PROTECTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT THE Federal LEVEL
Supreme Court upholds Indian Child Welfare Act
The Supreme Court issued a landmark victory for tribal sovereignty in Brackeen v. Haaland.
The Supreme Court issued a landmark victory for tribal sovereignty by rejecting all the constitutional challenges to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in Brackeen v. Haaland, requiring state courts to make active efforts to protect Native children and keep Native families together. Congress passed ICWA in 1978 to address the nationwide crisis of state child welfare agencies tearing Native children from their families and placing them in non-Native homes, in an attempt to force Native children to assimilate and adopt white cultural norms.
Since 1978, 14 states have passed their own state ICWA laws to strengthen the implementation of all aspects of the Indian Child Welfare Act. Now that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed ICWA, now is the time for states to take action and pass their own state laws building on the protections in the federal law. The map below shows where states have already enacted such state laws.
Fighting to Keep Native Families Together
Less than half of Native Americans live in a state with an ICWA law on the books. Email your state representatives and urge them to pass or update their state ICWAs to protect Native children and recognize placement preferences created by tribal governments.
Along with essential procedural protections, the federal ICWA created a placement preference to promote the stability and security of Native American tribes and families. For any adoption of a Native child under state law, preference must be given to placements with: (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Native child’s tribe; or (3) families from other Native American tribes. The majority of state ICWA laws incorporate identical or near-identical placement preference language as the federal ICWA, with a few exceptions. For example, some states prioritize placements with families of other Native American tribes that are of similar cultures to the Native child, while other states create a fourth preference for non-Native families that are committed to maintaining the child’s connection to their tribe and culture.By Anu Joshi, Deputy Director, ACLU’s Equality Division source
Supreme Court upholds Indian Child Welfare Act
The nation’s highest court on Thursday upheld the legality of the Indian Child Welfare Act in a historic decision for tribal law and sovereignty.
Judges for the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in Haaland v. Brackeen that the Act was constitutional. Challengers to the law claimed the Act discriminated against non-Native families, Congress did not have the authority to pass the Act, and that the act was anti-commandeering.
“But the bottom line is that we reject all of petitioners’ challenges to the statute, some on the merits and others for lack of standing.” U.S. Supreme Court Judge Amy Coney Barrett wrote in the opinion of the court.
President Joe Biden said he stood alongside tribal nations in the celebration of the court’s decision and nations’ “painful history” of the forced assimilation of Native children loomed over the decision.
“These were acts of unspeakable cruelty that affected generations of Native children and threatened the very survival of Tribal Nations,” Biden said in a press release. “The Indian Child Welfare Act was our Nation’s promise: never again.”
ICWA was enacted in 1978 by Congress to govern the removal and out-of-home placement of Native American children after it was found Native children were removed from their homes and communities at a higher rate than non-Native children.
According to the Act, the child’s biological family is given first preference, followed by members of the child’s tribe, then members of any other tribe, with placement with a non-Native American family as a last resort.
The Act clarifies tribal nations have sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over their members who reside on tribal land and establishes a process for transferring cases to tribal court in other cases.
Thursday’s decision came after a federal judge in Texas first ruled the Act unconstitutional in 2018.
A white couple, Chad and Jennifer Brackeen, sought to adopt a 10-month-old Native American child. The child remained in the couple’s custody for more than a year when a Texas state judge used ICWA in a ruling to place the child with a Native family.
The Brackeens later won custody of the child in state court with the decision later appealed to the Northern District of Texas.
U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor ruled the Act unconstitutional and wrote in his opinion the racial classification of children has not been shown to serve a “compelling governmental interest” and found the Act violated the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
O’Conner’s decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and a panel of three judges upheld the constitutionality of ICWA “with partial dissent.” That led to an en banc panel of 16-judges within the Fifth Circuit split in the constitutionality of the Act.
The en banc panel’s decision was then appealed to the nation’s highest court with argument in the case held in November 2022.
Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chuck Hoskin Jr., whose tribe was a party in the case, celebrated Thursday’s decision.
