Tue. Apr 16th, 2024

The Honorable Julie A. Palafox: Using Her Role…..
on the Bench to Help Families

Hon Julie A. Palafox

341 The City Dr S, Orange, CA 92868

The Honorable Julie A. Palafox
Orange County Superior Court, Department L73
CA Bar #: 111122 (December 1983)
Appointed By: Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr.

Biography

The Hon. Julie A. Palafox is a judge of the Superior Court of Orange County in California.
She was appointed by former governor Jerry Brown on July 23, 2015, filling a vacancy created by the retirement of Judge Wendy S. Lindley.
Palafox attended the University of Notre Dame, where she earned a bachelor’s degree in business administration. She completed her J.D. at the Pepperdine University School of Law in 1983.
Palafox began her career as an associate at Gould and Sayre in 1983. One year later, she started work as an associate at Alevizon, Smith and Lawrence. Between 1990 and 1998, Palafox worked as a partner at Alevizon, Smith, Susson and Palafox. She spent the next two years working as a partner at Alevizon, Edwards and Palafox. Then, from 2000 to 2015, she worked as an attorney in her own private practice.
Palafox was living in Trabuco Canyon at the time of her appointment to the Superior Court of Orange County.
She is registered to vote without party preference.

The Hon. Julie A. Palafox should know…….

Julie should know that judge McConville has violated my rights, become vindictive and used the law illegally to block my rights to challenge his lack of knowledge of law and Rights afforded to me via the US Constitution.  He labeled me a vexatious litigant when the two cases mentioned I am the respondent on, and the law requires 5 cases to be fininalyzed NOT IN MY FAVOR! Family law case is still open, and i am only the respondent! So you have not met any of the criteria necessary for vexatious litigant. Being in charge of an abusive subordinate is now your responsibility morally, civically, constitutionally  and now legally through  Martin v. Thomas et al. 2022.  It is imperative that all leaders are civic minded, show temperance and use caution when inherent rights of the US Constitution is involved, which they swore an oath to protect FIRST!
A Judge’s requirement is to make sure with diligence that he/she does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process rights of parents involved in custody disputes. California has “sufficiently important” interests, Zablocki v. Redhail434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978), in ensuring the orderly resolution of disputes and protecting parents and courts from vexatious litigants. See Cox v. Louisiana379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).

Wolfe v. George With respect to a First Amendment claim, the Court must first determine whether the Vexatious Litigant Statute actually encroaches upon a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to petition for a redress or grievance is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately connected both in origin and in purpose with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free press. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). However, the Supreme Court has also consistently held that “baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“[S]ince sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it does not come within the first amendment right to petition.”). In fact, as the Supreme Court stated in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, “The first amendment interests involved in private litigation — compensation for violated rights and interest, the psychological benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed facts — are not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims.” Id.

 

The First Amendment is “incorporated” against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hague v. C.I.O.307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939).

the statute is only implicated once the state court has concluded that there is “no reasonable probability that [the plaintiff] will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.”Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391.3. Further, even when a plaintiff has been declared a vexatious litigant, the statute does not preclude a plaintiff from filing subsequent lawsuits, so long as those lawsuits have merit. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7; see Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 60 (1997) (“When a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter.”) Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s argument is premised on his belief that the Vexatious Litigant Statute encroaches upon a First Amendment right because it is a prohibitive ban on meritorious litigation, his argument is fatally flawed. The Vexatious Litigant Statute is not, as Plaintiff contends, an absolute ban on the right to petition for  grievances.

The court was required to assess the merits of the petition before refusing to file it under the prefiling order, we direct the trial court to file the petition and evaluate it in accordance with habeas corpus procedure. ( People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 474-479.)

 

Bravo v Ismaj 2002 [7] Under our state Constitution, a party must generally prove he or she was prejudiced by an error to obtain a reversal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) An exception to this rule applies if the defendant was denied a fair hearing. [99 Cal. App. 4th 226] (Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 659, 677.) [6b]

the significant consequences that result from the outcome of a motion to declare a litigant vexatious support that a party is entitled to an oral hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is seeking security or a prefiling order. (See McColm v. Westwood Park Assn., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216, fn. 4; TJX Companies, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 750-751.)

