policies, which weighed heavily in the judge’s decision.

Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995): Public school district removed the book Voodoo and Hoodoo, a discussion of the origins, history, and practices of the voodoo and hoodoo religions that included an outline of some specific practices, from all district library shelves. Parents of several students sued and the district court granted summary judgment in their favor. The court of appeals reversed, finding that there was not enough evidence at that stage to determine that board members had an unconstitutional motivation, such as denying students access to ideas with which board members disagreed; the court remanded the case for a full trial at which all board members could be questioned about their reasons for removing the book. The court observed that “in light of the special role of the school library as a place where students may freely and voluntarily explore diverse topics, the school board’s non-curricular decision to remove a book well after it had been placed in the public school libraries evokes the question whether that action might not be an attempt to ‘strangle the free mind at its source.'” The court focused on some evidence that school board members had removed the book without having read it or having read only excerpts provided by the Christian Coalition. The parties settled the case before trial by returning the book to the libraries on specially designated reserve shelves.

Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, Texas, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D. Texas, 2000): City residents who were members of a church sought removal of two books, Heather Has Two Mommies and Daddy’s Roommate, because they disapproved of the books’ depiction of homosexuality. The City of Wichita Falls City Council voted to restrict access to the books if 300 persons signed a petition asking for the restriction. A separate group of citizens filed suit after the books were removed from the children’s section and placed on a locked shelf in the adult area of the library. Following a trial on the merits, the District Court permanently enjoined the city from enforcing the resolution permitting the removal of the two books. It held that the City’s resolution constituted impermissible content-based and viewpoint based discrimination; was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest; provided no standards or review process; and improperly delegated governmental authority over the selection and removal of the library’s books to any 300 private citizens who wish to remove a book from the children’s area of the Library.

Counts v. Cedarville School District, 295 F.Supp.2d 996 (W.D. Ark. 2003): The school board of the Cedarville, Arkansas school district voted to restrict students’ access to the Harry Potter books, on the grounds that the books promoted disobedience and disrespect for authority and dealt with witchcraft and the occult. As a result of the vote, students in the Cedarville school district were required to obtain a signed permission slip from their parents or guardians before they would be allowed to borrow any of the Harry Potter books from school libraries. The District Court overturned the Board’s decision and ordered the books returned to unrestricted circulation, on the grounds that the restrictions violated students’ First Amendment right to read and receive information. In so doing, the Court noted that while the Board necessarily performed highly discretionary functions related to the operation of the schools, it was still bound by the Bill of Rights and could not abridge students’ First Amendment right to read a book on the basis of an undifferentiated fear of disturbance or because the Board disagreed with the ideas contained in the book.

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION – 1st Amendment In the landmark 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case, the Supreme Court recognized that “[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points in the speech process.”

If a law restricts filming itself, one could argue that such a law “restricts a medium of expression—the use of a common instrument of communication—and thus an integral step in the speech process.”

In other words, by prohibiting someone from filming, the government is arguably prohibiting future speech (sharing or posting the video) by suppressing it at the first point in the speech process (the act of filming itself). 

The Court ultimately held in this case that the anti corruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech in question from Citizens United and that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.“

Illinois Supreme Court Strikes Down Eavesdropping Statute as Unconstitutional

People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852

This blog recently reported on developments in California regarding potential liability for businesses under California’s Call Recording and Monitoring Privacy Laws for recording or monitoring inbound and outbound telephone calls with customers or employees as well certification pitfalls to such cases.  Other states, such as Illinois, have similar criminal statutes related to the recording or monitoring of such calls.  In Illinois, for example, it is a crime for any person to record any conversation or electronic communication unless done so with the permission and consent of all parties to the communication.  See 720 ILCS 5/14-2.  While recent California opinions have curtailed the ability for plaintiffs to bring class action complaints under California’s privacy laws, the Illinois Supreme Court has gone even further.  In a pair of opinions recently released by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Clark and People v. Melongo, the Illinois eavesdropping law was declared unconstitutional as violating the overbreadth doctrine under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez

 several U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have found that the First Amendment protects the act of video recording itself, not just disseminating the recording. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has held that “[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.” Am. C.L. Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012). 

in Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private individual has the right to record police officers in public, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.

See also: Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982)

Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile (Ala.) County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987)

Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)

Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)

American Library Association v. U.S. Department of Justice and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d. 874 (1997)

Mainstream Loudoun, et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F.Supp.2d 552 (E.D. of Va. 1998)

Freedom of Expression in Schools

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d. 731 (1969): In this seminal case considering the First Amendment rights of students (John F. Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and Mary Beth Tinker) who were expelled after they wore black armbands to school in symbolic protest of the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court held that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate” and that the First Amendment protects public school students’ rights to express political and social views.

Zykan v. Warsaw (Indiana) Community School Corporation and Warsaw School Board of Trustees, 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980): A student brought suit seeking to reverse school officials’ decision to “limit or prohibit the use of certain textbooks, to remove a certain book from the school library, and to delete certain courses from the curriculum.” The district court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the school board has the right to establish a curriculum on the basis of its own discretion, but it is forbidden to impose a “pall of orthodoxy.” The right of students to file complaints was recognized, but the court held that the students’ claims “must cross a relatively high threshold before entering upon the field of a constitutional claim suitable for federal court litigation.”

Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982): In 1975, three school board members sought the removal of several books determined objectionable by a politically conservative organization. The following February, the board gave an “unofficial direction” that the books be removed from the school libraries, so that board members could read them. When the board action attracted press attention, the board described the books as “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.” The nine books that were the subject of the lawsuit were Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice; Laughing Boy by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldrige Cleaver.