“Today’s decision is a major victory for Native tribes, children, and the future of our culture and heritage,” Hoskin said in a release following the decision. “ It is also a broad affirmation of the rule of law, and of the basic constitutional principles surrounding relationships between Congress and tribal nations.”
Hoskin said he hopes the decision will end the political attacks aimed at diminishing tribal sovereignty.
Choctaw Nation Chief Gary Batton said in a release the tribe is glad to see ICWA stand and that the Act remains a critical part of protecting Native American heritage and tribal sovereignty.
“The Choctaw Nation will continue to support children and families through its foster care system, Indian Child Welfare team, tribal attorneys and over 100 tribal services,” Batton said.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in a concurring opinion that it is often Native American tribes come to the court seeking justice “only to leave with bowed heads and empty hands.”
“But that is not because this court has no justice to offer them. Our Constitution reserves for the tribes a place—an enduring place— in the structure of American life,” Gorsuch wrote. “It promises them sovereignty for as long as they wish to keep it.”
Gorsuch wrote the Constitution gave the federal government and Congress certain power aimed at “building a lasting peace” and that Congress passed the Act to give Native American parents the right to raise their families as they please and Native children to grow in the culture and the communities of Native Americans “to resist fading into the twilight of history.
“All of that is in keeping with the Constitution’s original design,” Gorsuch wrote. source
NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY
Topic 1. Application
Disclaimer: A Practical Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act is intended to facilitate compliance with the letter and spirit of ICWA and is intended for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice. You should consult competent legal counsel for legal advice, rather than rely on the Practical Guide.
APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW
25 U.S.C. § 1903. Definitions
(1) “child custody proceeding” shall mean and include—
(i) “foster care placement” which shall mean any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated;
(ii) “termination of parental rights” which shall mean any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship;
(iii) “preadoptive placement” which shall mean the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement; and
(iv) “adoptive placement” which shall mean the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption.
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.
(4) “Indian child” means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . .
Disclaimer: The above provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act are set forth to facilitate consideration of this particular topic. Additional federal, state or tribal law may be applicable. Independent research is necessary to make that determination.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
- 1.1 – When does the ICWA apply?
- 1.2 – What are the exceptions to ICWAs application?
- 1.3 – What is the so-called Existing Indian Family exception (EIF)?
- 1.4 – Who is an Indian Child under the ICWA?
- 1.5 – What is an Indian tribe under ICWA?
- 1.6 – Who determines membership or eligibility for membership?
- 1.7 – Who has the burden to prove an Indian child is involved?
- 1.8 – What if the childs Indian heritage is uncertain?
- 1.9 – What if more than one tribe has an interest in the Indian child?
1.1 – When does the ICWA apply?
Only two prerequisites must be satisfied for the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to apply. The first requirement is the presence of an Indian child as defined by 1903(4). That section defines an Indian child as an unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . . . The second requirement is that the child custody proceeding be one as defined by 1903(1); that is, a foster care placement; termination of parental rights; pre-adoptive placement; or adoptive placement.
Practice Tip:
Practitioners should review state law and intergovernmental agreements as they may expand the protection of the ICWA, such as by expanding the definition of an Indian child. MINN. STAT. 257.0651 (1992); IOWA CODE 232.7 (2003).
1.2 – What are the exceptions to ICWA’s application?
After defining those proceedings to which the ICWA does apply, the Act states: [s]uch term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1). Thus, ICWA expressly provides for only two exceptions to its applicability: certain juvenile criminal proceedings based on a status crime, such as underage drinking which only a minor can commit, and divorce cases. There are no other exceptions.
Even so, a Montana court excluded an intra-family custody dispute finding that it was not a child custody proceeding because the Act is not directed at disputes between Indian families regarding custody of Indian children; rather, its intent is to preserve Indian cultural values under circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a foster home or other protective institution. In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980). See also In re Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. App. 2004). Other courts have expressly rejected the Bertelson analysis as contrary to the express provision of the Act enumerating which proceedings are excluded; that is, certain juvenile crimes and divorce cases. All other proceedings involving the custody of an Indian child fall within the ambit of the Act. Comanche Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hovis (Hovis I), 847 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Okla. 1994); D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663 (Alaska 2001); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1998); In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1991); In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); In re Jennifer A., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54 (Ct. App. 2002); In re Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1990). Another court applied ICWA without deciding the intra-family issue because of the parties implicit assumption that ICWA applied to the situation. In re Anderson, 31 P.3d 510 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
Practice Tip:
Counsel should be aware that although a case may start as a delinquency proceeding, ICWA may apply to subsequent child placements (i.e. foster care) based upon a determination that a return to the childs home would be inappropriate.