[7] Under our state Constitution, a party must generally prove he or she was prejudiced by an error to obtain a reversal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) An exception to this rule applies if the defendant was denied a fair hearing. [99 Cal. App. 4th 226] (Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 659, 677.) [6b]

 

Pierce v. Cantil-Sakauye Id. at 383. Instead, it calls for an individualized  determination that a litigant is vexatious based on specific instances of harassing or frivolous litigation tactics. SeeCal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391(b)Wolfe v. George486 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 391.2-391.3. It then requires a court to examine a pro se parent’s proposed filings to ensure that “the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay” before allowing the parent to seek a custody-order modification. SeeCal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.7(b)George486 F.3d at 1126-27. And if a court orders a vexatious litigant to post security, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 391.7(b), it must “make an individualized determination of the appropriate amount.” George486 F.3d at 1126-27 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.3).

Nor does applying the VLS to parents in custody disputes “destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J.519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996). It does pose an additional hurdle to modifying a custody order, but only after the litigant has been found to be vexatious. The statute therefore does not unnecessarily perpetuate the “unique kind of deprivation” that imposing record preparation fees on parents appealing parental status termination decrees did. See id. at 127. 

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Being a firm believer in family rights the judges she rules over and oversees should be aware of her position and the US Constitution regarding the rights of parents, which is often overlooked in family courts!

That said all of the judges she oversees should study the 2 informational pages to learn more about the oath to the US Constitution they took and are clearly breaking

Even though I was illegally declared a Vexatious litigant. Maybe because Hon. Julie A. Palafox has a heart, she also is a competent judge who preside over the others beneath her that keep cheating me of fairness. Hon. Julie A. Palafox understands the law, and the case that I presented the three contempt against the mother of my son, had complete and 100% merit. Eventually after it being excepted the court case was in transferred to the judge, who declared me a vexatious litigant, upon showing up to his quart room. All three contempt cases that had complete and 100% merit and allowed in by Miss Palafox is proof that not only is the judge biased. He’s been vindictive , malicious, and in violation of my civil rights afforded to me in the US CONSTITUTION that I am afforded and protect me from men like judge   Thomas McConville

The head Judge over the family law circuit The Hon. Julie A. Palafox, allowed the case to continue, but the actual Judge dislikes me, and is completely malicious and out of his jurisdiction! He through my case out and still, my son is around they wanted fugitive sex offender. He never gave me due process for the restraining order either!

Here  The Hon. Julie A. Palafox allows my case with merit! But in court but McConville cons me out of my own rights and cancels my case once it appears in his lap!

Click Image Below to ENLARGE to CLEARLY READ

The Hon. Julie A. Palafox allows my cases with merit in, only to have a subordinate male bias judge reject the very paperwork his superior let in, as it was a very valid cases with merit and the The Hon. Julie A. Palafox knows the law and wanted to protect me but she may be unaware of the bias and prejudice of her subordinate Thomas McConville the con !

In the midst of a successful career as a civil litigator, the Honorable Judge Julie A. Palafox made an altruistic pivot that ultimately led her to becoming a judicial officer and Family Law Supervising Judge. While Judge Palafox described her eight years as a family law judge as the “best job ever,” Judge Palafox has found that greater attention must be given to the ever-increasing demands placed on the family court and that the greater bar and court system do not recognize the importance of the family court’s work.