The board appointed a review committee that recommended that five of the books be returned to the shelves, two be placed on restricted shelves, and two be removed from the library. The full board voted to remove all but one book. After years of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld (5-4) the students’ challenge to the board’s action. The Court held that school boards do not have unrestricted authority to select library books and that the First Amendment is implicated when books are removed arbitrarily. Justice Brennan declared in the plurality opinion: “Local school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”

Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile (Ala.) County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987): Parents and other citizens brought a lawsuit against the school board, alleging that the school system was teaching the tenets of an anti-religious religion called “secular humanism.” The complainants asked that forty-four different elementary through high school level textbooks be removed from the curriculum. After an initial ruling in a federal district court in favor of the plaintiffs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that as long as the school was motivated by a secular purpose, it didn’t matter whether the curriculum and texts shared ideas held by one or more religious groups. The Court found that the texts in question promoted important secular values (tolerance, self-respect, logical decision making) and thus the use of the textbooks neither unconstitutionally advanced a nontheistic religion nor inhibited theistic religions.

Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987): Parents and students brought this action challenging the mandatory use of certain textbooks on the ground that the texts promoted values offensive to their religious beliefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that the Constitution does not require school curricula to be revised substantially in order to accommodate religious beliefs.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988): After a school principal removed two pages containing articles, among others, on teenage pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students from a newspaper produced as part of a high school journalism class, the student staff filed suit claiming violation of their First Amendment rights. The principal defended his action on the grounds that he was protecting the privacy of the pregnant students described, protecting younger students from inappropriate references to sexual activity and birth control, and protecting the school from a potential libel action.

The Supreme Court held that the principal acted reasonably and did not violate the students’ First Amendment rights. A school need not tolerate student speech, the Court declared, “that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.” In addition, the Court found the newspaper was part of the regular journalism curriculum and subject to extensive control by a faculty member. The school, thus, did not create a public forum for the expression of ideas, but instead maintained the newspaper “as supervised learning experience for journalism students.” The Court concluded that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” The Court strongly suggested that supervised student activities that “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,” including school-sponsored publications and theatrical productions, were subject to the authority of educators. The Court cautioned, however, that this authority does not justify an educator’s attempt “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.

Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989): This case presented the question of whether the First Amendment prevents a school board from removing a previously approved textbook from an elective high school class because of objections to the material’s vulgarity and sexual explicitness. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a school board may, without contravening constitutional limits, take such action when the removal decision was “reasonably related” to the “legitimate pedagogical concern” of denying students access to “potentially sensitive topics.” The written “stipulation concerning Board Reasons” cites explicit sexuality and excessively vulgar language in two selections contained in Volume 1, The Humanities: Cultural Roots and Continuities as the basis for removal of this textbook. The two selections are Chaucer’s The Miller’s Tale and Aristophanes’s Lysistrata.

Romano v. Harrington, 725 F.Supp. 687 (E.D. N.Y. 1989): The U.S. District Court found in favor of a faculty adviser to a high-school newspaper who claimed a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments when fired following the newspaper’s publication of a student’s article opposing the federal holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr. The Court held that educators may exercise greater editorial control over what students write for class than what they voluntarily submit to extracurricular publications.

Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996): Tenured professor of English was disciplined for violating the college’s sexual harassment policy against creating a “hostile learning environment” for his in-class use of profanity, and discussions of sex, pornography, obscenity, cannibalism, and other controversial topics in a confrontational, devil’s advocate style. The court held the policy unconstitutionally vague as applied to Cohen’s in-class speech, calling it a “legalistic ambush.” In-class speech did not fall within the policy’s core definition of sexual harassment and Cohen, who had used this apparently sound and proper teaching style for year, did not know the policy would be applied to him or his teaching methods.

See also: Evans v. Selma Union High School District of Fresno County, 222 P. 801 (Ca. 1924)

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Rosenberg v. Board of Education of City of New York, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949)

Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 200 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)

Minarcini v. Strongsville (Ohio) City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976)

Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of the City of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978)

Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979)

Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980)

Case v. Unified School District No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kan. 1995)

Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995)

Counts v. Cedarville School District, 295 F.Supp.2d 996 (W.D. Ark. 2003)

Minors’ First Amendment Rights

American Amusement Machine Association, et al., v. Teri Kendrick, et al., 244 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2001); cert.denied, 534 U.S. 994; 122 S. Ct. 462; 151 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2001): Enacted in July 2001, an Indianapolis, Ind., city ordinance required video game arcade owners to limit access to games that depicted certain activities, including amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, or sexual intercourse. Only with the permission of an accompanying parent or guardian could children seventeen years old and younger play these types of video games. On March 23, 2001, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision stating that “children have First Amendment rights.” On Monday, October 29, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Interactive Digital Software Association, et al. v. St. Louis County, Missouri, et al., 329 F.3d 954(8th Cir. 2003): St. Louis County passed an ordinance banned selling or renting violent video games to minors, or permitting them to play such games, without parental consent, and video game dealers sued to overturn the law. The Court of Appeals found the ordinance unconstitutional, holding that depictions of violence alone cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity for either minors or adults, and that a government cannot silence protected speech for children by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental authority. The Court ordered the lower court to enter an injunction barring enforcement of the law, citing the Supreme Court’s recognition in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975) that “speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when the government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.”

See also: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d. 731 (1969)

Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982)

Free Press

New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d. 822 (1971): In the “Pentagon Papers” case, the U.S. government attempted to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing classified documents concerning the Vietnam War. Applying the doctrine of prior restraint from Near v. Minnesota, the Court found that the claims that publication of the documents would interfere with foreign policy and prolong the war were too speculative, and could not overcome the strong presumption against prior restraints.

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d. 41 (1988): Hustler Magazine published a parody of a liquor advertisement in which Rev. Jerry Falwell described his “first time” as a drunken encounter with his mother in an outhouse. A unanimous Supreme Court held that a public figure had to show actual malice in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of a parody in a magazine. The Court held that political cartoons and satire such as this parody “have played a prominent role in public and political debate. And although the outrageous caricature in this case “is at best a distant cousin of political cartoons,” the Court could see no standard to distinguish among types of parodies that would not harm public discourse, which would be poorer without such satire.

