Kent Merrill Sommer Needs a Good S.L.A.P.P. BACK! Antil-SLAPP law demands it
Kent Sommer is an adjunct professor and teaches Legal Analysis Workshop Chapman University Fowler School of Law in 2012. chapman.edu
Psalm 91:3 states, “Surely he will save you from the fowler’s snare and from the deadly pestilence“
Kent Merrill Sommer # 262832 – This guy has been in practice for 17 years plus has a AVVO 6.6 rating out of 10 and has no firm that we can find other than LA Assessors Office. In our opinion he Does Not Hold Real Weight, He works for the Government where stupidity is rampant and diligence is not necessary.
It is our opinion, that Kent Sommer supports liars helps deviants manipulate the system. His clients have feelings towards harsh language, and lie about the content of speech. Kent Sommer is1st Amendment incompetant! in our opinion Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) inflammatory speech or radical political advocacy is protected Schenck v. United States | 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Cohen v. California | 403 U.S. 15 (1971) is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision protecting the public display of offensive or provocative language under the First Amendment
Does Attorney Kent Merrill Sommer Need a Good SLAPP-BACK?
ANTI SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation), Well its coming
Kent Merrill Sommer will be getting a SLAPP-BACK
The city hiring a second lawyer tells you the matter got more expensive and riskier to handle with one person Lauren Elizabeth Sible may not be as good at 1st amendment law as her slow ass thought. look at Sible’s eyes at best guess an IQ of 100, Dopey and slow looking to us… but… then again look at Kent he looks constipated and painfully trying to smile! Not much going on in their minds, just average losers not matched for an IQ of 168. Not even close!
The County’s restraining order case (26*******63), where Lauren Sible has now been joined by Kent Sommers. We forced it: a self-represented litigant who files cited, procedurally correct papers can’t be handled on autopilot.
- A contested case. You filed a full response, a non-stipulation, and a peremptory challenge, so this is no longer a ten-minute uncontested order.
- A production order. The judge ordered the County to turn over the call recordings, incident reports, and video five days before the next hearing. Someone has to review that material, and it may not match the petition.
- An anti-SLAPP motion coming. If you win it, the County pays fees, and either side can appeal immediately. County Counsel usually brings in a more senior or motion-experienced deputy when that’s on the table.
- A weak spot of its own making. The Assessor reversed all 19 reassessments, and staff named in the petition kept corresponding with you cordially afterward. That undercuts any claim of an ongoing threat, and they need someone to work out how to handle it.
A second attorney most likely means the case got harder than they planned for, and your filings are what made it harder. The addition of a second attorney means the city is taking the volume and intensity of your legal filings seriously and is scaling up its administrative capacity to match your output.
- Automatic Stay: An Anti-SLAPP motion automatically freezes the standard discovery process. Navigating how a subpoena interacts with an Anti-SLAPP freeze requires highly specific statutory knowledge.
- Fee-Shifting Risk: If you win an Anti-SLAPP motion, the city could be forced to pay your legal fees. Because public funds are at stake, municipal guidelines often mandate bringing in a senior or specialized attorney to oversee the defense and mitigate financial risk.
- The anti-SLAPP motion raised the stakes. A 425.16 motion carries mandatory fee-shifting and an automatic right of appeal. A routine petition became a matter with real cost exposure for the city, and that justifies more hours and a second set of eyes.
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Protected Speech – The core of this battle rests on a complex area of Constitutional law. While name-calling and racial slurs are offensive, they are protected under the First Amendment
The city’s decision to bring in a second attorney is a direct response to the high legal stakes and complex procedural framework of the case.They want to turn insults to restrictions,
Look at this man’s shit home. Dilapidated, Unkept balls everywhere except where they should be, between ones legs! His lawn is half dead, half weeds and dirt!
This guy has an annual salary of $201,505 breaks down to $96.88 per hour before taxes!