The Supreme Court made the same astute observations in Elkins v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4th 1337 (2007), acknowledging that family law litigants may often be “subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.” This led to the appointment of the Elkins Family Law Task Force to “study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital dissolution proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants.” However, despite Elkins and the efforts that followed, Judge Palafox asserts “much more needs to be done.” Now, Judge Palafox brings these pivotal issues to the forefront of Orange County and embarks on a five-year self-imposed deadline to re-examine the Elkins Commission.
What led Judge Palafox to this pivot from civil litigator to crusader for justice in our courts? Her journey is in some ways typical, which makes the destination that much more remarkable. Judge Palafox comes from the American Southwest with familial roots in El Paso and Chihuahua, Mexico. Judge Palafox went on to the University of Notre Dame, which had just become coeducational. Judge Palafox made up one of the very first classes with a significant female student body. While she truly enjoyed one of the most quintessential collegiate experiences, the midwestern climate proved too cold for the native of the American Southwest. Judge Palafox came out west where she obtained her juris doctor degree at Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.
In Southern California, Judge Palafox made her home in Orange County. Judge Palafox went into civil litigation where she became a partner at Alevizon, Smith, Susson, and Palafox and then Alevizon, Edwards, and Palafox. In 2000, Judge Palafox left her partnership to become a solo practitioner. The move afforded her more flexibility to juggle her family life and maintain some semblance of work-life balance. In her private practice, Judge Palafox handled just one family law matter, which she recalled being a rather unpleasant experience. This perhaps shaped her drive toward the bench and her desire to improve family law in Orange County.
Once her three children were launched, Judge Palafox was at a crossroads. She wanted to close her small practice to return to something with more activity and fulfillment. This is when Judge Palafox had an epiphany. She questioned whether she made a difference and, when she looked back at her life, whether she had made a positive impact on the lives of others. Judge Palafox understood that service to others can be the highest calling and most rewarding. In this moment, Judge Palafox decided to submit an application to the governor for a judicial appointment.
It was a long three years before the governor called, but he eventually did, and in 2015, Judge Palafox began her assignment on the family law bench. The opportunity afforded her the chance “to do something more meaningful” and make a substantial difference in the lives of children and families. In a stark contrast with her civil experience, where attorneys had fewer trials and less frequently dealt with real people and real problems, family law of fered that in spades. Typically, each day, Judge Palafox took a morning walk around the courthouse, often with the late Honorable Frank J. Ospino. Each day, she was front and center adjudicating issues for dozens of litigants in evidentiary hearings and trials. Judge Palafox would try child custody, domestic violence, spousal support, and law and motion practice, all before lunch. Judge Palafox explained that, on the bench, she felt as if she “accomplished something meaningful to someone every day.”

Judge Palafox recalled one hearing as particularly impactful. In a custody case that involved a parent overcoming severe substance abuse issues, Judge Palafox recognized the angst felt between the parties and sense of betrayal.The emotions permeated the courtroom. Understanding that the parent had started a multi-step program requiring an admission of wrongdoing and an apology, Judge Palafox poignantly asked the parent whether there was any other person in the courtroom that the parent wanted to address.The parent turned to the other and accepted responsibility by apologizing for the betrayal. On another occasion, where Judge Palafox issued multiple restraining orders against a parent with a substance abuse issue that led to a child abduction, after thirty hearings over the course of five years, there was a pivotal moment which led to a full recovery and tearful forgiveness from the abused family.These heartfelt moments diffuse the litigiousness in the courtroom and are starting points for those involved and for others to observe that rebuilding trust for the fractured families is possible.

While these dramatic scenes may only happen from time-to-time, the intensity of emotions and the importance of the work is a constant. Unfortunately, even after Elkins, family law judicial resources are strained. Judges, clerks, and administrators work tirelessly, but Judge Palafox emphasizes that “more must be done” and repeats the California Supreme Court’s finding: “The same judicial resources and safeguards should be committed to a family law trial as are committed to other civil proceedings.” Elkins, 41 Cal. 4th at 1368. Family law courts have significant volume and while streamlining does help, family law litigants are entitled “to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trial proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.” Id.

Beyond those two best practices, Judge Palafox offered some advice to newer attorneys. “Consider looking into family law because there is so much court time” and “you can get into the arena” more quickly than in almost any other practice. Unlike civil law and motion practice, family law courts hold evidentiary hearings for temporary issues such as custody, support, and attorneys’ fees, and routinely bifurcate trial issues to have multiple trials over extended periods of time. For these new attorneys, Judge Palafox stressed the importance of learning evidence and how to present evidence in a persuasive manner.