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d. 476 (1991): The Supreme Court struck down New York’s “Son of Sam Law,” which required book publishers to turn over to the state, any proceeds from a book written by any person convicted of a crime, related to or about that crime. The Court said the law impermissibly singled out income only from the prisoner’s expressive activity, and then only expressive activity relating to his crime, without necessarily compensating any victims of those crimes. The Court agreed that many important books–including The Autobiography of Malcolm X, Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience, and works by Martin Luther King–perhaps might not have been published with such a law in place.

See also: The New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d. 686 (1964)

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d. 789 (1974)

The Right to Dissent

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943): In 1940, the West Virginia Board of Education issued regulations requiring every schoolchild to participate daily in a salute to the flag of the United States. The Barnette children, all members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused to participate in the flag salute, consistent with the tenets of their religious beliefs, and were expelled from school. The Supreme Court struck down the regulation on the grounds that the First Amendment barred any rule compelling an individual to salute the flag or participate in the Pledge of Allegiance. In strong language, the Court affirmed the right to dissent: “But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977): A Jehovah’s Witness objected to New Hampshire’s state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on his license plate. Because the saying went against his conscience, he did not believe the state had a right to force him to advertise something the state believes in, but he does not. When the state discovered he had covered up the motto on his license plate, they prosecuted him. The Supreme Court agreed with him, saying, “We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” In addition, the Court said, “The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire’s motto is not the test; most Americans also find the flag salute acceptable. The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989): In this case the Supreme Court held that burning the United States flag was a protected form of symbolic political speech, concluding that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting the U.S.flag where the sole act in question is destroying the flag in its symbolic capacity. “A bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment is that Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”

U.S. v. Eichman and U.S. v. Haggerty, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990): The Supreme Court struck down a federal statute designed to allow the government to punish persons who burn United States flags. The Court held that the plain intent of the statute was to punish persons for political expression and that burning the flag inextricably carries with it a political message.

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed. 2d. 36 (1994): A federal court struck down a local ordinance banning the placement of signs on private property, in a challenge brought by a woman who had posted a sign on her lawn protesting the Persian Gulf War. The Court said lawn signs were a “venerable means of communication that is both unique and important,” for which “no adequate substitutes exist.”

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d. 305 (1992): St. Paul, Minnesota passed an ordinance that banned “hate speech,” any expression, such as a burning cross or swastika, that might arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, religion, or gender. The Supreme Court struck the ordinance down as unconstitutionally discriminating based on the content of expression: the law banned only fighting words that insult based on race, religion, or gender, while abusive invective aimed at someone on the basis of political affiliation or sexual orientation would be permissible. The law thus reflected only the city’s special hostility towards certain biases and not others, which is what the First Amendment forbids.

See also: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d. 731 (1969)

The Right to Free Association and the Freedom of Religion

Concerned Women for America, Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989): The County library that had permitted various groups to use its auditorium had created a designated public forum and thus could not deny access to groups whose meetings had political or religious content. Such a denial would be based on the content of speech and would be permissible only as the least restrictive means to serve a compelling interest. Preventing disruption or interference with general use of the library could be such an interest; library officials’ first step to controlling such disruptions would be to impose reasonable regulations on the time, place, or manner of the auditorium’s use, provided the regulations apply regardless of the subject matter of the speech.

Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d. 352 (1993): The Court held that a school district that opened its classrooms after hours to a range of groups for social, civic, and recreational purposes, including films and lectures about a range of issues such as family values and child-rearing, could not deny access to a religious organization to discuss the same, permissible issues from a religious point of view. Whether or not the classrooms were public fora, the school district could not deny use based on the speaker’s point of view on an otherwise permissible topic.

Right to Privacy and Anonymity

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 55, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969): A man found to possess obscene materials in his home for his private use was convicted of possessing obscene materials in violation of the state laws of Georgia. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one’s privacy on the grounds that the government “cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”

McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d. 426 (1995): The Supreme Court struck down a state law banning distribution of anonymous campaign literature, emphasizing the long tradition of anonymous and pseudonymous political and literary speech and recognizing the right to exercise First Amendment rights anonymously as an “honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.”

Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. Sup. Ct., 2002): The Colorado Supreme Court reversed a court decision that required Denver’s Tattered Cover Book Store to turn over information about books purchased by one of its customers. As part of an investigation, officers of the City of Thornton (Colo.) discovered two books on the manufacture of amphetamines in a suspect’s residence and found a Tattered Cover mailer in the garbage. The officers, seeking to tie the books to the suspect directly, served a Drug Enforcement Agency subpoena on the Tattered Cover. The subpoena demanded the title of the books corresponding to the order and invoice numbers of the mailer, as well as information about all other books ever ordered by the suspect. The Tattered Cover then brought suit to litigate the validity of the search warrant. The court began its opinion by stating that both the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution protect an individual’s fundamental right to purchase books anonymously, free from governmental interference.

When Is Speech Unprotected?

Obscenity and Indecency

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 1 L. Ed. 2d 412, 77 S. Ct. 524 (1957): A man convicted of selling “a book containing obscene, immoral, lewd, lascivious language, or descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth” to a police officer appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court. The Court overturned the conviction and struck down the law, holding that the state’s attempt to quarantine the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women to read in order to shield juvenile innocence “is to burn the house to roast the pig.” Famously, the Court ruled that the state of Michigan could not “reduce[s] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.”