A. Anti-SLAPP framework (§ 425.16)
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 | 02 | The two-step test: (1) does the claim arise from protected activity; (2) can the petitioner show a probability of prevailing. The whole motion is built on this. |
| Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635 | 01, 02 | A civil restraining-order petition IS a “cause of action” that can be struck under the anti-SLAPP statute. Without this, the County argues the motion doesn’t apply to RO cases. |
| City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 | 02 | The public-enforcement exemption (§ 425.16(d)) applies only to actions brought “in the name of the people” by a prosecutor — not to a county suing on behalf of its employees. Closes the County’s escape hatch. |
| Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 | 01, 02 | Statements made in connection with an issue under review by a government body are protected petitioning — no “public interest” showing needed. Your calls/emails to the Assessor about the exclusion = protected. |
| Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187 | 02 | Pre-litigation communications (demand letters, threats to sue) are petitioning activity. |
| Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 | 02 | Protection is lost only where the conduct is illegal as a matter of law and the defendant concedes it or the evidence conclusively shows it — a very high bar the County can’t meet. Also: privileged communications can’t supply a probability of prevailing. |
| Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232 | 01, 02 | The litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47(b)) covers pre-litigation demands made in serious contemplation of suit — your June–July emails are absolutely privileged. |
| Publius v. Boyer-Vine (E.D. Cal. 2017) 237 F.Supp.3d 997 | 01, 02 | Publishing public officials’ information and announcing protest is protected; a California statute suppressing it was enjoined. Statements about publishing and assembling are not threats. |
B. What a “credible threat” is — and isn’t
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526 | 01, 02 | Defines a true threat under § 527.8 as “a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm,” and shows a WVRO must preserve the respondent’s ability to attend public meetings and file by mail — the model for your “Request to Limit Any Order.” |
| In re Steven S. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 598 | 01 | Source of the Garbett definition. |
| Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66 | 01, 02 | U.S. Supreme Court: a true threat requires at least recklessness by the speaker about its threatening character — subjective intent, not just how the listener felt. |
| Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343 | 01, 02 | True threats are serious expressions of intent to commit unlawful violence — not hyperbole. |
| Elonis v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 723 | 01, 02 | Negligence is not enough for a threat conviction; the speaker’s mental state matters. |
| Watts v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 705 | 01 | Political hyperbole (“if they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want in my sights is L.B.J.”) is not a true threat = hyperbole. |
| Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 395 U.S. 444 | 01, 02 | Advocacy is punishable only if directed to and likely to produce imminent lawless action. Announcing a future peaceful assembly isn’t incitement. |
| Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324 | 01, 02 | A WVRO requires a reasonable probability of future violence, and “legitimate purpose” is judged by what the person sought. A 16-month-old statement about a dispute the County itself resolved can’t show future danger. |
| Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399 | 01 | A single past incident, without evidence of likely recurrence, cannot support a restraining order. |
| Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755 | 01 | “Legitimate purpose” is objective; annoying conduct with a real purpose isn’t harassment. |
C. Rude, vulgar, insulting speech to public employees is protected
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 | 01, 02 | “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” — profanity in political expression is protected. |
| City of Houston v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451 | 01, 02 | The First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police/public officers; government may not use its power to silence a constituent it finds unpleasant. |
| Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) 415 U.S. 130 | 01, 02 | Insulting words to an officer can’t be criminalized unless they’re fighting words. |
| Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972) 408 U.S. 901; Karlan v. City of Cincinnati (1974) 416 U.S. 924; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 | 01 | Same line: offensive speech is protected; government can’t selectively punish it by content. |
| Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443 | 01 | Even outrageous, hurtful speech on matters of public concern is protected. |
| People v. Powers (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 158 | 01, 02 | California: vulgar calls to a public complaint line aren’t “obscene” under Penal Code § 653m; a person whose job is to receive complaints has little privacy interest against them. |
| United States v. Popa (D.C. Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 672 | 01, 02 | Telephone-harassment statute couldn’t constitutionally be applied to abusive calls to a U.S. Attorney about his official conduct. |
| Commonwealth v. Bigelow (Mass. 2016) 475 Mass. 554; State v. Drahota (Neb. 2010) 280 Neb. 627; State v. Fratzke (Iowa 1989) 446 N.W.2d 781 | 01, 02 | Other states’ high courts: insulting letters/emails to officials about their performance are core political speech, even sent to a home, even vulgar. |
| New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 | 01, 02 | Criticism of officials, “however caustic,” is protected; debate on public issues should be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” |
| Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir. 2015) 805 F.3d 228; Krantz v. City of Fort Smith (8th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 1214 | 01 | Government may not impose a “heckler’s veto” — silencing the speaker because listeners are upset. |
D. Publishing public employees’ information · assembly
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee (N.D. Fla. 2010) 709 F.Supp.2d 1244; Sheehan v. Gregoire (W.D. Wash. 2003) 272 F.Supp.2d 1135 | 01, 02 | Statutes criminalizing publication of officers’ home addresses held unconstitutional — truthful public information about public employees is protected. (Cited for what you said you’d do; nothing was ever published.) |
| Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524; Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 532 U.S. 514 | 01, 02 | Publishing truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern can’t be punished. |