Attorneys who have appeared before Judge Palafox recognize her efforts to help heal families, think prospectively and practically, and have clarity in her rulings. “Judge Palafox applies common sense to her rulings and makes orders that actually work for the parties and their children. A judge who makes clear orders prevents future problems,” said Jason Blonska of The Blonska Firm. Jason Schwartz of Stegmeier, Gelbart, Schwartz, and Benavente echoed those comments:

Judge Palafox makes a great effort to understand the nuances of each case and encourage the litigants to reach a fair resolution of their matter before trial. However, she is not afraid to make the tough call at trial. Win or lose, Judge Palafox makes sure you understand the reasoning for her decision. It is helpful for us as attorneys to explain what went right or wrong to our clients because of the detail she includes in her rulings.

Michael A. Morris of Minyard Morris summed it up most succinctly, “Good judge. Great understanding of family law. Wonderful to try a case in front of.”

After five years on the bench, in the midst of the pandemic, Judge Palafox ascended to her current role as Supervising Judge where she still maintains her full case load. As both a judicial officer and Supervising Judge, she works every weekend. She still volunteers and undertakes often thankless projects to streamline existing court procedures or create new ones to help litigants. However, the Supervising Judge functions within a large court system filled with longtime courthouse staff with immense institutional know-how and experience. Judge Palafox had to coordinate between the clerk’s office, the administration offices, the Orange County Sheriff for courtroom deputies, and navigate judicial calendars following elections, appointments, and reassignments.

Judge Palafox treated the institutional complexities as one of her motivations to improve the court system. Judge Palafox steadfastly promised herself to “leave the court in a better place” than when she arrived. She has spearheaded programs to clear the backlog caused by the pandemic and to facilitate settlement for future cases such as working on a pilot program for early mediation for self-represented parties and continuing to support the Family Law Voluntary Settlement Program launched by Judge Silbar and the Family Law bar during the pandemic. In doing all of this, Judge Palafox feels that she “made a difference for the better and considers this last chapter [her] best chapter.”

Today, there is good and bad news to report. The good news is the family law backlog from COVID-19 is much improved and, in some cases, nonexistent, and courtrooms are again processing cases both in-person and remotely. Even short-staffed, the family law court now processes orders and judgments more quickly than before. In family law, especially with child custody, “people need timely orders” and any delay can harm families according to Judge Palafox. The bad news is, while the world and court are recovering, filings are ticking up again and, in some cases, such as domestic violence, are even greater than pre-pandemic filings. This is proving challenging with the limited availability of judicial officers which, in turn, limits in-person hearings and justice for litigants on an already constrained family law court system. The family court has about four fewer judicial officers on the bench than just a few years ago.

In an effort to increase visibility for the benefit of the family law court, Judge Palafox has reluctantly stepped outside her judicial comfort zone and into the legal community. She has hosted the Annual Judge’s Barbeque on behalf of the Orange County Hispanic Bar Association. Judge Palafox presented at the most recent American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Annual Conference in San Diego. She has now made regular appearances at the Orange County Bar Association’s Judges’ Night.

Judge Palafox emphasizes that she “enjoys” her role as Supervising Judge, but before she leaves the court, Judge Palafox hopes to develop a five-year plan, with the assistance of the presiding judges, the court executives, the family law bench, and bar to re-examine Elkins’ recommendations and put Orange County at the forefront of family courts in California.

Judge Palafox still finds time to enjoy Orange County and spend time with her musically talented husband. When not working, Judge Palafox attends her husband’s local gigs or they play golf together. She and her long-time friends also take full advantage of the local hiking trails. Judge Palafox “loves Orange County.” Having lived in both Los Angeles and Orange County she reasons Orange County “is not Los Angeles, but has the best of Los Angeles.” Judge Palafox noted Orange County has less traffic than Los Angeles but still has a myriad of diverse ethnic communities, subcultures, restaurant options, and outdoor activities from hiking to the beach. Orange County offers all of this while having perfect weather, a far cry from South Bend’s winters and El Paso’s dry scorching summers.

Alexander C. Payne is a partner at Minyard Morris, practicing family law.