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 62, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968): The Supreme Court upheld a New York State statute barring retailers from selling sexually explicit publications to minors under the age of 17. Noting that the statute did not interfere with the right of adults to purchase and read such materials, it found that it was not constitutionally impermissible for New York to restrict minors rights to such publications in light of the state’s interest in safeguarding children’s welfare and supporting parents’ claim to authority in the rearing of their children.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d. 419 (1973): In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court mapped out its famous three-part definition of obscenity. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, must find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests; second, that it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as defined by state law; and third, that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Court ruled that community standards and state statutes that describe sexual depictions to be suppressed could be used to prosecute Miller, who operated one of the largest West Coast mail order businesses dealing in sexually explicit materials.

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982): In July 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court added child pornography as another category of speech excluded from First Amendment protection. The other categories excluded are obscenity, defamation, incitement, and “fighting words.” The ruling came in the case when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a conviction against Ferber for showing a movie depicting two young boys masturbating. The film itself was not seen as obscene for adults, but the Court made the distinction between what was obscene if children were the participants compared with if adults were the leading actors.

American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.), aff’d., 475 U.S. 1001, 106 S.Ct. 1172, 89 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986): The city of Indianapolis passed a statute outlawing pornography, defined as the graphic, sexually explicit subordination of women, presenting women as sex objects, or as enjoying pain, humiliation, or servility. The court of appeals struck the law down, saying it impermissibly established an “approved” view of women and how they react in sexual encounters. The law therefore allowed sexually explicit words and images that adhered to that approved view, but banned sexually explicit words and images that did not adhere to the approved view. The court called this “thought control,” saying the “Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents.”

National Endowment for the Arts, et al. v. Finley, et al., 524 U.S. 569, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1998): In 1990, homoerotic photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe and blasphemous ones by Andres Serrano created a furor on Capitol Hill, because both artists had received grants from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). As a consequence, the NEA governing statute was amended to require the NEA to consider “decency” and “respect” for American “values” when selecting future grant recipients. Shortly thereafter, performance artists Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller were denied fellowships, because of the “decency and respect” clause, they alleged. They made this allegation in a federal court lawsuit seeking to have the clause declared unconstitutional; and they were successful at the district court and court of appeals level. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, however, that the statute is constitutional “on its face.” Writing for the court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not “perceive a realistic danger that it will be utilized to preclude or punish the expression of particular views,” nor did she think that the statute would “significantly compromise First Amendment values.”

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al. v. Free Speech Coalition, et al., 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403, (2002): The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 on the grounds that the act’s ban on any depiction of pornographic images of children, including computer-generated images, was overly broad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote: “First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”

See also: Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 55, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969)

Libel

The New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d. 686 (1964): To protect “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues, the Supreme Court held that no public official may recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’–that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” The Court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that critics of official conduct have the “fair equivalent” to the immunity protection given to a public official when he is sued for defamatory speech uttered in the course of his duties.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d. 789 (1974): The Court applied the rule in the New York Times case to public figures, finding that persons who have special prominence in society by virtue of their fame or notoriety, even if they are not public officials, must prove “actual malice” when alleging libel. Gertz was a prominent lawyer who alleged that a leaflet defamed him.

See also: Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d. 41 (1988)

Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.​

KRANTZ v. CITY OF FORT SMITH United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. No. 97-3359. Decided: November 30, 1998

1. are not facially invalid on First Amendment overbreadth grounds,

2. are not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs, and

3. were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose.   In addition, defendant the City of Dyer challenges plaintiffs' standing.   
   For the reasons stated below, we hold that plaintiffs have standing to sue the City of Dyer. We further hold that the 
   ordinances are unconstitutional because they are facially overbroad restrictions on free speech.   Accordingly, we do not 
   reach the remaining issues raised on appeal.   The judgments of the district court are reversed, and the case is remanded 
   to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
   

The First Amendment and New Technologies

Broadcast and Cable Communications

FCC V. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978): In a case that considered the First Amendment protections extended to a radio station’s daytime broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s “Seven Filthy Words” monologue, the Supreme Court held that Section 326 of the Telecommunications Act, which prohibits the FCC from censoring broadcasts over radio or television, does not limit the FCC’s authority to sanction radio or television stations broadcasting material that is obscene, indecent, or profane. Though the censorship ban under Section 326 precludes editing proposed broadcasts in advance, the ban does not deny the FCC the power to review the content of completed broadcasts. In its decision, the Court concluded that broadcast materials have limited First Amendment protection because of the uniquely pervasive presence that radio and television occupy in the lives of people, and the unique ability of children to access radio and television broadcasts.

Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 135 L.Ed.2d. 288 (1996): In a decision that produced six opinions, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law permitting cable system operators to ban “indecent” or “patently offensive” speech on leased access channels. The Court also struck down a similar law for non-leased, public access channels, and struck down a law requiring indecent material to be shown on separate, segregated cable channels. The case is significant in that the Court affirmed that protecting children from some speech is a compelling state interest.

United States, et al. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000): On May 22, in a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a U.S. District Court decision that Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 violated the First Amendment when it sought to restrict certain cable channels with sexually explicit content to late night hours unless they fully scrambled their signal bleed. In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court ruled that the government may have a legitimate interest in protecting children from exposure to “indecent material.” Section 505, however, is a content-based speech restriction and, therefore, must be the least restrictive means for meeting the governmental interest. The court found that Section 505 is not the least restrictive means.

Telecommunications

Sable Communications of California, Inc v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989): The Supreme Court overturned a Telecommunications Act ban on indecent telephone messages, concluding the law violates the First Amendment because the statute’s denial of adult access to such messages far exceeds that which is necessary to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to the messages. Unlike broadcast radio and television, which can intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning of content and which is uniquely accessible to children, telephone communications require the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communications. The failure of the Government to show any findings that would justify a conclusion that there are no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors, such as scrambling or the use of access codes, demonstrates that a total ban on such communications goes too far in restricting constitutionally protected speech. To allow the ban to stand would have the effect of “limiting the content of adult telephone communications to that which is suitable for children to hear.”