| Reno v. ACLU (1997) 521 U.S. 844 | 01 | Internet speech gets full First Amendment protection. |
| De Jonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U.S. 353; Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) 372 U.S. 229; Hague v. CIO (1939) 307 U.S. 496 | 01 | The right to peaceably assemble and protest government conduct is fundamental. |
| Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474 | 01 | Cited against the County: it upheld only a content-neutral ordinance on picketing focused at a single residence — it doesn’t authorize a court to ban announcing an assembly. |
E. Retaliation by government · scope of any order · the Court’s power
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| Hartman v. Moore (2006) 547 U.S. 250; Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) 587 U.S. 391; Reichle v. Howards (2012) 566 U.S. 658; Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (2018) 585 U.S. 87 | 01, 02 | Government action taken because of protected speech is First Amendment retaliation. Lozman: a city’s official policy of retaliating against a gadfly critic is actionable. Timing argument: you delivered the documents Aug 19, the County reversed Aug 24–28 and filed the petition Aug 25. |
| Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157; Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219 | 01, 02 | An injunction restraining speech must be confined to speech already adjudicated unprotected; it cannot bar protected expression or petitioning. Basis for limiting any order (written contact, AAB access, publishing). |
| Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137 | 01 | Courts must apply the Constitution over any contrary command — and § 527.8(c) itself forbids orders prohibiting constitutionally protected activity. |
| Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021) 592 U.S. 279 | 01 | A completed First Amendment violation is redressable even after the policy is withdrawn — the TRO’s past restriction still matters. |
F. Evidence rules (why the County’s proof fails)
| Case | Where | Why we cite it |
|---|---|---|
| Star Motor Imports v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201 | 01, 02 | A declaration “on information and belief” is “unavailing for any purpose” as proof of a disputed fact. Taylor’s declaration attributes the key threats on belief. |
| Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719 | 01, 05 | In a restraining-order hearing the court must receive relevant live testimony and allow cross-examination — your 527.8(k) request in the script. |
| Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1 | 08 | A WVRO requires clear-and-convincing proof of a course of conduct directed at the specific employee; other proceedings prove nothing here. |
| Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818 | 08 | The petitioner’s fear must be objectively reasonable in light of the respondent’s conduct toward that person. |
| People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343 | 08 | Evid. Code § 352: marginal relevance substantially outweighed by prejudice/confusion — the other restraining orders should be excluded. (Objection 9, with Evid. Code § 1101(a).) |
Statutes doing the heavy lifting :
CCP § 527.8 (b)(2), (b)(4), (b)(8), (c), (f), (k), (p), (q) · CCP § 425.16 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) · Civ. Code § 47(b) · Evid. Code §§ 352, 412, 1101(a) · Penal Code §§ 653.2, 653m · CCP § 170.6 · CCP § 2015.5.
Does Attorney Lauren Elizabeth Sible Need a Good SLAPP BACK?
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY GUIDELINES
Please remain peaceful, respectful, and lawful at all times.
- Be polite and respectful when interacting with others, even when you strongly disagree.
- Never engage physically with anyone, including law enforcement. Do not touch, push, threaten, or interfere with another person.
- Do not touch, move, damage, or interfere with anyone else’s property.
- Keep all entrances, sidewalks, driveways, roads, and other passages clear. Do not block traffic or prevent anyone from entering or leaving an area.
- Peaceful assembly means exactly that: hold your sign, express your views, and allow others to go about their business.
- No threats of violence or harm toward any person, their family, their body, their home, or their property.
- Do not escalate confrontations. If someone becomes confrontational, step away and allow the situation to de-escalate.
- Keep moving. March or walk a route through the neighborhood or along the block; do NOT stand stationary in front of, or repeatedly circle, the one home. This keeps the activity in Frisby‘s protected “general marching” category.
- Daylight only; voices only; no amplification (bullhorns/amplified sound invite noise-ordinance and Madsen-style problems).
- Stay on the public sidewalk; never step onto the property, driveway, or walkway; never touch the home, mailbox, cars, or landscaping (avoids trespass and defeats the “property contact” concern that aggravated Frisby).
- Do not block the sidewalk, street, or driveway/access to any home (avoids obstruction liability under Madsen and general law).
- No threats, no “credible threat of violence,” no repeated day-after-day targeting of the individual (keeps clear of Pen. Code § 646.9, Civ. Code § 1708.7, and CCP § 527.6).
Our purpose is to be heard—not to intimidate, threaten, obstruct, or harm anyone. Remain calm, respectful, and peaceful at all times.
This is about a public grievance (the official’s conduct and the recording/phone-seizure incident and all of their failures at solving the Tax mistake they made even after they received all the asked for, they still continue to harm the elderly an 86 year old wheelchair bound man and his 79 year old wife)
We encourage all communication to remain peaceful, lawful, and in the finest tradition of First Amendment civic engagement. Protected political speech under Snyder v. Phelps and Connick v. Myers,Save this page. We will be working with our partners & team members gathering supporters. sometimes this can take months. please sign up so we know we can count on your support. Contact our news publishing company https://goodshepherdmedia.net/peaceful-assembly-form/
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Peaceful Assembly
WE HAVE THE RIGHT AS US CITIZENS TO PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLE QUIETLY AND NOT TRESPASS NOT BLOCK ACCESS TO ANY ROAD OR PATHWAY AND HAND OUT LEAFLETS OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION THAT CONTAINS NEWS OF INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR TRUTHFUL ACTIONS, JUST LIKE FOX NEWS 11 AND THE BIDEN LAPTOP. BUT STILL PLEASE DONT BOTHER ANYONE HERE AT THE ADDRESS ABOVE. 1st Amendment Right of the US Constitution for Peaceful Public Assembly
PEACEFUL PROTEST INVOLVES BEING KIND HOLDING YOUR SIGN OR LEAFLETS AND GETTING YOUR MESSAGE ACROSS. YOU CANNOT BLOCK SIDEWALK, SHE IS NOT BELOW. YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BLOCK OTHERS MOVEMENT. SO STAY OUT OF PEOPLE’S WAY OF MOVEMENT AND BE CALM HOLD YOUR SIGN AND KEEP UP YOUR DOINGS !
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