Attorneys who have appeared before Judge Palafox recognize her efforts to help heal families, think prospectively and practically, and have clarity in her rulings. source


 

 

Employers Beware: La Supreme Court Opens Line for Direct Negligence Claims from Negligent Employee Actions

read case Martin v. Thomas et al. 2022 – Opens Line for Direct Negligence Claims from Employee Actions

Government / Public Servants / Officers / Judges Not Immune from suit!

  1. State v. Sutton, 63 Min 147, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA630, AM ST 459 When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetuated, and no one is bound to obey it.
  2. Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 p. 491 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
  3. “The officers of the law, in the execution of process, are required to know the requirements of the law, and if they mistake them, whether through ignorance or design, and anyone is harmed by their error, they must respond in damages.Roger v. Marshall (United States use of Rogers v. Conklin), 1 Wall. (US) 644, 17 Led 714.
  4. “It is a general rule that an officer, executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise, who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction, and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit.”  Cooperv. O`Conner, 69 App DC 100, 99 F (2d)
  5. “Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights.      AFLCIO v.Woodard, 406 F 2d 137 t.
  6. “Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people.”   (CivilRights) Rabon vs Rowen MemorialHospital, Inc. 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE 1 d 485, 493.
  7. Government Immunity – “In Land  v.  Dollar, 338 US 731 (1947), the court noted, “that when the government entered into a commercial field of activity, it left immunity behind.”  Brady  v.  Roosevelt, 317 US 575 (1943); FHA  v.  Burr, 309 US 242 (1940); Kiefer  v.  RFC, 306 US 381 (1939).
  8. The high Courts, through their citations of authority, have frequently declared,  that  “…where  any  state  proceeds  against  a  privateindividual in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding the matters involved.”  Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308;
  9. “When  enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not actjudicially (and thus are not protected by “qualified” or “limitedimmunity,” – SEE:Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662;  Bothke  v.  Terry, 713 F2d 1404)
  10. Thompson  v.  Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464 “but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved  agency  —  but  only  in  a  “ministerial”  and  not  a“discretionary capacity…”  .
  11. Thompson v. Clark 2022 Holding: Larry Thompson’s showing that his criminal prosecution ended without a conviction satisfies the requirement to demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution in a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution; an affirmative indication of innocence is not needed.
  12. Immunity for judges does not extend to acts which are clearly outside of their jurisdiction.  Bauers v. Heisel,C.A. N.J. 1966, 361 F.2d 581, Cert. Den. 87 S.Ct. 1367, 386 U.S. 1021, 18 L.Ed. 2d 457 (see also Muller v. Wachtel, D.C.N.Y. 1972, 345 F.Supp. 160;  Rhodes v. Houston, D.C. Nebr. 1962, 202 F.Supp. 624 affirmed 309 F.2d 959, Cert. den 83 St. 724, 372 U.S. 909, 9 L.Ed. 719, Cert. Den 83 S.Ct. 1282, 383 U.S. 971, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 311, Motion denied 285 F.Supp. 546).
  13. “Judges not only can be sued over their official acts, but could be held liable for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney’s fees.” Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
  14. “The immunity of judges for acts within their judicial role is beyond cavil.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1957). Keyword within their role, outside of that role they are not.
  15. At least seven circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity bar to such relief, and in situations where in their judgment an injunction against a judicial officer is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner’s constitutional rights, courts will grant that relief.  “There is no common law judicial immunity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 104S.Ct. 1970; cited in Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.|
  16. Judges, members of city council, and police officers as well as other public officials, may utilize good faith defense of action for damages under 42-1983, but no public official has absolute immunity from suit under the 1871 civil rights statute.” (Samuel vs University ofPittsburg, 375 F.Supp. 1119, ‘see also, White vs Fleming 374 Supp. 267.)
  17. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882) “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. “
  18. Pierce v. United States (“The Floyd Acceptances”), 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 666, 677 (“We have no officers in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority”);
  19. Cunningham v. Macon, 109 U.S. 446, 452, 456, 3 S.Ct. 292, 297 (“In these cases he is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts authority as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him… It is no answer for the defendant to say I am an officer of the government and acted under its authority unless he shows the sufficiency of that authority”); and Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287, 5 S.Ct. 903, 912
  20. “Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” (Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988).
  21. “The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 533
  22. “If you’ve relied on prior decisions of the Supreme Court you have a perfect defense for willfulness.” U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346
  23. Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous. Accordingly that which Chief Justice Marshall has called ‘the tenderness of the law Page 11 of 48 for the rights of individuals’ [FN1] entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the confines of the statute. United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S.  624, 628, 10 S. Ct. 625, 626, 33 L. Ed. 1080; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476,485, 37 S. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857. FN1 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37.
  24. We do not overlook those constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, established by Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168,196 [26: 377, 386].
    We said in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 [29: 746, 751]—and it cannot be too often repeated—that the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sancity of a man’s home, and the privacies of his life.As said by Mr. Justice Field in Re Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241,250, “of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happinessthan the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value.”
  25. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326 When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.
    JURI$DICTION: NOTE: It is a fact of law that the person asserting jurisdiction must, when challenged, prove that jurisdiction exists; mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.
  26. Albrecht v. U.S. Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) “The United States District Court is not a true United States Court, established under Article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court.”
  27. “Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.” [U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]
  28. Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349. Some Defendants urge that any act “of a judicial nature” entitles the Judge to absolute judicial immunity. But in a jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial immunity is missing. A judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity.
  29. Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) “Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.”
  30. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S. Ct. 1648, 26 L. Ed. 2d 100 Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion at page 140 said, “If (federal judges) break the law, they can be prosecuted.” Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion at page 141) said, “Judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted and punished for crimes… The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution“.
  31. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938) A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts.
  32. “Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 250
  33. Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.”
  34. Griffin v. Mathews, 310 Supp. 341, 423 F. 2d 272 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Sims v. Aherns, 271 SW 720 (1925) “The practice of law is an occupation of common right.”
  35. Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, “Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants’ civil rights.” – Robert Craig Waters.