The Internet

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis – First Amendment

A Colorado law would have forced web designer Lorie Smith and her studio, 303 Creative, to design and publish websites promoting messages that violate her religious beliefs.

American Library Association v. U.S. Department of Justice and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d. 874 (1997): In a 9-0 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26, 1997, declared unconstitutional a federal law making it a crime to send or display indecent material on line in a way available to minors. The decision in the consolidated cases completed a successful challenge to the so-called Communications Decency Act by the Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition, in which the American Library Association and the Freedom to Read Foundation played leading roles. The Court held that speech on the Internet is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection, similar to the protection the Court gives to books and newspapers.

Mainstream Loudoun, et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F.Supp.2d 552 (E.D. of Va. 1998): Adopted in 1997, the Loudoun County, Va., Library Board’s “Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment” was designed to prevent adult and minor Internet users from accessing illegal pornography and to avoid the creation of a sexually hostile environment. To accomplish these goals, the board contracted with Log-On Data Corporation, a filtering software manufacturer that offers a product called “X-Stop.” Though Log-On Data Corp. refused to divulge the method by which X-Stop filters sites, it soon became apparent that the software blocks some sites that are not prohibited by the policy. Shortly after the adoption of the policy, People for the American Way Foundation commenced litigation on behalf of several Loudoun County residents and members of a nonprofit organization, claiming the policy violates the right to free speech under the First Amendment. The suit was predicated on the theory that the policy is unnecessarily restrictive, because it treats adults and children similarly, and precludes access to legitimate as well as pornographic material. On November 23, 1998, Judge Leonie Brinkema declared that the highly restrictive Loudoun County Internet policy was invalid under the free speech provisions of the First Amendment.

United States, et al. v. American Library Association, Inc. et al., 539 U.S. 194, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003): The Supreme Court upheld the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which requires libraries receiving federal funds for Internet access to install filters so that both adult and child patrons cannot access materials considered obscene, child pornography, or “harmful to minors.” Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the court that the law, on its face, is Constitutional. Speaking for a plurality of four justices, Rehnquist held that CIPA was a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power and did not impose an unconstitutional condition on public libraries that received federal assistance for Internet access because Congress could reasonably impose limitations on its Internet assistance, and because any concerns over filtering software’s alleged tendency to erroneously “overblock” access to constitutionally protected speech were dispelled by the ease with which library patrons could have the filtering software disabled. Justices Kennedy and Breyer concurred with the judgment, holding that CIPA, while raising First Amendment concerns, did not violate the First Amendment as long as adult library users could request that the Internet filter be disabled without delay.

Freedom of Speech and the Press

Express Unpopular Views – Rule of Law – Snyder v. Phelps  First Amendment Landmark Supreme Court case: Snyder v. Phelps 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)(link is external)

Express Unpopular Views – Rule of Law Texas v. Johnson First Amendment Landmark Supreme Court case: Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

Click to learn more on why Speech Is Not Violence and Violence Is Not Speech

Related Court Cases

Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore is a complaint filed by the mother of a 12-year-old who allegedly used public library Internet access to download and distribute sexually explicit materials. The case was settled in favor of the library. See Kathleen R.

The Consumer Review Fairness Act – What It Is & Why It Matters

What is California’s Filing Deadline for a Defamation Claim ?

U.S. Supreme Court Links

 The Supreme Court of the United States Home Page

The Federal Judiciary Home Page

Oyez Oyez Oyez, Northwestern University

Supreme Court Decisions, Findlaw

Findlaw First Amendment Annotations Expanded

• Freedom of Expression–Speech and Press
• Freedom of Expression–The Philosophical Basis
• Freedom of Expression: Is There a Difference Between Speech and Press?
• The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
• Obscenity and Prior Restraint
• Subsequent Punishment: Clear and Present Danger and Other Tests
• Freedom of Belief
• Right of Association
• Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment
• Particular Governmental Regulations Which Restrict Expression
• Government Restraint of Content of Expression
• Invasion of Privacy
• Obscenity
• Non-obscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expression
• Speech Plus–The Constitutional Law of Leafleting, Picketing, and Demonstrating

See also U.S. Constitution: First Amendment Annotations from FindLaw

sourced

God leaves NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND, it’s the child who refuses to return to his Father!

Our Father is always available, never drunk, never lies, never allows any harm to his children… (a perfect father, hence the name God, the creator)
the harm that one may perceive is not harm but an awakening, if you join with him by asking for his help
pray with good intent in your heart, believe like you once believed in Santa! That means NO DOUBT, 100% PURE TRUST in him!
He never lies, He will deliver! God, through Jesus and only him will give you what you need when you need it!

Gospel Mt 11:28-30

“Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened,
and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you and learn from me,
for I am meek and humble of heart;
and you will find rest for yourselves.
For my yoke is easy, and my burden light.”

Trust God!

He Lives in Those Whom Invite Their Father In

Nothing Formed Against You Shall Prosper !

DUE PROCESS READS>>>>>>

Due Process vs Substantive Due Process learn more HERE

Understanding Due Process  – This clause caused over 200 overturns in just DNA alone Click Here

Mathews v. Eldridge – Due Process – 5th, & 14th Amendment

 Mathews Test – 3 Part Test– Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test

“Unfriending” Evidence – 5th Amendment

At the Intersection of Technology and Law

What Is Traversing a Warrant (a Franks Motion)?

Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar – Police Warrant – Immunity Fail – 4th, 5th, & 14th Amendment

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?

ARE PEOPLE LYING ON YOU?
CAN YOU PROVE IT? IF YES…. THEN YOU ARE IN LUCK!