1.3 – What is the so-called Existing Indian Family exception (EIF)?
The Existing Indian Family exception (EIF) is a judicially-created exception to the ICWA that originated in In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). In that case, the court held that the ICWA did not apply to an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be. The court interpreted the ICWA as being only concerned with removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family unit. Id. at 175. Although narrowly interpreted in subsequent cases, a Washington court required that in addition to an Indian child being removed from an Indian family, the child was to be returned to an existing Indian family unit or environment. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992). The Crews decision appears to have been statutorily superseded. See WASH. REV. CODE 26.10.034(1), 26.33.040(1), 13.34.040(3) (2004).
The EIF exception has been raised to a constitutional level by two appellate districts of California (Second and Fourth). In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996); In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 2001); In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996). These cases hold that the child and his or her parents, and maybe even the extended family when involved, must have a significant social, political and cultural relationship to their tribal culture to uphold the constitutionality of the ICWA under federal law.
The EIF, however, has been implicitly and explicitly rejected by courts and legislatures in a number of states that have addressed the issue.
States rejecting the EIF exception by decision
Alabama: S.H. v. Calhoun County Dept of Human Res., 798 So. 2d 684 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)
Alaska: J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1998); In re T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982)
Arizona: Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
California: four of six appellate districts: In re Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1991) (1st Dist.); In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App. 1983) (certified for partial publication) (1st Dist.); In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Ct. App. 1990) (3d Dist.); In re Hannah S., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605 (Ct. App. 2006) (3d Dist.); In re Desiree F., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688 (Ct. App. 2000) (5th Dist.); In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121 (Ct. App. 1998) (5th Dist.); In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (Ct. App. 2007) (6th Dist.)
Colorado: In re N.B., No. 06CA1325 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007)
Idaho: In re Baby Boy Doe (Baby Boy Doe I), 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993)
Illinois: In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995)
Indiana: In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991)
Iowa: In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 2005)
Michigan: In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
Montana: In re Riffle (Riffle II), 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996)
New Jersey: In re Child of Indian Heritage (Indian Child II), 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988)
New York: In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313 (App. Div. 2005)
North Carolina: In re A.D.L., 612 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
North Dakota: In re A.B., 2003 ND 98, 663 N.W.2d 625
Oklahoma: In re Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, 103 P.3d 1099
Oregon: Quinn v. Walters (Quinn II), 881 P.2d 795 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
South Dakota: In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990)
Texas: In re W.D.H., III, 43 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App. 2001); Doty-Jabbaar v. Dallas County Child Protective Servs., 19 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App. 2000)
Utah: In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
States upholding ICWAs constitutionality, including those rejecting the EIF exception
Arizona: In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
California: In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (Ct. App. 2007) (6th Dist.)
Colorado: In re N.B., No. 06CA1325 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007)
Illinois: In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990
Maine: In re Marcus S., 638 A.2d 1158 (Me. 1994)
Michigan: In re Miller, 451 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
Montana: In re Riffle (Riffle II), 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996)
North Dakota: In re A.B., 2003 ND 98, 663 N.W.2d 625
Oklahoma: In re Baby Boy L., 2004 OK 93, 103 P.3d 1099
Oregon: In re Angus, 655 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
South Dakota: In re D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980)
States rejecting the EIF exception by statute
California: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 224(a)(1) (2006); CAL. R. CT. 5.664
Iowa: Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act, IOWA CODE 232B.5(2) (2003)
Minnesota: Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. 260.751, .755, .761, .765, .771 (1999)
Oklahoma: Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 40.1-.3 (1994)
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE 26.10.034(1), 26.33.040(1), 13.34.040(3) (2004) (superseding In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992))
States adopting the EIF exception by decision
California: two of six appellate districts: In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996) (2d Dist.); In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 2001) (2d Dist.); In re Derek W., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742 (Ct. App. 1999) (2d Dist.); In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996) (4th Dist.)
