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This site will rediret you to the Clown Page Paul Toepel the Liar in 420 seconds that’s 7 minutes for the impaired. CLICK HERE IF YOU DONT WANT TO WAIT. we suggest everything here 1st

Isaiah 5:20 Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter!

This low level douche bag Paul Toepel decided to sue the elderly in the later years for $30,000,000 ($30 MILLION) only to drop the case!

To FIND OUT WHERE THE PEACEFUL PROTEST WILL TAKE PLACE CLICK HERE

In Good Shepherd Media’s Eyes Paul Toepel is as Low and Scummy as they come, like cum! We would NEVER WANT HIM LIVING AROUND US or OUR FAMILY or have such a LOW BALL HUMAN as a FRIEND. In our personal opinion he should be told by others including his neighbors what they think of a man like this.

Mind  you Paul Toepel, will SPIN IT, SPIN IT HE WILL, HIS WAY! and he will say HE DID NOTHING WRONG and ITS EVERYONE ELSE’s FAULT. Very Narcistic and sociopathic in our opinion but thats how charming manipulators work.

Public court filings show an attorney filed a $30,000,000 lawsuit that also named two elderly parents who were later dismissed. According to their counsel, defending those claims cost about $39,000. Scan to review the documents and decide for yourself. OPINION & PEACEFUL-ASSEMBLY NOTICE : This flyer expresses opinions based on disclosed facts and public records (see sources at the link). We support lawful, peaceful public assembly only—no trespassing, harassment, or disruption.

Paul Toepel has sued an 85 year old double stroke victim and a 78 year old stroke and aneurysm victim for $30,000,000 ($30 MILLION) only to drop the case costing these elderly well over $39,000 and pain of lossed time and stress.  THIS HARDWORKING ELDERLY COUPLE was FORCED to WASTE  over $39,000 to defend themselves against his WONDERFULLY CREATIVE ACCOUNTS OF HOW THINGS HAPPEN. ONLY TO REALIZE HE FUCKED UP AND DROPS THE CASE 

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Constitutional Protection for Leafleting and Peaceful Assembly

U.S. and California courts have long held that distributing flyers and organizing peaceful protests on matters of public concern are core First Amendment activities. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that “peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment” in traditional public forums such as streets and sidewalks supreme.justia.com. Similarly, in Lovell v. City of Griffin, the Court struck down any permit requirement for pamphlet distribution, noting that “the First Amendment… ‘necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets,’ which ‘have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty’” law.justia.com. And in Talley v. California the Court invalidated a ban on anonymous handbills, observing that “anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind…allowing criticism of oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all” constitution.congress.gov. In short, peaceful leafletting about public issues is highly protected speech supreme.justia.comlaw.justia.com.

California Law (First District and State Court)

California courts likewise extend broad protection to political leafletting and petitioning. Under Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution, even privately‑owned spaces open to the public (like shopping centers or plazas) can be treated as “public forums” for free speech. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court held that distributing petitions and soliciting signatures at a mall – activities analogous to leaflet distribution – is constitutionally protected speech. The court expressly “h[e]ld that…soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution” law.justia.com. California courts have cited Pruneyard to underscore that visitors to generally‑accessible private property can engage in political speech if it is peaceful and not disruptive of the owner’s business.

Likewise, the California courts recognize a heavy presumption against any injunction limiting peaceful leafleting or protest. In Paradise Hills Associates v. Procel (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), neighbors had distributed leaflets accusing a homebuilder of “panic peddling” and posted large signs on model homes. The court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971), which involved peaceful pamphleteering about a broker’s practices. The court noted:

“The Court has often recognized that the activity of peaceful pamphleteering is a form of communication protected by the First Amendment…[T]hose practices were offensive to them…But so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.”
Organization for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 419, quoted in Paradise Hills law.justia.com.

The Paradise Hills court further stressed that any prior restraint on such expression “comes to [the Court] with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity,” and no authority “support[s] the claim that the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism” justifies an injunction law.justia.com. In other words, California case law squarely protects non‑threatening leaflets aimed at informing neighbors about alleged wrongdoing.