Penal Code 115 PC – Filing a False Document in California

Penal Code 118 PC – California Penalty of “Perjury” Law

Federal Perjury – Definition by Law

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Crimes Against Public Justice

Penal Code 118.1 PC – Police Officer$ Filing False Report$

Spencer v. Peters– Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment

Lying Cop or Citizen – PC 129 – Preparing False Statement or Report Under Oath

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Penal Code 135 PC – Destroying or Concealing Evidence

Lying Cop or Citizen – PC 129 – Preparing False Statement or Report Under Oath

Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

Penal Code 142 PC – Peace Officer Refusing to Arrest or Receive Person Charged with Criminal Offense

PC 146 Penal Code – False Arrest

Penal Code 148.5 PC –  Making a False Police Report in California

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code § 236 PC – False Imprisonment

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

Penal Code 32 PC – Accessory After the Fact

What is Abuse of Process? 

What is a Due Process Violation? – 4th Amendment & 14th Amendment

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

The Use and Abuse of Power by Prosecutors (Justice for All)

 Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983 – Recoverable Damage$

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Right$

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of Right$ Under Color of Law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against Right$

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

 Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct? (Tort Claim Forms here as well)

Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

What is Sua Sponte and How is it Used in a California Court? 

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case 

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

How to Recover “Punitive Damages” in a California Personal Injury Case

Pro Se Forms and Forms Information(Tort Claim Forms here as well)

What is Tort?

Tort Claims Form
File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (see below)

Federal –  Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages

How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines
Subject to Open Records Requests

case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government  Employees

Public Records Practices After the San Jose Decision

The Decision Briefing Merits After the San Jose Decision

Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule – Confronting Evidence

Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence

Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims

Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Section 832.7 – Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records

Senate Bill No. 1421 – California Public Records Act

Assembly Bill 748 Makes Video Evidence Captured by Police Agencies Subject to Disclosure as Public Records

SB 2, Creating Police Decertification Process and Expanding Civil Liability Exposure

The Right To Know: How To Fulfill The Public’s Right Of Access To Police Records

How Access to California Police Records

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department SB-1421 Records

 SB1421 – Form Access to California Police Records

California Statewide CPRA Requests Submit a CPRA Request 

Electronic Audio Recording Request of OC Court Hearings

Here is the Public Records Service Act Portal for all of CALIFORNIA Click Here

Police BodyCam Footage Release

GRANDPARENT CASE LAW 

Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
Family Law Packet SB Resource Center

Motion to vacate an adverse judgment

Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?

Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848

Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

Download Here this Recommended Citation

]]> https://goodshepherdmedia.net/the-first-amendment/ Fri, 13 May 2022 02:01:37 +0000 https://goodshepherdmedia.net/?p=2329 https://goodshepherdmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Tom-Petty-And-The-Heartbreakers-I-Wont-Back-Down.mp3

The First Amendment – Amendment I

The First Amendment provides that Congress make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise. It protects freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Can You Annoy the Government? click to learn mope

U.S. Supreme Court

• Miller v. US, 230 F 486 at 489 The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.
• Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 178 (1886) An unconstitutional “law ” is not a law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.
• Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States
• State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
• Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425 p. 442. “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
• Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp., 813, 816 (1947) U.S.D.C. — So. Dist. CA. History is clear that the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted to secure certain common law rights of the people, against invasion by the Federal Government.”
• SIMMONS v US, supra. “We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”
• Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989)
  When Congress acted to restrict this growing industry, Sable Communications filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene and indecent portions of Section 223(b). The district court denied the injunction, upheld the obscenity portion, and struck down the indecency section of Section 223(b).
• United States Supreme Court Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. overly broad and violative of the First Amendment” State v. Rosenfeld 62 N.J. 594 (1973) 303 A.2d 889
• Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
• Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 (1971),  The Supreme Court established that the government generally cannot criminalize the display of profane words in public places. The Court rejected a fighting words application to a young man who wore a leather jacket with the words “fuck the draft” on it in a public courthouse.

   Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
   make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. 
   Pp. 403 U. S. 22-26. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed.

  HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, J., joined, and in which WHITE, J., joined in part, post, p. 403 U. S. 27.
  

• People v. Boomer (Mich. Ct. App.) (2002) “Allowing a prosecution where one utters ‘insulting’ language could possibly subject a vast percentage of the populace to a misdemeanor conviction,”
  
• A.V v St Paul 1992 Justices ruled as unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance classifying as hate speechwords “that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ”
• Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) Police officers should not be considered “fighting words,” because police officers are trained to exercise a higher degree of constraint than the average citizen.
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
  speech on the Internetis entitled to the same high degree of First Amendment protection extended to the print media as opposed to the reduced level given the broadcast media.
• Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir.) (2015)
  The case stands for the principle that the First Amendment protects unpopular speech and that government officials should not sanction a heckler’s veto.
• Albert Krantz v. City of Fort Smith
  A 1998 decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the distribution and posting of flyers and leaflets. In this ruling informed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.
• Lucas v. Arkansas (1974)416 U.S. 919 (1974)
  The single-sentence Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974), vacated and remanded this case, along with Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California, and Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, to a state court for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974). Court remanded convictions after saying ordinance prohibiting fighting words violated First Amendment
• Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) authorities asked him to stop on the basis that others had complained and that the college prohibited any such speech that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).”
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974)  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 overturned a woman’s conviction for cursing at police. Lewis had overturned a New Orleans ordinance on the basis that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by being overbroad in its attempt to prohibit vulgar and offensive speech and “fighting words,” as recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) and Gooding v. Wilson (1972).
• City of Houston v. Hill (1987)  In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Supreme Court found a city ordinance prohibiting verbal abuse of police officers to be unconstitutionally overbroad and a criminalization of protected speech.
  