Kansas: In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982)
Kentucky: Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996)
Louisiana: Hampton v. J.A.L., 27-869 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/6/95); 658 So. 2d 331
Missouri: C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
Tennessee: In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997)
Washington: In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE 26.10.034(1) 26.33.040(1), 13.34.040(3) (2004)
The EIF exception still has vitality in the two California appellate districts (Second and Fourth) that have adopted a constitutionally-based EIF exception and one division within the Second District that has adopted it as an interpretation of ICWA. The exception is followed in Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee (an unreported decision) which have no federally recognized tribes. In Kansas and Louisiana, whose courts have refused to apply the EIF exception following the one decision upholding it, the validity of the exception may be in doubt. In re S.M.H., 103 P.3d 976 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); In re J.J.G., 83 P.3d 1264 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); In re A.P., 961 P.2d 706 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); In re H.A.M., 961 P.2d 716 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); In re H.D., 729 P.2d 1234 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Owens v. Willock, 29-595 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/97); 690 So. 2d 948.
At the Federal level, the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), implicitly rejected the EIF exception when it interpreted the ICWA to apply to Indian children who were placed for adoption and who never physically lived in an Indian home or on an Indian reservation prior to being placed with non-Indian prospective adoptive parents. Id. at 54. The Court made a threshold determination that the ICWA applied to these children. Id. at 42. It found that the state court proceeding at issue was an adoptive placement as defined by 1903(1)(iv) of the Act and that the children involved were Indian children as defined by 1903(4) of the Act even though they had never lived in an Indian home or on an Indian reservation. The Court relied on the plain language of the ICWA in its application to the facts.
1.4 – Who is an Indian Child under the ICWA?
An Indian child is an unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . . . 25 U.S.C. 1903(4). A key link to this definition is the meaning of Indian tribe.
1.5 – What is an Indian tribe under ICWA?
Indian tribe is defined as any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of title 43. 25 U.S.C. 1903(8). It means only federally recognized tribes. Canadian tribes, and other foreign Indian tribes, and non-federally recognized tribes are therefore excluded from its coverage.
From time to time, the Secretary of the Interior publishes a list of federally recognized tribes eligible for federal services and benefits. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. Most courts use this list to determine whether the Indian childs tribe, and thereby its children, are protected by the Act.
The Secretary, from time to time, will federally acknowledge an Indian tribe under the federal acknowledgment regulations contained at 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (2007). A newly-acknowledged tribe will not appear on the list of federally recognized tribes until the Secretary updates the list. If in doubt, a practitioner should contact the Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Washington, D.C. Also, OFA keeps a list of non-federally acknowledged tribes which have filed a letter of intent to file a petition for federal acknowledgment or have filed a petition. The practitioner may want to consult this list to determine if claimed ancestry of the parent or child is to a non-federally recognized tribe.
In addition, Congress will from time to time reaffirm or restore government-to-government relations with a tribe whose relationship was terminated during the termination era of the 1950s when the United States severed its government-to-government relationship with a number of Indian tribes and thereby withdrew eligibility for federal services provided to Indians because of their status as Indians. Also, the Congress will at times federally acknowledge Indian tribes by legislation. See, e.g., Federal Recognition of Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 25 U.S.C. 1758 (2000). The practitioner should contact the Assistant Secretarys Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C.
Practice Tip:
Practitioners should review state law and intergovernmental agreements as they may expand the protection of the ICWA, such as by expanding the definition of an Indian tribe.
1.6 – Who determines membership or eligibility for membership?
For ICWA purposes, the tribe or Alaskan Native village has the sole power to decide membership. In re A.G., 2005 MT 81, 326 Mont. 403, 109 P.3d 756; In re A.L.W., 32 P.3d 297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
1.7 – Who has the burden to prove an Indian child is involved?