For additional context, California legal guides note that even door‑to‑door leafleting in residential areas is generally allowed without special permits. For example, an ACLU handbook explains that “[n]o permits or advance notice can constitutionally be required for…leafleting on public sidewalks, or even door‑to‑door” aclunc.org. Thus, under California law – and especially for purely informational, peaceful protest leaflets – the freedom of speech and assembly strongly shields the activity.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

At the federal level, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed these principles:

• Leaflets and Pamphlets. As noted, Lovell v. Griffin (1938) and Schneider v. Irvington (1939) struck down broad bans on leaflet distribution, holding that simple handbilling in public is a fundamental right. These cases affirm that leaflets are protected “weapons in the defense of liberty” law.justia.com. Talley v. California (1960) extended this protection by invalidating an ordinance requiring the author’s identity on every handbill, precisely because anonymity in leafleting can be essential constitution.congress.gov.

• Peaceful Picketing and Public Forums. In United States v. Grace (1983), the Court struck down a total ban on expressive activity on the Supreme Court grounds, emphasizing that “as a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafletting are…speech protected by the First Amendment” in public spaces supreme.justia.com. The Court treated sidewalks and streets as “traditional public forums” where absolute bans on speech (like handbilling) would require a compelling government interest supreme.justia.com.

• Matters of Public Concern. Critically, speech on issues of public interest is given the highest protection. Snyder v. Phelps (2011) reaffirmed that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self‑expression; it is the essence of self‑government,” and that “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”supreme.justia.com. In Snyder, even deeply offensive picketing at a military funeral was upheld because it addressed broad public debates. By analogy, criticizing an attorney’s alleged court misconduct – a matter touching public trust in the legal system – is likely viewed as speech on a matter of public concern. As Snyder makes clear, such speech warrants the strongest protection supreme.justia.com.

• Anti-Doxxing and Anonymity. The state cannot simply prohibit naming names when leafleting. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton (2002), the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that required door‑to‑door advocates to register and obtain a permit before handing out literature constitution.congress.gov. The Court noted a “respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes,” and held that requiring advance permission would unduly chill speech constitution.congress.govconstitution.congress.gov. Thus, even if your flyers include the attorney’s identity and address, doing so in a truthful, non‑threatening way should be constitutionally protected speech (subject to anti‑harassment laws if threats or trespass are involved, but none are alleged here).

• No Prior Restraints. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971), the Supreme Court refused to enforce an injunction against distributing leaflets in a residential neighborhood. There, citizens hand‑delivered flyers exposing a realtor’s practices. The Court declared that peaceful pamphleteering “is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper,” and stressed that any prior restraint on such information “comes…with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity” law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. If leafletting a local broker was protected speech, the same logic applies to peacefully informing neighbors about a public‑interest complaint against an attorney.

In sum, both California and federal law provide robust protection for distributing flyers and gathering for peaceful protest on public concerns. The cases above strongly suggest that handing out informational leaflets to neighborhood residents – even naming an attorney and directing people to a home address for a silent assembly – would be constitutionally protected so long as the speech is non‑violent and non‑threatening. In fact, courts have consistently rejected injunctions against peaceful leaflet campaigns about business or legal controversies law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Any attempt to restrain such speech would bear a “heavy burden” and would likely be struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint law.justia.comlaw.justia.com.

Sources: U.S. Supreme Court and California appellate opinions on free speech, picketing, and leafletting supreme.justia.comlaw.justia.comconstitution.congress.govlaw.justia.comlaw.justia.com, as well as constitutional commentary. These authorities make clear that peaceful, informational leafleting for assembly on a matter of public concern is protected speech supreme.justia.comsupreme.justia.com.

Protected activity.
Leafleting/pamphleteering and online publication on public policy are protected under §425.16(e)(3)–(4). The flyer advocates about not haveing “manipulative type beahvior” and bringing meritless claims against elderly to attack their sons free speech; the elderly never said a word — classic public-concern speech. (Briggs; FilmOn; Cross v. Facebook.)

Harassment statutes exclude constitutionally protected activity (CCP §527.6(b)(1); PC §646.9(k)). (Snyder; Evans; Balboa Island re prior restraints.)

Anti-SLAPP Fee-Shifting (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §425.16(c)(1))

Under California law, any defendant prevailing on an anti‑SLAPP motion is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs scocal.stanford.edu. In Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that §425.16(c) “mandates” an award of fees to a winning SLAPP defendant, to “discourage . . . strategic lawsuits against public participation” scocal.stanford.edu. Federal courts applying California law agree: a “prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike” must recover fees and costs law.justia.com. Notably, a defendant need not actually win on the merits – even a voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff suffices. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that if a plaintiff abandons a SLAPP lawsuit while an anti‑SLAPP motion is pending, the defendant still “prevail[s]” and can recover fees law.justia.com. Thus, if the parents were sued in a SLAPP‑type case (e.g. as proxies for speech-related conduct), they could move to strike the complaint under §425.16 and demand fees. The statute’s fee‑shifting is mandatory and applies even if the motion is never ruled on, as long as the suit is dismissed law.justia.comscocal.stanford.edu.