  
• STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Darren J. DRAHOTA – Darren Drahota sent a couple of anonymous insulting emails to William Avery, Drahota’s former political science professor, who was running for the Nebraska Legislature at the time. (Avery was eventually elected and served two terms.) Drahota was convicted of disturbing the peace for sending those emails, but the conviction was reversed in 2010 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. (I have a soft spot in my heart for this case, because it was the first First Amendment case I ever argued in court.)
• STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. William James FRATZKE, Appellant –  William Fratzke was convicted of harassment “because he wrote a nasty letter to a state highway patrolman to protest a speeding ticket.” The Iowa Supreme Court (1989) reversed, on First Amendment grounds.
• State of Wisconsin v. Thomas G. Smith – Thomas Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct and “unlawful use of a computerized communication system” for leaving two vulgar, insulting comments on a police department’s Facebook page. A one-judge Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision (2014) reversed. (Note that such insults aren’t unprotected “fighting words” because they aren’t face-to-face and thus aren’t likely to lead to an immediate fight.)
• Commonwealth v. Bigelow – Harvey Bigelow sent two letters to Michael Costello, an elected town council member; both were insulting, and one was vulgar. Bigelow was convicted of criminal harassment, but the Massachusetts high court (2016) reversed: “Because these letters were directed at an elected political official and primarily discuss issues of public concern — Michael’s qualifications for and performance as a selectman — the letters fall within the category of constitutionally protected political speech at the core of the First Amendment.” And this was true even though the letters were sent to him at home.  the case law link was above, but you can actually read the newspaper article of his exact doings here
• People v. Powers, (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158,166. (“We conclude that the recordings appellant left on the customer service line cannot constitute substantial evidence that appellant violated section 653m, subdivision (a) [California’s annoying phone calls law]. The messages are annoying rants concerning customer service. It is reasonable for someone to be annoyed by appellant’s language. But the vulgarities uttered cannot be described as obscene, especially in the context of a customer service line maintained to take complaints. Except in extreme cases, we doubt that a person whose job it is to receive consumer complaints has a right to privacy against unwanted intrusion.”) THE PEOPLE,  v. DAVID THOMAS POWERS  determined although they may be a little annoying they were NOT ILLEGAL!

• Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach Supreme Court considers free speech vs. retaliatory arrests

• Ion Popa left seven messages containing racist insults on the answering machine of the head federal prosecutor in D.C. — Eric Holder, who eventually became attorney general. He was convicted of telephone harassment, which banned all anonymous calls made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”

  But the D.C. Circuit (1989) expressly held that the First Amendment prevented the statute from applying to “public or political discourse,”
   such as condemnation of political officials (even left expressly for that official).
  

Right to Record Government Officials Engaged in the Exercise of their Official Duties

Watch this different display of US RIGHTS in a JERSEY OFFICIAL MEETING by ANGRY CONSTITUTIONALIST https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wUH7GJjlYQ

 It doesn’t look like our constitutional right of freedom of the press is going away any time soon.

FLYER & NEWS WEBSITE LAW

Flyers  Handbills/ Leaflets - US constitutional rights, Freedom of Speech & Press

There shall be no Law passed to abridge or restrain freedom of speech or the press. Freedom of speech encompasses all manner of expression, both verbal and non-verbal

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS DEFINITION

The freedom of communication and expression through media and/or published material.  Flyers are communication and expression through published media material.

HANDBILL DEFINITION

A single page leaflet advertising events, services or other activities. Flyers are typically used by individuals or business’ to promote their product or services. They are a form of mass marketing or small scale community communication.  Information News Flyers are a legal form of community communication handbills by definition. A Website is a Digital Handbill of leaflet, it is the digital form of handing them out, how else could one get a peacefully assembly organized in todays society 2022

LITTER DEFINITION

Litter consists of waste products.  Information News Flyers (same as LA Times or LA Weekly or other Leaflet Information/News)  are not waste products or litter by legal definition and to claim or mislead holds no water to the law.  Flyers are not trash by legal definition and to mislead and claim they are would hold no water to the law.

TRASH DEFINITION

Unwanted or undesired waste material.

The freedom of communication and expression through media and/or published material. Flyers are communication and expression through published or printed media material.

FLYERS/LEAFLETS/HANDBILLS/ = MODERN DAY WEBPAGE

TODAY WE USE SOCIAL MEDIA OR WEBPAGES TO CATCH EYEBALLS ATTENTION TO OUR CAUSE, THE BEHAVIOR IS THE MODERN DIGITAL FORM OF LEAFLETS 

an in-depth article can be found below regarding

Freedom of the Religion, Speech & Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly

Freedom of the Press – Flyers, Newspaper, Leaflets, Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment

What Does An Asian American Band Called THE SLANTS Have To Do With Telling Police FUCK YOU?

Insulting letters to politician’s home are constitutionally protected, unless they are ‘true threats’

DUE PROCESS READS>>>>>>

Due Process vs Substantive Due Process learn more HERE

Understanding Due Process  – This clause caused over 200 overturns in just DNA alone Click Here

Mathews v. Eldridge – Due Process – 5th, & 14th Amendment

 Mathews Test – 3 Part Test– Amdt5.4.5.4.2 Mathews Test

“Unfriending” Evidence – 5th Amendment

At the Intersection of Technology and Law

What Is Traversing a Warrant (a Franks Motion)?

Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar – Police Warrant – Immunity Fail – 4th, 5th, & 14th Amendment

Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Process

What Is Considered Obstruction of Justice in California?

ARE PEOPLE LYING ON YOU?
CAN YOU PROVE IT? IF YES…. THEN YOU ARE IN LUCK!