WHEREAS, officials and even judges have questioned immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

“When lawsuits are brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their “individual” capacity not their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity.” Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).

NO IMMUNITY  – “Sovereign immunity does not apply where (as here) government is a lawbreaker or jurisdiction is the issue.Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622 “Knowing failure to disclose material information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are actionable as fraud under law.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 1990

    • [a] “Party in interest may become liable for fraud by mere silent acquiescence and partaking of benefits of fraud.” Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 1994
    • Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. Out of fraud no action arises; fraud never gives a right of action. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. As found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 509.
    • “Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,” Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S 426.
    • “Fraud vitiates everything” Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210
    • “Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgments.” U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61
    • When a Citizen challenges the acts of a federal or state official as being illegal, that official cannot just simply avoid liability based upon the fact that he is a public official. In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.196, 220, 221, 1 S.Ct. 240, 261, the United States claimed title to Arlington, Lee’s estate, via a tax sale some years earlier, held to be void by the Court. In so voiding the title of the United States, the Court declared:
      “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. “Shall it be said… that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his prop erty by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country,it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights.”
    • Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice John Marshall Marbury v. Madison,5 US (1Cranch) 137, 174, 176 (1803) All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the United States, meaning that American courts have the power to strike down laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137,(1803) “The Constitution of these United States is the supreme law of the land. Any law that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void of law.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) “… the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional. “In declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank”. “All law (rules and practices) which are repugnant to the Constitution are VOID”. Since the 14th Amendment to the Constitution states “NO State (Jurisdiction) shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens of the United States nor deprive any citizens of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, … or equal protection under the law”, this renders judicial immunity unconstitutional.

 

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: See also, 42 USC 1983 – Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note: Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion – he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act. Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States” and “No state shall… grant any Title of Nobility.” Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesn’t understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges. Article III, Sec. 1, “The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.”

Both the US Constitution and Californian Constitution has

  • 42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights

    Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

  • California Civil Code Section 52.1

    Interference by threat, intimidation or coercion with exercise or enjoyment of individual rights The Bane Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code Section 52.1) forbids anyone from interfering by force or by threat of violence with your federal or state constitutional or statutory rights. The acts forbidden by these civil laws may also be criminal acts, and can expose violators to criminal penalties. California Civil Code Section 52.1 – Interference by threat, intimidation or coercion with exercise or enjoyment of individual rights.