Malicious Prosecution (“SLAPPback”)

Alternatively, the parents can sue the attorney for malicious prosecution (sometimes called a “SLAPPback” suit). California law requires three elements:

(1) the prior suit terminated in favor of the current plaintiff (here, the parents);
(2) the prior suit was filed without probable cause; and
(3) it was brought with malice law.justia.com. In this case, the attorney voluntarily dismissed his claims against the parents when he realized he had “no case” and faced fee liability.

A voluntary dismissal is generally treated as a legally valid termination in favor of the former defendants law.justia.com. In MacDonald v. Joslyn, the court held that even a dismissal “without prejudice” is a “favorable termination which will support an action for malicious prosecution” law.justia.com. The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that a malicious-prosecution plaintiff must plead that the original case “was pursued to a legal termination in [their] favor” law.justia.com. Thus, the parents meet element (1) under MacDonald and Crowley v. Katleman, because the prior case ended with the attorney dropping it.

The second element—lack of probable cause—is likewise indicated by the facts. The attorney admitted he “had no case to proceed” and dismissed precisely to avoid losing and paying fees law.justia.com. That confession suggests no reasonable grounds existed. Malice (element 3) may be inferred if the suit was “not justified by probable cause” law.justia.com. The parents were sued only as relatives who “did nothing” wrong; targeting them suggests an improper purpose (e.g. harassment or retaliation). Notably, California law views lack of probable cause as evidence of malice law.justia.com.

• Key Malicious‑Prosecution Elements: (1) Favorable termination of the prior action law.justia.com (here, a voluntary dismissal counts law.justia.com), (2) lack of probable cause law.justia.com, and (3) malice law.justia.com.

The parents can recover damages and costs from the attorney. California has long held that when a maliciously prosecuted defendant’s losses exceed ordinary court costs, he may sue for “all the damages” caused law.justia.com. In Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, the Court explained that if a malicious prosecution imposes expenses beyond standard costs, the victim has “a remedy by action on the case” law.justia.com. Here, the $39,000 attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred defending the suit would be recoverable damages. In addition, because §425.16(c)(1) was triggered by the dismissal of the SLAPP‐type claims, the parents (as prevailing “defendants”) could themselves move for an award of their defense fees as costs law.justia.comscocal.stanford.edu. (Under CCP §425.16(c), the fee award goes to the defendant in the SLAPP, which here would be the parents.)

Supporting Authority

– Ketchum v. Moses (Cal. 2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122: “[A]ny SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees” under §425.16(c) scocal.stanford.edu. This case stresses that fee‑shifting is intended to deter meritless, chilling litigation.
– Law Offs. of Bruce Altschuld v. Wilson (9th Cir. 2015): “Under [§425.16(c)(1)], ‘a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike’ is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs” law.justia.com. It held that a defendant may prevail even if the plaintiff dismisses first. It also restates the three malicious-prosecution elements law.justia.com and confirms Crowley’s “entire action” requirement law.justia.com.
– Crowley v. Katleman (Cal. 1994) 8 Cal.4th 666: Sets out malicious prosecution law in California, requiring (1) favorable termination of the entire prior action, (2) lack of probable cause, and (3) malice law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. The Court explained that termination on the merits is not required; a voluntary end suffices so long as it’s not on “technical grounds” inconsistent with innocence scocal.stanford.edulaw.justia.com.
– MacDonald v. Joslyn (Cal. App. 1967) 275 Cal.App.2d 282: Held that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal (even without prejudice) is a “favorable termination” supporting malicious prosecution law.justia.com.
– Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (Cal. 1884) 66 Cal. 123: Established that when a malicious prosecution inflicts damages beyond ordinary costs, the defendant is entitled to sue for the excess (all attorneys’ fees and other damages) law.justia.com. This principle underlies the remedy here.

In summary, California law clearly authorizes awarding fees and damages to the innocent defendants in this scenario. The parents could invoke §425.16(c)(1) to recover their fees as prevailing defendants scocal.stanford.edulaw.justia.com, and they may pursue a malicious prosecution claim to recover the full $39K spent (and more) since their dismissal was “favorable” and without probable cause law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. These holdings from the California Supreme Court (and echoed by federal courts) leave little doubt that citing Ketchum and related cases is appropriate and well-founded.