Penal Code 115 PC – Filing a False Document in California

Penal Code 118 PC – California Penalty of “Perjury” Law

Federal Perjury – Definition by Law

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Crimes Against Public Justice

Penal Code 118.1 PC – Police Officer$ Filing False Report$

Spencer v. Peters– Police Fabrication of Evidence – 14th Amendment

Lying Cop or Citizen – PC 129 – Preparing False Statement or Report Under Oath

Penal Code 132 PC – Offering False Evidence

Penal Code 134 PC – Preparing False Evidence

Penal Code 135 PC – Destroying or Concealing Evidence

Lying Cop or Citizen – PC 129 – Preparing False Statement or Report Under Oath

Penal Code 141 PC – Planting or Tampering with Evidence in California

Penal Code 142 PC – Peace Officer Refusing to Arrest or Receive Person Charged with Criminal Offense

PC 146 Penal Code – False Arrest

Penal Code 148.5 PC –  Making a False Police Report in California

Misuse of the Warrant System – California Penal Code § 170

Penal Code 182 PC – “Criminal Conspiracy” Laws & Penalties

Penal Code § 236 PC – False Imprisonment

Penal Code 664 PC – “Attempted Crimes” in California

Penal Code 31 PC – Aiding and Abetting Laws

Penal Code 32 PC – Accessory After the Fact

What is Abuse of Process? 

What is a Due Process Violation? – 4th Amendment & 14th Amendment

What’s the Difference between Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest?

Defeating Extortion and Abuse of Process in All Their Ugly Disguises

The Use and Abuse of Power by Prosecutors (Justice for All)

 Under 42 U.S.C. $ection 1983 – Recoverable Damage$

42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil Action for Deprivation of Right$

18 U.S. Code § 242 – Deprivation of Right$ Under Color of Law

18 U.S. Code § 241 – Conspiracy against Right$

Section 1983 Lawsuit – How to Bring a Civil Rights Claim

 Suing for Misconduct – Know More of Your Right$

Police Misconduct in California – How to Bring a Lawsuit

How to File a complaint of Police Misconduct? (Tort Claim Forms here as well)

Deprivation of Rights – Under Color of the Law

What is Sua Sponte and How is it Used in a California Court? 

Removing Corrupt Judges, Prosecutors, Jurors
and other Individuals & Fake Evidence from Your Case 

Anti-SLAPP Law in California

Freedom of Assembly – Peaceful Assembly – 1st Amendment Right

How to Recover “Punitive Damages” in a California Personal Injury Case

Pro Se Forms and Forms Information(Tort Claim Forms here as well)

What is Tort?

Tort Claims Form
File Government Claim for Eligible Compensation

Complete and submit the Government Claim Form, including the required $25 filing fee or Fee Waiver Request, and supporting documents, to the GCP.

See Information Guides and Resources below for more information.

Tort Claims – Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (see below)

Federal –  Federal SF-95 Tort Claim Form Tort Claim online here or download it here or here from us

California – California Tort Claims Act – California Tort Claim Form Here or here from us

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint) and also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PDF

Taken from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Forms source

WRITS and WRIT Types in the United States

Can I Use Text Messages in My California Divorce?

Two-Steps And Voila: How To Authenticate Text Messages

How Your Texts Can Be Used As Evidence?

California Supreme Court Rules:
Text Messages Sent on Private Government Employees Lines
Subject to Open Records Requests

case law: City of San Jose v. Superior Court – Releasing Private Text/Phone Records of Government  Employees

Public Records Practices After the San Jose Decision

The Decision Briefing Merits After the San Jose Decision

Rules of Admissibility – Evidence Admissibility

Confrontation Clause – Sixth Amendment

Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule – Confronting Evidence

Prosecutor’s Obligation to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Successful Brady/Napue Cases – Suppression of Evidence

Cases Remanded or Hearing Granted Based on Brady/Napue Claims

Unsuccessful But Instructive Brady/Napue Cases

ABA – Functions and Duties of the Prosecutor – Prosecution Conduct

Frivolous, Meritless or Malicious Prosecution – fiduciary duty

Section 832.7 – Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records

Senate Bill No. 1421 – California Public Records Act

Assembly Bill 748 Makes Video Evidence Captured by Police Agencies Subject to Disclosure as Public Records

SB 2, Creating Police Decertification Process and Expanding Civil Liability Exposure

The Right To Know: How To Fulfill The Public’s Right Of Access To Police Records

How Access to California Police Records

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department SB-1421 Records

 SB1421 – Form Access to California Police Records

California Statewide CPRA Requests Submit a CPRA Request 

Electronic Audio Recording Request of OC Court Hearings

Here is the Public Records Service Act Portal for all of CALIFORNIA Click Here

Police BodyCam Footage Release

GRANDPARENT CASE LAW 

Do Grandparents Have Visitation Rights? If there is an Established Relationship then Yes

Third “PRESUMED PARENT” Family Code 7612(C) – Requires Established Relationship Required

Cal State Bar PDF to read about Three Parent Law –
The State Bar of California family law news issue4 2017 vol. 39, no. 4.pdf

Distinguishing Request for Custody from Request for Visitation

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) – Grandparents – 14th Amendment

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

9.32 Particular Rights – Fourteenth Amendment – Interference with Parent / Child Relationship

Child’s Best Interest in Custody Cases

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate? – Reason for Joinder

Joinder In Family Law Cases – CRC Rule 5.24

GrandParents Rights To Visit
Family Law Packet OC Resource Center
Family Law Packet SB Resource Center

Motion to vacate an adverse judgment

Mandatory Joinder vs Permissive Joinder – Compulsory vs Dismissive Joinder

When is a Joinder in a Family Law Case Appropriate?

Kyle O. v. Donald R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 848

Punsly v. Ho (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1099

Zauseta v. Zauseta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1242

S.F. Human Servs. Agency v. Christine C. (In re Caden C.)

Ian J. v. Peter M

Download Here this Recommended Citation

“Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened,
and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you and learn from me,
for I am meek and humble of heart;
and you will find rest for yourselves.
For my yoke is easy, and my burden light.”