The party seeking to establish the application of the ICWA has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case that an Indian child may be involved, although all parties and the court have a continuing obligation to inquire as to the status of the child. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 19-1-126 (2002); IOWA CODE 232B.4 (2000). There is no one proof of membership, although courts generally agree that an Indian childs enrollment in an Indian tribe is conclusive proof of membership. Tribal enrollment however, is not the only means of establishing membership. In re T.L.G., 108 P.3d 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). Some tribes automatically include a person as a member if the person descended from a tribal member who was listed on the tribal rolls as of a specific date. In re Arianna R.G., 2003 WI 11, 259 Wis. 2d 563, 657 N.W.2d 363. Thus, in some instances, courts have remanded for proper notice even where the parent offered no proof of membership and was not enrolled in a tribe. In re Gerardo A., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798 (Ct. App. 2004); Dwayne P. v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 2002).
A tribe may determine that a child is not enrollable but later change its determination and enroll the child. In re E.S., 964 P.2d 404 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). Once membership, or eligibility for membership, is established, and the ICWA is applied and accepted as applicable by all the parties, a party may not later change its mind and take a contrary position on appeal. In re R.L., 961 P.2d 606 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
1.8 – What if the childs Indian heritage is uncertain?
One purpose of ICWA notice is to enable the tribe or BIA to investigate and determine whether the minor is an Indian child. In re Gerardo A., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798 (Ct. App. 2004). Some information relating to Indian heritage must be provided to the court or entity seeking placement for notice to be sent to a tribe(s) or BIA area office. If the tribes identity is unknown, notice must be sent to the BIA as agent for the Secretary of the Interior. In re Antoinette S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15 (Ct. App. 2002). See also FAQ 4.11. An unsubstantiated belief a child has Indian heritage is not conclusive to establish such heritage. See, e.g., In re Arianna R.G., 2003 WI 11, 259 Wis. 2d 563, 657 N.W.2d 363.
The BIA Guidelines are helpful in determining under what circumstances a court has reason to know that a child is an Indian child under the ICWA. The Guidelines describe the following circumstances under which a state court has reason to believe a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian child:
(1) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization or public or private agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child.
(2) Any public- or state-licensed agency involved in child protection services or family support had discovered information which suggests that the child is an Indian child.
(3) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to believe he or she is an Indian child.
(4) The residence or domicile of the child, his or her biological parents, or the Indian custodian is known by the court to be or is shown to be a predominantly Indian community.
(5) An officer of the court involved in the proceeding has knowledge that the child may be an Indian child.
Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,586 (Nov. 26, 1979) (guidelines for state courts).
1.9 – What if more than one tribe has an interest in the Indian child?
In this situation, a court is called upon to determine which tribe has more significant contacts with the Indian child, although notice should be sent to each tribe regardless of the final determination. The BIA Guidelines are helpful in guiding a court to make its determination. The Guidelines list at least eight factors for a court to consider in determining which tribe has the most significant contacts for the purpose of designating the Indian childs tribe under the ICWA, especially for the purpose of transfer of jurisdiction. See Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,587 (Nov. 26, 1979) (guidelines for state courts).
For the tribe that has the lesser contacts, the Guidelines provide that it still could be granted a right of intervention without undermining the right of the tribe with greater contacts. The tribe with lesser contacts could also be afforded the ability to serve as a placement preference under 1915 the Act.
In South Dakota, a state court determined jurisdiction by looking at the childs domicile and the tribe with whom the child had the most significant contacts. The state court found jurisdiction vested in the tribe on whose reservation the child was domiciled and with whom the child had the most contacts, and not the tribe in which the child was enrolled. Cf. In re T.I., 2005 SD 125, 707 N.W.2d 826.
Practice Tip for tribal courts:
If the situation is not an emergency, two tribes that would have jurisdiction over a case, because the child is a tribal member or eligible for tribal membership in either tribe, should talk with each other about which tribal court should accept transfer jurisdiction under the Act to hear the case. At times, as for example in Alaska, a cooperative agreement can be worked out between the tribal courts to form a joint tribal court panel.
In emergencies, the tribal court that begins to handle a case should be recognized by the other tribal court to have priority jurisdiction until the tribal courts can sort out which court has primary jurisdiction. source