Sources: California Supreme Court decisions (Ketchum, Crowley); California Court of Appeal (MacDonald); Ninth Circuit (Altschuld v. Wilson) scocal.stanford.edulaw.justia.comlaw.justia.com (all discussing §425.16(c) and malicious prosecution elements).

California Anti-SLAPP Statute (§425.16) and Fee Awards

California Code of Civil Procedure §425.16(c) mandates fee-shifting for SLAPP suits. By its terms, a defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall” recover “reasonable attorney’s fees” and costs law.justia.com.

Courts have stressed that a plaintiff cannot evade this penalty simply by voluntarily dismissing the case. In Liu v. Moore (1999), for example, the court held that a SLAPP defendant who filed a section 425.16 motion must still have that motion heard, even if the plaintiff dismisses the complaint first. The Fourth District explained that dismissing the case does not allow the plaintiff to avoid paying fees: “a defendant who is voluntarily dismissed… after filing a §425.16 motion to strike is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard…as a predicate to a determination of the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs” law.justia.com. In other words, once the defendant moves to strike under the anti-SLAPP law, the court must resolve that motion (and then award fees) regardless of the voluntary dismissal.

• Liu v. Moore (CA 4th App. 1999) law.justia.com – Plaintiff dismissed a cross-complaint before the anti-SLAPP hearing. The court reversed a denial of fees and ordered the hearing: “a defendant… dismissed… after filing a §425.16 motion… is nevertheless entitled to have the merits… heard… and to attorney’s fees and costs” law.justia.com.

• Coltrain v. Shewalter (CA 4th App. 1998) law.justia.com – Plaintiff dropped its complaint in the face of a special motion to strike. The court nonetheless found the defendants were the “prevailing parties” under §425.16 and upheld an award of fees. It held that dismissing the SLAPP suit (even without a hearing) did not prevent the defendants from prevailing for fee purposes law.justia.com.

• Ross v. Seyfarth (CA 4th App. 2023) – The court emphasized that once a SLAPP defendant is deemed the prevailing party, an award of fees is mandatory. In a partially-adjudicated case, it noted a discretionary determination may be required to fix the amount, but that fees must be awarded once prevailing status is established. (See Ross, 96 Cal.App.5th 722 (2023) (distinguishing Coltrain vs. Liu approaches) ocbar.orgocbar.org.)

These cases make clear that a plaintiff’s dismissal does not relieve him of fee liability under the Anti-SLAPP Act if the lawsuit was meritless. In practical terms, if the elderly defendants had moved to strike under §425.16, they would be presumptively entitled to fees once they prevailed. Even without a formal motion, courts will treat an unjustified dismissal against innocent defendants as a victory for the defendants. As one appellate court phrased it, if a SLAPP defendant “gets the plaintiff to go away with its tail between its legs,” the defendant ordinarily “will be the prevailing party” and thus entitled to fees law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. In sum, California law expressly provides that SLAPP defendants who succeed (even by dismissal) recover their attorneys’ fees as of right law.justia.comlaw.justia.com.

Malicious Prosecution and Fee Recovery

Another avenue is the tort of malicious prosecution. If a plaintiff’s case is brought “without probable cause” and “maliciously,” and it terminates in favor of the defendant, the defendant may sue the plaintiff (and attorney) separately for damages law.justia.comscocal.stanford.edu. A key element is a “favorable termination” of the underlying proceeding. Under Jaffe v. Stone (1941), a termination is favorable if it indicates the defendant’s innocence, plaintiff dismissing them is just that.

In a criminal context, for example, dismissal for lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing was held a favorable termination because it shows no case against the accused scocal.stanford.edu. By analogy, a civil case voluntarily dropped when confronted with proof of no liability would likely qualify. Once the defendants establish the prerequisites (favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice), California law permits them to recover all consequential damages. Critically, Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) – a decision of the California Supreme Court – specifically recognized that such damages include the cost of defending the prior suit, “including reasonable attorney’s fees” law.justia.com. In Bertero, the court explained that settled law allows a malicious-prosecution plaintiff to recover attorney fees and court costs spent on the baseless suit, as well as reputational and emotional harm law.justia.com. Thus, if the elderly defendants can show the original claims were baseless and dismissed favorably, a malicious-prosecution judgment would obligate the plaintiff to reimburse their $39,000 in legal fees (along with any other proved losses) law.justia.comscocal.stanford.edu.

Other Fee-Shifting Authorities

Beyond these, California courts have recognized few other fee-shifting mechanisms. For example, Code Civ. Proc. §128.5 sanctions truly frivolous pleadings (after a safe-harbor notice) with attorney fee awards. And certain statutes (e.g. in defamation or constitutional cases) contain fee provisions. But absent such statutes, California follows the American Rule. (In federal court, the analogous principle is confirmed by Alyeska supreme.justia.com, and fees can only be shifted under rules like Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or 28 U.S.C. §1927 upon a finding of bad faith or frivolous multiplication of proceedings.) None of these general rules, however, override the Anti-SLAPP statute or the malicious prosecution remedy.

Conclusion: California law provides clear support for shifting fees to a meritless plaintiff. An anti-SLAPP motion (if made or deemed made) entitles a prevailing defendant to fees law.justia.comlaw.justia.com, and dismissal of a baseless suit does not defeat that entitlement law.justia.comlaw.justia.com. Alternatively, a subsequent malicious-prosecution claim allows recovery of fees as part of damages law.justia.com. Together, these authorities furnish definitive legal grounds for holding the plaintiff responsible for the $39,000 in defense fees paid by the innocent elderly defendants.

Public court filings show an attorney filed a $30,000,000 lawsuit that also named two elderly parents who were later dismissed. According to their counsel, defending those claims cost about $39,000.
Scan to review the documents and decide for yourself.

OPINION & PEACEFUL-ASSEMBLY NOTICE:
This flyer expresses opinions based on disclosed facts and public records (see sources at the link). We support lawful, peaceful public assembly only—no trespassing, harassment, or disruption.

Best bet is to admit you lied in court against the father in a personal apology letter to all 4 of your victims!

Father
Grandparents
And the child

THIS EX FAMILY LAW JUDGE HANDLED A CIVIL CASE THAT HAS HANDLED FAMILY LAW CASES AGAINST THE FAMILY WAS MIRACOUSLY CALLED TO JUDGE A CIVIL CASE FROM A FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY PAUL TOEPEL

Judge Theodore R Howard

But even the archangel Michael, when he was disputing with the devil about the body of Moses, did not himself dare to condemn him for slander but said, “The Lord rebuke you!”

This guy in the video below reminds us of someone special

he are more heart warming verses to enlighten anyone

• Matthew 18:6 “But whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea.”
• Mark 9:42 “Whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him if a great millstone were hung around his neck and he were thrown into the sea.
• Luke 17:2 “It would be better for him if a millstone were hung around his neck and he were cast into the sea than that he should cause one of these little ones to sin.”
• Matthew 25:40 And the King will answer them, ‘Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me.’
• Psalm 127:3-5 Behold, children are a heritage from the Lord, the fruit of the womb a reward. Like arrows in the hand of a warrior are the children of one’s youth. Blessed is the man who fills his quiver with them! He shall not be put to shame when he speaks with his enemies in the gate.
• Proverbs 31:8–9emphasizes speaking up for the voiceless and defending the rights of the poor.
• Isaiah 5:20warns against distorting truth by calling evil good and good evil.
• Psalm 101:3 expresses a refusal to tolerate evil.
• Luke 10:18 in the Bible states, “And he said to them, ‘I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven.”
• Proverbs 24:11–12urges the rescue of those in peril, warning that ignorance is no excuse before God.
• Psalm 82:3–4calls for the defense of the weak, fatherless, poor, and oppressed.
• Isaiah 1:17instructs believers to seek justice and defend the oppressed.
• 1 Corinthians 5:6–7uses the analogy of leaven to show how allowing sin can negatively impact the whole community. This is in the context of the deciple Paul (not this Paul Toepel) addressing the Corinthians’ tolerance of unrepentant sin.
• Romans 1:32 condemns not only those who commit sin but also those who approve of such actions.
• The story of Eli in 1 Samuel 3:13shows how God judged him for not restraining his sons’ wicked behavior, holding him accountable for his inaction.
• Romans 12:21advises overcoming evil with good.
• 1 Peter 3:9instructs not to retaliate with evil or insult, but to respond with blessing.
• Deuteronomy 32:35 Vengeance is mine, and recompense, for the time when their foot shall slip; for the day of their calamity is at hand, and their doom comes swiftly.’
• Proverbs 22:6 Train up a child in the way he should go; even when he is old he will not depart from it.

“I say to you who hear, love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who mistreat you”(Luke 6:27-28) We love you enough to help your help your soul and allow Jesus and correcting your malfeasant behavior that let to harm of an innocent child and father, fatherhood is not yours to harm with lies!

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